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commit d90eeb8ecd227c204ab6c34a17b372bd950b7aa2 upstream.
There are no scenarios where a weak increment is invalid on binder_node.
The only possible case where it could be invalid is if the kernel
delivers BR_DECREFS to the process that owns the node, and then
increments the weak refcount again, effectively "reviving" a dead node.
However, that is not possible: when the BR_DECREFS command is delivered,
the kernel removes and frees the binder_node. The fact that you were
able to call binder_inc_node_nilocked() implies that the node is not yet
destroyed, which implies that BR_DECREFS has not been delivered to
userspace, so incrementing the weak refcount is valid.
Note that it's currently possible to trigger this condition if the owner
calls BINDER_THREAD_EXIT while node->has_weak_ref is true. This causes
BC_INCREFS on binder_ref instances to fail when they should not.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 457b9a6f09f0 ("Staging: android: add binder driver")
Reported-by: Yu-Ting Tseng <yutingtseng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Alice Ryhl <aliceryhl@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251015-binder-weak-inc-v1-1-7914b092c371@google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 4df153652cc46545722879415937582028c18af5 upstream.
Binder objects are processed and copied individually into the target
buffer during transactions. Any raw data in-between these objects is
copied as well. However, this raw data copy lacks an out-of-bounds
check. If the raw data exceeds the data section size then the copy
overwrites the offsets section. This eventually triggers an error that
attempts to unwind the processed objects. However, at this point the
offsets used to index these objects are now corrupted.
Unwinding with corrupted offsets can result in decrements of arbitrary
nodes and lead to their premature release. Other users of such nodes are
left with a dangling pointer triggering a use-after-free. This issue is
made evident by the following KASAN report (trimmed):
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in _raw_spin_lock+0xe4/0x19c
Write of size 4 at addr ffff47fc91598f04 by task binder-util/743
CPU: 9 UID: 0 PID: 743 Comm: binder-util Not tainted 6.11.0-rc4 #1
Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
Call trace:
_raw_spin_lock+0xe4/0x19c
binder_free_buf+0x128/0x434
binder_thread_write+0x8a4/0x3260
binder_ioctl+0x18f0/0x258c
[...]
Allocated by task 743:
__kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x110/0x270
binder_new_node+0x50/0x700
binder_transaction+0x413c/0x6da8
binder_thread_write+0x978/0x3260
binder_ioctl+0x18f0/0x258c
[...]
Freed by task 745:
kfree+0xbc/0x208
binder_thread_read+0x1c5c/0x37d4
binder_ioctl+0x16d8/0x258c
[...]
==================================================================
To avoid this issue, let's check that the raw data copy is within the
boundaries of the data section.
Fixes: 6d98eb95b450 ("binder: avoid potential data leakage when copying txn")
Cc: Todd Kjos <tkjos@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Carlos Llamas <cmllamas@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240822182353.2129600-1-cmllamas@google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 31643d84b8c3d9c846aa0e20bc033e46c68c7e7d upstream.
With the introduction of binder_available_for_proc_work_ilocked() in
commit 1b77e9dcc3da ("ANDROID: binder: remove proc waitqueue") a binder
thread can only "wait_for_proc_work" after its thread->looper has been
marked as BINDER_LOOPER_STATE_{ENTERED|REGISTERED}.
This means an unregistered reader risks waiting indefinitely for work
since it never gets added to the proc->waiting_threads. If there are no
further references to its waitqueue either the task will hang. The same
applies to readers using the (e)poll interface.
I couldn't find the rationale behind this restriction. So this patch
restores the previous behavior of allowing unregistered threads to
"wait_for_proc_work". Note that an error message for this scenario,
which had previously become unreachable, is now re-enabled.
Fixes: 1b77e9dcc3da ("ANDROID: binder: remove proc waitqueue")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Martijn Coenen <maco@google.com>
Cc: Arve Hjønnevåg <arve@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Carlos Llamas <cmllamas@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240711201452.2017543-1-cmllamas@google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 42316941335644a98335f209daafa4c122f28983 upstream.
The type defined for the BINDER_SET_MAX_THREADS ioctl was changed from
size_t to __u32 in order to avoid incompatibility issues between 32 and
64-bit kernels. However, the internal types used to copy from user and
store the value were never updated. Use u32 to fix the inconsistency.
Fixes: a9350fc859ae ("staging: android: binder: fix BINDER_SET_MAX_THREADS declaration")
Reported-by: Arve Hjønnevåg <arve@android.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Carlos Llamas <cmllamas@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Alice Ryhl <aliceryhl@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240421173750.3117808-1-cmllamas@google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit aaef73821a3b0194a01bd23ca77774f704a04d40 upstream.
Commit 6d98eb95b450 ("binder: avoid potential data leakage when copying
txn") introduced changes to how binder objects are copied. In doing so,
it unintentionally removed an offset alignment check done through calls
to binder_alloc_copy_from_buffer() -> check_buffer().
These calls were replaced in binder_get_object() with copy_from_user(),
so now an explicit offset alignment check is needed here. This avoids
later complications when unwinding the objects gets harder.
It is worth noting this check existed prior to commit 7a67a39320df
("binder: add function to copy binder object from buffer"), likely
removed due to redundancy at the time.
