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This symbol is not used outside of security.c, so marks it static.
drivers/nvdimm/security.c:411:6: warning: no previous prototype for function '__nvdimm_security_overwrite_query'.
Link: https://bugzilla.openanolis.cn/show_bug.cgi?id=2148
Reported-by: Abaci Robot <abaci@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiapeng Chong <jiapeng.chong@linux.alibaba.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220914061251.42052-1-jiapeng.chong@linux.alibaba.com
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
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It is not clear why the original implementation of overwrite support
required the dimm driver to be active before overwrite could proceed. In
fact that can lead to cases where the kernel retains an invalid cached
copy of the labels from before the overwrite. Unfortunately the kernel
has not only allowed that case, but enforced it.
Going forward, allow for overwrite to happen while the label area is
offline, and follow-on with updates to 'ndctl sanitize-dimm --overwrite'
to trigger the label area invalidation by default.
Cc: Vishal Verma <vishal.l.verma@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
Cc: Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com>
Cc: Jeff Moyer <jmoyer@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Krzysztof Kensicki <krzysztof.kensicki@intel.com>
Fixes: 7d988097c546 ("acpi/nfit, libnvdimm/security: Add security DSM overwrite support")
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/nvdimm/nvdimm
Pull libnvdimm updayes from Vishal Verma:
"You'd normally receive this pull request from Dan Williams, but he's
busy watching a newborn (Congrats Dan!), so I'm watching libnvdimm
this cycle.
This adds a new feature in libnvdimm - 'Runtime Firmware Activation',
and a few small cleanups and fixes in libnvdimm and DAX. I'd
originally intended to make separate topic-based pull requests - one
for libnvdimm, and one for DAX, but some of the DAX material fell out
since it wasn't quite ready.
Summary:
- add 'Runtime Firmware Activation' support for NVDIMMs that
advertise the relevant capability
- misc libnvdimm and DAX cleanups"
* tag 'libnvdimm-for-5.9' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/nvdimm/nvdimm:
libnvdimm/security: ensure sysfs poll thread woke up and fetch updated attr
libnvdimm/security: the 'security' attr never show 'overwrite' state
libnvdimm/security: fix a typo
ACPI: NFIT: Fix ARS zero-sized allocation
dax: Fix incorrect argument passed to xas_set_err()
ACPI: NFIT: Add runtime firmware activate support
PM, libnvdimm: Add runtime firmware activation support
libnvdimm: Convert to DEVICE_ATTR_ADMIN_RO()
drivers/dax: Expand lock scope to cover the use of addresses
fs/dax: Remove unused size parameter
dax: print error message by pr_info() in __generic_fsdax_supported()
driver-core: Introduce DEVICE_ATTR_ADMIN_{RO,RW}
tools/testing/nvdimm: Emulate firmware activation commands
tools/testing/nvdimm: Prepare nfit_ctl_test() for ND_CMD_CALL emulation
tools/testing/nvdimm: Add command debug messages
tools/testing/nvdimm: Cleanup dimm index passing
ACPI: NFIT: Define runtime firmware activation commands
ACPI: NFIT: Move bus_dsm_mask out of generic nvdimm_bus_descriptor
libnvdimm: Validate command family indices
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commit 7d988097c546 ("acpi/nfit, libnvdimm/security: Add security DSM overwrite support")
adds a sysfs_notify_dirent() to wake up userspace poll thread when the "overwrite"
operation has completed. But the notification is issued before the internal
dimm security state and flags have been updated, so the userspace poll thread
wakes up and fetches the not-yet-updated attr and falls back to sleep, forever.
But if user from another terminal issue "ndctl wait-overwrite nmemX" again,
the command returns instantly.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1596494499-9852-3-git-send-email-jane.chu@oracle.com
Fixes: 7d988097c546 ("acpi/nfit, libnvdimm/security: Add security DSM overwrite support")
Cc: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jane Chu <jane.chu@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Vishal Verma <vishal.l.verma@intel.com>
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commit d78c620a2e82 ("libnvdimm/security: Introduce a 'frozen' attribute")
introduced a typo, causing a 'nvdimm->sec.flags' update being overwritten
by the subsequent update meant for 'nvdimm->sec.ext_flags'.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1596494499-9852-1-git-send-email-jane.chu@oracle.com
Fixes: d78c620a2e82 ("libnvdimm/security: Introduce a 'frozen' attribute")
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jane Chu <jane.chu@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Vishal Verma <vishal.l.verma@intel.com>
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As of commit 8c0637e950d6 ("keys: Make the KEY_NEED_* perms an enum rather
than a mask") lookup_user_key() needs an explicit declaration of what it
wants to do with the key. Add KEY_NEED_SEARCH to fix a warning with the
below signature, and fixes the inability to retrieve a key.
