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[ Upstream commit 5701875f9609b000d91351eaa6bfd97fe2f157f4 ]
There's issue as follows:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ext4_xattr_inode_dec_ref_all+0x6ff/0x790
Read of size 4 at addr ffff88807b003000 by task syz-executor.0/15172
CPU: 3 PID: 15172 Comm: syz-executor.0
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:82 [inline]
dump_stack+0xbe/0xfd lib/dump_stack.c:123
print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1e/0x280 mm/kasan/report.c:400
__kasan_report.cold+0x6c/0x84 mm/kasan/report.c:560
kasan_report+0x3a/0x50 mm/kasan/report.c:585
ext4_xattr_inode_dec_ref_all+0x6ff/0x790 fs/ext4/xattr.c:1137
ext4_xattr_delete_inode+0x4c7/0xda0 fs/ext4/xattr.c:2896
ext4_evict_inode+0xb3b/0x1670 fs/ext4/inode.c:323
evict+0x39f/0x880 fs/inode.c:622
iput_final fs/inode.c:1746 [inline]
iput fs/inode.c:1772 [inline]
iput+0x525/0x6c0 fs/inode.c:1758
ext4_orphan_cleanup fs/ext4/super.c:3298 [inline]
ext4_fill_super+0x8c57/0xba40 fs/ext4/super.c:5300
mount_bdev+0x355/0x410 fs/super.c:1446
legacy_get_tree+0xfe/0x220 fs/fs_context.c:611
vfs_get_tree+0x8d/0x2f0 fs/super.c:1576
do_new_mount fs/namespace.c:2983 [inline]
path_mount+0x119a/0x1ad0 fs/namespace.c:3316
do_mount+0xfc/0x110 fs/namespace.c:3329
__do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3540 [inline]
__se_sys_mount+0x219/0x2e0 fs/namespace.c:3514
do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x67/0xd1
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff88807b002f00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
ffff88807b002f80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
>ffff88807b003000: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
^
ffff88807b003080: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
ffff88807b003100: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
Above issue happens as ext4_xattr_delete_inode() isn't check xattr
is valid if xattr is in inode.
To solve above issue call xattr_check_inode() check if xattr if valid
in inode. In fact, we can directly verify in ext4_iget_extra_inode(),
so that there is no divergent verification.
Fixes: e50e5129f384 ("ext4: xattr-in-inode support")
Signed-off-by: Ye Bin <yebin10@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250208063141.1539283-3-yebin@huaweicloud.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: David Nyström <david.nystrom@est.tech>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 69f3a3039b0d0003de008659cafd5a1eaaa0a7a4 ]
Introduce ITAIL helper to get the bound of xattr in inode.
Signed-off-by: Ye Bin <yebin10@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250208063141.1539283-2-yebin@huaweicloud.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: David Nyström <david.nystrom@est.tech>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit ee5a977b4e771cc181f39d504426dbd31ed701cc ]
strscpy_pad() can't be used to copy a non-NUL-term string into a NUL-term
string of possibly bigger size. Commit 0efc5990bca5 ("string.h: Introduce
memtostr() and memtostr_pad()") provides additional information in that
regard. So if this happens, the following warning is observed:
strnlen: detected buffer overflow: 65 byte read of buffer size 64
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 28655 at lib/string_helpers.c:1032 __fortify_report+0x96/0xc0 lib/string_helpers.c:1032
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 28655 Comm: syz-executor.3 Not tainted 6.12.54-syzkaller-00144-g5f0270f1ba00 #0
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:__fortify_report+0x96/0xc0 lib/string_helpers.c:1032
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__fortify_panic+0x1f/0x30 lib/string_helpers.c:1039
strnlen include/linux/fortify-string.h:235 [inline]
sized_strscpy include/linux/fortify-string.h:309 [inline]
parse_apply_sb_mount_options fs/ext4/super.c:2504 [inline]
__ext4_fill_super fs/ext4/super.c:5261 [inline]
ext4_fill_super+0x3c35/0xad00 fs/ext4/super.c:5706
get_tree_bdev_flags+0x387/0x620 fs/super.c:1636
vfs_get_tree+0x93/0x380 fs/super.c:1814
do_new_mount fs/namespace.c:3553 [inline]
path_mount+0x6ae/0x1f70 fs/namespace.c:3880
do_mount fs/namespace.c:3893 [inline]
__do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:4103 [inline]
__se_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:4080 [inline]
__x64_sys_mount+0x280/0x300 fs/namespace.c:4080
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x64/0x140 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
Since userspace is expected to provide s_mount_opts field to be at most 63
characters long with the ending byte being NUL-term, use a 64-byte buffer
which matches the size of s_mount_opts, so that strscpy_pad() does its job
properly. Return with error if the user still managed to provide a
non-NUL-term string here.
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller.
Fixes: 8ecb790ea8c3 ("ext4: avoid potential buffer over-read in parse_apply_sb_mount_options()")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Fedor Pchelkin <pchelkin@ispras.ru>
Reviewed-by: Baokun Li <libaokun1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Message-ID: <20251101160430.222297-1-pchelkin@ispras.ru>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
[ goto failed_mount instead of return ]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 3f7a79d05c692c7cfec70bf104b1b3c3d0ce6247 upstream.
When the MB_CHECK_ASSERT macro is enabled, an assertion failure can
occur in __mb_check_buddy when checking preallocated blocks (pa) in
a block group:
Assertion failure in mb_free_blocks() : "groupnr == e4b->bd_group"
This happens when a pa at the very end of a block group (e.g.,
pa_pstart=32765, pa_len=3 in a group of 32768 blocks) becomes
exhausted - its pa_pstart is advanced by pa_len to 32768, which
lies in the next block group. If this exhausted pa (with pa_len == 0)
is still in the bb_prealloc_list during the buddy check, the assertion
incorrectly flags it as belonging to the wrong group. A possible
sequence is as follows:
ext4_mb_new_blocks
ext4_mb_release_context
pa->pa_pstart += EXT4_C2B(sbi, ac->ac_b_ex.fe_len)
pa->pa_len -= ac->ac_b_ex.fe_len
__mb_check_buddy
for each pa in group
ext4_get_group_no_and_offset
MB_CHECK_ASSERT(groupnr == e4b->bd_group)
To fix this, we modify the check to skip block group validation for
exhausted preallocations (where pa_len == 0). Such entries are in a
transitional state and will be removed from the list soon, so they
should not trigger an assertion. This change prevents the false
positive while maintaining the integrity of the checks for active
allocations.
Fixes: c9de560ded61f ("ext4: Add multi block allocator for ext4")
Signed-off-by: Yongjian Sun <sunyongjian1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Baokun Li <libaokun1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Message-ID: <20251106060614.631382-2-sunyongjian@huaweicloud.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit b97cb7d6a051aa6ebd57906df0e26e9e36c26d14 upstream.
If ext4_get_inode_loc() fails (e.g. if it returns -EFSCORRUPTED),
iloc.bh will remain set to NULL. Since ext4_xattr_inode_dec_ref_all()
lacks error checking, this will lead to a null pointer dereference
in ext4_raw_inode(), called right after ext4_get_inode_loc().
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE.
Fixes: c8e008b60492 ("ext4: ignore xattrs past end")
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Karina Yankevich <k.yankevich@omp.ru>
Reviewed-by: Sergey Shtylyov <s.shtylyov@omp.ru>
Reviewed-by: Baokun Li <libaokun1@huawei.com>
Message-ID: <20251022093253.3546296-1-k.yankevich@omp.ru>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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validation
[ Upstream commit d9ee3ff810f1cc0e253c9f2b17b668b973cb0e06 ]
When the MB_CHECK_ASSERT macro is enabled, we found that the
current validation logic in __mb_check_buddy has a gap in
detecting certain invalid buddy states, particularly related
to order-0 (bitmap) bits.
The original logic consists of three steps:
1. Validates higher-order buddies: if a higher-order bit is
set, at most one of the two corresponding lower-order bits
may be free; if a higher-order bit is clear, both lower-order
bits must be allocated (and their bitmap bits must be 0).
2. For any set bit in order-0, ensures all corresponding
higher-order bits are not free.
3. Verifies that all preallocated blocks (pa) in the group
have pa_pstart within bounds and their bitmap bits marked as
allocated.
However, this approach fails to properly validate cases where
order-0 bits are incorrectly cleared (0), allowing some invalid
configurations to pass:
corrupt integral
order 3 1 1
order 2 1 1 1 1
order 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
order 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Here we get two adjacent free blocks at order-0 with inconsistent
higher-order state, and the right one shows the correct scenario.
The root cause is insufficient validation of order-0 zero bits.
To fix this and improve completeness without significant performance
cost, we refine the logic:
1. Maintain the top-down higher-order validation, but we no longer
check the cases where the higher-order bit is 0, as this case will
be covered in step 2.
2. Enhance order-0 checking by examining pairs of bits:
- If either bit in a pair is set (1), all corresponding
higher-order bits must not be free.
- If both bits are clear (0), then exactly one of the
corresponding higher-order bits must be free
3. Keep the preallocation (pa) validation unchanged.
This change closes the validation gap, ensuring illegal buddy states
involving order-0 are correctly detected, while removing redundant
checks and maintaining efficiency.
Fixes: c9de560ded61f ("ext4: Add multi block allocator for ext4")
Suggested-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Yongjian Sun <sunyongjian1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Baokun Li <libaokun1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Message-ID: <20251106060614.631382-3-sunyongjian@huaweicloud.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 133de5a0d8f8e32b34feaa8beae7a189482f1856 ]
Remove unused return value of __mb_check_buddy.
Signed-off-by: Kemeng Shi <shikemeng@huaweicloud.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240105092102.496631-2-shikemeng@huaweicloud.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Stable-dep-of: d9ee3ff810f1 ("ext4: improve integrity checking in __mb_check_buddy by enhancing order-0 validation")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit a2e5a3cea4b18f6e2575acc444a5e8cce1fc8260 ]
The move extent operation should return -EOPNOTSUPP if any of the inodes
is a quota inode, rather than requiring both to be quota inodes.
Fixes: 02749a4c2082 ("ext4: add ext4_is_quota_file()")
Signed-off-by: Zhang Yi <yi.zhang@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Message-ID: <20251013015128.499308-2-yi.zhang@huaweicloud.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit d412df530f77d0f61c41b83f925997452fc3944c ]
Modify the error returns for two file types that can't be defragged to
more clearly communicate those restrictions to a caller. When the
defrag code is applied to swap files, return -ETXTBSY, and when applied
to quota files, return -EOPNOTSUPP. Move an extent tree search whose
results are only occasionally required to the site always requiring them
for improved efficiency. Address a few typos.
