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Create EX_TYPE_FAULT_SGX which does as EX_TYPE_FAULT does, except adds
this extra bit that SGX really fancies having.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211110101325.961246679@infradead.org
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Rework the MSR accessors to remove .fixup usage. Add two new extable
types (to the 4 already existing msr ones) using the new register
infrastructure to record which register should get the error value.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211110101325.364084212@infradead.org
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In order to remove further .fixup usage, extend the extable
infrastructure to take additional information from the extable entry
sites.
Specifically add _ASM_EXTABLE_TYPE_REG() and EX_TYPE_IMM_REG that
extend the existing _ASM_EXTABLE_TYPE() by taking an additional
register argument and encoding that and an s16 immediate into the
existing s32 type field. This limits the actual types to the first
byte, 255 seem plenty.
Also add a few flags into the type word, specifically CLEAR_AX and
CLEAR_DX which clear the return and extended return register.
Notes:
- due to the % in our register names it's hard to make it more
generally usable as arm64 did.
- the s16 is far larger than used in these patches, future extentions
can easily shrink this to get more bits.
- without the bitfield fix this will not compile, because: 0xFF > -1
and we can't even extract the TYPE field.
[nathanchance: Build fix for clang-lto builds:
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211210234953.3420108-1-nathan@kernel.org
]
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Tested-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211110101325.303890153@infradead.org
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Where possible, push the .fixup into code, at the tail of functions.
This is hard for macros since they're used in multiple functions,
therefore introduce a new extable handler to pop zeros.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211110101325.245184699@infradead.org
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SEV and TDX both protect guest memory from host accesses. They both use
guest physical address bits to communicate to the hardware which pages
receive protection or not. SEV and TDX both assume that all I/O (real
devices and virtio) must be performed to pages *without* protection.
To add this support, AMD SEV code forces force_dma_unencrypted() to
decrypt DMA pages when DMA pages were allocated for I/O. It also uses
swiotlb_update_mem_attributes() to update decryption bits in SWIOTLB DMA
buffers.
Since TDX also uses a similar memory sharing design, all the above
mentioned changes can be reused. So move force_dma_unencrypted(),
SWIOTLB update code and virtio changes out of mem_encrypt_amd.c to
mem_encrypt.c.
Introduce a new config option X86_MEM_ENCRYPT that can be selected by
platforms which use x86 memory encryption features (needed in both AMD
SEV and Intel TDX guest platforms).
Since the code is moved from mem_encrypt_amd.c, inherit the same make
flags.
This is preparation for enabling TDX memory encryption support and it
has no functional changes.
Co-developed-by: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Tested-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211206135505.75045-4-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
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Both Intel TDX and AMD SEV implement memory encryption features. But the
bulk of the code in mem_encrypt.c is AMD-specific. Rename the file to
mem_encrypt_amd.c. A subsequent patch will extract the parts that can be
shared by both TDX and AMD SEV/SME into a generic file.
No functional changes.
Signed-off-by: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Tested-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211206135505.75045-3-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
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INS/OUTS are not supported in TDX guests and cause #UD. Kernel has to
avoid them when running in TDX guest. To support existing usage, string
I/O operations are unrolled using IN/OUT instructions.
AMD SEV platform implements this support by adding unroll
logic in ins#bwl()/outs#bwl() macros with SEV-specific checks.
Since TDX VM guests will also need similar support, use
CC_ATTR_GUEST_UNROLL_STRING_IO and generic cc_platform_has() API to
implement it.
String I/O helpers were the last users of sev_key_active() interface and
sev_enable_key static key. Remove them.
[ bp: Move comment too and do not delete it. ]
Suggested-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Tested-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211206135505.75045-2-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
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Replace all ret/retq instructions with RET in preparation of making
RET a macro. Since AS is case insensitive it's a big no-op without
RET defined.
find arch/x86/ -name \*.S | while read file
do
sed -i 's/\<ret[q]*\>/RET/' $file
done
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211204134907.905503893@infradead.org
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The AP bringup code uses the trampoline_pgd page-table which
establishes global mappings in the user range of the address space.
Flush the global TLB entries after the indentity mappings are removed so
no stale entries remain in the TLB.
