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10 dayscrypto: af_alg - zero initialize memory allocated via sock_kmallocShivani Agarwal3-7/+4
[ Upstream commit 6f6e309328d53a10c0fe1f77dec2db73373179b6 ] Several crypto user API contexts and requests allocated with sock_kmalloc() were left uninitialized, relying on callers to set fields explicitly. This resulted in the use of uninitialized data in certain error paths or when new fields are added in the future. The ACVP patches also contain two user-space interface files: algif_kpp.c and algif_akcipher.c. These too rely on proper initialization of their context structures. A particular issue has been observed with the newly added 'inflight' variable introduced in af_alg_ctx by commit: 67b164a871af ("crypto: af_alg - Disallow multiple in-flight AIO requests") Because the context is not memset to zero after allocation, the inflight variable has contained garbage values. As a result, af_alg_alloc_areq() has incorrectly returned -EBUSY randomly when the garbage value was interpreted as true: https://github.com/gregkh/linux/blame/master/crypto/af_alg.c#L1209 The check directly tests ctx->inflight without explicitly comparing against true/false. Since inflight is only ever set to true or false later, an uninitialized value has triggered -EBUSY failures. Zero-initializing memory allocated with sock_kmalloc() ensures inflight and other fields start in a known state, removing random issues caused by uninitialized data. Fixes: fe869cdb89c9 ("crypto: algif_hash - User-space interface for hash operations") Fixes: 5afdfd22e6ba ("crypto: algif_rng - add random number generator support") Fixes: 2d97591ef43d ("crypto: af_alg - consolidation of duplicate code") Fixes: 67b164a871af ("crypto: af_alg - Disallow multiple in-flight AIO requests") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Shivani Agarwal <shivani.agarwal@broadcom.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> [ Adjust context ] Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
10 dayscrypto: seqiv - Do not use req->iv after crypto_aead_encryptHerbert Xu1-3/+5
[ Upstream commit 50fdb78b7c0bcc550910ef69c0984e751cac72fa ] As soon as crypto_aead_encrypt is called, the underlying request may be freed by an asynchronous completion. Thus dereferencing req->iv after it returns is invalid. Instead of checking req->iv against info, create a new variable unaligned_info and use it for that purpose instead. Fixes: 0a270321dbf9 ("[CRYPTO] seqiv: Add Sequence Number IV Generator") Reported-by: Xiumei Mu <xmu@redhat.com> Reported-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
10 dayscrypto: asymmetric_keys - prevent overflow in asymmetric_key_generate_idThorsten Blum1-4/+10
[ Upstream commit df0845cf447ae1556c3440b8b155de0926cbaa56 ] Use check_add_overflow() to guard against potential integer overflows when adding the binary blob lengths and the size of an asymmetric_key_id structure and return ERR_PTR(-EOVERFLOW) accordingly. This prevents a possible buffer overflow when copying data from potentially malicious X.509 certificate fields that can be arbitrarily large, such as ASN.1 INTEGER serial numbers, issuer names, etc. Fixes: 7901c1a8effb ("KEYS: Implement binary asymmetric key ID handling") Signed-off-by: Thorsten Blum <thorsten.blum@linux.dev> Reviewed-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-10-19crypto: essiv - Check ssize for decryption and in-place encryptionHerbert Xu1-8/+6
[ Upstream commit 6bb73db6948c2de23e407fe1b7ef94bf02b7529f ] Move the ssize check to the start in essiv_aead_crypt so that it's also checked for decryption and in-place encryption. Reported-by: Muhammad Alifa Ramdhan <ramdhan@starlabs.sg> Fixes: be1eb7f78aa8 ("crypto: essiv - create wrapper template for ESSIV generation") Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-10-15crypto: rng - Ensure set_ent is always presentHerbert Xu1-0/+8
commit c0d36727bf39bb16ef0a67ed608e279535ebf0da upstream. Ensure that set_ent is always set since only drbg provides it. Fixes: 77ebdabe8de7 ("crypto: af_alg - add extra parameters for DRBG interface") Reported-by: Yiqi Sun <sunyiqixm@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2025-09-25crypto: af_alg - Disallow concurrent writes in af_alg_sendmsgHerbert Xu1-0/+7
[ Upstream commit 1b34cbbf4f011a121ef7b2d7d6e6920a036d5285 ] Issuing two writes to the same af_alg socket is bogus as the data will be interleaved in an unpredictable fashion. Furthermore, concurrent writes may create inconsistencies in the internal socket state. Disallow this by adding a new ctx->write field that indiciates exclusive ownership for writing. Fixes: 8ff590903d5 ("crypto: algif_skcipher - User-space interface for skcipher operations") Reported-by: Muhammad Alifa Ramdhan <ramdhan@starlabs.sg> Reported-by: Bing-Jhong Billy Jheng <billy@starlabs.sg> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2025-09-25crypto: af_alg: Convert af_alg_sendpage() to use MSG_SPLICE_PAGESDavid Howells1-44/+8
[ Upstream commit fb800fa4c1f5aee1238267252e88a7837e645c02 ] Convert af_alg_sendpage() to use sendmsg() with MSG_SPLICE_PAGES rather than directly splicing in the pages itself. This allows ->sendpage() to be replaced by something that can handle multiple multipage folios in a single transaction. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> cc: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2025-09-25crypto: af_alg - Set merge to zero early in af_alg_sendmsgHerbert Xu1-0/+2