Signed-off-by: Eric Whitney <enwlinux@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220722163910.268564-1-enwlinux@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Stable-dep-of: a2e5a3cea4b1 ("ext4: correct the checking of quota files before moving extents")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 0cd8feea8777f8d9b9a862b89c688b049a5c8475 upstream.
Fix a race between inline data destruction and block mapping.
The function ext4_destroy_inline_data_nolock() changes the inode data
layout by clearing EXT4_INODE_INLINE_DATA and setting EXT4_INODE_EXTENTS.
At the same time, another thread may execute ext4_map_blocks(), which
tests EXT4_INODE_EXTENTS to decide whether to call ext4_ext_map_blocks()
or ext4_ind_map_blocks().
Without i_data_sem protection, ext4_ind_map_blocks() may receive inode
with EXT4_INODE_EXTENTS flag and triggering assert.
kernel BUG at fs/ext4/indirect.c:546!
EXT4-fs (loop2): unmounting filesystem.
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.12.0-1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:ext4_ind_map_blocks.cold+0x2b/0x5a fs/ext4/indirect.c:546
Call Trace:
<TASK>
ext4_map_blocks+0xb9b/0x16f0 fs/ext4/inode.c:681
_ext4_get_block+0x242/0x590 fs/ext4/inode.c:822
ext4_block_write_begin+0x48b/0x12c0 fs/ext4/inode.c:1124
ext4_write_begin+0x598/0xef0 fs/ext4/inode.c:1255
ext4_da_write_begin+0x21e/0x9c0 fs/ext4/inode.c:3000
generic_perform_write+0x259/0x5d0 mm/filemap.c:3846
ext4_buffered_write_iter+0x15b/0x470 fs/ext4/file.c:285
ext4_file_write_iter+0x8e0/0x17f0 fs/ext4/file.c:679
call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:2271 [inline]
do_iter_readv_writev+0x212/0x3c0 fs/read_write.c:735
do_iter_write+0x186/0x710 fs/read_write.c:861
vfs_iter_write+0x70/0xa0 fs/read_write.c:902
iter_file_splice_write+0x73b/0xc90 fs/splice.c:685
do_splice_from fs/splice.c:763 [inline]
direct_splice_actor+0x10f/0x170 fs/splice.c:950
splice_direct_to_actor+0x33a/0xa10 fs/splice.c:896
do_splice_direct+0x1a9/0x280 fs/splice.c:1002
do_sendfile+0xb13/0x12c0 fs/read_write.c:1255
__do_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1323 [inline]
__se_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1309 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendfile64+0x1cf/0x210 fs/read_write.c:1309
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x35/0x80 arch/x86/entry/common.c:81
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8
Fixes: c755e251357a ("ext4: fix deadlock between inline_data and ext4_expand_extra_isize_ea()")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.11+
Signed-off-by: Alexey Nepomnyashih <sdl@nppct.ru>
Message-ID: <20251104093326.697381-1-sdl@nppct.ru>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 892e1cf17555735e9d021ab036c36bc7b58b0e3b upstream.
The cached ei->i_inline_size can become stale between the initial size
check and when ext4_update_inline_data()/ext4_create_inline_data() use
it. Although ext4_get_max_inline_size() reads the correct value at the
time of the check, concurrent xattr operations can modify i_inline_size
before ext4_write_lock_xattr() is acquired.
This causes ext4_update_inline_data() and ext4_create_inline_data() to
work with stale capacity values, leading to a BUG_ON() crash in
ext4_write_inline_data():
kernel BUG at fs/ext4/inline.c:1331!
BUG_ON(pos + len > EXT4_I(inode)->i_inline_size);
The race window:
1. ext4_get_max_inline_size() reads i_inline_size = 60 (correct)
2. Size check passes for 50-byte write
3. [Another thread adds xattr, i_inline_size changes to 40]
4. ext4_write_lock_xattr() acquires lock
5. ext4_update_inline_data() uses stale i_inline_size = 60
6. Attempts to write 50 bytes but only 40 bytes actually available
7. BUG_ON() triggers
Fix this by recalculating i_inline_size via ext4_find_inline_data_nolock()
immediately after acquiring xattr_sem. This ensures ext4_update_inline_data()
and ext4_create_inline_data() work with current values that are protected
from concurrent modifications.
This is similar to commit a54c4613dac1 ("ext4: fix race writing to an
inline_data file while its xattrs are changing") which fixed i_inline_off
staleness. This patch addresses the related i_inline_size staleness issue.
Reported-by: syzbot+f3185be57d7e8dda32b8@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=f3185be57d7e8dda32b8
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Deepanshu Kartikey <kartikey406@gmail.com>
Message-ID: <20251020060936.474314-1-kartikey406@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 1534f72dc2a11ded38b0e0268fbcc0ca24e9fd4a ]
The parent function ext4_xattr_inode_lookup_create already uses GFP_NOFS for memory alloction, so the function ext4_xattr_inode_cache_find should use same gfp_flag.
Signed-off-by: chuguangqing <chuguangqing@inspur.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 8ecb790ea8c3fc69e77bace57f14cf0d7c177bd8 ]
Unlike other strings in the ext4 superblock, we rely on tune2fs to
make sure s_mount_opts is NUL terminated. Harden
parse_apply_sb_mount_options() by treating s_mount_opts as a potential
__nonstring.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 8b67f04ab9de ("ext4: Add mount options in superblock")
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Message-ID: <20250916-tune2fs-v2-1-d594dc7486f0@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
[ applied to ext4_fill_super() instead of parse_apply_sb_mount_options() ]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 1d3ad183943b38eec2acf72a0ae98e635dc8456b upstream.
syzbot reported a BUG_ON in ext4_es_cache_extent() when opening a verity
file on a corrupted ext4 filesystem mounted without a journal.
The issue is that the filesystem has an inode with both the INLINE_DATA
and EXTENTS flags set:
EXT4-fs error (device loop0): ext4_cache_extents:545: inode #15:
comm syz.0.17: corrupted extent tree: lblk 0 < prev 66
Investigation revealed that the inode has both flags set:
DEBUG: inode 15 - flag=1, i_inline_off=164, has_inline=1, extents_flag=1
This is an invalid combination since an inode should have either:
- INLINE_DATA: data stored directly in the inode
- EXTENTS: data stored in extent-mapped blocks
Having both flags causes ext4_has_inline_data() to return true, skipping
extent tree validation in __ext4_iget(). The unvalidated out-of-order
extents then trigger a BUG_ON in ext4_es_cache_extent() due to integer
underflow when calculating hole sizes.
Fix this by detecting this invalid flag combination early in ext4_iget()
and rejecting the corrupted inode.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+038b7bf43423e132b308@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=038b7bf43423e132b308
Suggested-by: Zhang Yi <yi.zhang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Deepanshu Kartikey <kartikey406@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Zhang Yi <yi.zhang@huawei.com>
Message-ID: <20250930112810.315095-1-kartikey406@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit f9bff0e31881d03badf191d3b0005839391f5f2b ]
Patch series "New page table range API", v6.
This patchset changes the API used by the MM to set up page table entries.
The four APIs are:
set_ptes(mm, addr, ptep, pte, nr)
update_mmu_cache_range(vma, addr, ptep, nr)
flush_dcache_folio(folio)
flush_icache_pages(vma, page, nr)
flush_dcache_folio() isn't technically new, but no architecture
implemented it, so I've done that for them. The old APIs remain around
but are mostly implemented by calling the new interfaces.
The new APIs are based around setting up N page table entries at once.
The N entries belong to the same PMD, the same folio and the same VMA, so
ptep++ is a legitimate operation, and locking is taken care of for you.
Some architectures can do a better job of it than just a loop, but I have
hesitated to make too deep a change to architectures I don't understand
well.
One thing I have changed in every architecture is that PG_arch_1 is now a
per-folio bit instead of a per-page bit when used for dcache clean/dirty
tracking. This was something that would have to happen eventually, and it
makes sense to do it now rather than iterate over every page involved in a
cache flush and figure out if it needs to happen.
The point of all this is better performance, and Fengwei Yin has measured
improvement on x86. I suspect you'll see improvement on your architecture
too. Try the new will-it-scale test mentioned here:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20230206140639.538867-5-fengwei.yin@intel.com/
You'll need to run it on an XFS filesystem and have
CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE set.
This patchset is the basis for much of the anonymous large folio work
being done by Ryan, so it's received quite a lot of testing over the last
few months.
This patch (of 38):
Determine if a value lies within a range more efficiently (subtraction +
comparison vs two comparisons and an AND). It also has useful (under some
circumstances) behaviour if the range exceeds the maximum value of the
type. Convert all the conflicting definitions of in_range() within the
kernel; some can use the generic definition while others need their own
definition.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230802151406.3735276-1-willy@infradead.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230802151406.3735276-2-willy@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Eliav Farber <farbere@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit 57295e835408d8d425bef58da5253465db3d6888 upstream.
syzkaller found a path where ext4_xattr_inode_update_ref() reads an EA
inode refcount that is already <= 0 and then applies ref_change (often
-1). That lets the refcount underflow and we proceed with a bogus value,
triggering errors like:
EXT4-fs error: EA inode <n> ref underflow: ref_count=-1 ref_change=-1
EXT4-fs warning: ea_inode dec ref err=-117
Make the invariant explicit: if the current refcount is non-positive,
treat this as on-disk corruption, emit ext4_error_inode(), and fail the
operation with -EFSCORRUPTED instead of updating the refcount. Delete the
WARN_ONCE() as negative refcounts are now impossible; keep error reporting
in ext4_error_inode().
This prevents the underflow and the follow-on orphan/cleanup churn.
Reported-by: syzbot+0be4f339a8218d2a5bb1@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: https://syzbot.org/bug?extid=0be4f339a8218d2a5bb1
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Co-developed-by: Albin Babu Varghese <albinbabuvarghese20@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Albin Babu Varghese <albinbabuvarghese20@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ahmet Eray Karadag <eraykrdg1@gmail.com>
Message-ID: <20250920021342.45575-1-eraykrdg1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit 46c22a8bb4cb03211da1100d7ee4a2005bf77c70 upstream.
