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2020-06-20ARM: tegra: Correct PL310 Auxiliary Control Register initializationDmitry Osipenko1-2/+2
commit 35509737c8f958944e059d501255a0bf18361ba0 upstream. The PL310 Auxiliary Control Register shouldn't have the "Full line of zero" optimization bit being set before L2 cache is enabled. The L2X0 driver takes care of enabling the optimization by itself. This patch fixes a noisy error message on Tegra20 and Tegra30 telling that cache optimization is erroneously enabled without enabling it for the CPU: L2C-310: enabling full line of zeros but not enabled in Cortex-A9 Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Dmitry Osipenko <digetx@gmail.com> Tested-by: Nicolas Chauvet <kwizart@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Thierry Reding <treding@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-06-20sparc64: fix misuses of access_process_vm() in genregs32_[sg]et()Al Viro1-14/+3
commit 142cd25293f6a7ecbdff4fb0af17de6438d46433 upstream. We do need access_process_vm() to access the target's reg_window. However, access to caller's memory (storing the result in genregs32_get(), fetching the new values in case of genregs32_set()) should be done by normal uaccess primitives. Fixes: ad4f95764040 ([SPARC64]: Fix user accesses in regset code.) Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-06-20sparc32: fix register window handling in genregs32_[gs]et()Al Viro1-130/+98
commit cf51e129b96847f969bfb8af1ee1516a01a70b39 upstream. It needs access_process_vm() if the traced process does not share mm with the caller. Solution is similar to what sparc64 does. Note that genregs32_set() is only ever called with pos being 0 or 32 * sizeof(u32) (the latter - as part of PTRACE_SETREGS handling). Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-06-20MIPS: Fix IRQ tracing when call handle_fpe() and handle_msa_fpe()YuanJunQing1-3/+3
[ Upstream commit 31e1b3efa802f97a17628dde280006c4cee4ce5e ] Register "a1" is unsaved in this function, when CONFIG_TRACE_IRQFLAGS is enabled, the TRACE_IRQS_OFF macro will call trace_hardirqs_off(), and this may change register "a1". The changed register "a1" as argument will be send to do_fpe() and do_msa_fpe(). Signed-off-by: YuanJunQing <yuanjunqing66@163.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2020-06-20m68k: mac: Don't call via_flush_cache() on Mac IIfxFinn Thain3-20/+8
[ Upstream commit bcc44f6b74106b31f0b0408b70305a40360d63b7 ] There is no VIA2 chip on the Mac IIfx, so don't call via_flush_cache(). This avoids a boot crash which appeared in v5.4. printk: console [ttyS0] enabled printk: bootconsole [debug0] disabled printk: bootconsole [debug0] disabled Calibrating delay loop... 9.61 BogoMIPS (lpj=48064) pid_max: default: 32768 minimum: 301 Mount-cache hash table entries: 1024 (order: 0, 4096 bytes, linear) Mountpoint-cache hash table entries: 1024 (order: 0, 4096 bytes, linear) devtmpfs: initialized random: get_random_u32 called from bucket_table_alloc.isra.27+0x68/0x194 with crng_init=0 clocksource: jiffies: mask: 0xffffffff max_cycles: 0xffffffff, max_idle_ns: 19112604462750000 ns futex hash table entries: 256 (order: -1, 3072 bytes, linear) NET: Registered protocol family 16 Data read fault at 0x00000000 in Super Data (pc=0x8a6a) BAD KERNEL BUSERR Oops: 00000000 Modules linked in: PC: [<00008a6a>] via_flush_cache+0x12/0x2c SR: 2700 SP: 01c1fe3c a2: 01c24000 d0: 00001119 d1: 0000000c d2: 00012000 d3: 0000000f d4: 01c06840 d5: 00033b92 a0: 00000000 a1: 00000000 Process swapper (pid: 1, task=01c24000) Frame format=B ssw=0755 isc=0200 isb=fff7 daddr=00000000 dobuf=01c1fed0 baddr=00008a6e dibuf=0000004e ver=f Stack from 01c1fec4: 01c1fed0 00007d7e 00010080 01c1fedc 0000792e 00000001 01c1fef4 00006b40 01c80000 00040000 00000006 00000003 01c1ff1c 004a545e 004ff200 00040000 00000000 00000003 01c06840 00033b92 004a5410 004b6c88 01c1ff84 000021e2 00000073 00000003 01c06840 00033b92 0038507a 004bb094 004b6ca8 004b6c88 004b6ca4 004b6c88 000021ae 00020002 00000000 01c0685d 00000000 01c1ffb4 0049f938 00409c85 01c06840 0045bd40 00000073 00000002 00000002 00000000 Call Trace: [<00007d7e>] mac_cache_card_flush+0x12/0x1c [<00010080>] fix_dnrm+0x2/0x18 [<0000792e>] cache_push+0x46/0x5a [<00006b40>] arch_dma_prep_coherent+0x60/0x6e [<00040000>] switched_to_dl+0x76/0xd0 [<004a545e>] dma_atomic_pool_init+0x4e/0x188 [<00040000>] switched_to_dl+0x76/0xd0 [<00033b92>] parse_args+0x0/0x370 [<004a5410>] dma_atomic_pool_init+0x0/0x188 [<000021e2>] do_one_initcall+0x34/0x1be [<00033b92>] parse_args+0x0/0x370 [<0038507a>] strcpy+0x0/0x1e [<000021ae>] do_one_initcall+0x0/0x1be [<00020002>] do_proc_dointvec_conv+0x54/0x74 [<0049f938>] kernel_init_freeable+0x126/0x190 [<0049f94c>] kernel_init_freeable+0x13a/0x190 [<004a5410>] dma_atomic_pool_init+0x0/0x188 [<00041798>] complete+0x0/0x3c [<000b9b0c>] kfree+0x0/0x20a [<0038df98>] schedule+0x0/0xd0 [<0038d604>] kernel_init+0x0/0xda [<0038d610>] kernel_init+0xc/0xda [<0038d604>] kernel_init+0x0/0xda [<00002d38>] ret_from_kernel_thread+0xc/0x14 Code: 0000 2079 0048 10da 2279 0048 10c8 d3c8 <1011> 0200 fff7 1280 d1f9 0048 10c8 1010 0000 0008 1080 4e5e 4e75 4e56 0000 2039 Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill init! exitcode=0x0000000b Thanks to Stan Johnson for capturing the console log and running git bisect. Git bisect said commit 8e3a68fb55e0 ("dma-mapping: make dma_atomic_pool_init self-contained") is the first "bad" commit. I don't know why. Perhaps mach_l2_flush first became reachable with that commit. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Reported-and-tested-by: Stan Johnson <userm57@yahoo.com> Signed-off-by: Finn Thain <fthain@telegraphics.com.au> Cc: Joshua Thompson <funaho@jurai.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/b8bbeef197d6b3898e82ed0d231ad08f575a4b34.1589949122.git.fthain@telegraphics.com.au Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2020-06-20x86/mm: Stop printing BRK addressesArvind Sankar1-2/+0
[ Upstream commit 67d631b7c05eff955ccff4139327f0f92a5117e5 ] This currently leaks kernel physical addresses into userspace. Signed-off-by: Arvind Sankar <nivedita@alum.mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200229231120.1147527-1-nivedita@alum.mit.edu Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2020-06-20mips: Add udelay lpj numbers adjustmentSerge Semin1-0/+70
[ Upstream commit ed26aacfb5f71eecb20a51c4467da440cb719d66 ] Loops-per-jiffies is a special number which represents a number of noop-loop cycles per CPU-scheduler quantum - jiffies. As you understand aside from CPU-specific implementation it depends on the CPU frequency. So when a platform has the CPU frequency fixed, we have no problem and the current udelay interface will work just fine. But as soon as CPU-freq driver is enabled and the cores frequency changes, we'll end up with distorted udelay's. In order to fix this we have to accordinly adjust the per-CPU udelay_val (the same as the global loops_per_jiffy) number. This can be done in the CPU-freq transition event handler. We subscribe to that event in the MIPS arch time-inititalization method. Co-developed-by: Alexey Malahov <Alexey.Malahov@baikalelectronics.ru> Signed-off-by: Alexey Malahov <Alexey.Malahov@baikalelectronics.ru> Signed-off-by: Serge Semin <Sergey.Semin@baikalelectronics.ru> Reviewed-by: Jiaxun Yang <jiaxun.yang@flygoat.com> Cc: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de> Cc: Paul Burton <paulburton@kernel.org> Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Rob Herring <robh+dt@kernel.org> Cc: devicetree@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2020-06-20mips: MAAR: Use more precise address maskSerge Semin1-1/+1
