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7 dayscrypto: af_alg - Cap AEAD AD length to 0x80000000Herbert Xu1-0/+2
commit e4c06479d7059888adf2f22bc1ebcf053bf691a2 upstream. In order to prevent arithmetic overflows when checking the TX buffer size, cap the associated data length to 0x80000000. Reported-by: Yiming Qian <yimingqian591@gmail.com> Fixes: 400c40cf78da ("crypto: algif - add AEAD support") Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
7 dayscrypto: jitterentropy - replace long-held spinlock with mutexHaixin Xu1-7/+7
[ Upstream commit 01d798e9feb30212952d4e992801ba6bd6a82351 ] jent_kcapi_random() serializes the shared jitterentropy state, but it currently holds a spinlock across the jent_read_entropy() call. That path performs expensive jitter collection and SHA3 conditioning, so parallel readers can trigger stalls as contending waiters spin for the same lock. To prevent non-preemptible lock hold, replace rng->jent_lock with a mutex so contended readers sleep instead of spinning on a shared lock held across expensive entropy generation. Fixes: bb5530e40824 ("crypto: jitterentropy - add jitterentropy RNG") Reported-by: Yifan Wu <yifanwucs@gmail.com> Reported-by: Juefei Pu <tomapufckgml@gmail.com> Reported-by: Yuan Tan <yuantan098@gmail.com> Suggested-by: Xin Liu <bird@lzu.edu.cn> Signed-off-by: Haixin Xu <jerryxucs@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
13 dayscrypto: authencesn - reject short ahash digests during instance creationYucheng Lu1-0/+5
commit 5db6ef9847717329f12c5ea8aba7e9f588a980c0 upstream. authencesn requires either a zero authsize or an authsize of at least 4 bytes because the ESN encrypt/decrypt paths always move 4 bytes of high-order sequence number data at the end of the authenticated data. While crypto_authenc_esn_setauthsize() already rejects explicit non-zero authsizes in the range 1..3, crypto_authenc_esn_create() still copied auth->digestsize into inst->alg.maxauthsize without validating it. The AEAD core then initialized the tfm's default authsize from that value. As a result, selecting an ahash with digest size 1..3, such as cbcmac(cipher_null), exposed authencesn instances whose default authsize was invalid even though setauthsize() would have rejected the same value. AF_ALG could then trigger the ESN tail handling with a too-short tag and hit an out-of-bounds access. Reject authencesn instances whose ahash digest size is in the invalid non-zero range 1..3 so that no tfm can inherit an unsupported default authsize. Fixes: f15f05b0a5de ("crypto: ccm - switch to separate cbcmac driver") Cc: stable@kernel.org Reported-by: Yifan Wu <yifanwucs@gmail.com> Reported-by: Juefei Pu <tomapufckgml@gmail.com> Co-developed-by: Yuan Tan <yuantan098@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Yuan Tan <yuantan098@gmail.com> Suggested-by: Xin Liu <bird@lzu.edu.cn> Tested-by: Yuhang Zheng <z1652074432@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Yucheng Lu <kanolyc@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Ren Wei <n05ec@lzu.edu.cn> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
13 dayscrypto: pcrypt - Fix handling of MAY_BACKLOG requestsHerbert Xu1-2/+5
commit 915b692e6cb723aac658c25eb82c58fd81235110 upstream. MAY_BACKLOG requests can return EBUSY. Handle them by checking for that value and filtering out EINPROGRESS notifications. Reported-by: Yiming Qian <yimingqian591@gmail.com> Fixes: 5a1436beec57 ("crypto: pcrypt - call the complete function on error") Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2026-04-30crypto: af_alg - Fix page reassignment overflow in af_alg_pull_tsglHerbert Xu1-2/+2
commit 31d00156e50ecad37f2cb6cbf04aaa9a260505ef upstream. When page reassignment was added to af_alg_pull_tsgl the original loop wasn't updated so it may try to reassign one more page than necessary. Add the check to the reassignment so that this does not happen. Also update the comment which still refers to the obsolete offset argument. Reported-by: syzbot+d23888375c2737c17ba5@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: e870456d8e7c ("crypto: algif_skcipher - overhaul memory management") Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2026-04-30crypto: authencesn - Fix src offset when decrypting in-placeHerbert Xu1-2/+4
commit 1f48ad3b19a9dfc947868edda0bb8e48e5b5a8fa upstream. The src SG list offset wasn't set properly when decrypting in-place, fix it. Reported-by: Wolfgang Walter <linux@stwm.de> Fixes: e02494114ebf ("crypto: authencesn - Do not place hiseq at end of dst for out-of-place decryption") Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2026-04-30crypto: authencesn - Do not place hiseq at end of dst for out-of-place ↵Herbert Xu1-19/+29
