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2021-03-03dm era: Update in-core bitset after committing the metadataNikos Tsironis1-6/+19
commit 2099b145d77c1d53f5711f029c37cc537897cee6 upstream. In case of a system crash, dm-era might fail to mark blocks as written in its metadata, although the corresponding writes to these blocks were passed down to the origin device and completed successfully. Consider the following sequence of events: 1. We write to a block that has not been yet written in the current era 2. era_map() checks the in-core bitmap for the current era and sees that the block is not marked as written. 3. The write is deferred for submission after the metadata have been updated and committed. 4. The worker thread processes the deferred write (process_deferred_bios()) and marks the block as written in the in-core bitmap, **before** committing the metadata. 5. The worker thread starts committing the metadata. 6. We do more writes that map to the same block as the write of step (1) 7. era_map() checks the in-core bitmap and sees that the block is marked as written, **although the metadata have not been committed yet**. 8. These writes are passed down to the origin device immediately and the device reports them as completed. 9. The system crashes, e.g., power failure, before the commit from step (5) finishes. When the system recovers and we query the dm-era target for the list of written blocks it doesn't report the aforementioned block as written, although the writes of step (6) completed successfully. The issue is that era_map() decides whether to defer or not a write based on non committed information. The root cause of the bug is that we update the in-core bitmap, **before** committing the metadata. Fix this by updating the in-core bitmap **after** successfully committing the metadata. Fixes: eec40579d84873 ("dm: add era target") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.15+ Signed-off-by: Nikos Tsironis <ntsironis@arrikto.com> Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-03-03dm era: only resize metadata in preresumeNikos Tsironis1-11/+10
commit cca2c6aebe86f68103a8615074b3578e854b5016 upstream. Metadata resize shouldn't happen in the ctr. The ctr loads a temporary (inactive) table that will only become active upon resume. That is why resize should always be done in terms of resume. Otherwise a load (ctr) whose inactive table never becomes active will incorrectly resize the metadata. Also, perform the resize directly in preresume, instead of using the worker to do it. The worker might run other metadata operations, e.g., it could start digestion, before resizing the metadata. These operations will end up using the old size. This could lead to errors, like: device-mapper: era: metadata_digest_transcribe_writeset: dm_array_set_value failed device-mapper: era: process_old_eras: digest step failed, stopping digestion The reason of the above error is that the worker started the digestion of the archived writeset using the old, larger size. As a result, metadata_digest_transcribe_writeset tried to write beyond the end of the era array. Fixes: eec40579d84873 ("dm: add era target") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.15+ Signed-off-by: Nikos Tsironis <ntsironis@arrikto.com> Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-03-03dm era: Reinitialize bitset cache before digesting a new writesetNikos Tsironis1-6/+6
commit 2524933307fd0036d5c32357c693c021ab09a0b0 upstream. In case of devices with at most 64 blocks, the digestion of consecutive eras uses the writeset of the first era as the writeset of all eras to digest, leading to lost writes. That is, we lose the information about what blocks were written during the affected eras. The digestion code uses a dm_disk_bitset object to access the archived writesets. This structure includes a one word (64-bit) cache to reduce the number of array lookups. This structure is initialized only once, in metadata_digest_start(), when we kick off digestion. But, when we insert a new writeset into the writeset tree, before the digestion of the previous writeset is done, or equivalently when there are multiple writesets in the writeset tree to digest, then all these writesets are digested using the same cache and the cache is not re-initialized when moving from one writeset to the next. For devices with more than 64 blocks, i.e., the size of the cache, the cache is indirectly invalidated when we move to a next set of blocks, so we avoid the bug. But for devices with at most 64 blocks we end up using the same cached data for digesting all archived writesets, i.e., the cache is loaded when digesting the first writeset and it never gets reloaded, until the digestion is done. As a result, the writeset of the first era to digest is used as the writeset of all the following archived eras, leading to lost writes. Fix this by reinitializing the dm_disk_bitset structure, and thus invalidating the cache, every time the digestion code starts digesting a new writeset. Fixes: eec40579d84873 ("dm: add era target") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.15+ Signed-off-by: Nikos Tsironis <ntsironis@arrikto.com> Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-03-03dm era: Use correct value size in equality function of writeset treeNikos Tsironis1-1/+1
commit 64f2d15afe7b336aafebdcd14cc835ecf856df4b upstream. Fix the writeset tree equality test function to use the right value size when comparing two btree values. Fixes: eec40579d84873 ("dm: add era target") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.15+ Signed-off-by: Nikos Tsironis <ntsironis@arrikto.com> Reviewed-by: Ming-Hung Tsai <mtsai@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-03-03dm era: Fix bitset memory leaksNikos Tsironis1-0/+6
commit 904e6b266619c2da5c58b5dce14ae30629e39645 upstream. Deallocate the memory allocated for the in-core bitsets when destroying the target and in error paths. Fixes: eec40579d84873 ("dm: add era target") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.15+ Signed-off-by: Nikos Tsironis <ntsironis@arrikto.com> Reviewed-by: Ming-Hung Tsai <mtsai@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-03-03dm era: Verify the data block size hasn't changedNikos Tsironis1-1/+9
commit c8e846ff93d5eaa5384f6f325a1687ac5921aade upstream. dm-era doesn't support changing the data block size of existing devices, so check explicitly that the requested block size for a new target matches the one stored in the metadata. Fixes: eec40579d84873 ("dm: add era target") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.15+ Signed-off-by: Nikos Tsironis <ntsironis@arrikto.com> Reviewed-by: Ming-Hung Tsai <mtsai@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-03-03dm era: Recover committed writeset after crashNikos Tsironis1-8/+9