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211202153226.22946-3-joro@8bytes.org
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Document the fact that using the trampoline_pgd will result in the
creation of global TLB entries in the user range of the address
space.
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211202153226.22946-2-joro@8bytes.org
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Some thread flags can be set remotely, and so even when IRQs are disabled,
the flags can change under our feet. Generally this is unlikely to cause a
problem in practice, but it is somewhat unsound, and KCSAN will
legitimately warn that there is a data race.
To avoid such issues, a snapshot of the flags has to be taken prior to
using them. Some places already use READ_ONCE() for that, others do not.
Convert them all to the new flag accessor helpers.
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211129130653.2037928-12-mark.rutland@arm.com
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Add guest api and guest kernel support for SEV live migration.
Introduces a new hypercall to notify the host of changes to the page
encryption status. If the page is encrypted then it must be migrated
through the SEV firmware or a helper VM sharing the key. If page is
not encrypted then it can be migrated normally by userspace. This new
hypercall is invoked using paravirt_ops.
Conflicts: sev_active() replaced by cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT).
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feature.
The guest support for detecting and enabling SEV Live migration
feature uses the following logic :
- kvm_init_plaform() checks if its booted under the EFI
- If not EFI,
i) if kvm_para_has_feature(KVM_FEATURE_MIGRATION_CONTROL), issue a wrmsrl()
to enable the SEV live migration support
- If EFI,
i) If kvm_para_has_feature(KVM_FEATURE_MIGRATION_CONTROL), read
the UEFI variable which indicates OVMF support for live migration
ii) the variable indicates live migration is supported, issue a wrmsrl() to
enable the SEV live migration support
The EFI live migration check is done using a late_initcall() callback.
Also, ensure that _bss_decrypted section is marked as decrypted in the
hypervisor's guest page encryption status tracking.
Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Steve Rutherford <srutherford@google.com>
Message-Id: <b4453e4c87103ebef12217d2505ea99a1c3e0f0f.1629726117.git.ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Invoke a hypercall when a memory region is changed from encrypted ->
decrypted and vice versa. Hypervisor needs to know the page encryption
status during the guest migration.
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Steve Rutherford <srutherford@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Venu Busireddy <venu.busireddy@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Message-Id: <0a237d5bb08793916c7790a3e653a2cbe7485761.1629726117.git.ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Merge more updates from Andrew Morton:
"87 patches.
Subsystems affected by this patch series: mm (pagecache and hugetlb),
procfs, misc, MAINTAINERS, lib, checkpatch, binfmt, kallsyms, ramfs,
init, codafs, nilfs2, hfs, crash_dump, signals, seq_file, fork,
sysvfs, kcov, gdb, resource, selftests, and ipc"
* emailed patches from Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>: (87 commits)
ipc/ipc_sysctl.c: remove fallback for !CONFIG_PROC_SYSCTL
ipc: check checkpoint_restore_ns_capable() to modify C/R proc files
selftests/kselftest/runner/run_one(): allow running non-executable files
virtio-mem: disallow mapping virtio-mem memory via /dev/mem
kernel/resource: disallow access to exclusive system RAM regions
kernel/resource: clean up and optimize iomem_is_exclusive()
scripts/gdb: handle split debug for vmlinux
kcov: replace local_irq_save() with a local_lock_t
kcov: avoid enable+disable interrupts if !in_task()
kcov: allocate per-CPU memory on the relevant node
Documentation/kcov: define `ip' in the example
Documentation/kcov: include types.h in the example
sysv: use BUILD_BUG_ON instead of runtime check
kernel/fork.c: unshare(): use swap() to make code cleaner
seq_file: fix passing wrong private data
seq_file: move seq_escape() to a header
signal: remove duplicate include in signal.h
crash_dump: remove duplicate include in crash_dump.h
crash_dump: fix boolreturn.cocci warning
hfs/hfsplus: use WARN_ON for sanity check
...
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Commit b56cd05c55a1 ("x86/mm: Rename is_kernel_text to __is_kernel_text"),
add '__' prefix not to get in conflict with existing is_kernel_text() in
<linux/kallsyms.h>.
