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2022-06-25Revert "hwmon: Make chip parameter for with_info API mandatory"Greg Kroah-Hartman1-7/+9
This reverts commit 1ec0bc72f5dab3ab367ae5230cf6f212d805a225 which is commit ddaefa209c4ac791c1262e97c9b2d0440c8ef1d5 upstream. It should not have been applied to the stable trees. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220622154454.GA1864037@roeck-us.net Reported-by: Julian Haller <julian.haller@philips.com> Reported-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> Cc: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-06-25usb: gadget: u_ether: fix regression in setting fixed MAC addressMarian Postevca1-2/+9
commit b337af3a4d6147000b7ca6b3438bf5c820849b37 upstream. In systemd systems setting a fixed MAC address through the "dev_addr" module argument fails systematically. When checking the MAC address after the interface is created it always has the same but different MAC address to the one supplied as argument. This is partially caused by systemd which by default will set an internally generated permanent MAC address for interfaces that are marked as having a randomly generated address. Commit 890d5b40908bfd1a ("usb: gadget: u_ether: fix race in setting MAC address in setup phase") didn't take into account the fact that the interface must be marked as having a set MAC address when it's set as module argument. Fixed by marking the interface with NET_ADDR_SET when the "dev_addr" module argument is supplied. Fixes: 890d5b40908bfd1a ("usb: gadget: u_ether: fix race in setting MAC address in setup phase") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Marian Postevca <posteuca@mutex.one> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220603153459.32722-1-posteuca@mutex.one Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-06-25virtio-pci: Remove wrong address verification in vp_del_vqs()Murilo Opsfelder Araujo1-2/+1
commit 7e415282b41bf0d15c6e0fe268f822d9b083f2f7 upstream. GCC 12 enhanced -Waddress when comparing array address to null [0], which warns: drivers/virtio/virtio_pci_common.c: In function ‘vp_del_vqs’: drivers/virtio/virtio_pci_common.c:257:29: warning: the comparison will always evaluate as ‘true’ for the pointer operand in ‘vp_dev->msix_affinity_masks + (sizetype)((long unsigned int)i * 256)’ must not be NULL [-Waddress] 257 | if (vp_dev->msix_affinity_masks[i]) | ^~~~~~ In fact, the verification is comparing the result of a pointer arithmetic, the address "msix_affinity_masks + i", which will always evaluate to true. Under the hood, free_cpumask_var() calls kfree(), which is safe to pass NULL, not requiring non-null verification. So remove the verification to make compiler happy (happy compiler, happy life). [0] https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=102103 Signed-off-by: Murilo Opsfelder Araujo <muriloo@linux.ibm.com> Message-Id: <20220415023002.49805-1-muriloo@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Acked-by: Christophe de Dinechin <dinechin@redhat.com> Cc: Sudip Mukherjee <sudipm.mukherjee@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-06-25serial: 8250: Store to lsr_save_flags after lsr readIlpo Järvinen1-0/+2
commit be03b0651ffd8bab69dfd574c6818b446c0753ce upstream. Not all LSR register flags are preserved across reads. Therefore, LSR readers must store the non-preserved bits into lsr_save_flags. This fix was initially mixed into feature commit f6f586102add ("serial: 8250: Handle UART without interrupt on TEMT using em485"). However, that feature change had a flaw and it was reverted to make room for simpler approach providing the same feature. The embedded fix got reverted with the feature change. Re-add the lsr_save_flags fix and properly mark it's a fix. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/1d6c31d-d194-9e6a-ddf9-5f29af829f3@linux.intel.com/T/#m1737eef986bd20cf19593e344cebd7b0244945fc Fixes: e490c9144cfa ("tty: Add software emulated RS485 support for 8250") Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org> Acked-by: Uwe Kleine-König <u.kleine-koenig@penugtronix.de> Signed-off-by: Uwe Kleine-König <u.kleine-koenig@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Ilpo Järvinen <ilpo.jarvinen@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/f4d774be-1437-a550-8334-19d8722ab98c@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-06-25usb: gadget: lpc32xx_udc: Fix refcount leak in lpc32xx_udc_probeMiaoqian Lin1-0/+1
commit 4757c9ade34178b351580133771f510b5ffcf9c8 upstream. of_parse_phandle() returns a node pointer with refcount incremented, we should use of_node_put() on it when not need anymore. Add missing of_node_put() to avoid refcount leak. of_node_put() will check NULL pointer. Fixes: 24a28e428351 ("USB: gadget driver for LPC32xx") Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Miaoqian Lin <linmq006@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220603140246.64529-1-linmq006@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-06-25usb: dwc2: Fix memory leak in dwc2_hcd_initMiaoqian Lin1-1/+1
commit 3755278f078460b021cd0384562977bf2039a57a upstream. usb_create_hcd will alloc memory for hcd, and we should call usb_put_hcd to free it when platform_get_resource() fails to prevent memory leak. goto error2 label instead error1 to fix this. Fixes: 856e6e8e0f93 ("usb: dwc2: check return value after calling platform_get_resource()") Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org> Acked-by: Minas Harutyunyan <hminas@synopsys.com> Signed-off-by: Miaoqian Lin <linmq006@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220530085413.44068-1-linmq006@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-06-25USB: serial: io_ti: add Agilent E5805A supportRobert Eckelmann2-0/+3
commit 908e698f2149c3d6a67d9ae15c75545a3f392559 upstream. Add support for Agilent E5805A (rebranded ION Edgeport/4) to io_ti. Signed-off-by: Robert Eckelmann <longnoserob@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220521230808.30931eca@octoberrain Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-06-25USB: serial: option: add support for Cinterion MV31 with new baselineSlark Xiao1-0/+6