Fixes: 6d98eb95b450 ("binder: avoid potential data leakage when copying txn")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Carlos Llamas <cmllamas@google.com>
Acked-by: Todd Kjos <tkjos@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240330190115.1877819-1-cmllamas@google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 97830f3c3088638ff90b20dfba2eb4d487bf14d7 upstream.
In (e)poll mode, threads often depend on I/O events to determine when
data is ready for consumption. Within binder, a thread may initiate a
command via BINDER_WRITE_READ without a read buffer and then make use
of epoll_wait() or similar to consume any responses afterwards.
It is then crucial that epoll threads are signaled via wakeup when they
queue their own work. Otherwise, they risk waiting indefinitely for an
event leaving their work unhandled. What is worse, subsequent commands
won't trigger a wakeup either as the thread has pending work.
Fixes: 457b9a6f09f0 ("Staging: android: add binder driver")
Cc: Arve Hjønnevåg <arve@android.com>
Cc: Martijn Coenen <maco@android.com>
Cc: Alice Ryhl <aliceryhl@google.com>
Cc: Steven Moreland <smoreland@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.19+
Signed-off-by: Carlos Llamas <cmllamas@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240131215347.1808751-1-cmllamas@google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 6ac061db9c58ca5b9270b1b3940d2464fb3ff183 upstream.
Use EPOLLERR instead of POLLERR to make sure it is cast to the correct
__poll_t type. This fixes the following sparse issue:
drivers/android/binder.c:5030:24: warning: incorrect type in return expression (different base types)
drivers/android/binder.c:5030:24: expected restricted __poll_t
drivers/android/binder.c:5030:24: got int
Fixes: f88982679f54 ("binder: check for binder_thread allocation failure in binder_poll()")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Alice Ryhl <aliceryhl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Carlos Llamas <cmllamas@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231201172212.1813387-2-cmllamas@google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 1aa3aaf8953c84bad398adf6c3cabc9d6685bf7d upstream
A transaction complete work is allocated and queued for each
transaction. Under certain conditions the work->type might be marked as
BINDER_WORK_TRANSACTION_ONEWAY_SPAM_SUSPECT to notify userspace about
potential spamming threads or as BINDER_WORK_TRANSACTION_PENDING when
the target is currently frozen.
However, these work types are not being handled in binder_release_work()
so they will leak during a cleanup. This was reported by syzkaller with
the following kmemleak dump:
BUG: memory leak
unreferenced object 0xffff88810e2d6de0 (size 32):
comm "syz-executor338", pid 5046, jiffies 4294968230 (age 13.590s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
e0 6d 2d 0e 81 88 ff ff e0 6d 2d 0e 81 88 ff ff .m-......m-.....
04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
backtrace:
[<ffffffff81573b75>] kmalloc_trace+0x25/0x90 mm/slab_common.c:1114
[<ffffffff83d41873>] kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:599 [inline]
[<ffffffff83d41873>] kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:720 [inline]
[<ffffffff83d41873>] binder_transaction+0x573/0x4050 drivers/android/binder.c:3152
[<ffffffff83d45a05>] binder_thread_write+0x6b5/0x1860 drivers/android/binder.c:4010
[<ffffffff83d486dc>] binder_ioctl_write_read drivers/android/binder.c:5066 [inline]
[<ffffffff83d486dc>] binder_ioctl+0x1b2c/0x3cf0 drivers/android/binder.c:5352
[<ffffffff816b25f2>] vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
[<ffffffff816b25f2>] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:871 [inline]
[<ffffffff816b25f2>] __se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:857 [inline]
[<ffffffff816b25f2>] __x64_sys_ioctl+0xf2/0x140 fs/ioctl.c:857
[<ffffffff84b30008>] do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
[<ffffffff84b30008>] do_syscall_64+0x38/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
[<ffffffff84c0008b>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
Fix the leaks by kfreeing these work types in binder_release_work() and
handle them as a BINDER_WORK_TRANSACTION_COMPLETE cleanup.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: a7dc1e6f99df ("binder: tell userspace to dump current backtrace when detected oneway spamming")
Reported-by: syzbot+7f10c1653e35933c0f1e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=7f10c1653e35933c0f1e
Suggested-by: Alice Ryhl <aliceryhl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Carlos Llamas <cmllamas@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Alice Ryhl <aliceryhl@google.com>
Acked-by: Todd Kjos <tkjos@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230922175138.230331-1-cmllamas@google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[cmllamas: backport to v5.15 by dropping BINDER_WORK_TRANSACTION_PENDING
as commit 0567461a7a6e is not present. Remove fixes tag accordingly.]
Signed-off-by: Carlos Llamas <cmllamas@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit adb9743d6a08778b78d62d16b4230346d3508986 upstream.
In binder_init(), the destruction of binder_alloc_shrinker_init() is not
performed in the wrong path, which will cause memory leaks. So this commit
introduces binder_alloc_shrinker_exit() and calls it in the wrong path to
fix that.
Signed-off-by: Qi Zheng <zhengqi.arch@bytedance.com>
Acked-by: Carlos Llamas <cmllamas@google.com>
Fixes: f2517eb76f1f ("android: binder: Add global lru shrinker to binder")
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230625154937.64316-1-qi.zheng@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit bdc1c5fac982845a58d28690cdb56db8c88a530d ]
In binder_transaction_buffer_release() the 'failed_at' offset indicates
the number of objects to clean up. However, this function was changed by
commit 44d8047f1d87 ("binder: use standard functions to allocate fds"),
to release all the objects in the buffer when 'failed_at' is zero.
