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commit e487a0f52301293152a6f8c4e217f2a11dd808e3 upstream.
Functionality of the xen-tpmfront driver was lost secondary to
the introduction of xenbus multi-page support in commit ccc9d90a9a8b
("xenbus_client: Extend interface to support multi-page ring").
In this commit pointer to location of where the shared page address
is stored was being passed to the xenbus_grant_ring() function rather
then the address of the shared page itself. This resulted in a situation
where the driver would attach to the vtpm-stubdom but any attempt
to send a command to the stub domain would timeout.
A diagnostic finding for this regression is the following error
message being generated when the xen-tpmfront driver probes for a
device:
<3>vtpm vtpm-0: tpm_transmit: tpm_send: error -62
<3>vtpm vtpm-0: A TPM error (-62) occurred attempting to determine
the timeouts
This fix is relevant to all kernels from 4.1 forward which is the
release in which multi-page xenbus support was introduced.
Daniel De Graaf formulated the fix by code inspection after the
regression point was located.
Fixes: ccc9d90a9a8b ("xenbus_client: Extend interface to support multi-page ring")
Signed-off-by: Dr. Greg Wettstein <greg@enjellic.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[boris: Updated commit message, added Fixes tag]
Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.1+
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
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[ Upstream commit 0d6d0d62d9505a9816716aa484ebd0b04c795063 ]
For TPM 1.2 chips the system setup utility allows to set the TPM device in
one of the following states:
* Active: Security chip is functional
* Inactive: Security chip is visible, but is not functional
* Disabled: Security chip is hidden and is not functional
When choosing the "Inactive" state, the TPM 1.2 device is enumerated and
registered, but sending TPM commands fail with either TPM_DEACTIVATED or
TPM_DISABLED depending if the firmware deactivated or disabled the TPM.
Since these TPM 1.2 error codes don't have special treatment, inactivating
the TPM leads to a very noisy kernel log buffer that shows messages like
the following:
tpm_tis 00:05: 1.2 TPM (device-id 0x0, rev-id 78)
tpm tpm0: A TPM error (6) occurred attempting to read a pcr value
tpm tpm0: TPM is disabled/deactivated (0x6)
tpm tpm0: A TPM error (6) occurred attempting get random
tpm tpm0: A TPM error (6) occurred attempting to read a pcr value
ima: No TPM chip found, activating TPM-bypass! (rc=6)
tpm tpm0: A TPM error (6) occurred attempting get random
tpm tpm0: A TPM error (6) occurred attempting get random
tpm tpm0: A TPM error (6) occurred attempting get random
tpm tpm0: A TPM error (6) occurred attempting get random
Let's just suppress error log messages for the TPM_{DEACTIVATED,DISABLED}
return codes, since this is expected when the TPM 1.2 is set to Inactive.
In that case the kernel log is cleaner and less confusing for users, i.e:
tpm_tis 00:05: 1.2 TPM (device-id 0x0, rev-id 78)
tpm tpm0: TPM is disabled/deactivated (0x6)
ima: No TPM chip found, activating TPM-bypass! (rc=6)
Reported-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 0711e8c1b4572d076264e71b0002d223f2666ed7 upstream.
Please note that below oops is from an older kernel, but the same
race seems to be present in the upstream kernel too.
---8<---
The following panic was encountered during removing the ipmi_ssif
module:
[ 526.352555] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffff000006923090
[ 526.360464] Mem abort info:
[ 526.363257] ESR = 0x86000007
[ 526.366304] Exception class = IABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[ 526.372221] SET = 0, FnV = 0
[ 526.375269] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[ 526.378405] swapper pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgd = 000000008ae60416
[ 526.385185] [ffff000006923090] *pgd=000000bffcffe803, *pud=000000bffcffd803, *pmd=0000009f4731a003, *pte=0000000000000000
[ 526.396141] Internal error: Oops: 86000007 [#1] SMP
[ 526.401008] Modules linked in: nls_iso8859_1 ipmi_devintf joydev input_leds ipmi_msghandler shpchp sch_fq_codel ib_iser rdma_cm iw_cm ib_cm ib_core iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi ip_tables x_tables autofs4 btrfs zstd_compress raid10 raid456 async_raid6_recov async_memcpy async_pq async_xor async_tx xor raid6_pq libcrc32c raid1 raid0 multipath linear i2c_smbus hid_generic usbhid uas hid usb_storage ast aes_ce_blk i2c_algo_bit aes_ce_cipher qede ttm crc32_ce ptp crct10dif_ce drm_kms_helper ghash_ce syscopyarea sha2_ce sysfillrect sysimgblt pps_core fb_sys_fops sha256_arm64 sha1_ce mpt3sas qed drm raid_class ahci scsi_transport_sas libahci gpio_xlp i2c_xlp9xx aes_neon_bs aes_neon_blk crypto_simd cryptd aes_arm64 [last unloaded: ipmi_ssif]
[ 526.468085] CPU: 125 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/125 Not tainted 4.15.0-35-generic #38~lp1775396+build.1
[ 526.476942] Hardware name: To be filled by O.E.M. Saber/Saber, BIOS 0ACKL022 08/14/2018
[ 526.484932] pstate: 00400009 (nzcv daif +PAN -UAO)