commit 158f7585bfcea4aae0ad4128d032a80fec550df1 upstream. Adding support for Cinterion device MV31 with Qualcomm new baseline. Use different PIDs to separate it from previous base line products. All interfaces settings keep same as previous. Below is test evidence: T: Bus=03 Lev=01 Prnt=01 Port=00 Cnt=01 Dev#= 6 Spd=480 MxCh= 0 D: Ver= 2.10 Cls=ef(misc ) Sub=02 Prot=01 MxPS=64 #Cfgs= 1 P: Vendor=1e2d ProdID=00b8 Rev=04.14 S: Manufacturer=Cinterion S: Product=Cinterion PID 0x00B8 USB Mobile Broadband S: SerialNumber=90418e79 C: #Ifs= 6 Cfg#= 1 Atr=a0 MxPwr=500mA I: If#=0x0 Alt= 0 #EPs= 1 Cls=02(commc) Sub=0e Prot=00 Driver=cdc_mbim I: If#=0x1 Alt= 1 #EPs= 2 Cls=0a(data ) Sub=00 Prot=02 Driver=cdc_mbim I: If#=0x2 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=40 Driver=option I: If#=0x3 Alt= 0 #EPs= 1 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=(none) I: If#=0x4 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=60 Driver=option I: If#=0x5 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=30 Driver=option T: Bus=03 Lev=01 Prnt=01 Port=00 Cnt=01 Dev#= 7 Spd=480 MxCh= 0 D: Ver= 2.10 Cls=ef(misc ) Sub=02 Prot=01 MxPS=64 #Cfgs= 1 P: Vendor=1e2d ProdID=00b9 Rev=04.14 S: Manufacturer=Cinterion S: Product=Cinterion PID 0x00B9 USB Mobile Broadband S: SerialNumber=90418e79 C: #Ifs= 4 Cfg#= 1 Atr=a0 MxPwr=500mA I: If#=0x0 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=50 Driver=qmi_wwan I: If#=0x1 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=40 Driver=option I: If#=0x2 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=60 Driver=option I: If#=0x3 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=30 Driver=option For PID 00b8, interface 3 is GNSS port which don't use serial driver. Signed-off-by: Slark Xiao <slark_xiao@163.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220601034740.5438-1-slark_xiao@163.com [ johan: rename defines using a "2" infix ] Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-06-25comedi: vmk80xx: fix expression for tx buffer sizeIan Abbott1-1/+1
commit 242439f7e279d86b3f73b5de724bc67b2f8aeb07 upstream. The expression for setting the size of the allocated bulk TX buffer (`devpriv->usb_tx_buf`) is calling `usb_endpoint_maxp(devpriv->ep_rx)`, which is using the wrong endpoint (should be `devpriv->ep_tx`). Fix it. Fixes: a23461c47482 ("comedi: vmk80xx: fix transfer-buffer overflow") Cc: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.9+ Reviewed-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ian Abbott <abbotti@mev.co.uk> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220607171819.4121-1-abbotti@mev.co.uk Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-06-25irqchip/gic-v3: Fix refcount leak in gic_populate_ppi_partitionsMiaoqian Lin1-1/+4
[ Upstream commit fa1ad9d4cc47ca2470cd904ad4519f05d7e43a2b ] of_find_node_by_phandle() returns a node pointer with refcount incremented, we should use of_node_put() on it when not need anymore. Add missing of_node_put() to avoid refcount leak. Fixes: e3825ba1af3a ("irqchip/gic-v3: Add support for partitioned PPIs") Signed-off-by: Miaoqian Lin <linmq006@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220601080930.31005-6-linmq006@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2022-06-25irqchip/gic/realview: Fix refcount leak in realview_gic_of_initMiaoqian Lin1-0/+1
[ Upstream commit f4b98e314888cc51486421bcf6d52852452ea48b ] of_find_matching_node_and_match() returns a node pointer with refcount incremented, we should use of_node_put() on it when not need anymore. Add missing of_node_put() to avoid refcount leak. Fixes: 82b0a434b436 ("irqchip/gic/realview: Support more RealView DCC variants") Signed-off-by: Miaoqian Lin <linmq006@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220601080930.31005-2-linmq006@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2022-06-25net: bgmac: Fix an erroneous kfree() in bgmac_remove()Christophe JAILLET1-1/+0
[ Upstream commit d7dd6eccfbc95ac47a12396f84e7e1b361db654b ] 'bgmac' is part of a managed resource allocated with bgmac_alloc(). It should not be freed explicitly. Remove the erroneous kfree() from the .remove() function. Fixes: 34a5102c3235 ("net: bgmac: allocate struct bgmac just once & don't copy it") Signed-off-by: Christophe JAILLET <christophe.jaillet@wanadoo.fr> Reviewed-by: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/a026153108dd21239036a032b95c25b5cece253b.1655153616.git.christophe.jaillet@wanadoo.fr Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2022-06-25mlxsw: spectrum_cnt: Reorder counter poolsPetr Machata1-1/+1
[ Upstream commit 4b7a632ac4e7101ceefee8484d5c2ca505d347b3 ] Both RIF and ACL flow counters use a 24-bit SW-managed counter address to communicate which counter they want to bind. In a number of Spectrum FW releases, binding a RIF counter is broken and slices the counter index to 16 bits. As a result, on Spectrum-2 and above, no more than about 410 RIF counters can be effectively used. This translates to 205 netdevices for which L3 HW stats can be enabled. (This does not happen on Spectrum-1, because there are fewer counters available overall and the counter index never exceeds 16 bits.) Binding counters to ACLs does not have this issue. Therefore reorder the counter allocation scheme so that RIF counters come first and therefore get lower indices that are below the 16-bit barrier. Fixes: 98e60dce4da1 ("Merge branch 'mlxsw-Introduce-initial-Spectrum-2-support'") Reported-by: Maksym Yaremchuk <maksymy@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Petr Machata <petrm@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220613125017.2018162-1-idosch@nvidia.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2022-06-25misc: atmel-ssc: Fix IRQ check in ssc_probeMiaoqian Lin1-2/+2
[ Upstream commit 1c245358ce0b13669f6d1625f7a4e05c41f28980 ] platform_get_irq() returns negative error number instead 0 on failure. And the doc of platform_get_irq() provides a usage example: int irq = platform_get_irq(pdev, 0); if (irq < 0) return irq; Fix the check of return value to catch errors correctly. Fixes: eb1f2930609b ("Driver for the Atmel on-chip SSC on AT32AP and AT91") Reviewed-by: Claudiu Beznea <claudiu.beznea@microchip.com> Signed-off-by: Miaoqian Lin <linmq006@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220601123026.7119-1-linmq006@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2022-06-25tty: goldfish: Fix free_irq() on removeVincent Whitchurch1-1/+1