[ Upstream commit 9574b2330dbd2b5459b74d3b5e9619d39299fc6f ] If an error causes af_alg_sendmsg to abort, ctx->merge may contain a garbage value from the previous loop. This may then trigger a crash on the next entry into af_alg_sendmsg when it attempts to do a merge that can't be done. Fix this by setting ctx->merge to zero near the start of the loop. Fixes: 8ff590903d5 ("crypto: algif_skcipher - User-space interface for skcipher operations") Reported-by: Muhammad Alifa Ramdhan <ramdhan@starlabs.sg> Reported-by: Bing-Jhong Billy Jheng <billy@starlabs.sg> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-09-25crypto: af_alg: Indent the loop in af_alg_sendmsg()David Howells1-24/+27
[ Upstream commit 73d7409cfdad7fd08a9203eb2912c1c77e527776 ] Put the loop in af_alg_sendmsg() into an if-statement to indent it to make the next patch easier to review as that will add another branch to handle MSG_SPLICE_PAGES to the if-statement. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> cc: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Stable-dep-of: 9574b2330dbd ("crypto: af_alg - Set merge to zero early in af_alg_sendmsg") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-06-27crypto: xts - Only add ecb if it is not already thereHerbert Xu1-2/+2
[ Upstream commit 270b6f13454cb7f2f7058c50df64df409c5dcf55 ] Only add ecb to the cipher name if it isn't already ecb. Also use memcmp instead of strncmp since these strings are all stored in an array of length CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME. Fixes: f1c131b45410 ("crypto: xts - Convert to skcipher") Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-06-27crypto: lrw - Only add ecb if it is not already thereHerbert Xu1-2/+2
[ Upstream commit 3d73909bddc2ebb3224a8bc2e5ce00e9df70c15d ] Only add ecb to the cipher name if it isn't already ecb. Also use memcmp instead of strncmp since these strings are all stored in an array of length CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME. Fixes: 700cb3f5fe75 ("crypto: lrw - Convert to skcipher") Reported-by: kernel test robot <oliver.sang@intel.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-lkp/202505151503.d8a6cf10-lkp@intel.com Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-06-04crypto: algif_hash - fix double free in hash_acceptIvan Pravdin1-4/+0
commit b2df03ed4052e97126267e8c13ad4204ea6ba9b6 upstream. If accept(2) is called on socket type algif_hash with MSG_MORE flag set and crypto_ahash_import fails, sk2 is freed. However, it is also freed in af_alg_release, leading to slab-use-after-free error. Fixes: fe869cdb89c9 ("crypto: algif_hash - User-space interface for hash operations") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ivan Pravdin <ipravdin.official@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2025-06-04crypto: lzo - Fix compression buffer overrunHerbert Xu2-2/+2
[ Upstream commit cc47f07234f72cbd8e2c973cdbf2a6730660a463 ] Unlike the decompression code, the compression code in LZO never checked for output overruns. It instead assumes that the caller always provides enough buffer space, disregarding the buffer length provided by the caller. Add a safe compression interface that checks for the end of buffer before each write. Use the safe interface in crypto/lzo. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-05-02crypto: null - Use spin lock instead of mutexHerbert Xu1-13/+26
[ Upstream commit dcc47a028c24e793ce6d6efebfef1a1e92f80297 ] As the null algorithm may be freed in softirq context through af_alg, use spin locks instead of mutexes to protect the default null algorithm. Reported-by: syzbot+b3e02953598f447d4d2a@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-12-14crypto: api - Add crypto_clone_tfmHerbert Xu2-9/+52
[ Upstream commit 3c3a24cb0ae46c9c45e4ce2272f84f0504831f59 ] This patch adds the helper crypto_clone_tfm. The purpose is to allocate a tfm object with GFP_ATOMIC. As we cannot sleep, the object has to be cloned from an existing tfm object. This allows code paths that cannot otherwise allocate a crypto_tfm object to do so. Once a new tfm has been obtained its key could then be changed without impacting other users. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@corigine.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Stable-dep-of: 1465036b10be ("llc: Improve setsockopt() handling of malformed user input") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-12-14crypto: api - Add crypto_tfm_getHerbert Xu2-0/+10
[ Upstream commit ae131f4970f0778f35ed06aeb15bde2fbc1d9619 ] Add a crypto_tfm_get interface to allow tfm objects to be shared. They can still be freed in the usual way. This should only be done with tfm objects with no keys. You must also not modify the tfm flags in any way once it becomes shared. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@corigine.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Stable-dep-of: 1465036b10be ("llc: Improve setsockopt() handling of malformed user input") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-12-14crypto: pcrypt - Call crypto layer directly when padata_do_parallel() return ↵Yi Yang1-4/+8