[ 526.489713] pc : 0xffff000006923090
[ 526.493198] lr : call_timer_fn+0x34/0x178
[ 526.497194] sp : ffff000009b0bdd0
[ 526.500496] x29: ffff000009b0bdd0 x28: 0000000000000082
[ 526.505796] x27: 0000000000000002 x26: ffff000009515188
[ 526.511096] x25: ffff000009515180 x24: ffff0000090f1018
[ 526.516396] x23: ffff000009519660 x22: dead000000000200
[ 526.521696] x21: ffff000006923090 x20: 0000000000000100
[ 526.526995] x19: ffff809eeb466a40 x18: 0000000000000000
[ 526.532295] x17: 000000000000000e x16: 0000000000000007
[ 526.537594] x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 071c71c71c71c71c
[ 526.542894] x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
[ 526.548193] x11: 0000000000000001 x10: ffff000009b0be88
[ 526.553493] x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : 0000000000000005
[ 526.558793] x7 : ffff80befc1f8528 x6 : 0000000000000020
[ 526.564092] x5 : 0000000000000040 x4 : 0000000020001b20
[ 526.569392] x3 : 0000000000000000 x2 : ffff809eeb466a40
[ 526.574692] x1 : ffff000006923090 x0 : ffff809eeb466a40
[ 526.579992] Process swapper/125 (pid: 0, stack limit = 0x000000002eb50acc)
[ 526.586854] Call trace:
[ 526.589289] 0xffff000006923090
[ 526.592419] expire_timers+0xc8/0x130
[ 526.596070] run_timer_softirq+0xec/0x1b0
[ 526.600070] __do_softirq+0x134/0x328
[ 526.603726] irq_exit+0xc8/0xe0
[ 526.606857] __handle_domain_irq+0x6c/0xc0
[ 526.610941] gic_handle_irq+0x84/0x188
[ 526.614679] el1_irq+0xe8/0x180
[ 526.617822] cpuidle_enter_state+0xa0/0x328
[ 526.621993] cpuidle_enter+0x34/0x48
[ 526.625564] call_cpuidle+0x44/0x70
[ 526.629040] do_idle+0x1b8/0x1f0
[ 526.632256] cpu_startup_entry+0x2c/0x30
[ 526.636174] secondary_start_kernel+0x11c/0x130
[ 526.640694] Code: bad PC value
[ 526.643800] ---[ end trace d020b0b8417c2498 ]---
[ 526.648404] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
[ 526.654778] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
[ 526.658734] Kernel Offset: disabled
[ 526.662211] CPU features: 0x5800c38
[ 526.665688] Memory Limit: none
[ 526.668768] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
Prevent mod_timer from arming a timer that was already removed by
del_timer during module unload.
Signed-off-by: Jan Glauber <jglauber@cavium.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 3.19
Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 4f3b193dee4423d8c89c9a3e8e05f9197ea459a4 ]
Call put_device() and return error code if devm_add_action() fails.
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Reported-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
Fixes: 8e0ee3c9faed ("tpm: fix the cleanup of struct tpm_chip")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 3ab2011ea368ec3433ad49e1b9e1c7b70d2e65df upstream.
There is a race condition in tpm_common_write function allowing
two threads on the same /dev/tpm<N>, or two different applications
on the same /dev/tpmrm<N> to overwrite each other commands/responses.
Fixed this by taking the priv->buffer_mutex early in the function.
Also converted the priv->data_pending from atomic to a regular size_t
type. There is no need for it to be atomic since it is only touched
under the protection of the priv->buffer_mutex.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 81e69df38e2911b642ec121dec319fad2a4782f3 upstream.
Fedora has integrated the jitter entropy daemon to work around slow
boot problems, especially on VM's that don't support virtio-rng:
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1572944
It's understandable why they did this, but the Jitter entropy daemon
works fundamentally on the principle: "the CPU microarchitecture is
**so** complicated and we can't figure it out, so it *must* be
random". Yes, it uses statistical tests to "prove" it is secure, but
AES_ENCRYPT(NSA_KEY, COUNTER++) will also pass statistical tests with
flying colors.
So if RDRAND is available, mix it into entropy submitted from
userspace. It can't hurt, and if you believe the NSA has backdoored
RDRAND, then they probably have enough details about the Intel
microarchitecture that they can reverse engineer how the Jitter
entropy daemon affects the microarchitecture, and attack its output
stream. And if RDRAND is in fact an honest DRNG, it will immeasurably
improve on what the Jitter entropy daemon might produce.
This also provides some protection against someone who is able to read
or set the entropy seed file.
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit fe50a7d0393a552e4539da2d31261a59d6415950 upstream.
There was one place where the timeout value for an operation was
not being set, if a capabilities request was done from idle. Move
the timeout value setting to before where that change might be
requested.
IMHO the cause here is the invisible returns in the macros. Maybe
that's a job for later, though.
Reported-by: Nordmark Claes <Claes.Nordmark@tieto.com>
Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 362f924b64ba0f4be2ee0cb697690c33d40be721 upstream.
Those are stupid and code should use static_cpu_has_safe() or
boot_cpu_has() instead. Kill the least used and unused ones.