[ Upstream commit 499e13aac6c762e1e828172b0f0f5275651d6512 ] Pass the correct dev_id to free_irq() to fix this splat when the driver is unbound: WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 30 at kernel/irq/manage.c:1895 free_irq Trying to free already-free IRQ 65 Call Trace: warn_slowpath_fmt free_irq goldfish_tty_remove platform_remove device_remove device_release_driver_internal device_driver_detach unbind_store drv_attr_store ... Fixes: 465893e18878e119 ("tty: goldfish: support platform_device with id -1") Signed-off-by: Vincent Whitchurch <vincent.whitchurch@axis.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220609141704.1080024-1-vincent.whitchurch@axis.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2022-06-25i40e: Fix call trace in setup_tx_descriptorsAleksandr Loktionov1-8/+17
[ Upstream commit fd5855e6b1358e816710afee68a1d2bc685176ca ] After PF reset and ethtool -t there was call trace in dmesg sometimes leading to panic. When there was some time, around 5 seconds, between reset and test there were no errors. Problem was that pf reset calls i40e_vsi_close in prep_for_reset and ethtool -t calls i40e_vsi_close in diag_test. If there was not enough time between those commands the second i40e_vsi_close starts before previous i40e_vsi_close was done which leads to crash. Add check to diag_test if pf is in reset and don't start offline tests if it is true. Add netif_info("testing failed") into unhappy path of i40e_diag_test() Fixes: e17bc411aea8 ("i40e: Disable offline diagnostics if VFs are enabled") Fixes: 510efb2682b3 ("i40e: Fix ethtool offline diagnostic with netqueues") Signed-off-by: Michal Jaron <michalx.jaron@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Aleksandr Loktionov <aleksandr.loktionov@intel.com> Tested-by: Gurucharan <gurucharanx.g@intel.com> (A Contingent worker at Intel) Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2022-06-25i40e: Fix adding ADQ filter to TC0Grzegorz Szczurek1-0/+5
[ Upstream commit c3238d36c3a2be0a29a9d848d6c51e1b14be6692 ] Procedure of configure tc flower filters erroneously allows to create filters on TC0 where unfiltered packets are also directed by default. Issue was caused by insufficient checks of hw_tc parameter specifying the hardware traffic class to pass matching packets to. Fix checking hw_tc parameter which blocks creation of filters on TC0. Fixes: 2f4b411a3d67 ("i40e: Enable cloud filters via tc-flower") Signed-off-by: Grzegorz Szczurek <grzegorzx.szczurek@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jedrzej Jagielski <jedrzej.jagielski@intel.com> Tested-by: Bharathi Sreenivas <bharathi.sreenivas@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2022-06-25random: credit cpu and bootloader seeds by defaultJason A. Donenfeld1-21/+33
[ Upstream commit 846bb97e131d7938847963cca00657c995b1fce1 ] This commit changes the default Kconfig values of RANDOM_TRUST_CPU and RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER to be Y by default. It does not change any existing configs or change any kernel behavior. The reason for this is several fold. As background, I recently had an email thread with the kernel maintainers of Fedora/RHEL, Debian, Ubuntu, Gentoo, Arch, NixOS, Alpine, SUSE, and Void as recipients. I noted that some distros trust RDRAND, some trust EFI, and some trust both, and I asked why or why not. There wasn't really much of a "debate" but rather an interesting discussion of what the historical reasons have been for this, and it came up that some distros just missed the introduction of the bootloader Kconfig knob, while another didn't want to enable it until there was a boot time switch to turn it off for more concerned users (which has since been added). The result of the rather uneventful discussion is that every major Linux distro enables these two options by default. While I didn't have really too strong of an opinion going into this thread -- and I mostly wanted to learn what the distros' thinking was one way or another -- ultimately I think their choice was a decent enough one for a default option (which can be disabled at boot time). I'll try to summarize the pros and cons: Pros: - The RNG machinery gets initialized super quickly, and there's no messing around with subsequent blocking behavior. - The bootloader mechanism is used by kexec in order for the prior kernel to initialize the RNG of the next kernel, which increases the entropy available to early boot daemons of the next kernel. - Previous objections related to backdoors centered around Dual_EC_DRBG-like kleptographic systems, in which observing some amount of the output stream enables an adversary holding the right key to determine the entire output stream. This used to be a partially justified concern, because RDRAND output was mixed into the output stream in varying ways, some of which may have lacked pre-image resistance (e.g. XOR or an LFSR). But this is no longer the case. Now, all usage of RDRAND and bootloader seeds go through a cryptographic hash function. This means that the CPU would have to compute a hash pre-image, which is not considered to be feasible (otherwise the hash function would be terribly broken). - More generally, if the CPU is backdoored, the RNG is probably not the realistic vector of choice for an attacker. - These CPU or bootloader seeds are far from being the only source of entropy. Rather, there is generally a pretty huge amount of entropy, not all of which is credited, especially on CPUs that support instructions like RDRAND. In other words, assuming RDRAND outputs all zeros, an attacker would *still* have to accurately model every single other entropy source also in use. - The RNG now reseeds itself quite rapidly during boot, starting at 2 seconds, then 4, then 8, then 16, and so forth, so that other sources of entropy get used without much delay. - Paranoid users can set random.trust_{cpu,bootloader}=no in the kernel command line, and paranoid system builders can set the Kconfig options to N, so there's no reduction or restriction of optionality. - It's a practical default. - All the distros have it set this way. Microsoft and Apple trust it too. Bandwagon. Cons: - RDRAND *could* still be backdoored with something like a fixed key or limited space serial number seed or another indexable scheme like that. (However, it's hard to imagine threat models where the CPU is backdoored like this, yet people are still okay making *any* computations with it or connecting it to networks, etc.) - RDRAND *could* be defective, rather than backdoored, and produce garbage that is in one way or another insufficient for crypto. - Suggesting a *reduction* in paranoia, as this commit effectively does, may cause some to question my personal integrity as a "security