decryption commit e02494114ebf7c8b42777c6cd6982f113bfdbec7 upstream. When decrypting data that is not in-place (src != dst), there is no need to save the high-order sequence bits in dst as it could simply be re-copied from the source. However, the data to be hashed need to be rearranged accordingly. Reported-by: Taeyang Lee <0wn@theori.io> Fixes: 104880a6b470 ("crypto: authencesn - Convert to new AEAD interface") Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2026-04-30crypto: authenc - use memcpy_sglist() instead of null skcipherEric Biggers3-67/+4
commit dbc4b1458e931e47198c3165ff5853bc1ad6bd7a upstream. For copying data between two scatterlists, just use memcpy_sglist() instead of the so-called "null skcipher". This is much simpler. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2026-04-30crypto: algif_aead - snapshot IV for async AEAD requestsDouya Le1-2/+8
commit 5aa58c3a572b3e3b6c786953339f7978b845cc52 upstream. AF_ALG AEAD AIO requests currently use the socket-wide IV buffer during request processing. For async requests, later socket activity can update that shared state before the original request has fully completed, which can lead to inconsistent IV handling. Snapshot the IV into per-request storage when preparing the AEAD request, so in-flight operations no longer depend on mutable socket state. Fixes: d887c52d6ae4 ("crypto: algif_aead - overhaul memory management") Cc: stable@kernel.org Reported-by: Yuan Tan <yuantan098@gmail.com> Reported-by: Yifan Wu <yifanwucs@gmail.com> Reported-by: Juefei Pu <tomapufckgml@gmail.com> Reported-by: Xin Liu <bird@lzu.edu.cn> Co-developed-by: Luxing Yin <tr0jan@lzu.edu.cn> Signed-off-by: Luxing Yin <tr0jan@lzu.edu.cn> Tested-by: Yucheng Lu <kanolyc@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Douya Le <ldy3087146292@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Ren Wei <n05ec@lzu.edu.cn> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2026-04-30crypto: algif_aead - Revert to operating out-of-placeHerbert Xu3-123/+32
commit a664bf3d603dc3bdcf9ae47cc21e0daec706d7a5 upstream. This mostly reverts commit 72548b093ee3 except for the copying of the associated data. There is no benefit in operating in-place in algif_aead since the source and destination come from different mappings. Get rid of all the complexity added for in-place operation and just copy the AD directly. Fixes: 72548b093ee3 ("crypto: algif_aead - copy AAD from src to dst") Reported-by: Taeyang Lee <0wn@theori.io> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2026-04-30crypto: algif_aead - use memcpy_sglist() instead of null skcipherEric Biggers2-84/+18
commit f2804d0eee8ddd57aa79d0b82872b74c21e1b69b upstream. For copying data between two scatterlists, just use memcpy_sglist() instead of the so-called "null skcipher". This is much simpler. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2026-04-30crypto: scatterwalk - Backport memcpy_sglist()Eric Biggers1-0/+94
This backports the current implementation of memcpy_sglist() from upstream commit 4dffc9bbffb9ccfcda730d899c97c553599e7ca8. This function was rewritten twice. The earlier implementations had many prerequisite commits, while the latest implementation is standalone. It's much easier to just backport the latest code directly. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2026-04-27crypto: testmgr - Hide ENOENT errors betterHerbert Xu1-12/+11
commit 6318fbe26e67f9c27a1917fe63936b0fc6000373 upstream. The previous patch removed the ENOENT warning at the point of allocation, but the overall self-test warning is still there. Fix all of them by returning zero as the test result. This is safe because if the algorithm has gone away, then it cannot be marked as tested. Fixes: 4eded6d14f5b ("crypto: testmgr - Hide ENOENT errors") Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: Hamza Mahfooz <hamzamahfooz@linux.microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2026-04-27crypto: testmgr - Hide ENOENT errorsHerbert Xu1-1/+22
commit 4eded6d14f5b7bb857b68872970a40cf3105c015 upstream. When a crypto algorithm with a higher priority is registered, it kills the spawns of all lower-priority algorithms. Thus it is to be expected for an algorithm to go away at any time, even during a self-test. This is now much more common with asynchronous testing. Remove the printk when an ENOENT is encountered during a self-test. This is not really an error since the algorithm being tested is no longer there (i.e., it didn't fail the test which is what we care about). Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: Hamza Mahfooz <hamzamahfooz@linux.microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2026-04-27crypto: algif_aead - Fix minimum RX size check for decryptionHerbert Xu1-1/+1
