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This is a logical revert of commit e37fdb785a5f ("exec: Use secureexec
for setting dumpability")
This weakens dumpability back to checking only for uid/gid changes in
current (which is useless), but userspace depends on dumpability not
being tied to secureexec.
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1528633
Reported-by: Tom Horsley <horsley1953@gmail.com>
Fixes: e37fdb785a5f ("exec: Use secureexec for setting dumpability")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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This reverts commit 04e35f4495dd560db30c25efca4eecae8ec8c375.
SELinux runs with secureexec for all non-"noatsecure" domain transitions,
which means lots of processes end up hitting the stack hard-limit change
that was introduced in order to fix a race with prlimit(). That race fix
will need to be redesigned.
Reported-by: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Tomáš Trnka <trnka@scm.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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gcc-8 warns about using strncpy() with the source size as the limit:
fs/exec.c:1223:32: error: argument to 'sizeof' in 'strncpy' call is the same expression as the source; did you mean to use the size of the destination? [-Werror=sizeof-pointer-memaccess]
This is indeed slightly suspicious, as it protects us from source
arguments without NUL-termination, but does not guarantee that the
destination is terminated.
This keeps the strncpy() to ensure we have properly padded target
buffer, but ensures that we use the correct length, by passing the
actual length of the destination buffer as well as adding a build-time
check to ensure it is exactly TASK_COMM_LEN.
There are only 23 callsites which I all reviewed to ensure this is
currently the case. We could get away with doing only the check or
passing the right length, but it doesn't hurt to do both.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171205151724.1764896-1-arnd@arndb.de
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Suggested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Cc: Aleksa Sarai <asarai@suse.de>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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While the defense-in-depth RLIMIT_STACK limit on setuid processes was
protected against races from other threads calling setrlimit(), I missed
protecting it against races from external processes calling prlimit().
This adds locking around the change and makes sure that rlim_max is set
too.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171127193457.GA11348@beast
Fixes: 64701dee4178e ("exec: Use sane stack rlimit under secureexec")
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reported-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Reported-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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to READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE()
Please do not apply this to mainline directly, instead please re-run the
coccinelle script shown below and apply its output.
For several reasons, it is desirable to use {READ,WRITE}_ONCE() in
preference to ACCESS_ONCE(), and new code is expected to use one of the
former. So far, there's been no reason to change most existing uses of
ACCESS_ONCE(), as these aren't harmful, and changing them results in
churn.
However, for some features, the read/write distinction is critical to
correct operation. To distinguish these cases, separate read/write
accessors must be used. This patch migrates (most) remaining
ACCESS_ONCE() instances to {READ,WRITE}_ONCE(), using the following
coccinelle script:
----
// Convert trivial ACCESS_ONCE() uses to equivalent READ_ONCE() and
// WRITE_ONCE()
// $ make coccicheck COCCI=/home/mark/once.cocci SPFLAGS="--include-headers" MODE=patch
virtual patch
@ depends on patch @
expression E1, E2;
@@
- ACCESS_ONCE(E1) = E2
+ WRITE_ONCE(E1, E2)
@ depends on patch @
expression E;
@@
- ACCESS_ONCE(E)
+ READ_ONCE(E)
----
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: davem@davemloft.net
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: mpe@ellerman.id.au
Cc: shuah@kernel.org
Cc: snitzer@redhat.com
Cc: thor.thayer@linux.intel.com
Cc: tj@kernel.org
Cc: viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk
Cc: will.deacon@arm.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1508792849-3115-19-git-send-email-paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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This introduces a "register private expedited" membarrier command which
allows eventual removal of important memory barrier constraints on the
scheduler fast-paths. It changes how the "private expedited" membarrier
command (new to 4.14) is used from user-space.
This new command allows processes to register their intent to use the
private expedited command. This affects how the expedited private
command introduced in 4.14-rc is meant to be used, and should be merged
before 4.14 final.
Processes are now required to register before using
MEMBARRIER_CMD_PRIVATE_EXPEDITED, otherwise that command returns EPERM.
This fixes a problem that arose when designing requested extensions to
sys_membarrier() to allow JITs to efficiently flush old code from
instruction caches. Several potential algorithms are much less painful
if the user register intent to use this functionality early on, for
example, before the process spawns the second thread. Registering at
this time removes the need to interrupt each and every thread in that
process at the first expedited sys_membarrier() system call.
Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Patch series "exec: binfmt_misc: fix use-after-free, kill
iname[BINPRM_BUF_SIZE]".
It looks like this code was always wrong, then commit 948b701a607f
("binfmt_misc: add persistent opened binary handler for containers")
added more problems.
This patch (of 6):
load_script() can simply use i_name instead, it points into bprm->buf[]
and nobody can change this memory until we call prepare_binprm().