commit de89afc1e40fdfa5f8b666e5d07c43d21a1d3be0 upstream. Following a system crash, dm-era fails to recover the committed writeset for the current era, leading to lost writes. That is, we lose the information about what blocks were written during the affected era. dm-era assumes that the writeset of the current era is archived when the device is suspended. So, when resuming the device, it just moves on to the next era, ignoring the committed writeset. This assumption holds when the device is properly shut down. But, when the system crashes, the code that suspends the target never runs, so the writeset for the current era is not archived. There are three issues that cause the committed writeset to get lost: 1. dm-era doesn't load the committed writeset when opening the metadata 2. The code that resizes the metadata wipes the information about the committed writeset (assuming it was loaded at step 1) 3. era_preresume() starts a new era, without taking into account that the current era might not have been archived, due to a system crash. To fix this: 1. Load the committed writeset when opening the metadata 2. Fix the code that resizes the metadata to make sure it doesn't wipe the loaded writeset 3. Fix era_preresume() to check for a loaded writeset and archive it, before starting a new era. Fixes: eec40579d84873 ("dm: add era target") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.15+ Signed-off-by: Nikos Tsironis <ntsironis@arrikto.com> Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-01-30dm: avoid filesystem lookup in dm_get_dev_t()Hannes Reinecke1-3/+12
commit 809b1e4945774c9ec5619a8f4e2189b7b3833c0c upstream. This reverts commit 644bda6f3460 ("dm table: fall back to getting device using name_to_dev_t()") dm_get_dev_t() is just used to convert an arbitrary 'path' string into a dev_t. It doesn't presume that the device is present; that check will be done later, as the only caller is dm_get_device(), which does a dm_get_table_device() later on, which will properly open the device. So if the path string already _is_ in major:minor representation we can convert it directly, avoiding a recursion into the filesystem to lookup the block device. This avoids a hang in multipath_message() when the filesystem is inaccessible. Fixes: 644bda6f3460 ("dm table: fall back to getting device using name_to_dev_t()") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Martin Wilck <mwilck@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-12-29dm ioctl: fix error return code in target_messageQinglang Miao1-0/+1
[ Upstream commit 4d7659bfbe277a43399a4a2d90fca141e70f29e1 ] Fix to return a negative error code from the error handling case instead of 0, as done elsewhere in this function. Fixes: 2ca4c92f58f9 ("dm ioctl: prevent empty message") Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Qinglang Miao <miaoqinglang@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2020-12-29md: fix a warning caused by a race between concurrent md_ioctl()sDae R. Jeong1-2/+5
commit c731b84b51bf7fe83448bea8f56a6d55006b0615 upstream. Syzkaller reports a warning as belows. WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 9647 at drivers/md/md.c:7169 ... Call Trace: ... RIP: 0010:md_ioctl+0x4017/0x5980 drivers/md/md.c:7169 RSP: 0018:ffff888096027950 EFLAGS: 00010293 RAX: ffff88809322c380 RBX: 0000000000000932 RCX: ffffffff84e266f2 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff84e299f7 RDI: 0000000000000007 RBP: ffff888096027bc0 R08: ffff88809322c380 R09: ffffed101341a482 R10: ffff888096027940 R11: ffff88809a0d240f R12: 0000000000000932 R13: ffff8880a2c14100 R14: ffff88809a0d2268 R15: ffff88809a0d2408 __blkdev_driver_ioctl block/ioctl.c:304 [inline] blkdev_ioctl+0xece/0x1c10 block/ioctl.c:606 block_ioctl+0xee/0x130 fs/block_dev.c:1930 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:46 [inline] file_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:509 [inline] do_vfs_ioctl+0xd5f/0x1380 fs/ioctl.c:696 ksys_ioctl+0xab/0xd0 fs/ioctl.c:713 __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:720 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:718 [inline] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x73/0xb0 fs/ioctl.c:718 do_syscall_64+0xfd/0x680 arch/x86/entry/common.c:301 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe This is caused by a race between two concurrenct md_ioctl()s closing the array. CPU1 (md_ioctl()) CPU2 (md_ioctl()) ------ ------ set_bit(MD_CLOSING, &mddev->flags); did_set_md_closing = true; WARN_ON_ONCE(test_bit(MD_CLOSING, &mddev->flags)); if(did_set_md_closing) clear_bit(MD_CLOSING, &mddev->flags); Fix the warning by returning immediately if the MD_CLOSING bit is set in &mddev->flags which indicates that the array is being closed. Fixes: 065e519e71b2 ("md: MD_CLOSING needs to be cleared after called md_set_readonly or do_md_stop") Reported-by: syzbot+1e46a0864c1a6e9bd3d8@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Dae R. Jeong <dae.r.jeong@kaist.ac.kr> Signed-off-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-12-29dm table: Remove BUG_ON(in_interrupt())Thomas Gleixner1-6/+0
[ Upstream commit e7b624183d921b49ef0a96329f21647d38865ee9 ] The BUG_ON(in_interrupt()) in dm_table_event() is a historic leftover from a rework of the dm table code which changed the calling context. Issuing a BUG for a wrong calling context is frowned upon and in_interrupt() is deprecated and only covering parts of the wrong contexts. The sanity check for the context is covered by CONFIG_DEBUG_ATOMIC_SLEEP and other debug facilities already. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2020-11-10md/raid5: fix oops during stripe resizingSong Liu1-2/+2
commit b44c018cdf748b96b676ba09fdbc5b34fc443ada upstream. KoWei reported crash during raid5 reshape: [ 1032.252932] Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP PTI [...] [ 1032.252943] RIP: 0010:memcpy_erms+0x6/0x10 [...] [ 1032.252947] RSP: 0018:ffffba1ac0c03b78 EFLAGS: 00010286 [ 1032.252949] RAX: 0000784ac0000000 RBX: ffff91bec3d09740 RCX: 0000000000001000 [ 1032.252951] RDX: 0000000000001000 RSI: ffff91be6781c000 RDI: 0000784ac0000000 [ 1032.252953] RBP: ffffba1ac0c03bd8 R08: 0000000000001000 R09: ffffba1ac0c03bf8 [ 1032.252954] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffba1ac0c03bf8 [ 1032.252955] R13: 0000000000001000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 1032.252958] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff91becf500000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 1032.252959] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 1032.252961] CR2: 0000784ac0000000 CR3: 000000031780a002 CR4: 00000000001606e0 [ 1032.252962] Call Trace: [ 1032.252969] ? async_memcpy+0x179/0x1000 [async_memcpy] [ 1032.252977] ? raid5_release_stripe+0x8e/0x110 [raid456] [ 1032.252982] handle_stripe_expansion+0x15a/0x1f0 [raid456] [ 1032.252988] handle_stripe+0x592/0x1270 [raid456] [ 1032.252993] handle_active_stripes.isra.0+0x3cb/0x5a0 [raid456] [ 1032.252999] raid5d+0x35c/0x550 [raid456] [ 1032.253002] ? schedule+0x42/0xb0 [ 1032.253006] ? schedule_timeout+0x10e/0x160 [ 1032.253011] md_thread+0x97/0x160 [ 1032.253015] ? wait_woken+0x80/0x80 [ 1032.253019] kthread+0x104/0x140 [ 1032.253022] ? md_start_sync+0x60/0x60 [ 1032.253024] ? kthread_park+0x90/0x90 [ 1032.253027] ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40 This is because cache_size_mutex was unlocked too early in resize_stripes, which races with grow_one_stripe() that grow_one_stripe() allocates a stripe with wrong pool_size. Fix this issue by unlocking cache_size_mutex after updating pool_size. Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.4+ Reported-by: KoWei Sung <winders@amazon.com> Signed-off-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-11-10md/bitmap: md_bitmap_get_counter returns wrong blocksZhao Heming1-1/+1