[ Upstream commit 3d14bd48e3a77091cbce637a12c2ae31b4a1687c ] The check for the minimum receive buffer size did not take the tag size into account during decryption. Fix this by adding the required extra length. Reported-by: syzbot+aa11561819dc42ebbc7c@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: Daniel Pouzzner <douzzer@mega.nu> Fixes: d887c52d6ae4 ("crypto: algif_aead - overhaul memory management") Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2026-04-18X.509: Fix out-of-bounds access when parsing extensionsLukas Wunner1-4/+4
commit d702c3408213bb12bd570bb97204d8340d141c51 upstream. Leo reports an out-of-bounds access when parsing a certificate with empty Basic Constraints or Key Usage extension because the first byte of the extension is read before checking its length. Fix it. The bug can be triggered by an unprivileged user by submitting a specially crafted certificate to the kernel through the keyrings(7) API. Leo has demonstrated this with a proof-of-concept program responsibly disclosed off-list. Fixes: 30eae2b037af ("KEYS: X.509: Parse Basic Constraints for CA") Fixes: 567671281a75 ("KEYS: X.509: Parse Key Usage") Reported-by: Leo Lin <leo@depthfirst.com> # off-list Signed-off-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de> Reviewed-by: Ignat Korchagin <ignat@linux.win> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.4+ Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2026-04-11crypto: af-alg - fix NULL pointer dereference in scatterwalkNorbert Szetei1-1/+3
[ Upstream commit 62397b493e14107ae82d8b80938f293d95425bcb ] The AF_ALG interface fails to unmark the end of a Scatter/Gather List (SGL) when chaining a new af_alg_tsgl structure. If a sendmsg() fills an SGL exactly to MAX_SGL_ENTS, the last entry is marked as the end. A subsequent sendmsg() allocates a new SGL and chains it, but fails to clear the end marker on the previous SGL's last data entry. This causes the crypto scatterwalk to hit a premature end, returning NULL on sg_next() and leading to a kernel panic during dereference. Fix this by explicitly unmarking the end of the previous SGL when performing sg_chain() in af_alg_alloc_tsgl(). Fixes: 8ff590903d5f ("crypto: algif_skcipher - User-space interface for skcipher operations") Signed-off-by: Norbert Szetei <norbert@doyensec.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2026-01-30crypto: authencesn - reject too-short AAD (assoclen<8) to match ESP/ESN specTaeyang Lee1-0/+6
[ Upstream commit 2397e9264676be7794f8f7f1e9763d90bd3c7335 ] authencesn assumes an ESP/ESN-formatted AAD. When assoclen is shorter than the minimum expected length, crypto_authenc_esn_decrypt() can advance past the end of the destination scatterlist and trigger a NULL pointer dereference in scatterwalk_map_and_copy(), leading to a kernel panic (DoS). Add a minimum AAD length check to fail fast on invalid inputs. Fixes: 104880a6b470 ("crypto: authencesn - Convert to new AEAD interface") Reported-By: Taeyang Lee <0wn@theori.io> Signed-off-by: Taeyang Lee <0wn@theori.io> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2026-01-11crypto: seqiv - Do not use req->iv after crypto_aead_encryptHerbert Xu1-3/+5
[ Upstream commit 50fdb78b7c0bcc550910ef69c0984e751cac72fa ] As soon as crypto_aead_encrypt is called, the underlying request may be freed by an asynchronous completion. Thus dereferencing req->iv after it returns is invalid. Instead of checking req->iv against info, create a new variable unaligned_info and use it for that purpose instead. Fixes: 0a270321dbf9 ("[CRYPTO] seqiv: Add Sequence Number IV Generator") Reported-by: Xiumei Mu <xmu@redhat.com> Reported-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2026-01-11crypto: af_alg - zero initialize memory allocated via sock_kmallocShivani Agarwal3-7/+4
commit 6f6e309328d53a10c0fe1f77dec2db73373179b6 upstream. Several crypto user API contexts and requests allocated with sock_kmalloc() were left uninitialized, relying on callers to set fields explicitly. This resulted in the use of uninitialized data in certain error paths or when new fields are added in the future. The ACVP patches also contain two user-space interface files: algif_kpp.c and algif_akcipher.c. These too rely on proper initialization of their context structures. A particular issue has been observed with the newly added 'inflight' variable introduced in af_alg_ctx by commit: 67b164a871af ("crypto: af_alg - Disallow multiple in-flight AIO requests") Because the context is not memset to zero after allocation, the inflight variable has contained garbage values. As a result, af_alg_alloc_areq() has incorrectly returned -EBUSY randomly when the garbage value was interpreted as true: https://github.com/gregkh/linux/blame/master/crypto/af_alg.c#L1209 The check directly tests ctx->inflight without explicitly comparing against true/false. Since inflight is only ever set to true or false later, an uninitialized value has triggered -EBUSY failures. Zero-initializing memory allocated with sock_kmalloc() ensures inflight and other fields start in a known state, removing random issues caused by uninitialized data. Fixes: fe869cdb89c9 ("crypto: algif_hash - User-space interface for hash operations") Fixes: 5afdfd22e6ba ("crypto: algif_rng - add random number generator support") Fixes: 2d97591ef43d ("crypto: af_alg - consolidation of duplicate code") Fixes: 67b164a871af ("crypto: af_alg - Disallow multiple in-flight AIO requests") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Shivani Agarwal <shivani.agarwal@broadcom.