The only complication is that we need to also change the signature of
bprm_change_interp() but this change looks good too.
While at it, do whitespace/style cleanups.
NOTE: the real motivation for this change is that people want to
increase BINPRM_BUF_SIZE, we need to change load_misc_binary() too but
this looks more complicated because afaics it is very buggy.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170918163446.GA26793@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Travis Gummels <tgummels@redhat.com>
Cc: Ben Woodard <woodard@redhat.com>
Cc: Jim Foraker <foraker1@llnl.gov>
Cc: <tdhooge@llnl.gov>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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This patch constifies the path argument to kernel_read_file_from_path().
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs
Pull more set_fs removal from Al Viro:
"Christoph's 'use kernel_read and friends rather than open-coding
set_fs()' series"
* 'work.set_fs' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
fs: unexport vfs_readv and vfs_writev
fs: unexport vfs_read and vfs_write
fs: unexport __vfs_read/__vfs_write
lustre: switch to kernel_write
gadget/f_mass_storage: stop messing with the address limit
mconsole: switch to kernel_read
btrfs: switch write_buf to kernel_write
net/9p: switch p9_fd_read to kernel_write
mm/nommu: switch do_mmap_private to kernel_read
serial2002: switch serial2002_tty_write to kernel_{read/write}
fs: make the buf argument to __kernel_write a void pointer
fs: fix kernel_write prototype
fs: fix kernel_read prototype
fs: move kernel_read to fs/read_write.c
fs: move kernel_write to fs/read_write.c
autofs4: switch autofs4_write to __kernel_write
ashmem: switch to ->read_iter
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GFP_TEMPORARY was introduced by commit e12ba74d8ff3 ("Group short-lived
and reclaimable kernel allocations") along with __GFP_RECLAIMABLE. It's
primary motivation was to allow users to tell that an allocation is
short lived and so the allocator can try to place such allocations close
together and prevent long term fragmentation. As much as this sounds
like a reasonable semantic it becomes much less clear when to use the
highlevel GFP_TEMPORARY allocation flag. How long is temporary? Can the
context holding that memory sleep? Can it take locks? It seems there is
no good answer for those questions.
The current implementation of GFP_TEMPORARY is basically GFP_KERNEL |
__GFP_RECLAIMABLE which in itself is tricky because basically none of
the existing caller provide a way to reclaim the allocated memory. So
this is rather misleading and hard to evaluate for any benefits.
I have checked some random users and none of them has added the flag
with a specific justification. I suspect most of them just copied from
other existing users and others just thought it might be a good idea to
use without any measuring. This suggests that GFP_TEMPORARY just
motivates for cargo cult usage without any reasoning.
I believe that our gfp flags are quite complex already and especially
those with highlevel semantic should be clearly defined to prevent from
confusion and abuse. Therefore I propose dropping GFP_TEMPORARY and
replace all existing users to simply use GFP_KERNEL. Please note that
SLAB users with shrinkers will still get __GFP_RECLAIMABLE heuristic and
so they will be placed properly for memory fragmentation prevention.
I can see reasons we might want some gfp flag to reflect shorterm
allocations but I propose starting from a clear semantic definition and
only then add users with proper justification.
This was been brought up before LSF this year by Matthew [1] and it
turned out that GFP_TEMPORARY really doesn't have a clear semantic. It
seems to be a heuristic without any measured advantage for most (if not
all) its current users. The follow up discussion has revealed that
opinions on what might be temporary allocation differ a lot between
developers. So rather than trying to tweak existing users into a
semantic which they haven't expected I propose to simply remove the flag
and start from scratch if we really need a semantic for short term
allocations.
[1] http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170118054945.GD18349@bombadil.infradead.org
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix typo]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
[sfr@canb.auug.org.au: drm/i915: fix up]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170816144703.378d4f4d@canb.auug.org.au
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170728091904.14627-1-mhocko@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Acked-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Use proper ssize_t and size_t types for the return value and count
argument, move the offset last and make it an in/out argument like
all other read/write helpers, and make the buf argument a void pointer
to get rid of lots of casts in the callers.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Instead of an additional secureexec check for pdeath_signal, just move it
up into the initial secureexec test. Neither perf nor arch code touches
pdeath_signal, so the relocation shouldn't change anything.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
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For a secureexec, before memory layout selection has happened, reset the
stack rlimit to something sane to avoid the caller having control over
the resulting layouts.
$ ulimit -s
8192
$ ulimit -s unlimited
$ /bin/sh -c 'ulimit -s'
unlimited
$ sudo /bin/sh -c 'ulimit -s'
8192
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
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Since it's already valid to set dumpability in the early part of
setup_new_exec(), we can consolidate the logic into a single place.