The remaining ones need more careful inspection before a conversion can
happen. On the TODO.
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1449481182-27541-4-git-send-email-bp@alien8.de
Cc: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>
Cc: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
Cc: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 0803d7befa15cab5717d667a97a66214d2a4c083 upstream.
The Acer Acer Veriton X4110G has a TPM device detected as:
tpm_tis 00:0b: 1.2 TPM (device-id 0xFE, rev-id 71)
After the first S3 suspend, the following error appears during resume:
tpm tpm0: A TPM error(38) occurred continue selftest
Any following S3 suspend attempts will now fail with this error:
tpm tpm0: Error (38) sending savestate before suspend
PM: Device 00:0b failed to suspend: error 38
Error 38 is TPM_ERR_INVALID_POSTINIT which means the TPM is
not in the correct state. This indicates that the platform BIOS
is not sending the usual TPM_Startup command during S3 resume.
>From this point onwards, all TPM commands will fail.
The same issue was previously reported on Foxconn 6150BK8MC and
Sony Vaio TX3.
The platform behaviour seems broken here, but we should not break
suspend/resume because of this.
When the unexpected TPM state is encountered, set a flag to skip the
affected TPM_SaveState command on later suspends.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Chris Chiu <chiu@endlessm.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Drake <drake@endlessm.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CAB4CAwfSCvj1cudi+MWaB5g2Z67d9DwY1o475YOZD64ma23UiQ@mail.gmail.com
Link: https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/3/28/192
Link: https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=591031
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit b5d0ebc99bf5d0801a5ecbe958caa3d68b8eaee8 upstream.
The suspend/resume behavior of the TPM can be controlled by setting
"powered-while-suspended" in the DTS. This is useful for the cases
when hardware does not power-off the TPM.
Signed-off-by: Sonny Rao <sonnyrao@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Enric Balletbo i Serra <enric.balletbo@collabora.com>
Reviewed-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 326ed382256475aa4b8b7eae8a2f60689fd25e78 ]
Avoid issue when probing the RNG without
reset if bad status has been detected previously
Signed-off-by: Lionel Debieve <lionel.debieve@st.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit f002612b9d86613bc6fde0a444e0095225f6053e ]
This happens when BMC doesn't return any data and the code is trying
to print the value of data[2].
Getting following crash:
[ 484.728410] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000002
[ 484.736496] pgd = ffff0000094a2000
[ 484.739885] [00000002] *pgd=00000047fcffe003, *pud=00000047fcffd003, *pmd=0000000000000000
[ 484.748158] Internal error: Oops: 96000005 [#1] SMP
[...]
[ 485.101451] Call trace:
[...]
[ 485.188473] [<ffff000000a46e68>] msg_done_handler+0x668/0x700 [ipmi_ssif]
[ 485.195249] [<ffff000000a456b8>] ipmi_ssif_thread+0x110/0x128 [ipmi_ssif]
[ 485.202038] [<ffff0000080f1430>] kthread+0x108/0x138
[ 485.206994] [<ffff0000080838e0>] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x30
[ 485.212294] Code: aa1903e1 aa1803e0 b900227f 95fef6a5 (39400aa3)
Adding a check to validate the data len before printing data[2] to fix this issue.
Signed-off-by: Kamlakant Patel <kamlakant.patel@cavium.com>
Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit e749d328b0b450aa78d562fa26a0cd8872325dd9 ]
Fix to return a negative error code from the request_irq() error
handling case instead of 0, as done elsewhere in this function.
Fixes: dce143c3381c ("ipmi/powernv: Convert to irq event interface")
Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@ozlabs.ru>
Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit a7a69ec0d8e4a58be7db88d33cbfa2912807bb2b upstream.
Console driver is out of spec. The spec says:
A driver MUST NOT decrement the available idx on a live
virtqueue (ie. there is no way to “unexpose” buffers).
and it does exactly that by trying to detach unused buffers
without doing a device reset first.
Defer detaching the buffers until device unplug.
Of course this means we might get an interrupt for
a vq without an attached port now. Handle that by
discarding the consumed buffer.
Reported-by: Tiwei Bie <tiwei.bie@intel.com>
Fixes: b3258ff1d6 ("virtio: Decrement avail idx on buffer detach")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 9f886f4d1d292442b2f22a0a33321eae821bde40 upstream.
This fixes a harmless UBSAN where root could potentially end up
causing an overflow while bumping the entropy_total field (which is
ignored once the entropy pool has been initialized, and this generally
is completed during the boot sequence).
This is marginal for the stable kernel series, but it's a really
trivial patch, and it fixes UBSAN warning that might cause security
folks to get overly excited for no reason.
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reported-by: Chen Feng <puck.chen@hisilicon.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 92e75428ffc90e2a0321062379f883f3671cfebe upstream.
Linus pointed out that there is a much more efficient way of avoiding
the problem that we were trying to address in commit 9dfa7bba35ac0:
"fix race in drivers/char/random.c:get_reg()".
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Michael Schmitz <schmitzmic@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 9dfa7bba35ac08a63565d58c454dccb7e1bb0a08 ]
get_reg() can be reentered on architectures with prioritized interrupts
(m68k in this case), causing f->reg_index to be incremented after the
range check. Out of bounds memory access past the pt_regs struct results.