person". - Bootloader seeds and RDRAND are generally very difficult if not all together impossible to audit. Keep in mind that this doesn't actually change any behavior. This is just a change in the default Kconfig value. The distros already are shipping kernels that set things this way. Ard made an additional argument in [1]: We're at the mercy of firmware and micro-architecture anyway, given that we are also relying on it to ensure that every instruction in the kernel's executable image has been faithfully copied to memory, and that the CPU implements those instructions as documented. So I don't think firmware or ISA bugs related to RNGs deserve special treatment - if they are broken, we should quirk around them like we usually do. So enabling these by default is a step in the right direction IMHO. In [2], Phil pointed out that having this disabled masked a bug that CI otherwise would have caught: A clean 5.15.45 boots cleanly, whereas a downstream kernel shows the static key warning (but it does go on to boot). The significant difference is that our defconfigs set CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER=y defining that on top of multi_v7_defconfig demonstrates the issue on a clean 5.15.45. Conversely, not setting that option in a downstream kernel build avoids the warning [1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAMj1kXGi+ieviFjXv9zQBSaGyyzeGW_VpMpTLJK8PJb2QHEQ-w@mail.gmail.com/ [2] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/c47c42e3-1d56-5859-a6ad-976a1a3381c6@raspberrypi.com/ Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2022-06-25net: ethernet: mtk_eth_soc: fix misuse of mem alloc interface ↵Chen Lin1-2/+19
netdev[napi]_alloc_frag [ Upstream commit 2f2c0d2919a14002760f89f4e02960c735a316d2 ] When rx_flag == MTK_RX_FLAGS_HWLRO, rx_data_len = MTK_MAX_LRO_RX_LENGTH(4096 * 3) > PAGE_SIZE. netdev_alloc_frag is for alloction of page fragment only. Reference to other drivers and Documentation/vm/page_frags.rst Branch to use __get_free_pages when ring->frag_size > PAGE_SIZE. Signed-off-by: Chen Lin <chen45464546@163.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1654692413-2598-1-git-send-email-chen45464546@163.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2022-06-25nfc: nfcmrvl: Fix memory leak in nfcmrvl_play_deferredXiaohui Zhang1-2/+14
[ Upstream commit 8a4d480702b71184fabcf379b80bf7539716752e ] Similar to the handling of play_deferred in commit 19cfe912c37b ("Bluetooth: btusb: Fix memory leak in play_deferred"), we thought a patch might be needed here as well. Currently usb_submit_urb is called directly to submit deferred tx urbs after unanchor them. So the usb_giveback_urb_bh would failed to unref it in usb_unanchor_urb and cause memory leak. Put those urbs in tx_anchor to avoid the leak, and also fix the error handling. Signed-off-by: Xiaohui Zhang <xiaohuizhang@ruc.edu.cn> Acked-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzysztof.kozlowski@linaro.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220607083230.6182-1-xiaohuizhang@ruc.edu.cn Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2022-06-25virtio-mmio: fix missing put_device() when vm_cmdline_parent registration failedchengkaitao1-0/+1
[ Upstream commit a58a7f97ba11391d2d0d408e0b24f38d86ae748e ] The reference must be released when device_register(&vm_cmdline_parent) failed. Add the corresponding 'put_device()' in the error handling path. Signed-off-by: chengkaitao <pilgrimtao@gmail.com> Message-Id: <20220602005542.16489-1-chengkaitao@didiglobal.com> Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2022-06-25scsi: pmcraid: Fix missing resource cleanup in error caseChengguang Xu1-1/+1
[ Upstream commit ec1e8adcbdf661c57c395bca342945f4f815add7 ] Fix missing resource cleanup (when '(--i) == 0') for error case in pmcraid_register_interrupt_handler(). Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220529153456.4183738-6-cgxu519@mykernel.net Reviewed-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Chengguang Xu <cgxu519@mykernel.net> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2022-06-25scsi: ipr: Fix missing/incorrect resource cleanup in error caseChengguang Xu1-2/+2
[ Upstream commit d64c491911322af1dcada98e5b9ee0d87e8c8fee ] Fix missing resource cleanup (when '(--i) == 0') for error case in ipr_alloc_mem() and skip incorrect resource cleanup (when '(--i) == 0') for error case in ipr_request_other_msi_irqs() because variable i started from 1. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220529153456.4183738-4-cgxu519@mykernel.net Reviewed-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Acked-by: Brian King <brking@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Chengguang Xu <cgxu519@mykernel.net> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2022-06-25scsi: lpfc: Fix port stuck in bypassed state after LIP in PT2PT topologyJames Smart1-1/+2
[ Upstream commit 336d63615466b4c06b9401c987813fd19bdde39b ] After issuing a LIP, a specific target vendor does not ACC the FLOGI that lpfc sends. However, it does send its own FLOGI that lpfc ACCs. The target then establishes the port IDs by sending a PLOGI. lpfc PLOGI_ACCs and starts the RPI registration for DID 0x000001. The target then sends a LOGO to the fabric DID. lpfc is currently treating the LOGO from the fabric DID as a link down and cleans up all the ndlps. The ndlp for DID 0x000001 is put back into NPR and discovery stops, leaving the port in stuck in bypassed mode. Change lpfc behavior such that if a LOGO is received for the fabric DID in PT2PT topology skip the lpfc_linkdown_port() routine and just move the fabric DID back to NPR. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220603174329.63777-7-jsmart2021@gmail.com Co-developed-by: Justin Tee <justin.tee@broadcom.com> Signed-off-by: Justin Tee <justin.tee@broadcom.com> Signed-off-by: James Smart <jsmart2021@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2022-06-25scsi: vmw_pvscsi: Expand vcpuHint to 16 bitsWentao Wang1-2/+2
[ Upstream commit cf71d59c2eceadfcde0fb52e237990a0909880d7 ] vcpuHint has been expanded to 16 bit on host to enable routing to more CPUs. Guest side should align with the change. This change has been tested with hosts with 8-bit and 16-bit vcpuHint, on both platforms host side can get correct value. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/EF35F4D5-5DCC-42C5-BCC4-29DF1729B24C@vmware.com Signed-off-by: Wentao Wang <wwentao@vmware.com> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2022-06-25ata: libata-core: fix NULL pointer deref in ata_host_alloc_pinfo()Sergey Shtylyov1-2/+2