The BINPRM_FLAGS_ENFORCE_NONDUMP is set during would_dump() calls
before setup_new_exec(), so its test is safe to move as well.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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Like dumpability, clearing pdeath_signal happens both in setup_new_exec()
and later in commit_creds(). The test in setup_new_exec() is different
from all other privilege comparisons, though: it is checking the new cred
(bprm) uid vs the old cred (current) euid. This appears to be a bug,
introduced by commit a6f76f23d297 ("CRED: Make execve() take advantage of
copy-on-write credentials"):
- if (bprm->e_uid != current_euid() ||
- bprm->e_gid != current_egid()) {
- set_dumpable(current->mm, suid_dumpable);
+ if (bprm->cred->uid != current_euid() ||
+ bprm->cred->gid != current_egid()) {
It was bprm euid vs current euid (and egids), but the effective got
dropped. Nothing in the exec flow changes bprm->cred->uid (nor gid).
The call traces are:
prepare_bprm_creds()
prepare_exec_creds()
prepare_creds()
memcpy(new_creds, old_creds, ...)
security_prepare_creds() (unimplemented by commoncap)
...
prepare_binprm()
bprm_fill_uid()
resets euid/egid to current euid/egid
sets euid/egid on bprm based on set*id file bits
security_bprm_set_creds()
cap_bprm_set_creds()
handle all caps-based manipulations
so this test is effectively a test of current_uid() vs current_euid(),
which is wrong, just like the prior dumpability tests were wrong.
The commit log says "Clear pdeath_signal and set dumpable on
certain circumstances that may not be covered by commit_creds()." This
may be meaning the earlier old euid vs new euid (and egid) test that
got changed.
Luckily, as with dumpability, this is all masked by commit_creds()
which performs old/new euid and egid tests and clears pdeath_signal.
And again, like dumpability, we should include LSM secureexec logic for
pdeath_signal clearing. For example, Smack goes out of its way to clear
pdeath_signal when it finds a secureexec condition.
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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The examination of "current" to decide dumpability is wrong. This was a
check of and euid/uid (or egid/gid) mismatch in the existing process,
not the newly created one. This appears to stretch back into even the
"history.git" tree. Luckily, dumpability is later set in commit_creds().
In earlier kernel versions before creds existed, similar checks also
existed late in the exec flow, covering up the mistake as far back as I
could find.
Note that because the commit_creds() check examines differences of euid,
uid, egid, gid, and capabilities between the old and new creds, it would
look like the setup_new_exec() dumpability test could be entirely removed.
However, the secureexec test may cover a different set of tests (specific
to the LSMs) than what commit_creds() checks for. So, fix this test to
use secureexec (the removed euid tests are redundant to the commoncap
secureexec checks now).
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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This removes the bprm_secureexec hook since the logic has been folded into
the bprm_set_creds hook for all LSMs now.
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
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The commoncap implementation of the bprm_secureexec hook is the only LSM
that depends on the final call to its bprm_set_creds hook (since it may
be called for multiple files, it ignores bprm->called_set_creds). As a
result, it cannot safely _clear_ bprm->secureexec since other LSMs may
have set it. Instead, remove the bprm_secureexec hook by introducing a
new flag to bprm specific to commoncap: cap_elevated. This is similar to
cap_effective, but that is used for a specific subset of elevated
privileges, and exists solely to track state from bprm_set_creds to
bprm_secureexec. As such, it will be removed in the next patch.
Here, set the new bprm->cap_elevated flag when setuid/setgid has happened
from bprm_fill_uid() or fscapabilities have been prepared. This temporarily
moves the bprm_secureexec hook to a static inline. The helper will be
removed in the next patch; this makes the step easier to review and bisect,
since this does not introduce any changes to inputs nor outputs to the
"elevated privileges" calculation.
The new flag is merged with the bprm->secureexec flag in setup_new_exec()
since this marks the end of any further prepare_binprm() calls.
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
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The bprm_secureexec hook can be moved earlier. Right now, it is called
during create_elf_tables(), via load_binary(), via search_binary_handler(),
via exec_binprm(). Nearly all (see exception below) state used by
bprm_secureexec is created during the bprm_set_creds hook, called from
prepare_binprm().
For all LSMs (except commoncaps described next), only the first execution
of bprm_set_creds takes any effect (they all check bprm->called_set_creds
which prepare_binprm() sets after the first call to the bprm_set_creds
hook). However, all these LSMs also only do anything with bprm_secureexec
when they detected a secure state during their first run of bprm_set_creds.
Therefore, it is functionally identical to move the detection into
bprm_set_creds, since the results from secureexec here only need to be
based on the first call to the LSM's bprm_set_creds hook.
The single exception is that the commoncaps secureexec hook also examines
euid/uid and egid/gid differences which are controlled by bprm_fill_uid(),
via prepare_binprm(), which can be called multiple times (e.g.
binfmt_script, binfmt_misc), and may clear the euid/egid for the final
load (i.e. the script interpreter). However, while commoncaps specifically
ignores bprm->cred_prepared, and runs its bprm_set_creds hook each time
prepare_binprm() may get called, it needs to base the secureexec decision
on the final call to bprm_set_creds. As a result, it will need special
handling.