-EBUSY [ Upstream commit 662f2f13e66d3883b9238b0b96b17886179e60e2 ] Since commit 8f4f68e788c3 ("crypto: pcrypt - Fix hungtask for PADATA_RESET"), the pcrypt encryption and decryption operations return -EAGAIN when the CPU goes online or offline. In alg_test(), a WARN is generated when pcrypt_aead_decrypt() or pcrypt_aead_encrypt() returns -EAGAIN, the unnecessary panic will occur when panic_on_warn set 1. Fix this issue by calling crypto layer directly without parallelization in that case. Fixes: 8f4f68e788c3 ("crypto: pcrypt - Fix hungtask for PADATA_RESET") Signed-off-by: Yi Yang <yiyang13@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-11-17crypto: api - Fix liveliness check in crypto_alg_testedHerbert Xu1-1/+1
[ Upstream commit b81e286ba154a4e0f01a94d99179a97f4ba3e396 ] As algorithm testing is carried out without holding the main crypto lock, it is always possible for the algorithm to go away during the test. So before crypto_alg_tested updates the status of the tested alg, it checks whether it's still on the list of all algorithms. This is inaccurate because it may be off the main list but still on the list of algorithms to be removed. Updating the algorithm status is safe per se as the larval still holds a reference to it. However, killing spawns of other algorithms that are of lower priority is clearly a deficiency as it adds unnecessary churn. Fix the test by checking whether the algorithm is dead. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-10-17crypto: simd - Do not call crypto_alloc_tfm during registrationHerbert Xu1-61/+15
[ Upstream commit 3c44d31cb34ce4eb8311a2e73634d57702948230 ] Algorithm registration is usually carried out during module init, where as little work as possible should be carried out. The SIMD code violated this rule by allocating a tfm, this then triggers a full test of the algorithm which may dead-lock in certain cases. SIMD is only allocating the tfm to get at the alg object, which is in fact already available as it is what we are registering. Use that directly and remove the crypto_alloc_tfm call. Also remove some obsolete and unused SIMD API. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-10-17KEYS: prevent NULL pointer dereference in find_asymmetric_key()Roman Smirnov1-3/+4
commit 70fd1966c93bf3bfe3fe6d753eb3d83a76597eef upstream. In find_asymmetric_key(), if all NULLs are passed in the id_{0,1,2} arguments, the kernel will first emit WARN but then have an oops because id_2 gets dereferenced anyway. Add the missing id_2 check and move WARN_ON() to the final else branch to avoid duplicate NULL checks. Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Svace static analysis tool. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.17+ Fixes: 7d30198ee24f ("keys: X.509 public key issuer lookup without AKID") Suggested-by: Sergey Shtylyov <s.shtylyov@omp.ru> Signed-off-by: Roman Smirnov <r.smirnov@omp.ru> Reviewed-by: Sergey Shtylyov <s.shtylyov@omp.ru> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2024-10-17crypto: xor - fix template benchmarkingHelge Deller1-17/+14
[ Upstream commit ab9a244c396aae4aaa34b2399b82fc15ec2df8c1 ] Commit c055e3eae0f1 ("crypto: xor - use ktime for template benchmarking") switched from using jiffies to ktime-based performance benchmarking. This works nicely on machines which have a fine-grained ktime() clocksource as e.g. x86 machines with TSC. But other machines, e.g. my 4-way HP PARISC server, don't have such fine-grained clocksources, which is why it seems that 800 xor loops take zero seconds, which then shows up in the logs as: xor: measuring software checksum speed 8regs : -1018167296 MB/sec 8regs_prefetch : -1018167296 MB/sec 32regs : -1018167296 MB/sec 32regs_prefetch : -1018167296 MB/sec Fix this with some small modifications to the existing code to improve the algorithm to always produce correct results without introducing major delays for architectures with a fine-grained ktime() clocksource: a) Delay start of the timing until ktime() just advanced. On machines with a fast ktime() this should be just one additional ktime() call. b) Count the number of loops. Run at minimum 800 loops and finish earliest when the ktime() counter has progressed. With that the throughput can now be calculated more accurately under all conditions. Fixes: c055e3eae0f1 ("crypto: xor - use ktime for template benchmarking") Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> Tested-by: John David Anglin <dave.anglin@bell.net> v2: - clean up coding style (noticed & suggested by Herbert Xu) - rephrased & fixed typo in commit message Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-07-11crypto: aead,cipher - zeroize key buffer after useHailey Mothershead2-4/+2
[ Upstream commit 23e4099bdc3c8381992f9eb975c79196d6755210 ] I.G 9.7.B for FIPS 140-3 specifies that variables temporarily holding cryptographic information should be zeroized once they are no longer needed. Accomplish this by using kfree_sensitive for buffers that previously held the private key. Signed-off-by: Hailey Mothershead <hailmo@amazon.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-07-05crypto: ecdh - explicitly zeroize private_keyJoachim Vandersmissen1-0/+2
