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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
Pull MM updates from Andrew Morton:
"Almost all of MM here. A few things are still getting finished off,
reviewed, etc.
- Yang Shi has improved the behaviour of khugepaged collapsing of
readonly file-backed transparent hugepages.
- Johannes Weiner has arranged for zswap memory use to be tracked and
managed on a per-cgroup basis.
- Munchun Song adds a /proc knob ("hugetlb_optimize_vmemmap") for
runtime enablement of the recent huge page vmemmap optimization
feature.
- Baolin Wang contributes a series to fix some issues around hugetlb
pagetable invalidation.
- Zhenwei Pi has fixed some interactions between hwpoisoned pages and
virtualization.
- Tong Tiangen has enabled the use of the presently x86-only
page_table_check debugging feature on arm64 and riscv.
- David Vernet has done some fixup work on the memcg selftests.
- Peter Xu has taught userfaultfd to handle write protection faults
against shmem- and hugetlbfs-backed files.
- More DAMON development from SeongJae Park - adding online tuning of
the feature and support for monitoring of fixed virtual address
ranges. Also easier discovery of which monitoring operations are
available.
- Nadav Amit has done some optimization of TLB flushing during
mprotect().
- Neil Brown continues to labor away at improving our swap-over-NFS
support.
- David Hildenbrand has some fixes to anon page COWing versus
get_user_pages().
- Peng Liu fixed some errors in the core hugetlb code.
- Joao Martins has reduced the amount of memory consumed by
device-dax's compound devmaps.
- Some cleanups of the arch-specific pagemap code from Anshuman
Khandual.
- Muchun Song has found and fixed some errors in the TLB flushing of
transparent hugepages.
- Roman Gushchin has done more work on the memcg selftests.
... and, of course, many smaller fixes and cleanups. Notably, the
customary million cleanup serieses from Miaohe Lin"
* tag 'mm-stable-2022-05-25' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm: (381 commits)
mm: kfence: use PAGE_ALIGNED helper
selftests: vm: add the "settings" file with timeout variable
selftests: vm: add "test_hmm.sh" to TEST_FILES
selftests: vm: check numa_available() before operating "merge_across_nodes" in ksm_tests
selftests: vm: add migration to the .gitignore
selftests/vm/pkeys: fix typo in comment
ksm: fix typo in comment
selftests: vm: add process_mrelease tests
Revert "mm/vmscan: never demote for memcg reclaim"
mm/kfence: print disabling or re-enabling message
include/trace/events/percpu.h: cleanup for "percpu: improve percpu_alloc_percpu event trace"
include/trace/events/mmflags.h: cleanup for "tracing: incorrect gfp_t conversion"
mm: fix a potential infinite loop in start_isolate_page_range()
MAINTAINERS: add Muchun as co-maintainer for HugeTLB
zram: fix Kconfig dependency warning
mm/shmem: fix shmem folio swapoff hang
cgroup: fix an error handling path in alloc_pagecache_max_30M()
mm: damon: use HPAGE_PMD_SIZE
tracing: incorrect isolate_mote_t cast in mm_vmscan_lru_isolate
nodemask.h: fix compilation error with GCC12
...
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This defines and exports a platform specific custom vm_get_page_prot() via
subscribing ARCH_HAS_VM_GET_PAGE_PROT. This also unsubscribes from config
ARCH_HAS_FILTER_PGPROT, after dropping off arch_filter_pgprot() and
arch_vm_get_page_prot().
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220414062125.609297-6-anshuman.khandual@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Khalid Aziz <khalid.aziz@oracle.com>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
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It doesn't make any sense to disable non-executable mappings -
security-wise or else.
So rip out that switch and move the remaining code into setup.c and
delete setup_nx.c
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Lai Jiangshan <jiangshanlai@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220127115626.14179-6-bp@alien8.de
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SEV and TDX both protect guest memory from host accesses. They both use
guest physical address bits to communicate to the hardware which pages
receive protection or not. SEV and TDX both assume that all I/O (real
devices and virtio) must be performed to pages *without* protection.
To add this support, AMD SEV code forces force_dma_unencrypted() to
decrypt DMA pages when DMA pages were allocated for I/O. It also uses
swiotlb_update_mem_attributes() to update decryption bits in SWIOTLB DMA
buffers.
Since TDX also uses a similar memory sharing design, all the above
mentioned changes can be reused. So move force_dma_unencrypted(),
SWIOTLB update code and virtio changes out of mem_encrypt_amd.c to
mem_encrypt.c.
Introduce a new config option X86_MEM_ENCRYPT that can be selected by
platforms which use x86 memory encryption features (needed in both AMD
SEV and Intel TDX guest platforms).