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2026-01-11crypto: asymmetric_keys - prevent overflow in asymmetric_key_generate_idThorsten Blum1-4/+10
[ Upstream commit df0845cf447ae1556c3440b8b155de0926cbaa56 ] Use check_add_overflow() to guard against potential integer overflows when adding the binary blob lengths and the size of an asymmetric_key_id structure and return ERR_PTR(-EOVERFLOW) accordingly. This prevents a possible buffer overflow when copying data from potentially malicious X.509 certificate fields that can be arbitrarily large, such as ASN.1 INTEGER serial numbers, issuer names, etc. Fixes: 7901c1a8effb ("KEYS: Implement binary asymmetric key ID handling") Signed-off-by: Thorsten Blum <thorsten.blum@linux.dev> Reviewed-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2026-01-11crypto: authenc - Correctly pass EINPROGRESS back up to the callerHerbert Xu1-25/+50
[ Upstream commit 96feb73def02d175850daa0e7c2c90c876681b5c ] When authenc is invoked with MAY_BACKLOG, it needs to pass EINPROGRESS notifications back up to the caller when the underlying algorithm returns EBUSY synchronously. However, if the EBUSY comes from the second part of an authenc call, i.e., it is asynchronous, both the EBUSY and the subsequent EINPROGRESS notification must not be passed to the caller. Implement this by passing a mask to the function that starts the second half of authenc and using it to determine whether EBUSY and EINPROGRESS should be passed to the caller. This was a deficiency in the original implementation of authenc because it was not expected to be used with MAY_BACKLOG. Reported-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com> Reported-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com> Fixes: 180ce7e81030 ("crypto: authenc - Add EINPROGRESS check") Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-10-19crypto: essiv - Check ssize for decryption and in-place encryptionHerbert Xu1-8/+6
[ Upstream commit 6bb73db6948c2de23e407fe1b7ef94bf02b7529f ] Move the ssize check to the start in essiv_aead_crypt so that it's also checked for decryption and in-place encryption. Reported-by: Muhammad Alifa Ramdhan <ramdhan@starlabs.sg> Fixes: be1eb7f78aa8 ("crypto: essiv - create wrapper template for ESSIV generation") Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-10-15KEYS: X.509: Fix Basic Constraints CA flag parsingFan Wu1-4/+12
[ Upstream commit 5851afffe2ab323a53e184ba5a35fddf268f096b ] Fix the X.509 Basic Constraints CA flag parsing to correctly handle the ASN.1 DER encoded structure. The parser was incorrectly treating the length field as the boolean value. Per RFC 5280 section 4.1, X.509 certificates must use ASN.1 DER encoding. According to ITU-T X.690, a DER-encoded BOOLEAN is represented as: Tag (0x01), Length (0x01), Value (0x00 for FALSE, 0xFF for TRUE) The basicConstraints extension with CA:TRUE is encoded as: SEQUENCE (0x30) | Length | BOOLEAN (0x01) | Length (0x01) | Value (0xFF) ^-- v[2] ^-- v[3] ^-- v[4] The parser was checking v[3] (the length field, always 0x01) instead of v[4] (the actual boolean value, 0xFF for TRUE in DER encoding). Also handle the case where the extension is an empty SEQUENCE (30 00), which is valid for CA:FALSE when the default value is omitted as required by DER encoding rules (X.690 section 11.5). Per ITU-T X.690-0207: - Section 11.5: Default values must be omitted in DER - Section 11.1: DER requires TRUE to be encoded as 0xFF Link: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5280 Link: https://www.itu.int/ITU-T/studygroups/com17/languages/X.690-0207.pdf Fixes: 30eae2b037af ("KEYS: X.509: Parse Basic Constraints for CA") Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-10-12crypto: rng - Ensure set_ent is always presentHerbert Xu1-0/+8
commit c0d36727bf39bb16ef0a67ed608e279535ebf0da upstream. Ensure that set_ent is always set since only drbg provides it. Fixes: 77ebdabe8de7 ("crypto: af_alg - add extra parameters for DRBG interface") Reported-by: Yiqi Sun <sunyiqixm@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2025-09-25crypto: af_alg - Set merge to zero early in af_alg_sendmsgHerbert Xu1-1/+2
