summaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/arch/x86/mm
AgeCommit message (Collapse)AuthorFilesLines
2021-12-11x86/sgx: Remove .fixup usagePeter Zijlstra1-0/+10
Create EX_TYPE_FAULT_SGX which does as EX_TYPE_FAULT does, except adds this extra bit that SGX really fancies having. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211110101325.961246679@infradead.org
2021-12-11x86/msr: Remove .fixup usagePeter Zijlstra1-23/+28
Rework the MSR accessors to remove .fixup usage. Add two new extable types (to the 4 already existing msr ones) using the new register infrastructure to record which register should get the error value. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211110101325.364084212@infradead.org
2021-12-11x86/extable: Extend extable functionalityPeter Zijlstra1-4/+36
In order to remove further .fixup usage, extend the extable infrastructure to take additional information from the extable entry sites. Specifically add _ASM_EXTABLE_TYPE_REG() and EX_TYPE_IMM_REG that extend the existing _ASM_EXTABLE_TYPE() by taking an additional register argument and encoding that and an s16 immediate into the existing s32 type field. This limits the actual types to the first byte, 255 seem plenty. Also add a few flags into the type word, specifically CLEAR_AX and CLEAR_DX which clear the return and extended return register. Notes: - due to the % in our register names it's hard to make it more generally usable as arm64 did. - the s16 is far larger than used in these patches, future extentions can easily shrink this to get more bits. - without the bitfield fix this will not compile, because: 0xFF > -1 and we can't even extract the TYPE field. [nathanchance: Build fix for clang-lto builds: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211210234953.3420108-1-nathan@kernel.org ] Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Tested-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211110101325.303890153@infradead.org
2021-12-11x86/entry_32: Remove .fixup usagePeter Zijlstra1-0/+14
Where possible, push the .fixup into code, at the tail of functions. This is hard for macros since they're used in multiple functions, therefore introduce a new extable handler to pop zeros. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211110101325.245184699@infradead.org
2021-12-08x86/sev: Move common memory encryption code to mem_encrypt.cKirill A. Shutemov3-69/+89
SEV and TDX both protect guest memory from host accesses. They both use guest physical address bits to communicate to the hardware which pages receive protection or not. SEV and TDX both assume that all I/O (real devices and virtio) must be performed to pages *without* protection. To add this support, AMD SEV code forces force_dma_unencrypted() to decrypt DMA pages when DMA pages were allocated for I/O. It also uses swiotlb_update_mem_attributes() to update decryption bits in SWIOTLB DMA buffers. Since TDX also uses a similar memory sharing design, all the above mentioned changes can be reused. So move force_dma_unencrypted(), SWIOTLB update code and virtio changes out of mem_encrypt_amd.c to mem_encrypt.c. Introduce a new config option X86_MEM_ENCRYPT that can be selected by platforms which use x86 memory encryption features (needed in both AMD SEV and Intel TDX guest platforms). Since the code is moved from mem_encrypt_amd.c, inherit the same make flags. This is preparation for enabling TDX memory encryption support and it has no functional changes. Co-developed-by: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Tested-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211206135505.75045-4-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
2021-12-08x86/sev: Rename mem_encrypt.c to mem_encrypt_amd.cKuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan2-4/+4
Both Intel TDX and AMD SEV implement memory encryption features. But the bulk of the code in mem_encrypt.c is AMD-specific. Rename the file to mem_encrypt_amd.c. A subsequent patch will extract the parts that can be shared by both TDX and AMD SEV/SME into a generic file. No functional changes. Signed-off-by: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Tested-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211206135505.75045-3-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
2021-12-08x86/sev: Use CC_ATTR attribute to generalize string I/O unrollKuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan1-10/+0
INS/OUTS are not supported in TDX guests and cause #UD. Kernel has to avoid them when running in TDX guest. To support existing usage, string I/O operations are unrolled using IN/OUT instructions. AMD SEV platform implements this support by adding unroll logic in ins#bwl()/outs#bwl() macros with SEV-specific checks. Since TDX VM guests will also need similar support, use CC_ATTR_GUEST_UNROLL_STRING_IO and generic cc_platform_has() API to implement it. String I/O helpers were the last users of sev_key_active() interface and sev_enable_key static key. Remove them. [ bp: Move comment too and do not delete it. ] Suggested-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Tested-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211206135505.75045-2-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
2021-12-08x86: Prepare asm files for straight-line-speculationPeter Zijlstra1-2/+2