[ Upstream commit bf476fe22aa1851bab4728e0c49025a6a0bea307 ] In an unlikely (and probably wrong?) case that the 'ppi' parameter of ata_host_alloc_pinfo() points to an array starting with a NULL pointer, there's going to be a kernel oops as the 'pi' local variable won't get reassigned from the initial value of NULL. Initialize 'pi' instead to '&ata_dummy_port_info' to fix the possible kernel oops for good... Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with the SVACE static analysis tool. Signed-off-by: Sergey Shtylyov <s.shtylyov@omp.ru> Signed-off-by: Damien Le Moal <damien.lemoal@opensource.wdc.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2022-06-25random: account for arch randomness in bitsJason A. Donenfeld1-4/+4
commit 77fc95f8c0dc9e1f8e620ec14d2fb65028fb7adc upstream. Rather than accounting in bytes and multiplying (shifting), we can just account in bits and avoid the shift. The main motivation for this is there are other patches in flux that expand this code a bit, and avoiding the duplication of "* 8" everywhere makes things a bit clearer. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 12e45a2a6308 ("random: credit architectural init the exact amount") Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-06-25random: mark bootloader randomness code as __initJason A. Donenfeld1-4/+3
commit 39e0f991a62ed5efabd20711a7b6e7da92603170 upstream. add_bootloader_randomness() and the variables it touches are only used during __init and not after, so mark these as __init. At the same time, unexport this, since it's only called by other __init code that's built-in. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 428826f5358c ("fdt: add support for rng-seed") Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-06-25random: avoid checking crng_ready() twice in random_init()Jason A. Donenfeld1-1/+1
commit 9b29b6b20376ab64e1b043df6301d8a92378e631 upstream. The current flow expands to: if (crng_ready()) ... else if (...) if (!crng_ready()) ... The second crng_ready() call is redundant, but can't so easily be optimized out by the compiler. This commit simplifies that to: if (crng_ready() ... else if (...) ... Fixes: 560181c27b58 ("random: move initialization functions out of hot pages") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-06-25crypto: drbg - make reseeding from get_random_bytes() synchronousNicolai Stange1-2/+0
commit 074bcd4000e0d812bc253f86fedc40f81ed59ccc upstream. get_random_bytes() usually hasn't full entropy available by the time DRBG instances are first getting seeded from it during boot. Thus, the DRBG implementation registers random_ready_callbacks which would in turn schedule some work for reseeding the DRBGs once get_random_bytes() has sufficient entropy available. For reference, the relevant history around handling DRBG (re)seeding in the context of a not yet fully seeded get_random_bytes() is: commit 16b369a91d0d ("random: Blocking API for accessing nonblocking_pool") commit 4c7879907edd ("crypto: drbg - add async seeding operation") commit 205a525c3342 ("random: Add callback API for random pool readiness") commit 57225e679788 ("crypto: drbg - Use callback API for random readiness") commit c2719503f5e1 ("random: Remove kernel blocking API") However, some time later, the initialization state of get_random_bytes() has been made queryable via rng_is_initialized() introduced with commit 9a47249d444d ("random: Make crng state queryable"). This primitive now allows for streamlining the DRBG reseeding from get_random_bytes() by replacing that aforementioned asynchronous work scheduling from random_ready_callbacks with some simpler, synchronous code in drbg_generate() next to the related logic already present therein. Apart from improving overall code readability, this change will also enable DRBG users to rely on wait_for_random_bytes() for ensuring that the initial seeding has completed, if desired. The previous patches already laid the grounds by making drbg_seed() to record at each DRBG instance whether it was being seeded at a time when rng_is_initialized() still had been false as indicated by ->seeded == DRBG_SEED_STATE_PARTIAL. All that remains to be done now is to make drbg_generate() check for this condition, determine whether rng_is_initialized() has flipped to true in the meanwhile and invoke a reseed from get_random_bytes() if so. Make this move: - rename the former drbg_async_seed() work handler, i.e. the one in charge of reseeding a DRBG instance from get_random_bytes(), to "drbg_seed_from_random()", - change its signature as appropriate, i.e. make it take a struct drbg_state rather than a work_struct and change its return type from "void" to "int" in order to allow for passing error information from e.g. its __drbg_seed() invocation onwards to callers, - make drbg_generate() invoke this drbg_seed_from_random() once it encounters a DRBG instance with ->seeded == DRBG_SEED_STATE_PARTIAL by the time rng_is_initialized() has flipped to true and - prune everything related to the former, random_ready_callback based mechanism. As drbg_seed_from_random() is now getting invoked from drbg_generate() with the ->drbg_mutex being held, it must not attempt to recursively grab it once again. Remove the corresponding mutex operations from what is now drbg_seed_from_random(). Furthermore, as drbg_seed_from_random() can now report errors directly to its caller, there's no need for it to temporarily switch the DRBG's ->seeded state to DRBG_SEED_STATE_UNSEEDED so that a failure of the subsequently invoked __drbg_seed() will get signaled to drbg_generate(). Don't do it then. Signed-off-by: Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> [Jason: for stable, undid the modifications for the backport of 5acd3548.] Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-06-25Revert "random: use static branch for crng_ready()"Jason A. Donenfeld1-10/+2
This reverts upstream commit f5bda35fba615ace70a656d4700423fa6c9bebee from stable. It's not essential and will take some time during 5.19 to work out properly. Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-06-25random: check for signals after page of pool writesJason A. Donenfeld1-4/+10