This introduced an issue when a transaction buffer is released without
any objects having been processed so far. In this case, 'failed_at' is
indeed zero yet it is misinterpreted as releasing the entire buffer.
This leads to use-after-free errors where nodes are incorrectly freed
and subsequently accessed. Such is the case in the following KASAN
report:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in binder_thread_read+0xc40/0x1f30
Read of size 8 at addr ffff4faf037cfc58 by task poc/474
CPU: 6 PID: 474 Comm: poc Not tainted 6.3.0-12570-g7df047b3f0aa #5
Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
Call trace:
dump_backtrace+0x94/0xec
show_stack+0x18/0x24
dump_stack_lvl+0x48/0x60
print_report+0xf8/0x5b8
kasan_report+0xb8/0xfc
__asan_load8+0x9c/0xb8
binder_thread_read+0xc40/0x1f30
binder_ioctl+0xd9c/0x1768
__arm64_sys_ioctl+0xd4/0x118
invoke_syscall+0x60/0x188
[...]
Allocated by task 474:
kasan_save_stack+0x3c/0x64
kasan_set_track+0x2c/0x40
kasan_save_alloc_info+0x24/0x34
__kasan_kmalloc+0xb8/0xbc
kmalloc_trace+0x48/0x5c
binder_new_node+0x3c/0x3a4
binder_transaction+0x2b58/0x36f0
binder_thread_write+0x8e0/0x1b78
binder_ioctl+0x14a0/0x1768
__arm64_sys_ioctl+0xd4/0x118
invoke_syscall+0x60/0x188
[...]
Freed by task 475:
kasan_save_stack+0x3c/0x64
kasan_set_track+0x2c/0x40
kasan_save_free_info+0x38/0x5c
__kasan_slab_free+0xe8/0x154
__kmem_cache_free+0x128/0x2bc
kfree+0x58/0x70
binder_dec_node_tmpref+0x178/0x1fc
binder_transaction_buffer_release+0x430/0x628
binder_transaction+0x1954/0x36f0
binder_thread_write+0x8e0/0x1b78
binder_ioctl+0x14a0/0x1768
__arm64_sys_ioctl+0xd4/0x118
invoke_syscall+0x60/0x188
[...]
==================================================================
In order to avoid these issues, let's always calculate the intended
'failed_at' offset beforehand. This is renamed and wrapped in a helper
function to make it clear and convenient.
Fixes: 32e9f56a96d8 ("binder: don't detect sender/target during buffer cleanup")
Reported-by: Zi Fan Tan <zifantan@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Carlos Llamas <cmllamas@google.com>
Acked-by: Todd Kjos <tkjos@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230505203020.4101154-1-cmllamas@google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit ef38de9217a04c9077629a24652689d8fdb4c6c6 upstream.
Some android userspace is sending BINDER_TYPE_FDA objects with
num_fds=0. Like the previous patch, this is reproducible when
playing a video.
Before commit 09184ae9b575 BINDER_TYPE_FDA objects with num_fds=0
were 'correctly handled', as in no fixup was performed.
After commit 09184ae9b575 we aggregate fixup and skip regions in
binder_ptr_fixup structs and distinguish between the two by using
the skip_size field: if it's 0, then it's a fixup, otherwise skip.
When processing BINDER_TYPE_FDA objects with num_fds=0 we add a
skip region of skip_size=0, and this causes issues because now
binder_do_deferred_txn_copies will think this was a fixup region.
To address that, return early from binder_translate_fd_array to
avoid adding an empty skip region.
Fixes: 09184ae9b575 ("binder: defer copies of pre-patched txn data")
Acked-by: Todd Kjos <tkjos@google.com>
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alessandro Astone <ales.astone@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220415120015.52684-1-ales.astone@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Carlos Llamas <cmllamas@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Lee Jones <lee@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 2d1746e3fda0c3612143d7c06f8e1d1830c13e23 upstream.
When handling BINDER_TYPE_FDA object we are pushing a parent fixup
with a certain skip_size but no scatter-gather copy object, since
the copy is handled standalone.
If BINDER_TYPE_FDA is the last children the scatter-gather copy
loop will never stop to skip it, thus we are left with an item in
the parent fixup list. This will trigger the BUG_ON().
This is reproducible in android when playing a video.
We receive a transaction that looks like this:
obj[0] BINDER_TYPE_PTR, parent
obj[1] BINDER_TYPE_PTR, child
obj[2] BINDER_TYPE_PTR, child
obj[3] BINDER_TYPE_FDA, child
Fixes: 09184ae9b575 ("binder: defer copies of pre-patched txn data")
Acked-by: Todd Kjos <tkjos@google.com>
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alessandro Astone <ales.astone@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220415120015.52684-2-ales.astone@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Carlos Llamas <cmllamas@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Lee Jones <lee@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 9a0a930fe2535a76ad70d3f43caeccf0d86a3009 upstream.
binder_uintptr_t is not the same as uintptr_t, so converting it into a
pointer requires a second cast:
drivers/android/binder.c: In function 'binder_translate_fd_array':
drivers/android/binder.c:2511:28: error: cast to pointer from integer of different size [-Werror=int-to-pointer-cast]
2511 | sender_ufda_base = (void __user *)sender_uparent->buffer + fda->parent_offset;
| ^
Fixes: 656e01f3ab54 ("binder: read pre-translated fds from sender buffer")
Acked-by: Todd Kjos <tkjos@google.com>
Acked-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> # build-tested
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211207122448.1185769-1-arnd@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Carlos Llamas <cmllamas@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Lee Jones <lee@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 09184ae9b5756cc469db6fd1d1cfdcffbf627c2d upstream.