[ Upstream commit d837f7277f56e70d82b3a4a037d744854e62f387 ] md_bitmap_get_counter() has code: ``` if (bitmap->bp[page].hijacked || bitmap->bp[page].map == NULL) csize = ((sector_t)1) << (bitmap->chunkshift + PAGE_COUNTER_SHIFT - 1); ``` The minus 1 is wrong, this branch should report 2048 bits of space. With "-1" action, this only report 1024 bit of space. This bug code returns wrong blocks, but it doesn't inflence bitmap logic: 1. Most callers focus this function return value (the counter of offset), not the parameter blocks. 2. The bug is only triggered when hijacked is true or map is NULL. the hijacked true condition is very rare. the "map == null" only true when array is creating or resizing. 3. Even the caller gets wrong blocks, current code makes caller just to call md_bitmap_get_counter() one more time. Signed-off-by: Zhao Heming <heming.zhao@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2020-10-01bcache: fix a lost wake-up problem caused by mca_cannibalize_lockGuoju Fang3-4/+10
[ Upstream commit 34cf78bf34d48dddddfeeadb44f9841d7864997a ] This patch fix a lost wake-up problem caused by the race between mca_cannibalize_lock and bch_cannibalize_unlock. Consider two processes, A and B. Process A is executing mca_cannibalize_lock, while process B takes c->btree_cache_alloc_lock and is executing bch_cannibalize_unlock. The problem happens that after process A executes cmpxchg and will execute prepare_to_wait. In this timeslice process B executes wake_up, but after that process A executes prepare_to_wait and set the state to TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE. Then process A goes to sleep but no one will wake up it. This problem may cause bcache device to dead. Signed-off-by: Guoju Fang <fangguoju@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Coly Li <colyli@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2020-09-12dm thin metadata: Avoid returning cmd->bm wild pointer on errorYe Bin1-2/+6
commit 219403d7e56f9b716ad80ab87db85d29547ee73e upstream. Maybe __create_persistent_data_objects() caller will use PTR_ERR as a pointer, it will lead to some strange things. Signed-off-by: Ye Bin <yebin10@huawei.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-09-12dm cache metadata: Avoid returning cmd->bm wild pointer on errorYe Bin1-2/+6
commit d16ff19e69ab57e08bf908faaacbceaf660249de upstream. Maybe __create_persistent_data_objects() caller will use PTR_ERR as a pointer, it will lead to some strange things. Signed-off-by: Ye Bin <yebin10@huawei.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-09-03overflow.h: Add allocation size calculation helpersKees Cook1-5/+5
commit 610b15c50e86eb1e4b77274fabcaea29ac72d6a8 upstream. In preparation for replacing unchecked overflows for memory allocations, this creates helpers for the 3 most common calculations: array_size(a, b): 2-dimensional array array3_size(a, b, c): 3-dimensional array struct_size(ptr, member, n): struct followed by n-many trailing members Each of these return SIZE_MAX on overflow instead of wrapping around. (Additionally renames a variable named "array_size" to avoid future collision.) Co-developed-by: Matthew Wilcox <mawilcox@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-08-21bcache: allocate meta data pages as compound pagesColy Li4-5/+5
commit 5fe48867856367142d91a82f2cbf7a57a24cbb70 upstream. There are some meta data of bcache are allocated by multiple pages, and they are used as bio bv_page for I/Os to the cache device. for example cache_set->uuids, cache->disk_buckets, journal_write->data, bset_tree->data. For such meta data memory, all the allocated pages should be treated as a single memory block. Then the memory management and underlying I/O code can treat them more clearly. This patch adds __GFP_COMP flag to all the location allocating >0 order pages for the above mentioned meta data. Then their pages are treated as compound pages now. Signed-off-by: Coly Li <colyli@suse.de> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-08-21md/raid5: Fix Force reconstruct-write io stuck in degraded raid5ChangSyun Peng1-1/+2
commit a1c6ae3d9f3dd6aa5981a332a6f700cf1c25edef upstream. In degraded raid5, we need to read parity to do reconstruct-write when data disks fail. However, we can not read parity from handle_stripe_dirtying() in force reconstruct-write mode. Reproducible Steps: 1. Create degraded raid5 mdadm -C /dev/md2 --assume-clean -l5 -n3 /dev/sda2 /dev/sdb2 missing 2. Set rmw_level to 0 echo 0 > /sys/block/md2/md/rmw_level 3. IO to raid5 Now some io may be stuck in raid5. We can use handle_stripe_fill() to read the parity in this situation. Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.4+ Reviewed-by: Alex Wu <alexwu@synology.com> Reviewed-by: BingJing Chang <bingjingc@synology.com> Reviewed-by: Danny Shih <dannyshih@synology.com> Signed-off-by: ChangSyun Peng <allenpeng@synology.com> Signed-off-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-08-21bcache: fix super block seq numbers comparision in register_cache_set()Coly Li1-1/+8
[ Upstream commit 117f636ea695270fe492d0c0c9dfadc7a662af47 ] In register_cache_set(), c is pointer to struct cache_set, and ca is pointer to struct cache, if ca->sb.seq > c->sb.seq, it means this registering cache has up to date version and other members, the in- memory version and other members should be updated to the newer value. But current implementation makes a cache set only has a single cache device, so the above assumption works well except for a special case. The execption is when a cache device new created and both ca->sb.seq and c->sb.seq are 0, because the super block is never flushed out yet. In the location for the following if() check, 2156 if (ca->sb.seq > c->sb.seq) { 2157 c->sb.version = ca->sb.version; 2158 memcpy(c->sb.set_uuid, ca->sb.set_uuid, 16); 2159 c->sb.flags = ca->sb.flags; 2160 c->sb.seq = ca->sb.seq; 2161 pr_debug("set version = %llu\n", c->sb.version); 2162 } c->sb.version is not initialized yet and valued 0. When ca->sb.seq is 0, the if() check will fail (because both values are 0), and the cache set version, set_uuid, flags and seq won't be updated. The above problem is hiden for current code, because the bucket size is compatible among different super block version. And the next time when running cache set again, ca->sb.seq will be larger than 0 and cache set super block version will be updated properly. But if the large bucket feature is enabled, sb->bucket_size is the low 16bits of the bucket size. For a power of 2 value, when the actual bucket size exceeds 16bit width, sb->bucket_size will always be 0. Then read_super_common() will fail because the if() check to is_power_of_2(sb->bucket_size) is false. This is how the long time hidden bug is triggered. This patch modifies the if() check to the following way, 2156 if (ca->sb.seq > c->sb.seq || c->sb.seq == 0) { Then cache set's version, set_uuid, flags and seq will always be updated corectly including for a new created cache device. Signed-off-by: Coly Li <colyli@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2020-08-21md-cluster: fix wild pointer of unlock_all_bitmaps()Zhao Heming1-0/+1