[ Upstream commit 9574b2330dbd2b5459b74d3b5e9619d39299fc6f ] If an error causes af_alg_sendmsg to abort, ctx->merge may contain a garbage value from the previous loop. This may then trigger a crash on the next entry into af_alg_sendmsg when it attempts to do a merge that can't be done. Fix this by setting ctx->merge to zero near the start of the loop. Fixes: 8ff590903d5 ("crypto: algif_skcipher - User-space interface for skcipher operations") Reported-by: Muhammad Alifa Ramdhan <ramdhan@starlabs.sg> Reported-by: Bing-Jhong Billy Jheng <billy@starlabs.sg> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-09-25crypto: af_alg - Disallow concurrent writes in af_alg_sendmsgHerbert Xu1-0/+7
commit 1b34cbbf4f011a121ef7b2d7d6e6920a036d5285 upstream. Issuing two writes to the same af_alg socket is bogus as the data will be interleaved in an unpredictable fashion. Furthermore, concurrent writes may create inconsistencies in the internal socket state. Disallow this by adding a new ctx->write field that indiciates exclusive ownership for writing. Fixes: 8ff590903d5 ("crypto: algif_skcipher - User-space interface for skcipher operations") Reported-by: Muhammad Alifa Ramdhan <ramdhan@starlabs.sg> Reported-by: Bing-Jhong Billy Jheng <billy@starlabs.sg> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2025-08-28crypto: jitter - fix intermediary handlingMarkus Theil1-4/+5
[ Upstream commit 735b72568c73875269a6b73ab9543a70f6ac8a9f ] The intermediary value was included in the wrong hash state. While there, adapt to user-space by setting the timestamp to 0 if stuck and inserting the values nevertheless. Acked-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> Signed-off-by: Markus Theil <theil.markus@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-07-17crypto: ecdsa - Harden against integer overflows in DIV_ROUND_UP()Lukas Wunner1-1/+1
commit b16510a530d1e6ab9683f04f8fb34f2e0f538275 upstream. Herbert notes that DIV_ROUND_UP() may overflow unnecessarily if an ecdsa implementation's ->key_size() callback returns an unusually large value. Herbert instead suggests (for a division by 8): X / 8 + !!(X & 7) Based on this formula, introduce a generic DIV_ROUND_UP_POW2() macro and use it in lieu of DIV_ROUND_UP() for ->key_size() return values. Additionally, use the macro in ecc_digits_from_bytes(), whose "nbytes" parameter is a ->key_size() return value in some instances, or a user-specified ASN.1 length in the case of ecdsa_get_signature_rs(). Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/Z3iElsILmoSu6FuC@gondor.apana.org.au/ Signed-off-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de> Signed-off-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2025-06-19crypto: xts - Only add ecb if it is not already thereHerbert Xu1-2/+2
[ Upstream commit 270b6f13454cb7f2f7058c50df64df409c5dcf55 ] Only add ecb to the cipher name if it isn't already ecb. Also use memcmp instead of strncmp since these strings are all stored in an array of length CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME. Fixes: f1c131b45410 ("crypto: xts - Convert to skcipher") Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-06-19crypto: lrw - Only add ecb if it is not already thereHerbert Xu1-2/+2
[ Upstream commit 3d73909bddc2ebb3224a8bc2e5ce00e9df70c15d ] Only add ecb to the cipher name if it isn't already ecb. Also use memcmp instead of strncmp since these strings are all stored in an array of length CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME. Fixes: 700cb3f5fe75 ("crypto: lrw - Convert to skcipher") Reported-by: kernel test robot <oliver.sang@intel.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-lkp/202505151503.d8a6cf10-lkp@intel.com Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-06-04crypto: algif_hash - fix double free in hash_acceptIvan Pravdin1-4/+0
commit b2df03ed4052e97126267e8c13ad4204ea6ba9b6 upstream. If accept(2) is called on socket type algif_hash with MSG_MORE flag set and crypto_ahash_import fails, sk2 is freed. However, it is also freed in af_alg_release, leading to slab-use-after-free error. Fixes: fe869cdb89c9 ("crypto: algif_hash - User-space interface for hash operations") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ivan Pravdin <ipravdin.official@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2025-06-04crypto: skcipher - Zap type in crypto_alloc_sync_skcipherHerbert Xu1-0/+1
[ Upstream commit ee509efc74ddbc59bb5d6fd6e050f9ef25f74bff ] The type needs to be zeroed as otherwise the user could use it to allocate an asynchronous sync skcipher. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-06-04crypto: ahash - Set default reqsize from ahash_algHerbert Xu1-0/+4
[ Upstream commit 9e01aaa1033d6e40f8d7cf4f20931a61ce9e3f04 ] Add a reqsize field to struct ahash_alg and use it to set the default reqsize so that algorithms with a static reqsize are not forced to create an init_tfm function. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-06-04crypto: lzo - Fix compression buffer overrunHerbert Xu2-2/+2