We will add __is_kernel_text() for the basic kernel text range check in
the next patch, so use private is_x86_32_kernel_text() naming for x86
special check.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210930071143.63410-6-wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <senozhatsky@chromium.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Ivan Kokshaysky <ink@jurassic.park.msu.ru>
Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Michal Simek <monstr@monstr.eu>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Merge misc updates from Andrew Morton:
"257 patches.
Subsystems affected by this patch series: scripts, ocfs2, vfs, and
mm (slab-generic, slab, slub, kconfig, dax, kasan, debug, pagecache,
gup, swap, memcg, pagemap, mprotect, mremap, iomap, tracing, vmalloc,
pagealloc, memory-failure, hugetlb, userfaultfd, vmscan, tools,
memblock, oom-kill, hugetlbfs, migration, thp, readahead, nommu, ksm,
vmstat, madvise, memory-hotplug, rmap, zsmalloc, highmem, zram,
cleanups, kfence, and damon)"
* emailed patches from Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>: (257 commits)
mm/damon: remove return value from before_terminate callback
mm/damon: fix a few spelling mistakes in comments and a pr_debug message
mm/damon: simplify stop mechanism
Docs/admin-guide/mm/pagemap: wordsmith page flags descriptions
Docs/admin-guide/mm/damon/start: simplify the content
Docs/admin-guide/mm/damon/start: fix a wrong link
Docs/admin-guide/mm/damon/start: fix wrong example commands
mm/damon/dbgfs: add adaptive_targets list check before enable monitor_on
mm/damon: remove unnecessary variable initialization
Documentation/admin-guide/mm/damon: add a document for DAMON_RECLAIM
mm/damon: introduce DAMON-based Reclamation (DAMON_RECLAIM)
selftests/damon: support watermarks
mm/damon/dbgfs: support watermarks
mm/damon/schemes: activate schemes based on a watermarks mechanism
tools/selftests/damon: update for regions prioritization of schemes
mm/damon/dbgfs: support prioritization weights
mm/damon/vaddr,paddr: support pageout prioritization
mm/damon/schemes: prioritize regions within the quotas
mm/damon/selftests: support schemes quotas
mm/damon/dbgfs: support quotas of schemes
...
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CONFIG_MEMORY_HOTPLUG was marked BROKEN over one year and we just
restricted it to 64 bit. Let's remove the unused x86 32bit
implementation and simplify the Kconfig.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210929143600.49379-7-david@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de>
Cc: Alex Shi <alexs@kernel.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael@kernel.org>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Rename memblock_free_ptr() to memblock_free() and use memblock_free()
when freeing a virtual pointer so that memblock_free() will be a
counterpart of memblock_alloc()
The callers are updated with the below semantic patch and manual
addition of (void *) casting to pointers that are represented by
unsigned long variables.
@@
identifier vaddr;
expression size;
@@
(
- memblock_phys_free(__pa(vaddr), size);
+ memblock_free(vaddr, size);
|
- memblock_free_ptr(vaddr, size);
+ memblock_free(vaddr, size);
)
[sfr@canb.auug.org.au: fixup]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211018192940.3d1d532f@canb.auug.org.au
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210930185031.18648-7-rppt@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Shahab Vahedi <Shahab.Vahedi@synopsys.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Since memblock_free() operates on a physical range, make its name
reflect it and rename it to memblock_phys_free(), so it will be a
logical counterpart to memblock_phys_alloc().
The callers are updated with the below semantic patch:
@@
expression addr;
expression size;
@@
- memblock_free(addr, size);
+ memblock_phys_free(addr, size);
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210930185031.18648-6-rppt@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Shahab Vahedi <Shahab.Vahedi@synopsys.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/hyperv/linux
Pull hyperv updates from Wei Liu:
- Initial patch set for Hyper-V isolation VM support (Tianyu Lan)
- Fix a warning on preemption (Vitaly Kuznetsov)
- A bunch of misc cleanup patches
* tag 'hyperv-next-signed-20211102' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/hyperv/linux:
x86/hyperv: Protect set_hv_tscchange_cb() against getting preempted
Drivers: hv : vmbus: Adding NULL pointer check
x86/hyperv: Remove duplicate include
x86/hyperv: Remove duplicated include in hv_init
Drivers: hv: vmbus: Remove unused code to check for subchannels
Drivers: hv: vmbus: Initialize VMbus ring buffer for Isolation VM
Drivers: hv: vmbus: Add SNP support for VMbus channel initiate message
x86/hyperv: Add ghcb hvcall support for SNP VM
x86/hyperv: Add Write/Read MSR registers via ghcb page
Drivers: hv: vmbus: Mark vmbus ring buffer visible to host in Isolation VM
x86/hyperv: Add new hvcall guest address host visibility support
x86/hyperv: Initialize shared memory boundary in the Isolation VM.