Replace all ret/retq instructions with RET in preparation of making RET a macro. Since AS is case insensitive it's a big no-op without RET defined. find arch/x86/ -name \*.S | while read file do sed -i 's/\<ret[q]*\>/RET/' $file done Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211204134907.905503893@infradead.org
2021-12-06x86/mm/64: Flush global TLB on boot and AP bringupJoerg Roedel1-6/+2
The AP bringup code uses the trampoline_pgd page-table which establishes global mappings in the user range of the address space. Flush the global TLB entries after the indentity mappings are removed so no stale entries remain in the TLB. Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211202153226.22946-3-joro@8bytes.org
2021-12-04x86/realmode: Add comment for Global bit usage in trampoline_pgdJoerg Roedel1-0/+5
Document the fact that using the trampoline_pgd will result in the creation of global TLB entries in the user range of the address space. Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211202153226.22946-2-joro@8bytes.org
2021-12-01x86: Snapshot thread flagsMark Rutland1-1/+1
Some thread flags can be set remotely, and so even when IRQs are disabled, the flags can change under our feet. Generally this is unlikely to cause a problem in practice, but it is somewhat unsound, and KCSAN will legitimately warn that there is a data race. To avoid such issues, a snapshot of the flags has to be taken prior to using them. Some places already use READ_ONCE() for that, others do not. Convert them all to the new flag accessor helpers. Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211129130653.2037928-12-mark.rutland@arm.com
2021-11-11Merge branch 'kvm-guest-sev-migration' into kvm-masterPaolo Bonzini2-9/+69
Add guest api and guest kernel support for SEV live migration. Introduces a new hypercall to notify the host of changes to the page encryption status. If the page is encrypted then it must be migrated through the SEV firmware or a helper VM sharing the key. If page is not encrypted then it can be migrated normally by userspace. This new hypercall is invoked using paravirt_ops. Conflicts: sev_active() replaced by cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT).
2021-11-11x86/kvm: Add guest support for detecting and enabling SEV Live Migration ↵Ashish Kalra1-0/+5
feature. The guest support for detecting and enabling SEV Live migration feature uses the following logic : - kvm_init_plaform() checks if its booted under the EFI - If not EFI, i) if kvm_para_has_feature(KVM_FEATURE_MIGRATION_CONTROL), issue a wrmsrl() to enable the SEV live migration support - If EFI, i) If kvm_para_has_feature(KVM_FEATURE_MIGRATION_CONTROL), read the UEFI variable which indicates OVMF support for live migration ii) the variable indicates live migration is supported, issue a wrmsrl() to enable the SEV live migration support The EFI live migration check is done using a late_initcall() callback. Also, ensure that _bss_decrypted section is marked as decrypted in the hypervisor's guest page encryption status tracking. Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Steve Rutherford <srutherford@google.com> Message-Id: <b4453e4c87103ebef12217d2505ea99a1c3e0f0f.1629726117.git.ashish.kalra@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-11-11mm: x86: Invoke hypercall when page encryption status is changedBrijesh Singh2-9/+64
Invoke a hypercall when a memory region is changed from encrypted -> decrypted and vice versa. Hypervisor needs to know the page encryption status during the guest migration. Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: x86@kernel.org Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Steve Rutherford <srutherford@google.com> Reviewed-by: Venu Busireddy <venu.busireddy@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Message-Id: <0a237d5bb08793916c7790a3e653a2cbe7485761.1629726117.git.ashish.kalra@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-11-09Merge branch 'akpm' (patches from Andrew)Linus Torvalds1-9/+5
Merge more updates from Andrew Morton: "87 patches. Subsystems affected by this patch series: mm (pagecache and hugetlb), procfs, misc, MAINTAINERS, lib, checkpatch, binfmt, kallsyms, ramfs, init, codafs, nilfs2, hfs, crash_dump, signals, seq_file, fork, sysvfs, kcov, gdb, resource, selftests, and ipc" * emailed patches from Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>: (87 commits) ipc/ipc_sysctl.c: remove fallback for !CONFIG_PROC_SYSCTL ipc: check checkpoint_restore_ns_capable() to modify C/R proc files selftests/kselftest/runner/run_one(): allow running non-executable files virtio-mem: disallow mapping virtio-mem memory via /dev/mem kernel/resource: disallow access to exclusive system RAM regions kernel/resource: clean up and optimize iomem_is_exclusive() scripts/gdb: handle split debug for vmlinux kcov: replace local_irq_save() with a local_lock_t kcov: avoid enable+disable interrupts if !in_task() kcov: allocate per-CPU memory on the relevant node Documentation/kcov: define `ip' in the example Documentation/kcov: include types.h in the example sysv: use BUILD_BUG_ON instead of runtime check kernel/fork.c: unshare(): use swap() to make code cleaner seq_file: fix passing wrong private data seq_file: move seq_escape() to a header signal: remove duplicate include in signal.h crash_dump: remove duplicate include in crash_dump.h crash_dump: fix boolreturn.cocci warning hfs/hfsplus: use WARN_ON for sanity check ...