[ Upstream commit bbb5946eb545fab8ad8f46bce8a803e1c0c39d47 ] Indeed according to the MIPS32 Privileged Resource Architecgture the MAAR pair register address field either takes [12:31] bits for non-XPA systems and [12:55] otherwise. In any case the current address mask is just wrong for 64-bit and 32-bits XPA chips. So lets extend it to 59-bits of physical address value. This shall cover the 64-bits architecture and systems with XPA enabled, and won't cause any problem for non-XPA 32-bit systems, since address values exceeding the architecture specific MAAR mask will be just truncated with setting zeros in the unsupported upper bits. Co-developed-by: Alexey Malahov <Alexey.Malahov@baikalelectronics.ru> Signed-off-by: Alexey Malahov <Alexey.Malahov@baikalelectronics.ru> Signed-off-by: Serge Semin <Sergey.Semin@baikalelectronics.ru> Cc: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de> Cc: Paul Burton <paulburton@kernel.org> Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Rob Herring <robh+dt@kernel.org> Cc: devicetree@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2020-06-20x86/boot: Correct relocation destination on old linkersArvind Sankar2-2/+4
[ Upstream commit 5214028dd89e49ba27007c3ee475279e584261f0 ] For the 32-bit kernel, as described in 6d92bc9d483a ("x86/build: Build compressed x86 kernels as PIE"), pre-2.26 binutils generates R_386_32 relocations in PIE mode. Since the startup code does not perform relocation, any reloc entry with R_386_32 will remain as 0 in the executing code. Commit 974f221c84b0 ("x86/boot: Move compressed kernel to the end of the decompression buffer") added a new symbol _end but did not mark it hidden, which doesn't give the correct offset on older linkers. This causes the compressed kernel to be copied beyond the end of the decompression buffer, rather than flush against it. This region of memory may be reserved or already allocated for other purposes by the bootloader. Mark _end as hidden to fix. This changes the relocation from R_386_32 to R_386_RELATIVE even on the pre-2.26 binutils. For 64-bit, this is not strictly necessary, as the 64-bit kernel is only built as PIE if the linker supports -z noreloc-overflow, which implies binutils-2.27+, but for consistency, mark _end as hidden here too. The below illustrates the before/after impact of the patch using binutils-2.25 and gcc-4.6.4 (locally compiled from source) and QEMU. Disassembly before patch: 48: 8b 86 60 02 00 00 mov 0x260(%esi),%eax 4e: 2d 00 00 00 00 sub $0x0,%eax 4f: R_386_32 _end Disassembly after patch: 48: 8b 86 60 02 00 00 mov 0x260(%esi),%eax 4e: 2d 00 f0 76 00 sub $0x76f000,%eax 4f: R_386_RELATIVE *ABS* Dump from extract_kernel before patch: early console in extract_kernel input_data: 0x0207c098 <--- this is at output + init_size input_len: 0x0074fef1 output: 0x01000000 output_len: 0x00fa63d0 kernel_total_size: 0x0107c000 needed_size: 0x0107c000 Dump from extract_kernel after patch: early console in extract_kernel input_data: 0x0190d098 <--- this is at output + init_size - _end input_len: 0x0074fef1 output: 0x01000000 output_len: 0x00fa63d0 kernel_total_size: 0x0107c000 needed_size: 0x0107c000 Fixes: 974f221c84b0 ("x86/boot: Move compressed kernel to the end of the decompression buffer") Signed-off-by: Arvind Sankar <nivedita@alum.mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200207214926.3564079-1-nivedita@alum.mit.edu Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2020-06-20mips: cm: Fix an invalid error code of INTVN_*_ERRSerge Semin1-3/+3
[ Upstream commit 8a0efb8b101665a843205eab3d67ab09cb2d9a8d ] Commit 3885c2b463f6 ("MIPS: CM: Add support for reporting CM cache errors") adds cm2_causes[] array with map of error type ID and pointers to the short description string. There is a mistake in the table, since according to MIPS32 manual CM2_ERROR_TYPE = {17,18} correspond to INTVN_WR_ERR and INTVN_RD_ERR, while the table claims they have {0x17,0x18} codes. This is obviously hex-dec copy-paste bug. Moreover codes {0x18 - 0x1a} indicate L2 ECC errors. Fixes: 3885c2b463f6 ("MIPS: CM: Add support for reporting CM cache errors") Signed-off-by: Serge Semin <Sergey.Semin@baikalelectronics.ru> Cc: Alexey Malahov <Alexey.Malahov@baikalelectronics.ru> Cc: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de> Cc: Paul Burton <paulburton@kernel.org> Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Rob Herring <robh+dt@kernel.org> Cc: linux-pm@vger.kernel.org Cc: devicetree@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2020-06-20MIPS: Truncate link address into 32bit for 32bit kernelJiaxun Yang3-3/+14
[ Upstream commit ff487d41036035376e47972c7c522490b839ab37 ] LLD failed to link vmlinux with 64bit load address for 32bit ELF while bfd will strip 64bit address into 32bit silently. To fix LLD build, we should truncate load address provided by platform into 32bit for 32bit kernel. Signed-off-by: Jiaxun Yang <jiaxun.yang@flygoat.com> Link: https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/786 Link: https://sourceware.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=25784 Reviewed-by: Fangrui Song <maskray@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Tested-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com> Cc: Maciej W. Rozycki <macro@linux-mips.org> Tested-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2020-06-20powerpc/spufs: fix copy_to_user while atomicJeremy Kerr1-38/+75
[ Upstream commit 88413a6bfbbe2f648df399b62f85c934460b7a4d ] Currently, we may perform a copy_to_user (through simple_read_from_buffer()) while holding a context's register_lock, while accessing the context save area. This change uses a temporary buffer for the context save area data, which we then pass to simple_read_from_buffer. Includes changes from Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>. Fixes: bf1ab978be23 ("[POWERPC] coredump: Add SPU elf notes to coredump.") Signed-off-by: Jeremy Kerr <jk@ozlabs.org> Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> [hch: renamed to function to avoid ___-prefixes] Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2020-06-20MIPS: Make sparse_init() using top-down allocationTiezhu Yang1-0/+10
[ Upstream commit 269b3a9ac538c4ae87f84be640b9fa89914a2489 ] In the current code, if CONFIG_SWIOTLB is set, when failed to get IO TLB memory from the low pages by plat_swiotlb_setup(), it may lead to the boot process failed with kernel panic. (1) On the Loongson and SiByte platform arch/mips/loongson64/dma.c arch/mips/sibyte/common/dma.c void __init plat_swiotlb_setup(void) { swiotlb_init(1); } kernel/dma/swiotlb.c void __init swiotlb_init(int verbose) { ... vstart = memblock_alloc_low(PAGE_ALIGN(bytes), PAGE_SIZE); if (vstart && !swiotlb_init_with_tbl(vstart, io_tlb_nslabs, verbose)) return; ... pr_warn("Cannot allocate buffer"); no_iotlb_memory = true; } phys_addr_t swiotlb_tbl_map_single() { ... if (no_iotlb_memory) panic("Can not allocate SWIOTLB buffer earlier ..."); ... } (2) On the Cavium OCTEON platform arch/mips/cavium-octeon/dma-octeon.c void __init plat_swiotlb_setup(void) { ... octeon_swiotlb = memblock_alloc_low(swiotlbsize, PAGE_SIZE); if (!octeon_swiotlb) panic("%s: Failed to allocate %zu bytes align=%lx\n", __func__, swiotlbsize, PAGE_SIZE); ... } Because IO_TLB_DEFAULT_SIZE is 64M, if the rest size of low memory is less than 64M when call plat_swiotlb_setup(), we can easily reproduce the panic case. In order to reduce the possibility of kernel panic when failed to get IO TLB memory under CONFIG_SWIOTLB, it is better to allocate low memory as small as possible before plat_swiotlb_setup(), so make sparse_init() using top-down allocation. Reported-by: Juxin Gao <gaojuxin@loongson.cn> Co-developed-by: Juxin Gao <gaojuxin@loongson.cn> Signed-off-by: Juxin Gao <gaojuxin@loongson.cn> Signed-off-by: Tiezhu Yang <yangtiezhu@loongson.cn> Signed-off-by: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2020-06-20ARM: 8978/1: mm: make act_mm() respect THREAD_SIZELinus Walleij1-1/+2