x86/hyperv: Initialize GHCB page in Isolation VM
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 core updates from Borislav Petkov:
- Do not #GP on userspace use of CLI/STI but pretend it was a NOP to
keep old userspace from breaking. Adjust the corresponding iopl
selftest to that.
- Improve stack overflow warnings to say which stack got overflowed and
raise the exception stack sizes to 2 pages since overflowing the
single page of exception stack is very easy to do nowadays with all
the tracing machinery enabled. With that, rip out the custom mapping
of AMD SEV's too.
- A bunch of changes in preparation for FGKASLR like supporting more
than 64K section headers in the relocs tool, correct ORC lookup table
size to cover the whole kernel .text and other adjustments.
* tag 'x86_core_for_v5.16_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
selftests/x86/iopl: Adjust to the faked iopl CLI/STI usage
vmlinux.lds.h: Have ORC lookup cover entire _etext - _stext
x86/boot/compressed: Avoid duplicate malloc() implementations
x86/boot: Allow a "silent" kaslr random byte fetch
x86/tools/relocs: Support >64K section headers
x86/sev: Make the #VC exception stacks part of the default stacks storage
x86: Increase exception stack sizes
x86/mm/64: Improve stack overflow warnings
x86/iopl: Fake iopl(3) CLI/STI usage
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 SEV updates from Borislav Petkov:
- Export sev_es_ghcb_hv_call() so that HyperV Isolation VMs can use it
too
- Non-urgent fixes and cleanups
* tag 'x86_sev_for_v5.16_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/sev: Expose sev_es_ghcb_hv_call() for use by HyperV
x86/sev: Allow #VC exceptions on the VC2 stack
x86/sev: Fix stack type check in vc_switch_off_ist()
x86/sme: Use #define USE_EARLY_PGTABLE_L5 in mem_encrypt_identity.c
x86/sev: Carve out HV call's return value verification
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull generic confidential computing updates from Borislav Petkov:
"Add an interface called cc_platform_has() which is supposed to be used
by confidential computing solutions to query different aspects of the
system.
The intent behind it is to unify testing of such aspects instead of
having each confidential computing solution add its own set of tests
to code paths in the kernel, leading to an unwieldy mess"
* tag 'x86_cc_for_v5.16_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
treewide: Replace the use of mem_encrypt_active() with cc_platform_has()
x86/sev: Replace occurrences of sev_es_active() with cc_platform_has()
x86/sev: Replace occurrences of sev_active() with cc_platform_has()
x86/sme: Replace occurrences of sme_active() with cc_platform_has()
powerpc/pseries/svm: Add a powerpc version of cc_platform_has()
x86/sev: Add an x86 version of cc_platform_has()
arch/cc: Introduce a function to check for confidential computing features
x86/ioremap: Selectively build arch override encryption functions
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Add new hvcall guest address host visibility support to mark
memory visible to host. Call it inside set_memory_decrypted
/encrypted(). Add HYPERVISOR feature check in the
hv_is_isolation_supported() to optimize in non-virtualization
environment.
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Tianyu Lan <Tianyu.Lan@microsoft.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211025122116.264793-4-ltykernel@gmail.com
[ wei: fix conflicts with tip ]
Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>
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To make upcoming changes for support of dynamically enabled features
simpler, provide a proper function for the exception handler which removes
exposure of FPU internals.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211015011540.053515012@linutronix.de
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In order to remove internal.h make signal.h independent of it.