[ Upstream commit 73e5984e540a76a2ee1868b91590c922da8c24c9 ] private_key is overwritten with the key parameter passed in by the caller (if present), or alternatively a newly generated private key. However, it is possible that the caller provides a key (or the newly generated key) which is shorter than the previous key. In that scenario, some key material from the previous key would not be overwritten. The easiest solution is to explicitly zeroize the entire private_key array first. Note that this patch slightly changes the behavior of this function: previously, if the ecc_gen_privkey failed, the old private_key would remain. Now, the private_key is always zeroized. This behavior is consistent with the case where params.key is set and ecc_is_key_valid fails. Signed-off-by: Joachim Vandersmissen <git@jvdsn.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-06-16crypto: ecrdsa - Fix module auto-load on add_keyVitaly Chikunov1-0/+1
commit eb5739a1efbc9ff216271aeea0ebe1c92e5383e5 upstream. Add module alias with the algorithm cra_name similar to what we have for RSA-related and other algorithms. The kernel attempts to modprobe asymmetric algorithms using the names "crypto-$cra_name" and "crypto-$cra_name-all." However, since these aliases are currently missing, the modules are not loaded. For instance, when using the `add_key` function, the hash algorithm is typically loaded automatically, but the asymmetric algorithm is not. Steps to test: 1. Cert is generated usings ima-evm-utils test suite with `gen-keys.sh`, example cert is provided below: $ base64 -d >test-gost2012_512-A.cer <<EOF MIIB/DCCAWagAwIBAgIUK8+whWevr3FFkSdU9GLDAM7ure8wDAYIKoUDBwEBAwMFADARMQ8wDQYD VQQDDAZDQSBLZXkwIBcNMjIwMjAxMjIwOTQxWhgPMjA4MjEyMDUyMjA5NDFaMBExDzANBgNVBAMM BkNBIEtleTCBoDAXBggqhQMHAQEBAjALBgkqhQMHAQIBAgEDgYQABIGALXNrTJGgeErBUOov3Cfo IrHF9fcj8UjzwGeKCkbCcINzVUbdPmCopeJRHDJEvQBX1CQUPtlwDv6ANjTTRoq5nCk9L5PPFP1H z73JIXHT0eRBDVoWy0cWDRz1mmQlCnN2HThMtEloaQI81nTlKZOcEYDtDpi5WODmjEeRNQJMdqCj UDBOMAwGA1UdEwQFMAMBAf8wHQYDVR0OBBYEFCwfOITMbE9VisW1i2TYeu1tAo5QMB8GA1UdIwQY MBaAFCwfOITMbE9VisW1i2TYeu1tAo5QMAwGCCqFAwcBAQMDBQADgYEAmBfJCMTdC0/NSjz4BBiQ qDIEjomO7FEHYlkX5NGulcF8FaJW2jeyyXXtbpnub1IQ8af1KFIpwoS2e93LaaofxpWlpQLlju6m KYLOcO4xK3Whwa2hBAz9YbpUSFjvxnkS2/jpH2MsOSXuUEeCruG/RkHHB3ACef9umG6HCNQuAPY= EOF 2. Optionally, trace module requests with: trace-cmd stream -e module & 3. Trigger add_key call for the cert: # keyctl padd asymmetric "" @u <test-gost2012_512-A.cer 939910969 # lsmod | head -3 Module Size Used by ecrdsa_generic 16384 0 streebog_generic 28672 0 Repored-by: Paul Wolneykien <manowar@altlinux.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org> Tested-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2024-06-16crypto: ecdsa - Fix module auto-load on add-keyStefan Berger1-0/+3
commit 48e4fd6d54f54d0ceab5a952d73e47a9454a6ccb upstream. Add module alias with the algorithm cra_name similar to what we have for RSA-related and other algorithms. The kernel attempts to modprobe asymmetric algorithms using the names "crypto-$cra_name" and "crypto-$cra_name-all." However, since these aliases are currently missing, the modules are not loaded. For instance, when using the `add_key` function, the hash algorithm is typically loaded automatically, but the asymmetric algorithm is not. Steps to test: 1. Create certificate openssl req -x509 -sha256 -newkey ec \ -pkeyopt "ec_paramgen_curve:secp384r1" -keyout key.pem -days 365 \ -subj '/CN=test' -nodes -outform der -out nist-p384.der 2. Optionally, trace module requests with: trace-cmd stream -e module & 3. Trigger add_key call for the cert: # keyctl padd asymmetric "" @u < nist-p384.der 641069229 # lsmod | head -2 Module Size Used by ecdsa_generic 16384 0 Fixes: c12d448ba939 ("crypto: ecdsa - Register NIST P384 and extend test suite") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2024-06-12KEYS: asymmetric: Add missing dependencies of FIPS_SIGNATURE_SELFTESTEric Biggers1-0/+2
commit 9d2fd8bdc12f403a5c35c971936a0e1d5cb5108e upstream. Since the signature self-test uses RSA and SHA-256, it must only be enabled when those algorithms are enabled. Otherwise it fails and panics the kernel on boot-up. Reported-by: kernel test robot <oliver.sang@intel.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-lkp/202404221528.51d75177-lkp@intel.com Fixes: 3cde3174eb91 ("certs: Add FIPS selftests") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2024-05-02Revert "crypto: api - Disallow identical driver names"Greg Kroah-Hartman1-1/+0
This reverts commit 680eb0a99336f7b21ff149bc57579d059421c5de which is commit 27016f75f5ed47e2d8e0ca75a8ff1f40bc1a5e27 upstream. It is reported to cause problems in older kernels due to some crypto drivers having the same name, so revert it here to fix the problems. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/aceda6e2-cefb-4146-aef8-ff4bafa56e56@roeck-us.net Reported-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> Cc: Ovidiu Panait <ovidiu.panait@windriver.com> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2024-03-27crypto: jitter - fix CRYPTO_JITTERENTROPY help textRandy Dunlap1-2/+3
[ Upstream commit e63df1ec9a16dd9e13e9068243e64876de06f795 ] Correct various small problems in the help text: a. change 2 spaces to ", " b. finish an incomplete sentence c. change non-working URL to working URL Fixes: a9a98d49da52 ("crypto: Kconfig - simplify compression/RNG entries") Closes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=218458 Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Cc: Bagas Sanjaya <bagasdotme@gmail.com> Cc: Robert Elliott <elliott@hpe.com> Cc: Christoph Biedl <bugzilla.kernel.bpeb@manchmal.in-ulm.de> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Acked-by: Bagas Sanjaya <bagasdotme@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-02-01crypto: api - Disallow identical driver namesHerbert Xu1-0/+1