Since the code is moved from mem_encrypt_amd.c, inherit the same make
flags.
This is preparation for enabling TDX memory encryption support and it
has no functional changes.
Co-developed-by: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Tested-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211206135505.75045-4-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
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Both Intel TDX and AMD SEV implement memory encryption features. But the
bulk of the code in mem_encrypt.c is AMD-specific. Rename the file to
mem_encrypt_amd.c. A subsequent patch will extract the parts that can be
shared by both TDX and AMD SEV/SME into a generic file.
No functional changes.
Signed-off-by: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Tested-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211206135505.75045-3-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
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Some Makefiles already pass -fno-stack-protector unconditionally.
For example, arch/arm64/kernel/vdso/Makefile, arch/x86/xen/Makefile.
No problem report so far about hard-coding this option. So, we can
assume all supported compilers know -fno-stack-protector.
GCC 4.8 and Clang support this option (https://godbolt.org/z/_HDGzN)
Get rid of cc-option from -fno-stack-protector.
Remove CONFIG_CC_HAS_STACKPROTECTOR_NONE, which is always 'y'.
Note:
arch/mips/vdso/Makefile adds -fno-stack-protector twice, first
unconditionally, and second conditionally. I removed the second one.
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
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Conflicts:
arch/x86/purgatory/Makefile
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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Make use of the new functionality in walk_page_range to remove the arch
page walking code and use the generic code to walk the page tables.
The effective permissions are passed down the chain using new fields in
struct pg_state.
The KASAN optimisation is implemented by setting action=CONTINUE in the
callbacks to skip an entire tree of entries.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191218162402.45610-21-steven.price@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Steven Price <steven.price@arm.com>
Cc: Albert Ou <aou@eecs.berkeley.edu>
Cc: Alexandre Ghiti <alex@ghiti.fr>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: James Hogan <jhogan@kernel.org>
Cc: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Cc: Jerome Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com>
Cc: "Liang, Kan" <kan.liang@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Paul Burton <paul.burton@mips.com>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@synopsys.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: Zong Li <zong.li@sifive.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/daveh/x86-mpx
Pull x86 MPX removal from Dave Hansen:
"MPX requires recompiling applications, which requires compiler
support. Unfortunately, GCC 9.1 is expected to be be released without
support for MPX. This means that there was only a relatively small
window where folks could have ever used MPX. It failed to gain wide
adoption in the industry, and Linux was the only mainstream OS to ever
support it widely.
Support for the feature may also disappear on future processors.
This set completes the process that we started during the 5.4 merge
window when the MPX prctl()s were removed. XSAVE support is left in
place, which allows MPX-using KVM guests to continue to function"
* tag 'mpx-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/daveh/x86-mpx:
x86/mpx: remove MPX from arch/x86
mm: remove arch_bprm_mm_init() hook
x86/mpx: remove bounds exception code
x86/mpx: remove build infrastructure
x86/alternatives: add missing insn.h include
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From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
MPX is being removed from the kernel due to a lack of support
in the toolchain going forward (gcc).
Remove the Kconfig option and the Makefile line. This makes
arch/x86/mm/mpx.c and anything under an #ifdef for
X86_INTEL_MPX dead code.
Cc: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
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Conflicts:
init/main.c
lib/Kconfig.debug
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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- pat.c offers, dominantly, the memtype APIs - so rename it to memtype.c.
- pageattr.c is offering, primarily, the set_memory*() page attribute APIs,
which is offered via the <asm/set_memory.h> header: name the .c file
along the same pattern.
I.e. perform these renames, and move them all next to each other in arch/x86/mm/pat/:
pat.c => memtype.c
pat_internal.h => memtype.h
pat_interval.c => memtype_interval.c
pageattr.c => set_memory.c
pageattr-test.c => cpa-test.c
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 mm updates from Ingo Molnar:
"The main changes in this cycle were:
- A PAT series from Davidlohr Bueso, which simplifies the memtype
rbtree by using the interval tree helpers. (There's more cleanups
in this area queued up, but they didn't make the merge window.)
- Also flip over CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL to default-y. This might draw in a
few more testers, as all the major distros are going to have
5-level paging enabled by default in their next iterations.
- Misc cleanups"
* 'x86-mm-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/mm/pat: Rename pat_rbtree.c to pat_interval.c
x86/mm/pat: Drop the rbt_ prefix from external memtype calls
x86/mm/pat: Do not pass 'rb_root' down the memtype tree helper functions
x86/mm/pat: Convert the PAT tree to a generic interval tree
x86/mm: Clean up the pmd_read_atomic() comments
x86/mm: Fix function name typo in pmd_read_atomic() comment
x86/cpu: Clean up intel_tlb_table[]
x86/mm: Enable 5-level paging support by default
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Considering the previous changes, this is a more proper name.
Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191121011601.20611-5-dave@stgolabs.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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This patch enables KCSAN for x86, with updates to build rules to not use
KCSAN for several incompatible compilation units.
Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
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Add two new probe_kernel_read_strict() and strncpy_from_unsafe_strict()
helpers which by default alias to the __probe_kernel_read() and the
__strncpy_from_unsafe(), respectively, but can be overridden by archs
which have non-overlapping address ranges for kernel space and user
space in order to bail out with -EFAULT when attempting to probe user
memory including non-canonical user access addresses [0]:
4-level page tables:
user-space mem: 0x0000000000000000 - 0x00007fffffffffff
non-canonical: 0x0000800000000000 - 0xffff7fffffffffff
5-level page tables:
user-space mem: 0x0000000000000000 - 0x00ffffffffffffff
non-canonical: 0x0100000000000000 - 0xfeffffffffffffff
The idea is that these helpers are complementary to the probe_user_read()
and strncpy_from_unsafe_user() which probe user-only memory. Both added
helpers here do the same, but for kernel-only addresses.
Both set of helpers are going to be used for BPF tracing. They also
explicitly avoid throwing the splat for non-canonical user addresses from
00c42373d397 ("x86-64: add warning for non-canonical user access address
dereferences").
For compat, the current probe_kernel_read() and strncpy_from_unsafe() are
left as-is.
[0] Documentation/x86/x86_64/mm.txt
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/eefeefd769aa5a013531f491a71f0936779e916b.1572649915.git.daniel@iogearbox.net
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Currently, the Kbuild core manipulates header search paths in a crazy
way [1].
To fix this mess, I want all Makefiles to add explicit $(srctree)/ to
the search paths in the srctree. Some Makefiles are already written in
that way, but not all. The goal of this work is to make the notation
consistent, and finally get rid of the gross hacks.
Having whitespaces after -I does not matter since commit 48f6e3cf5bc6
("kbuild: do not drop -I without parameter").
[1]: https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/9632347/
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
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Stack protection is not compatible with early boot code. All of the early
SME boot code is now isolated in a separate file, mem_encrypt_identity.c,
so arch/x86/mm/Makefile can be updated to turn off stack protection for
the entire file. This eliminates the need to worry about other functions
within the file being instrumented with stack protection (as was seen
when a newer version of GCC instrumented sme_encrypt_kernel() where an
older version hadn't). It also allows removal of the __nostackprotector
attribute from individual functions.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180226232554.14108.16881.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net
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There are bunch of functions in mem_encrypt.c that operate on the
identity mapping, which means they want virtual addresses to be equal to
physical one, without PAGE_OFFSET shift.
We also need to avoid paravirtualizaion call there.
Getting this done is tricky. We cannot use usual page table helpers.
It forces us to open-code a lot of things. It makes code ugly and hard
to modify.
We can get it work with the page table helpers, but it requires few
preprocessor tricks. These tricks may have side effects for the rest of
the file.
Let's isolate such functions into own translation unit.
Tested-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180131135404.40692-2-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 page table isolation updates from Thomas Gleixner:
"This is the final set of enabling page table isolation on x86:
- Infrastructure patches for handling the extra page tables.
- Patches which map the various bits and pieces which are required to
get in and out of user space into the user space visible page
tables.
- The required changes to have CR3 switching in the entry/exit code.
- Optimizations for the CR3 switching along with documentation how
the ASID/PCID mechanism works.
- Updates to dump pagetables to cover the user space page tables for
W+X scans and extra debugfs files to analyze both the kernel and
the user space visible page tables
The whole functionality is compile time controlled via a config switch
and can be turned on/off on the command line as well"
* 'x86-pti-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (32 commits)
x86/ldt: Make the LDT mapping RO
x86/mm/dump_pagetables: Allow dumping current pagetables
x86/mm/dump_pagetables: Check user space page table for WX pages
x86/mm/dump_pagetables: Add page table directory to the debugfs VFS hierarchy
x86/mm/pti: Add Kconfig
x86/dumpstack: Indicate in Oops whether PTI is configured and enabled
x86/mm: Clarify the whole ASID/kernel PCID/user PCID naming
x86/mm: Use INVPCID for __native_flush_tlb_single()
x86/mm: Optimize RESTORE_CR3
x86/mm: Use/Fix PCID to optimize user/kernel switches
x86/mm: Abstract switching CR3
x86/mm: Allow flushing for future ASID switches
x86/pti: Map the vsyscall page if needed
x86/pti: Put the LDT in its own PGD if PTI is on
x86/mm/64: Make a full PGD-entry size hole in the memory map
x86/events/intel/ds: Map debug buffers in cpu_entry_area
x86/cpu_entry_area: Add debugstore entries to cpu_entry_area
x86/mm/pti: Map ESPFIX into user space
x86/mm/pti: Share entry text PMD
x86/entry: Align entry text section to PMD boundary
...
