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2019-07-08Merge tag 'v5.2' into perf/core, to pick up fixesIngo Molnar17-100/+140
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2019-07-06Merge tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvmLinus Torvalds3-14/+24
Pull kvm fixes from Paolo Bonzini: "x86 bugfix patches and one compilation fix for ARM" * tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm: KVM: arm64/sve: Fix vq_present() macro to yield a bool KVM: LAPIC: Fix pending interrupt in IRR blocked by software disable LAPIC KVM: nVMX: Change KVM_STATE_NESTED_EVMCS to signal vmcs12 is copied from eVMCS KVM: nVMX: Allow restore nested-state to enable eVMCS when vCPU in SMM KVM: x86: degrade WARN to pr_warn_ratelimited
2019-07-04Merge branch 'x86/cpu' into perf/core, to pick up revertIngo Molnar9-316/+85
perf/core has an earlier version of the x86/cpu tree merged, to avoid conflicts, and due to this we want to pick up this ABI impacting revert as well: 049331f277fe: ("x86/fsgsbase: Revert FSGSBASE support") Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2019-07-04Merge tag 'trace-v5.2-rc5' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-0/+10
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt: "This includes three fixes: - Fix a deadlock from a previous fix to keep module loading and function tracing text modifications from stepping on each other (this has a few patches to help document the issue in comments) - Fix a crash when the snapshot buffer gets out of sync with the main ring buffer - Fix a memory leak when reading the memory logs" * tag 'trace-v5.2-rc5' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace: ftrace/x86: Anotate text_mutex split between ftrace_arch_code_modify_post_process() and ftrace_arch_code_modify_prepare() tracing/snapshot: Resize spare buffer if size changed tracing: Fix memory leak in tracing_err_log_open() ftrace/x86: Add a comment to why we take text_mutex in ftrace_arch_code_modify_prepare() ftrace/x86: Remove possible deadlock between register_kprobe() and ftrace_run_update_code()
2019-07-03x86/fsgsbase: Revert FSGSBASE supportThomas Gleixner7-326/+50
The FSGSBASE series turned out to have serious bugs and there is still an open issue which is not fully understood yet. The confidence in those changes has become close to zero especially as the test cases which have been shipped with that series were obviously never run before sending the final series out to LKML. ./fsgsbase_64 >/dev/null Segmentation fault As the merge window is close, the only sane decision is to revert FSGSBASE support. The revert is necessary as this branch has been merged into perf/core already and rebasing all of that a few days before the merge window is not the most brilliant idea. I could definitely slap myself for not noticing the test case fail when merging that series, but TBH my expectations weren't that low back then. Won't happen again. Revert the following commits: 539bca535dec ("x86/entry/64: Fix and clean up paranoid_exit") 2c7b5ac5d5a9 ("Documentation/x86/64: Add documentation for GS/FS addressing mode") f987c955c745 ("x86/elf: Enumerate kernel FSGSBASE capability in AT_HWCAP2") 2032f1f96ee0 ("x86/cpu: Enable FSGSBASE on 64bit by default and add a chicken bit") 5bf0cab60ee2 ("x86/entry/64: Document GSBASE handling in the paranoid path") 708078f65721 ("x86/entry/64: Handle FSGSBASE enabled paranoid entry/exit") 79e1932fa3ce ("x86/entry/64: Introduce the FIND_PERCPU_BASE macro") 1d07316b1363 ("x86/entry/64: Switch CR3 before SWAPGS in paranoid entry") f60a83df4593 ("x86/process/64: Use FSGSBASE instructions on thread copy and ptrace") 1ab5f3f7fe3d ("x86/process/64: Use FSBSBASE in switch_to() if available") a86b4625138d ("x86/fsgsbase/64: Enable FSGSBASE instructions in helper functions") 8b71340d702e ("x86/fsgsbase/64: Add intrinsics for FSGSBASE instructions") b64ed19b93c3 ("x86/cpu: Add 'unsafe_fsgsbase' to enable CR4.FSGSBASE") Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Chang S. Bae <chang.seok.bae@intel.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Ravi Shankar <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2019-07-02ftrace/x86: Anotate text_mutex split between ↵Jiri Kosina1-0/+2
ftrace_arch_code_modify_post_process() and ftrace_arch_code_modify_prepare() ftrace_arch_code_modify_prepare() is acquiring text_mutex, while the corresponding release is happening in ftrace_arch_code_modify_post_process(). This has already been documented in the code, but let's also make the fact that this is intentional clear to the semantic analysis tools such as sparse. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/nycvar.YFH.7.76.1906292321170.27227@cbobk.fhfr.pm Fixes: 39611265edc1a ("ftrace/x86: Add a comment to why we take text_mutex in ftrace_arch_code_modify_prepare()") Fixes: d5b844a2cf507 ("ftrace/x86: Remove possible deadlock between register_kprobe() and ftrace_run_update_code()") Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2019-07-02KVM: LAPIC: Fix pending interrupt in IRR blocked by software disable LAPICWanpeng Li1-1/+1
Thomas reported that: | Background: | | In preparation of supporting IPI shorthands I changed the CPU offline | code to software disable the local APIC instead of just masking it. | That's done by clearing the APIC_SPIV_APIC_ENABLED bit in the APIC_SPIV | register. | | Failure: | | When the CPU comes back online the startup code triggers occasionally | the warning in apic_pending_intr_clear(). That complains that the IRRs | are not empty. | | The offending vector is the local APIC timer vector who's IRR bit is set | and stays set. | | It took me quite some time to reproduce the issue locally, but now I can | see what happens. | | It requires apicv_enabled=0, i.e. full apic emulation. With apicv_enabled=1 | (and hardware support) it behaves correctly. | | Here is the series of events: | | Guest CPU | | goes down | | native_cpu_disable() | | apic_soft_disable(); | | play_dead() | | .... | | startup() | | if (apic_enabled()) | apic_pending_intr_clear() <- Not taken | | enable APIC | | apic_pending_intr_clear() <- Triggers warning because IRR is stale | | When this happens then the deadline timer or the regular APIC timer - | happens with both, has fired shortly before the APIC is disabled, but the | interrupt was not serviced because the guest CPU was in an interrupt | disabled region at that point. | | The state of