commit 27016f75f5ed47e2d8e0ca75a8ff1f40bc1a5e27 upstream. Disallow registration of two algorithms with identical driver names. Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Reported-by: Ovidiu Panait <ovidiu.panait@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2024-01-26crypto: scomp - fix req->dst buffer overflowChengming Zhou1-0/+6
[ Upstream commit 744e1885922a9943458954cfea917b31064b4131 ] The req->dst buffer size should be checked before copying from the scomp_scratch->dst to avoid req->dst buffer overflow problem. Fixes: 1ab53a77b772 ("crypto: acomp - add driver-side scomp interface") Reported-by: syzbot+3eff5e51bf1db122a16e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/0000000000000b05cd060d6b5511@google.com/ Signed-off-by: Chengming Zhou <zhouchengming@bytedance.com> Reviewed-by: Barry Song <v-songbaohua@oppo.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-01-26crypto: af_alg - Disallow multiple in-flight AIO requestsHerbert Xu1-1/+13
[ Upstream commit 67b164a871af1d736f131fd6fe78a610909f06f3 ] Having multiple in-flight AIO requests results in unpredictable output because they all share the same IV. Fix this by only allowing one request at a time. Fixes: 83094e5e9e49 ("crypto: af_alg - add async support to algif_aead") Fixes: a596999b7ddf ("crypto: algif - change algif_skcipher to be asynchronous") Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-11-28crypto: pcrypt - Fix hungtask for PADATA_RESETLu Jialin1-0/+4
[ Upstream commit 8f4f68e788c3a7a696546291258bfa5fdb215523 ] We found a hungtask bug in test_aead_vec_cfg as follows: INFO: task cryptomgr_test:391009 blocked for more than 120 seconds. "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. Call trace: __switch_to+0x98/0xe0 __schedule+0x6c4/0xf40 schedule+0xd8/0x1b4 schedule_timeout+0x474/0x560 wait_for_common+0x368/0x4e0 wait_for_completion+0x20/0x30 wait_for_completion+0x20/0x30 test_aead_vec_cfg+0xab4/0xd50 test_aead+0x144/0x1f0 alg_test_aead+0xd8/0x1e0 alg_test+0x634/0x890 cryptomgr_test+0x40/0x70 kthread+0x1e0/0x220 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18 Kernel panic - not syncing: hung_task: blocked tasks For padata_do_parallel, when the return err is 0 or -EBUSY, it will call wait_for_completion(&wait->completion) in test_aead_vec_cfg. In normal case, aead_request_complete() will be called in pcrypt_aead_serial and the return err is 0 for padata_do_parallel. But, when pinst->flags is PADATA_RESET, the return err is -EBUSY for padata_do_parallel, and it won't call aead_request_complete(). Therefore, test_aead_vec_cfg will hung at wait_for_completion(&wait->completion), which will cause hungtask. The problem comes as following: (padata_do_parallel) | rcu_read_lock_bh(); | err = -EINVAL; | (padata_replace) | pinst->flags |= PADATA_RESET; err = -EBUSY | if (pinst->flags & PADATA_RESET) | rcu_read_unlock_bh() | return err In order to resolve the problem, we replace the return err -EBUSY with -EAGAIN, which means parallel_data is changing, and the caller should call it again. v3: remove retry and just change the return err. v2: introduce padata_try_do_parallel() in pcrypt_aead_encrypt and pcrypt_aead_decrypt to solve the hungtask. Signed-off-by: Lu Jialin <lujialin4@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Guo Zihua <guozihua@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-09-23crypto: lrw,xts - Replace strlcpy with strscpyAzeem Shaikh2-6/+6
[ Upstream commit babb80b3ecc6f40c962e13c654ebcd27f25ee327 ] strlcpy() reads the entire source buffer first. This read may exceed the destination size limit. This is both inefficient and can lead to linear read overflows if a source string is not NUL-terminated [1]. In an effort to remove strlcpy() completely [2], replace strlcpy() here with strscpy(). Direct replacement is safe here since return value of -errno is used to check for truncation instead of sizeof(dest). [1] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/deprecated.html#strlcpy [2] https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/89 Signed-off-by: Azeem Shaikh <azeemshaikh38@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-09-13X.509: if signature is unsupported skip validationThore Sommer1-0/+5
commit ef5b52a631f8c18353e80ccab8408b963305510c upstream. When the hash algorithm for the signature is not available the digest size is 0 and the signature in the certificate is marked as unsupported. When validating a self-signed certificate, this needs to be checked, because otherwise trying to validate the signature will fail with an warning: Loading compiled-in X.509 certificates WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1 at crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c:537 \ pkcs1pad_verify+0x46/0x12c ... Problem loading in-kernel X.509 certificate (-22) Signed-off-by: Thore Sommer <public@thson.de> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.7+ Fixes: 6c2dc5ae4ab7 ("X.509: Extract signature digest and make self-signed cert checks earlier") Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2023-09-13crypto: api - Use work queue in crypto_destroy_instanceHerbert Xu1-2/+14