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Add the initial files for kernel page table isolation, with a minimal init
function and the boot time detection for this misfeature.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
Cc: hughd@google.com
Cc: keescook@google.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 PTI preparatory patches from Thomas Gleixner:
"Todays Advent calendar window contains twentyfour easy to digest
patches. The original plan was to have twenty three matching the date,
but a late fixup made that moot.
- Move the cpu_entry_area mapping out of the fixmap into a separate
address space. That's necessary because the fixmap becomes too big
with NRCPUS=8192 and this caused already subtle and hard to
diagnose failures.
The top most patch is fresh from today and cures a brain slip of
that tall grumpy german greybeard, who ignored the intricacies of
32bit wraparounds.
- Limit the number of CPUs on 32bit to 64. That's insane big already,
but at least it's small enough to prevent address space issues with
the cpu_entry_area map, which have been observed and debugged with
the fixmap code
- A few TLB flush fixes in various places plus documentation which of
the TLB functions should be used for what.
- Rename the SYSENTER stack to CPU_ENTRY_AREA stack as it is used for
more than sysenter now and keeping the name makes backtraces
confusing.
- Prevent LDT inheritance on exec() by moving it to arch_dup_mmap(),
which is only invoked on fork().
- Make vysycall more robust.
- A few fixes and cleanups of the debug_pagetables code. Check
PAGE_PRESENT instead of checking the PTE for 0 and a cleanup of the
C89 initialization of the address hint array which already was out
of sync with the index enums.
- Move the ESPFIX init to a different place to prepare for PTI.
- Several code moves with no functional change to make PTI
integration simpler and header files less convoluted.
- Documentation fixes and clarifications"
* 'x86-pti-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (24 commits)
x86/cpu_entry_area: Prevent wraparound in setup_cpu_entry_area_ptes() on 32bit
init: Invoke init_espfix_bsp() from mm_init()
x86/cpu_entry_area: Move it out of the fixmap
x86/cpu_entry_area: Move it to a separate unit
x86/mm: Create asm/invpcid.h
x86/mm: Put MMU to hardware ASID translation in one place
x86/mm: Remove hard-coded ASID limit checks
x86/mm: Move the CR3 construction functions to tlbflush.h
x86/mm: Add comments to clarify which TLB-flush functions are supposed to flush what
x86/mm: Remove superfluous barriers
x86/mm: Use __flush_tlb_one() for kernel memory
x86/microcode: Dont abuse the TLB-flush interface
x86/uv: Use the right TLB-flush API
x86/entry: Rename SYSENTER_stack to CPU_ENTRY_AREA_entry_stack
x86/doc: Remove obvious weirdnesses from the x86 MM layout documentation
x86/mm/64: Improve the memory map documentation
x86/ldt: Prevent LDT inheritance on exec
x86/ldt: Rework locking
arch, mm: Allow arch_dup_mmap() to fail
x86/vsyscall/64: Warn and fail vsyscall emulation in NATIVE mode
...
|
|
Separate the cpu_entry_area code out of cpu/common.c and the fixmap.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
|
|
Fix up makefiles, remove references, and git rm kmemcheck.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171007030159.22241-4-alexander.levin@verizon.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegardno@ifi.uio.no>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Tim Hansen <devtimhansen@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.
By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.
Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.
This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.
How this work was done:
Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
- file had no licensing information it it.
- file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
- file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,
Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.
The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.
The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
- Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
- Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
lines of source
- File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
lines).
All documentation files were explicitly excluded.
The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.
- when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
COPYING file license applied.
For non */uapi/* files that summary was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 11139
and resulted in the first patch in this series.
If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930
and resulted in the second patch in this series.
- if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
it (per prior point). Results summary:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270
GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17
LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15
GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14
((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5
LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4
LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1
and that resulted in the third patch in this series.
- when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
the concluded license(s).
- when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.
- In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).
- When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
- If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
in time.
In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.
Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.
In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.
Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
- a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
license ids and scores
- reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
- reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
SPDX license was correct
This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.
These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
Some routines in mem_encrypt.c are called very early in the boot process,
e.g. sme_enable(). When CONFIG_KCOV=y is defined the resulting code added
to sme_enable() (and others) for KCOV instrumentation results in a kernel
crash. Disable the KCOV instrumentation for mem_encrypt.c by adding
KCOV_INSTRUMENT_mem_encrypt.o := n to arch/x86/mm/Makefile.