Currently, our handling of metadata is _ambiguous_ in some scenarios,
that is, we end up returning unknown if the range only covers the
mapping partially.
For example, in the following case:
$ xfs_io -c fsmap -d
0: 254:16 [0..7]: static fs metadata 8
1: 254:16 [8..15]: special 102:1 8
2: 254:16 [16..5127]: special 102:2 5112
3: 254:16 [5128..5255]: special 102:3 128
4: 254:16 [5256..5383]: special 102:4 128
5: 254:16 [5384..70919]: inodes 65536
6: 254:16 [70920..70967]: unknown 48
...
$ xfs_io -c fsmap -d 24 33
0: 254:16 [24..39]: unknown 16 <--- incomplete reporting
$ xfs_io -c fsmap -d 24 33 (With patch)
0: 254:16 [16..5127]: special 102:2 5112
This is because earlier in ext4_getfsmap_meta_helper, we end up ignoring
any extent that starts before our queried range, but overlaps it. While
the man page [1] is a bit ambiguous on this, this fix makes the output
make more sense since we are anyways returning an "unknown" extent. This
is also consistent to how XFS does it:
$ xfs_io -c fsmap -d
...
6: 254:16 [104..127]: free space 24
7: 254:16 [128..191]: inodes 64
...
$ xfs_io -c fsmap -d 137 150
0: 254:16 [128..191]: inodes 64 <-- full extent returned
[1] https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/ioctl_getfsmap.2.html
Reported-by: Ritesh Harjani (IBM) <ritesh.list@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ojaswin Mujoo <ojaswin@linux.ibm.com>
Message-ID: <023f37e35ee280cd9baac0296cbadcbe10995cab.1757058211.git.ojaswin@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
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commit 9d80eaa1a1d37539224982b76c9ceeee736510b9 upstream.
After running a stress test combined with fault injection,
we performed fsck -a followed by fsck -fn on the filesystem
image. During the second pass, fsck -fn reported:
Inode 131512, end of extent exceeds allowed value
(logical block 405, physical block 1180540, len 2)
This inode was not in the orphan list. Analysis revealed the
following call chain that leads to the inconsistency:
ext4_da_write_end()
//does not update i_disksize
ext4_punch_hole()
//truncate folio, keep size
ext4_page_mkwrite()
ext4_block_page_mkwrite()
ext4_block_write_begin()
ext4_get_block()
//insert written extent without update i_disksize
journal commit
echo 1 > /sys/block/xxx/device/delete
da-write path updates i_size but does not update i_disksize. Then
ext4_punch_hole truncates the da-folio yet still leaves i_disksize
unchanged(in the ext4_update_disksize_before_punch function, the
condition offset + len < size is met). Then ext4_page_mkwrite sees
ext4_nonda_switch return 1 and takes the nodioread_nolock path, the
folio about to be written has just been punched out, and it’s offset
sits beyond the current i_disksize. This may result in a written
extent being inserted, but again does not update i_disksize. If the
journal gets committed and then the block device is yanked, we might
run into this. It should be noted that replacing ext4_punch_hole with
ext4_zero_range in the call sequence may also trigger this issue, as
neither will update i_disksize under these circumstances.
To fix this, we can modify ext4_update_disksize_before_punch to
increase i_disksize to min(i_size, offset + len) when both i_size and
(offset + len) are greater than i_disksize.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Yongjian Sun <sunyongjian1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Zhang Yi <yi.zhang@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Baokun Li <libaokun1@huawei.com>
Message-ID: <20250911133024.1841027-1-sunyongjian@huaweicloud.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
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[ Upstream commit 02c7f7219ac0e2277b3379a3a0e9841ef464b6d4 ]
In a filesystem with a block size larger than 4KB, the hole length
calculation for a non-extent inode in ext4_ind_map_blocks() can easily
exceed INT_MAX. Then it could return a zero length hole and trigger the
following waring and infinite in the iomap infrastructure.
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 434101 at fs/iomap/iter.c:34 iomap_iter_done+0x148/0x190
CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 434101 Comm: fsstress Not tainted 6.16.0-rc7+ #128 PREEMPT(voluntary)
Hardware name: QEMU KVM Virtual Machine, BIOS unknown 2/2/2022
pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : iomap_iter_done+0x148/0x190
lr : iomap_iter+0x174/0x230
sp : ffff8000880af740
x29: ffff8000880af740 x28: ffff0000db8e6840 x27: 0000000000000000
x26: 0000000000000000 x25: ffff8000880af830 x24: 0000004000000000
x23: 0000000000000002 x22: 000001bfdbfa8000 x21: ffffa6a41c002e48
x20: 0000000000000001 x19: ffff8000880af808 x18: 0000000000000000
x17: 0000000000000000 x16: ffffa6a495ee6cd0 x15: 0000000000000000
x14: 00000000000003d4 x13: 00000000fa83b2da x12: 0000b236fc95f18c
x11: ffffa6a4978b9c08 x10: 0000000000001da0 x9 : ffffa6a41c1a2a44
x8 : ffff8000880af5c8 x7 : 0000000001000000 x6 : 0000000000000000
x5 : 0000000000000004 x4 : 000001bfdbfa8000 x3 : 0000000000000000
x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000004004030000 x0 : 0000000000000000
Call trace:
iomap_iter_done+0x148/0x190 (P)
iomap_iter+0x174/0x230
iomap_fiemap+0x154/0x1d8
ext4_fiemap+0x110/0x140 [ext4]
do_vfs_ioctl+0x4b8/0xbc0
__arm64_sys_ioctl+0x8c/0x120
invoke_syscall+0x6c/0x100
el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x48/0xf0
do_el0_svc+0x24/0x38
el0_svc+0x38/0x120
el0t_64_sync_handler+0x10c/0x138
el0t_64_sync+0x198/0x1a0
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Fixes: facab4d9711e ("ext4: return hole from ext4_map_blocks()")
Reported-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-ext4/9b650a52-9672-4604-a765-bb6be55d1e4a@gmx.com/
Tested-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Zhang Yi <yi.zhang@huawei.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250811064532.1788289-1-yi.zhang@huaweicloud.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 3ffbdd1f1165f1b2d6a94d1b1aabef57120deaf7 upstream.
In some cases like small FSes with no meta_bg and where the resize
doesn't need extra gdt blocks as it can fit in the current one,
s_reserved_gdt_blocks is set as 0, which causes fsmap to emit a 0
length entry, which is incorrect.
$ mkfs.ext4 -b 65536 -O bigalloc /dev/sda 5G
$ mount /dev/sda /mnt/scratch
$ xfs_io -c "fsmap -d" /mnt/scartch
0: 253:48 [0..127]: static fs metadata 128
1: 253:48 [128..255]: special 102:1 128
2: 253:48 [256..255]: special 102:2 0 <---- 0 len entry
3: 253:48 [256..383]: special 102:3 128
Fix this by adding a check for this case.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Fixes: 0c9ec4beecac ("ext4: support GETFSMAP ioctls")
Signed-off-by: Ojaswin Mujoo <ojaswin@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/08781b796453a5770112aa96ad14c864fbf31935.1754377641.git.ojaswin@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit bae76c035bf0852844151e68098c9b7cd63ef238 upstream.
With bigalloc enabled, the logic to report last extent has a bug since
we try to use cluster units instead of block units. This can cause an
issue where extra incorrect entries might be returned back to the
user. This was flagged by generic/365 with 64k bs and -O bigalloc.
** Details of issue **
The issue was noticed on 5G 64k blocksize FS with -O bigalloc which has
only 1 bg.
$ xfs_io -c "fsmap -d" /mnt/scratch
0: 253:48 [0..127]: static fs metadata 128 /* sb */
1: 253:48 [128..255]: special 102:1 128 /* gdt */
3: 253:48 [256..383]: special 102:3 128 /* block bitmap */
4: 253:48 [384..2303]: unknown 1920 /* flex bg empty space */
5: 253:48 [2304..2431]: special 102:4 128 /* inode bitmap */
6: 253:48 [2432..4351]: unknown 1920 /* flex bg empty space */
7: 253:48 [4352..6911]: inodes 2560
8: 253:48 [6912..538623]: unknown 531712
9: 253:48 [538624..10485759]: free space 9947136
The issue can be seen with:
$ xfs_io -c "fsmap -d 0 3" /mnt/scratch
0: 253:48 [0..127]: static fs metadata 128
1: 253:48 [384..2047]: unknown 1664
Only the first entry was expected to be returned but we get 2. This is
because:
ext4_getfsmap_datadev()
first_cluster, last_cluster = 0
...
info->gfi_last = true;
ext4_getfsmap_datadev_helper(sb, end_ag, last_cluster + 1, 0, info);
fsb = C2B(1) = 16
fslen = 0
...
/* Merge in any relevant extents from the meta_list */
list_for_each_entry_safe(p, tmp, &info->gfi_meta_list, fmr_list) {
...
// since fsb = 16, considers all metadata which starts before 16 blockno
iter 1: error = ext4_getfsmap_helper(sb, info, p); // p = sb (0,1), nop
info->gfi_next_fsblk = 1
iter 2: error = ext4_getfsmap_helper(sb, info, p); // p = gdt (1,2), nop
info->gfi_next_fsblk = 2
iter 3: error = ext4_getfsmap_helper(sb, info, p); // p = blk bitmap (2,3), nop
info->gfi_next_fsblk = 3
iter 4: error = ext4_getfsmap_helper(sb, info, p); // p = ino bitmap (18,19)
if (rec_blk > info->gfi_next_fsblk) { // (18 > 3)
// emits an extra entry ** BUG **
}
}
Fix this by directly calling ext4_getfsmap_datadev() with a dummy
record that has fmr_physical set to (end_fsb + 1) instead of
last_cluster + 1. By using the block instead of cluster we get the
correct behavior.
Replacing ext4_getfsmap_datadev_helper() with ext4_getfsmap_helper()
is okay since the gfi_lastfree and metadata checks in
ext4_getfsmap_datadev_helper() are anyways redundant when we only want
to emit the last allocated block of the range, as we have already
taken care of emitting metadata and any last free blocks.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Reported-by: Disha Goel <disgoel@linux.ibm.com>
Fixes: 4a622e4d477b ("ext4: fix FS_IOC_GETFSMAP handling")
Signed-off-by: Ojaswin Mujoo <ojaswin@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/e7472c8535c9c5ec10f425f495366864ea12c9da.1754377641.git.ojaswin@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit b4cc4a4077268522e3d0d34de4b2dc144e2330fa upstream.