the timer vector ISR/IRR bits: | | ISR IRR | before apic_soft_disable() 0 1 | after apic_soft_disable() 0 1 | | On startup 0 1 | | Now one would assume that the IRR is cleared after the INIT reset, but this | happens only on CPU0. | | Why? | | Because our CPU0 hotplug is just for testing to make sure nothing breaks | and goes through an NMI wakeup vehicle because INIT would send it through | the boots-trap code which is not really working if that CPU was not | physically unplugged. | | Now looking at a real world APIC the situation in that case is: | | ISR IRR | before apic_soft_disable() 0 1 | after apic_soft_disable() 0 1 | | On startup 0 0 | | Why? | | Once the dying CPU reenables interrupts the pending interrupt gets | delivered as a spurious interupt and then the state is clear. | | While that CPU0 hotplug test case is surely an esoteric issue, the APIC | emulation is still wrong, Even if the play_dead() code would not enable | interrupts then the pending IRR bit would turn into an ISR .. interrupt | when the APIC is reenabled on startup. From SDM 10.4.7.2 Local APIC State After It Has Been Software Disabled * Pending interrupts in the IRR and ISR registers are held and require masking or handling by the CPU. In Thomas's testing, hardware cpu will not respect soft disable LAPIC when IRR has already been set or APICv posted-interrupt is in flight, so we can skip soft disable APIC checking when clearing IRR and set ISR, continue to respect soft disable APIC when attempting to set IRR. Reported-by: Rong Chen <rong.a.chen@intel.com> Reported-by: Feng Tang <feng.tang@intel.com> Reported-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Tested-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Rong Chen <rong.a.chen@intel.com> Cc: Feng Tang <feng.tang@intel.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2019-07-02KVM: nVMX: Change KVM_STATE_NESTED_EVMCS to signal vmcs12 is copied from eVMCSLiran Alon1-9/+16
Currently KVM_STATE_NESTED_EVMCS is used to signal that eVMCS capability is enabled on vCPU. As indicated by vmx->nested.enlightened_vmcs_enabled. This is quite bizarre as userspace VMM should make sure to expose same vCPU with same CPUID values in both source and destination. In case vCPU is exposed with eVMCS support on CPUID, it is also expected to enable KVM_CAP_HYPERV_ENLIGHTENED_VMCS capability. Therefore, KVM_STATE_NESTED_EVMCS is redundant. KVM_STATE_NESTED_EVMCS is currently used on restore path (vmx_set_nested_state()) only to enable eVMCS capability in KVM and to signal need_vmcs12_sync such that on next VMEntry to guest nested_sync_from_vmcs12() will be called to sync vmcs12 content into eVMCS in guest memory. However, because restore nested-state is rare enough, we could have just modified vmx_set_nested_state() to always signal need_vmcs12_sync. From all the above, it seems that we could have just removed the usage of KVM_STATE_NESTED_EVMCS. However, in order to preserve backwards migration compatibility, we cannot do that. (vmx_get_nested_state() needs to signal flag when migrating from new kernel to old kernel). Returning KVM_STATE_NESTED_EVMCS when just vCPU have eVMCS enabled have a bad side-effect of userspace VMM having to send nested-state from source to destination as part of migration stream. Even if guest have never used eVMCS as it doesn't even run a nested hypervisor workload. This requires destination userspace VMM and KVM to support setting nested-state. Which make it more difficult to migrate from new host to older host. To avoid this, change KVM_STATE_NESTED_EVMCS to signal eVMCS is not only enabled but also active. i.e. Guest have made some eVMCS active via an enlightened VMEntry. i.e. vmcs12 is copied from eVMCS and therefore should be restored into eVMCS resident in memory (by copy_vmcs12_to_enlightened()). Reviewed-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Maran Wilson <maran.wilson@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Krish Sadhukhan <krish.sadhukhan@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2019-07-02KVM: nVMX: Allow restore nested-state to enable eVMCS when vCPU in SMMLiran Alon1-1/+4
As comment in code specifies, SMM temporarily disables VMX so we cannot be in guest mode, nor can VMLAUNCH/VMRESUME be pending. However, code currently assumes that these are the only flags that can be set on kvm_state->flags. This is not true as KVM_STATE_NESTED_EVMCS can also be set on this field to signal that eVMCS should be enabled. Therefore, fix code to check for guest-mode and pending VMLAUNCH/VMRESUME explicitly. Reviewed-by: Joao Martins <joao.m.martins@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2019-07-02KVM: x86: degrade WARN to pr_warn_ratelimitedPaolo Bonzini1-3/+3
This warning can be triggered easily by userspace, so it should certainly not cause a panic if panic_on_warn is set. Reported-by: syzbot+c03f30b4f4c46bdf8575@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Suggested-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Acked-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2019-07-02x86/entry/64: Fix and clean up paranoid_exitAndy Lutomirski1-16/+17
paranoid_exit needs to restore CR3 before GSBASE. Doing it in the opposite order crashes if the exception came from a context with user GSBASE and user CR3 -- RESTORE_CR3 cannot resture user CR3 if run with user GSBASE. This results in infinitely recursing exceptions if user code does SYSENTER with TF set if both FSGSBASE and PTI are enabled. The old code worked if user code just set TF without SYSENTER because #DB from user mode is special cased in idtentry and paranoid_exit doesn't run. Fix it by cleaning up the spaghetti code. All that paranoid_exit needs to do is to disable IRQs, handle IRQ tracing, then restore CR3, and restore GSBASE. Simply do those actions in that order. Fixes: 708078f65721 ("x86/entry/64: Handle FSGSBASE enabled paranoid entry/exit") Reported-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Chang S. Bae <chang.seok.bae@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Ravi Shankar <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/59725ceb08977359489fbed979716949ad45f616.1562035429.git.luto@kernel.org
2019-07-02x86/entry/64: Don't compile ignore_sysret if 32-bit emulation is enabledAndy Lutomirski1-0/+6