[ Upstream commit cc47f07234f72cbd8e2c973cdbf2a6730660a463 ] Unlike the decompression code, the compression code in LZO never checked for output overruns. It instead assumes that the caller always provides enough buffer space, disregarding the buffer length provided by the caller. Add a safe compression interface that checks for the end of buffer before each write. Use the safe interface in crypto/lzo. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-05-02crypto: null - Use spin lock instead of mutexHerbert Xu1-13/+26
[ Upstream commit dcc47a028c24e793ce6d6efebfef1a1e92f80297 ] As the null algorithm may be freed in softirq context through af_alg, use spin locks instead of mutexes to protect the default null algorithm. Reported-by: syzbot+b3e02953598f447d4d2a@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-01-09crypto: ecc - Prevent ecc_digits_from_bytes from reading too many bytesStefan Berger1-0/+22
[ Upstream commit c6ab5c915da460c0397960af3c308386c3f3247b ] Prevent ecc_digits_from_bytes from reading too many bytes from the input byte array in case an insufficient number of bytes is provided to fill the output digit array of ndigits. Therefore, initialize the most significant digits with 0 to avoid trying to read too many bytes later on. Convert the function into a regular function since it is getting too big for an inline function. If too many bytes are provided on the input byte array the extra bytes are ignored since the input variable 'ndigits' limits the number of digits that will be filled. Fixes: d67c96fb97b5 ("crypto: ecdsa - Convert byte arrays with key coordinates to digits") Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-01-09crypto: ecdsa - Avoid signed integer overflow on signature decodingLukas Wunner1-12/+7
[ Upstream commit 3b0565c703503f832d6cd7ba805aafa3b330cb9d ] When extracting a signature component r or s from an ASN.1-encoded integer, ecdsa_get_signature_rs() subtracts the expected length "bufsize" from the ASN.1 length "vlen" (both of unsigned type size_t) and stores the result in "diff" (of signed type ssize_t). This results in a signed integer overflow if vlen > SSIZE_MAX + bufsize. The kernel is compiled with -fno-strict-overflow, which implies -fwrapv, meaning signed integer overflow is not undefined behavior. And the function does check for overflow: if (-diff >= bufsize) return -EINVAL; So the code is fine in principle but not very obvious. In the future it might trigger a false-positive with CONFIG_UBSAN_SIGNED_WRAP=y. Avoid by comparing the two unsigned variables directly and erroring out if "vlen" is too large. Signed-off-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de> Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-01-09crypto: ecdsa - Use ecc_digits_from_bytes to convert signatureStefan Berger1-10/+2
[ Upstream commit 546ce0bdc91afd9f5c4c67d9fc4733e0fc7086d1 ] Since ecc_digits_from_bytes will provide zeros when an insufficient number of bytes are passed in the input byte array, use it to convert the r and s components of the signature to digits directly from the input byte array. This avoids going through an intermediate byte array that has the first few bytes filled with zeros. Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Stable-dep-of: 3b0565c70350 ("crypto: ecdsa - Avoid signed integer overflow on signature decoding") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-01-09crypto: ecdsa - Rename keylen to bufsize where necessaryStefan Berger1-6/+6
[ Upstream commit 703ca5cda1ea04735e48882a7cccff97d57656c3 ] In cases where 'keylen' was referring to the size of the buffer used by a curve's digits, it does not reflect the purpose of the variable anymore once NIST P521 is used. What it refers to then is the size of the buffer, which may be a few bytes larger than the size a coordinate of a key. Therefore, rename keylen to bufsize where appropriate. Tested-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Stable-dep-of: 3b0565c70350 ("crypto: ecdsa - Avoid signed integer overflow on signature decoding") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-01-09crypto: ecdsa - Convert byte arrays with key coordinates to digitsStefan Berger1-5/+9