The check for a fast symlink in the presence of only an
external xattr inode is incorrect. If a fast symlink does
not have an xattr block (i_file_acl == 0), but does have
an external xattr inode that increases inode i_blocks, then
the check for a fast symlink will incorrectly fail and
__ext4_iget()->ext4_ind_check_inode() will report the inode
is corrupt when it "validates" i_data[] on the next read:
# ln -s foo /mnt/tmp/bar
# setfattr -h -n trusted.test \
-v "$(yes | head -n 4000)" /mnt/tmp/bar
# umount /mnt/tmp
# mount /mnt/tmp
# ls -l /mnt/tmp
ls: cannot access '/mnt/tmp/bar': Structure needs cleaning
total 4
? l?????????? ? ? ? ? ? bar
# dmesg | tail -1
EXT4-fs error (device dm-8): __ext4_iget:5098:
inode #24578: block 7303014: comm ls: invalid block
(note that "block 7303014" = 0x6f6f66 = "foo" in LE order).
ext4_inode_is_fast_symlink() should check the superblock
EXT4_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_EA_INODE feature flag, not the inode
EXT4_EA_INODE_FL, since the latter is only set on the xattr
inode itself, and not on the inode that uses this xattr.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: fc82228a5e38 ("ext4: support fast symlinks from ext3 file systems")
Signed-off-by: Andreas Dilger <adilger@whamcloud.com>
Reviewed-by: Li Dongyang <dongyangli@ddn.com>
Reviewed-by: Alex Zhuravlev <bzzz@whamcloud.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Drokin <green@whamcloud.com>
Reviewed-on: https://review.whamcloud.com/59879
Lustre-bug-id: https://jira.whamcloud.com/browse/LU-19121
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250717063709.757077-1-adilger@dilger.ca
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 099b847ccc6c1ad2f805d13cfbcc83f5b6d4bc42 ]
A syzbot fuzzed image triggered a BUG_ON in ext4_update_inline_data()
when an inode had the INLINE_DATA_FL flag set but was missing the
system.data extended attribute.
Since this can happen due to a maiciouly fuzzed file system, we
shouldn't BUG, but rather, report it as a corrupted file system.
Add similar replacements of BUG_ON with EXT4_ERROR_INODE() ii
ext4_create_inline_data() and ext4_inline_data_truncate().
Reported-by: syzbot+544248a761451c0df72f@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
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[ Upstream commit f22a0ef2231a7d8374bb021eb86404d0e9de5a02 ]
The EXT4_IOC_GET_ES_CACHE and EXT4_IOC_PRECACHE_EXTENTS currently
invokes ext4_ext_precache() to preload the extent cache without holding
the inode's i_rwsem. This can result in stale extent cache entries when
competing with operations such as ext4_collapse_range() which calls
ext4_ext_remove_space() or ext4_ext_shift_extents().
The problem arises when ext4_ext_remove_space() temporarily releases
i_data_sem due to insufficient journal credits. During this interval, a
concurrent EXT4_IOC_GET_ES_CACHE or EXT4_IOC_PRECACHE_EXTENTS may cache
extent entries that are about to be deleted. As a result, these cached
entries become stale and inconsistent with the actual extents.
Loading the extents cache without holding the inode's i_rwsem or the
mapping's invalidate_lock is not permitted besides during the writeback.
Fix this by holding the i_rwsem during EXT4_IOC_GET_ES_CACHE and
EXT4_IOC_PRECACHE_EXTENTS.
Signed-off-by: Zhang Yi <yi.zhang@huawei.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250423085257.122685-6-yi.zhang@huaweicloud.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
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[ Upstream commit 53ce42accd2002cc490fc86000ac532530507a74 ]
When removing space, we should use EXT4_EX_NOCACHE because we don't
need to cache extents, and we should also use EXT4_EX_NOFAIL to prevent
metadata inconsistencies that may arise from memory allocation failures.
While ext4_ext_remove_space() already uses these two flags in most
places, they are missing in ext4_ext_search_right() and
read_extent_tree_block() calls. Unify the flags to ensure consistent
behavior throughout the extent removal process.
Signed-off-by: Zhang Yi <yi.zhang@huawei.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250423085257.122685-2-yi.zhang@huaweicloud.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 1a77a028a392fab66dd637cdfac3f888450d00af upstream.
The inode i_size cannot be larger than maxbytes, check it while loading
inode from the disk.
Signed-off-by: Zhang Yi <yi.zhang@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Baokun Li <libaokun1@huawei.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250506012009.3896990-4-yi.zhang@huaweicloud.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit dbe27f06fa38b9bfc598f8864ae1c5d5831d9992 upstream.
There are several locations that get the correct maxbytes value based on
the inode's block type. It would be beneficial to extract a common
helper function to make the code more clear.
Signed-off-by: Zhang Yi <yi.zhang@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Baokun Li <libaokun1@huawei.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250506012009.3896990-3-yi.zhang@huaweicloud.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 32a93f5bc9b9812fc710f43a4d8a6830f91e4988 upstream.
Luis and David are reporting that after running generic/750 test for 90+
hours on 2k ext4 filesystem, they are able to trigger a warning in
jbd2_journal_dirty_metadata() complaining that there are not enough
credits in the running transaction started in ext4_do_writepages().
Indeed the code in ext4_do_writepages() is racy and the extent tree can
change between the time we compute credits necessary for extent tree
computation and the time we actually modify the extent tree. Thus it may
happen that the number of credits actually needed is higher. Modify
ext4_ext_index_trans_blocks() to count with the worst case of maximum
tree depth. This can reduce the possible number of writers that can
operate in the system in parallel (because the credit estimates now won't
fit in one transaction) but for reasonably sized journals this shouldn't
really be an issue. So just go with a safe and simple fix.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250415013641.f2ppw6wov4kn4wq2@offworld
Reported-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Reported-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Tested-by: kdevops@lists.linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Zhang Yi <yi.zhang@huawei.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250429175535.23125-2-jack@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 227cb4ca5a6502164f850d22aec3104d7888b270 upstream.
When running the following code on an ext4 filesystem with inline_data
feature enabled, it will lead to the bug below.
fd = open("file1", O_RDWR | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, 0666);
ftruncate(fd, 30);
pwrite(fd, "a", 1, (1UL << 40) + 5UL);
That happens because write_begin will succeed as when
ext4_generic_write_inline_data calls ext4_prepare_inline_data, pos + len
will be truncated, leading to ext4_prepare_inline_data parameter to be 6
instead of 0x10000000006.
Then, later when write_end is called, we hit:
BUG_ON(pos + len > EXT4_I(inode)->i_inline_size);
at ext4_write_inline_data.
Fix it by using a loff_t type for the len parameter in
ext4_prepare_inline_data instead of an unsigned int.
[ 44.545164] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 44.545530] kernel BUG at fs/ext4/inline.c:240!
[ 44.545834] Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
[ 44.546172] CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 343 Comm: test Not tainted 6.15.0-rc2-00003-g9080916f4863 #45 PREEMPT(full) 112853fcebfdb93254270a7959841d2c6aa2c8bb
[ 44.546523] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
[ 44.546523] RIP: 0010:ext4_write_inline_data+0xfe/0x100
[ 44.546523] Code: 3c 0e 48 83 c7 48 48 89 de 5b 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f 5d e9 e4 fa 43 01 5b 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f 5d c3 cc cc cc cc cc 0f 0b <0f> 0b 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 41 57 41 56 41 55 41 54 53 48 83 ec 20 49
[ 44.546523] RSP: 0018:ffffb342008b79a8 EFLAGS: 00010216
[ 44.546523] RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffff9329c579c000 RCX: 0000010000000006
[ 44.546523] RDX: 000000000000003c RSI: ffffb342008b79f0 RDI: ffff9329c158e738
[ 44.546523] RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 44.546523] R10: 00007ffffffff000 R11: ffffffff9bd0d910 R12: 0000006210000000
[ 44.546523] R13: fffffc7e4015e700 R14: 0000010000000005 R15: ffff9329c158e738
[ 44.546523] FS: 00007f4299934740(0000) GS:ffff932a60179000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 44.546523] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 44.546523] CR2: 00007f4299a1ec90 CR3: 0000000002886002 CR4: 0000000000770eb0
[ 44.546523] PKRU: 55555554
[ 44.546523] Call Trace:
[ 44.546523] <TASK>
[ 44.546523] ext4_write_inline_data_end+0x126/0x2d0
[ 44.546523] generic_perform_write+0x17e/0x270
[ 44.546523] ext4_buffered_write_iter+0xc8/0x170
[ 44.546523] vfs_write+0x2be/0x3e0
[ 44.546523] __x64_sys_pwrite64+0x6d/0xc0
[ 44.546523] do_syscall_64+0x6a/0xf0
[ 44.546523] ? __wake_up+0x89/0xb0
[ 44.546523] ? xas_find+0x72/0x1c0
[ 44.546523] ? next_uptodate_folio+0x317/0x330
[ 44.546523] ? set_pte_range+0x1a6/0x270
[ 44.546523] ? filemap_map_pages+0x6ee/0x840
[ 44.546523] ? ext4_setattr+0x2fa/0x750
[ 44.546523] ? do_pte_missing+0x128/0xf70
[ 44.546523] ? security_inode_post_setattr+0x3e/0xd0
[ 44.546523] ? ___pte_offset_map+0x19/0x100
[ 44.546523] ? handle_mm_fault+0x721/0xa10
[ 44.546523] ? do_user_addr_fault+0x197/0x730
[ 44.546523] ? do_syscall_64+0x76/0xf0
[ 44.546523] ? arch_exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x1e/0x60
[ 44.546523] ? irqentry_exit_to_user_mode+0x79/0x90
[ 44.546523] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x55/0x5d
[ 44.546523] RIP: 0033:0x7f42999c6687
[ 44.546523] Code: 48 89 fa 4c 89 df e8 58 b3 00 00 8b 93 08 03 00 00 59 5e 48 83 f8 fc 74 1a 5b c3 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 48 8b 44 24 10 0f 05 <5b> c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 83 e2 39 83 fa 08 75 de e8 23 ff ff ff
[ 44.546523] RSP: 002b:00007ffeae4a7930 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000012
[ 44.546523] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f4299934740 RCX: 00007f42999c6687
[ 44.546523] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 000055ea6149200f RDI: 0000000000000003
[ 44.546523] RBP: 00007ffeae4a79a0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 44.546523] R10: 0000010000000005 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000000000
[ 44.546523] R13: 00007ffeae4a7ac8 R14: 00007f4299b86000 R15: 000055ea61493dd8
[ 44.546523] </TASK>
[ 44.546523] Modules linked in:
[ 44.568501] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
[ 44.568889] RIP: 0010:ext4_write_inline_data+0xfe/0x100
[ 44.569328] Code: 3c 0e 48 83 c7 48 48 89 de 5b 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f 5d e9 e4 fa 43 01 5b 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f 5d c3 cc cc cc cc cc 0f 0b <0f> 0b 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 41 57 41 56 41 55 41 54 53 48 83 ec 20 49
[ 44.570931] RSP: 0018:ffffb342008b79a8 EFLAGS: 00010216
[ 44.571356] RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffff9329c579c000 RCX: 0000010000000006
[ 44.571959] RDX: 000000000000003c RSI: ffffb342008b79f0 RDI: ffff9329c158e738
[ 44.572571] RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 44.573148] R10: 00007ffffffff000 R11: ffffffff9bd0d910 R12: 0000006210000000
[ 44.573748] R13: fffffc7e4015e700 R14: 0000010000000005 R15: ffff9329c158e738
[ 44.574335] FS: 00007f4299934740(0000) GS:ffff932a60179000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 44.575027] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 44.575520] CR2: 00007f4299a1ec90 CR3: 0000000002886002 CR4: 0000000000770eb0
[ 44.576112] PKRU: 55555554
[ 44.576338] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
[ 44.576517] Kernel Offset: 0x1a600000 from 0xffffffff81000000 (relocation range: 0xffffffff80000000-0xffffffffbfffffff)
Reported-by: syzbot+fe2a25dae02a207717a0@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=fe2a25dae02a207717a0
Fixes: f19d5870cbf7 ("ext4: add normal write support for inline data")
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@igalia.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Dilger <adilger@dilger.ca>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250415-ext4-prepare-inline-overflow-v1-1-f4c13d900967@igalia.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 1b419c889c0767a5b66d0a6c566cae491f1cb0f7 ]
capable() calls refer to enabled LSMs whether to permit or deny the
request. This is relevant in connection with SELinux, where a
capability check results in a policy decision and by default a denial
message on insufficient permission is issued.