[ Upstream commit 60f80d6f2d07a6d8aee485a1d1252327eeee0c81 ] reproduction steps: ``` node1 # mdadm -C /dev/md0 -b clustered -e 1.2 -n 2 -l mirror /dev/sda /dev/sdb node2 # mdadm -A /dev/md0 /dev/sda /dev/sdb node1 # mdadm -G /dev/md0 -b none mdadm: failed to remove clustered bitmap. node1 # mdadm -S --scan ^C <==== mdadm hung & kernel crash ``` kernel stack: ``` [ 335.230657] general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI [...] [ 335.230848] Call Trace: [ 335.230873] ? unlock_all_bitmaps+0x5/0x70 [md_cluster] [ 335.230886] unlock_all_bitmaps+0x3d/0x70 [md_cluster] [ 335.230899] leave+0x10f/0x190 [md_cluster] [ 335.230932] ? md_super_wait+0x93/0xa0 [md_mod] [ 335.230947] ? leave+0x5/0x190 [md_cluster] [ 335.230973] md_cluster_stop+0x1a/0x30 [md_mod] [ 335.230999] md_bitmap_free+0x142/0x150 [md_mod] [ 335.231013] ? _cond_resched+0x15/0x40 [ 335.231025] ? mutex_lock+0xe/0x30 [ 335.231056] __md_stop+0x1c/0xa0 [md_mod] [ 335.231083] do_md_stop+0x160/0x580 [md_mod] [ 335.231119] ? 0xffffffffc05fb078 [ 335.231148] md_ioctl+0xa04/0x1930 [md_mod] [ 335.231165] ? filename_lookup+0xf2/0x190 [ 335.231179] blkdev_ioctl+0x93c/0xa10 [ 335.231205] ? _cond_resched+0x15/0x40 [ 335.231214] ? __check_object_size+0xd4/0x1a0 [ 335.231224] block_ioctl+0x39/0x40 [ 335.231243] do_vfs_ioctl+0xa0/0x680 [ 335.231253] ksys_ioctl+0x70/0x80 [ 335.231261] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x16/0x20 [ 335.231271] do_syscall_64+0x65/0x1f0 [ 335.231278] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 ``` Signed-off-by: Zhao Heming <heming.zhao@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2020-06-30bcache: fix potential deadlock problem in btree_gc_coalesceZhiqiang Liu1-2/+6
[ Upstream commit be23e837333a914df3f24bf0b32e87b0331ab8d1 ] coccicheck reports: drivers/md//bcache/btree.c:1538:1-7: preceding lock on line 1417 In btree_gc_coalesce func, if the coalescing process fails, we will goto to out_nocoalesce tag directly without releasing new_nodes[i]->write_lock. Then, it will cause a deadlock when trying to acquire new_nodes[i]-> write_lock for freeing new_nodes[i] before return. btree_gc_coalesce func details as follows: if alloc new_nodes[i] fails: goto out_nocoalesce; // obtain new_nodes[i]->write_lock mutex_lock(&new_nodes[i]->write_lock) // main coalescing process for (i = nodes - 1; i > 0; --i) [snipped] if coalescing process fails: // Here, directly goto out_nocoalesce // tag will cause a deadlock goto out_nocoalesce; [snipped] // release new_nodes[i]->write_lock mutex_unlock(&new_nodes[i]->write_lock) // coalesing succ, return return; out_nocoalesce: btree_node_free(new_nodes[i]) // free new_nodes[i] // obtain new_nodes[i]->write_lock mutex_lock(&new_nodes[i]->write_lock); // set flag for reuse clear_bit(BTREE_NODE_dirty, &ew_nodes[i]->flags); // release new_nodes[i]->write_lock mutex_unlock(&new_nodes[i]->write_lock); To fix the problem, we add a new tag 'out_unlock_nocoalesce' for releasing new_nodes[i]->write_lock before out_nocoalesce tag. If coalescing process fails, we will go to out_unlock_nocoalesce tag for releasing new_nodes[i]->write_lock before free new_nodes[i] in out_nocoalesce tag. (Coly Li helps to clean up commit log format.) Fixes: 2a285686c109816 ("bcache: btree locking rework") Signed-off-by: Zhiqiang Liu <liuzhiqiang26@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Coly Li <colyli@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2020-06-20md: don't flush workqueue unconditionally in md_openGuoqing Jiang1-1/+2
[ Upstream commit f6766ff6afff70e2aaf39e1511e16d471de7c3ae ] We need to check mddev->del_work before flush workqueu since the purpose of flush is to ensure the previous md is disappeared. Otherwise the similar deadlock appeared if LOCKDEP is enabled, it is due to md_open holds the bdev->bd_mutex before flush workqueue. kernel: [ 154.522645] ====================================================== kernel: [ 154.522647] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected kernel: [ 154.522650] 5.6.0-rc7-lp151.27-default #25 Tainted: G O kernel: [ 154.522651] ------------------------------------------------------ kernel: [ 154.522653] mdadm/2482 is trying to acquire lock: kernel: [ 154.522655] ffff888078529128 ((wq_completion)md_misc){+.+.}, at: flush_workqueue+0x84/0x4b0 kernel: [ 154.522673] kernel: [ 154.522673] but task is already holding lock: kernel: [ 154.522675] ffff88804efa9338 (&bdev->bd_mutex){+.+.}, at: __blkdev_get+0x79/0x590 kernel: [ 154.522691] kernel: [ 154.522691] which lock already depends on the new lock. kernel: [ 154.522691] kernel: [ 154.522694] kernel: [ 154.522694] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: kernel: [ 154.522696] kernel: [ 154.522696] -> #4 (&bdev->bd_mutex){+.+.}: kernel: [ 154.522704] __mutex_lock+0x87/0x950 kernel: [ 154.522706] __blkdev_get+0x79/0x590 kernel: [ 154.522708] blkdev_get+0x65/0x140 kernel: [ 154.522709] blkdev_get_by_dev+0x2f/0x40 kernel: [ 154.522716] lock_rdev+0x3d/0x90 [md_mod] kernel: [ 154.522719] md_import_device+0xd6/0x1b0 [md_mod] kernel: [ 154.522723] new_dev_store+0x15e/0x210 [md_mod] kernel: [ 154.522728] md_attr_store+0x7a/0xc0 [md_mod] kernel: [ 154.522732] kernfs_fop_write+0x117/0x1b0 kernel: [ 154.522735] vfs_write+0xad/0x1a0 kernel: [ 154.522737] ksys_write+0xa4/0xe0 kernel: [ 154.522745] do_syscall_64+0x64/0x2b0 kernel: [ 154.522748] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe kernel: [ 154.522749] kernel: [ 154.522749] -> #3 (&mddev->reconfig_mutex){+.+.}: kernel: [ 154.522752] __mutex_lock+0x87/0x950 kernel: [ 154.522756] new_dev_store+0xc9/0x210 [md_mod] kernel: [ 154.522759] md_attr_store+0x7a/0xc0 [md_mod] kernel: [ 154.522761] kernfs_fop_write+0x117/0x1b0 kernel: [ 154.522763] vfs_write+0xad/0x1a0 kernel: [ 154.522765] ksys_write+0xa4/0xe0 kernel: [ 154.522767] do_syscall_64+0x64/0x2b0 kernel: [ 154.522769] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe kernel: [ 154.522770] kernel: [ 154.522770] -> #2 (kn->count#253){++++}: kernel: [ 154.522775] __kernfs_remove+0x253/0x2c0 kernel: [ 154.522778] kernfs_remove+0x1f/0x30 kernel: [ 154.522780] kobject_del+0x28/0x60 kernel: [ 154.522783] mddev_delayed_delete+0x24/0x30 [md_mod] kernel: [ 154.522786] process_one_work+0x2a7/0x5f0 kernel: [ 154.522788] worker_thread+0x2d/0x3d0 kernel: [ 154.522793] kthread+0x117/0x130 kernel: [ 154.522795] ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 kernel: [ 154.522796] kernel: [ 154.522796] -> #1 ((work_completion)(&mddev->del_work)){+.