Include asm/fpu/xstate.h to fix a missing update_regset_xstate_info()
prototype, which is
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211015011539.844565975@linutronix.de
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Swapping the host/guest FPU is directly fiddling with FPU internals which
requires 5 exports. The upcoming support of dynamically enabled states
would even need more.
Implement a swap function in the FPU core code and export that instead.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211015011539.076072399@linutronix.de
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When runtime support for converting between 4-level and 5-level pagetables
was added to the kernel, the SME code that built pagetables was updated
to use the pagetable functions, e.g. p4d_offset(), etc., in order to
simplify the code. However, the use of the pagetable functions in early
boot code requires the use of the USE_EARLY_PGTABLE_L5 #define in order to
ensure that the proper definition of pgtable_l5_enabled() is used.
Without the #define, pgtable_l5_enabled() is #defined as
cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_LA57). In early boot, the CPU features
have not yet been discovered and populated, so pgtable_l5_enabled() will
return false even when 5-level paging is enabled. This causes the SME code
to always build 4-level pagetables to perform the in-place encryption.
If 5-level paging is enabled, switching to the SME pagetables results in
a page-fault that kills the boot.
Adding the #define results in pgtable_l5_enabled() using the
__pgtable_l5_enabled variable set in early boot and the SME code building
pagetables for the proper paging level.
Fixes: aad983913d77 ("x86/mm/encrypt: Simplify sme_populate_pgd() and sme_populate_pgd_large()")
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.18.x
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/2cb8329655f5c753905812d951e212022a480475.1634318656.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com
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Resolve the conflict between these commits:
x86/fpu: 1193f408cd51 ("x86/fpu/signal: Change return type of __fpu_restore_sig() to boolean")
x86/urgent: d298b03506d3 ("x86/fpu: Restore the masking out of reserved MXCSR bits")
b2381acd3fd9 ("x86/fpu: Mask out the invalid MXCSR bits properly")
Conflicts:
arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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The size of the exception stacks was increased by the commit in Fixes,
resulting in stack sizes greater than a page in size. The #VC exception
handling was only mapping the first (bottom) page, resulting in an
SEV-ES guest failing to boot.
Make the #VC exception stacks part of the default exception stacks
storage and allocate them with a CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT=y .config. Map
them only when a SEV-ES guest has been detected.
Rip out the custom VC stacks mapping and storage code.
[ bp: Steal and adapt Tom's commit message. ]
Fixes: 7fae4c24a2b8 ("x86: Increase exception stack sizes")
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Tested-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Tested-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/YVt1IMjIs7pIZTRR@zn.tnic
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Pick up dependent cc_platform_has() changes.
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
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Replace uses of mem_encrypt_active() with calls to cc_platform_has() with
the CC_ATTR_MEM_ENCRYPT attribute.
Remove the implementation of mem_encrypt_active() across all arches.
For s390, since the default implementation of the cc_platform_has()
matches the s390 implementation of mem_encrypt_active(), cc_platform_has()
does not need to be implemented in s390 (the config option
ARCH_HAS_CC_PLATFORM is not set).
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210928191009.32551-9-bp@alien8.de
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Replace uses of sev_es_active() with the more generic cc_platform_has()
using CC_ATTR_GUEST_STATE_ENCRYPT. If future support is added for other
memory encyrption techonologies, the use of CC_ATTR_GUEST_STATE_ENCRYPT
can be updated, as required.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210928191009.32551-8-bp@alien8.de
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Replace uses of sev_active() with the more generic cc_platform_has()
using CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT. If future support is added for other
memory encryption technologies, the use of CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT
can be updated, as required.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210928191009.32551-7-bp@alien8.de
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Replace uses of sme_active() with the more generic cc_platform_has()
using CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT. If future support is added for other
memory encryption technologies, the use of CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT
can be updated, as required.