In order to avoid other possible early boot issues, model mem_encrypt.c
after head64.c in regards to tools. In addition to disabling KCOV as
stated above and a previous patch that disables branch profiling, also
remove the "-pg" CFLAG if CONFIG_FUNCTION_TRACER is enabled and set
KASAN_SANITIZE to "n", each of which are done on a file basis.
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@01.org>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171010194504.18887.38053.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
|
|
Add the support to encrypt the kernel in-place. This is done by creating
new page mappings for the kernel - a decrypted write-protected mapping
and an encrypted mapping. The kernel is encrypted by copying it through
a temporary buffer.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>
Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/c039bf9412ef95e1e6bf4fdf8facab95e00c717b.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
|
|
Add support for Secure Memory Encryption (SME). This initial support
provides a Kconfig entry to build the SME support into the kernel and
defines the memory encryption mask that will be used in subsequent
patches to mark pages as encrypted.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>
Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/a6c34d16caaed3bc3e2d6f0987554275bd291554.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
|
|
This patch provides all required callbacks required by the generic
get_user_pages_fast() code and switches x86 over - and removes
the platform specific implementation.
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170606113133.22974-2-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
|
|
Randomizes the virtual address space of kernel memory regions for
x86_64. This first patch adds the infrastructure and does not randomize
any region. The following patches will randomize the physical memory
mapping, vmalloc and vmemmap regions.
This security feature mitigates exploits relying on predictable kernel
addresses. These addresses can be used to disclose the kernel modules
base addresses or corrupt specific structures to elevate privileges
bypassing the current implementation of KASLR. This feature can be
enabled with the CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MEMORY option.
The order of each memory region is not changed. The feature looks at the
available space for the regions based on different configuration options
and randomizes the base and space between each. The size of the physical
memory mapping is the available physical memory. No performance impact
was detected while testing the feature.
Entropy is generated using the KASLR early boot functions now shared in
the lib directory (originally written by Kees Cook). Randomization is
done on PGD & PUD page table levels to increase possible addresses. The
physical memory mapping code was adapted to support PUD level virtual
addresses. This implementation on the best configuration provides 30,000
possible virtual addresses in average for each memory region. An
additional low memory page is used to ensure each CPU can start with a
PGD aligned virtual address (for realmode).
x86/dump_pagetable was updated to correctly display each region.
Updated documentation on x86_64 memory layout accordingly.
Performance data, after all patches in the series:
Kernbench shows almost no difference (-+ less than 1%):
Before:
Average Optimal load -j 12 Run (std deviation): Elapsed Time 102.63 (1.2695)
User Time 1034.89 (1.18115) System Time 87.056 (0.456416) Percent CPU 1092.9
(13.892) Context Switches 199805 (3455.33) Sleeps 97907.8 (900.636)
After:
Average Optimal load -j 12 Run (std deviation): Elapsed Time 102.489 (1.10636)
User Time 1034.86 (1.36053) System Time 87.764 (0.49345) Percent CPU 1095
(12.7715) Context Switches 199036 (4298.1) Sleeps 97681.6 (1031.11)
Hackbench shows 0% difference on average (hackbench 90 repeated 10 times):
attemp,before,after 1,0.076,0.069 2,0.072,0.069 3,0.066,0.066 4,0.066,0.068
5,0.066,0.067 6,0.066,0.069 7,0.067,0.066 8,0.063,0.067 9,0.067,0.065
10,0.068,0.071 average,0.0677,0.0677
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Alexander Kuleshov <kuleshovmail@gmail.com>
Cc: Alexander Popov <alpopov@ptsecurity.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Lv Zheng <lv.zheng@intel.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>
Cc: Xiao Guangrong <guangrong.xiao@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1466556426-32664-6-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
|
|
Currently all of the functions that live in tlb.c are inlined on
!SMP builds. One can debate whether this is a good idea (in many
respects the code in tlb.c is better than the inlined UP code).
Regardless, I want to add code that needs to be built on UP and SMP
kernels and relates to tlb flushing, so arrange for tlb.c to be
compiled unconditionally.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/f0d778f0d828fc46e5d1946bca80f0aaf9abf032.1461688545.git.luto@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
|
|
kcov provides code coverage collection for coverage-guided fuzzing
(randomized testing). Coverage-guided fuzzing is a testing technique
that uses coverage feedback to determine new interesting inputs to a
system. A notable user-space example is AFL
(http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl/). However, this technique is not
widely used for kernel testing due to missing compiler and kernel
support.
kcov does not aim to collect as much coverage as possible. It aims to
collect more or less stable coverage that is function of syscall inputs.
To achieve this goal it does not collect coverage in soft/hard
interrupts and instrumentation of some inherently non-deterministic or
non-interesting parts of kernel is disbled (e.g. scheduler, locking).