It can lead to three undesired cases:
1. A denial message is generated, even in case the operation was an
unprivileged one and thus the syscall succeeded, creating noise.
2. To avoid the noise from 1. the policy writer adds a rule to ignore
those denial messages, hiding future syscalls, where the task
performs an actual privileged operation, leading to hidden limited
functionality of that task.
3. To avoid the noise from 1. the policy writer adds a rule to permit
the task the requested capability, while it does not need it,
violating the principle of least privilege.
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250302160657.127253-2-cgoettsche@seltendoof.de
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit ccad447a3d331a239477c281533bacb585b54a98 ]
Block validity checks need to be skipped in case they are called
for journal blocks since they are part of system's protected
zone.
Currently, this is done by checking inode->ino against
sbi->s_es->s_journal_inum, which is a direct read from the ext4 sb
buffer head. If someone modifies this underneath us then the
s_journal_inum field might get corrupted. To prevent against this,
change the check to directly compare the inode with journal->j_inode.
**Slight change in behavior**: During journal init path,
check_block_validity etc might be called for journal inode when
sbi->s_journal is not set yet. In this case we now proceed with
ext4_inode_block_valid() instead of returning early. Since systems zones
have not been set yet, it is okay to proceed so we can perform basic
checks on the blocks.
Suggested-by: Baokun Li <libaokun1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Baokun Li <libaokun1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Zhang Yi <yi.zhang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Ojaswin Mujoo <ojaswin@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/0c06bc9ebfcd6ccfed84a36e79147bf45ff5adc1.1743142920.git.ojaswin@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
commit 0ce160c5bdb67081a62293028dc85758a8efb22a upstream.
Syzbot has found an ODEBUG bug in ext4_fill_super
The del_timer_sync function cancels the s_err_report timer,
which reminds about filesystem errors daily. We should
guarantee the timer is no longer active before kfree(sbi).
When filesystem mounting fails, the flow goes to failed_mount3,
where an error occurs when ext4_stop_mmpd is called, causing
a read I/O failure. This triggers the ext4_handle_error function
that ultimately re-arms the timer,
leaving the s_err_report timer active before kfree(sbi) is called.
Fix the issue by canceling the s_err_report timer after calling ext4_stop_mmpd.
Signed-off-by: Xiaxi Shen <shenxiaxi26@gmail.com>
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+59e0101c430934bc9a36@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=59e0101c430934bc9a36
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240715043336.98097-1-shenxiaxi26@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
[Minor context change fixed]
Signed-off-by: Xiangyu Chen <xiangyu.chen@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: He Zhe <zhe.he@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
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commit 94824ac9a8aaf2fb3c54b4bdde842db80ffa555d upstream.
Syzkaller detected a use-after-free issue in ext4_insert_dentry that was
caused by out-of-bounds access due to incorrect splitting in do_split.
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ext4_insert_dentry+0x36a/0x6d0 fs/ext4/namei.c:2109
Write of size 251 at addr ffff888074572f14 by task syz-executor335/5847
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5847 Comm: syz-executor335 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc6-syzkaller-00318-ga9cda7c0ffed #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/30/2024
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:120
print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:377 [inline]
print_report+0x169/0x550 mm/kasan/report.c:488
kasan_report+0x143/0x180 mm/kasan/report.c:601
kasan_check_range+0x282/0x290 mm/kasan/generic.c:189
__asan_memcpy+0x40/0x70 mm/kasan/shadow.c:106
ext4_insert_dentry+0x36a/0x6d0 fs/ext4/namei.c:2109
add_dirent_to_buf+0x3d9/0x750 fs/ext4/namei.c:2154
make_indexed_dir+0xf98/0x1600 fs/ext4/namei.c:2351
ext4_add_entry+0x222a/0x25d0 fs/ext4/namei.c:2455
ext4_add_nondir+0x8d/0x290 fs/ext4/namei.c:2796
ext4_symlink+0x920/0xb50 fs/ext4/namei.c:3431
vfs_symlink+0x137/0x2e0 fs/namei.c:4615
do_symlinkat+0x222/0x3a0 fs/namei.c:4641
__do_sys_symlink fs/namei.c:4662 [inline]
__se_sys_symlink fs/namei.c:4660 [inline]
__x64_sys_symlink+0x7a/0x90 fs/namei.c:4660
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
</TASK>
The following loop is located right above 'if' statement.
for (i = count-1; i >= 0; i--) {
/* is more than half of this entry in 2nd half of the block? */
if (size + map[i].size/2 > blocksize/2)
break;
size += map[i].size;
move++;
}
'i' in this case could go down to -1, in which case sum of active entries
wouldn't exceed half the block size, but previous behaviour would also do
split in half if sum would exceed at the very last block, which in case of
having too many long name files in a single block could lead to
out-of-bounds access and following use-after-free.
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 5872331b3d91 ("ext4: fix potential negative array index in do_split()")
Signed-off-by: Artem Sadovnikov <a.sadovnikov@ispras.ru>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250404082804.2567-3-a.sadovnikov@ispras.ru
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
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[ Upstream commit 642335f3ea2b3fd6dba03e57e01fa9587843a497 ]
A file handle that userspace provides to open_by_handle_at() can
legitimately contain an outdated inode number that has since been reused
for another purpose - that's why the file handle also contains a generation
number.
But if the inode number has been reused for an ea_inode, check_igot_inode()
will notice, __ext4_iget() will go through ext4_error_inode(), and if the
inode was newly created, it will also be marked as bad by iget_failed().
This all happens before the point where the inode generation is checked.
ext4_error_inode() is supposed to only be used on filesystem corruption; it
should not be used when userspace just got unlucky with a stale file
handle. So when this happens, let __ext4_iget() just return an error.
Fixes: b3e6bcb94590 ("ext4: add EA_INODE checking to ext4_iget()")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241129-ext4-ignore-ea-fhandle-v1-1-e532c0d1cee0@google.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 8216776ccff6fcd40e3fdaa109aa4150ebe760b3 ]
It is invalid for the casefold inode flag to be set without the casefold
superblock feature flag also being set. e2fsck already considers this
case to be invalid and handles it by offering to clear the casefold flag
on the inode. __ext4_iget() also already considered this to be invalid,
sort of, but it only got so far as logging an error message; it didn't
actually reject the inode. Make it reject the inode so that other code
doesn't have to handle this case. This matches what f2fs does.
Note: we could check 's_encoding != NULL' instead of
ext4_has_feature_casefold(). This would make the check robust against
the casefold feature being enabled by userspace writing to the page
cache of the mounted block device. However, it's unsolvable in general
for filesystems to be robust against concurrent writes to the page cache
of the mounted block device. Though this very particular scenario
involving the casefold feature is solvable, we should not pretend that
we can support this model, so let's just check the casefold feature.
tune2fs already forbids enabling casefold on a mounted filesystem.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230814182903.37267-2-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Stable-dep-of: 642335f3ea2b ("ext4: don't treat fhandle lookup of ea_inode as FS corruption")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
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[ Upstream commit c8e008b60492cf6fd31ef127aea6d02fd3d314cd ]
Once inside 'ext4_xattr_inode_dec_ref_all' we should
ignore xattrs entries past the 'end' entry.