[ Upstream commit 9ae4577bc077a7e32c3c7d442c95bc76865c0f17 ] The function crypto_drop_spawn expects to be called in process context. However, when an instance is unregistered while it still has active users, the last user may cause the instance to be freed in atomic context. Fix this by delaying the freeing to a work queue. Fixes: 6bfd48096ff8 ("[CRYPTO] api: Added spawns") Reported-by: Florent Revest <revest@chromium.org> Reported-by: syzbot+d769eed29cc42d75e2a3@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+610ec0671f51e838436e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Tested-by: Florent Revest <revest@chromium.org> Acked-by: Florent Revest <revest@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-09-13crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad - Use helper to set reqsizeHerbert Xu1-1/+4
commit 5b11d1a360ea23c80c6d4ec3f5986a788d0a0995 upstream. The value of reqsize must only be changed through the helper. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: Giovanni Cabiddu <giovanni.cabiddu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2023-07-19crypto: jitter - correct health test during initializationStephan Müller1-6/+3
[ Upstream commit d23659769ad1bf2cbafaa0efcbae20ef1a74f77e ] With the update of the permanent and intermittent health errors, the actual indicator for the health test indicates a potential error only for the one offending time stamp gathered in the current iteration round. The next iteration round will "overwrite" the health test result. Thus, the entropy collection loop in jent_gen_entropy checks for the health test failure upon each loop iteration. However, the initialization operation checked for the APT health test once for an APT window which implies it would not catch most errors. Thus, the check for all health errors is now invoked unconditionally during each loop iteration for the startup test. With the change, the error JENT_ERCT becomes unused as all health errors are only reported with the JENT_HEALTH return code. This allows the removal of the error indicator. Fixes: 3fde2fe99aa6 ("crypto: jitter - permanent and intermittent health errors" ) Reported-by: Joachim Vandersmissen <git@jvdsn.com> Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-06-09KEYS: asymmetric: Copy sig and digest in public_key_verify_signature()Roberto Sassu1-17/+21
commit c3d03e8e35e005e1a614e51bb59053eeb5857f76 upstream. Commit ac4e97abce9b8 ("scatterlist: sg_set_buf() argument must be in linear mapping") checks that both the signature and the digest reside in the linear mapping area. However, more recently commit ba14a194a434c ("fork: Add generic vmalloced stack support") made it possible to move the stack in the vmalloc area, which is not contiguous, and thus not suitable for sg_set_buf() which needs adjacent pages. Always make a copy of the signature and digest in the same buffer used to store the key and its parameters, and pass them to sg_init_one(). Prefer it to conditionally doing the copy if necessary, to keep the code simple. The buffer allocated with kmalloc() is in the linear mapping area. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.9.x Fixes: ba14a194a434 ("fork: Add generic vmalloced stack support") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/Y4pIpxbjBdajymBJ@sol.localdomain/ Suggested-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Tested-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2023-05-24crypto: testmgr - fix RNG performance in fuzz testsEric Biggers1-97/+169
commit f900fde28883602b6c5e1027a6c912b673382aaf upstream. The performance of the crypto fuzz tests has greatly regressed since v5.18. When booting a kernel on an arm64 dev board with all software crypto algorithms and CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS enabled, the fuzz tests now take about 200 seconds to run, or about 325 seconds with lockdep enabled, compared to about 5 seconds before. The root cause is that the random number generation has become much slower due to commit d4150779e60f ("random32: use real rng for non-deterministic randomness"). On my same arm64 dev board, at the time the fuzz tests are run, get_random_u8() is about 345x slower than prandom_u32_state(), or about 469x if lockdep is enabled. Lockdep makes a big difference, but much of the rest comes from the get_random_*() functions taking a *very* slow path when the CRNG is not yet initialized. Since the crypto self-tests run early during boot, even having a hardware RNG driver enabled (CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_QCOM_RNG in my case) doesn't prevent this. x86 systems don't have this issue, but they still see a significant regression if lockdep is enabled. Converting the "Fully random bytes" case in generate_random_bytes() to use get_random_bytes() helps significantly, improving the test time to about 27 seconds. But that's still over 5x slower than before. This is all a bit silly, though, since the fuzz tests don't actually need cryptographically secure random numbers. So let's just make them use a non-cryptographically-secure RNG as they did before. The original prandom_u32() is gone now, so let's use prandom_u32_state() instead, with an explicitly managed state, like various other self-tests in the kernel source tree (rbtree_test.c, test_scanf.c, etc.) already do. This also has the benefit that no locking is required anymore, so performance should be even better than the original version that used prandom_u32(). Fixes: d4150779e60f ("random32: use real rng for non-deterministic randomness") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-05-24crypto: jitter - permanent and intermittent health errorsStephan Müller3-120/+76