[ Upstream commit d67c96fb97b5811e15c881d5cb72e293faa5f8e1 ] For NIST P192/256/384 the public key's x and y parameters could be copied directly from a given array since both parameters filled 'ndigits' of digits (a 'digit' is a u64). For support of NIST P521 the key parameters need to have leading zeros prepended to the most significant digit since only 2 bytes of the most significant digit are provided. Therefore, implement ecc_digits_from_bytes to convert a byte array into an array of digits and use this function in ecdsa_set_pub_key where an input byte array needs to be converted into digits. Suggested-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de> Tested-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Stable-dep-of: 3b0565c70350 ("crypto: ecdsa - Avoid signed integer overflow on signature decoding") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-12-09crypto: pcrypt - Call crypto layer directly when padata_do_parallel() return ↵Yi Yang1-4/+8
-EBUSY [ Upstream commit 662f2f13e66d3883b9238b0b96b17886179e60e2 ] Since commit 8f4f68e788c3 ("crypto: pcrypt - Fix hungtask for PADATA_RESET"), the pcrypt encryption and decryption operations return -EAGAIN when the CPU goes online or offline. In alg_test(), a WARN is generated when pcrypt_aead_decrypt() or pcrypt_aead_encrypt() returns -EAGAIN, the unnecessary panic will occur when panic_on_warn set 1. Fix this issue by calling crypto layer directly without parallelization in that case. Fixes: 8f4f68e788c3 ("crypto: pcrypt - Fix hungtask for PADATA_RESET") Signed-off-by: Yi Yang <yiyang13@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-11-17crypto: api - Fix liveliness check in crypto_alg_testedHerbert Xu1-1/+1
[ Upstream commit b81e286ba154a4e0f01a94d99179a97f4ba3e396 ] As algorithm testing is carried out without holding the main crypto lock, it is always possible for the algorithm to go away during the test. So before crypto_alg_tested updates the status of the tested alg, it checks whether it's still on the list of all algorithms. This is inaccurate because it may be off the main list but still on the list of algorithms to be removed. Updating the algorithm status is safe per se as the larval still holds a reference to it. However, killing spawns of other algorithms that are of lower priority is clearly a deficiency as it adds unnecessary churn. Fix the test by checking whether the algorithm is dead. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-10-10crypto: simd - Do not call crypto_alloc_tfm during registrationHerbert Xu1-61/+15
[ Upstream commit 3c44d31cb34ce4eb8311a2e73634d57702948230 ] Algorithm registration is usually carried out during module init, where as little work as possible should be carried out. The SIMD code violated this rule by allocating a tfm, this then triggers a full test of the algorithm which may dead-lock in certain cases. SIMD is only allocating the tfm to get at the alg object, which is in fact already available as it is what we are registering. Use that directly and remove the crypto_alloc_tfm call. Also remove some obsolete and unused SIMD API. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-10-04KEYS: prevent NULL pointer dereference in find_asymmetric_key()Roman Smirnov1-3/+4
commit 70fd1966c93bf3bfe3fe6d753eb3d83a76597eef upstream. In find_asymmetric_key(), if all NULLs are passed in the id_{0,1,2} arguments, the kernel will first emit WARN but then have an oops because id_2 gets dereferenced anyway. Add the missing id_2 check and move WARN_ON() to the final else branch to avoid duplicate NULL checks. Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Svace static analysis tool. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.17+ Fixes: 7d30198ee24f ("keys: X.509 public key issuer lookup without AKID") Suggested-by: Sergey Shtylyov <s.shtylyov@omp.ru> Signed-off-by: Roman Smirnov <r.smirnov@omp.ru> Reviewed-by: Sergey Shtylyov <s.shtylyov@omp.ru> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2024-10-04crypto: xor - fix template benchmarkingHelge Deller1-17/+14
[ Upstream commit ab9a244c396aae4aaa34b2399b82fc15ec2df8c1 ] Commit c055e3eae0f1 ("crypto: xor - use ktime for template benchmarking") switched from using jiffies to ktime-based performance benchmarking. This works nicely on machines which have a fine-grained ktime() clocksource as e.g. x86 machines with TSC. But other machines, e.g. my 4-way HP PARISC server, don't have such fine-grained clocksources, which is why it seems that 800 xor loops take zero seconds, which then shows up in the logs as: xor: measuring software checksum speed 8regs : -1018167296 MB/sec 8regs_prefetch : -1018167296 MB/sec 32regs : -1018167296 MB/sec 32regs_prefetch : -1018167296 MB/sec Fix this with some small modifications to the existing code to improve the algorithm to always produce correct results without introducing major delays for architectures with a fine-grained ktime() clocksource: a) Delay start of the timing until ktime() just advanced. On machines with a fast ktime() this should be just one additional ktime() call. b) Count the number of loops. Run at minimum 800 loops and finish earliest when the ktime() counter has progressed. With that the throughput can now be calculated more accurately under all conditions. Fixes: c055e3eae0f1 ("crypto: xor - use ktime for template benchmarking") Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> Tested-by: John David Anglin <dave.anglin@bell.net> v2: - clean up coding style (noticed & suggested by Herbert Xu) - rephrased & fixed typo in commit message Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-07-11crypto: aead,cipher - zeroize key buffer after useHailey Mothershead2-4/+2