This fixes the following KASAN reported issue:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ext4_xattr_inode_dec_ref_all+0xb8c/0xe90
Read of size 4 at addr ffff888012c120c4 by task repro/2065
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 2065 Comm: repro Not tainted 6.13.0-rc2+ #11
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x1fd/0x300
? tcp_gro_dev_warn+0x260/0x260
? _printk+0xc0/0x100
? read_lock_is_recursive+0x10/0x10
? irq_work_queue+0x72/0xf0
? __virt_addr_valid+0x17b/0x4b0
print_address_description+0x78/0x390
print_report+0x107/0x1f0
? __virt_addr_valid+0x17b/0x4b0
? __virt_addr_valid+0x3ff/0x4b0
? __phys_addr+0xb5/0x160
? ext4_xattr_inode_dec_ref_all+0xb8c/0xe90
kasan_report+0xcc/0x100
? ext4_xattr_inode_dec_ref_all+0xb8c/0xe90
ext4_xattr_inode_dec_ref_all+0xb8c/0xe90
? ext4_xattr_delete_inode+0xd30/0xd30
? __ext4_journal_ensure_credits+0x5f0/0x5f0
? __ext4_journal_ensure_credits+0x2b/0x5f0
? inode_update_timestamps+0x410/0x410
ext4_xattr_delete_inode+0xb64/0xd30
? ext4_truncate+0xb70/0xdc0
? ext4_expand_extra_isize_ea+0x1d20/0x1d20
? __ext4_mark_inode_dirty+0x670/0x670
? ext4_journal_check_start+0x16f/0x240
? ext4_inode_is_fast_symlink+0x2f2/0x3a0
ext4_evict_inode+0xc8c/0xff0
? ext4_inode_is_fast_symlink+0x3a0/0x3a0
? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x53/0x8a0
? ext4_inode_is_fast_symlink+0x3a0/0x3a0
evict+0x4ac/0x950
? proc_nr_inodes+0x310/0x310
? trace_ext4_drop_inode+0xa2/0x220
? _raw_spin_unlock+0x1a/0x30
? iput+0x4cb/0x7e0
do_unlinkat+0x495/0x7c0
? try_break_deleg+0x120/0x120
? 0xffffffff81000000
? __check_object_size+0x15a/0x210
? strncpy_from_user+0x13e/0x250
? getname_flags+0x1dc/0x530
__x64_sys_unlinkat+0xc8/0xf0
do_syscall_64+0x65/0x110
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x67/0x6f
RIP: 0033:0x434ffd
Code: 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 8
RSP: 002b:00007ffc50fa7b28 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000107
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffc50fa7e18 RCX: 0000000000434ffd
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000240 RDI: 0000000000000005
RBP: 00007ffc50fa7be0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000001
R13: 00007ffc50fa7e08 R14: 00000000004bbf30 R15: 0000000000000001
</TASK>
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888012c12000
which belongs to the cache filp of size 360
The buggy address is located 196 bytes inside of
freed 360-byte region [ffff888012c12000, ffff888012c12168)
The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
page: refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x12c12
head: order:1 mapcount:0 entire_mapcount:0 nr_pages_mapped:0 pincount:0
flags: 0x40(head|node=0|zone=0)
page_type: f5(slab)
raw: 0000000000000040 ffff888000ad7640 ffffea0000497a00 dead000000000004
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000100010 00000001f5000000 0000000000000000
head: 0000000000000040 ffff888000ad7640 ffffea0000497a00 dead000000000004
head: 0000000000000000 0000000000100010 00000001f5000000 0000000000000000
head: 0000000000000001 ffffea00004b0481 ffffffffffffffff 0000000000000000
head: 0000000000000002 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff888012c11f80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
ffff888012c12000: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
> ffff888012c12080: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
^
ffff888012c12100: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc
ffff888012c12180: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
==================================================================
Reported-by: syzbot+b244bda78289b00204ed@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=b244bda78289b00204ed
Suggested-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@igalia.com>
Signed-off-by: Bhupesh <bhupesh@igalia.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250128082751.124948-2-bhupesh@igalia.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
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[ Upstream commit 530fea29ef82e169cd7fe048c2b7baaeb85a0028 ]
Protect ext4_release_dquot against freezing so that we
don't try to start a transaction when FS is frozen, leading
to warnings.
Further, avoid taking the freeze protection if a transaction
is already running so that we don't need end up in a deadlock
as described in
46e294efc355 ext4: fix deadlock with fs freezing and EA inodes
Suggested-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Ojaswin Mujoo <ojaswin@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Baokun Li <libaokun1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241121123855.645335-3-ojaswin@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit d5e206778e96e8667d3bde695ad372c296dc9353 upstream.
Mounting a corrupted filesystem with directory which contains '.' dir
entry with rec_len == block size results in out-of-bounds read (later
on, when the corrupted directory is removed).
ext4_empty_dir() assumes every ext4 directory contains at least '.'
and '..' as directory entries in the first data block. It first loads
the '.' dir entry, performs sanity checks by calling ext4_check_dir_entry()
and then uses its rec_len member to compute the location of '..' dir
entry (in ext4_next_entry). It assumes the '..' dir entry fits into the
same data block.
If the rec_len of '.' is precisely one block (4KB), it slips through the
sanity checks (it is considered the last directory entry in the data
block) and leaves "struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *de" point exactly past the
memory slot allocated to the data block. The following call to
ext4_check_dir_entry() on new value of de then dereferences this pointer
which results in out-of-bounds mem access.
Fix this by extending __ext4_check_dir_entry() to check for '.' dir
entries that reach the end of data block. Make sure to ignore the phony
dir entries for checksum (by checking name_len for non-zero).
Note: This is reported by KASAN as use-after-free in case another
structure was recently freed from the slot past the bound, but it is
really an OOB read.
This issue was found by syzkaller tool.
Call Trace:
[ 38.594108] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __ext4_check_dir_entry+0x67e/0x710
[ 38.594649] Read of size 2 at addr ffff88802b41a004 by task syz-executor/5375
[ 38.595158]
[ 38.595288] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5375 Comm: syz-executor Not tainted 6.14.0-rc7 #1
[ 38.595298] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[ 38.595304] Call Trace:
[ 38.595308] <TASK>
[ 38.595311] dump_stack_lvl+0xa7/0xd0
[ 38.595325] print_address_description.constprop.0+0x2c/0x3f0
[ 38.595339] ? __ext4_check_dir_entry+0x67e/0x710
[ 38.595349] print_report+0xaa/0x250
[ 38.595359] ? __ext4_check_dir_entry+0x67e/0x710
[ 38.595368] ? kasan_addr_to_slab+0x9/0x90
[ 38.595378] kasan_report+0xab/0xe0
[ 38.595389] ? __ext4_check_dir_entry+0x67e/0x710
[ 38.595400] __ext4_check_dir_entry+0x67e/0x710
[ 38.595410] ext4_empty_dir+0x465/0x990
[ 38.595421] ? __pfx_ext4_empty_dir+0x10/0x10
[ 38.595432] ext4_rmdir.part.0+0x29a/0xd10
[ 38.595441] ? __dquot_initialize+0x2a7/0xbf0
[ 38.595455] ? __pfx_ext4_rmdir.part.0+0x10/0x10
[ 38.595464] ? __pfx___dquot_initialize+0x10/0x10
[ 38.595478] ? down_write+0xdb/0x140
[ 38.595487] ? __pfx_down_write+0x10/0x10
[ 38.595497] ext4_rmdir+0xee/0x140
[ 38.595506] vfs_rmdir+0x209/0x670
[ 38.595517] ? lookup_one_qstr_excl+0x3b/0x190
[ 38.595529] do_rmdir+0x363/0x3c0
[ 38.595537] ? __pfx_do_rmdir+0x10/0x10
[ 38.595544] ? strncpy_from_user+0x1ff/0x2e0
[ 38.595561] __x64_sys_unlinkat+0xf0/0x130
[ 38.595570] do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x180
[ 38.595583] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
Fixes: ac27a0ec112a0 ("[PATCH] ext4: initial copy of files from ext3")
Signed-off-by: Jakub Acs <acsjakub@amazon.de>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Andreas Dilger <adilger.kernel@dilger.ca>
Cc: linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Mahmoud Adam <mngyadam@amazon.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: security@kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/b3ae36a6794c4a01944c7d70b403db5b@amazon.de
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit f87d3af7419307ae26e705a2b2db36140db367a2 upstream.
This fixes an analogus bug that was fixed in xfs in commit
4b8d867ca6e2 ("xfs: don't over-report free space or inodes in
statvfs") where statfs can report misleading / incorrect information
where project quota is enabled, and the free space is less than the
remaining quota.
This commit will resolve a test failure in generic/762 which tests for
this bug.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Fixes: 689c958cbe6b ("ext4: add project quota support")
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: "Darrick J. Wong" <djwong@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 4a622e4d477bb12ad5ed4abbc7ad1365de1fa347 upstream.
The original implementation ext4's FS_IOC_GETFSMAP handling only
worked when the range of queried blocks included at least one free
(unallocated) block range. This is because how the metadata blocks
were emitted was as a side effect of ext4_mballoc_query_range()
calling ext4_getfsmap_datadev_helper(), and that function was only
called when a free block range was identified. As a result, this
caused generic/365 to fail.
Fix this by creating a new function ext4_getfsmap_meta_helper() which
gets called so that blocks before the first free block range in a
block group can get properly reported.
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 902cc179c931a033cd7f4242353aa2733bf8524c upstream.
find_group_other() and find_group_orlov() read *_lo, *_hi with
ext4_free_inodes_count without additional locking. This can cause
data-race warning, but since the lock is held for most writes and free
inodes value is generally not a problem even if it is incorrect, it is
more appropriate to use READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() than to add locking.
==================================================================
BUG: KCSAN: data-race in ext4_free_inodes_count / ext4_free_inodes_set
write to 0xffff88810404300e of 2 bytes by task 6254 on cpu 1:
ext4_free_inodes_set+0x1f/0x80 fs/ext4/super.c:405
__ext4_new_inode+0x15ca/0x2200 fs/ext4/ialloc.c:1216
ext4_symlink+0x242/0x5a0 fs/ext4/namei.c:3391
vfs_symlink+0xca/0x1d0 fs/namei.c:4615
do_symlinkat+0xe3/0x340 fs/namei.c:4641
__do_sys_symlinkat fs/namei.c:4657 [inline]
__se_sys_symlinkat fs/namei.c:4654 [inline]
__x64_sys_symlinkat+0x5e/0x70 fs/namei.c:4654
x64_sys_call+0x1dda/0x2d60 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:267
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x54/0x120 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
read to 0xffff88810404300e of 2 bytes by task 6257 on cpu 0:
ext4_free_inodes_count+0x1c/0x80 fs/ext4/super.c:349
find_group_other fs/ext4/ialloc.c:594 [inline]
__ext4_new_inode+0x6ec/0x2200 fs/ext4/ialloc.c:1017
ext4_symlink+0x242/0x5a0 fs/ext4/namei.c:3391
vfs_symlink+0xca/0x1d0 fs/namei.c:4615
do_symlinkat+0xe3/0x340 fs/namei.c:4641
__do_sys_symlinkat fs/namei.c:4657 [inline]
__se_sys_symlinkat fs/namei.c:4654 [inline]
__x64_sys_symlinkat+0x5e/0x70 fs/namei.c:4654
x64_sys_call+0x1dda/0x2d60 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:267
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x54/0x120 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jeongjun Park <aha310510@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Dilger <adilger@dilger.ca>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241003125337.47283-1-aha310510@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 619f75dae2cf117b1d07f27b046b9ffb071c4685 upstream.