It's only used if !CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION, so disable it in normal configs. This will save a few bytes of text and reduce confusion. Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "BaeChang Seok" <chang.seok.bae@intel.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: "Bae, Chang Seok" <chang.seok.bae@intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/0f7dafa72fe7194689de5ee8cfe5d83509fabcf5.1562035429.git.luto@kernel.org
2019-06-29Merge branch 'x86-urgent-for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds8-55/+89
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 fixes from Ingo Molnar: "Misc fixes all over the place: - might_sleep() atomicity fix in the microcode loader - resctrl boundary condition fix - APIC arithmethics bug fix for frequencies >= 4.2 GHz - three 5-level paging crash fixes - two speculation fixes - a perf/stacktrace fix" * 'x86-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/unwind/orc: Fall back to using frame pointers for generated code perf/x86: Always store regs->ip in perf_callchain_kernel() x86/speculation: Allow guests to use SSBD even if host does not x86/mm: Handle physical-virtual alignment mismatch in phys_p4d_init() x86/boot/64: Add missing fixup_pointer() for next_early_pgt access x86/boot/64: Fix crash if kernel image crosses page table boundary x86/apic: Fix integer overflow on 10 bit left shift of cpu_khz x86/resctrl: Prevent possible overrun during bitmap operations x86/microcode: Fix the microcode load on CPU hotplug for real
2019-06-29Merge branch 'perf-urgent-for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds5-30/+16
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull perf fixes from Ingo Molnar: "Various fixes, most of them related to bugs perf fuzzing found in the x86 code" * 'perf-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: perf/x86/regs: Use PERF_REG_EXTENDED_MASK perf/x86: Remove pmu->pebs_no_xmm_regs perf/x86: Clean up PEBS_XMM_REGS perf/x86/regs: Check reserved bits perf/x86: Disable extended registers for non-supported PMUs perf/ioctl: Add check for the sample_period value perf/core: Fix perf_sample_regs_user() mm check
2019-06-29Merge branch 'efi-urgent-for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-1/+1
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull EFI fixes from Ingo Molnar: "Four fixes: - fix a kexec crash on arm64 - fix a reboot crash on some Android platforms - future-proof the code for upcoming ACPI 6.2 changes - fix a build warning on x86" * 'efi-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: efibc: Replace variable set function in notifier call x86/efi: fix a -Wtype-limits compilation warning efi/bgrt: Drop BGRT status field reserved bits check efi/memreserve: deal with memreserve entries in unmapped memory
2019-06-28ftrace/x86: Add a comment to why we take text_mutex in ↵Steven Rostedt (VMware)1-0/+5
ftrace_arch_code_modify_prepare() Taking the text_mutex in ftrace_arch_code_modify_prepare() is to fix a race against module loading and live kernel patching that might try to change the text permissions while ftrace has it as read/write. This really needs to be documented in the code. Add a comment that does such. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190627211819.5a591f52@gandalf.local.home Suggested-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2019-06-28ftrace/x86: Remove possible deadlock between register_kprobe() and ↵Petr Mladek1-0/+3
ftrace_run_update_code() The commit 9f255b632bf12c4dd7 ("module: Fix livepatch/ftrace module text permissions race") causes a possible deadlock between register_kprobe() and ftrace_run_update_code() when ftrace is using stop_machine(). The existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 (text_mutex){+.+.}: validate_chain.isra.21+0xb32/0xd70 __lock_acquire+0x4b8/0x928 lock_acquire+0x102/0x230 __mutex_lock+0x88/0x908 mutex_lock_nested+0x32/0x40 register_kprobe+0x254/0x658 init_kprobes+0x11a/0x168 do_one_initcall+0x70/0x318 kernel_init_freeable+0x456/0x508 kernel_init+0x22/0x150 ret_from_fork+0x30/0x34 kernel_thread_starter+0x0/0xc -> #0 (cpu_hotplug_lock.rw_sem){++++}: check_prev_add+0x90c/0xde0 validate_chain.isra.21+0xb32/0xd70 __lock_acquire+0x4b8/0x928 lock_acquire+0x102/0x230 cpus_read_lock+0x62/0xd0 stop_machine+0x2e/0x60 arch_ftrace_update_code+0x2e/0x40 ftrace_run_update_code+0x40/0xa0 ftrace_startup+0xb2/0x168 register_ftrace_function+0x64/0x88 klp_patch_object+0x1a2/0x290 klp_enable_patch+0x554/0x980 do_one_initcall+0x70/0x318 do_init_module+0x6e/0x250 load_module+0x1782/0x1990 __s390x_sys_finit_module+0xaa/0xf0 system_call+0xd8/0x2d0 Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(text_mutex); lock(cpu_hotplug_lock.rw_sem); lock(text_mutex); lock(cpu_hotplug_lock.rw_sem); It is similar problem that has been solved by the commit 2d1e38f56622b9b ("kprobes: Cure hotplug lock ordering issues"). Many locks are involved. To be on the safe side, text_mutex must become a low level lock taken after cpu_hotplug_lock.rw_sem. This can't be achieved easily with the current ftrace design. For example, arm calls set_all_modules_text_rw() already in ftrace_arch_code_modify_prepare(), see arch/arm/kernel/ftrace.c. This functions is called: + outside stop_machine() from ftrace_run_update_code() + without stop_machine() from ftrace_module_enable() Fortunately, the problematic fix is needed only on x86_64. It is the only architecture that calls set_all_modules_text_rw() in ftrace path and supports livepatching at the same time. Therefore it is enough to move text_mutex handling from the generic kernel/trace/ftrace.c into arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c: ftrace_arch_code_modify_prepare() ftrace_arch_code_modify_post_process() This patch basically reverts the ftrace part of the problematic commit 9f255b632bf12c4dd7 ("module: Fix livepatch/ftrace module text permissions race"). And provides x86_64 specific-fix. Some refactoring of the ftrace code will be needed when livepatching is implemented for arm or nds32. These architectures call set_all_modules_text_rw() and use stop_machine() at the same time. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190627081334.12793-1-pmladek@suse.com Fixes: 9f255b632bf12c4dd7 ("module: Fix livepatch/ftrace module text permissions race") Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reported-by: Miroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz> Reviewed-by: Miroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> [ As reviewed by Miroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz>, removed return value of ftrace_run_update_code() as it is a void function. ] Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2019-06-28x86/mtrr: Skip cache flushes on CPUs with cache self-snoopingRicardo Neri1-2/+13