[ Upstream commit e1de94380af588bdf6ad6f0cc1f75004c35bc096 ] Recent work with KASan exposed the folling hard-coded bitmask in arch/arm/mm/proc-macros.S: bic rd, sp, #8128 bic rd, rd, #63 This forms the bitmask 0x1FFF that is coinciding with (PAGE_SIZE << THREAD_SIZE_ORDER) - 1, this code was assuming that THREAD_SIZE is always 8K (8192). As KASan was increasing THREAD_SIZE_ORDER to 2, I ran into this bug. Fix it by this little oneline suggested by Ard: bic rd, sp, #(THREAD_SIZE - 1) & ~63 Where THREAD_SIZE is defined using THREAD_SIZE_ORDER. We have to also include <linux/const.h> since the THREAD_SIZE expands to use the _AC() macro. Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Cc: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com> Suggested-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2020-06-20MIPS: Loongson: Build ATI Radeon GPU driver as moduleTiezhu Yang1-1/+1
[ Upstream commit a44de7497f91834df0b8b6d459e259788ba66794 ] When ATI Radeon GPU driver has been compiled directly into the kernel instead of as a module, we should make sure the firmware for the model (check available ones in /lib/firmware/radeon) is built-in to the kernel as well, otherwise there exists the following fatal error during GPU init, change CONFIG_DRM_RADEON=y to CONFIG_DRM_RADEON=m to fix it. [ 1.900997] [drm] Loading RS780 Microcode [ 1.905077] radeon 0000:01:05.0: Direct firmware load for radeon/RS780_pfp.bin failed with error -2 [ 1.914140] r600_cp: Failed to load firmware "radeon/RS780_pfp.bin" [ 1.920405] [drm:r600_init] *ERROR* Failed to load firmware! [ 1.926069] radeon 0000:01:05.0: Fatal error during GPU init [ 1.931729] [drm] radeon: finishing device. Fixes: 024e6a8b5bb1 ("MIPS: Loongson: Add a Loongson-3 default config file") Signed-off-by: Tiezhu Yang <yangtiezhu@loongson.cn> Signed-off-by: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2020-06-20KVM: arm64: Make vcpu_cp1x() work on Big Endian hostsMarc Zyngier1-2/+4
commit 3204be4109ad681523e3461ce64454c79278450a upstream. AArch32 CP1x registers are overlayed on their AArch64 counterparts in the vcpu struct. This leads to an interesting problem as they are stored in their CPU-local format, and thus a CP1x register doesn't "hit" the lower 32bit portion of the AArch64 register on a BE host. To workaround this unfortunate situation, introduce a bias trick in the vcpu_cp1x() accessors which picks the correct half of the 64bit register. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Tested-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Acked-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-06-20KVM: MIPS: Fix VPN2_MASK definition for variable cpu_vmbitsXing Li1-0/+4
commit 5816c76dea116a458f1932eefe064e35403248eb upstream. If a CPU support more than 32bit vmbits (which is true for 64bit CPUs), VPN2_MASK set to fixed 0xffffe000 will lead to a wrong EntryHi in some functions such as _kvm_mips_host_tlb_inv(). The cpu_vmbits definition of 32bit CPU in cpu-features.h is 31, so we still use the old definition. Cc: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Aleksandar Markovic <aleksandar.qemu.devel@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Xing Li <lixing@loongson.cn> [Huacai: Improve commit messages] Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen <chenhc@lemote.com> Message-Id: <1590220602-3547-3-git-send-email-chenhc@lemote.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-06-20KVM: MIPS: Define KVM_ENTRYHI_ASID to cpu_asid_mask(&boot_cpu_data)Xing Li1-1/+1
commit fe2b73dba47fb6d6922df1ad44e83b1754d5ed4d upstream. The code in decode_config4() of arch/mips/kernel/cpu-probe.c asid_mask = MIPS_ENTRYHI_ASID; if (config4 & MIPS_CONF4_AE) asid_mask |= MIPS_ENTRYHI_ASIDX; set_cpu_asid_mask(c, asid_mask); set asid_mask to cpuinfo->asid_mask. So in order to support variable ASID_MASK, KVM_ENTRYHI_ASID should also be changed to cpu_asid_mask(&boot_cpu_data). Cc: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> #4.9+ Reviewed-by: Aleksandar Markovic <aleksandar.qemu.devel@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Xing Li <lixing@loongson.cn> [Huacai: Change current_cpu_data to boot_cpu_data for optimization] Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen <chenhc@lemote.com> Message-Id: <1590220602-3547-2-git-send-email-chenhc@lemote.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-06-20KVM: nVMX: Consult only the "basic" exit reason when routing nested exitSean Christopherson1-1/+1
commit 2ebac8bb3c2d35f5135466490fc8eeaf3f3e2d37 upstream. Consult only the basic exit reason, i.e. bits 15:0 of vmcs.EXIT_REASON, when determining whether a nested VM-Exit should be reflected into L1 or handled by KVM in L0. For better or worse, the switch statement in nested_vmx_exit_reflected() currently defaults to "true", i.e. reflects any nested VM-Exit without dedicated logic. Because the case statements only contain the basic exit reason, any VM-Exit with modifier bits set will be reflected to L1, even if KVM intended to handle it in L0. Practically speaking, this only affects EXIT_REASON_MCE_DURING_VMENTRY, i.e. a #MC that occurs on nested VM-Enter would be incorrectly routed to L1, as "failed VM-Entry" is the only modifier that KVM can currently encounter. The SMM modifiers will never be generated as KVM doesn't support/employ a SMI Transfer Monitor. Ditto for "exit from enclave", as KVM doesn't yet support virtualizing SGX, i.e. it's impossible to enter an enclave in a KVM guest (L1 or L2). Fixes: 644d711aa0e1 ("KVM: nVMX: Deciding if L0 or L1 should handle an L2 exit") Cc: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Cc: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Message-Id: <20200227174430.26371-1-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-06-20KVM: nSVM: leave ASID aside in copy_vmcb_control_areaPaolo Bonzini1-1/+1
commit 6c0238c4a62b3a0b1201aeb7e33a4636d552a436 upstream. Restoring the ASID from the hsave area on VMEXIT is wrong, because its value depends on the handling of TLB flushes. Just skipping the field in copy_vmcb_control_area will do. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-06-20KVM: nSVM: fix condition for filtering async PFPaolo Bonzini1-2/+2
commit a3535be731c2a343912578465021f50937f7b099 upstream. Async page faults have to be trapped in the host (L1 in this case), since the APF reason was passed from L0 to L1 and stored in the L1 APF data page. This was completely reversed: the page faults were passed to the guest, a L2 hypervisor. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-06-20x86/speculation: PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE enforcement for indirect branches.Anthony Steinhauser1-2/+5