To begin this refactoring, this adds the secureexec flag to the bprm
struct, and calls the secureexec hook during setup_new_exec(). This is
safe since all the cred work is finished (and past the point of no return).
This explicit call will be removed in later patches once the hook has been
removed.
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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In commit 221af7f87b97 ("Split 'flush_old_exec' into two functions"),
the comment about the point of no return should have stayed in
flush_old_exec() since it refers to "bprm->mm = NULL;" line, but prior
changes in commits c89681ed7d0e ("remove steal_locks()"), and
fd8328be874f ("sanitize handling of shared descriptor tables in failing
execve()") made it look like it meant the current->sas_ss_sp line instead.
The comment was referring to the fact that once bprm->mm is NULL, all
failures from a binfmt load_binary hook (e.g. load_elf_binary), will
get SEGV raised against current. Move this comment and expand the
explanation a bit, putting it above the assignment this time, and add
details about the true nature of "point of no return" being the call
to flush_old_exec() itself.
This also removes an erroneous commet about when credentials are being
installed. That has its own dedicated function, install_exec_creds(),
which carries a similar (and correct) comment, so remove the bogus comment
where installation is not actually happening.
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
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The cred_prepared bprm flag has a misleading name. It has nothing to do
with the bprm_prepare_cred hook, and actually tracks if bprm_set_creds has
been called. Rename this flag and improve its comment.
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
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To avoid pathological stack usage or the need to special-case setuid
execs, just limit all arg stack usage to at most 75% of _STK_LIM (6MB).
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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When limiting the argv/envp strings during exec to 1/4 of the stack limit,
the storage of the pointers to the strings was not included. This means
that an exec with huge numbers of tiny strings could eat 1/4 of the stack
limit in strings and then additional space would be later used by the
pointers to the strings.
For example, on 32-bit with a 8MB stack rlimit, an exec with 1677721
single-byte strings would consume less than 2MB of stack, the max (8MB /
4) amount allowed, but the pointers to the strings would consume the
remaining additional stack space (1677721 * 4 == 6710884).
The result (1677721 + 6710884 == 8388605) would exhaust stack space
entirely. Controlling this stack exhaustion could result in
pathological behavior in setuid binaries (CVE-2017-1000365).
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: additional commenting from Kees]
Fixes: b6a2fea39318 ("mm: variable length argument support")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170622001720.GA32173@beast
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Qualys Security Advisory <qsa@qualys.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Intel supports faulting on the CPUID instruction beginning with Ivy Bridge.
When enabled, the processor will fault on attempts to execute the CPUID
instruction with CPL>0. Exposing this feature to userspace will allow a
ptracer to trap and emulate the CPUID instruction.
When supported, this feature is controlled by toggling bit 0 of
MSR_MISC_FEATURES_ENABLES. It is documented in detail in Section 2.3.2 of
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/attachment.cgi?id=243991
Implement a new pair of arch_prctls, available on both x86-32 and x86-64.
ARCH_GET_CPUID: Returns the current CPUID state, either 0 if CPUID faulting
is enabled (and thus the CPUID instruction is not available) or 1 if
CPUID faulting is not enabled.
ARCH_SET_CPUID: Set the CPUID state to the second argument. If
cpuid_enabled is 0 CPUID faulting will be activated, otherwise it will
be deactivated. Returns ENODEV if CPUID faulting is not supported on
this system.
The state of the CPUID faulting flag is propagated across forks, but reset
upon exec.
Signed-off-by: Kyle Huey <khuey@kylehuey.com>
Cc: Grzegorz Andrejczuk <grzegorz.andrejczuk@intel.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>
Cc: Robert O'Callahan <robert@ocallahan.org>
Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: user-mode-linux-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
Cc: Jeff Dike <jdike@addtoit.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: user-mode-linux-user@lists.sourceforge.net
Cc: David Matlack <dmatlack@google.com>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Dmitry Safonov <dsafonov@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170320081628.18952-9-khuey@kylehuey.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
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<linux/sched/task.h>
We are going to split <linux/sched/task.h> out of <linux/sched.h>, which
will have to be picked up from other headers and a couple of .c files.
Create a trivial placeholder <linux/sched/task.h> file that just
maps to <linux/sched.h> to make this patch obviously correct and
bisectable.
Include the new header in the files that are going to need it.
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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<linux/sched/numa_balancing.h>
We are going to split <linux/sched/numa_balancing.h> out of <linux/sched.h>, which
will have to be picked up from other headers and a couple of .c files.