WARNING: CPU: 15 PID: 6276 at security/keys/permission.c:35 key_task_permission+0xd3/0x140
[..]
RIP: 0010:key_task_permission+0xd3/0x140
[..]
Call Trace:
lookup_user_key+0xeb/0x6b0
? vsscanf+0x3df/0x840
? key_validate+0x50/0x50
? key_default_cmp+0x20/0x20
nvdimm_get_user_key_payload.part.0+0x21/0x110 [libnvdimm]
nvdimm_security_store+0x67d/0xb20 [libnvdimm]
security_store+0x67/0x1a0 [libnvdimm]
kernfs_fop_write+0xcf/0x1c0
vfs_write+0xde/0x1d0
ksys_write+0x68/0xe0
do_syscall_64+0x5c/0xa0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xb3
Fixes: 8c0637e950d6 ("keys: Make the KEY_NEED_* perms an enum rather than a mask")
Suggested-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Vishal Verma <vishal.l.verma@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
Cc: Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/159297332630.1304143.237026690015653759.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
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Current implementation attempts to request keys from the keyring even when
security is not enabled. Change behavior so when security is disabled it
will skip key request.
Error messages seen when no keys are installed and libnvdimm is loaded:
request-key[4598]: Cannot find command to construct key 661489677
request-key[4606]: Cannot find command to construct key 34713726
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 4c6926a23b76 ("acpi/nfit, libnvdimm: Add unlock of nvdimm support for Intel DIMMs")
Signed-off-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/156934642272.30222.5230162488753445916.stgit@djiang5-desk3.ch.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
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The security operations are exported from libnvdimm/security.c to
libnvdimm/dimm_devs.c, and libnvdimm/security.c is optionally compiled
based on the CONFIG_NVDIMM_KEYS config symbol.
Rather than export the operations across compile objects, just move the
__security_store() entry point to live with the helpers.
Acked-by: Jeff Moyer <jmoyer@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/156686730515.184120.10522747907309996674.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
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An attempt to freeze DIMMs currently runs afoul of default blocking of
all security operations in the entry to the 'store' routine for the
'security' sysfs attribute.
The blanket blocking of all security operations while the DIMM is in
active use in a region is too restrictive. The only security operations
that need to be aware of the ->busy state are those that mutate the
state of data, i.e. erase and overwrite.
Refactor the ->busy checks to be applied at the entry common entry point
in __security_store() rather than each of the helper routines to enable
freeze to be run regardless of busy state.
Reviewed-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Moyer <jmoyer@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/156686729996.184120.3458026302402493937.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
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In the process of debugging a system with an NVDIMM that was failing to
unlock it was found that the kernel is reporting 'locked' while the DIMM
security interface is 'frozen'. Unfortunately the security state is
tracked internally as an enum which prevents it from communicating the
difference between 'locked' and 'locked + frozen'. It follows that the
enum also prevents the kernel from communicating 'unlocked + frozen'
which would be useful for debugging why security operations like 'change
passphrase' are disabled.
Ditch the security state enum for a set of flags and introduce a new
sysfs attribute explicitly for the 'frozen' state. The regression risk
is low because the 'frozen' state was already blocked behind the
'locked' state, but will need to revisit if there were cases where
applications need 'frozen' to show up in the primary 'security'
attribute. The expectation is that communicating 'frozen' is mostly a
helper for debug and status monitoring.
Reviewed-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
Reported-by: Jeff Moyer <jmoyer@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Moyer <jmoyer@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/156686729474.184120.5835135644278860826.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs"
This reverts merge 0f75ef6a9cff49ff612f7ce0578bced9d0b38325 (and thus
effectively commits
7a1ade847596 ("keys: Provide KEYCTL_GRANT_PERMISSION")
2e12256b9a76 ("keys: Replace uid/gid/perm permissions checking with an ACL")
that the merge brought in).
It turns out that it breaks booting with an encrypted volume, and Eric
biggers reports that it also breaks the fscrypt tests [1] and loading of
in-kernel X.509 certificates [2].