commit 1ce6c8d68f8ac587f54d0a271ac594d3d51f3efb upstream. get_random_bytes_user() checks for signals after producing a PAGE_SIZE worth of output, just like /dev/zero does. write_pool() is doing basically the same work (actually, slightly more expensive), and so should stop to check for signals in the same way. Let's also name it write_pool_user() to match get_random_bytes_user(), so this won't be misused in the future. Before this patch, massive writes to /dev/urandom would tie up the process for an extremely long time and make it unterminatable. After, it can be successfully interrupted. The following test program can be used to see this works as intended: #include <unistd.h> #include <fcntl.h> #include <signal.h> #include <stdio.h> static unsigned char x[~0U]; static void handle(int) { } int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { pid_t pid = getpid(), child; int fd; signal(SIGUSR1, handle); if (!(child = fork())) { for (;;) kill(pid, SIGUSR1); } fd = open("/dev/urandom", O_WRONLY); pause(); printf("interrupted after writing %zd bytes\n", write(fd, x, sizeof(x))); close(fd); kill(child, SIGTERM); return 0; } Result before: "interrupted after writing 2147479552 bytes" Result after: "interrupted after writing 4096 bytes" Cc: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-06-25random: wire up fops->splice_{read,write}_iter()Jens Axboe1-0/+4
commit 79025e727a846be6fd215ae9cdb654368ac3f9a6 upstream. Now that random/urandom is using {read,write}_iter, we can wire it up to using the generic splice handlers. Fixes: 36e2c7421f02 ("fs: don't allow splice read/write without explicit ops") Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> [Jason: added the splice_write path. Note that sendfile() and such still does not work for read, though it does for write, because of a file type restriction in splice_direct_to_actor(), which I'll address separately.] Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-06-25random: convert to using fops->write_iter()Jens Axboe1-32/+35
commit 22b0a222af4df8ee9bb8e07013ab44da9511b047 upstream. Now that the read side has been converted to fix a regression with splice, convert the write side as well to have some symmetry in the interface used (and help deprecate ->write()). Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> [Jason: cleaned up random_ioctl a bit, require full writes in RNDADDENTROPY since it's crediting entropy, simplify control flow of write_pool(), and incorporate suggestions from Al.] Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-06-25random: move randomize_page() into mm where it belongsJason A. Donenfeld1-157/+83
commit 5ad7dd882e45d7fe432c32e896e2aaa0b21746ea upstream. randomize_page is an mm function. It is documented like one. It contains the history of one. It has the naming convention of one. It looks just like another very similar function in mm, randomize_stack_top(). And it has always been maintained and updated by mm people. There is no need for it to be in random.c. In the "which shape does not look like the other ones" test, pointing to randomize_page() is correct. So move randomize_page() into mm/util.c, right next to the similar randomize_stack_top() function. This commit contains no actual code changes. Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-06-25random: move initialization functions out of hot pagesJason A. Donenfeld1-22/+18
commit 560181c27b582557d633ecb608110075433383af upstream. Much of random.c is devoted to initializing the rng and accounting for when a sufficient amount of entropy has been added. In a perfect world, this would all happen during init, and so we could mark these functions as __init. But in reality, this isn't the case: sometimes the rng only finishes initializing some seconds after system init is finished. For this reason, at the moment, a whole host of functions that are only used relatively close to system init and then never again are intermixed with functions that are used in hot code all the time. This creates more cache misses than necessary. In order to pack the hot code closer together, this commit moves the initialization functions that can't be marked as __init into .text.unlikely by way of the __cold attribute. Of particular note is moving credit_init_bits() into a macro wrapper that inlines the crng_ready() static branch check. This avoids a function call to a nop+ret, and most notably prevents extra entropy arithmetic from being computed in mix_interrupt_randomness(). Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net> [ Jason: for stable, made sure the printk_deferred was a pr_notice, because those caused problems on ≤ 4.19 according to commit logs. ] Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-06-25random: use proper return types on get_random_{int,long}_wait()Jason A. Donenfeld1-100/+95
commit 7c3a8a1db5e03d02cc0abb3357a84b8b326dfac3 upstream. Before these were returning signed values, but the API is intended to be used with unsigned values. Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-06-25random: use static branch for crng_ready()Jason A. Donenfeld1-4/+12
commit f5bda35fba615ace70a656d4700423fa6c9bebee upstream. Since crng_ready() is only false briefly during initialization and then forever after becomes true, we don't need to evaluate it after, making it a prime candidate for a static branch. One complication, however, is that it changes state in a particular call to credit_init_bits(), which might be made from atomic context, which means we must kick off a workqueue to change the static key. Further complicating things, credit_init_bits() may be called sufficiently early on in system initialization such that system_wq is NULL. Fortunately, there exists the nice function execute_in_process_context(), which will immediately execute the function if !in_interrupt(), and otherwise defer it to a workqueue. During early init, before workqueues are available, in_interrupt() is always false, because interrupts haven't even been enabled yet, which means the function in that case executes immediately. Later on, after workqueues are available, in_interrupt() might be true, but in that case, the work is queued in system_wq and all goes well. Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: Sultan Alsawaf <sultan@kerneltoast.com> Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-06-25random: credit architectural init the exact amountJason A. Donenfeld1-6/+6