Currently there is a single coverage collection mode (tracing), but the
API anticipates additional collection modes. Initially I also
implemented a second mode which exposes coverage in a fixed-size hash
table of counters (what Quentin used in his original patch). I've
dropped the second mode for simplicity.
This patch adds the necessary support on kernel side. The complimentary
compiler support was added in gcc revision 231296.
We've used this support to build syzkaller system call fuzzer, which has
found 90 kernel bugs in just 2 months:
https://github.com/google/syzkaller/wiki/Found-Bugs
We've also found 30+ bugs in our internal systems with syzkaller.
Another (yet unexplored) direction where kcov coverage would greatly
help is more traditional "blob mutation". For example, mounting a
random blob as a filesystem, or receiving a random blob over wire.
Why not gcov. Typical fuzzing loop looks as follows: (1) reset
coverage, (2) execute a bit of code, (3) collect coverage, repeat. A
typical coverage can be just a dozen of basic blocks (e.g. an invalid
input). In such context gcov becomes prohibitively expensive as
reset/collect coverage steps depend on total number of basic
blocks/edges in program (in case of kernel it is about 2M). Cost of
kcov depends only on number of executed basic blocks/edges. On top of
that, kernel requires per-thread coverage because there are always
background threads and unrelated processes that also produce coverage.
With inlined gcov instrumentation per-thread coverage is not possible.
kcov exposes kernel PCs and control flow to user-space which is
insecure. But debugfs should not be mapped as user accessible.
Based on a patch by Quentin Casasnovas.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: make task_struct.kcov_mode have type `enum kcov_mode']
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: unbreak allmodconfig]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: follow x86 Makefile layout standards]
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Tavis Ormandy <taviso@google.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com>
Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Protection keys provide new page-based protection in hardware.
But, they have an interesting attribute: they only affect data
accesses and never affect instruction fetches. That means that
if we set up some memory which is set as "access-disabled" via
protection keys, we can still execute from it.
This patch uses protection keys to set up mappings to do just that.
If a user calls:
mmap(..., PROT_EXEC);
or
mprotect(ptr, sz, PROT_EXEC);
(note PROT_EXEC-only without PROT_READ/WRITE), the kernel will
notice this, and set a special protection key on the memory. It
also sets the appropriate bits in the Protection Keys User Rights
(PKRU) register so that the memory becomes unreadable and
unwritable.
I haven't found any userspace that does this today. With this
facility in place, we expect userspace to move to use it
eventually. Userspace _could_ start doing this today. Any
PROT_EXEC calls get converted to PROT_READ inside the kernel, and
would transparently be upgraded to "true" PROT_EXEC with this
code. IOW, userspace never has to do any PROT_EXEC runtime
detection.
This feature provides enhanced protection against leaking
executable memory contents. This helps thwart attacks which are
attempting to find ROP gadgets on the fly.
But, the security provided by this approach is not comprehensive.
The PKRU register which controls access permissions is a normal
user register writable from unprivileged userspace. An attacker
who can execute the 'wrpkru' instruction can easily disable the
protection provided by this feature.
The protection key that is used for execute-only support is
permanently dedicated at compile time. This is fine for now
because there is currently no API to set a protection key other
than this one.
Despite there being a constant PKRU value across the entire
system, we do not set it unless this feature is in use in a
process. That is to preserve the PKRU XSAVE 'init state',
which can lead to faster context switches.
PKRU *is* a user register and the kernel is modifying it. That
means that code doing:
pkru = rdpkru()
pkru |= 0x100;
mmap(..., PROT_EXEC);
wrpkru(pkru);
could lose the bits in PKRU that enforce execute-only
permissions. To avoid this, we suggest avoiding ever calling
mmap() or mprotect() when the PKRU value is expected to be
unstable.
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Chen Gang <gang.chen.5i5j@gmail.com>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Piotr Kwapulinski <kwapulinski.piotr@gmail.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Vladimir Murzin <vladimir.murzin@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: keescook@google.com
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160212210240.CB4BB5CA@viggo.jf.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
|
|
Being able to examine page tables is handy, so make this a
module that can be loaded as needed.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>
Cc: Vladimir Murzin <vladimir.murzin@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20151120010755.GA9060@www.outflux.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
|
|
Warn on any residual W+X mappings after setting NX
if DEBUG_WX is enabled. Introduce a separate
X86_PTDUMP_CORE config that enables the code for
dumping the page tables without enabling the debugfs
interface, so that DEBUG_WX can be enabled without
exposing the debugfs interface. Switch EFI_PGT_DUMP
to using X86_PTDUMP_CORE so that it also does not require
enabling the debugfs interface.
On success it prints this to the kernel log:
x86/mm: Checked W+X mappings: passed, no W+X pages found.