[ Upstream commit 4d8df8cbb9156b0a0ab3f802b80cb5db57acc0bf ] Currently, it is possible to enable indirect branch speculation even after it was force-disabled using the PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE option. Moreover, the PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL command gives afterwards an incorrect result (force-disabled when it is in fact enabled). This also is inconsistent vs. STIBP and the documention which cleary states that PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE cannot be undone. Fix this by actually enforcing force-disabled indirect branch speculation. PR_SPEC_ENABLE called after PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE now fails with -EPERM as described in the documentation. Fixes: 9137bb27e60e ("x86/speculation: Add prctl() control for indirect branch speculation") Signed-off-by: Anthony Steinhauser <asteinhauser@google.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2020-06-20x86/speculation: Avoid force-disabling IBPB based on STIBP and enhanced IBRS.Anthony Steinhauser1-37/+50
[ Upstream commit 21998a351512eba4ed5969006f0c55882d995ada ] When STIBP is unavailable or enhanced IBRS is available, Linux force-disables the IBPB mitigation of Spectre-BTB even when simultaneous multithreading is disabled. While attempts to enable IBPB using prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH, ...) fail with EPERM, the seccomp syscall (or its prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, ...) equivalent) which are used e.g. by Chromium or OpenSSH succeed with no errors but the application remains silently vulnerable to cross-process Spectre v2 attacks (classical BTB poisoning). At the same time the SYSFS reporting (/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2) displays that IBPB is conditionally enabled when in fact it is unconditionally disabled. STIBP is useful only when SMT is enabled. When SMT is disabled and STIBP is unavailable, it makes no sense to force-disable also IBPB, because IBPB protects against cross-process Spectre-BTB attacks regardless of the SMT state. At the same time since missing STIBP was only observed on AMD CPUs, AMD does not recommend using STIBP, but recommends using IBPB, so disabling IBPB because of missing STIBP goes directly against AMD's advice: https://developer.amd.com/wp-content/resources/Architecture_Guidelines_Update_Indirect_Branch_Control.pdf Similarly, enhanced IBRS is designed to protect cross-core BTB poisoning and BTB-poisoning attacks from user space against kernel (and BTB-poisoning attacks from guest against hypervisor), it is not designed to prevent cross-process (or cross-VM) BTB poisoning between processes (or VMs) running on the same core. Therefore, even with enhanced IBRS it is necessary to flush the BTB during context-switches, so there is no reason to force disable IBPB when enhanced IBRS is available. Enable the prctl control of IBPB even when STIBP is unavailable or enhanced IBRS is available. Fixes: 7cc765a67d8e ("x86/speculation: Enable prctl mode for spectre_v2_user") Signed-off-by: Anthony Steinhauser <asteinhauser@google.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2020-06-20x86/speculation: Add support for STIBP always-on preferred modeThomas Lendacky3-6/+24
[ Upstream commit 20c3a2c33e9fdc82e9e8e8d2a6445b3256d20191 ] Different AMD processors may have different implementations of STIBP. When STIBP is conditionally enabled, some implementations would benefit from having STIBP always on instead of toggling the STIBP bit through MSR writes. This preference is advertised through a CPUID feature bit. When conditional STIBP support is requested at boot and the CPU advertises STIBP always-on mode as preferred, switch to STIBP "on" support. To show that this transition has occurred, create a new spectre_v2_user_mitigation value and a new spectre_v2_user_strings message. The new mitigation value is used in spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation() to print the new mitigation message as well as to return a new string from stibp_state(). Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181213230352.6937.74943.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2020-06-20x86/speculation: Change misspelled STIPB to STIBPWaiman Long2-4/+4
[ Upstream commit aa77bfb354c495fc4361199e63fc5765b9e1e783 ] STIBP stands for Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors. The acronym, however, can be easily mis-spelled as STIPB. It is perhaps due to the presence of another related term - IBPB (Indirect Branch Predictor Barrier). Fix the mis-spelling in the code. Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed@amazon.de> Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1544039368-9009-1-git-send-email-longman@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2020-06-20KVM: x86: only do L1TF workaround on affected processorsPaolo Bonzini1-9/+10
[ Upstream commit d43e2675e96fc6ae1a633b6a69d296394448cc32 ] KVM stores the gfn in MMIO SPTEs as a caching optimization. These are split in two parts, as in "[high 11111 low]", to thwart any attempt to use these bits in an L1TF attack. This works as long as there are 5 free bits between MAXPHYADDR and bit 50 (inclusive), leaving bit 51 free so that the MMIO access triggers a reserved-bit-set page fault. The bit positions however were computed wrongly for AMD processors that have encryption support. In this case, x86_phys_bits is reduced (for example from 48 to 43, to account for the C bit at position 47 and four bits used internally to store the SEV ASID and other stuff) while x86_cache_bits in would remain set to 48, and _all_ bits between the reduced MAXPHYADDR and bit 51 are set. Then low_phys_bits would also cover some of the bits that are set in the shadow_mmio_value, terribly confusing the gfn caching mechanism. To fix this, avoid splitting gfns as long as the processor does not have the L1TF bug (which includes all AMD processors). When there is no splitting, low_phys_bits can be set to the reduced MAXPHYADDR removing the overlap. This fixes "npt=0" operation on EPYC processors. Thanks to Maxim Levitsky for bisecting this bug. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 52918ed5fcf0 ("KVM: SVM: Override default MMIO mask if memory encryption is enabled") Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2020-06-20KVM: x86/mmu: Consolidate "is MMIO SPTE" codeSean Christopherson1-8/+8
[ Upstream commit 26c44a63a291893e0a00f01e96b6e1d0310a79a9 ] Replace the open-coded "is MMIO SPTE" checks in the MMU warnings related to software-based access/dirty tracking to make the code slightly more self-documenting. No functional change intended. Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2020-06-20kvm: x86: Fix L1TF mitigation for shadow MMUKai Huang1-5/+13
[ Upstream commit 61455bf26236e7f3d72705382a6437fdfd1bd0af ] Currently KVM sets 5 most significant bits of physical address bits reported by CPUID (boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits) for nonpresent or reserved bits SPTE to mitigate L1TF attack from guest when using shadow MMU. However for some particular Intel CPUs the physical address bits of internal cache is greater than physical address bits reported by CPUID. Use the kernel's existing boot_cpu_data.x86_cache_bits to determine the five most significant bits. Doing so improves KVM's L1TF mitigation in the unlikely scenario that system RAM overlaps the high order bits of the "real" physical address space as reported by CPUID. This aligns with the kernel's warnings regarding L1TF mitigation, e.g. in the above scenario the kernel won't warn the user about lack of L1TF mitigation if x86_cache_bits is greater than x86_phys_bits. Also initialize shadow_nonpresent_or_rsvd_mask explicitly to make it consistent with other 'shadow_{xxx}_mask', and opportunistically add a WARN once if KVM's L1TF mitigation cannot be applied on a system that is marked as being susceptible to L1TF. Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2020-06-20x86/reboot/quirks: Add MacBook6,1 reboot quirkHill Ma1-0/+8