+.}: kernel: [ 154.522800] process_one_work+0x27e/0x5f0 kernel: [ 154.522802] worker_thread+0x2d/0x3d0 kernel: [ 154.522804] kthread+0x117/0x130 kernel: [ 154.522806] ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 kernel: [ 154.522807] kernel: [ 154.522807] -> #0 ((wq_completion)md_misc){+.+.}: kernel: [ 154.522813] __lock_acquire+0x1392/0x1690 kernel: [ 154.522816] lock_acquire+0xb4/0x1a0 kernel: [ 154.522818] flush_workqueue+0xab/0x4b0 kernel: [ 154.522821] md_open+0xb6/0xc0 [md_mod] kernel: [ 154.522823] __blkdev_get+0xea/0x590 kernel: [ 154.522825] blkdev_get+0x65/0x140 kernel: [ 154.522828] do_dentry_open+0x1d1/0x380 kernel: [ 154.522831] path_openat+0x567/0xcc0 kernel: [ 154.522834] do_filp_open+0x9b/0x110 kernel: [ 154.522836] do_sys_openat2+0x201/0x2a0 kernel: [ 154.522838] do_sys_open+0x57/0x80 kernel: [ 154.522840] do_syscall_64+0x64/0x2b0 kernel: [ 154.522842] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe kernel: [ 154.522844] kernel: [ 154.522844] other info that might help us debug this: kernel: [ 154.522844] kernel: [ 154.522846] Chain exists of: kernel: [ 154.522846] (wq_completion)md_misc --> &mddev->reconfig_mutex --> &bdev->bd_mutex kernel: [ 154.522846] kernel: [ 154.522850] Possible unsafe locking scenario: kernel: [ 154.522850] kernel: [ 154.522852] CPU0 CPU1 kernel: [ 154.522853] ---- ---- kernel: [ 154.522854] lock(&bdev->bd_mutex); kernel: [ 154.522856] lock(&mddev->reconfig_mutex); kernel: [ 154.522858] lock(&bdev->bd_mutex); kernel: [ 154.522860] lock((wq_completion)md_misc); kernel: [ 154.522861] kernel: [ 154.522861] *** DEADLOCK *** kernel: [ 154.522861] kernel: [ 154.522864] 1 lock held by mdadm/2482: kernel: [ 154.522865] #0: ffff88804efa9338 (&bdev->bd_mutex){+.+.}, at: __blkdev_get+0x79/0x590 kernel: [ 154.522868] kernel: [ 154.522868] stack backtrace: kernel: [ 154.522873] CPU: 1 PID: 2482 Comm: mdadm Tainted: G O 5.6.0-rc7-lp151.27-default #25 kernel: [ 154.522875] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014 kernel: [ 154.522878] Call Trace: kernel: [ 154.522881] dump_stack+0x8f/0xcb kernel: [ 154.522884] check_noncircular+0x194/0x1b0 kernel: [ 154.522888] ? __lock_acquire+0x1392/0x1690 kernel: [ 154.522890] __lock_acquire+0x1392/0x1690 kernel: [ 154.522893] lock_acquire+0xb4/0x1a0 kernel: [ 154.522895] ? flush_workqueue+0x84/0x4b0 kernel: [ 154.522898] flush_workqueue+0xab/0x4b0 kernel: [ 154.522900] ? flush_workqueue+0x84/0x4b0 kernel: [ 154.522905] ? md_open+0xb6/0xc0 [md_mod] kernel: [ 154.522908] md_open+0xb6/0xc0 [md_mod] kernel: [ 154.522910] __blkdev_get+0xea/0x590 kernel: [ 154.522912] ? bd_acquire+0xc0/0xc0 kernel: [ 154.522914] blkdev_get+0x65/0x140 kernel: [ 154.522916] ? bd_acquire+0xc0/0xc0 kernel: [ 154.522918] do_dentry_open+0x1d1/0x380 kernel: [ 154.522921] path_openat+0x567/0xcc0 kernel: [ 154.522923] ? __lock_acquire+0x380/0x1690 kernel: [ 154.522926] do_filp_open+0x9b/0x110 kernel: [ 154.522929] ? __alloc_fd+0xe5/0x1f0 kernel: [ 154.522935] ? kmem_cache_alloc+0x28c/0x630 kernel: [ 154.522939] ? do_sys_openat2+0x201/0x2a0 kernel: [ 154.522941] do_sys_openat2+0x201/0x2a0 kernel: [ 154.522944] do_sys_open+0x57/0x80 kernel: [ 154.522946] do_syscall_64+0x64/0x2b0 kernel: [ 154.522948] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe kernel: [ 154.522951] RIP: 0033:0x7f98d279d9ae And md_alloc also flushed the same workqueue, but the thing is different here. Because all the paths call md_alloc don't hold bdev->bd_mutex, and the flush is necessary to avoid race condition, so leave it as it is. Signed-off-by: Guoqing Jiang <guoqing.jiang@cloud.ionos.com> Signed-off-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2020-05-05dm verity fec: fix hash block number in verity_fec_decodeSunwook Eom1-1/+1
commit ad4e80a639fc61d5ecebb03caa5cdbfb91fcebfc upstream. The error correction data is computed as if data and hash blocks were concatenated. But hash block number starts from v->hash_start. So, we have to calculate hash block number based on that. Fixes: a739ff3f543af ("dm verity: add support for forward error correction") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sunwook Eom <speed.eom@samsung.com> Reviewed-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com> Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-04-24dm flakey: check for null arg_name in parse_features()Goldwyn Rodrigues1-0/+5
[ Upstream commit 7690e25302dc7d0cd42b349e746fe44b44a94f2b ] One can crash dm-flakey by specifying more feature arguments than the number of features supplied. Checking for null in arg_name avoids this. dmsetup create flakey-test --table "0 66076080 flakey /dev/sdb9 0 0 180 2 drop_writes" Signed-off-by: Goldwyn Rodrigues <rgoldwyn@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2020-04-24dm verity fec: fix memory leak in verity_fec_dtrShetty, Harshini X (EXT-Sony Mobile)1-0/+1
commit 75fa601934fda23d2f15bf44b09c2401942d8e15 upstream. Fix below kmemleak detected in verity_fec_ctr. output_pool is allocated for each dm-verity-fec device. But it is not freed when dm-table for the verity target is removed. Hence free the output mempool in destructor function verity_fec_dtr. unreferenced object 0xffffffffa574d000 (size 4096): comm "init", pid 1667, jiffies 4294894890 (age 307.168s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): 8e 36 00 98 66 a8 0b 9b 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .6..f........... 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ backtrace: [<0000000060e82407>] __kmalloc+0x2b4/0x340 [<00000000dd99488f>] mempool_kmalloc+0x18/0x20 [<000000002560172b>] mempool_init_node+0x98/0x118 [<000000006c3574d2>] mempool_init+0x14/0x20 [<0000000008cb266e>] verity_fec_ctr+0x388/0x3b0 [<000000000887261b>] verity_ctr+0x87c/0x8d0 [<000000002b1e1c62>] dm_table_add_target+0x174/0x348 [<000000002ad89eda>] table_load+0xe4/0x328 [<000000001f06f5e9>] dm_ctl_ioctl+0x3b4/0x5a0 [<00000000bee5fbb7>] do_vfs_ioctl+0x5dc/0x928 [<00000000b475b8f5>] __arm64_sys_ioctl+0x70/0x98 [<000000005361e2e8>] el0_svc_common+0xa0/0x158 [<000000001374818f>] el0_svc_handler+0x6c/0x88 [<000000003364e9f4>] el0_svc+0x8/0xc [<000000009d84cec9>] 0xffffffffffffffff Fixes: a739ff3f543af ("dm verity: add support for forward error correction") Depends-on: 6f1c819c219f7 ("dm: convert to bioset_init()/mempool_init()") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Harshini Shetty <harshini.x.shetty@sony.com> Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-03-11dm cache: fix a crash due to incorrect work item cancellingMikulas Patocka1-2/+2