This will go mostly undetected unless access is beyond end of memory.
Prevent the race by disabling interrupts in get_reg().
Tested on m68k (Atari Falcon, and ARAnyM emulator).
Kudos to Geert Uytterhoeven for helping to trace this race.
Signed-off-by: Michael Schmitz <schmitzmic@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit cf9806f32ef63b745f2486e0dbb2ac21f4ca44f0 ]
We should unlock and re-enable IRQs if this allocation fails.
Fixes: 259307074bfc ("ipmi: Add SMBus interface driver (SSIF) ")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 2c1175c2e8e5487233cabde358a19577562ac83e ]
Commit c49c097610fe ("ipmi: Don't call receive handler in the
panic context") means that the panic_recv_free is not called during a
panic and the atomic count does not drop to 0.
Fix this by only expecting one decrement of the atomic variable
which comes from panic_smi_free.
Signed-off-by: Robert Lippert <rlippert@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 6bb320ca4a4a7b5b3db8c8d7250cc40002046878 upstream.
Discrete TPMs are often connected over slow serial buses which, on
some platforms, can have glitches causing bit flips. In all the
driver _recv() functions, we need to use a u32 to unmarshal the
response size, otherwise a bit flip of the 31st bit would cause the
expected variable to go negative, which would then try to read a huge
amount of data. Also sanity check that the expected amount of data is
large enough for the TPM header.
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Boone <jeremy.boone@nccgroup.trust>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 3be23274755ee85771270a23af7691dc9b3a95db upstream.
Discrete TPMs are often connected over slow serial buses which, on
some platforms, can have glitches causing bit flips. If a bit does
flip it could cause an overrun if it's in one of the size parameters,
so sanity check that we're not overrunning the provided buffer when
doing a memcpy().
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Boone <jeremy.boone@nccgroup.trust>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 8516673a996870ea0ceb337ee4f83c33c5ec3111 ]
Before accessing the GGTT we must flush the PTE writes and make them
visible to the chipset, or else the indirect access may end up in the
wrong page. In commit 3497971a71d8 ("agp/intel: Flush chipset writes
after updating a single PTE"), we noticed corruption of the uploads for
pwrite and for capturing GPU error states, but it was presumed that the
explicit calls to intel_gtt_chipset_flush() were sufficient for the
execbuffer path. However, we have not been flushing the chipset between
the PTE writes and access via the GTT itself.
For simplicity, do the flush after any PTE update rather than try and
batch the flushes on a just-in-time basis.
References: 3497971a71d8 ("agp/intel: Flush chipset writes after updating a single PTE")
Signed-off-by: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk>
Cc: Tvrtko Ursulin <tvrtko.ursulin@intel.com>
Cc: Mika Kuoppala <mika.kuoppala@intel.com>
Cc: drm-intel-fixes@lists.freedesktop.org
Reviewed-by: Joonas Lahtinen <joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20171208214616.30147-1-chris@chris-wilson.co.uk
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit f9d4d9b5a5ef2f017bc344fb65a58a902517173b upstream.
Discrete TPMs are often connected over slow serial buses which, on
some platforms, can have glitches causing bit flips. In all the
driver _recv() functions, we need to use a u32 to unmarshal the
response size, otherwise a bit flip of the 31st bit would cause the
expected variable to go negative, which would then try to read a huge
amount of data. Also sanity check that the expected amount of data is
large enough for the TPM header.
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Boone <jeremy.boone@nccgroup.trust>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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the bus
commit 9b8cb28d7c62568a5916bdd7ea1c9176d7f8f2ed upstream.
Discrete TPMs are often connected over slow serial buses which, on
some platforms, can have glitches causing bit flips. In all the
driver _recv() functions, we need to use a u32 to unmarshal the
response size, otherwise a bit flip of the 31st bit would cause the
expected variable to go negative, which would then try to read a huge
amount of data. Also sanity check that the expected amount of data is
large enough for the TPM header.
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Boone <jeremy.boone@nccgroup.trust>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 6d24cd186d9fead3722108dec1b1c993354645ff upstream.
Discrete TPMs are often connected over slow serial buses which, on
some platforms, can have glitches causing bit flips. In all the
driver _recv() functions, we need to use a u32 to unmarshal the
response size, otherwise a bit flip of the 31st bit would cause the
expected variable to go negative, which would then try to read a huge
amount of data. Also sanity check that the expected amount of data is
large enough for the TPM header.
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Boone <jeremy.boone@nccgroup.trust>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit b93f342da1766ef1740e6277508329356c4ea48b upstream.
The exynos random driver uses #ifdef to check for CONFIG_PM, but
then uses SIMPLE_DEV_PM_OPS, which leaves the references out when
CONFIG_PM_SLEEP is not defined, so we get a warning with
PM=y && PM_SLEEP=n:
drivers/char/hw_random/exynos-rng.c:166:12: error: 'exynos_rng_suspend' defined but not used [-Werror=unused-function]
drivers/char/hw_random/exynos-rng.c:171:12: error: 'exynos_rng_resume' defined but not used [-Werror=unused-function]
This removes the incorrect #ifdef and instead uses a __maybe_unused
annotation to let the compiler know it can silently drop
the function definition.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Reviewed-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <k.kozlowski@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 1ab87298cb59b649d8d648d25dc15b36ab865f5a upstream.
hwrng kthread can be waiting via hwrng_fillfn for some data from a rng
like virtio-rng:
hwrng D ffff880093e17798 0 382 2 0x00000000
...