The syzbot has reported that it can hit the warning in
ext4_dio_write_end_io() because i_size < i_disksize. Indeed the
reproducer creates a race between DIO IO completion and truncate
expanding the file and thus ext4_dio_write_end_io() sees an inconsistent
inode state where i_disksize is already updated but i_size is not
updated yet. Since we are careful when setting up DIO write and consider
it extending (and thus performing the IO synchronously with i_rwsem held
exclusively) whenever it goes past either of i_size or i_disksize, we
can use the same test during IO completion without risking entering
ext4_handle_inode_extension() without i_rwsem held. This way we make it
obvious both i_size and i_disksize are large enough when we report DIO
completion without relying on unreliable WARN_ON.
Reported-by: <syzbot+47479b71cdfc78f56d30@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Fixes: 91562895f803 ("ext4: properly sync file size update after O_SYNC direct IO")
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Ritesh Harjani (IBM) <ritesh.list@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231130095653.22679-1-jack@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit d1bc560e9a9c78d0b2314692847fc8661e0aeb99 ]
Add nested locking with I_MUTEX_XATTR subclass to avoid lockdep warning
while handling xattr inode on file open syscall at ext4_xattr_inode_iget.
Backtrace
EXT4-fs (loop0): Ignoring removed oldalloc option
======================================================
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
5.10.0-syzkaller #0 Not tainted
------------------------------------------------------
syz-executor543/2794 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff8880215e1a48 (&ea_inode->i_rwsem#7/1){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: inode_lock include/linux/fs.h:782 [inline]
ffff8880215e1a48 (&ea_inode->i_rwsem#7/1){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: ext4_xattr_inode_iget+0x42a/0x5c0 fs/ext4/xattr.c:425
but task is already holding lock:
ffff8880215e3278 (&ei->i_data_sem/3){++++}-{3:3}, at: ext4_setattr+0x136d/0x19c0 fs/ext4/inode.c:5559
which lock already depends on the new lock.
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #1 (&ei->i_data_sem/3){++++}-{3:3}:
lock_acquire+0x197/0x480 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5566
down_write+0x93/0x180 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1564
ext4_update_i_disksize fs/ext4/ext4.h:3267 [inline]
ext4_xattr_inode_write fs/ext4/xattr.c:1390 [inline]
ext4_xattr_inode_lookup_create fs/ext4/xattr.c:1538 [inline]
ext4_xattr_set_entry+0x331a/0x3d80 fs/ext4/xattr.c:1662
ext4_xattr_ibody_set+0x124/0x390 fs/ext4/xattr.c:2228
ext4_xattr_set_handle+0xc27/0x14e0 fs/ext4/xattr.c:2385
ext4_xattr_set+0x219/0x390 fs/ext4/xattr.c:2498
ext4_xattr_user_set+0xc9/0xf0 fs/ext4/xattr_user.c:40
__vfs_setxattr+0x404/0x450 fs/xattr.c:177
__vfs_setxattr_noperm+0x11d/0x4f0 fs/xattr.c:208
__vfs_setxattr_locked+0x1f9/0x210 fs/xattr.c:266
vfs_setxattr+0x112/0x2c0 fs/xattr.c:283
setxattr+0x1db/0x3e0 fs/xattr.c:548
path_setxattr+0x15a/0x240 fs/xattr.c:567
__do_sys_setxattr fs/xattr.c:582 [inline]
__se_sys_setxattr fs/xattr.c:578 [inline]
__x64_sys_setxattr+0xc5/0xe0 fs/xattr.c:578
do_syscall_64+0x6d/0xa0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:62
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x61/0xcb
-> #0 (&ea_inode->i_rwsem#7/1){+.+.}-{3:3}:
check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2988 [inline]
check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3113 [inline]
validate_chain+0x1695/0x58f0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3729
__lock_acquire+0x12fd/0x20d0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4955
lock_acquire+0x197/0x480 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5566
down_write+0x93/0x180 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1564
inode_lock include/linux/fs.h:782 [inline]
ext4_xattr_inode_iget+0x42a/0x5c0 fs/ext4/xattr.c:425
ext4_xattr_inode_get+0x138/0x410 fs/ext4/xattr.c:485
ext4_xattr_move_to_block fs/ext4/xattr.c:2580 [inline]
ext4_xattr_make_inode_space fs/ext4/xattr.c:2682 [inline]
ext4_expand_extra_isize_ea+0xe70/0x1bb0 fs/ext4/xattr.c:2774
__ext4_expand_extra_isize+0x304/0x3f0 fs/ext4/inode.c:5898
ext4_try_to_expand_extra_isize fs/ext4/inode.c:5941 [inline]
__ext4_mark_inode_dirty+0x591/0x810 fs/ext4/inode.c:6018
ext4_setattr+0x1400/0x19c0 fs/ext4/inode.c:5562
notify_change+0xbb6/0xe60 fs/attr.c:435
do_truncate+0x1de/0x2c0 fs/open.c:64
handle_truncate fs/namei.c:2970 [inline]
do_open fs/namei.c:3311 [inline]
path_openat+0x29f3/0x3290 fs/namei.c:3425
do_filp_open+0x20b/0x450 fs/namei.c:3452
do_sys_openat2+0x124/0x460 fs/open.c:1207
do_sys_open fs/open.c:1223 [inline]
__do_sys_open fs/open.c:1231 [inline]
__se_sys_open fs/open.c:1227 [inline]
__x64_sys_open+0x221/0x270 fs/open.c:1227
do_syscall_64+0x6d/0xa0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:62
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x61/0xcb
other info that might help us debug this:
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
lock(&ei->i_data_sem/3);
lock(&ea_inode->i_rwsem#7/1);
lock(&ei->i_data_sem/3);
lock(&ea_inode->i_rwsem#7/1);
*** DEADLOCK ***
5 locks held by syz-executor543/2794:
#0: ffff888026fbc448 (sb_writers#4){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: mnt_want_write+0x4a/0x2a0 fs/namespace.c:365
#1: ffff8880215e3488 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#7){++++}-{3:3}, at: inode_lock include/linux/fs.h:782 [inline]
#1: ffff8880215e3488 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#7){++++}-{3:3}, at: do_truncate+0x1cf/0x2c0 fs/open.c:62
#2: ffff8880215e3310 (&ei->i_mmap_sem){++++}-{3:3}, at: ext4_setattr+0xec4/0x19c0 fs/ext4/inode.c:5519
#3: ffff8880215e3278 (&ei->i_data_sem/3){++++}-{3:3}, at: ext4_setattr+0x136d/0x19c0 fs/ext4/inode.c:5559
#4: ffff8880215e30c8 (&ei->xattr_sem){++++}-{3:3}, at: ext4_write_trylock_xattr fs/ext4/xattr.h:162 [inline]
#4: ffff8880215e30c8 (&ei->xattr_sem){++++}-{3:3}, at: ext4_try_to_expand_extra_isize fs/ext4/inode.c:5938 [inline]
#4: ffff8880215e30c8 (&ei->xattr_sem){++++}-{3:3}, at: __ext4_mark_inode_dirty+0x4fb/0x810 fs/ext4/inode.c:6018
stack backtrace:
CPU: 1 PID: 2794 Comm: syz-executor543 Not tainted 5.10.0-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 03/27/2024
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0x177/0x211 lib/dump_stack.c:118
print_circular_bug+0x146/0x1b0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2002
check_noncircular+0x2cc/0x390 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2123
check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2988 [inline]
check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3113 [inline]
validate_chain+0x1695/0x58f0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3729
__lock_acquire+0x12fd/0x20d0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4955
lock_acquire+0x197/0x480 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5566
down_write+0x93/0x180 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1564
inode_lock include/linux/fs.h:782 [inline]
ext4_xattr_inode_iget+0x42a/0x5c0 fs/ext4/xattr.c:425
ext4_xattr_inode_get+0x138/0x410 fs/ext4/xattr.c:485
ext4_xattr_move_to_block fs/ext4/xattr.c:2580 [inline]
ext4_xattr_make_inode_space fs/ext4/xattr.c:2682 [inline]
ext4_expand_extra_isize_ea+0xe70/0x1bb0 fs/ext4/xattr.c:2774
__ext4_expand_extra_isize+0x304/0x3f0 fs/ext4/inode.c:5898
ext4_try_to_expand_extra_isize fs/ext4/inode.c:5941 [inline]
__ext4_mark_inode_dirty+0x591/0x810 fs/ext4/inode.c:6018
ext4_setattr+0x1400/0x19c0 fs/ext4/inode.c:5562
notify_change+0xbb6/0xe60 fs/attr.c:435
do_truncate+0x1de/0x2c0 fs/open.c:64
handle_truncate fs/namei.c:2970 [inline]
do_open fs/namei.c:3311 [inline]
path_openat+0x29f3/0x3290 fs/namei.c:3425
do_filp_open+0x20b/0x450 fs/namei.c:3452
do_sys_openat2+0x124/0x460 fs/open.c:1207
do_sys_open fs/open.c:1223 [inline]
__do_sys_open fs/open.c:1231 [inline]
__se_sys_open fs/open.c:1227 [inline]
__x64_sys_open+0x221/0x270 fs/open.c:1227
do_syscall_64+0x6d/0xa0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:62
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x61/0xcb
RIP: 0033:0x7f0cde4ea229
Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 21 18 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007ffd81d1c978 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000002
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0030656c69662f30 RCX: 00007f0cde4ea229
RDX: 0000000000000089 RSI: 00000000000a0a00 RDI: 00000000200001c0
RBP: 2f30656c69662f2e R08: 0000000000208000 R09: 0000000000208000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffd81d1c9c0
R13: 00007ffd81d1ca00 R14: 0000000000080000 R15: 0000000000000003
EXT4-fs error (device loop0): ext4_expand_extra_isize_ea:2730: inode #13: comm syz-executor543: corrupted in-inode xattr
Signed-off-by: Wojciech Gładysz <wojciech.gladysz@infogain.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240801143827.19135-1-wojciech.gladysz@infogain.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 3f5424790d4377839093b68c12b130077a4e4510 upstream.