BINDER_TYPE_PTR objects point to memory areas in the
source process to be copied into the target buffer
as part of a transaction. This implements a scatter-
gather model where non-contiguous memory in a source
process is "gathered" into a contiguous region in
the target buffer.
The data can include pointers that must be fixed up
to correctly point to the copied data. To avoid making
source process pointers visible to the target process,
this patch defers the copy until the fixups are known
and then copies and fixeups are done together.
There is a special case of BINDER_TYPE_FDA which applies
the fixup later in the target process context. In this
case the user data is skipped (so no untranslated fds
become visible to the target).
Reviewed-by: Martijn Coenen <maco@android.com>
Signed-off-by: Todd Kjos <tkjos@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211130185152.437403-5-tkjos@google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Lee Jones <lee@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 656e01f3ab54afe71bed066996fc2640881e1220 upstream.
This patch is to prepare for an up coming patch where we read
pre-translated fds from the sender buffer and translate them before
copying them to the target. It does not change run time.
The patch adds two new parameters to binder_translate_fd_array() to
hold the sender buffer and sender buffer parent. These parameters let
us call copy_from_user() directly from the sender instead of using
binder_alloc_copy_from_buffer() to copy from the target. Also the patch
adds some new alignment checks. Previously the alignment checks would
have been done in a different place, but this lets us print more
useful error messages.
Reviewed-by: Martijn Coenen <maco@android.com>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: Todd Kjos <tkjos@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211130185152.437403-4-tkjos@google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Carlos Llamas <cmllamas@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Lee Jones <lee@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit a0e44c64b6061dda7e00b7c458e4523e2331b739 upstream.
A transaction of type BINDER_TYPE_WEAK_HANDLE can fail to increment the
reference for a node. In this case, the target proc normally releases
the failed reference upon close as expected. However, if the target is
dying in parallel the call will race with binder_deferred_release(), so
the target could have released all of its references by now leaving the
cleanup of the new failed reference unhandled.
The transaction then ends and the target proc gets released making the
ref->proc now a dangling pointer. Later on, ref->node is closed and we
attempt to take spin_lock(&ref->proc->inner_lock), which leads to the
use-after-free bug reported below. Let's fix this by cleaning up the
failed reference on the spot instead of relying on the target to do so.
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in _raw_spin_lock+0xa8/0x150
Write of size 4 at addr ffff5ca207094238 by task kworker/1:0/590
CPU: 1 PID: 590 Comm: kworker/1:0 Not tainted 5.19.0-rc8 #10
Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
Workqueue: events binder_deferred_func
Call trace:
dump_backtrace.part.0+0x1d0/0x1e0
show_stack+0x18/0x70
dump_stack_lvl+0x68/0x84
print_report+0x2e4/0x61c
kasan_report+0xa4/0x110
kasan_check_range+0xfc/0x1a4
__kasan_check_write+0x3c/0x50
_raw_spin_lock+0xa8/0x150
binder_deferred_func+0x5e0/0x9b0
process_one_work+0x38c/0x5f0
worker_thread+0x9c/0x694
kthread+0x188/0x190
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
Acked-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Carlos Llamas <cmllamas@google.com>
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org> # 4.14+
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220801182511.3371447-1-cmllamas@google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit b7e241bbff24f9e106bf616408fd58bcedc44bae ]
The patchset in [1] exported some definitions to binder_internal.h in
order to make the debugfs entries such as 'stats' and 'transaction_log'
available in a binderfs instance. However, the DEFINE_SHOW_ATTRIBUTE
macro expands into a static function/variable pair, which in turn get
redefined each time a source file includes this internal header.
This problem was made evident after a report from the kernel test robot
<lkp@intel.com> where several W=1 build warnings are seen in downstream
kernels. See the following example:
include/../drivers/android/binder_internal.h:111:23: warning: 'binder_stats_fops' defined but not used [-Wunused-const-variable=]
111 | DEFINE_SHOW_ATTRIBUTE(binder_stats);
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~
include/linux/seq_file.h:174:37: note: in definition of macro 'DEFINE_SHOW_ATTRIBUTE'
174 | static const struct file_operations __name ## _fops = { \
| ^~~~~~
This patch fixes the above issues by moving back the definitions into
binder.c and instead creates an array of the debugfs entries which is
more convenient to share with binderfs and iterate through.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20190903161655.107408-1-hridya@google.com/
Fixes: 0e13e452dafc ("binder: Add stats, state and transactions files")
Fixes: 03e2e07e3814 ("binder: Make transaction_log available in binderfs")
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Carlos Llamas <cmllamas@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220701182041.2134313-1-cmllamas@google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 6d98eb95b450a75adb4516a1d33652dc78d2b20c ]
Transactions are copied from the sender to the target
first and objects like BINDER_TYPE_PTR and BINDER_TYPE_FDA
are then fixed up. This means there is a short period where
the sender's version of these objects are visible to the
target prior to the fixups.