On failure it prints a warning and a count of the failed pages:
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 1 at arch/x86/mm/dump_pagetables.c:226 note_page+0x610/0x7b0()
x86/mm: Found insecure W+X mapping at address ffffffff81755000/__stop___ex_table+0xfa8/0xabfa8
[...]
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81380a5f>] dump_stack+0x44/0x55
[<ffffffff8109d3f2>] warn_slowpath_common+0x82/0xc0
[<ffffffff8109d48c>] warn_slowpath_fmt+0x5c/0x80
[<ffffffff8106cfc9>] ? note_page+0x5c9/0x7b0
[<ffffffff8106d010>] note_page+0x610/0x7b0
[<ffffffff8106d409>] ptdump_walk_pgd_level_core+0x259/0x3c0
[<ffffffff8106d5a7>] ptdump_walk_pgd_level_checkwx+0x17/0x20
[<ffffffff81063905>] mark_rodata_ro+0xf5/0x100
[<ffffffff817415a0>] ? rest_init+0x80/0x80
[<ffffffff817415bd>] kernel_init+0x1d/0xe0
[<ffffffff8174cd1f>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70
[<ffffffff817415a0>] ? rest_init+0x80/0x80
---[ end trace a1f23a1e42a2ac76 ]---
x86/mm: Checked W+X mappings: FAILED, 171 W+X pages found.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1444064120-11450-1-git-send-email-sds@tycho.nsa.gov
[ Improved the Kconfig help text and made the new option default-y
if CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA=y, because it already found buggy mappings,
so we really want people to have this on by default. ]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
|
|
Memtest is a simple feature which fills the memory with a given set of
patterns and validates memory contents, if bad memory regions is detected
it reserves them via memblock API. Since memblock API is widely used by
other architectures this feature can be enabled outside of x86 world.
This patch set promotes memtest to live under generic mm umbrella and
enables memtest feature for arm/arm64.
It was reported that this patch set was useful for tracking down an issue
with some errant DMA on an arm64 platform.
This patch (of 6):
There is nothing platform dependent in the core memtest code, so other
platforms might benefit from this feature too.
[linux@roeck-us.net: MEMTEST depends on MEMBLOCK]
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Murzin <vladimir.murzin@arm.com>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Tested-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Russell King <rmk@arm.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Paul Bolle <pebolle@tiscali.nl>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
This patch adds arch specific code for kernel address sanitizer.
16TB of virtual addressed used for shadow memory. It's located in range
[ffffec0000000000 - fffffc0000000000] between vmemmap and %esp fixup
stacks.
At early stage we map whole shadow region with zero page. Latter, after
pages mapped to direct mapping address range we unmap zero pages from
corresponding shadow (see kasan_map_shadow()) and allocate and map a real
shadow memory reusing vmemmap_populate() function.
Also replace __pa with __pa_nodebug before shadow initialized. __pa with
CONFIG_DEBUG_VIRTUAL=y make external function call (__phys_addr)
__phys_addr is instrumented, so __asan_load could be called before shadow
area initialized.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com>
Cc: Yuri Gribov <tetra2005@gmail.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Jim Davis <jim.epost@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
We have chosen to perform the allocation of bounds tables in
kernel (See the patch "on-demand kernel allocation of bounds
tables") and to mark these VMAs with VM_MPX.
However, there is currently no suitable interface to actually do
this. Existing interfaces, like do_mmap_pgoff(), have no way to
set a modified ->vm_ops or ->vm_flags and don't hold mmap_sem
long enough to let a caller do it.
This patch wraps mmap_region() and hold mmap_sem long enough to
make the modifications to the VMA which we need.
Also note the 32/64-bit #ifdef in the header. We actually need
to do this at runtime eventually. But, for now, we don't support
running 32-bit binaries on 64-bit kernels. Support for this will
come in later patches.
Signed-off-by: Qiaowei Ren <qiaowei.ren@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20141114151827.CE440F67@viggo.jf.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
|
|
This patch introduces page fault tracepoints to x86 architecture
by switching IDT.
Two events, for user and kernel spaces, are introduced at the beginning
of page fault handler for tracing.
- User space event
There is a request of page fault event for user space as below.
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1368079520-11015-2-git-send-email-fdeslaur+()+gmail+!+com
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1368079520-11015-1-git-send-email-fdeslaur+()+gmail+!+com
- Kernel space event:
When we measure an overhead in kernel space for investigating performance
issues, we can check if it comes from the page fault events.
Signed-off-by: Seiji Aguchi <seiji.aguchi@hds.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/52716E67.6090705@hds.com
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
|
|
Other than sanity check and debug message, the x86 specific version of
memblock reserve/free functions are simple wrappers around the generic
versions - memblock_reserve/free().