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff817339c6>] wait_for_completion_killable+0x96/0x210
[<ffffffffa00aa1b7>] virtio_read+0x57/0xf0 [virtio_rng]
[<ffffffff814f4a35>] hwrng_fillfn+0x75/0x130
[<ffffffff810aa243>] kthread+0xf3/0x110
And when some user program tries to read the /dev node in this state,
we get:
rngd D ffff880093e17798 0 762 1 0x00000004
...
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff817351ac>] mutex_lock_nested+0x15c/0x3e0
[<ffffffff814f478e>] rng_dev_read+0x6e/0x240
[<ffffffff81231958>] __vfs_read+0x28/0xe0
[<ffffffff81232393>] vfs_read+0x83/0x130
And this is indeed unkillable. So use mutex_lock_interruptible
instead of mutex_lock in rng_dev_read and exit immediatelly when
interrupted. And possibly return already read data, if any (as POSIX
allows).
v2: use ERESTARTSYS instead of EINTR
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: <linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 39380b80d72723282f0ea1d1bbf2294eae45013e upstream.
Currently it's possible for broken (or malicious) userspace to flood a
kernel log indefinitely with messages a-la
Program dmidecode tried to access /dev/mem between f0000->100000
because range_is_allowed() is case of CONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEM being turned on
dumps this information each and every time devmem_is_allowed() fails.
Reportedly userspace that is able to trigger contignuous flow of these
messages exists.
It would be possible to rate limit this message, but that'd have a
questionable value; the administrator wouldn't get information about all
the failing accessess, so then the information would be both superfluous
and incomplete at the same time :)
Returning EPERM (which is what is actually happening) is enough indication
for userspace what has happened; no need to log this particular error as
some sort of special condition.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@suse.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LNX.2.00.1607081137020.24757@cbobk.fhfr.pm
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 4f7f5551a760eb0124267be65763008169db7087 upstream.
System may crash after unloading ipmi_si.ko module
because a timer may remain and fire after the module cleaned up resources.
cleanup_one_si() contains the following processing.
/*
* Make sure that interrupts, the timer and the thread are
* stopped and will not run again.
*/
if (to_clean->irq_cleanup)
to_clean->irq_cleanup(to_clean);
wait_for_timer_and_thread(to_clean);
/*
* Timeouts are stopped, now make sure the interrupts are off
* in the BMC. Note that timers and CPU interrupts are off,
* so no need for locks.
*/
while (to_clean->curr_msg || (to_clean->si_state != SI_NORMAL)) {
poll(to_clean);
schedule_timeout_uninterruptible(1);
}
si_state changes as following in the while loop calling poll(to_clean).
SI_GETTING_MESSAGES
=> SI_CHECKING_ENABLES
=> SI_SETTING_ENABLES
=> SI_GETTING_EVENTS
=> SI_NORMAL
As written in the code comments above,
timers are expected to stop before the polling loop and not to run again.
But the timer is set again in the following process
when si_state becomes SI_SETTING_ENABLES.
=> poll
=> smi_event_handler
=> handle_transaction_done
// smi_info->si_state == SI_SETTING_ENABLES
=> start_getting_events
=> start_new_msg
=> smi_mod_timer
=> mod_timer
As a result, before the timer set in start_new_msg() expires,
the polling loop may see si_state becoming SI_NORMAL
and the module clean-up finishes.
For example, hard LOCKUP and panic occurred as following.
smi_timeout was called after smi_event_handler,
kcs_event and hangs at port_inb()
trying to access I/O port after release.
[exception RIP: port_inb+19]
RIP: ffffffffc0473053 RSP: ffff88069fdc3d80 RFLAGS: 00000006
RAX: ffff8806800f8e00 RBX: ffff880682bd9400 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000ca3 RSI: 0000000000000ca3 RDI: ffff8806800f8e40
RBP: ffff88069fdc3d80 R8: ffffffff81d86dfc R9: ffffffff81e36426
R10: 00000000000509f0 R11: 0000000000100000 R12: 0000000000]:000000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000246 R15: ffff8806800f8e00
ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0000
--- <NMI exception stack> ---
To fix the problem I defined a flag, timer_can_start,
as member of struct smi_info.
The flag is enabled immediately after initializing the timer
and disabled immediately before waiting for timer deletion.
Fixes: 0cfec916e86d ("ipmi: Start the timer and thread on internal msgs")
Signed-off-by: Yamazaki Masamitsu <m-yamazaki@ah.jp.nec.com>
[Adjusted for recent changes in the driver.]
[Some fairly major changes went into the IPMI driver in 4.15, so this
required a backport as the code had changed and moved to a different
file. The 4.14 version of this patch moved some code under an
if statement and there was an API change causing it to not apply to
4.4-4.6.]
Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 392a17b10ec4320d3c0e96e2a23ebaad1123b989 upstream.
When I set the timeout to a specific value such as 500ms, the timeout
event will not happen in time due to the overflow in function
check_msg_timeout:
...
ent->timeout -= timeout_period;
if (ent->timeout > 0)
return;
...
The type of timeout_period is long, but ent->timeout is unsigned long.
This patch makes the type consistent.
Reported-by: Weilong Chen <chenweilong@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
Tested-by: Weilong Chen <chenweilong@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 15516788e581eb32ec1c50e5f00aba3faf95d817 upstream.
Replace the device number bitmap with IDR. Extend the number of devices we
can create to 64k.
Since an IDR allows us to associate a pointer with an ID, we use this now
to rewrite tpm_chip_find_get() to simply look up the chip pointer by the
given device ID.
Protect the IDR calls with a mutex.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 13b47cfcfc60495cde216eef4c01040d76174cbe upstream.
While cleaning up sysfs callback that prints EK we discovered a kernel
memory leak. This commit fixes the issue by zeroing the buffer used for
TPM command/response.
The leak happen when we use either tpm_vtpm_proxy, tpm_ibmvtpm or
xen-tpmfront.
Fixes: 0883743825e3 ("TPM: sysfs functions consolidation")
Reported-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
Tested-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 860f01e96981a68553f3ca49f574ff14fe955e72 upstream.
systemd by default starts watchdog on reboot and sets the timer to
ShutdownWatchdogSec=10min. Reboot handler in ipmi_watchdog than reduces
the timer to 120s which is not enough time to boot a Xen machine with
a lot of RAM. As a result the machine is rebooted the second time
during the long run of (XEN) Scrubbing Free RAM.....
Fix this by setting the timer to 120s only if it was previously
set to a low value.
Signed-off-by: Valentin Vidic <Valentin.Vidic@CARNet.hr>
Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 4495ec6d770e1bca7a04e93ac453ab6720c56c5d upstream.
When getting flags, a response to a different message would
result in a deadlock because of a missing unlock. Add that
unlock and a comment. Found by static analysis.
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit cdea46566bb21ce309725a024208322a409055cc upstream.
A vendor with a system having more than 128 CPUs occasionally encounters
the following crash during shutdown. This is not an easily reproduceable
event, but the vendor was able to provide the following analysis of the
crash, which exhibits the same footprint each time.
crash> bt
PID: 0 TASK: ffff88017c70ce70 CPU: 5 COMMAND: "swapper/5"
#0 [ffff88085c143ac8] machine_kexec at ffffffff81059c8b
#1 [ffff88085c143b28] __crash_kexec at ffffffff811052e2
#2 [ffff88085c143bf8] crash_kexec at ffffffff811053d0
#3 [ffff88085c143c10] oops_end at ffffffff8168ef88
#4 [ffff88085c143c38] no_context at ffffffff8167ebb3
#5 [ffff88085c143c88] __bad_area_nosemaphore at ffffffff8167ec49
#6 [ffff88085c143cd0] bad_area_nosemaphore at ffffffff8167edb3
#7 [ffff88085c143ce0] __do_page_fault at ffffffff81691d1e
#8 [ffff88085c143d40] do_page_fault at ffffffff81691ec5
#9 [ffff88085c143d70] page_fault at ffffffff8168e188
[exception RIP: unknown or invalid address]
RIP: ffffffffa053c800 RSP: ffff88085c143e28 RFLAGS: 00010206
RAX: ffff88017c72bfd8 RBX: ffff88017a8dc000 RCX: ffff8810588b5ac8
RDX: ffff8810588b5a00 RSI: ffffffffa053c800 RDI: ffff8810588b5a00
RBP: ffff88085c143e58 R8: ffff88017c70d408 R9: ffff88017a8dc000
R10: 0000000000000002 R11: ffff88085c143da0 R12: ffff8810588b5ac8
R13: 0000000000000100 R14: ffffffffa053c800 R15: ffff8810588b5a00
ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018
<IRQ stack>
[exception RIP: cpuidle_enter_state+82]
RIP: ffffffff81514192 RSP: ffff88017c72be50 RFLAGS: 00000202
RAX: 0000001e4c3c6f16 RBX: 000000000000f8a0 RCX: 0000000000000018
RDX: 0000000225c17d03 RSI: ffff88017c72bfd8 RDI: 0000001e4c3c6f16
RBP: ffff88017c72be78 R8: 000000000000237e R9: 0000000000000018
R10: 0000000000002494 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff88017c72be20
R13: ffff88085c14f8e0 R14: 0000000000000082 R15: 0000001e4c3bb400
ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffff10 CS: 0010 SS: 0018
This is the corresponding stack trace
It has crashed because the area pointed with RIP extracted from timer
element is already removed during a shutdown process.
The function is smi_timeout().