2021-11-09x86: mm: rename __is_kernel_text() to is_x86_32_kernel_text()Kefeng Wang1-9/+5
Commit b56cd05c55a1 ("x86/mm: Rename is_kernel_text to __is_kernel_text"), add '__' prefix not to get in conflict with existing is_kernel_text() in <linux/kallsyms.h>. We will add __is_kernel_text() for the basic kernel text range check in the next patch, so use private is_x86_32_kernel_text() naming for x86 special check. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210930071143.63410-6-wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <senozhatsky@chromium.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Ivan Kokshaysky <ink@jurassic.park.msu.ru> Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Michal Simek <monstr@monstr.eu> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-11-07Merge branch 'akpm' (patches from Andrew)Linus Torvalds5-36/+5
Merge misc updates from Andrew Morton: "257 patches. Subsystems affected by this patch series: scripts, ocfs2, vfs, and mm (slab-generic, slab, slub, kconfig, dax, kasan, debug, pagecache, gup, swap, memcg, pagemap, mprotect, mremap, iomap, tracing, vmalloc, pagealloc, memory-failure, hugetlb, userfaultfd, vmscan, tools, memblock, oom-kill, hugetlbfs, migration, thp, readahead, nommu, ksm, vmstat, madvise, memory-hotplug, rmap, zsmalloc, highmem, zram, cleanups, kfence, and damon)" * emailed patches from Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>: (257 commits) mm/damon: remove return value from before_terminate callback mm/damon: fix a few spelling mistakes in comments and a pr_debug message mm/damon: simplify stop mechanism Docs/admin-guide/mm/pagemap: wordsmith page flags descriptions Docs/admin-guide/mm/damon/start: simplify the content Docs/admin-guide/mm/damon/start: fix a wrong link Docs/admin-guide/mm/damon/start: fix wrong example commands mm/damon/dbgfs: add adaptive_targets list check before enable monitor_on mm/damon: remove unnecessary variable initialization Documentation/admin-guide/mm/damon: add a document for DAMON_RECLAIM mm/damon: introduce DAMON-based Reclamation (DAMON_RECLAIM) selftests/damon: support watermarks mm/damon/dbgfs: support watermarks mm/damon/schemes: activate schemes based on a watermarks mechanism tools/selftests/damon: update for regions prioritization of schemes mm/damon/dbgfs: support prioritization weights mm/damon/vaddr,paddr: support pageout prioritization mm/damon/schemes: prioritize regions within the quotas mm/damon/selftests: support schemes quotas mm/damon/dbgfs: support quotas of schemes ...
2021-11-06x86: remove memory hotplug support on X86_32David Hildenbrand1-31/+0
CONFIG_MEMORY_HOTPLUG was marked BROKEN over one year and we just restricted it to 64 bit. Let's remove the unused x86 32bit implementation and simplify the Kconfig. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210929143600.49379-7-david@redhat.com Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de> Cc: Alex Shi <alexs@kernel.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael@kernel.org> Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-11-06memblock: use memblock_free for freeing virtual pointersMike Rapoport3-4/+4
Rename memblock_free_ptr() to memblock_free() and use memblock_free() when freeing a virtual pointer so that memblock_free() will be a counterpart of memblock_alloc() The callers are updated with the below semantic patch and manual addition of (void *) casting to pointers that are represented by unsigned long variables. @@ identifier vaddr; expression size; @@ ( - memblock_phys_free(__pa(vaddr), size); + memblock_free(vaddr, size); | - memblock_free_ptr(vaddr, size); + memblock_free(vaddr, size); ) [sfr@canb.auug.org.au: fixup] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211018192940.3d1d532f@canb.auug.org.au Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210930185031.18648-7-rppt@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Shahab Vahedi <Shahab.Vahedi@synopsys.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-11-06memblock: rename memblock_free to memblock_phys_freeMike Rapoport1-1/+1
Since memblock_free() operates on a physical range, make its name reflect it and rename it to memblock_phys_free(), so it will be a logical counterpart to memblock_phys_alloc(). The callers are updated with the below semantic patch: @@ expression addr; expression size; @@ - memblock_free(addr, size); + memblock_phys_free(addr, size); Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210930185031.18648-6-rppt@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Shahab Vahedi <Shahab.Vahedi@synopsys.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-11-02Merge tag 'hyperv-next-signed-20211102' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-5/+18