Instead of copying all of the data first, copy data only
after any needed fixups have been applied.
Fixes: 457b9a6f09f0 ("Staging: android: add binder driver")
Reviewed-by: Martijn Coenen <maco@android.com>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: Todd Kjos <tkjos@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211130185152.437403-3-tkjos@google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit fe6b1869243f23a485a106c214bcfdc7aa0ed593 ]
If a memory copy function fails to copy the whole buffer,
a positive integar with the remaining bytes is returned.
In binder_translate_fd_array() this can result in an fd being
skipped due to the failed copy, but the loop continues
processing fds since the early return condition expects a
negative integer on error.
Fix by returning "ret > 0 ? -EINVAL : ret" to handle this case.
Fixes: bb4a2e48d510 ("binder: return errors from buffer copy functions")
Suggested-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: Todd Kjos <tkjos@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211130185152.437403-2-tkjos@google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit a880b28a71e39013e357fd3adccd1d8a31bc69a8 upstream.
wake_up_poll() uses nr_exclusive=1, so it's not guaranteed to wake up
all exclusive waiters. Yet, POLLFREE *must* wake up all waiters. epoll
and aio poll are fortunately not affected by this, but it's very
fragile. Thus, the new function wake_up_pollfree() has been introduced.
Convert binder to use wake_up_pollfree().
Reported-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Fixes: f5cb779ba163 ("ANDROID: binder: remove waitqueue when thread exits.")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211209010455.42744-3-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit c21a80ca0684ec2910344d72556c816cb8940c01 upstream.
This is a partial revert of commit
29bc22ac5e5b ("binder: use euid from cred instead of using task").
Setting sender_euid using proc->cred caused some Android system test
regressions that need further investigation. It is a partial
reversion because subsequent patches rely on proc->cred.
Fixes: 29bc22ac5e5b ("binder: use euid from cred instead of using task")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: Todd Kjos <tkjos@google.com>
Change-Id: I9b1769a3510fed250bb21859ef8beebabe034c66
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211112180720.2858135-1-tkjos@google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 32e9f56a96d8d0f23cb2aeb2a3cd18d40393e787 upstream.
When freeing txn buffers, binder_transaction_buffer_release()
attempts to detect whether the current context is the target by
comparing current->group_leader to proc->tsk. This is an unreliable
test. Instead explicitly pass an 'is_failure' boolean.
Detecting the sender was being used as a way to tell if the
transaction failed to be sent. When cleaning up after
failing to send a transaction, there is no need to close
the fds associated with a BINDER_TYPE_FDA object. Now
'is_failure' can be used to accurately detect this case.
Fixes: 44d8047f1d87 ("binder: use standard functions to allocate fds")
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: Todd Kjos <tkjos@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211015233811.3532235-1-tkjos@google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 4d5b5539742d2554591751b4248b0204d20dcc9d upstream.
Use the 'struct cred' saved at binder_open() to lookup
the security ID via security_cred_getsecid(). This
ensures that the security context that opened binder
is the one used to generate the secctx.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.4+
Fixes: ec74136ded79 ("binder: create node flag to request sender's security context")
Signed-off-by: Todd Kjos <tkjos@google.com>
Suggested-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 52f88693378a58094c538662ba652aff0253c4fe upstream.
Since binder was integrated with selinux, it has passed
'struct task_struct' associated with the binder_proc
to represent the source and target of transactions.
The conversion of task to SID was then done in the hook
implementations. It turns out that there are race conditions
which can result in an incorrect security context being used.
Fix by using the 'struct cred' saved during binder_open and pass
it to the selinux subsystem.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.14 (need backport for earlier stables)
Fixes: 79af73079d75 ("Add security hooks to binder and implement the hooks for SELinux.")
Suggested-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Todd Kjos <tkjos@google.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 29bc22ac5e5bc63275e850f0c8fc549e3d0e306b upstream.
Save the 'struct cred' associated with a binder process
at initial open to avoid potential race conditions
when converting to an euid.
Set a transaction's sender_euid from the 'struct cred'
saved at binder_open() instead of looking up the euid
from the binder proc's 'struct task'. This ensures
the euid is associated with the security context that
of the task that opened binder.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Fixes: 457b9a6f09f0 ("Staging: android: add binder driver")
Signed-off-by: Todd Kjos <tkjos@google.com>
Suggested-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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During BC_FREE_BUFFER processing, the BINDER_TYPE_FDA object
cleanup may close 1 or more fds. The close operations are
completed using the task work mechanism -- which means the thread
needs to return to userspace or the file object may never be
dereferenced -- which can lead to hung processes.
Force the binder thread back to userspace if an fd is closed during
BC_FREE_BUFFER handling.
Fixes: 80cd795630d6 ("binder: fix use-after-free due to ksys_close() during fdget()")
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Martijn Coenen <maco@android.com>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: Todd Kjos <tkjos@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210830195146.587206-1-tkjos@google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Currently cgroup freezer is used to freeze the application threads, and
BINDER_FREEZE is used to freeze the corresponding binder interface.