This also replaces two usages of sev_active() that are really geared
towards detecting if SME is active.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210928191009.32551-6-bp@alien8.de
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Introduce an x86 version of the cc_platform_has() function. This will be
used to replace vendor specific calls like sme_active(), sev_active(),
etc.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210928191009.32551-4-bp@alien8.de
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In preparation for other uses of the cc_platform_has() function
besides AMD's memory encryption support, selectively build the
AMD memory encryption architecture override functions only when
CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT=y. These functions are:
- early_memremap_pgprot_adjust()
- arch_memremap_can_ram_remap()
Additionally, routines that are only invoked by these architecture
override functions can also be conditionally built. These functions are:
- memremap_should_map_decrypted()
- memremap_is_efi_data()
- memremap_is_setup_data()
- early_memremap_is_setup_data()
And finally, phys_mem_access_encrypted() is conditionally built as well,
but requires a static inline version of it when CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT is
not set.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210928191009.32551-2-bp@alien8.de
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Current code has an explicit check for hitting the task stack guard;
but overflowing any of the other stacks will get you a non-descript
general #DF warning.
Improve matters by using get_stack_info_noinstr() to detetrmine if and
which stack guard page got hit, enabling a better stack warning.
In specific, Michael Wang reported what turned out to be an NMI
exception stack overflow, which is now clearly reported as such:
[] BUG: NMI stack guard page was hit at 0000000085fd977b (stack is 000000003a55b09e..00000000d8cce1a5)
Reported-by: Michael Wang <yun.wang@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Tested-by: Michael Wang <yun.wang@linux.alibaba.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/YUTE/NuqnaWbST8n@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net
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The function __bad_area_nosemaphore() calls kernelmode_fixup_or_oops()
with the parameter @signal being actually @pkey, which will send a
signal numbered with the argument in @pkey.
This bug can be triggered when the kernel fails to access user-given
memory pages that are protected by a pkey, so it can go down the
do_user_addr_fault() path and pass the !user_mode() check in
__bad_area_nosemaphore().
Most cases will simply run the kernel fixup code to make an -EFAULT. But
when another condition current->thread.sig_on_uaccess_err is met, which
is only used to emulate vsyscall, the kernel will generate the wrong
signal.
Add a new parameter @pkey to kernelmode_fixup_or_oops() to fix this.
[ bp: Massage commit message, fix build error as reported by the 0day
bot: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/202109202245.APvuT8BX-lkp@intel.com ]
Fixes: 5042d40a264c ("x86/fault: Bypass no_context() for implicit kernel faults from usermode")
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiashuo Liang <liangjs@pku.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210730030152.249106-1-liangjs@pku.edu.cn
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 fixes from Borislav Petkov:
- Prevent a infinite loop in the MCE recovery on return to user space,
which was caused by a second MCE queueing work for the same page and
thereby creating a circular work list.
- Make kern_addr_valid() handle existing PMD entries, which are marked
not present in the higher level page table, correctly instead of
blindly dereferencing them.
- Pass a valid address to sanitize_phys(). This was caused by the
mixture of inclusive and exclusive ranges. memtype_reserve() expect
'end' being exclusive, but sanitize_phys() wants it inclusive. This
worked so far, but with end being the end of the physical address
space the fail is exposed.
- Increase the maximum supported GPIO numbers for 64bit. Newer SoCs
exceed the previous maximum.
* tag 'x86_urgent_for_v5.15_rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/mce: Avoid infinite loop for copy from user recovery
x86/mm: Fix kern_addr_valid() to cope with existing but not present entries
x86/platform: Increase maximum GPIO number for X86_64
x86/pat: Pass valid address to sanitize_phys()
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The boot-time allocation interface for memblock is a mess, with
'memblock_alloc()' returning a virtual pointer, but then you are
supposed to free it with 'memblock_free()' that takes a _physical_
address.
Not only is that all kinds of strange and illogical, but it actually
causes bugs, when people then use it like a normal allocation function,
and it fails spectacularly on a NULL pointer:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/20210912140820.GD25450@xsang-OptiPlex-9020/
or just random memory corruption if the debug checks don't catch it:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/61ab2d0c-3313-aaab-514c-e15b7aa054a0@suse.cz/
I really don't want to apply patches that treat the symptoms, when the
fundamental cause is this horribly confusing interface.
I started out looking at just automating a sane replacement sequence,
but because of this mix or virtual and physical addresses, and because
people have used the "__pa()" macro that can take either a regular
kernel pointer, or just the raw "unsigned long" address, it's all quite
messy.