[ Upstream commit 3fde2fe99aa6dacd4151c87382b07ce7f30f0a52 ] According to SP800-90B, two health failures are allowed: the intermittend and the permanent failure. So far, only the intermittent failure was implemented. The permanent failure was achieved by resetting the entire entropy source including its health test state and waiting for two or more back-to-back health errors. This approach is appropriate for RCT, but not for APT as APT has a non-linear cutoff value. Thus, this patch implements 2 cutoff values for both RCT/APT. This implies that the health state is left untouched when an intermittent failure occurs. The noise source is reset and a new APT powerup-self test is performed. Yet, whith the unchanged health test state, the counting of failures continues until a permanent failure is reached. Any non-failing raw entropy value causes the health tests to reset. The intermittent error has an unchanged significance level of 2^-30. The permanent error has a significance level of 2^-60. Considering that this level also indicates a false-positive rate (see SP800-90B section 4.2) a false-positive must only be incurred with a low probability when considering a fleet of Linux kernels as a whole. Hitting the permanent error may cause a panic(), the following calculation applies: Assuming that a fleet of 10^9 Linux kernels run concurrently with this patch in FIPS mode and on each kernel 2 health tests are performed every minute for one year, the chances of a false positive is about 1:1000 based on the binomial distribution. In addition, any power-up health test errors triggered with jent_entropy_init are treated as permanent errors. A permanent failure causes the entire entropy source to permanently return an error. This implies that a caller can only remedy the situation by re-allocating a new instance of the Jitter RNG. In a subsequent patch, a transparent re-allocation will be provided which also changes the implied heuristic entropy assessment. In addition, when the kernel is booted with fips=1, the Jitter RNG is defined to be part of a FIPS module. The permanent error of the Jitter RNG is translated as a FIPS module error. In this case, the entire FIPS module must cease operation. This is implemented in the kernel by invoking panic(). The patch also fixes an off-by-one in the RCT cutoff value which is now set to 30 instead of 31. This is because the counting of the values starts with 0. Reviewed-by: Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> Reviewed-by: Marcelo Henrique Cerri <marcelo.cerri@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-05-17crypto: engine - fix crypto_queue backlog handlingOlivier Bacon2-3/+6
[ Upstream commit 4140aafcff167b5b9e8dae6a1709a6de7cac6f74 ] CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG tells the crypto driver that it should internally backlog requests until the crypto hw's queue becomes full. At that point, crypto_engine backlogs the request and returns -EBUSY. Calling driver such as dm-crypt then waits until the complete() function is called with a status of -EINPROGRESS before sending a new request. The problem lies in the call to complete() with a value of -EINPROGRESS that is made when a backlog item is present on the queue. The call is done before the successful execution of the crypto request. In the case that do_one_request() returns < 0 and the retry support is available, the request is put back in the queue. This leads upper drivers to send a new request even if the queue is still full. The problem can be reproduced by doing a large dd into a crypto dm-crypt device. This is pretty easy to see when using Freescale CAAM crypto driver and SWIOTLB dma. Since the actual amount of requests that can be hold in the queue is unlimited we get IOs error and dma allocation. The fix is to call complete with a value of -EINPROGRESS only if the request is not enqueued back in crypto_queue. This is done by calling complete() later in the code. In order to delay the decision, crypto_queue is modified to correctly set the backlog pointer when a request is enqueued back. Fixes: 6a89f492f8e5 ("crypto: engine - support for parallel requests based on retry mechanism") Co-developed-by: Sylvain Ouellet <souellet@genetec.com> Signed-off-by: Sylvain Ouellet <souellet@genetec.com> Signed-off-by: Olivier Bacon <obacon@genetec.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-05-17crypto: engine - Use crypto_request_completeHerbert Xu1-3/+3
[ Upstream commit 6909823d47c17cba84e9244d04050b5db8d53789 ] Use the crypto_request_complete helper instead of calling the completion function directly. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Stable-dep-of: 4140aafcff16 ("crypto: engine - fix crypto_queue backlog handling") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-05-11crypto: drbg - Only fail when jent is unavailable in FIPS modeHerbert Xu1-1/+1