commit 12e45a2a6308105469968951e6d563e8f4fea187 upstream. RDRAND and RDSEED can fail sometimes, which is fine. We currently initialize the RNG with 512 bits of RDRAND/RDSEED. We only need 256 bits of those to succeed in order to initialize the RNG. Instead of the current "all or nothing" approach, actually credit these contributions the amount that is actually contributed. Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-06-25random: handle latent entropy and command line from random_init()Jason A. Donenfeld1-5/+8
commit 2f14062bb14b0fcfcc21e6dc7d5b5c0d25966164 upstream. Currently, start_kernel() adds latent entropy and the command line to the entropy bool *after* the RNG has been initialized, deferring when it's actually used by things like stack canaries until the next time the pool is seeded. This surely is not intended. Rather than splitting up which entropy gets added where and when between start_kernel() and random_init(), just do everything in random_init(), which should eliminate these kinds of bugs in the future. While we're at it, rename the awkwardly titled "rand_initialize()" to the more standard "random_init()" nomenclature. Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-06-25random: use proper jiffies comparison macroJason A. Donenfeld1-1/+1
commit 8a5b8a4a4ceb353b4dd5bafd09e2b15751bcdb51 upstream. This expands to exactly the same code that it replaces, but makes things consistent by using the same macro for jiffy comparisons throughout. Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-06-25random: remove ratelimiting for in-kernel unseeded randomnessJason A. Donenfeld1-43/+18
commit cc1e127bfa95b5fb2f9307e7168bf8b2b45b4c5e upstream. The CONFIG_WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM debug option controls whether the kernel warns about all unseeded randomness or just the first instance. There's some complicated rate limiting and comparison to the previous caller, such that even with CONFIG_WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM enabled, developers still don't see all the messages or even an accurate count of how many were missed. This is the result of basically parallel mechanisms aimed at accomplishing more or less the same thing, added at different points in random.c history, which sort of compete with the first-instance-only limiting we have now. It turns out, however, that nobody cares about the first unseeded randomness instance of in-kernel users. The same first user has been there for ages now, and nobody is doing anything about it. It isn't even clear that anybody _can_ do anything about it. Most places that can do something about it have switched over to using get_random_bytes_wait() or wait_for_random_bytes(), which is the right thing to do, but there is still much code that needs randomness sometimes during init, and as a geeneral rule, if you're not using one of the _wait functions or the readiness notifier callback, you're bound to be doing it wrong just based on that fact alone. So warning about this same first user that can't easily change is simply not an effective mechanism for anything at all. Users can't do anything about it, as the Kconfig text points out -- the problem isn't in userspace code -- and kernel developers don't or more often can't react to it. Instead, show the warning for all instances when CONFIG_WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM is set, so that developers can debug things need be, or if it isn't set, don't show a warning at all. At the same time, CONFIG_WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM now implies setting random.ratelimit_disable=1 on by default, since if you care about one you probably care about the other too. And we can clean up usage around the related urandom_warning ratelimiter as well (whose behavior isn't changing), so that it properly counts missed messages after the 10 message threshold is reached. Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-06-25random: avoid initializing twice in credit raceJason A. Donenfeld1-26/+22
commit fed7ef061686cc813b1f3d8d0edc6c35b4d3537b upstream. Since all changes of crng_init now go through credit_init_bits(), we can fix a long standing race in which two concurrent callers of credit_init_bits() have the new bit count >= some threshold, but are doing so with crng_init as a lower threshold, checked outside of a lock, resulting in crng_reseed() or similar being called twice. In order to fix this, we can use the original cmpxchg value of the bit count, and only change crng_init when the bit count transitions from below a threshold to meeting the threshold. Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-06-25random: use symbolic constants for crng_init statesJason A. Donenfeld1-19/+19
commit e3d2c5e79a999aa4e7d6f0127e16d3da5a4ff70d upstream. crng_init represents a state machine, with three states, and various rules for transitions. For the longest time, we've been managing these with "0", "1", and "2", and expecting people to figure it out. To make the code more obvious, replace these with proper enum values representing the transition, and then redocument what each of these states mean. Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net> Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-06-25siphash: use one source of truth for siphash permutationsJason A. Donenfeld1-23/+7
commit e73aaae2fa9024832e1f42e30c787c7baf61d014 upstream. The SipHash family of permutations is currently used in three places: - siphash.c itself, used in the ordinary way it was intended. - random32.c, in a construction from an anonymous contributor. - random.c, as part of its fast_mix function. Each one of these places reinvents the wheel with the same C code, same rotation constants, and same symmetry-breaking constants. This commit tidies things up a bit by placing macros for the permutations and constants into siphash.h, where each of the three .c users can access them. It also leaves a note dissuading more users of them from emerging. Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-06-25random: help compiler out with fast_mix() by using simpler argumentsJason A. Donenfeld1-21/+23
commit 791332b3cbb080510954a4c152ce02af8832eac9 upstream. Now that fast_mix() has more than one caller, gcc no longer inlines it. That's fine. But it also doesn't handle the compound literal argument we pass it very efficiently, nor does it handle the loop as well as it could. So just expand the code to spell out this function so that it generates the same code as it did before. Performance-wise, this now behaves as it did before the last commit. The difference in actual code size on x86 is 45 bytes, which is less than a cache line. Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-06-25random: do not use input pool from hard IRQsJason A. Donenfeld1-15/+36