commit 140fd4ac78d385e6c8e6a5757585f6c707085f87 upstream. On MacBook6,1 reboot would hang unless parameter reboot=pci is added. Make it automatic. Signed-off-by: Hill Ma <maahiuzeon@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200425200641.GA1554@cslab.localdomain Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-06-20x86/speculation: Prevent rogue cross-process SSBD shutdownAnthony Steinhauser1-18/+10
commit dbbe2ad02e9df26e372f38cc3e70dab9222c832e upstream. On context switch the change of TIF_SSBD and TIF_SPEC_IB are evaluated to adjust the mitigations accordingly. This is optimized to avoid the expensive MSR write if not needed. This optimization is buggy and allows an attacker to shutdown the SSBD protection of a victim process. The update logic reads the cached base value for the speculation control MSR which has neither the SSBD nor the STIBP bit set. It then OR's the SSBD bit only when TIF_SSBD is different and requests the MSR update. That means if TIF_SSBD of the previous and next task are the same, then the base value is not updated, even if TIF_SSBD is set. The MSR write is not requested. Subsequently if the TIF_STIBP bit differs then the STIBP bit is updated in the base value and the MSR is written with a wrong SSBD value. This was introduced when the per task/process conditional STIPB switching was added on top of the existing SSBD switching. It is exploitable if the attacker creates a process which enforces SSBD and has the contrary value of STIBP than the victim process (i.e. if the victim process enforces STIBP, the attacker process must not enforce it; if the victim process does not enforce STIBP, the attacker process must enforce it) and schedule it on the same core as the victim process. If the victim runs after the attacker the victim becomes vulnerable to Spectre V4. To fix this, update the MSR value independent of the TIF_SSBD difference and dependent on the SSBD mitigation method available. This ensures that a subsequent STIPB initiated MSR write has the correct state of SSBD. [ tglx: Handle X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD & X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD correctly and massaged changelog ] Fixes: 5bfbe3ad5840 ("x86/speculation: Prepare for per task indirect branch speculation control") Signed-off-by: Anthony Steinhauser <asteinhauser@google.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-06-20x86/PCI: Mark Intel C620 MROMs as having non-compliant BARsXiaochun Lee1-0/+4
commit 1574051e52cb4b5b7f7509cfd729b76ca1117808 upstream. The Intel C620 Platform Controller Hub has MROM functions that have non-PCI registers (undocumented in the public spec) where BAR 0 is supposed to be, which results in messages like this: pci 0000:00:11.0: [Firmware Bug]: reg 0x30: invalid BAR (can't size) Mark these MROM functions as having non-compliant BARs so we don't try to probe any of them. There are no other BARs on these devices. See the Intel C620 Series Chipset Platform Controller Hub Datasheet, May 2019, Document Number 336067-007US, sec 2.1, 35.5, 35.6. [bhelgaas: commit log, add 0xa26d] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1589513467-17070-1-git-send-email-lixiaochun.2888@163.com Signed-off-by: Xiaochun Lee <lixc17@lenovo.com> Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-06-20x86_64: Fix jiffies ODR violationBob Haarman2-6/+2
commit d8ad6d39c35d2b44b3d48b787df7f3359381dcbf upstream. 'jiffies' and 'jiffies_64' are meant to alias (two different symbols that share the same address). Most architectures make the symbols alias to the same address via a linker script assignment in their arch/<arch>/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S: jiffies = jiffies_64; which is effectively a definition of jiffies. jiffies and jiffies_64 are both forward declared for all architectures in include/linux/jiffies.h. jiffies_64 is defined in kernel/time/timer.c. x86_64 was peculiar in that it wasn't doing the above linker script assignment, but rather was: 1. defining jiffies in arch/x86/kernel/time.c instead via the linker script. 2. overriding the symbol jiffies_64 from kernel/time/timer.c in arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.s via 'jiffies_64 = jiffies;'. As Fangrui notes: In LLD, symbol assignments in linker scripts override definitions in object files. GNU ld appears to have the same behavior. It would probably make sense for LLD to error "duplicate symbol" but GNU ld is unlikely to adopt for compatibility reasons. This results in an ODR violation (UB), which seems to have survived thus far. Where it becomes harmful is when; 1. -fno-semantic-interposition is used: As Fangrui notes: Clang after LLVM commit 5b22bcc2b70d ("[X86][ELF] Prefer to lower MC_GlobalAddress operands to .Lfoo$local") defaults to -fno-semantic-interposition similar semantics which help -fpic/-fPIC code avoid GOT/PLT when the referenced symbol is defined within the same translation unit. Unlike GCC -fno-semantic-interposition, Clang emits such relocations referencing local symbols for non-pic code as well. This causes references to jiffies to refer to '.Ljiffies$local' when jiffies is defined in the same translation unit. Likewise, references to jiffies_64 become references to '.Ljiffies_64$local' in translation units that define jiffies_64. Because these differ from the names used in the linker script, they will not be rewritten to alias one another. 2. Full LTO Full LTO effectively treats all source files as one translation unit, causing these local references to be produced everywhere. When the linker processes the linker script, there are no longer any references to jiffies_64' anywhere to replace with 'jiffies'. And thus '.Ljiffies$local' and '.Ljiffies_64$local' no longer alias at all. In the process of porting patches enabling Full LTO from arm64 to x86_64, spooky bugs have been observed where the kernel appeared to boot, but init doesn't get scheduled. Avoid the ODR violation by matching other architectures and define jiffies only by linker script. For -fno-semantic-interposition + Full LTO, there is no longer a global definition of jiffies for the compiler to produce a local symbol which the linker script won't ensure aliases to jiffies_64. Fixes: 40747ffa5aa8 ("asmlinkage: Make jiffies visible") Reported-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com> Reported-by: Alistair Delva <adelva@google.com> Debugged-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Debugged-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com> Suggested-by: Fangrui Song <maskray@google.com> Signed-off-by: Bob Haarman <inglorion@google.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Tested-by: Sedat Dilek <sedat.dilek@gmail.com> # build+boot on Reviewed-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/852 Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200602193100.229287-1-inglorion@google.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-06-20powerpc/xive: Clear the page tables for the ESB IO mappingCédric Le Goater1-0/+5