This patch adds debug messages with caller identification to the
generic versions and replaces x86 specific ones and kills them.
arch/x86/include/asm/memblock.h and arch/x86/mm/memblock.c are empty
after this change and removed.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1310462166-31469-14-git-send-email-tj@kernel.org
Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
|
|
amdtopology is going to be used by 32bit too drop _64 suffix. This is
pure rename.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
|
|
SRAT support implementation in srat_32.c and srat.c are generally
similar; however, there are some differences.
First of all, 64bit implementation supports more types of SRAT
entries. 64bit supports x2apic, affinity, memory and SLIT. 32bit
only supports processor and memory.
Most other differences stem from different initialization protocols
employed by 64bit and 32bit NUMA init paths.
On 64bit,
* Mappings among PXM, node and apicid are directly done in each SRAT
entry callback.
* Memory affinity information is passed to numa_add_memblk() which
takes care of all interfacing with NUMA init.
* Doesn't directly initialize NUMA configurations. All the
information is recorded in numa_nodes_parsed and memblks.
On 32bit,
* Checks numa_off.
* Things go through one more level of indirection via private tables
but eventually end up initializing the same mappings.
* node_start/end_pfn[] are initialized and
memblock_x86_register_active_regions() is called for each memory
chunk.
* node_set_online() is called for each online node.
* sort_node_map() is called.
There are also other minor differences in sanity checking and messages
but taking 64bit version should be good enough.
This patch drops the 32bit specific implementation and makes the 64bit
implementation common for both 32 and 64bit.
The init protocol differences are dealt with in two places - the
numa_add_memblk() shim added in the previous patch and new temporary
numa_32.c:get_memcfg_from_srat() which wraps invocation of
x86_acpi_numa_init().
The shim numa_add_memblk() handles the folowings.
* node_start/end_pfn[] initialization.
* node_set_online() for memory nodes.
* Invocation of memblock_x86_register_active_regions().
The shim get_memcfg_from_srat() handles the followings.
* numa_off check.
* node_set_online() for CPU nodes.
* sort_node_map() invocation.
* Clearing of numa_nodes_parsed and active_ranges on failure.
The shims are temporary and will be removed as the generic NUMA init
path in 32bit is replaced with 64bit one.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
|
|
Rename srat_64.c to srat.c. This is to prepare for unification of
NUMA init paths between 32 and 64bit.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
|
|
Create numa_emulation.c and move all NUMA emulation code there. The
definitions of struct numa_memblk and numa_meminfo are moved to
numa_64.h. Also, numa_remove_memblk_from(), numa_cleanup_meminfo(),
numa_reset_distance() along with numa_emulation() are made global.
- v2: Internal declarations moved to numa_internal.h as suggested by
Yinghai.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
|
|
Not only the naming of the files was confusing, it was even more so for
the function and variable names.
Renamed the K8 NB and NUMA stuff that is also used on other AMD
platforms. This also renames the CONFIG_K8_NUMA option to
CONFIG_AMD_NUMA and the related file k8topology_64.c to
amdtopology_64.c. No functional changes intended.
Signed-off-by: Hans Rosenfeld <hans.rosenfeld@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <borislav.petkov@amd.com>
|
|
size is returned according free range.
Will be used to find free ranges for early_memtest and memory corruption check
Do not mess it up with lib/memblock.c yet.
Signed-off-by: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
|
|
Move pat backend to fully rbtree based implementation from the existing
rbtree and linked list hybrid.
New rbtree based solution uses interval trees (augmented rbtrees) in
order to store the PAT ranges. The new code seprates out the pat backend
to pat_rbtree.c file, making is cleaner. The change also makes the PAT
lookup, reserve and free operations more optimal, as we don't have to
traverse linear linked list of few tens of entries in normal case.
Signed-off-by: Venkatesh Pallipadi <venkatesh.pallipadi@intel.com>
LKML-Reference: <20100210232607.GB11465@linux-os.sc.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Suresh Siddha <suresh.b.siddha@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
|
|
Move the NX setup into a separate file so that it can be compiled
without stack-protection while leaving the rest of the mm/init code
protected.
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com>
|
|
x86-64 assumes NX is available by default, so we need to
explicitly check for it before using NX. Some first-generation
Intel x86-64 processors didn't support NX, and even recent systems
allow it to be disabled in BIOS.
[ Impact: prevent Xen crash on NX-less 64-bit machines ]
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com>
Cc: Stable Kernel <stable@kernel.org>
|
|
Split __phys_addr out into its own file so we can disable
-fstack-protector in a fine-grained fashion. Also it doesn't
have terribly much to do with the rest of ioremap.c.
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com>
|