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/hyperv/linux Pull hyperv updates from Wei Liu: - Initial patch set for Hyper-V isolation VM support (Tianyu Lan) - Fix a warning on preemption (Vitaly Kuznetsov) - A bunch of misc cleanup patches * tag 'hyperv-next-signed-20211102' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/hyperv/linux: x86/hyperv: Protect set_hv_tscchange_cb() against getting preempted Drivers: hv : vmbus: Adding NULL pointer check x86/hyperv: Remove duplicate include x86/hyperv: Remove duplicated include in hv_init Drivers: hv: vmbus: Remove unused code to check for subchannels Drivers: hv: vmbus: Initialize VMbus ring buffer for Isolation VM Drivers: hv: vmbus: Add SNP support for VMbus channel initiate message x86/hyperv: Add ghcb hvcall support for SNP VM x86/hyperv: Add Write/Read MSR registers via ghcb page Drivers: hv: vmbus: Mark vmbus ring buffer visible to host in Isolation VM x86/hyperv: Add new hvcall guest address host visibility support x86/hyperv: Initialize shared memory boundary in the Isolation VM. x86/hyperv: Initialize GHCB page in Isolation VM
2021-11-02Merge tag 'x86_core_for_v5.16_rc1' of ↵Linus Torvalds2-10/+17
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 core updates from Borislav Petkov: - Do not #GP on userspace use of CLI/STI but pretend it was a NOP to keep old userspace from breaking. Adjust the corresponding iopl selftest to that. - Improve stack overflow warnings to say which stack got overflowed and raise the exception stack sizes to 2 pages since overflowing the single page of exception stack is very easy to do nowadays with all the tracing machinery enabled. With that, rip out the custom mapping of AMD SEV's too. - A bunch of changes in preparation for FGKASLR like supporting more than 64K section headers in the relocs tool, correct ORC lookup table size to cover the whole kernel .text and other adjustments. * tag 'x86_core_for_v5.16_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: selftests/x86/iopl: Adjust to the faked iopl CLI/STI usage vmlinux.lds.h: Have ORC lookup cover entire _etext - _stext x86/boot/compressed: Avoid duplicate malloc() implementations x86/boot: Allow a "silent" kaslr random byte fetch x86/tools/relocs: Support >64K section headers x86/sev: Make the #VC exception stacks part of the default stacks storage x86: Increase exception stack sizes x86/mm/64: Improve stack overflow warnings x86/iopl: Fake iopl(3) CLI/STI usage
2021-11-02Merge tag 'x86_sev_for_v5.16_rc1' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-0/+9
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 SEV updates from Borislav Petkov: - Export sev_es_ghcb_hv_call() so that HyperV Isolation VMs can use it too - Non-urgent fixes and cleanups * tag 'x86_sev_for_v5.16_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/sev: Expose sev_es_ghcb_hv_call() for use by HyperV x86/sev: Allow #VC exceptions on the VC2 stack x86/sev: Fix stack type check in vc_switch_off_ist() x86/sme: Use #define USE_EARLY_PGTABLE_L5 in mem_encrypt_identity.c x86/sev: Carve out HV call's return value verification
2021-11-02Merge tag 'x86_cc_for_v5.16_rc1' of ↵Linus Torvalds4-52/+33
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull generic confidential computing updates from Borislav Petkov: "Add an interface called cc_platform_has() which is supposed to be used by confidential computing solutions to query different aspects of the system. The intent behind it is to unify testing of such aspects instead of having each confidential computing solution add its own set of tests to code paths in the kernel, leading to an unwieldy mess" * tag 'x86_cc_for_v5.16_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: treewide: Replace the use of mem_encrypt_active() with cc_platform_has() x86/sev: Replace occurrences of sev_es_active() with cc_platform_has() x86/sev: Replace occurrences of sev_active() with cc_platform_has() x86/sme: Replace occurrences of sme_active() with cc_platform_has() powerpc/pseries/svm: Add a powerpc version of cc_platform_has() x86/sev: Add an x86 version of cc_platform_has() arch/cc: Introduce a function to check for confidential computing features x86/ioremap: Selectively build arch override encryption functions
2021-10-28x86/hyperv: Add new hvcall guest address host visibility supportTianyu Lan1-5/+18
Add new hvcall guest address host visibility support to mark memory visible to host. Call it inside set_memory_decrypted /encrypted(). Add HYPERVISOR feature check in the hv_is_isolation_supported() to optimize in non-virtualization environment. Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Michael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Tianyu Lan <Tianyu.Lan@microsoft.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211025122116.264793-4-ltykernel@gmail.com [ wei: fix conflicts with tip ] Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>
2021-10-28Merge remote-tracking branch 'tip/x86/cc' into hyperv-nextWei Liu4-52/+33
2021-10-20x86/fpu: Provide a proper function for ex_handler_fprestore()Thomas Gleixner1-3/+2
To make upcoming changes for support of dynamically enabled features simpler, provide a proper function for the exception handler which removes exposure of FPU internals. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211015011540.053515012@linutronix.de
2021-10-20x86/fpu: Remove internal.h dependency from fpu/signal.hThomas Gleixner1-1/+2
In order to remove internal.h make signal.h independent of it. Include asm/fpu/xstate.h to fix a missing update_regset_xstate_info() prototype, which is Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211015011539.844565975@linutronix.de