Create a trivial placeholder <linux/sched/numa_balancing.h> file that just
maps to <linux/sched.h> to make this patch obviously correct and
bisectable.
Include the new header in the files that are going to need it.
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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<linux/sched/signal.h>
We are going to split <linux/sched/signal.h> out of <linux/sched.h>, which
will have to be picked up from other headers and a couple of .c files.
Create a trivial placeholder <linux/sched/signal.h> file that just
maps to <linux/sched.h> to make this patch obviously correct and
bisectable.
Include the new header in the files that are going to need it.
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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<linux/sched/coredump.h>
We are going to split <linux/sched/coredump.h> out of <linux/sched.h>, which
will have to be picked up from other headers and a couple of .c files.
Create a trivial placeholder <linux/sched/coredump.h> file that just
maps to <linux/sched.h> to make this patch obviously correct and
bisectable.
Include the new header in the files that are going to need it.
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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<linux/sched/mm.h>
We are going to split <linux/sched/mm.h> out of <linux/sched.h>, which
will have to be picked up from other headers and a couple of .c files.
Create a trivial placeholder <linux/sched/mm.h> file that just
maps to <linux/sched.h> to make this patch obviously correct and
bisectable.
The APIs that are going to be moved first are:
mm_alloc()
__mmdrop()
mmdrop()
mmdrop_async_fn()
mmdrop_async()
mmget_not_zero()
mmput()
mmput_async()
get_task_mm()
mm_access()
mm_release()
Include the new header in the files that are going to need it.
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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threadgroup_change_begin()/end() is a pointless wrapper around
cgroup_threadgroup_change_begin()/end(), minus a might_sleep()
in the !CONFIG_CGROUPS=y case.
Remove the wrappery, move the might_sleep() (the down_read()
already has a might_sleep() check).
This debloats <linux/sched.h> a bit and simplifies this API.
Update all call sites.
No change in functionality.
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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Right now bprm_fill_uid() uses inode fetched from file_inode(bprm->file).
This in turn returns inode of lower filesystem (in a stacked filesystem
setup).
I was playing with modified patches of shiftfs posted by james bottomley
and realized that through shiftfs setuid bit does not take effect. And
reason being that we fetch uid/gid from inode of lower fs (and not from
shiftfs inode). And that results in following checks failing.
/* We ignore suid/sgid if there are no mappings for them in the ns */
if (!kuid_has_mapping(bprm->cred->user_ns, uid) ||
!kgid_has_mapping(bprm->cred->user_ns, gid))
return;
uid/gid fetched from lower fs inode might not be mapped inside the user
namespace of container. So we need to look at uid/gid fetched from
upper filesystem (shiftfs in this particular case) and these should be
mapped and setuid bit can take affect.
Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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With previous changes every location that tests for
LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP also tests for LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE making the
LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP redundant, so remove it.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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This was entirely automated, using the script by Al:
PATT='^[[:blank:]]*#[[:blank:]]*include[[:blank:]]*<asm/uaccess.h>'
sed -i -e "s!$PATT!#include <linux/uaccess.h>!" \
$(git grep -l "$PATT"|grep -v ^include/linux/uaccess.h)
to do the replacement at the end of the merge window.
Requested-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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If you have a process that has set itself to be non-dumpable, and it
then undergoes exec(2), any CLOEXEC file descriptors it has open are
"exposed" during a race window between the dumpable flags of the process
being reset for exec(2) and CLOEXEC being applied to the file
descriptors. This can be exploited by a process by attempting to access
/proc/<pid>/fd/... during this window, without requiring CAP_SYS_PTRACE.
The race in question is after set_dumpable has been (for get_link,
though the trace is basically the same for readlink):
[vfs]
-> proc_pid_link_inode_operations.get_link
-> proc_pid_get_link
-> proc_fd_access_allowed
-> ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS);
Which will return 0, during the race window and CLOEXEC file descriptors
will still be open during this window because do_close_on_exec has not
been called yet. As a result, the ordering of these calls should be
reversed to avoid this race window.
This is of particular concern to container runtimes, where joining a
PID namespace with file descriptors referring to the host filesystem
can result in security issues (since PRCTL_SET_DUMPABLE doesn't protect
against access of CLOEXEC file descriptors -- file descriptors which may
reference filesystem objects the container shouldn't have access to).
Cc: dev@opencontainers.org
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.2+
Reported-by: Michael Crosby <crosbymichael@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <asarai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Merge more updates from Andrew Morton:
- a few misc things
- kexec updates
- DMA-mapping updates to better support networking DMA operations
- IPC updates
- various MM changes to improve DAX fault handling
- lots of radix-tree changes, mainly to the test suite. All leading up
to reimplementing the IDA/IDR code to be a wrapper layer over the
radix-tree. However the final trigger-pulling patch is held off for
4.11.