The root cause of all the breakage is likely the same, but David Howells
is off email so rather than try to work it out it's getting reverted in
order to not impact the rest of the merge window.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190710011559.GA7973@sol.localdomain/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190710013225.GB7973@sol.localdomain/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=wjxoeMJfeBahnWH=9zShKp2bsVy527vo3_y8HfOdhwAAw@mail.gmail.com/
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Replace the uid/gid/perm permissions checking on a key with an ACL to allow
the SETATTR and SEARCH permissions to be split. This will also allow a
greater range of subjects to represented.
============
WHY DO THIS?
============
The problem is that SETATTR and SEARCH cover a slew of actions, not all of
which should be grouped together.
For SETATTR, this includes actions that are about controlling access to a
key:
(1) Changing a key's ownership.
(2) Changing a key's security information.
(3) Setting a keyring's restriction.
And actions that are about managing a key's lifetime:
(4) Setting an expiry time.
(5) Revoking a key.
and (proposed) managing a key as part of a cache:
(6) Invalidating a key.
Managing a key's lifetime doesn't really have anything to do with
controlling access to that key.
Expiry time is awkward since it's more about the lifetime of the content
and so, in some ways goes better with WRITE permission. It can, however,
be set unconditionally by a process with an appropriate authorisation token
for instantiating a key, and can also be set by the key type driver when a
key is instantiated, so lumping it with the access-controlling actions is
probably okay.
As for SEARCH permission, that currently covers:
(1) Finding keys in a keyring tree during a search.
(2) Permitting keyrings to be joined.
(3) Invalidation.
But these don't really belong together either, since these actions really
need to be controlled separately.
Finally, there are number of special cases to do with granting the
administrator special rights to invalidate or clear keys that I would like
to handle with the ACL rather than key flags and special checks.
===============
WHAT IS CHANGED
===============
The SETATTR permission is split to create two new permissions:
(1) SET_SECURITY - which allows the key's owner, group and ACL to be
changed and a restriction to be placed on a keyring.
(2) REVOKE - which allows a key to be revoked.
The SEARCH permission is split to create:
(1) SEARCH - which allows a keyring to be search and a key to be found.
(2) JOIN - which allows a keyring to be joined as a session keyring.
(3) INVAL - which allows a key to be invalidated.
The WRITE permission is also split to create:
(1) WRITE - which allows a key's content to be altered and links to be
added, removed and replaced in a keyring.
(2) CLEAR - which allows a keyring to be cleared completely. This is
split out to make it possible to give just this to an administrator.
(3) REVOKE - see above.
Keys acquire ACLs which consist of a series of ACEs, and all that apply are
unioned together. An ACE specifies a subject, such as:
(*) Possessor - permitted to anyone who 'possesses' a key
(*) Owner - permitted to the key owner
(*) Group - permitted to the key group
(*) Everyone - permitted to everyone
Note that 'Other' has been replaced with 'Everyone' on the assumption that
you wouldn't grant a permit to 'Other' that you wouldn't also grant to
everyone else.
Further subjects may be made available by later patches.
The ACE also specifies a permissions mask. The set of permissions is now:
VIEW Can view the key metadata
READ Can read the key content
WRITE Can update/modify the key content
SEARCH Can find the key by searching/requesting
LINK Can make a link to the key
SET_SECURITY Can change owner, ACL, expiry
INVAL Can invalidate
REVOKE Can revoke
JOIN Can join this keyring
CLEAR Can clear this keyring
The KEYCTL_SETPERM function is then deprecated.
The KEYCTL_SET_TIMEOUT function then is permitted if SET_SECURITY is set,
or if the caller has a valid instantiation auth token.
The KEYCTL_INVALIDATE function then requires INVAL.
The KEYCTL_REVOKE function then requires REVOKE.
The KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING function then requires JOIN to join an
existing keyring.
The JOIN permission is enabled by default for session keyrings and manually
created keyrings only.
======================
BACKWARD COMPATIBILITY
======================
To maintain backward compatibility, KEYCTL_SETPERM will translate the
permissions mask it is given into a new ACL for a key - unless
KEYCTL_SET_ACL has been called on that key, in which case an error will be
returned.
It will convert possessor, owner, group and other permissions into separate
ACEs, if each portion of the mask is non-zero.
SETATTR permission turns on all of INVAL, REVOKE and SET_SECURITY. WRITE
permission turns on WRITE, REVOKE and, if a keyring, CLEAR. JOIN is turned
on if a keyring is being altered.
The KEYCTL_DESCRIBE function translates the ACL back into a permissions
mask to return depending on possessor, owner, group and everyone ACEs.