2021-10-20x86/fpu: Move KVMs FPU swapping to FPU coreThomas Gleixner1-1/+1
Swapping the host/guest FPU is directly fiddling with FPU internals which requires 5 exports. The upcoming support of dynamically enabled states would even need more. Implement a swap function in the FPU core code and export that instead. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211015011539.076072399@linutronix.de
2021-10-19x86/sme: Use #define USE_EARLY_PGTABLE_L5 in mem_encrypt_identity.cTom Lendacky1-0/+9
When runtime support for converting between 4-level and 5-level pagetables was added to the kernel, the SME code that built pagetables was updated to use the pagetable functions, e.g. p4d_offset(), etc., in order to simplify the code. However, the use of the pagetable functions in early boot code requires the use of the USE_EARLY_PGTABLE_L5 #define in order to ensure that the proper definition of pgtable_l5_enabled() is used. Without the #define, pgtable_l5_enabled() is #defined as cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_LA57). In early boot, the CPU features have not yet been discovered and populated, so pgtable_l5_enabled() will return false even when 5-level paging is enabled. This causes the SME code to always build 4-level pagetables to perform the in-place encryption. If 5-level paging is enabled, switching to the SME pagetables results in a page-fault that kills the boot. Adding the #define results in pgtable_l5_enabled() using the __pgtable_l5_enabled variable set in early boot and the SME code building pagetables for the proper paging level. Fixes: aad983913d77 ("x86/mm/encrypt: Simplify sme_populate_pgd() and sme_populate_pgd_large()") Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.18.x Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/2cb8329655f5c753905812d951e212022a480475.1634318656.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com
2021-10-16Merge branch 'x86/urgent' into x86/fpu, to resolve a conflictIngo Molnar6-19/+31
Resolve the conflict between these commits: x86/fpu: 1193f408cd51 ("x86/fpu/signal: Change return type of __fpu_restore_sig() to boolean") x86/urgent: d298b03506d3 ("x86/fpu: Restore the masking out of reserved MXCSR bits") b2381acd3fd9 ("x86/fpu: Mask out the invalid MXCSR bits properly") Conflicts: arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2021-10-06x86/sev: Make the #VC exception stacks part of the default stacks storageBorislav Petkov1-0/+7
The size of the exception stacks was increased by the commit in Fixes, resulting in stack sizes greater than a page in size. The #VC exception handling was only mapping the first (bottom) page, resulting in an SEV-ES guest failing to boot. Make the #VC exception stacks part of the default exception stacks storage and allocate them with a CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT=y .config. Map them only when a SEV-ES guest has been detected. Rip out the custom VC stacks mapping and storage code. [ bp: Steal and adapt Tom's commit message. ] Fixes: 7fae4c24a2b8 ("x86: Increase exception stack sizes") Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Tested-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Tested-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/YVt1IMjIs7pIZTRR@zn.tnic
2021-10-04Merge branch x86/cc into x86/coreBorislav Petkov10-71/+64
Pick up dependent cc_platform_has() changes. Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
2021-10-04treewide: Replace the use of mem_encrypt_active() with cc_platform_has()Tom Lendacky3-4/+5
Replace uses of mem_encrypt_active() with calls to cc_platform_has() with the CC_ATTR_MEM_ENCRYPT attribute. Remove the implementation of mem_encrypt_active() across all arches. For s390, since the default implementation of the cc_platform_has() matches the s390 implementation of mem_encrypt_active(), cc_platform_has() does not need to be implemented in s390 (the config option ARCH_HAS_CC_PLATFORM is not set). Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210928191009.32551-9-bp@alien8.de
2021-10-04x86/sev: Replace occurrences of sev_es_active() with cc_platform_has()Tom Lendacky1-21/+3
Replace uses of sev_es_active() with the more generic cc_platform_has() using CC_ATTR_GUEST_STATE_ENCRYPT. If future support is added for other memory encyrption techonologies, the use of CC_ATTR_GUEST_STATE_ENCRYPT can be updated, as required. Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210928191009.32551-8-bp@alien8.de
2021-10-04x86/sev: Replace occurrences of sev_active() with cc_platform_has()Tom Lendacky2-16/+11
Replace uses of sev_active() with the more generic cc_platform_has() using CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT. If future support is added for other memory encryption technologies, the use of CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT can be updated, as required. Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210928191009.32551-7-bp@alien8.de
2021-10-04x86/sme: Replace occurrences of sme_active() with cc_platform_has()Tom Lendacky3-13/+15