* emailed patches from Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>: (114 commits)
radix tree test suite: delete unused rcupdate.c
radix tree test suite: add new tag check
radix-tree: ensure counts are initialised
radix tree test suite: cache recently freed objects
radix tree test suite: add some more functionality
idr: reduce the number of bits per level from 8 to 6
rxrpc: abstract away knowledge of IDR internals
tpm: use idr_find(), not idr_find_slowpath()
idr: add ida_is_empty
radix tree test suite: check multiorder iteration
radix-tree: fix replacement for multiorder entries
radix-tree: add radix_tree_split_preload()
radix-tree: add radix_tree_split
radix-tree: add radix_tree_join
radix-tree: delete radix_tree_range_tag_if_tagged()
radix-tree: delete radix_tree_locate_item()
radix-tree: improve multiorder iterators
btrfs: fix race in btrfs_free_dummy_fs_info()
radix-tree: improve dump output
radix-tree: make radix_tree_find_next_bit more useful
...
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Patch series "mm: unexport __get_user_pages_unlocked()".
This patch series continues the cleanup of get_user_pages*() functions
taking advantage of the fact we can now pass gup_flags as we please.
It firstly adds an additional 'locked' parameter to
get_user_pages_remote() to allow for its callers to utilise
VM_FAULT_RETRY functionality. This is necessary as the invocation of
__get_user_pages_unlocked() in process_vm_rw_single_vec() makes use of
this and no other existing higher level function would allow it to do
so.
Secondly existing callers of __get_user_pages_unlocked() are replaced
with the appropriate higher-level replacement -
get_user_pages_unlocked() if the current task and memory descriptor are
referenced, or get_user_pages_remote() if other task/memory descriptors
are referenced (having acquiring mmap_sem.)
This patch (of 2):
Add a int *locked parameter to get_user_pages_remote() to allow
VM_FAULT_RETRY faulting behaviour similar to get_user_pages_[un]locked().
Taking into account the previous adjustments to get_user_pages*()
functions allowing for the passing of gup_flags, we are now in a
position where __get_user_pages_unlocked() need only be exported for his
ability to allow VM_FAULT_RETRY behaviour, this adjustment allows us to
subsequently unexport __get_user_pages_unlocked() as well as allowing
for future flexibility in the use of get_user_pages_remote().
[sfr@canb.auug.org.au: merge fix for get_user_pages_remote API change]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20161122210511.024ec341@canb.auug.org.au
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20161027095141.2569-2-lstoakes@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Stoakes <lstoakes@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Radim Krcmar <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace
Pull namespace updates from Eric Biederman:
"After a lot of discussion and work we have finally reachanged a basic
understanding of what is necessary to make unprivileged mounts safe in
the presence of EVM and IMA xattrs which the last commit in this
series reflects. While technically it is a revert the comments it adds
are important for people not getting confused in the future. Clearing
up that confusion allows us to seriously work on unprivileged mounts
of fuse in the next development cycle.
The rest of the fixes in this set are in the intersection of user
namespaces, ptrace, and exec. I started with the first fix which
started a feedback cycle of finding additional issues during review
and fixing them. Culiminating in a fix for a bug that has been present
since at least Linux v1.0.
Potentially these fixes were candidates for being merged during the rc
cycle, and are certainly backport candidates but enough little things
turned up during review and testing that I decided they should be
handled as part of the normal development process just to be certain
there were not any great surprises when it came time to backport some
of these fixes"
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace:
Revert "evm: Translate user/group ids relative to s_user_ns when computing HMAC"
exec: Ensure mm->user_ns contains the execed files
ptrace: Don't allow accessing an undumpable mm
ptrace: Capture the ptracer's creds not PT_PTRACE_CAP
mm: Add a user_ns owner to mm_struct and fix ptrace permission checks
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When the user namespace support was merged the need to prevent
ptrace from revealing the contents of an unreadable executable
was overlooked.
Correct this oversight by ensuring that the executed file
or files are in mm->user_ns, by adjusting mm->user_ns.
Use the new function privileged_wrt_inode_uidgid to see if
the executable is a member of the user namespace, and as such
if having CAP_SYS_PTRACE in the user namespace should allow
tracing the executable. If not update mm->user_ns to
the parent user namespace until an appropriate parent is found.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Fixes: 9e4a36ece652 ("userns: Fail exec for suid and sgid binaries with ids outside our user namespace.")
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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When the flag PT_PTRACE_CAP was added the PTRACE_TRACEME path was
overlooked. This can result in incorrect behavior when an application
like strace traces an exec of a setuid executable.
Further PT_PTRACE_CAP does not have enough information for making good
security decisions as it does not report which user namespace the
capability is in. This has already allowed one mistake through
insufficient granulariy.
I found this issue when I was testing another corner case of exec and
discovered that I could not get strace to set PT_PTRACE_CAP even when
running strace as root with a full set of caps.