[ Upstream commit a101950fcb78b0ba20cd487be6627dea58d55c2b ] Commit 1ca3dec2b2df ("powerpc/xive: Prevent page fault issues in the machine crash handler") fixed an issue in the FW assisted dump of machines using hash MMU and the XIVE interrupt mode under the POWER hypervisor. It forced the mapping of the ESB page of interrupts being mapped in the Linux IRQ number space to make sure the 'crash kexec' sequence worked during such an event. But it didn't handle the un-mapping. This mapping is now blocking the removal of a passthrough IO adapter under the POWER hypervisor because it expects the guest OS to have cleared all page table entries related to the adapter. If some are still present, the RTAS call which isolates the PCI slot returns error 9001 "valid outstanding translations". Remove these mapping in the IRQ data cleanup routine. Under KVM, this cleanup is not required because the ESB pages for the adapter interrupts are un-mapped from the guest by the hypervisor in the KVM XIVE native device. This is now redundant but it's harmless. Fixes: 1ca3dec2b2df ("powerpc/xive: Prevent page fault issues in the machine crash handler") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.5+ Signed-off-by: Cédric Le Goater <clg@kaod.org> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200429075122.1216388-2-clg@kaod.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2020-06-20ARM: 8977/1: ptrace: Fix mask for thumb breakpoint hookFredrik Strupe1-2/+2
[ Upstream commit 3866f217aaa81bf7165c7f27362eee5d7919c496 ] call_undef_hook() in traps.c applies the same instr_mask for both 16-bit and 32-bit thumb instructions. If instr_mask then is only 16 bits wide (0xffff as opposed to 0xffffffff), the first half-word of 32-bit thumb instructions will be masked out. This makes the function match 32-bit thumb instructions where the second half-word is equal to instr_val, regardless of the first half-word. The result in this case is that all undefined 32-bit thumb instructions with the second half-word equal to 0xde01 (udf #1) work as breakpoints and will raise a SIGTRAP instead of a SIGILL, instead of just the one intended 16-bit instruction. An example of such an instruction is 0xeaa0de01, which is unallocated according to Arm ARM and should raise a SIGILL, but instead raises a SIGTRAP. This patch fixes the issue by setting all the bits in instr_mask, which will still match the intended 16-bit thumb instruction (where the upper half is always 0), but not any 32-bit thumb instructions. Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Fredrik Strupe <fredrik@strupe.net> Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2020-06-20x86: uaccess: Inhibit speculation past access_ok() in user_access_begin()Will Deacon1-1/+1
commit 6e693b3ffecb0b478c7050b44a4842854154f715 upstream. Commit 594cc251fdd0 ("make 'user_access_begin()' do 'access_ok()'") makes the access_ok() check part of the user_access_begin() preceding a series of 'unsafe' accesses. This has the desirable effect of ensuring that all 'unsafe' accesses have been range-checked, without having to pick through all of the callsites to verify whether the appropriate checking has been made. However, the consolidated range check does not inhibit speculation, so it is still up to the caller to ensure that they are not susceptible to any speculative side-channel attacks for user addresses that ultimately fail the access_ok() check. This is an oversight, so use __uaccess_begin_nospec() to ensure that speculation is inhibited until the access_ok() check has passed. Reported-by: Julien Thierry <julien.thierry@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Miles Chen <miles.chen@mediatek.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-06-20arch/openrisc: Fix issues with access_ok()Stafford Horne1-2/+6
commit 9cb2feb4d21d97386eb25c7b67e2793efcc1e70a upstream. The commit 594cc251fdd0 ("make 'user_access_begin()' do 'access_ok()'") exposed incorrect implementations of access_ok() macro in several architectures. This change fixes 2 issues found in OpenRISC. OpenRISC was not properly using parenthesis for arguments and also using arguments twice. This patch fixes those 2 issues. I test booted this patch with v5.0-rc1 on qemu and it's working fine. Cc: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Reported-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Miles Chen <miles.chen@mediatek.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-06-20Fix 'acccess_ok()' on alpha and SHLinus Torvalds2-5/+10
commit 94bd8a05cd4de344a9a57e52ef7d99550251984f upstream. Commit 594cc251fdd0 ("make 'user_access_begin()' do 'access_ok()'") broke both alpha and SH booting in qemu, as noticed by Guenter Roeck. It turns out that the bug wasn't actually in that commit itself (which would have been surprising: it was mostly a no-op), but in how the addition of access_ok() to the strncpy_from_user() and strnlen_user() functions now triggered the case where those functions would test the access of the very last byte of the user address space. The string functions actually did that user range test before too, but they did it manually by just comparing against user_addr_max(). But with user_access_begin() doing the check (using "access_ok()"), it now exposed problems in the architecture implementations of that function. For example, on alpha, the access_ok() helper macro looked like this: #define __access_ok(addr, size) \ ((get_fs().seg & (addr | size | (addr+size))) == 0) and what it basically tests is of any of the high bits get set (the USER_DS masking value is 0xfffffc0000000000). And that's completely wrong for the "addr+size" check. Because it's off-by-one for the case where we check to the very end of the user address space, which is exactly what the strn*_user() functions do. Why? Because "addr+size" will be exactly the size of the address space, so trying to access the last byte of the user address space will fail the __access_ok() check, even though it shouldn't. As a result, the user string accessor functions failed consistently - because they literally don't know how long the string is going to be, and the max access is going to be that last byte of the user address space. Side note: that alpha macro is buggy for another reason too - it re-uses the arguments twice. And SH has another version of almost the exact same bug: #define __addr_ok(addr) \ ((unsigned long __force)(addr) < current_thread_info()->addr_limit.seg) so far so good: yes, a user address must be below the limit. But then: #define __access_ok(addr, size) \ (__addr_ok((addr) + (size))) is wrong with the exact same off-by-one case: the case when "addr+size" is exactly _equal_ to the limit is actually perfectly fine (think "one byte access at the last address of the user address space") The SH version is actually seriously buggy in another way: it doesn't actually check for overflow, even though it did copy the _comment_ that talks about overflow. So it turns out that both SH and alpha actually have completely buggy implementations of access_ok(), but they happened to work in practice (although the SH overflow one is a serious serious security bug, not that anybody likely cares about SH security). This fixes the problems by using a similar macro on both alpha and SH. It isn't trying to be clever, the end address is based on this logic: unsigned long __ao_end = __ao_a + __ao_b - !!__ao_b; which basically says "add start and length, and then subtract one unless the length was zero". We can't subtract one for a zero length, or we'd just hit an underflow instead. For a lot of access_ok() users the length is a constant, so this isn't actually as expensive as it initially looks. Reported-and-tested-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com> Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Miles Chen <miles.chen@mediatek.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-06-20make 'user_access_begin()' do 'access_ok()'Linus Torvalds1-1/+11