There's already a mechanism in ioctl(BINDER_FREEZE) to wait for any
existing transactions to drain out before actually freezing the binder
interface.
But freezing an app requires 2 steps, freezing the binder interface with
ioctl(BINDER_FREEZE) and then freezing the application main threads with
cgroupfs. This is not an atomic operation. The following race issue
might happen.
1) Binder interface is frozen by ioctl(BINDER_FREEZE);
2) Main thread A initiates a new sync binder transaction to process B;
3) Main thread A is frozen by "echo 1 > cgroup.freeze";
4) The response from process B reaches the frozen thread, which will
unexpectedly fail.
This patch provides a mechanism to check if there's any new pending
transaction happening between ioctl(BINDER_FREEZE) and freezing the
main thread. If there's any, the main thread freezing operation can
be rolled back to finish the pending transaction.
Furthermore, the response might reach the binder driver before the
rollback actually happens. That will still cause failed transaction.
As the other process doesn't wait for another response of the response,
the response transaction failure can be fixed by treating the response
transaction like an oneway/async one, allowing it to reach the frozen
thread. And it will be consumed when the thread gets unfrozen later.
NOTE: This patch reuses the existing definition of struct
binder_frozen_status_info but expands the bit assignments of __u32
member sync_recv.
To ensure backward compatibility, bit 0 of sync_recv still indicates
there's an outstanding sync binder transaction. This patch adds new
information to bit 1 of sync_recv, indicating the binder transaction
happens exactly when there's a race.
If an existing userspace app runs on a new kernel, a sync binder call
will set bit 0 of sync_recv so ioctl(BINDER_GET_FROZEN_INFO) still
return the expected value (true). The app just doesn't check bit 1
intentionally so it doesn't have the ability to tell if there's a race.
This behavior is aligned with what happens on an old kernel which
doesn't set bit 1 at all.
A new userspace app can 1) check bit 0 to know if there's a sync binder
transaction happened when being frozen - same as before; and 2) check
bit 1 to know if that sync binder transaction happened exactly when
there's a race - a new information for rollback decision.
the same time, confirmed the pending transactions succeeded.
Fixes: 432ff1e91694 ("binder: BINDER_FREEZE ioctl")
Acked-by: Todd Kjos <tkjos@google.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Li Li <dualli@google.com>
Test: stress test with apps being frozen and initiating binder calls at
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210910164210.2282716-2-dualli@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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In the case of a failed transaction, only the thread and process id are
logged. Add the handle info for the reference to the target node in user
error log to aid debugging.
Acked-by: Todd Kjos <tkjos@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Ramji Jiyani <ramjiyani@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210802220446.1938347-1-ramjiyani@google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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All the other ioctl paths return EFAULT in case the
copy_from_user/copy_to_user call fails, make oneway spam detection
follow the same paradigm.
Fixes: a7dc1e6f99df ("binder: tell userspace to dump current backtrace when detected oneway spamming")
Acked-by: Todd Kjos <tkjos@google.com>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: Luca Stefani <luca.stefani.ge1@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210506193726.45118-1-luca.stefani.ge1@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore:
- Add support for measuring the SELinux state and policy capabilities
using IMA.
- A handful of SELinux/NFS patches to compare the SELinux state of one
mount with a set of mount options. Olga goes into more detail in the
patch descriptions, but this is important as it allows more
flexibility when using NFS and SELinux context mounts.
- Properly differentiate between the subjective and objective LSM
credentials; including support for the SELinux and Smack. My clumsy
attempt at a proper fix for AppArmor didn't quite pass muster so John
is working on a proper AppArmor patch, in the meantime this set of
patches shouldn't change the behavior of AppArmor in any way. This
change explains the bulk of the diffstat beyond security/.
- Fix a problem where we were not properly terminating the permission
list for two SELinux object classes.
* tag 'selinux-pr-20210426' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: add proper NULL termination to the secclass_map permissions
smack: differentiate between subjective and objective task credentials
selinux: clarify task subjective and objective credentials
lsm: separate security_task_getsecid() into subjective and objective variants
nfs: account for selinux security context when deciding to share superblock
nfs: remove unneeded null check in nfs_fill_super()
lsm,selinux: add new hook to compare new mount to an existing mount
selinux: fix misspellings using codespell tool
selinux: fix misspellings using codespell tool
selinux: measure state and policy capabilities
selinux: Allow context mounts for unpriviliged overlayfs
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When async binder buffer got exhausted, some normal oneway transactions
will also be discarded and may cause system or application failures. By
that time, the binder debug information we dump may not be relevant to
the root cause. And this issue is difficult to debug if without the
backtrace of the thread sending spam.
This change will send BR_ONEWAY_SPAM_SUSPECT to userspace when oneway
spamming is detected, request to dump current backtrace. Oneway spamming
will be reported only once when exceeding the threshold (target process
dips below 80% of its oneway space, and current process is responsible for
either more than 50 transactions, or more than 50% of the oneway space).
And the detection will restart when the async buffer has returned to a
healthy state.
Acked-by: Todd Kjos <tkjos@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Hang Lu <hangl@codeaurora.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1617961246-4502-3-git-send-email-hangl@codeaurora.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Add BR_FROZEN_REPLY in binder_return_strings to support stat function.