commit 7cdf6a0aae1cccf5167f3f04ecddcf648b78e289 upstream. The crash can be reproduced by running the lvm2 testsuite test lvconvert-thin-external-cache.sh for several minutes, e.g.: while :; do make check T=shell/lvconvert-thin-external-cache.sh; done The crash happens in this call chain: do_waker -> policy_tick -> smq_tick -> end_hotspot_period -> clear_bitset -> memset -> __memset -- which accesses an invalid pointer in the vmalloc area. The work entry on the workqueue is executed even after the bitmap was freed. The problem is that cancel_delayed_work doesn't wait for the running work item to finish, so the work item can continue running and re-submitting itself even after cache_postsuspend. In order to make sure that the work item won't be running, we must use cancel_delayed_work_sync. Also, change flush_workqueue to drain_workqueue, so that if some work item submits itself or another work item, we are properly waiting for both of them. Fixes: c6b4fcbad044 ("dm: add cache target") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.9 Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-02-28bcache: explicity type cast in bset_bkey_last()Coly Li1-1/+2
[ Upstream commit 7c02b0055f774ed9afb6e1c7724f33bf148ffdc0 ] In bset.h, macro bset_bkey_last() is defined as, bkey_idx((struct bkey *) (i)->d, (i)->keys) Parameter i can be variable type of data structure, the macro always works once the type of struct i has member 'd' and 'keys'. bset_bkey_last() is also used in macro csum_set() to calculate the checksum of a on-disk data structure. When csum_set() is used to calculate checksum of on-disk bcache super block, the parameter 'i' data type is struct cache_sb_disk. Inside struct cache_sb_disk (also in struct cache_sb) the member keys is __u16 type. But bkey_idx() expects unsigned int (a 32bit width), so there is problem when sending parameters via stack to call bkey_idx(). Sparse tool from Intel 0day kbuild system reports this incompatible problem. bkey_idx() is part of user space API, so the simplest fix is to cast the (i)->keys to unsigned int type in macro bset_bkey_last(). Reported-by: kbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Coly Li <colyli@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2020-02-15dm: fix potential for q->make_request_fn NULL pointerMike Snitzer1-2/+7
commit 47ace7e012b9f7ad71d43ac9063d335ea3d6820b upstream. Move blk_queue_make_request() to dm.c:alloc_dev() so that q->make_request_fn is never NULL during the lifetime of a DM device (even one that is created without a DM table). Otherwise generic_make_request() will crash simply by doing: dmsetup create -n test mount /dev/dm-N /mnt While at it, move ->congested_data initialization out of dm.c:alloc_dev() and into the bio-based specific init method. Reported-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com> BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1860231 Fixes: ff36ab34583a ("dm: remove request-based logic from make_request_fn wrapper") Depends-on: c12c9a3c3860c ("dm: various cleanups to md->queue initialization code") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com> [smb: adjusted for context and dm_init_md_queue() exitsting in older kernels, and congested_data embedded in backing_dev_info] Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-02-15dm space map common: fix to ensure new block isn't already in useJoe Thornber4-3/+37
commit 4feaef830de7ffdd8352e1fe14ad3bf13c9688f8 upstream. The space-maps track the reference counts for disk blocks allocated by both the thin-provisioning and cache targets. There are variants for tracking metadata blocks and data blocks. Transactionality is implemented by never touching blocks from the previous transaction, so we can rollback in the event of a crash. When allocating a new block we need to ensure the block is free (has reference count of 0) in both the current and previous transaction. Prior to this fix we were doing this by searching for a free block in the previous transaction, and relying on a 'begin' counter to track where the last allocation in the current transaction was. This 'begin' field was not being updated in all code paths (eg, increment of a data block reference count due to breaking sharing of a neighbour block in the same btree leaf). This fix keeps the 'begin' field, but now it's just a hint to speed up the search. Instead the current transaction is searched for a free block, and then the old transaction is double checked to ensure it's free. Much simpler. This fixes reports of sm_disk_new_block()'s BUG_ON() triggering when DM thin-provisioning's snapshots are heavily used. Reported-by: Eric Wheeler <dm-devel@lists.ewheeler.net> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Joe Thornber <ejt@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-01-29md: Avoid namespace collision with bitmap APIAndy Shevchenko1-4/+4
commit e64e4018d572710c44f42c923d4ac059f0a23320 upstream. bitmap API (include/linux/bitmap.h) has 'bitmap' prefix for its methods. On the other hand MD bitmap API is special case. Adding 'md' prefix to it to avoid name space collision. No functional changes intended. Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Shaohua Li <shli@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com> [only take the bitmap_free change for stable - gregkh] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-01-29bcache: silence static checker warningDan Carpenter1-3/+0
commit da22f0eea555baf9b0a84b52afe56db2052cfe8d upstream. In olden times, closure_return() used to have a hidden return built in. We removed the hidden return but forgot to add a new return here. If "c" were NULL we would oops on the next line, but fortunately "c" is never NULL. Let's just remove the if statement. Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Coly Li <colyli@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: Lee Jones <lee.jones@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-01-23block: fix an integer overflow in logical block sizeMikulas Patocka2-2/+2
commit ad6bf88a6c19a39fb3b0045d78ea880325dfcf15 upstream. Logical block size has type unsigned short. That means that it can be at most 32768. However, there are architectures that can run with 64k pages (for example arm64) and on these architectures, it may be possible to create block devices with 64k block size. For exmaple (run this on an architecture with 64k pages): Mount will fail with this error because it tries to read the superblock using 2-sector access: device-mapper: writecache: I/O is not aligned, sector 2, size 1024, block size 65536 EXT4-fs (dm-0): unable to read superblock This patch changes the logical block size from unsigned short to unsigned int to avoid the overflow. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-01-12md: raid1: check rdev before reference in raid1_sync_request funcZhiqiang Liu1-1/+1
[ Upstream commit 028288df635f5a9addd48ac4677b720192747944 ] In raid1_sync_request func, rdev should be checked before reference. Signed-off-by: Zhiqiang Liu <liuzhiqiang26@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2020-01-04bcache: at least try to shrink 1 node in bch_mca_scan()Coly Li1-0/+2