This change fixes the above issue with strace allowing stracing as
root a setuid executable without disabling setuid. More fundamentaly
this change allows what is allowable at all times, by using the correct
information in it's decision.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 4214e42f96d4 ("v2.4.9.11 -> v2.4.9.12")
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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Some embedded systems have no use for them. This removes about
25KB from the kernel binary size when configured out.
Corresponding syscalls are routed to a stub logging the attempt to
use those syscalls which should be enough of a clue if they were
disabled without proper consideration. They are: timer_create,
timer_gettime: timer_getoverrun, timer_settime, timer_delete,
clock_adjtime, setitimer, getitimer, alarm.
The clock_settime, clock_gettime, clock_getres and clock_nanosleep
syscalls are replaced by simple wrappers compatible with CLOCK_REALTIME,
CLOCK_MONOTONIC and CLOCK_BOOTTIME only which should cover the vast
majority of use cases with very little code.
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Pitre <nico@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Richard Cochran <richardcochran@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>
Cc: Paul Bolle <pebolle@tiscali.nl>
Cc: linux-kbuild@vger.kernel.org
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.com>
Cc: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1478841010-28605-7-git-send-email-nicolas.pitre@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
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This removes the 'write' and 'force' from get_user_pages_remote() and
replaces them with 'gup_flags' to make the use of FOLL_FORCE explicit in
callers as use of this flag can result in surprising behaviour (and
hence bugs) within the mm subsystem.
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Stoakes <lstoakes@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gerg/m68knommu
Pull m68knommu updates from Greg Ungerer:
"This series is all about Nicolas flat format support for MMU systems.
Traditional m68k no-MMU flat format binaries can now be run on m68k
MMU enabled systems too. The series includes some nice cleanups of
the binfmt_flat code and converts it to using proper user space
accessor functions.
With all this in place you can boot and run a complete no-MMU flat
format based user space on an MMU enabled system"
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gerg/m68knommu:
m68k: enable binfmt_flat on systems with an MMU
binfmt_flat: allow compressed flat binary format to work on MMU systems
binfmt_flat: add MMU-specific support
binfmt_flat: update libraries' data segment pointer with userspace accessors
binfmt_flat: use clear_user() rather than memset() to clear .bss
binfmt_flat: use proper user space accessors with old relocs code
binfmt_flat: use proper user space accessors with relocs processing code
binfmt_flat: clean up create_flat_tables() and stack accesses
binfmt_flat: use generic transfer_args_to_stack()
elf_fdpic_transfer_args_to_stack(): make it generic
binfmt_flat: prevent kernel dammage from corrupted executable headers
binfmt_flat: convert printk invocations to their modern form
binfmt_flat: assorted cleanups
m68k: use same start_thread() on MMU and no-MMU
m68k: fix file path comment
m68k: fix bFLT executable running on MMU enabled systems
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Some systems are memory constrained but they need to load very large
firmwares. The firmware subsystem allows drivers to request this
firmware be loaded from the filesystem, but this requires that the
entire firmware be loaded into kernel memory first before it's provided
to the driver. This can lead to a situation where we map the firmware
twice, once to load the firmware into kernel memory and once to copy the
firmware into the final resting place.
This creates needless memory pressure and delays loading because we have
to copy from kernel memory to somewhere else. Let's add a
request_firmware_into_buf() API that allows drivers to request firmware
be loaded directly into a pre-allocated buffer. This skips the
intermediate step of allocating a buffer in kernel memory to hold the
firmware image while it's read from the filesystem. It also requires
that drivers know how much memory they'll require before requesting the
firmware and negates any benefits of firmware caching because the
firmware layer doesn't manage the buffer lifetime.
For a 16MB buffer, about half the time is spent performing a memcpy from
the buffer to the final resting place. I see loading times go from
0.081171 seconds to 0.047696 seconds after applying this patch. Plus
the vmalloc pressure is reduced.
This is based on a patch from Vikram Mulukutla on codeaurora.org:
https://www.codeaurora.org/cgit/quic/la/kernel/msm-3.18/commit/drivers/base/firmware_class.c?h=rel/msm-3.18&id=0a328c5f6cd999f5c591f172216835636f39bcb5
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160607164741.31849-4-stephen.boyd@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Stephen Boyd <stephen.boyd@linaro.org>
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Vikram Mulukutla <markivx@codeaurora.org>
Cc: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Cc: Ming Lei <ming.lei@canonical.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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This copying of arguments and environment is common to both NOMMU
binary formats we support. Let's make the elf_fdpic version available
to the flat format as well.
While at it, improve the code a bit not to copy below the actual
data area.