commit e3e33fc2ea7fcefd0d761db9d6219f83b4248f5c upstream. Years ago, a separate fast pool was added for interrupts, so that the cost associated with taking the input pool spinlocks and mixing into it would be avoided in places where latency is critical. However, one oversight was that add_input_randomness() and add_disk_randomness() still sometimes are called directly from the interrupt handler, rather than being deferred to a thread. This means that some unlucky interrupts will be caught doing a blake2s_compress() call and potentially spinning on input_pool.lock, which can also be taken by unprivileged users by writing into /dev/urandom. In order to fix this, add_timer_randomness() now checks whether it is being called from a hard IRQ and if so, just mixes into the per-cpu IRQ fast pool using fast_mix(), which is much faster and can be done lock-free. A nice consequence of this, as well, is that it means hard IRQ context FPU support is likely no longer useful. The entropy estimation algorithm used by add_timer_randomness() is also somewhat different than the one used for add_interrupt_randomness(). The former looks at deltas of deltas of deltas, while the latter just waits for 64 interrupts for one bit or for one second since the last bit. In order to bridge these, and since add_interrupt_randomness() runs after an add_timer_randomness() that's called from hard IRQ, we add to the fast pool credit the related amount, and then subtract one to account for add_interrupt_randomness()'s contribution. A downside of this, however, is that the num argument is potentially attacker controlled, which puts a bit more pressure on the fast_mix() sponge to do more than it's really intended to do. As a mitigating factor, the first 96 bits of input aren't attacker controlled (a cycle counter followed by zeros), which means it's essentially two rounds of siphash rather than one, which is somewhat better. It's also not that much different from add_interrupt_randomness()'s use of the irq stack instruction pointer register. Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-06-25random: order timer entropy functions below interrupt functionsJason A. Donenfeld1-119/+119
commit a4b5c26b79ffdfcfb816c198f2fc2b1e7b5b580f upstream. There are no code changes here; this is just a reordering of functions, so that in subsequent commits, the timer entropy functions can call into the interrupt ones. Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-06-25random: do not pretend to handle premature next security modelJason A. Donenfeld1-112/+62
commit e85c0fc1d94c52483a603651748d4c76d6aa1c6b upstream. Per the thread linked below, "premature next" is not considered to be a realistic threat model, and leads to more serious security problems. "Premature next" is the scenario in which: - Attacker compromises the current state of a fully initialized RNG via some kind of infoleak. - New bits of entropy are added directly to the key used to generate the /dev/urandom stream, without any buffering or pooling. - Attacker then, somehow having read access to /dev/urandom, samples RNG output and brute forces the individual new bits that were added. - Result: the RNG never "recovers" from the initial compromise, a so-called violation of what academics term "post-compromise security". The usual solutions to this involve some form of delaying when entropy gets mixed into the crng. With Fortuna, this involves multiple input buckets. With what the Linux RNG was trying to do prior, this involves entropy estimation. However, by delaying when entropy gets mixed in, it also means that RNG compromises are extremely dangerous during the window of time before the RNG has gathered enough entropy, during which time nonces may become predictable (or repeated), ephemeral keys may not be secret, and so forth. Moreover, it's unclear how realistic "premature next" is from an attack perspective, if these attacks even make sense in practice. Put together -- and discussed in more detail in the thread below -- these constitute grounds for just doing away with the current code that pretends to handle premature next. I say "pretends" because it wasn't doing an especially great job at it either; should we change our mind about this direction, we would probably implement Fortuna to "fix" the "problem", in which case, removing the pretend solution still makes sense. This also reduces the crng reseed period from 5 minutes down to 1 minute. The rationale from the thread might lead us toward reducing that even further in the future (or even eliminating it), but that remains a topic of a future commit. At a high level, this patch changes semantics from: Before: Seed for the first time after 256 "bits" of estimated entropy have been accumulated since the system booted. Thereafter, reseed once every five minutes, but only if 256 new "bits" have been accumulated since the last reseeding. After: Seed for the first time after 256 "bits" of estimated entropy have been accumulated since the system booted. Thereafter, reseed once every minute. Most of this patch is renaming and removing: POOL_MIN_BITS becomes POOL_INIT_BITS, credit_entropy_bits() becomes credit_init_bits(), crng_reseed() loses its "force" parameter since it's now always true, the drain_entropy() function no longer has any use so it's removed, entropy estimation is skipped if we've already init'd, the various notifiers for "low on entropy" are now only active prior to init, and finally, some documentation comments are cleaned up here and there. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/YmlMGx6+uigkGiZ0@zx2c4.com/ Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: Nadia Heninger <nadiah@cs.ucsd.edu> Cc: Tom Ristenpart <ristenpart@cornell.edu> Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-06-25random: do not use batches when !crng_ready()Jason A. Donenfeld1-99/+59
commit cbe89e5a375a51bbb952929b93fa973416fea74e upstream. It's too hard to keep the batches synchronized, and pointless anyway, since in !crng_ready(), we're updating the base_crng key really often, where batching only hurts. So instead, if the crng isn't ready, just call into get_random_bytes(). At this stage nothing is performance critical anyhow. Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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