It will make the following mappings:
(1) INVAL, JOIN -> SEARCH
(2) SET_SECURITY -> SETATTR
(3) REVOKE -> WRITE if SETATTR isn't already set
(4) CLEAR -> WRITE
Note that the value subsequently returned by KEYCTL_DESCRIBE may not match
the value set with KEYCTL_SETATTR.
=======
TESTING
=======
This passes the keyutils testsuite for all but a couple of tests:
(1) tests/keyctl/dh_compute/badargs: The first wrong-key-type test now
returns EOPNOTSUPP rather than ENOKEY as READ permission isn't removed
if the type doesn't have ->read(). You still can't actually read the
key.
(2) tests/keyctl/permitting/valid: The view-other-permissions test doesn't
work as Other has been replaced with Everyone in the ACL.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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With zero-key defined, we can remove previous detection of key id 0 or null
key in order to deal with a zero-key situation. Syncing all security
commands to use the zero-key. Helper functions are introduced to return the
data that points to the actual key payload or the zero_key. This helps
uniformly handle the key material even with zero_key.
Signed-off-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
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Add a zero key in order to standardize hardware that want a key of 0's to
be passed. Some platforms defaults to a zero-key with security enabled
rather than allow the OS to enable the security. The zero key would allow
us to manage those platform as well. This also adds a fix to secure erase
so it can use the zero key to do crypto erase. Some other security commands
already use zero keys. This introduces a standard zero-key to allow
unification of semantics cross nvdimm security commands.
Signed-off-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
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The security implementation is too chatty. For example, the common case
is that security is not enabled / setup, and booting a qemu
configuration currently yields:
nvdimm nmem0: request_key() found no key
nvdimm nmem0: failed to unlock dimm: -126
nvdimm nmem1: request_key() found no key
nvdimm nmem1: failed to unlock dimm: -126
Convert all security related log messages to debug level.
Cc: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
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With Intel DSM 1.8 [1] two new security DSMs are introduced. Enable/update
master passphrase and master secure erase. The master passphrase allows
a secure erase to be performed without the user passphrase that is set on
the NVDIMM. The commands of master_update and master_erase are added to
the sysfs knob in order to initiate the DSMs. They are similar in opeartion
mechanism compare to update and erase.
[1]: http://pmem.io/documents/NVDIMM_DSM_Interface-V1.8.pdf
Signed-off-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
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Add support for the NVDIMM_FAMILY_INTEL "ovewrite" capability as
described by the Intel DSM spec v1.7. This will allow triggering of
overwrite on Intel NVDIMMs. The overwrite operation can take tens of
minutes. When the overwrite DSM is issued successfully, the NVDIMMs will
be unaccessible. The kernel will do backoff polling to detect when the
overwrite process is completed. According to the DSM spec v1.7, the 128G
NVDIMMs can take up to 15mins to perform overwrite and larger DIMMs will
take longer.
Given that overwrite puts the DIMM in an indeterminate state until it
completes introduce the NDD_SECURITY_OVERWRITE flag to prevent other
operations from executing when overwrite is happening. The
NDD_WORK_PENDING flag is added to denote that there is a device reference
on the nvdimm device for an async workqueue thread context.
Signed-off-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
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Add support to issue a secure erase DSM to the Intel nvdimm. The
required passphrase is acquired from an encrypted key in the kernel user
keyring. To trigger the action, "erase <keyid>" is written to the
"security" sysfs attribute.
Signed-off-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
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Add support for enabling and updating passphrase on the Intel nvdimms.
The passphrase is the an encrypted key in the kernel user keyring.
We trigger the update via writing "update <old_keyid> <new_keyid>" to the
sysfs attribute "security". If no <old_keyid> exists (for enabling
security) then a 0 should be used.
Signed-off-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
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Add support to disable passphrase (security) for the Intel nvdimm. The
passphrase used for disabling is pulled from an encrypted-key in the kernel
user keyring. The action is triggered by writing "disable <keyid>" to the
sysfs attribute "security".
Signed-off-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
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Add support to unlock the dimm via the kernel key management APIs. The
passphrase is expected to be pulled from userspace through keyutils.
The key management and sysfs attributes are libnvdimm generic.
Encrypted keys are used to protect the nvdimm passphrase at rest. The
master key can be a trusted-key sealed in a TPM, preferred, or an
encrypted-key, more flexible, but more exposure to a potential attacker.
Signed-off-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
Co-developed-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Reported-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
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