Fixes: ae28c1be1e54 ("binder: BINDER_GET_FROZEN_INFO ioctl")
Acked-by: Todd Kjos <tkjos@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Hang Lu <hangl@codeaurora.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1617961246-4502-2-git-send-email-hangl@codeaurora.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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User space needs to know if binder transactions occurred to frozen
processes. Introduce a new BINDER_GET_FROZEN ioctl and keep track of
transactions occurring to frozen proceses.
Signed-off-by: Marco Ballesio <balejs@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Li Li <dualli@google.com>
Acked-by: Todd Kjos <tkjos@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210316011630.1121213-4-dualli@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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when interrupted by a signal, binder_wait_for_work currently returns
-ERESTARTSYS. This error code isn't propagated to user space, but a way
to handle interruption due to signals must be provided to code using
this API.
Replace this instance of -ERESTARTSYS with -EINTR, which is propagated
to user space.
binder_wait_for_work
Signed-off-by: Marco Ballesio <balejs@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Li Li <dualli@google.com>
Test: built, booted, interrupted a worker thread within
Acked-by: Todd Kjos <tkjos@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210316011630.1121213-3-dualli@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Frozen tasks can't process binder transactions, so a way is required to
inform transmitting ends of communication failures due to the frozen
state of their receiving counterparts. Additionally, races are possible
between transitions to frozen state and binder transactions enqueued to
a specific process.
Implement BINDER_FREEZE ioctl for user space to inform the binder driver
about the intention to freeze or unfreeze a process. When the ioctl is
called, block the caller until any pending binder transactions toward
the target process are flushed. Return an error to transactions to
processes marked as frozen.
Co-developed-by: Todd Kjos <tkjos@google.com>
Acked-by: Todd Kjos <tkjos@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marco Ballesio <balejs@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Todd Kjos <tkjos@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Li Li <dualli@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210316011630.1121213-2-dualli@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Of the three LSMs that implement the security_task_getsecid() LSM
hook, all three LSMs provide the task's objective security
credentials. This turns out to be unfortunate as most of the hook's
callers seem to expect the task's subjective credentials, although
a small handful of callers do correctly expect the objective
credentials.
This patch is the first step towards fixing the problem: it splits
the existing security_task_getsecid() hook into two variants, one
for the subjective creds, one for the objective creds.
void security_task_getsecid_subj(struct task_struct *p,
u32 *secid);
void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p,
u32 *secid);
While this patch does fix all of the callers to use the correct
variant, in order to keep this patch focused on the callers and to
ease review, the LSMs continue to use the same implementation for
both hooks. The net effect is that this patch should not change
the behavior of the kernel in any way, it will be up to the latter
LSM specific patches in this series to change the hook
implementations and return the correct credentials.
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> (IMA)
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace
Pull execve updates from Eric Biederman:
"This set of changes ultimately fixes the interaction of posix file
lock and exec. Fundamentally most of the change is just moving where
unshare_files is called during exec, and tweaking the users of
files_struct so that the count of files_struct is not unnecessarily
played with.
Along the way fcheck and related helpers were renamed to more
accurately reflect what they do.
There were also many other small changes that fell out, as this is the
first time in a long time much of this code has been touched.
Benchmarks haven't turned up any practical issues but Al Viro has
observed a possibility for a lot of pounding on task_lock. So I have
some changes in progress to convert put_files_struct to always rcu
free files_struct. That wasn't ready for the merge window so that will
have to wait until next time"
* 'exec-for-v5.11' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: (27 commits)
exec: Move io_uring_task_cancel after the point of no return
coredump: Document coredump code exclusively used by cell spufs
file: Remove get_files_struct
file: Rename __close_fd_get_file close_fd_get_file
file: Replace ksys_close with close_fd
file: Rename __close_fd to close_fd and remove the files parameter
file: Merge __alloc_fd into alloc_fd
file: In f_dupfd read RLIMIT_NOFILE once.
file: Merge __fd_install into fd_install
proc/fd: In fdinfo seq_show don't use get_files_struct
bpf/task_iter: In task_file_seq_get_next use task_lookup_next_fd_rcu
proc/fd: In proc_readfd_common use task_lookup_next_fd_rcu
file: Implement task_lookup_next_fd_rcu
kcmp: In get_file_raw_ptr use task_lookup_fd_rcu
proc/fd: In tid_fd_mode use task_lookup_fd_rcu
file: Implement task_lookup_fd_rcu
file: Rename fcheck lookup_fd_rcu
file: Replace fcheck_files with files_lookup_fd_rcu
file: Factor files_lookup_fd_locked out of fcheck_files
file: Rename __fcheck_files to files_lookup_fd_raw
...
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The function close_fd_get_file is explicitly a variant of
__close_fd[1]. Now that __close_fd has been renamed close_fd, rename
close_fd_get_file to be consistent with close_fd.
When __alloc_fd, __close_fd and __fd_install were introduced the
double underscore indicated that the function took a struct
files_struct parameter. The function __close_fd_get_file never has so
the naming has always been inconsistent. This just cleans things up
so there are not any lingering mentions or references __close_fd left
in the code.