[ Upstream commit 9fcc34b1a6dd4b8e5337e2b6ef45e428897eca6b ] In bch_mca_scan(), the number of shrinking btree node is calculated by code like this, unsigned long nr = sc->nr_to_scan; nr /= c->btree_pages; nr = min_t(unsigned long, nr, mca_can_free(c)); variable sc->nr_to_scan is number of objects (here is bcache B+tree nodes' number) to shrink, and pointer variable sc is sent from memory management code as parametr of a callback. If sc->nr_to_scan is smaller than c->btree_pages, after the above calculation, variable 'nr' will be 0 and nothing will be shrunk. It is frequeently observed that only 1 or 2 is set to sc->nr_to_scan and make nr to be zero. Then bch_mca_scan() will do nothing more then acquiring and releasing mutex c->bucket_lock. This patch checkes whether nr is 0 after the above calculation, if 0 is the result then set 1 to variable 'n'. Then at least bch_mca_scan() will try to shrink a single B+tree node. Signed-off-by: Coly Li <colyli@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2019-12-21dm btree: increase rebalance threshold in __rebalance2()Hou Tao1-1/+7
commit 474e559567fa631dea8fb8407ab1b6090c903755 upstream. We got the following warnings from thin_check during thin-pool setup: $ thin_check /dev/vdb examining superblock examining devices tree missing devices: [1, 84] too few entries in btree_node: 41, expected at least 42 (block 138, max_entries = 126) examining mapping tree The phenomenon is the number of entries in one node of details_info tree is less than (max_entries / 3). And it can be easily reproduced by the following procedures: $ new a thin pool $ presume the max entries of details_info tree is 126 $ new 127 thin devices (e.g. 1~127) to make the root node being full and then split $ remove the first 43 (e.g. 1~43) thin devices to make the children reblance repeatedly $ stop the thin pool $ thin_check The root cause is that the B-tree removal procedure in __rebalance2() doesn't guarantee the invariance: the minimal number of entries in non-root node should be >= (max_entries / 3). Simply fix the problem by increasing the rebalance threshold to make sure the number of entries in each child will be greater than or equal to (max_entries / 3 + 1), so no matter which child is used for removal, the number will still be valid. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com> Acked-by: Joe Thornber <ejt@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-12-05dm flakey: Properly corrupt multi-page bios.Sweet Tea1-11/+22
[ Upstream commit a00f5276e26636cbf72f24f79831026d2e2868e7 ] The flakey target is documented to be able to corrupt the Nth byte in a bio, but does not corrupt byte indices after the first biovec in the bio. Change the corrupting function to actually corrupt the Nth byte no matter in which biovec that index falls. A test device generating two-page bios, atop a flakey device configured to corrupt a byte index on the second page, verified both the failure to corrupt before this patch and the expected corruption after this change. Signed-off-by: John Dorminy <jdorminy@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2019-11-28dm: use blk_set_queue_dying() in __dm_destroy()Bart Van Assche1-3/+1
commit 2e91c3694181dc500faffec16c5aaa0ac5e15449 upstream. After QUEUE_FLAG_DYING has been set any code that is waiting in get_request() should be woken up. But to get this behaviour blk_set_queue_dying() must be used instead of only setting QUEUE_FLAG_DYING. Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche <bart.vanassche@sandisk.com> Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Lee Jones <lee.jones@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-11-25bcache: recal cached_dev_sectors on detachShenghui Wang1-0/+1
[ Upstream commit 46010141da6677b81cc77f9b47f8ac62bd1cbfd3 ] Recal cached_dev_sectors on cached_dev detached, as recal done on cached_dev attached. Update the cached_dev_sectors before bcache_device_detach called as bcache_device_detach will set bcache_device->c to NULL. Signed-off-by: Shenghui Wang <shhuiw@foxmail.com> Signed-off-by: Coly Li <colyli@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2019-11-06dm: Use kzalloc for all structs with embedded biosets/mempoolsKent Overstreet6-6/+6
[ Upstream commit d377535405686f735b90a8ad4ba269484cd7c96e ] mempool_init()/bioset_init() require that the mempools/biosets be zeroed first; they probably should not _require_ this, but not allocating those structs with kzalloc is a fairly nonsensical thing to do (calling mempool_exit()/bioset_exit() on an uninitialized mempool/bioset is legal and safe, but only works if said memory was zeroed.) Acked-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Kent Overstreet <kent.overstreet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2019-11-06dm snapshot: rework COW throttling to fix deadlockMikulas Patocka1-16/+64
[ Upstream commit b21555786f18cd77f2311ad89074533109ae3ffa ] Commit 721b1d98fb517a ("dm snapshot: Fix excessive memory usage and workqueue stalls") introduced a semaphore to limit the maximum number of in-flight kcopyd (COW) jobs. The implementation of this throttling mechanism is prone to a deadlock: 1. One or more threads write to the origin device causing COW, which is performed by kcopyd. 2. At some point some of these threads might reach the s->cow_count semaphore limit and block in down(&s->cow_count), holding a read lock on _origins_lock. 3. Someone tries to acquire a write lock on _origins_lock, e.g., snapshot_ctr(), which blocks because the threads at step (2) already hold a read lock on it. 4. A COW operation completes and kcopyd runs dm-snapshot's completion callback, which ends up calling pending_complete(). pending_complete() tries to resubmit any deferred origin bios. This requires acquiring a read lock on _origins_lock, which blocks. This happens because the read-write semaphore implementation gives priority to writers, meaning that as soon as a writer tries to enter the critical section, no readers will be allowed in, until all writers have completed their work. So, pending_complete() waits for the writer at step (3) to acquire and release the lock. This writer waits for the readers at step (2) to release the read lock and those readers wait for pending_complete() (the kcopyd thread) to signal the s->cow_count semaphore: DEADLOCK. The above was thoroughly analyzed and documented by Nikos Tsironis as part of his initial proposal for fixing this deadlock, see: https://www.redhat.com/archives/dm-devel/2019-October/msg00001.html Fix this deadlock by reworking COW throttling so that it waits without holding any locks. Add a variable 'in_progress' that counts how many kcopyd jobs are running. A function wait_for_in_progress() will sleep if 'in_progress' is over the limit. It drops _origins_lock in order to avoid the deadlock. Reported-by: Guruswamy Basavaiah <guru2018@gmail.com> Reported-by: Nikos Tsironis <ntsironis@arrikto.com> Reviewed-by: Nikos Tsironis <ntsironis@arrikto.com> Tested-by: Nikos Tsironis <ntsironis@arrikto.com> Fixes: 721b1d98fb51 ("dm snapshot: Fix excessive memory usage and workqueue stalls") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.0+ Depends-on: 4a3f111a73a8c ("dm snapshot: introduce account_start_copy() and account_end_copy()") Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2019-11-06dm snapshot: introduce account_start_copy() and account_end_copy()Mikulas Patocka1-3/+13