Replace uses of sme_active() with the more generic cc_platform_has() using CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT. If future support is added for other memory encryption technologies, the use of CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT can be updated, as required. This also replaces two usages of sev_active() that are really geared towards detecting if SME is active. Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210928191009.32551-6-bp@alien8.de
2021-10-04x86/sev: Add an x86 version of cc_platform_has()Tom Lendacky1-0/+1
Introduce an x86 version of the cc_platform_has() function. This will be used to replace vendor specific calls like sme_active(), sev_active(), etc. Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210928191009.32551-4-bp@alien8.de
2021-10-04x86/ioremap: Selectively build arch override encryption functionsTom Lendacky1-1/+1
In preparation for other uses of the cc_platform_has() function besides AMD's memory encryption support, selectively build the AMD memory encryption architecture override functions only when CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT=y. These functions are: - early_memremap_pgprot_adjust() - arch_memremap_can_ram_remap() Additionally, routines that are only invoked by these architecture override functions can also be conditionally built. These functions are: - memremap_should_map_decrypted() - memremap_is_efi_data() - memremap_is_setup_data() - early_memremap_is_setup_data() And finally, phys_mem_access_encrypted() is conditionally built as well, but requires a static inline version of it when CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT is not set. Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210928191009.32551-2-bp@alien8.de
2021-09-21x86/mm/64: Improve stack overflow warningsPeter Zijlstra1-10/+10
Current code has an explicit check for hitting the task stack guard; but overflowing any of the other stacks will get you a non-descript general #DF warning. Improve matters by using get_stack_info_noinstr() to detetrmine if and which stack guard page got hit, enabling a better stack warning. In specific, Michael Wang reported what turned out to be an NMI exception stack overflow, which is now clearly reported as such: [] BUG: NMI stack guard page was hit at 0000000085fd977b (stack is 000000003a55b09e..00000000d8cce1a5) Reported-by: Michael Wang <yun.wang@linux.alibaba.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Tested-by: Michael Wang <yun.wang@linux.alibaba.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/YUTE/NuqnaWbST8n@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net
2021-09-20x86/fault: Fix wrong signal when vsyscall fails with pkeyJiashuo Liang1-8/+18
The function __bad_area_nosemaphore() calls kernelmode_fixup_or_oops() with the parameter @signal being actually @pkey, which will send a signal numbered with the argument in @pkey. This bug can be triggered when the kernel fails to access user-given memory pages that are protected by a pkey, so it can go down the do_user_addr_fault() path and pass the !user_mode() check in __bad_area_nosemaphore(). Most cases will simply run the kernel fixup code to make an -EFAULT. But when another condition current->thread.sig_on_uaccess_err is met, which is only used to emulate vsyscall, the kernel will generate the wrong signal. Add a new parameter @pkey to kernelmode_fixup_or_oops() to fix this. [ bp: Massage commit message, fix build error as reported by the 0day bot: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/202109202245.APvuT8BX-lkp@intel.com ] Fixes: 5042d40a264c ("x86/fault: Bypass no_context() for implicit kernel faults from usermode") Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jiashuo Liang <liangjs@pku.edu.cn> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210730030152.249106-1-liangjs@pku.edu.cn
2021-09-19Merge tag 'x86_urgent_for_v5.15_rc2' of ↵Linus Torvalds2-4/+9
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 fixes from Borislav Petkov: - Prevent a infinite loop in the MCE recovery on return to user space, which was caused by a second MCE queueing work for the same page and thereby creating a circular work list. - Make kern_addr_valid() handle existing PMD entries, which are marked not present in the higher level page table, correctly instead of blindly dereferencing them. - Pass a valid address to sanitize_phys(). This was caused by the mixture of inclusive and exclusive ranges. memtype_reserve() expect 'end' being exclusive, but sanitize_phys() wants it inclusive. This worked so far, but with end being the end of the physical address space the fail is exposed. - Increase the maximum supported GPIO numbers for 64bit. Newer SoCs exceed the previous maximum. * tag 'x86_urgent_for_v5.15_rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/mce: Avoid infinite loop for copy from user recovery x86/mm: Fix kern_addr_valid() to cope with existing but not present entries x86/platform: Increase maximum GPIO number for X86_64 x86/pat: Pass valid address to sanitize_phys()
2021-09-14memblock: introduce saner 'memblock_free_ptr()' interfaceLinus Torvalds3-7/+4