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Pitre <nico@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Greg Ungerer <gerg@linux-m68k.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Ungerer <gerg@linux-m68k.org>
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If a process gets access to a mount from a different user
namespace, that process should not be able to take advantage of
setuid files or selinux entrypoints from that filesystem. Prevent
this by treating mounts from other mount namespaces and those not
owned by current_user_ns() or an ancestor as nosuid.
This will make it safer to allow more complex filesystems to be
mounted in non-root user namespaces.
This does not remove the need for MNT_LOCK_NOSUID. The setuid,
setgid, and file capability bits can no longer be abused if code in
a user namespace were to clear nosuid on an untrusted filesystem,
but this patch, by itself, is insufficient to protect the system
from abuse of files that, when execed, would increase MAC privilege.
As a more concrete explanation, any task that can manipulate a
vfsmount associated with a given user namespace already has
capabilities in that namespace and all of its descendents. If they
can cause a malicious setuid, setgid, or file-caps executable to
appear in that mount, then that executable will only allow them to
elevate privileges in exactly the set of namespaces in which they
are already privileges.
On the other hand, if they can cause a malicious executable to
appear with a dangerous MAC label, running it could change the
caller's security context in a way that should not have been
possible, even inside the namespace in which the task is confined.
As a hardening measure, this would have made CVE-2014-5207 much
more difficult to exploit.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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setup_arg_pages requires mmap_sem for write. If the waiting task gets
killed by the oom killer it would block oom_reaper from asynchronous
address space reclaim and reduce the chances of timely OOM resolving.
Wait for the lock in the killable mode and return with EINTR if the task
got killed while waiting. All the callers are already handling error
path and the fatal signal doesn't need any additional treatment.
The same applies to __bprm_mm_init.
Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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remove_arg_zero() does free_arg_page() for no reason. This was needed
before and only if CONFIG_MMU=y: see commit 4fc75ff4816c ("exec: fix
remove_arg_zero"), install_arg_page() was called for every page != NULL
in bprm->page[] array. Today install_arg_page() has already gone and
free_arg_page() is nop after another commit b6a2fea39318 ("mm: variable
length argument support").
CONFIG_MMU=n does free_arg_pages() in free_bprm() and thus it doesn't
need remove_arg_zero()->free_arg_page() too; apart from get_arg_page()
it never checks if the page in bprm->page[] was allocated or not, so the
"extra" non-freed page is fine. OTOH, this free_arg_page() can add the
minor pessimization, the caller is going to do copy_strings_kernel()
right after remove_arg_zero() which will likely need to re-allocate the
same page again.
And as Hujunjie pointed out, the "offset == PAGE_SIZE" check is wrong
because we are going to increment bprm->p once again before return, so
CONFIG_MMU=n "leaks" the page anyway if '0' is the final byte in this
page.
NOTE: remove_arg_zero() assumes that argv[0] is null-terminated but this
is not necessarily true. copy_strings() does "len = strnlen_user(...)",
then copy_from_user(len) but another thread or debuger can overwrite the
trailing '0' in between. Afaics nothing really bad can happen because
we must always have the null-terminated bprm->filename copied by the 1st
copy_strings_kernel(), but perhaps we should change this code to check
"bprm->p < bprm->exec" anyway, and/or change copy_strings() to ensure
that the last byte in string is always zero.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160517155335.GA31435@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reported by: hujunjie <jj.net@163.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
"Highlights:
- A new LSM, "LoadPin", from Kees Cook is added, which allows forcing
of modules and firmware to be loaded from a specific device (this
is from ChromeOS, where the device as a whole is verified
cryptographically via dm-verity).
This is disabled by default but can be configured to be enabled by
default (don't do this if you don't know what you're doing).
- Keys: allow authentication data to be stored in an asymmetric key.
Lots of general fixes and updates.
- SELinux: add restrictions for loading of kernel modules via
finit_module(). Distinguish non-init user namespace capability
checks. Apply execstack check on thread stacks"
* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (48 commits)
LSM: LoadPin: provide enablement CONFIG
Yama: use atomic allocations when reporting
seccomp: Fix comment typo
ima: add support for creating files using the mknodat syscall
ima: fix ima_inode_post_setattr
vfs: forbid write access when reading a file into memory
fs: fix over-zealous use of "const"
selinux: apply execstack check on thread stacks
selinux: distinguish non-init user namespace capability checks
LSM: LoadPin for kernel file loading restrictions
fs: define a string representation of the kernel_read_file_id enumeration
Yama: consolidate error reporting
string_helpers: add kstrdup_quotable_file
string_helpers: add kstrdup_quotable_cmdline
string_helpers: add kstrdup_quotable
selinux: check ss_initialized before revalidating an inode label
selinux: delay inode label lookup as long as possible
selinux: don't revalidate an inode's label when explicitly setting it
selinux: Change bool variable name to index.
KEYS: Add KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE command
...
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This section of code initially looks redundant, but is required. This
improves the comment to explain more clearly why the reset is needed.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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