And we think ffff8810588b5a00 in RDX is a parameter struct smi_info
crash> rd ffff8810588b5a00 20
ffff8810588b5a00: ffff8810588b6000 0000000000000000 .`.X............
ffff8810588b5a10: ffff880853264400 ffffffffa05417e0 .D&S......T.....
ffff8810588b5a20: 24a024a000000000 0000000000000000 .....$.$........
ffff8810588b5a30: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ................
ffff8810588b5a30: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ................
ffff8810588b5a40: ffffffffa053a040 ffffffffa053a060 @.S.....`.S.....
ffff8810588b5a50: 0000000000000000 0000000100000001 ................
ffff8810588b5a60: 0000000000000000 0000000000000e00 ................
ffff8810588b5a70: ffffffffa053a580 ffffffffa053a6e0 ..S.......S.....
ffff8810588b5a80: ffffffffa053a4a0 ffffffffa053a250 ..S.....P.S.....
ffff8810588b5a90: 0000000500000002 0000000000000000 ................
Unfortunately the top of this area is already detroyed by someone.
But because of two reasonns we think this is struct smi_info
1) The address included in between ffff8810588b5a70 and ffff8810588b5a80:
are inside of ipmi_si_intf.c see crash> module ffff88085779d2c0
2) We've found the area which point this.
It is offset 0x68 of ffff880859df4000
crash> rd ffff880859df4000 100
ffff880859df4000: 0000000000000000 0000000000000001 ................
ffff880859df4010: ffffffffa0535290 dead000000000200 .RS.............
ffff880859df4020: ffff880859df4020 ffff880859df4020 @.Y.... @.Y....
ffff880859df4030: 0000000000000002 0000000000100010 ................
ffff880859df4040: ffff880859df4040 ffff880859df4040 @@.Y....@@.Y....
ffff880859df4050: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ................
ffff880859df4060: 0000000000000000 ffff8810588b5a00 .........Z.X....
ffff880859df4070: 0000000000000001 ffff880859df4078 ........x@.Y....
If we regards it as struct ipmi_smi in shutdown process
it looks consistent.
The remedy for this apparent race is affixed below.
Signed-off-by: Tony Camuso <tcamuso@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
This was first introduced in 7ea0ed2b5be817 ipmi: Make the
message handler easier to use for SMI interfaces
where some code was moved outside of the rcu_read_lock()
and the lock was not added.
Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
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commit d1bd4a792d3961a04e6154118816b00167aad91a upstream.
If a TPM2 loses power without a TPM2_Shutdown command being issued (a
"disorderly reboot"), it may lose some state that has yet to be
persisted to NVRam, and will increment the DA counter. After the DA
counter gets sufficiently large, the TPM will lock the user out.
NOTE: This only changes behavior on TPM2 devices. Since TPM1 uses sysfs,
and sysfs relies on implicit locking on chip->ops, it is not safe to
allow this code to run in TPM1, or to add sysfs support to TPM2, until
that locking is made explicit.
Signed-off-by: Josh Zimmerman <joshz@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 74d6b3ceaa17 ("tpm: fix suspend/resume paths for TPM 2.0")
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 4e26195f240d73150e8308ae42874702e3df8d2c upstream.
Add a read/write semaphore around the ops function pointers so
ops can be set to null when the driver un-registers.
Previously the tpm core expected module locking to be enough to
ensure that tpm_unregister could not be called during certain times,
however that hasn't been sufficient for a long time.
Introduce a read/write semaphore around 'ops' so the core can set
it to null when unregistering. This provides a strong fence around
the driver callbacks, guaranteeing to the driver that no callbacks
are running or will run again.
For now the ops_lock is placed very high in the call stack, it could
be pushed down and made more granular in future if necessary.
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 8cfffc9d4d3786d3b496a021d7224e06328bac7d upstream.
This is a hold over from before the struct device conversion.
- All prints should be using &chip->dev, which is the Linux
standard. This changes prints to use tpm0 as the device name,
not the PnP/etc ID.
- The few places involving sysfs/modules that really do need the
parent just use chip->dev.parent instead
- We no longer need to get_device(pdev) in any places since it is no
longer used by any of the code. The kref on the parent is held
by the device core during device_add and dropped in device_del
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 8379cadf71c3ee8173a1c6fc1ea7762a9638c047 ]
Using control_work instead of config_work as the 3rd argument to
container_of results in an invalid portdev pointer. Indeed, the work
structure is initialized as below:
INIT_WORK(&portdev->config_work, &config_work_handler);
It leads to a crash when portdev->vdev is dereferenced later. This
bug
is triggered when the guest uses a virtio-console without multiport
feature and receives a config_changed virtio interrupt.
Signed-off-by: G. Campana <gcampana@quarkslab.com>
Reviewed-by: Amit Shah <amit.shah@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 32829da54d9368103a2f03269a5120aa9ee4d5da upstream.
A recent fix to /dev/mem prevents mappings from wrapping around the end
of physical address space. However, the check was written in a way that
also prevents a mapping reaching just up to the end of physical address
space, which may be a valid use case (especially on 32-bit systems).
This patch fixes it by checking the last mapped address (instead of the
first address behind that) for overflow.
Fixes: b299cde245 ("drivers: char: mem: Check for address space wraparound with mmap()")
Reported-by: Nico Huber <nico.h@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Julius Werner <jwerner@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit b1132deac01c2332d234fa821a70022796b79182 upstream.
get_random_long() reads from the get_random_int_hash array using an
unsigned long pointer. For this code to be guaranteed correct on all
architectures, the array must be aligned to an unsigned long boundary.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit ec9ee4acd97c0039a61c0ae4f12705767ae62153 upstream.