The boot-time allocation interface for memblock is a mess, with 'memblock_alloc()' returning a virtual pointer, but then you are supposed to free it with 'memblock_free()' that takes a _physical_ address. Not only is that all kinds of strange and illogical, but it actually causes bugs, when people then use it like a normal allocation function, and it fails spectacularly on a NULL pointer: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20210912140820.GD25450@xsang-OptiPlex-9020/ or just random memory corruption if the debug checks don't catch it: https://lore.kernel.org/all/61ab2d0c-3313-aaab-514c-e15b7aa054a0@suse.cz/ I really don't want to apply patches that treat the symptoms, when the fundamental cause is this horribly confusing interface. I started out looking at just automating a sane replacement sequence, but because of this mix or virtual and physical addresses, and because people have used the "__pa()" macro that can take either a regular kernel pointer, or just the raw "unsigned long" address, it's all quite messy. So this just introduces a new saner interface for freeing a virtual address that was allocated using 'memblock_alloc()', and that was kept as a regular kernel pointer. And then it converts a couple of users that are obvious and easy to test, including the 'xbc_nodes' case in lib/bootconfig.c that caused problems. Reported-by: kernel test robot <oliver.sang@intel.com> Fixes: 40caa127f3c7 ("init: bootconfig: Remove all bootconfig data when the init memory is removed") Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-09-13x86/extable: Provide EX_TYPE_DEFAULT_MCE_SAFE and EX_TYPE_FAULT_MCE_SAFEThomas Gleixner1-0/+2
Provide exception fixup types which can be used to identify fixups which allow in kernel #MC recovery and make them invoke the existing handlers. These will be used at places where #MC recovery is handled correctly by the caller. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210908132525.269689153@linutronix.de
2021-09-13x86/extable: Rework the exception table mechanicsThomas Gleixner1-71/+52
The exception table entries contain the instruction address, the fixup address and the handler address. All addresses are relative. Storing the handler address has a few downsides: 1) Most handlers need to be exported 2) Handlers can be defined everywhere and there is no overview about the handler types 3) MCE needs to check the handler type to decide whether an in kernel #MC can be recovered. The functionality of the handler itself is not in any way special, but for these checks there need to be separate functions which in the worst case have to be exported. Some of these 'recoverable' exception fixups are pretty obscure and just reuse some other handler to spare code. That obfuscates e.g. the #MC safe copy functions. Cleaning that up would require more handlers and exports Rework the exception fixup mechanics by storing a fixup type number instead of the handler address and invoke the proper handler for each fixup type. Also teach the extable sort to leave the type field alone. This makes most handlers static except for special cases like the MCE MSR fixup and the BPF fixup. This allows to add more types for cleaning up the obscure places without adding more handler code and exports. There is a marginal code size reduction for a production config and it removes _eight_ exported symbols. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210908132525.211958725@linutronix.de
2021-09-13x86/extable: Tidy up redundant handler functionsThomas Gleixner1-11/+5
No need to have the same code all over the place. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210908132524.963232825@linutronix.de
2021-09-08Merge branch 'akpm' (patches from Andrew)Linus Torvalds2-4/+2
Merge more updates from Andrew Morton: "147 patches, based on 7d2a07b769330c34b4deabeed939325c77a7ec2f. Subsystems affected by this patch series: mm (memory-hotplug, rmap, ioremap, highmem, cleanups, secretmem, kfence, damon, and vmscan), alpha, percpu, procfs, misc, core-kernel, MAINTAINERS, lib, checkpatch, epoll, init, nilfs2, coredump, fork, pids, criu, kconfig, selftests, ipc, and scripts" * emailed patches from Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>: (94 commits) scripts: check_extable: fix typo in user error message mm/workingset: correct kernel-doc notations ipc: replace costly bailout check in sysvipc_find_ipc() selftests/memfd: remove unused variable Kconfig.debug: drop selecting non-existing HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR_ARCH configs: remove the obsolete CONFIG_INPUT_POLLDEV prctl: allow to setup brk for et_dyn executables pid: cleanup the stale comment mentioning pidmap_init(). kernel/fork.c: unexport get_{mm,task}_exe_file coredump: fix memleak in dump_vma_snapshot() fs/coredump.c: log if a core dump is aborted due to changed file permissions nilfs2: use refcount_dec_and_lock() to fix potential UAF nilfs2: fix memory leak in nilfs_sysfs_delete_snapshot_group nilfs2: fix memory leak in nilfs_sysfs_create_snapshot_group nilfs2: fix memory leak in nilfs_sysfs_delete_##name##_group nilfs2: fix memory leak in nilfs_sysfs_create_##name##_group nilfs2: fix NULL pointer in nilfs_##name##_attr_release nilfs2: fix memory leak in nilfs_sysfs_create_device_group trap: cleanup trap_init() init: move usermodehelper_enable() to populate_rootfs() ...