Programming MTRR registers in multi-processor systems is a rather lengthy process. Furthermore, all processors must program these registers in lock step and with interrupts disabled; the process also involves flushing caches and TLBs twice. As a result, the process may take a considerable amount of time. On some platforms, this can lead to a large skew of the refined-jiffies clock source. Early when booting, if no other clock is available (e.g., booting with hpet=disabled), the refined-jiffies clock source is used to monitor the TSC clock source. If the skew of refined-jiffies is too large, Linux wrongly assumes that the TSC is unstable: clocksource: timekeeping watchdog on CPU1: Marking clocksource 'tsc-early' as unstable because the skew is too large: clocksource: 'refined-jiffies' wd_now: fffedc10 wd_last: fffedb90 mask: ffffffff clocksource: 'tsc-early' cs_now: 5eccfddebc cs_last: 5e7e3303d4 mask: ffffffffffffffff tsc: Marking TSC unstable due to clocksource watchdog As per measurements, around 98% of the time needed by the procedure to program MTRRs in multi-processor systems is spent flushing caches with wbinvd(). As per the Section 11.11.8 of the Intel 64 and IA 32 Architectures Software Developer's Manual, it is not necessary to flush caches if the CPU supports cache self-snooping. Thus, skipping the cache flushes can reduce by several tens of milliseconds the time needed to complete the programming of the MTRR registers: Platform Before After 104-core (208 Threads) Skylake 1437ms 28ms 2-core ( 4 Threads) Haswell 114ms 2ms Reported-by: Mohammad Etemadi <mohammad.etemadi@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri-calderon@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Alan Cox <alan.cox@intel.com> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi.kleen@intel.com> Cc: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Jordan Borgner <mail@jordan-borgner.de> Cc: "Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com> Cc: Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri@intel.com> Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@intel.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Peter Feiner <pfeiner@google.com> Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1561689337-19390-3-git-send-email-ricardo.neri-calderon@linux.intel.com
2019-06-28x86/cpu/intel: Clear cache self-snoop capability in CPUs with known errataRicardo Neri1-0/+27
Processors which have self-snooping capability can handle conflicting memory type across CPUs by snooping its own cache. However, there exists CPU models in which having conflicting memory types still leads to unpredictable behavior, machine check errors, or hangs. Clear this feature on affected CPUs to prevent its use. Suggested-by: Alan Cox <alan.cox@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri-calderon@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi.kleen@intel.com> Cc: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Jordan Borgner <mail@jordan-borgner.de> Cc: "Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com> Cc: Mohammad Etemadi <mohammad.etemadi@intel.com> Cc: Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri@intel.com> Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@intel.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Peter Feiner <pfeiner@google.com> Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1561689337-19390-2-git-send-email-ricardo.neri-calderon@linux.intel.com
2019-06-28x86/unwind/orc: Fall back to using frame pointers for generated codeJosh Poimboeuf1-4/+22
The ORC unwinder can't unwind through BPF JIT generated code because there are no ORC entries associated with the code. If an ORC entry isn't available, try to fall back to frame pointers. If BPF and other generated code always do frame pointer setup (even with CONFIG_FRAME_POINTERS=n) then this will allow ORC to unwind through most generated code despite there being no corresponding ORC entries. Fixes: d15d356887e7 ("perf/x86: Make perf callchains work without CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER") Reported-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Kairui Song <kasong@redhat.com> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/b6f69208ddff4343d56b7bfac1fc7cfcd62689e8.1561595111.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
2019-06-28perf/x86: Always store regs->ip in perf_callchain_kernel()Song Liu1-5/+5
The stacktrace_map_raw_tp BPF selftest is failing because the RIP saved by perf_arch_fetch_caller_regs() isn't getting saved by perf_callchain_kernel(). This was broken by the following commit: d15d356887e7 ("perf/x86: Make perf callchains work without CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER") With that change, when starting with non-HW regs, the unwinder starts with the current stack frame and unwinds until it passes up the frame which called perf_arch_fetch_caller_regs(). So regs->ip needs to be saved deliberately. Fixes: d15d356887e7 ("perf/x86: Make perf callchains work without CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER") Signed-off-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Kairui Song <kasong@redhat.com> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/3975a298fa52b506fea32666d8ff6a13467eee6d.1561595111.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
2019-06-26x86/speculation: Allow guests to use SSBD even if host does notAlejandro Jimenez1-1/+10
The bits set in x86_spec_ctrl_mask are used to calculate the guest's value of SPEC_CTRL that is written to the MSR before VMENTRY, and control which mitigations the guest can enable. In the case of SSBD, unless the host has enabled SSBD always on mode (by passing "spec_store_bypass_disable=on" in the kernel parameters), the SSBD bit is not set in the mask and the guest can not properly enable the SSBD always on mitigation mode. This has been confirmed by running the SSBD PoC on a guest using the SSBD always on mitigation mode (booted with kernel parameter "spec_store_bypass_disable=on"), and verifying that the guest is vulnerable unless the host is also using SSBD always on mode. In addition, the guest OS incorrectly reports the SSB vulnerability as mitigated. Always set the SSBD bit in x86_spec_ctrl_mask when the host CPU supports it, allowing the guest to use SSBD whether or not the host has chosen to enable the mitigation in any of its modes. Fixes: be6fcb5478e9 ("x86/bugs: Rework spec_ctrl base and mask logic") Signed-off-by: Alejandro Jimenez <alejandro.j.jimenez@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Liam Merwick <liam.merwick@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Mark Kanda <mark.kanda@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: bp@alien8.de Cc: rkrcmar@redhat.com Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1560187210-11054-1-git-send-email-alejandro.j.jimenez@oracle.com