So this just introduces a new saner interface for freeing a virtual
address that was allocated using 'memblock_alloc()', and that was kept
as a regular kernel pointer. And then it converts a couple of users
that are obvious and easy to test, including the 'xbc_nodes' case in
lib/bootconfig.c that caused problems.
Reported-by: kernel test robot <oliver.sang@intel.com>
Fixes: 40caa127f3c7 ("init: bootconfig: Remove all bootconfig data when the init memory is removed")
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Provide exception fixup types which can be used to identify fixups which
allow in kernel #MC recovery and make them invoke the existing handlers.
These will be used at places where #MC recovery is handled correctly by the
caller.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210908132525.269689153@linutronix.de
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The exception table entries contain the instruction address, the fixup
address and the handler address. All addresses are relative. Storing the
handler address has a few downsides:
1) Most handlers need to be exported
2) Handlers can be defined everywhere and there is no overview about the
handler types
3) MCE needs to check the handler type to decide whether an in kernel #MC
can be recovered. The functionality of the handler itself is not in any
way special, but for these checks there need to be separate functions
which in the worst case have to be exported.
Some of these 'recoverable' exception fixups are pretty obscure and
just reuse some other handler to spare code. That obfuscates e.g. the
#MC safe copy functions. Cleaning that up would require more handlers
and exports
Rework the exception fixup mechanics by storing a fixup type number instead
of the handler address and invoke the proper handler for each fixup
type. Also teach the extable sort to leave the type field alone.
This makes most handlers static except for special cases like the MCE
MSR fixup and the BPF fixup. This allows to add more types for cleaning up
the obscure places without adding more handler code and exports.
There is a marginal code size reduction for a production config and it
removes _eight_ exported symbols.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210908132525.211958725@linutronix.de
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No need to have the same code all over the place.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210908132524.963232825@linutronix.de
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Merge more updates from Andrew Morton:
"147 patches, based on 7d2a07b769330c34b4deabeed939325c77a7ec2f.
Subsystems affected by this patch series: mm (memory-hotplug, rmap,
ioremap, highmem, cleanups, secretmem, kfence, damon, and vmscan),
alpha, percpu, procfs, misc, core-kernel, MAINTAINERS, lib,
checkpatch, epoll, init, nilfs2, coredump, fork, pids, criu, kconfig,
selftests, ipc, and scripts"
* emailed patches from Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>: (94 commits)
scripts: check_extable: fix typo in user error message
mm/workingset: correct kernel-doc notations
ipc: replace costly bailout check in sysvipc_find_ipc()
selftests/memfd: remove unused variable
Kconfig.debug: drop selecting non-existing HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR_ARCH
configs: remove the obsolete CONFIG_INPUT_POLLDEV
prctl: allow to setup brk for et_dyn executables
pid: cleanup the stale comment mentioning pidmap_init().
kernel/fork.c: unexport get_{mm,task}_exe_file
coredump: fix memleak in dump_vma_snapshot()
fs/coredump.c: log if a core dump is aborted due to changed file permissions
nilfs2: use refcount_dec_and_lock() to fix potential UAF
nilfs2: fix memory leak in nilfs_sysfs_delete_snapshot_group
nilfs2: fix memory leak in nilfs_sysfs_create_snapshot_group
nilfs2: fix memory leak in nilfs_sysfs_delete_##name##_group
nilfs2: fix memory leak in nilfs_sysfs_create_##name##_group
nilfs2: fix NULL pointer in nilfs_##name##_attr_release
nilfs2: fix memory leak in nilfs_sysfs_create_device_group
trap: cleanup trap_init()
init: move usermodehelper_enable() to populate_rootfs()
...