2021-09-08x86/mm: Fix kern_addr_valid() to cope with existing but not present entriesMike Rapoport1-3/+3
Jiri Olsa reported a fault when running: # cat /proc/kallsyms | grep ksys_read ffffffff8136d580 T ksys_read # objdump -d --start-address=0xffffffff8136d580 --stop-address=0xffffffff8136d590 /proc/kcore /proc/kcore: file format elf64-x86-64 Segmentation fault general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xf887ffcbff000: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI CPU: 12 PID: 1079 Comm: objdump Not tainted 5.14.0-rc5qemu+ #508 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.14.0-4.fc34 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:kern_addr_valid Call Trace: read_kcore ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held ? trace_hardirqs_on ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held ? lock_acquire ? lock_acquire ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held ? lock_acquire ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held ? lock_release ? _raw_spin_unlock ? __handle_mm_fault ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held ? lock_acquire ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held ? lock_release proc_reg_read ? vfs_read vfs_read ksys_read do_syscall_64 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe The fault happens because kern_addr_valid() dereferences existent but not present PMD in the high kernel mappings. Such PMDs are created when free_kernel_image_pages() frees regions larger than 2Mb. In this case, a part of the freed memory is mapped with PMDs and the set_memory_np_noalias() -> ... -> __change_page_attr() sequence will mark the PMD as not present rather than wipe it completely. Have kern_addr_valid() check whether higher level page table entries are present before trying to dereference them to fix this issue and to avoid similar issues in the future. Stable backporting note: ------------------------ Note that the stable marking is for all active stable branches because there could be cases where pagetable entries exist but are not valid - see 9a14aefc1d28 ("x86: cpa, fix lookup_address"), for example. So make sure to be on the safe side here and use pXY_present() accessors rather than pXY_none() which could #GP when accessing pages in the direct map. Also see: c40a56a7818c ("x86/mm/init: Remove freed kernel image areas from alias mapping") for more info. Reported-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Tested-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.4+ Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210819132717.19358-1-rppt@kernel.org
2021-09-08mm/memory_hotplug: remove nid parameter from arch_remove_memory()David Hildenbrand2-4/+2
The parameter is unused, let's remove it. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210712124052.26491-3-david@redhat.com Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Acked-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> [powerpc] Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com> [s390] Reviewed-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@ionos.com> Reviewed-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com> Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp> Cc: Rich Felker <dalias@libc.org> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org> Cc: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Cc: Pavel Tatashin <pasha.tatashin@soleen.com> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Laurent Dufour <ldufour@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Sergei Trofimovich <slyfox@gentoo.org> Cc: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com> Cc: Michel Lespinasse <michel@lespinasse.org> Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr> Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Cc: Pierre Morel <pmorel@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Jia He <justin.he@arm.com> Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@ozlabs.org> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com> Cc: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com> Cc: Len Brown <lenb@kernel.org> Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> Cc: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta.linux@gmail.com> Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@rjwysocki.net> Cc: Scott Cheloha <cheloha@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Vishal Verma <vishal.l.verma@intel.com> Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: Wei Yang <richard.weiyang@linux.alibaba.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-09-03Merge branch 'akpm' (patches from Andrew)Linus Torvalds3-14/+19
Merge misc updates from Andrew Morton: "173 patches. Subsystems affected by this series: ia64, ocfs2, block, and mm (debug, pagecache, gup, swap, shmem, memcg, selftests, pagemap, mremap, bootmem, sparsemem, vmalloc, kasan, pagealloc, memory-failure, hugetlb, userfaultfd, vmscan, compaction, mempolicy, memblock, oom-kill, migration, ksm, percpu, vmstat, and madvise)" * emailed patches from Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>: (173 commits) mm/madvise: add MADV_WILLNEED to process_madvise() mm/vmstat: remove unneeded return value mm/vmstat: simplify the array size calculation mm/vmstat: correct some wrong comments mm/percpu,c: remove obsolete comments of pcpu_chunk_populated() selftests: vm: add COW time test for KSM pages selftests: vm: add KSM merging time test mm: KSM: fix data type selftests: vm: add KSM merging across nodes test selftests: vm: add KSM zero page merging test selftests: vm: add KSM unmerge test selftests: vm: add KSM merge test mm/migrate: correct kernel-doc notation mm: wire up syscall process_mrelease mm: introduce process_mrelease system call memblock: make memblock_find_in_range method private mm/mempolicy.c: use in_task() in mempolicy_slab_node() mm/mempolicy: unify the create() func for bind/interleave/prefer-many policies mm/mempolicy: advertise new MPOL_PREFERRED_MANY mm/hugetlb: add support for mempolicy MPOL_PREFERRED_MANY ...