commit 594cc251fdd0d231d342d88b2fdff4bc42fb0690 upstream. Originally, the rule used to be that you'd have to do access_ok() separately, and then user_access_begin() before actually doing the direct (optimized) user access. But experience has shown that people then decide not to do access_ok() at all, and instead rely on it being implied by other operations or similar. Which makes it very hard to verify that the access has actually been range-checked. If you use the unsafe direct user accesses, hardware features (either SMAP - Supervisor Mode Access Protection - on x86, or PAN - Privileged Access Never - on ARM) do force you to use user_access_begin(). But nothing really forces the range check. By putting the range check into user_access_begin(), we actually force people to do the right thing (tm), and the range check vill be visible near the actual accesses. We have way too long a history of people trying to avoid them. Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Miles Chen <miles.chen@mediatek.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-06-11x86/speculation: Add Special Register Buffer Data Sampling (SRBDS) mitigationMark Gross5-0/+144
commit 7e5b3c267d256822407a22fdce6afdf9cd13f9fb upstream SRBDS is an MDS-like speculative side channel that can leak bits from the random number generator (RNG) across cores and threads. New microcode serializes the processor access during the execution of RDRAND and RDSEED. This ensures that the shared buffer is overwritten before it is released for reuse. While it is present on all affected CPU models, the microcode mitigation is not needed on models that enumerate ARCH_CAPABILITIES[MDS_NO] in the cases where TSX is not supported or has been disabled with TSX_CTRL. The mitigation is activated by default on affected processors and it increases latency for RDRAND and RDSEED instructions. Among other effects this will reduce throughput from /dev/urandom. * Enable administrator to configure the mitigation off when desired using either mitigations=off or srbds=off. * Export vulnerability status via sysfs * Rename file-scoped macros to apply for non-whitelist table initializations. [ bp: Massage, - s/VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPING/VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS/g, - do not read arch cap MSR a second time in tsx_fused_off() - just pass it in, - flip check in cpu_set_bug_bits() to save an indentation level, - reflow comments. jpoimboe: s/Mitigated/Mitigation/ in user-visible strings tglx: Dropped the fused off magic for now ] Signed-off-by: Mark Gross <mgross@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Tested-by: Neelima Krishnan <neelima.krishnan@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-06-11x86/cpu: Add 'table' argument to cpu_matches()Mark Gross1-10/+13
commit 93920f61c2ad7edb01e63323832585796af75fc9 upstream To make cpu_matches() reusable for other matching tables, have it take a pointer to a x86_cpu_id table as an argument. [ bp: Flip arguments order. ] Signed-off-by: Mark Gross <mgross@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-06-11x86/cpu: Add a steppings field to struct x86_cpu_idMark Gross2-1/+33
commit e9d7144597b10ff13ff2264c059f7d4a7fbc89ac upstream Intel uses the same family/model for several CPUs. Sometimes the stepping must be checked to tell them apart. On x86 there can be at most 16 steppings. Add a steppings bitmask to x86_cpu_id and a X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAMILY_MODEL_STEPPING_FEATURE macro and support for matching against family/model/stepping. [ bp: Massage. tglx: Lightweight variant for backporting ] Signed-off-by: Mark Gross <mgross@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-06-11mm: Fix mremap not considering huge pmd devmapFan Yang1-0/+1
commit 5bfea2d9b17f1034a68147a8b03b9789af5700f9 upstream. The original code in mm/mremap.c checks huge pmd by: if (is_swap_pmd(*old_pmd) || pmd_trans_huge(*old_pmd)) { However, a DAX mapped nvdimm is mapped as huge page (by default) but it is not transparent huge page (_PAGE_PSE | PAGE_DEVMAP). This commit changes the condition to include the case. This addresses CVE-2020-10757. Fixes: 5c7fb56e5e3f ("mm, dax: dax-pmd vs thp-pmd vs hugetlbfs-pmd") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Reported-by: Fan Yang <Fan_Yang@sjtu.edu.cn> Signed-off-by: Fan Yang <Fan_Yang@sjtu.edu.cn> Tested-by: Fan Yang <Fan_Yang@sjtu.edu.cn> Tested-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-06-11x86/mmiotrace: Use cpumask_available() for cpumask_var_t variablesNathan Chancellor1-2/+2
[ Upstream commit d7110a26e5905ec2fe3fc88bc6a538901accb72b ] When building with Clang + -Wtautological-compare and CONFIG_CPUMASK_OFFSTACK unset: arch/x86/mm/mmio-mod.c:375:6: warning: comparison of array 'downed_cpus' equal to a null pointer is always false [-Wtautological-pointer-compare] if (downed_cpus == NULL && ^~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~ arch/x86/mm/mmio-mod.c:405:6: warning: comparison of array 'downed_cpus' equal to a null pointer is always false [-Wtautological-pointer-compare] if (downed_cpus == NULL || cpumask_weight(downed_cpus) == 0) ^~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~ 2 warnings generated. Commit f7e30f01a9e2 ("cpumask: Add helper cpumask_available()") added cpumask_available() to fix warnings of this nature. Use that here so that clang does not warn regardless of CONFIG_CPUMASK_OFFSTACK's value. Reported-by: Sedat Dilek <sedat.dilek@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Acked-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org> Link: https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/982 Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200408205323.44490-1-natechancellor@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2020-06-11ARC: [plat-eznps]: Restrict to CONFIG_ISA_ARCOMPACTVineet Gupta1-0/+1
[ Upstream commit 799587d5731db9dcdafaac4002463aa7d9cd6cf7 ] Elide invalid configuration EZNPS + ARCv2, triggered by a make allyesconfig build. Granted the root cause is in source code (asm/barrier.h) where we check for ARCv2 before PLAT_EZNPS, but it is better to avoid such combinations at onset rather then baking subtle nuances into code. Reported-by: kbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@synopsys.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2020-06-11ARC: Fix ICCM & DCCM runtime size checksEugeniy Paltsev1-2/+3
[ Upstream commit 43900edf67d7ef3ac8909854d75b8a1fba2d570c ] As of today the ICCM and DCCM size checks are incorrectly using mismatched units (KiB checked against bytes). The CONFIG_ARC_DCCM_SZ and CONFIG_ARC_ICCM_SZ are in KiB, but the size calculated in runtime and stored in cpu->dccm.sz and cpu->iccm.sz is in bytes. Fix that. Reported-by: Paul Greco <pmgreco@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Eugeniy Paltsev <Eugeniy.Paltsev@synopsys.com> Signed-off-by: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@synopsys.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2020-06-11s390/ftrace: save traced function callerVasily Gorbik1-0/+1