If ENOMEM fails when the extent is splitting, we need to restore the length
of the split extent.
In the ext4_split_extent_at function, only in ext4_ext_create_new_leaf will
it alloc memory and change the shape of the extent tree,even if an ENOMEM
is returned at this time, the extent tree is still self-consistent, Just
restore the split extent lens in the function ext4_split_extent_at.
ext4_split_extent_at
ext4_ext_insert_extent
ext4_ext_create_new_leaf
1)ext4_ext_split
ext4_find_extent
2)ext4_ext_grow_indepth
ext4_find_extent
Signed-off-by: zhanchengbin <zhanchengbin1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230103022812.130603-1-zhanchengbin1@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Baokun Li <libaokun1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit dda898d7ffe85931f9cca6d702a51f33717c501e ]
The dax_iomap_rw() does two things in each iteration: map written blocks
and copy user data to blocks. If the process is killed by user(See signal
handling in dax_iomap_iter()), the copied data will be returned and added
on inode size, which means that the length of written extents may exceed
the inode size, then fsck will fail. An example is given as:
dd if=/dev/urandom of=file bs=4M count=1
dax_iomap_rw
iomap_iter // round 1
ext4_iomap_begin
ext4_iomap_alloc // allocate 0~2M extents(written flag)
dax_iomap_iter // copy 2M data
iomap_iter // round 2
iomap_iter_advance
iter->pos += iter->processed // iter->pos = 2M
ext4_iomap_begin
ext4_iomap_alloc // allocate 2~4M extents(written flag)
dax_iomap_iter
fatal_signal_pending
done = iter->pos - iocb->ki_pos // done = 2M
ext4_handle_inode_extension
ext4_update_inode_size // inode size = 2M
fsck reports: Inode 13, i_size is 2097152, should be 4194304. Fix?
Fix the problem by truncating extents if the written length is smaller
than expected.
Fixes: 776722e85d3b ("ext4: DAX iomap write support")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=219136
Signed-off-by: Zhihao Cheng <chengzhihao1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Zhihao Cheng <chengzhihao1@huawei.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240809121532.2105494-1-chengzhihao@huaweicloud.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 91562895f8030cb9a0470b1db49de79346a69f91 ]
Gao Xiang has reported that on ext4 O_SYNC direct IO does not properly
sync file size update and thus if we crash at unfortunate moment, the
file can have smaller size although O_SYNC IO has reported successful
completion. The problem happens because update of on-disk inode size is
handled in ext4_dio_write_iter() *after* iomap_dio_rw() (and thus
dio_complete() in particular) has returned and generic_file_sync() gets
called by dio_complete(). Fix the problem by handling on-disk inode size
update directly in our ->end_io completion handler.
References: https://lore.kernel.org/all/02d18236-26ef-09b0-90ad-030c4fe3ee20@linux.alibaba.com
Reported-by: Gao Xiang <hsiangkao@linux.alibaba.com>
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 378f32bab371 ("ext4: introduce direct I/O write using iomap infrastructure")
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Tested-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Reviewed-by: "Ritesh Harjani (IBM)" <ritesh.list@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231013121350.26872-1-jack@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Stable-dep-of: dda898d7ffe8 ("ext4: dax: fix overflowing extents beyond inode size when partially writing")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit dd589b0f1445e1ea1085b98edca6e4d5dedb98d0 upstream.
Function ext4_wait_for_tail_page_commit() assumes that '0' is not a valid
value for transaction IDs, which is incorrect. Don't assume that and invoke
jbd2_log_wait_commit() if the journal had a committing transaction instead.
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques (SUSE) <luis.henriques@linux.dev>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240724161119.13448-2-luis.henriques@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 5b4b2dcace35f618fe361a87bae6f0d13af31bc1 upstream.
In ext4_find_extent(), if the path is not big enough, we free it and set
*orig_path to NULL. But after reallocating and successfully initializing
the path, we don't update *orig_path, in which case the caller gets a
valid path but a NULL ppath, and this may cause a NULL pointer dereference
or a path memory leak. For example:
ext4_split_extent
path = *ppath = 2000
ext4_find_extent
if (depth > path[0].p_maxdepth)
kfree(path = 2000);
*orig_path = path = NULL;
path = kcalloc() = 3000
ext4_split_extent_at(*ppath = NULL)
path = *ppath;
ex = path[depth].p_ext;
// NULL pointer dereference!
==================================================================
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000010
CPU: 6 UID: 0 PID: 576 Comm: fsstress Not tainted 6.11.0-rc2-dirty #847
RIP: 0010:ext4_split_extent_at+0x6d/0x560
Call Trace:
<TASK>
ext4_split_extent.isra.0+0xcb/0x1b0
ext4_ext_convert_to_initialized+0x168/0x6c0
ext4_ext_handle_unwritten_extents+0x325/0x4d0
ext4_ext_map_blocks+0x520/0xdb0
ext4_map_blocks+0x2b0/0x690
ext4_iomap_begin+0x20e/0x2c0
[...]
==================================================================
Therefore, *orig_path is updated when the extent lookup succeeds, so that
the caller can safely use path or *ppath.
Fixes: 10809df84a4d ("ext4: teach ext4_ext_find_extent() to realloc path if necessary")
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Baokun Li <libaokun1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240822023545.1994557-6-libaokun@huaweicloud.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit dcaa6c31134c0f515600111c38ed7750003e1b9c upstream.
In ext4_ext_try_to_merge_up(), set path[1].p_bh to NULL after it has been
released, otherwise it may be released twice. An example of what triggers
this is as follows:
split2 map split1
|--------|-------|--------|
ext4_ext_map_blocks
ext4_ext_handle_unwritten_extents
ext4_split_convert_extents
// path->p_depth == 0
ext4_split_extent
// 1. do split1
ext4_split_extent_at
|ext4_ext_insert_extent
| ext4_ext_create_new_leaf
| ext4_ext_grow_indepth
| le16_add_cpu(&neh->eh_depth, 1)
| ext4_find_extent
| // return -ENOMEM
|// get error and try zeroout
|path = ext4_find_extent
| path->p_depth = 1
|ext4_ext_try_to_merge
| ext4_ext_try_to_merge_up
| path->p_depth = 0
| brelse(path[1].p_bh) ---> not set to NULL here
|// zeroout success
// 2. update path
ext4_find_extent
// 3. do split2
ext4_split_extent_at
ext4_ext_insert_extent
ext4_ext_create_new_leaf
ext4_ext_grow_indepth
le16_add_cpu(&neh->eh_depth, 1)
ext4_find_extent
path[0].p_bh = NULL;
path->p_depth = 1
read_extent_tree_block ---> return err
// path[1].p_bh is still the old value
ext4_free_ext_path
ext4_ext_drop_refs
// path->p_depth == 1
brelse(path[1].p_bh) ---> brelse a buffer twice
Finally got the following WARRNING when removing the buffer from lru:
============================================
VFS: brelse: Trying to free free buffer
WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 72 at fs/buffer.c:1241 __brelse+0x58/0x90
CPU: 2 PID: 72 Comm: kworker/u19:1 Not tainted 6.9.0-dirty #716
RIP: 0010:__brelse+0x58/0x90
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__find_get_block+0x6e7/0x810
bdev_getblk+0x2b/0x480
__ext4_get_inode_loc+0x48a/0x1240
ext4_get_inode_loc+0xb2/0x150
ext4_reserve_inode_write+0xb7/0x230
__ext4_mark_inode_dirty+0x144/0x6a0
ext4_ext_insert_extent+0x9c8/0x3230
ext4_ext_map_blocks+0xf45/0x2dc0
ext4_map_blocks+0x724/0x1700
ext4_do_writepages+0x12d6/0x2a70
[...]
============================================
Fixes: ecb94f5fdf4b ("ext4: collapse a single extent tree block into the inode if possible")
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Baokun Li <libaokun1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Ojaswin Mujoo <ojaswin@linux.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Ojaswin Mujoo <ojaswin@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240822023545.1994557-9-libaokun@huaweicloud.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit a164f3a432aae62ca23d03e6d926b122ee5b860d upstream.
As Ojaswin mentioned in Link, in ext4_ext_insert_extent(), if the path is
reallocated in ext4_ext_create_new_leaf(), we'll use the stale path and
cause UAF. Below is a sample trace with dummy values:
ext4_ext_insert_extent
path = *ppath = 2000
ext4_ext_create_new_leaf(ppath)
ext4_find_extent(ppath)
path = *ppath = 2000
if (depth > path[0].p_maxdepth)
kfree(path = 2000);
*ppath = path = NULL;
path = kcalloc() = 3000
*ppath = 3000;
return path;
/* here path is still 2000, UAF! */
eh = path[depth].p_hdr
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ext4_ext_insert_extent+0x26d4/0x3330
Read of size 8 at addr ffff8881027bf7d0 by task kworker/u36:1/179
CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 179 Comm: kworker/u6:1 Not tainted 6.11.0-rc2-dirty #866
Call Trace:
<TASK>
ext4_ext_insert_extent+0x26d4/0x3330
ext4_ext_map_blocks+0xe22/0x2d40
ext4_map_blocks+0x71e/0x1700
ext4_do_writepages+0x1290/0x2800
[...]
Allocated by task 179:
ext4_find_extent+0x81c/0x1f70
ext4_ext_map_blocks+0x146/0x2d40
ext4_map_blocks+0x71e/0x1700
ext4_do_writepages+0x1290/0x2800
ext4_writepages+0x26d/0x4e0
do_writepages+0x175/0x700
[...]
Freed by task 179:
kfree+0xcb/0x240
ext4_find_extent+0x7c0/0x1f70
ext4_ext_insert_extent+0xa26/0x3330
ext4_ext_map_blocks+0xe22/0x2d40
ext4_map_blocks+0x71e/0x1700
ext4_do_writepages+0x1290/0x2800
ext4_writepages+0x26d/0x4e0
do_writepages+0x175/0x700
[...]
==================================================================
So use *ppath to update the path to avoid the above problem.
Reported-by: Ojaswin Mujoo <ojaswin@linux.ibm.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/r/ZqyL6rmtwl6N4MWR@li-bb2b2a4c-3307-11b2-a85c-8fa5c3a69313.ibm.com
Fixes: 10809df84a4d ("ext4: teach ext4_ext_find_extent() to realloc path if necessary")
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Baokun Li <libaokun1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240822023545.1994557-7-libaokun@huaweicloud.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