[ Upstream commit 686cd976b6ddedeeb1a1fb09ba53a891d3cc9a03 ] When jent initialisation fails for any reason other than ENOENT, the entire drbg fails to initialise, even when we're not in FIPS mode. This is wrong because we can still use the kernel RNG when we're not in FIPS mode. Change it so that it only fails when we are in FIPS mode. Fixes: 57225e679788 ("crypto: drbg - Use callback API for random readiness") Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Reviewed-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-05-11crypto: api - Demote BUG_ON() in crypto_unregister_alg() to a WARN_ON()Toke Høiland-Jørgensen1-1/+3
commit a543ada7db729514ddd3ba4efa45f4c7b802ad85 upstream. The crypto_unregister_alg() function expects callers to ensure that any algorithm that is unregistered has a refcnt of exactly 1, and issues a BUG_ON() if this is not the case. However, there are in fact drivers that will call crypto_unregister_alg() without ensuring that the refcnt has been lowered first, most notably on system shutdown. This causes the BUG_ON() to trigger, which prevents a clean shutdown and hangs the system. To avoid such hangs on shutdown, demote the BUG_ON() in crypto_unregister_alg() to a WARN_ON() with early return. Cc stable because this problem was observed on a 6.2 kernel, cf the link below. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/87r0tyq8ph.fsf@toke.dk Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2023-04-20asymmetric_keys: log on fatal failures in PE/pkcs7Robbie Harwood2-17/+17
[ Upstream commit 3584c1dbfffdabf8e3dc1dd25748bb38dd01cd43 ] These particular errors can be encountered while trying to kexec when secureboot lockdown is in place. Without this change, even with a signed debug build, one still needs to reboot the machine to add the appropriate dyndbg parameters (since lockdown blocks debugfs). Accordingly, upgrade all pr_debug() before fatal error into pr_warn(). Signed-off-by: Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230220171254.592347-3-rharwood@redhat.com/ # v2 Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-04-20verify_pefile: relax wrapper length checkRobbie Harwood1-4/+8
[ Upstream commit 4fc5c74dde69a7eda172514aaeb5a7df3600adb3 ] The PE Format Specification (section "The Attribute Certificate Table (Image Only)") states that `dwLength` is to be rounded up to 8-byte alignment when used for traversal. Therefore, the field is not required to be an 8-byte multiple in the first place. Accordingly, pesign has not performed this alignment since version 0.110. This causes kexec failure on pesign'd binaries with "PEFILE: Signature wrapper len wrong". Update the comment and relax the check. Signed-off-by: Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org Link: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/debug/pe-format#the-attribute-certificate-table-image-only Link: https://github.com/rhboot/pesign Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230220171254.592347-2-rharwood@redhat.com/ # v2 Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-03-10crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad - Use akcipher_request_completeHerbert Xu1-19/+15
[ Upstream commit 564cabc0ca0bdfa8f0fc1ae74b24d0a7554522c5 ] Use the akcipher_request_complete helper instead of calling the completion function directly. In fact the previous code was buggy in that EINPROGRESS was never passed back to the original caller. Fixes: 3d5b1ecdea6f ("crypto: rsa - RSA padding algorithm") Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-03-10crypto: xts - Handle EBUSY correctlyHerbert Xu1-4/+4
[ Upstream commit 51c082514c2dedf2711c99d93c196cc4eedceb40 ] As it is xts only handles the special return value of EINPROGRESS, which means that in all other cases it will free data related to the request. However, as the caller of xts may specify MAY_BACKLOG, we also need to expect EBUSY and treat it in the same way. Otherwise backlogged requests will trigger a use-after-free. Fixes: 8083b1bf8163 ("crypto: xts - add support for ciphertext stealing") Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-03-10crypto: seqiv - Handle EBUSY correctlyHerbert Xu1-1/+1
[ Upstream commit 32e62025e5e52fbe4812ef044759de7010b15dbc ] As it is seqiv only handles the special return value of EINPROGERSS, which means that in all other cases it will free data related to the request. However, as the caller of seqiv may specify MAY_BACKLOG, we also need to expect EBUSY and treat it in the same way. Otherwise backlogged requests will trigger a use-after-free. Fixes: 0a270321dbf9 ("[CRYPTO] seqiv: Add Sequence Number IV Generator") Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-03-10crypto: essiv - Handle EBUSY correctlyHerbert Xu1-1/+6
[ Upstream commit b5a772adf45a32c68bef28e60621f12617161556 ] As it is essiv only handles the special return value of EINPROGERSS, which means that in all other cases it will free data related to the request. However, as the caller of essiv may specify MAY_BACKLOG, we also need to expect EBUSY and treat it in the same way. Otherwise backlogged requests will trigger a use-after-free. Fixes: be1eb7f78aa8 ("crypto: essiv - create wrapper template...") Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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