[1] 80cd795630d6 ("binder: fix use-after-free due to ksys_close() during fdget()")
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201120231441.29911-23-ebiederm@xmission.com
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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Add a per-transaction flag to indicate that the buffer
must be cleared when the transaction is complete to
prevent copies of sensitive data from being preserved
in memory.
Signed-off-by: Todd Kjos <tkjos@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201120233743.3617529-1-tkjos@google.com
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Since the original trace_binder_transaction_received cannot
precisely present the real finished time of transaction, adding a
trace_binder_txn_latency_free at the point of free transaction
may be more close to it.
Signed-off-by: Frankie.Chang <Frankie.Chang@mediatek.com>
Acked-by: Todd Kjos <tkjos@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1605063764-12930-3-git-send-email-Frankie.Chang@mediatek.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Moving all structs to header file makes module more
extendable, and makes all these structs to be defined
in the same file.
Signed-off-by: Frankie.Chang <Frankie.Chang@mediatek.com>
Acked-by: Todd Kjos <tkjos@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1605063764-12930-2-git-send-email-Frankie.Chang@mediatek.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Depending on the context, the error return value
here (extra_buffers_size < added_size) should be
negative.
Acked-by: Martijn Coenen <maco@android.com>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: Zhang Qilong <zhangqilong3@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201026110314.135481-1-zhangqilong3@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Fixed a coding style issue.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bridges <andrew@slova.app>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201027225655.650922-1-andrew@slova.app
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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A previous commit changed the notification mode from true/false to an
int, allowing notify-no, notify-yes, or signal-notify. This was
backwards compatible in the sense that any existing true/false user
would translate to either 0 (on notification sent) or 1, the latter
which mapped to TWA_RESUME. TWA_SIGNAL was assigned a value of 2.
Clean this up properly, and define a proper enum for the notification
mode. Now we have:
- TWA_NONE. This is 0, same as before the original change, meaning no
notification requested.
- TWA_RESUME. This is 1, same as before the original change, meaning
that we use TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME.
- TWA_SIGNAL. This uses TIF_SIGPENDING/JOBCTL_TASK_WORK for the
notification.
Clean up all the callers, switching their 0/1/false/true to using the
appropriate TWA_* mode for notifications.
Fixes: e91b48162332 ("task_work: teach task_work_add() to do signal_wake_up()")
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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When releasing a thread todo list when tearing down
a binder_proc, the following race was possible which
could result in a use-after-free:
1. Thread 1: enter binder_release_work from binder_thread_release
2. Thread 2: binder_update_ref_for_handle() -> binder_dec_node_ilocked()
3. Thread 2: dec nodeA --> 0 (will free node)
4. Thread 1: ACQ inner_proc_lock
5. Thread 2: block on inner_proc_lock
6. Thread 1: dequeue work (BINDER_WORK_NODE, part of nodeA)
7. Thread 1: REL inner_proc_lock
8. Thread 2: ACQ inner_proc_lock
9. Thread 2: todo list cleanup, but work was already dequeued
10. Thread 2: free node
11. Thread 2: REL inner_proc_lock
12. Thread 1: deref w->type (UAF)
The problem was that for a BINDER_WORK_NODE, the binder_work element
must not be accessed after releasing the inner_proc_lock while
processing the todo list elements since another thread might be
handling a deref on the node containing the binder_work element
leading to the node being freed.
Signed-off-by: Todd Kjos <tkjos@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201009232455.4054810-1-tkjos@google.com
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.14, 4.19, 5.4, 5.8
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Simplify the return expression.
Acked-by: Martijn Coenen <maco@android.com>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: Liu Shixin <liushixin2@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200929015216.1829946-1-liushixin2@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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The most common cause of the binder transaction buffer filling up is a
client rapidly firing oneway transactions into a process, before it has
a chance to handle them. Yet the root cause of this is often hard to
debug, because either the system or the app will stop, and by that time
binder debug information we dump in bugreports is no longer relevant.
This change warns as soon as a process dips below 80% of its oneway
space (less than 100kB available in the configuration), when any one
process is responsible for either more than 50 transactions, or more
than 50% of the oneway space.
Signed-off-by: Martijn Coenen <maco@android.com>
Acked-by: Todd Kjos <tkjos@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200821122544.1277051-1-maco@android.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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While binder transactions with the same binder_proc as sender and recipient
are forbidden, transactions with the same task_struct as sender and
recipient are possible (even though currently there is a weird check in
binder_transaction() that rejects them in the target==0 case).
Therefore, task_struct identities can't be used to distinguish whether
the caller is running in the context of the sender or the recipient.
Since I see no easy way to make this WARN_ON() useful and correct, let's
just remove it.
Fixes: 44d8047f1d87 ("binder: use standard functions to allocate fds")
Reported-by: syzbot+e113a0b970b7b3f394ba@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: Todd Kjos <tkjos@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200806165359.2381483-1-jannh@google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Remove braces for both if and else block as suggested by checkpatch.
Signed-off-by: Mrinal Pandey <mrinalmni@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200724131403.dahfhdwa3wirzkxj@mrinalpandey
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Remove the unnecessary else branch after return statement as suggested by
checkpatch.
Signed-off-by: Mrinal Pandey <mrinalmni@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200724131348.haz4ocxcferdcsgn@mrinalpandey
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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