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Jiri Olsa reported a fault when running:
# cat /proc/kallsyms | grep ksys_read
ffffffff8136d580 T ksys_read
# objdump -d --start-address=0xffffffff8136d580 --stop-address=0xffffffff8136d590 /proc/kcore
/proc/kcore: file format elf64-x86-64
Segmentation fault
general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xf887ffcbff000: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
CPU: 12 PID: 1079 Comm: objdump Not tainted 5.14.0-rc5qemu+ #508
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.14.0-4.fc34 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:kern_addr_valid
Call Trace:
read_kcore
? rcu_read_lock_sched_held
? rcu_read_lock_sched_held
? rcu_read_lock_sched_held
? trace_hardirqs_on
? rcu_read_lock_sched_held
? lock_acquire
? lock_acquire
? rcu_read_lock_sched_held
? lock_acquire
? rcu_read_lock_sched_held
? rcu_read_lock_sched_held
? rcu_read_lock_sched_held
? lock_release
? _raw_spin_unlock
? __handle_mm_fault
? rcu_read_lock_sched_held
? lock_acquire
? rcu_read_lock_sched_held
? lock_release
proc_reg_read
? vfs_read
vfs_read
ksys_read
do_syscall_64
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe
The fault happens because kern_addr_valid() dereferences existent but not
present PMD in the high kernel mappings.
Such PMDs are created when free_kernel_image_pages() frees regions larger
than 2Mb. In this case, a part of the freed memory is mapped with PMDs and
the set_memory_np_noalias() -> ... -> __change_page_attr() sequence will
mark the PMD as not present rather than wipe it completely.
Have kern_addr_valid() check whether higher level page table entries are
present before trying to dereference them to fix this issue and to avoid
similar issues in the future.
Stable backporting note:
------------------------
Note that the stable marking is for all active stable branches because
there could be cases where pagetable entries exist but are not valid -
see 9a14aefc1d28 ("x86: cpa, fix lookup_address"), for example. So make
sure to be on the safe side here and use pXY_present() accessors rather
than pXY_none() which could #GP when accessing pages in the direct map.
Also see:
c40a56a7818c ("x86/mm/init: Remove freed kernel image areas from alias mapping")
for more info.
Reported-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Tested-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.4+
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210819132717.19358-1-rppt@kernel.org
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The parameter is unused, let's remove it.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210712124052.26491-3-david@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Acked-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> [powerpc]
Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com> [s390]
Reviewed-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@ionos.com>
Reviewed-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp>
Cc: Rich Felker <dalias@libc.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
Cc: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Cc: Pavel Tatashin <pasha.tatashin@soleen.com>
Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: Laurent Dufour <ldufour@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Sergei Trofimovich <slyfox@gentoo.org>
Cc: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com>
Cc: Michel Lespinasse <michel@lespinasse.org>
Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr>
Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Cc: Pierre Morel <pmorel@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Jia He <justin.he@arm.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@ozlabs.org>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
Cc: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Cc: Len Brown <lenb@kernel.org>
Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Cc: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta.linux@gmail.com>
Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@rjwysocki.net>
Cc: Scott Cheloha <cheloha@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Vishal Verma <vishal.l.verma@intel.com>
Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Wei Yang <richard.weiyang@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Merge misc updates from Andrew Morton:
"173 patches.
Subsystems affected by this series: ia64, ocfs2, block, and mm (debug,
pagecache, gup, swap, shmem, memcg, selftests, pagemap, mremap,
bootmem, sparsemem, vmalloc, kasan, pagealloc, memory-failure,
hugetlb, userfaultfd, vmscan, compaction, mempolicy, memblock,
oom-kill, migration, ksm, percpu, vmstat, and madvise)"
* emailed patches from Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>: (173 commits)
mm/madvise: add MADV_WILLNEED to process_madvise()
mm/vmstat: remove unneeded return value
mm/vmstat: simplify the array size calculation
mm/vmstat: correct some wrong comments
mm/percpu,c: remove obsolete comments of pcpu_chunk_populated()
selftests: vm: add COW time test for KSM pages
selftests: vm: add KSM merging time test
mm: KSM: fix data type
selftests: vm: add KSM merging across nodes test
selftests: vm: add KSM zero page merging test
selftests: vm: add KSM unmerge test
selftests: vm: add KSM merge test
mm/migrate: correct kernel-doc notation
mm: wire up syscall process_mrelease
mm: introduce process_mrelease system call
memblock: make memblock_find_in_range method private
mm/mempolicy.c: use in_task() in mempolicy_slab_node()
mm/mempolicy: unify the create() func for bind/interleave/prefer-many policies
mm/mempolicy: advertise new MPOL_PREFERRED_MANY
mm/hugetlb: add support for mempolicy MPOL_PREFERRED_MANY
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