Commit d07e22597d1d ("mm: mmap: add new /proc tunable for mmap_base
ASLR") added the ability to choose from a range of values to use for
entropy count in generating the random offset to the mmap_base address.
The maximum value on this range was set to 32 bits for 64-bit x86
systems, but this value could be increased further, requiring more than
the 32 bits of randomness provided by get_random_int(), as is already
possible for arm64. Add a new function: get_random_long() which more
naturally fits with the mmap usage of get_random_int() but operates
exactly the same as get_random_int().
Also, fix the shifting constant in mmap_rnd() to be an unsigned long so
that values greater than 31 bits generate an appropriate mask without
overflow. This is especially important on x86, as its shift instruction
uses a 5-bit mask for the shift operand, which meant that any value for
mmap_rnd_bits over 31 acts as a no-op and effectively disables mmap_base
randomization.
Finally, replace calls to get_random_int() with get_random_long() where
appropriate.
This patch (of 2):
Add get_random_long().
Signed-off-by: Daniel Cashman <dcashman@android.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com>
Cc: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>
Cc: Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@android.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit ff5a20169b98d84ad8d7f99f27c5ebbb008204d6 upstream.
Commit 5b5e0928f742 ("lib/vsprintf.c: remove %Z support") removed some
usages of format %Z but forgot "%.2Zx". This makes clang 4.0 reports a
-Wformat-extra-args warning because it does not know about %Z.
Replace %Z with %z.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170520090946.22562-1-nicolas.iooss_linux@m4x.org
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Iooss <nicolas.iooss_linux@m4x.org>
Cc: Harald Welte <laforge@gnumonks.org>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit b299cde245b0b76c977f4291162cf668e087b408 upstream.
/dev/mem currently allows mmap() mappings that wrap around the end of
the physical address space, which should probably be illegal. It
circumvents the existing STRICT_DEVMEM permission check because the loop
immediately terminates (as the start address is already higher than the
end address). On the x86_64 architecture it will then cause a panic
(from the BUG(start >= end) in arch/x86/mm/pat.c:reserve_memtype()).
This patch adds an explicit check to make sure offset + size will not
wrap around in the physical address type.
Signed-off-by: Julius Werner <jwerner@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 8569defde8057258835c51ce01a33de82e14b148 upstream.
Make sure size of response buffer is at least 6 bytes, or
we will underflow and pass large size_t to memcpy_fromio().
This was encountered while testing earlier version of
locality patchset.
Fixes: 30fc8d138e912 ("tpm: TPM 2.0 CRB Interface")
Signed-off-by: Jerry Snitselaar <jsnitsel@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 3e21f4af170bebf47c187c1ff8bf155583c9f3b1 upstream.
The lp_setup() code doesn't apply any bounds checking when passing
"lp=none", and only in this case, resulting in an overflow of the
parport_nr[] array. All versions in Git history are affected.
Reported-By: Roee Hay <roee.hay@hcl.com>
Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 6de65fcfdb51835789b245203d1bfc8d14cb1e06 upstream.
msg_written_handler() may set ssif_info->multi_data to NULL
when using ipmitool to write fru.
Before setting ssif_info->multi_data to NULL, add new local
pointer "data_to_send" and store correct i2c data pointer to
it to fix NULL pointer kernel panic and incorrect ssif_info->multi_pos.
Signed-off-by: Joeseph Chang <joechang@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit c4baad50297d84bde1a7ad45e50c73adae4a2192 upstream.
put_chars() stuffs the buffer it gets into an sg, but that buffer may be
on the stack. This breaks with CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y (for me, it
manifested as printks getting turned into NUL bytes).
Signed-off-by: Omar Sandoval <osandov@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Amit Shah <amit.shah@redhat.com>
Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit a4866aa812518ed1a37d8ea0c881dc946409de94 upstream.
Under CONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEM, reading System RAM through /dev/mem is
disallowed. However, on x86, the first 1MB was always allowed for BIOS
and similar things, regardless of it actually being System RAM. It was
possible for heap to end up getting allocated in low 1MB RAM, and then
read by things like x86info or dd, which would trip hardened usercopy:
usercopy: kernel memory exposure attempt detected from ffff880000090000 (dma-kmalloc-256) (4096 bytes)
This changes the x86 exception for the low 1MB by reading back zeros for
System RAM areas instead of blindly allowing them. More work is needed to
extend this to mmap, but currently mmap doesn't go through usercopy, so
hardened usercopy won't Oops the kernel.
Reported-by: Tommi Rantala <tommi.t.rantala@nokia.com>
Tested-by: Tommi Rantala <tommi.t.rantala@nokia.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit f2cfa58b136e4b06a9b9db7af5ef62fbb5992f62 upstream.
Without a bool string present, using "# CONFIG_DEVPORT is not set" in
defconfig files would not actually unset devport. This esnured that
/dev/port was always on, but there are reasons a user may wish to
disable it (smaller kernel, attack surface reduction) if it's not being
used. Adding a message here in order to make this user visible.
Signed-off-by: Max Bires <jbires@google.com>
Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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