[ Upstream commit a2f83e8b0c82c9500421a26c49eb198b25fcdea3 ] This simple refactoring moves code for modifying the semaphore cow_count into separate functions to prepare for changes that will extend these methods to provide for a more sophisticated mechanism for COW throttling. Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Nikos Tsironis <ntsironis@arrikto.com> Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2019-11-06dm snapshot: use mutex instead of rw_semaphoreMikulas Patocka1-41/+43
[ Upstream commit ae1093be5a0ef997833e200a0dafb9ed0b1ff4fe ] The rw_semaphore is acquired for read only in two places, neither is performance-critical. So replace it with a mutex -- which is more efficient. Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2019-10-05md/raid6: Set R5_ReadError when there is read failure on parity diskXiao Ni1-1/+3
commit 143f6e733b73051cd22dcb80951c6c929da413ce upstream. 7471fb77ce4d ("md/raid6: Fix anomily when recovering a single device in RAID6.") avoids rereading P when it can be computed from other members. However, this misses the chance to re-write the right data to P. This patch sets R5_ReadError if the re-read fails. Also, when re-read is skipped, we also missed the chance to reset rdev->read_errors to 0. It can fail the disk when there are many read errors on P member disk (other disks don't have read error) V2: upper layer read request don't read parity/Q data. So there is no need to consider such situation. This is Reported-by: kbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com> Fixes: 7471fb77ce4d ("md/raid6: Fix anomily when recovering a single device in RAID6.") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> #4.4+ Signed-off-by: Xiao Ni <xni@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-10-05md/raid1: fail run raid1 array when active disk less than oneYufen Yu1-1/+12
[ Upstream commit 07f1a6850c5d5a65c917c3165692b5179ac4cb6b ] When run test case: mdadm -CR /dev/md1 -l 1 -n 4 /dev/sd[a-d] --assume-clean --bitmap=internal mdadm -S /dev/md1 mdadm -A /dev/md1 /dev/sd[b-c] --run --force mdadm --zero /dev/sda mdadm /dev/md1 -a /dev/sda echo offline > /sys/block/sdc/device/state echo offline > /sys/block/sdb/device/state sleep 5 mdadm -S /dev/md1 echo running > /sys/block/sdb/device/state echo running > /sys/block/sdc/device/state mdadm -A /dev/md1 /dev/sd[a-c] --run --force mdadm run fail with kernel message as follow: [ 172.986064] md: kicking non-fresh sdb from array! [ 173.004210] md: kicking non-fresh sdc from array! [ 173.022383] md/raid1:md1: active with 0 out of 4 mirrors [ 173.022406] md1: failed to create bitmap (-5) In fact, when active disk in raid1 array less than one, we need to return fail in raid1_run(). Reviewed-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Yufen Yu <yuyufen@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2019-10-05md: don't set In_sync if array is frozenGuoqing Jiang1-2/+9
[ Upstream commit 062f5b2ae12a153644c765e7ba3b0f825427be1d ] When a disk is added to array, the following path is called in mdadm. Manage_subdevs -> sysfs_freeze_array -> Manage_add -> sysfs_set_str(&info, NULL, "sync_action","idle") Then from kernel side, Manage_add invokes the path (add_new_disk -> validate_super = super_1_validate) to set In_sync flag. Since In_sync means "device is in_sync with rest of array", and the new added disk need to resync thread to help the synchronization of data. And md_reap_sync_thread would call spare_active to set In_sync for the new added disk finally. So don't set In_sync if array is in frozen. Signed-off-by: Guoqing Jiang <guoqing.jiang@cloud.ionos.com> Signed-off-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2019-10-05md: don't call spare_active in md_reap_sync_thread if all member devices ↵Guoqing Jiang1-1/+2
can't work [ Upstream commit 0d8ed0e9bf9643f27f4816dca61081784dedb38d ] When add one disk to array, the md_reap_sync_thread is responsible to activate the spare and set In_sync flag for the new member in spare_active(). But if raid1 has one member disk A, and disk B is added to the array. Then we offline A before all the datas are synchronized from A to B, obviously B doesn't have the latest data as A, but B is still marked with In_sync flag. So let's not call spare_active under the condition, otherwise B is still showed with 'U' state which is not correct. Signed-off-by: Guoqing Jiang <guoqing.jiang@cloud.ionos.com> Signed-off-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2019-09-06dm table: fix invalid memory accesses with too high sector numberMikulas Patocka1-1/+4
commit 1cfd5d3399e87167b7f9157ef99daa0e959f395d upstream. If the sector number is too high, dm_table_find_target() should return a pointer to a zeroed dm_target structure (the caller should test it with dm_target_is_valid). However, for some table sizes, the code in dm_table_find_target() that performs btree lookup will access out of bound memory structures. Fix this bug by testing the sector number at the beginning of dm_table_find_target(). Also, add an "inline" keyword to the function dm_table_get_size() because this is a hot path. Fixes: 512875bd9661 ("dm: table detect io beyond device") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Zhang Tao <kontais@zoho.com> Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-09-06dm space map metadata: fix missing store of apply_bops() return valueZhangXiaoxu1-1/+1
commit ae148243d3f0816b37477106c05a2ec7d5f32614 upstream. In commit 6096d91af0b6 ("dm space map metadata: fix occasional leak of a metadata block on resize"), we refactor the commit logic to a new function 'apply_bops'. But when that logic was replaced in out() the return value was not stored. This may lead out() returning a wrong value to the caller. Fixes: 6096d91af0b6 ("dm space map metadata: fix occasional leak of a metadata block on resize") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: ZhangXiaoxu <zhangxiaoxu5@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-09-06dm btree: fix order of block initialization in btree_split_beneathZhangXiaoxu1-15/+16
commit e4f9d6013820d1eba1432d51dd1c5795759aa77f upstream. When btree_split_beneath() splits a node to two new children, it will allocate two blocks: left and right. If right block's allocation failed, the left block will be unlocked and marked dirty. If this happened, the left block'ss content is zero, because it wasn't initialized with the btree struct before the attempot to allocate the right block. Upon return, when flushing the left block to disk, the validator will fail when check this block. Then a BUG_ON is raised. Fix this by completely initializing the left block before allocating and initializing the right block. Fixes: 4dcb8b57df359 ("dm btree: fix leak of bufio-backed block in btree_split_beneath error path") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: ZhangXiaoxu <zhangxiaoxu5@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>