2019-06-26x86/mm: Handle physical-virtual alignment mismatch in phys_p4d_init()Kirill A. Shutemov1-11/+13
Kyle has reported occasional crashes when booting a kernel in 5-level paging mode with KASLR enabled: WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 0 at arch/x86/mm/init_64.c:87 phys_p4d_init+0x1d4/0x1ea RIP: 0010:phys_p4d_init+0x1d4/0x1ea Call Trace: __kernel_physical_mapping_init+0x10a/0x35c kernel_physical_mapping_init+0xe/0x10 init_memory_mapping+0x1aa/0x3b0 init_range_memory_mapping+0xc8/0x116 init_mem_mapping+0x225/0x2eb setup_arch+0x6ff/0xcf5 start_kernel+0x64/0x53b ? copy_bootdata+0x1f/0xce x86_64_start_reservations+0x24/0x26 x86_64_start_kernel+0x8a/0x8d secondary_startup_64+0xb6/0xc0 which causes later: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ff484d019580eff8 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page BAD Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI RIP: 0010:fill_pud+0x13/0x130 Call Trace: set_pte_vaddr_p4d+0x2e/0x50 set_pte_vaddr+0x6f/0xb0 __native_set_fixmap+0x28/0x40 native_set_fixmap+0x39/0x70 register_lapic_address+0x49/0xb6 early_acpi_boot_init+0xa5/0xde setup_arch+0x944/0xcf5 start_kernel+0x64/0x53b Kyle bisected the issue to commit b569c1843498 ("x86/mm/KASLR: Reduce randomization granularity for 5-level paging to 1GB") Before this commit PAGE_OFFSET was always aligned to P4D_SIZE when booting 5-level paging mode. But now only PUD_SIZE alignment is guaranteed. In the case I was able to reproduce the following vaddr/paddr values were observed in phys_p4d_init(): Iteration vaddr paddr 1 0xff4228027fe00000 0x033fe00000 2 0xff42287f40000000 0x8000000000 'vaddr' in both cases belongs to the same p4d entry. But due to the original assumption that PAGE_OFFSET is aligned to P4D_SIZE this overlap cannot be handled correctly. The code assumes strictly aligned entries and unconditionally increments the index into the P4D table, which creates false duplicate entries. Once the index reaches the end, the last entry in the page table is missing. Aside of that the 'paddr >= paddr_end' condition can evaluate wrong which causes an P4D entry to be cleared incorrectly. Change the loop in phys_p4d_init() to walk purely based on virtual addresses like __kernel_physical_mapping_init() does. This makes it work correctly with unaligned virtual addresses. Fixes: b569c1843498 ("x86/mm/KASLR: Reduce randomization granularity for 5-level paging to 1GB") Reported-by: Kyle Pelton <kyle.d.pelton@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Tested-by: Kyle Pelton <kyle.d.pelton@intel.com> Acked-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190624123150.920-1-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
2019-06-26x86/boot/64: Add missing fixup_pointer() for next_early_pgt accessKirill A. Shutemov1-1/+2
__startup_64() uses fixup_pointer() to access global variables in a position-independent fashion. Access to next_early_pgt was wrapped into the helper, but one instance in the 5-level paging branch was missed. GCC generates a R_X86_64_PC32 PC-relative relocation for the access which doesn't trigger the issue, but Clang emmits a R_X86_64_32S which leads to an invalid memory access and system reboot. Fixes: 187e91fe5e91 ("x86/boot/64/clang: Use fixup_pointer() to access 'next_early_pgt'") Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190620112422.29264-1-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
2019-06-26x86/boot/64: Fix crash if kernel image crosses page table boundaryKirill A. Shutemov1-8/+9
A kernel which boots in 5-level paging mode crashes in a small percentage of cases if KASLR is enabled. This issue was tracked down to the case when the kernel image unpacks in a way that it crosses an 1G boundary. The crash is caused by an overrun of the PMD page table in __startup_64() and corruption of P4D page table allocated next to it. This particular issue is not visible with 4-level paging as P4D page tables are not used. But the P4D and the PUD calculation have similar problems. The PMD index calculation is wrong due to operator precedence, which fails to confine the PMDs in the PMD array on wrap around. The P4D calculation for 5-level paging and the PUD calculation calculate the first index correctly, but then blindly increment it which causes the same issue when a kernel image is located across a 512G and for 5-level paging across a 46T boundary. This wrap around mishandling was introduced when these parts moved from assembly to C. Restore it to the correct behaviour. Fixes: c88d71508e36 ("x86/boot/64: Rewrite startup_64() in C") Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190620112345.28833-1-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
2019-06-24perf/x86/rapl: Get quirk state from new probe frameworkJiri Olsa1-79/+3
Getting the apply_quirk bool from new rapl_model_match array. And because apply_quirk was the last remaining piece of data in rapl_cpu_match, replacing it with rapl_model_match as device table. The switch to new perf_msr_probe detection API is done. Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Kan <kan.liang@linux.intel.com> Cc: Liang Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190616140358.27799-9-jolsa@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2019-06-24perf/x86/rapl: Get attributes from new probe frameworkJiri Olsa1-89/+0
We no longer need model specific attribute arrays, because we get all this detected in rapl_events_attrs. Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Kan <kan.liang@linux.intel.com> Cc: Liang Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190616140358.27799-8-jolsa@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2019-06-24perf/x86/rapl: Get MSR values from new probe frameworkJiri Olsa1-42/+11