[ Upstream commit b4adfe55915d8363e244e42386d69567db1719b9 ] A typical backtrace acquired from ftraced function currently looks like the following (e.g. for "path_openat"): arch_stack_walk+0x15c/0x2d8 stack_trace_save+0x50/0x68 stack_trace_call+0x15a/0x3b8 ftrace_graph_caller+0x0/0x1c 0x3e0007e3c98 <- ftraced function caller (should be do_filp_open+0x7c/0xe8) do_open_execat+0x70/0x1b8 __do_execve_file.isra.0+0x7d8/0x860 __s390x_sys_execve+0x56/0x68 system_call+0xdc/0x2d8 Note random "0x3e0007e3c98" stack value as ftraced function caller. This value causes either imprecise unwinder result or unwinding failure. That "0x3e0007e3c98" comes from r14 of ftraced function stack frame, which it haven't had a chance to initialize since the very first instruction calls ftrace code ("ftrace_caller"). (ftraced function might never save r14 as well). Nevertheless according to s390 ABI any function is called with stack frame allocated for it and r14 contains return address. "ftrace_caller" itself is called with "brasl %r0,ftrace_caller". So, to fix this issue simply always save traced function caller onto ftraced function stack frame. Reported-by: Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2020-06-03KVM: VMX: check for existence of secondary exec controls before accessingSean Christopherson1-3/+4
commit fd6b6d9b82f97a851fb0078201ddc38fe9728cda upstream. Return early from vmx_set_virtual_apic_mode() if the processor doesn't support VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES or VIRTUALIZE_X2APIC_MODE, both of which reside in SECONDARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL. This eliminates warnings due to VMWRITEs to SECONDARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL (VMCS field 401e) failing on processors without secondary exec controls. Remove the similar check for TPR shadowing as it is incorporated in the flexpriority_enabled check and the APIC-related code in vmx_update_msr_bitmap() is further gated by VIRTUALIZE_X2APIC_MODE. Reported-by: Gerhard Wiesinger <redhat@wiesinger.com> Fixes: 8d860bbeedef ("kvm: vmx: Basic APIC virtualization controls have three settings") Cc: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-06-03copy_xstate_to_kernel(): don't leave parts of destination uninitializedAl Viro1-38/+48
commit 9e4636545933131de15e1ecd06733538ae939b2f upstream. copy the corresponding pieces of init_fpstate into the gaps instead. Cc: stable@kernel.org Tested-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-06-03x86/dma: Fix max PFN arithmetic overflow on 32 bit systemsAlexander Dahl1-1/+1
commit 88743470668ef5eb6b7ba9e0f99888e5999bf172 upstream. The intermediate result of the old term (4UL * 1024 * 1024 * 1024) is 4 294 967 296 or 0x100000000 which is no problem on 64 bit systems. The patch does not change the later overall result of 0x100000 for MAX_DMA32_PFN (after it has been shifted by PAGE_SHIFT). The new calculation yields the same result, but does not require 64 bit arithmetic. On 32 bit systems the old calculation suffers from an arithmetic overflow in that intermediate term in braces: 4UL aka unsigned long int is 4 byte wide and an arithmetic overflow happens (the 0x100000000 does not fit in 4 bytes), the in braces result is truncated to zero, the following right shift does not alter that, so MAX_DMA32_PFN evaluates to 0 on 32 bit systems. That wrong value is a problem in a comparision against MAX_DMA32_PFN in the init code for swiotlb in pci_swiotlb_detect_4gb() to decide if swiotlb should be active. That comparison yields the opposite result, when compiling on 32 bit systems. This was not possible before 1b7e03ef7570 ("x86, NUMA: Enable emulation on 32bit too") when that MAX_DMA32_PFN was first made visible to x86_32 (and which landed in v3.0). In practice this wasn't a problem, unless CONFIG_SWIOTLB is active on x86-32. However if one has set CONFIG_IOMMU_INTEL, since c5a5dc4cbbf4 ("iommu/vt-d: Don't switch off swiotlb if bounce page is used") there's a dependency on CONFIG_SWIOTLB, which was not necessarily active before. That landed in v5.4, where we noticed it in the fli4l Linux distribution. We have CONFIG_IOMMU_INTEL active on both 32 and 64 bit kernel configs there (I could not find out why, so let's just say historical reasons). The effect is at boot time 64 MiB (default size) were allocated for bounce buffers now, which is a noticeable amount of memory on small systems like pcengines ALIX 2D3 with 256 MiB memory, which are still frequently used as home routers. We noticed this effect when migrating from kernel v4.19 (LTS) to v5.4 (LTS) in fli4l and got that kernel messages for example: Linux version 5.4.22 (buildroot@buildroot) (gcc version 7.3.0 (Buildroot 2018.02.8)) #1 SMP Mon Nov 26 23:40:00 CET 2018 … Memory: 183484K/261756K available (4594K kernel code, 393K rwdata, 1660K rodata, 536K init, 456K bss , 78272K reserved, 0K cma-reserved, 0K highmem) … PCI-DMA: Using software bounce buffering for IO (SWIOTLB) software IO TLB: mapped [mem 0x0bb78000-0x0fb78000] (64MB) The initial analysis and the suggested fix was done by user 'sourcejedi' at stackoverflow and explicitly marked as GPLv2 for inclusion in the Linux kernel: https://unix.stackexchange.com/a/520525/50007 The new calculation, which does not suffer from that overflow, is the same as for arch/mips now as suggested by Robin Murphy. The fix was tested by fli4l users on round about two dozen different systems, including both 32 and 64 bit archs, bare metal and virtualized machines. [ bp: Massage commit message. ] Fixes: 1b7e03ef7570 ("x86, NUMA: Enable emulation on 32bit too") Reported-by: Alan Jenkins <alan.christopher.jenkins@gmail.com> Suggested-by: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Alexander Dahl <post@lespocky.de> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://unix.stackexchange.com/q/520065/50007 Link: https://web.nettworks.org/bugs/browse/FFL-2560 Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200526175749.20742-1-post@lespocky.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-06-03parisc: Fix kernel panic in mem_init()Helge Deller1-1/+1
commit bf71bc16e02162388808949b179d59d0b571b965 upstream. The Debian kernel v5.6 triggers this kernel panic: Kernel panic - not syncing: Bad Address (null pointer deref?) Bad Address (null pointer deref?): Code=26 (Data memory access rights trap) at addr 0000000000000000 CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 5.6.0-2-parisc64 #1 Debian 5.6.14-1 IAOQ[0]: mem_init+0xb0/0x150 IAOQ[1]: mem_init+0xb4/0x150 RP(r2): start_kernel+0x6c8/0x1190 Backtrace: [<0000000040101ab4>] start_kernel+0x6c8/0x1190 [<0000000040108574>] start_parisc+0x158/0x1b8 on a HP-PARISC rp3440 machine with this memory layout: Memory Ranges: 0) Start 0x0000000000000000 End 0x000000003fffffff Size 1024 MB 1) Start 0x0000004040000000 End 0x00000040ffdfffff Size 3070 MB Fix the crash by avoiding virt_to_page() and similar functions in mem_init() until the memory zones have been fully set up. Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.0+ Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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