[ Upstream commit 23e4099bdc3c8381992f9eb975c79196d6755210 ] I.G 9.7.B for FIPS 140-3 specifies that variables temporarily holding cryptographic information should be zeroized once they are no longer needed. Accomplish this by using kfree_sensitive for buffers that previously held the private key. Signed-off-by: Hailey Mothershead <hailmo@amazon.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-07-05crypto: ecdh - explicitly zeroize private_keyJoachim Vandersmissen1-0/+2
[ Upstream commit 73e5984e540a76a2ee1868b91590c922da8c24c9 ] private_key is overwritten with the key parameter passed in by the caller (if present), or alternatively a newly generated private key. However, it is possible that the caller provides a key (or the newly generated key) which is shorter than the previous key. In that scenario, some key material from the previous key would not be overwritten. The easiest solution is to explicitly zeroize the entire private_key array first. Note that this patch slightly changes the behavior of this function: previously, if the ecc_gen_privkey failed, the old private_key would remain. Now, the private_key is always zeroized. This behavior is consistent with the case where params.key is set and ecc_is_key_valid fails. Signed-off-by: Joachim Vandersmissen <git@jvdsn.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-06-16crypto: ecrdsa - Fix module auto-load on add_keyVitaly Chikunov1-0/+1
commit eb5739a1efbc9ff216271aeea0ebe1c92e5383e5 upstream. Add module alias with the algorithm cra_name similar to what we have for RSA-related and other algorithms. The kernel attempts to modprobe asymmetric algorithms using the names "crypto-$cra_name" and "crypto-$cra_name-all." However, since these aliases are currently missing, the modules are not loaded. For instance, when using the `add_key` function, the hash algorithm is typically loaded automatically, but the asymmetric algorithm is not. Steps to test: 1. Cert is generated usings ima-evm-utils test suite with `gen-keys.sh`, example cert is provided below: $ base64 -d >test-gost2012_512-A.cer <<EOF MIIB/DCCAWagAwIBAgIUK8+whWevr3FFkSdU9GLDAM7ure8wDAYIKoUDBwEBAwMFADARMQ8wDQYD VQQDDAZDQSBLZXkwIBcNMjIwMjAxMjIwOTQxWhgPMjA4MjEyMDUyMjA5NDFaMBExDzANBgNVBAMM BkNBIEtleTCBoDAXBggqhQMHAQEBAjALBgkqhQMHAQIBAgEDgYQABIGALXNrTJGgeErBUOov3Cfo IrHF9fcj8UjzwGeKCkbCcINzVUbdPmCopeJRHDJEvQBX1CQUPtlwDv6ANjTTRoq5nCk9L5PPFP1H z73JIXHT0eRBDVoWy0cWDRz1mmQlCnN2HThMtEloaQI81nTlKZOcEYDtDpi5WODmjEeRNQJMdqCj UDBOMAwGA1UdEwQFMAMBAf8wHQYDVR0OBBYEFCwfOITMbE9VisW1i2TYeu1tAo5QMB8GA1UdIwQY MBaAFCwfOITMbE9VisW1i2TYeu1tAo5QMAwGCCqFAwcBAQMDBQADgYEAmBfJCMTdC0/NSjz4BBiQ qDIEjomO7FEHYlkX5NGulcF8FaJW2jeyyXXtbpnub1IQ8af1KFIpwoS2e93LaaofxpWlpQLlju6m KYLOcO4xK3Whwa2hBAz9YbpUSFjvxnkS2/jpH2MsOSXuUEeCruG/RkHHB3ACef9umG6HCNQuAPY= EOF 2. Optionally, trace module requests with: trace-cmd stream -e module & 3. Trigger add_key call for the cert: # keyctl padd asymmetric "" @u <test-gost2012_512-A.cer 939910969 # lsmod | head -3 Module Size Used by ecrdsa_generic 16384 0 streebog_generic 28672 0 Repored-by: Paul Wolneykien <manowar@altlinux.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org> Tested-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2024-06-16crypto: ecdsa - Fix module auto-load on add-keyStefan Berger1-0/+3
commit 48e4fd6d54f54d0ceab5a952d73e47a9454a6ccb upstream. Add module alias with the algorithm cra_name similar to what we have for RSA-related and other algorithms. The kernel attempts to modprobe asymmetric algorithms using the names "crypto-$cra_name" and "crypto-$cra_name-all." However, since these aliases are currently missing, the modules are not loaded. For instance, when using the `add_key` function, the hash algorithm is typically loaded automatically, but the asymmetric algorithm is not. Steps to test: 1. Create certificate openssl req -x509 -sha256 -newkey ec \ -pkeyopt "ec_paramgen_curve:secp384r1" -keyout key.pem -days 365 \ -subj '/CN=test' -nodes -outform der -out nist-p384.der 2. Optionally, trace module requests with: trace-cmd stream -e module & 3. Trigger add_key call for the cert: # keyctl padd asymmetric "" @u < nist-p384.der 641069229 # lsmod | head -2 Module Size Used by ecdsa_generic 16384 0 Fixes: c12d448ba939 ("crypto: ecdsa - Register NIST P384 and extend test suite") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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