There's no need to have special code for getting the bit and MSR value for given event. We can now easily get it from rapl_msrs array. Also getting rid of RAPL_IDX_*, which is no longer needed and replacing INTEL_RAPL* with PERF_RAPL* enums. Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Kan <kan.liang@linux.intel.com> Cc: Liang Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190616140358.27799-7-jolsa@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2019-06-24perf/x86/rapl: Get rapl_cntr_mask from new probe frameworkJiri Olsa1-36/+2
We get rapl_cntr_mask from perf_msr_probe call, as a replacement for current intel_rapl_init_fun::cntr_mask value for each model. Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Kan <kan.liang@linux.intel.com> Cc: Liang Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190616140358.27799-6-jolsa@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2019-06-24perf/x86/rapl: Use new MSR detection interfaceJiri Olsa1-1/+191
Using perf_msr_probe function to probe for RAPL MSRs. Adding new rapl_model_match device table, that gathers events info for given model, following the MSR and cstate module design. It will replace the current rapl_cpu_match device table and detection code in following patches. Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Kan <kan.liang@linux.intel.com> Cc: Liang Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190616140358.27799-5-jolsa@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2019-06-24perf/x86/cstate: Use new probe functionJiri Olsa1-65/+87
Using perf_msr_probe function to probe for cstate events. The functionality is the same, with one exception, that perf_msr_probe checks for rdmsr to return value != 0 for given MSR register. Using the new attribute groups and adding the events via pmu::attr_update. Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Kan <kan.liang@linux.intel.com> Cc: Liang Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190616140358.27799-4-jolsa@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2019-06-24perf/x86/msr: Use new probe functionJiri Olsa1-50/+60
Using perf_msr_probe function to probe for msr events. The functionality is the same, with one exception, that perf_msr_probe checks for rdmsr to return value != 0 for given MSR register. Using the new attribute groups and adding the events via pmu::attr_update. Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Kan <kan.liang@linux.intel.com> Cc: Liang Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190616140358.27799-3-jolsa@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2019-06-24perf/x86: Add MSR probe interfaceJiri Olsa3-1/+75
Adding perf_msr_probe function to provide interface for checking up on MSR register and set the related attribute group visibility. User defines following struct for each MSR register: struct perf_msr { u64 msr; struct attribute_group *grp; bool (*test)(int idx, void *data); bool no_check; }; Where: msr - is the MSR address attrs - is attribute groups array to add if the check passed test - is test function pointer no_check - is bool that bypass the check and adds the attribute without any test The array of struct perf_msr is passed into: perf_msr_probe(struct perf_msr *msr, int cnt, bool zero, void *data) Together with: cnt - which is the number of struct msr array elements data - which is user pointer passed to the test function zero - allow counters that returns zero on rdmsr The perf_msr_probe will executed test code, read the MSR and check the value is != 0. If all these tests pass, related attribute group is kept visible. Also adding PMU_EVENT_GROUP macro helper to define attribute group for single attribute. It will be used in following patches. Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Kan <kan.liang@linux.intel.com> Cc: Liang Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190616140358.27799-2-jolsa@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2019-06-24Merge branch 'x86/cpu' into perf/core, to pick up dependent patchesIngo Molnar23-92/+791
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2019-06-24Merge tag 'v5.2-rc6' into perf/core, to refresh branchIngo Molnar103-444/+252
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2019-06-24perf/x86: Remove pmu->pebs_no_xmm_regsKan Liang3-7/+4
We don't need pmu->pebs_no_xmm_regs anymore, the capabilities PERF_PMU_CAP_EXTENDED_REGS can be used to check if XMM registers collection is supported. Signed-off-by: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1559081314-9714-4-git-send-email-kan.liang@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2019-06-24perf/x86: Clean up PEBS_XMM_REGSKan Liang3-21/+3
Use generic macro PERF_REG_EXTENDED_MASK to replace PEBS_XMM_REGS to avoid duplication. Signed-off-by: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1559081314-9714-3-git-send-email-kan.liang@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2019-06-24perf/x86/regs: Check reserved bitsKan Liang1-2/+5
The perf fuzzer triggers a warning which map to: if (WARN_ON_ONCE(idx >= ARRAY_SIZE(pt_regs_offset))) return 0; The bits between XMM registers and generic registers are reserved. But perf_reg_validate() doesn't check these bits. Add PERF_REG_X86_RESERVED for reserved bits on X86. Check the reserved bits in perf_reg_validate(). Reported-by: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu> Signed-off-by: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Fixes: 878068ea270e ("perf/x86: Support outputting XMM registers") Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1559081314-9714-2-git-send-email-kan.liang@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2019-06-24perf/x86: Disable extended registers for non-supported PMUsKan Liang2-0/+4
The perf fuzzer caused Skylake machine to crash: [ 9680.085831] Call Trace: [ 9680.088301] <IRQ> [ 9680.090363] perf_output_sample_regs+0x43/0xa0 [ 9680.094928] perf_output_sample+0x3aa/0x7a0 [ 9680.099181] perf_event_output_forward+0x53/0x80 [ 9680.103917] __perf_event_overflow+0x52/0xf0 [ 9680.108266] ? perf_trace_run_bpf_submit+0xc0/0xc0 [ 9680.113108] perf_swevent_hrtimer+0xe2/0x150 [ 9680.117475] ? check_preempt_wakeup+0x181/0x230 [ 9680.122091] ? check_preempt_curr+0x62/0x90 [ 9680.126361] ? ttwu_do_wakeup+0x19/0x140 [ 9680.130355] ? try_to_wake_up+0x54/0x460 [ 9680.134366] ? reweight_entity+0x15b/0x1a0 [ 9680.138559] ? __queue_work+0x103/0x3f0 [ 9680.142472] ? update_dl_rq_load_avg+0x1cd/0x270 [ 9680.147194] ? timerqueue_del+0x1e/0x40 [ 9680.151092] ? __remove_hrtimer+0x35/0x70 [ 9680.155191] __hrtimer_run_queues+0x100/0x280 [ 9680.159658] hrtimer_interrupt+0x100/0x220 [ 9680.163835] smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x6a/0x140 [ 9680.168555] apic_timer_interrupt+0xf/0x20 [ 9680.172756] </IRQ> The XMM registers can only be collected by PEBS hardware events on the platforms with PEBS baseline support, e.g. Icelake, not software/probe events. Add capabilities flag PERF_PMU_CAP_EXTENDED_REGS to indicate the PMU which support extended registers. For X86, the extended registers are XMM registers. Add has_extended_regs() to check if extended registers are applied. The generic code define the mask of extended registers as 0 if arch headers haven't overridden it. Originally-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Reported-by: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu> Signed-off-by: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Fixes: 878068ea270e ("perf/x86: Support outputting XMM registers") Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1559081314-9714-1-git-send-email-kan.liang@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2019-06-24x86/umwait: Add sysfs interface to control umwait maximum timeFenghua Yu1-0/+36
IA32_UMWAIT_CONTROL[31:2] determines the maximum time in TSC-quanta that processor can stay in C0.1 or C0.2. A zero value means no maximum time. Each instruction sets its own deadline in the instruction's implicit input EDX:EAX value. The instruction wakes up if the time-stamp counter reaches or exceeds the specified deadline, or the umwait maximum time expires, or a store happens in the monitored address range in umwait. The administrator can write an unsigned 32-bit number to /sys/devices/system/cpu/umwait_control/max_time to change the default value. Note that a value of zero means there is no limit. The lower two bits of the value must be zero. [ tglx: Simplify the write function. Massage changelog ] Signed-off-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: "Borislav Petkov" <bp@alien8.de> Cc: "H Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: "Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org> Cc: "Peter Zijlstra" <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: "Ravi V Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1560994438-235698-5-git-send-email-fenghua.yu@intel.com
2019-06-24x86/umwait: Add sysfs interface to control umwait C0.2 stateFenghua Yu1-8/+110
C0.2 state in umwait and tpause instructions can be enabled or disabled on a processor through IA32_UMWAIT_CONTROL MSR register. By default, C0.2 is enabled and the user wait instructions results in lower power consumption with slower wakeup time. But in real time systems which require faster wakeup time although power savings could be smaller, the administrator needs to disable C0.2 and all umwait invocations from user applications use C0.1. Create a sysfs interface which allows the administrator to control C0.2 state during run time. Andy Lutomirski suggested to turn off local irqs before writing the MSR to ensure the cached control value is not changed by a concurrent sysfs write from a different CPU via IPI. [ tglx: Simplified the update logic in the write function and got rid of all the convoluted type casts. Added a shared update function and made the namespace consistent. Moved the sysfs create invocation. Massaged changelog ] Signed-off-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: "Borislav Petkov" <bp@alien8.de> Cc: "H Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: "Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org> Cc: "Peter Zijlstra" <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: "Ravi V Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1560994438-235698-4-git-send-email-fenghua.yu@intel.com
2019-06-24x86/umwait: Initialize umwait control valuesFenghua Yu3-0/+72
umwait or tpause allows the processor to enter a light-weight power/performance optimized state (C0.1 state) or an improved power/performance optimized state (C0.2 state) for a period specified by the instruction or until the system time limit or until a store to the monitored address range in umwait. IA32_UMWAIT_CONTROL MSR register allows the OS to enable/disable C0.2 on the processor and to set the maximum time the processor can reside in C0.1 or C0.2. By default C0.2 is enabled so the user wait instructions can enter the C0.2 state to save more power with slower wakeup time. Andy Lutomirski proposed to set the maximum umwait time to 100000 cycles by default. A quote from Andy: "What I want to avoid is the case where it works dramatically differently on NO_HZ_FULL systems as compared to everything else. Also, UMWAIT may behave a bit differently if the max timeout is hit, and I'd like that path to get exercised widely by making it happen even on default configs." A sysfs interface to adjust the time and the C0.2 enablement is provided in a follow up change. [ tglx: Renamed MSR_IA32_UMWAIT_CONTROL_MAX_TIME to MSR_IA32_UMWAIT_CONTROL_TIME_MASK because the constant is used as mask throughout the code. Massaged comments and changelog ] Signed-off-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: "Borislav Petkov" <bp@alien8.de> Cc: "H Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: "Peter Zijlstra" <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: "Tony Luck" <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: "Ravi V Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1560994438-235698-3-git-send-email-fenghua.yu@intel.com
2019-06-24x86/cpufeatures: Enumerate user wait instructionsFenghua Yu1-0/+1
umonitor, umwait, and tpause are a set of user wait instructions. umonitor arms address monitoring hardware using an address. The address range is determined by using CPUID.0x5. A store to an address within the specified address range triggers the monitoring hardware to wake up the processor waiting in umwait. umwait instructs the processor to enter an implementation-dependent optimized state while monitoring a range of addresses. The optimized state may be either a light-weight power/performance optimized state (C0.1 state) or an improved power/performance optimized state (C0.2 state). tpause instructs the processor to enter an implementation-dependent optimized state C0.1 or C0.2 state and wake up when time-stamp counter reaches specified timeout. The three instructions may be executed at any privilege level. The instructions provide power saving method while waiting in user space. Additionally, they can allow a sibling hyperthread to make faster progress while this thread is waiting. One example of an application usage of umwait is when waiting for input data from another application, such as a user level multi-threaded packet processing engine. Availability of the user wait instructions is indicated by the presence of the CPUID feature flag WAITPKG CPUID.0x07.0x0:ECX[5]. Detailed information on the instructions and CPUID feature WAITPKG flag can be found in the latest Intel Architecture Instruction Set Extensions and Future Features Programming Reference and Intel 64 and IA-32 Architectures Software Developer's Manual. Signed-off-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: "Borislav Petkov" <bp@alien8.de> Cc: "H Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: "Peter Zijlstra" <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: "Tony Luck" <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: "Ravi V Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1560994438-235698-2-git-send-email-fenghua.yu@intel.com
2019-06-22x86/cpu: Disable frequency requests via aperfmperf IPI for nohz_full CPUsKonstantin Khlebnikov1-1/+11
Since commit 7d5905dc14a8 ("x86 / CPU: Always show current CPU frequency in /proc/cpuinfo") open and read of /proc/cpuinfo sends IPI to all CPUs. Many applications read /proc/cpuinfo at the start for trivial reasons like counting cores or detecting cpu features. While sensitive workloads like DPDK network polling don't like any interrupts. Integrates this feature with cpu isolation and do not send IPIs to CPUs without housekeeping flag HK_FLAG_MISC (set by nohz_full). Code that requests cpu frequency like show_cpuinfo() falls back to the last frequency set by the cpufreq driver if this method returns 0. Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org> Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/155790354043.1104.15333317408370209.stgit@buzz
2019-06-22x86/apic: Fix integer overflow on 10 bit left shift of cpu_khzColin Ian King1-1/+2
The left shift of unsigned int cpu_khz will overflow for large values of cpu_khz, so cast it to a long long before shifting it to avoid overvlow. For example, this can happen when cpu_khz is 4194305, i.e. ~4.2 GHz. Addresses-Coverity: ("Unintentional integer overflow") Fixes: 8c3ba8d04924 ("x86, apic: ack all pending irqs when crashed/on kexec") Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: kernel-janitors@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190619181446.13635-1-colin.king@canonical.com
2019-06-22x86/acpi/cstate: Add Zhaoxin processors support for cache flush policy in C3Tony W Wang-oc1-0/+15
Same as Intel, Zhaoxin MP CPUs support C3 share cache and on all recent Zhaoxin platforms ARB_DISABLE is a nop. So set related flags correctly in the same way as Intel does. Signed-off-by: Tony W Wang-oc <TonyWWang-oc@zhaoxin.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "hpa@zytor.com" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: "gregkh@linuxfoundation.org" <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: "rjw@rjwysocki.net" <rjw@rjwysocki.net> Cc: "lenb@kernel.org" <lenb@kernel.org> Cc: David Wang <DavidWang@zhaoxin.com> Cc: "Cooper Yan(BJ-RD)" <CooperYan@zhaoxin.com> Cc: "Qiyuan Wang(BJ-RD)" <QiyuanWang@zhaoxin.com> Cc: "Herry Yang(BJ-RD)" <HerryYang@zhaoxin.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/a370503660994669991a7f7cda7c5e98@zhaoxin.com
2019-06-22x86/cpu: Create Zhaoxin processors architecture support fileTony W Wang-oc4-1/+183
Add x86 architecture support for new Zhaoxin processors. Carve out initialization code needed by Zhaoxin processors into a separate compilation unit. To identify Zhaoxin CPU, add a new vendor type X86_VENDOR_ZHAOXIN for system recognition. Signed-off-by: Tony W Wang-oc <TonyWWang-oc@zhaoxin.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "hpa@zytor.com" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: "gregkh@linuxfoundation.org" <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: "rjw@rjwysocki.net" <rjw@rjwysocki.net> Cc: "lenb@kernel.org" <lenb@kernel.org> Cc: David Wang <DavidWang@zhaoxin.com> Cc: "Cooper Yan(BJ-RD)" <CooperYan@zhaoxin.com> Cc: "Qiyuan Wang(BJ-RD)" <QiyuanWang@zhaoxin.com> Cc: "Herry Yang(BJ-RD)" <HerryYang@zhaoxin.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/01042674b2f741b2aed1f797359bdffb@zhaoxin.com
2019-06-22x86/cpu: Split Tremont based Atoms from the restAndy Shevchenko1-0/+1
Split Tremont based Atoms from the rest to keep logical grouping. Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190617115537.33309-1-andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com
2019-06-22x86/elf: Enumerate kernel FSGSBASE capability in AT_HWCAP2Andi Kleen2-1/+6
The kernel needs to explicitly enable FSGSBASE. So, the application needs to know if it can safely use these instructions. Just looking at the CPUID bit is not enough because it may be running in a kernel that does not enable the instructions. One way for the application would be to just try and catch the SIGILL. But that is difficult to do in libraries which may not want to overwrite the signal handlers of the main application. Enumerate the enabled FSGSBASE capability in bit 1 of AT_HWCAP2 in the ELF aux vector. AT_HWCAP2 is already used by PPC for similar purposes. The application can access it open coded or by using the getauxval() function in newer versions of glibc. [ tglx: Massaged changelog ] Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Chang S. Bae <chang.seok.bae@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Ravi Shankar <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1557309753-24073-18-git-send-email-chang.seok.bae@intel.com
2019-06-22x86/cpu: Enable FSGSBASE on 64bit by default and add a chicken bitAndy Lutomirski1-18/+14
Now that FSGSBASE is fully supported, remove unsafe_fsgsbase, enable FSGSBASE by default, and add nofsgsbase to disable it. Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Chang S. Bae <chang.seok.bae@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Ravi Shankar <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1557309753-24073-17-git-send-email-chang.seok.bae@intel.com