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commit 3c9fa24ca7c9c47605672916491f79e8ccacb9e6 upstream.
The functions that were used in the emulation of fxrstor, fxsave, sgdt and
sidt were originally meant for task switching, and as such they did not
check privilege levels. This is very bad when the same functions are used
in the emulation of unprivileged instructions. This is CVE-2018-10853.
The obvious fix is to add a new argument to ops->read_std and ops->write_std,
which decides whether the access is a "system" access or should use the
processor's CPL.
Fixes: 129a72a0d3c8 ("KVM: x86: Introduce segmented_write_std", 2017-01-12)
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit ce14e868a54edeb2e30cb7a7b104a2fc4b9d76ca upstream.
Int the next patch the emulator's .read_std and .write_std callbacks will
grow another argument, which is not needed in kvm_read_guest_virt and
kvm_write_guest_virt_system's callers. Since we have to make separate
functions, let's give the currently existing names a nicer interface, too.
Fixes: 129a72a0d3c8 ("KVM: x86: Introduce segmented_write_std", 2017-01-12)
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 766d3571d8e50d3a73b77043dc632226f9e6b389 upstream.
KVM_X86_DISABLE_EXITS_HTL really refers to exit on halt.
Obviously a typo: should be named KVM_X86_DISABLE_EXITS_HLT.
Fixes: caa057a2cad ("KVM: X86: Provide a capability to disable HLT intercepts")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit a780a3ea628268b2ad0ed43d7f28d90db0ff18be upstream.
MSB of CR3 is a reserved bit if the PCIDE bit is not set in CR4.
It should be checked when PCIDE bit is not set, however commit
'd1cd3ce900441 ("KVM: MMU: check guest CR3 reserved bits based on
its physical address width")' removes the bit 63 checking
unconditionally. This patch fixes it by checking bit 63 of CR3
when PCIDE bit is not set in CR4.
Fixes: d1cd3ce900441 (KVM: MMU: check guest CR3 reserved bits based on its physical address width)
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Junaid Shahid <junaids@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Pull KVM fixes from Radim Krčmář:
"PPC:
- Close a hole which could possibly lead to the host timebase getting
out of sync.
- Three fixes relating to PTEs and TLB entries for radix guests.
- Fix a bug which could lead to an interrupt never getting delivered
to the guest, if it is pending for a guest vCPU when the vCPU gets
offlined.
s390:
- Fix false negatives in VSIE validity check (Cc stable)
x86:
- Fix time drift of VMX preemption timer when a guest uses LAPIC
timer in periodic mode (Cc stable)
- Unconditionally expose CPUID.IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES to allow
migration from hosts that don't need retpoline mitigation (Cc
stable)
- Fix guest crashes on reboot by properly coupling CR4.OSXSAVE and
CPUID.OSXSAVE (Cc stable)
- Report correct RIP after Hyper-V hypercall #UD (introduced in
-rc6)"
* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm:
KVM: x86: fix #UD address of failed Hyper-V hypercalls
kvm: x86: IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES is always supported
KVM: x86: Update cpuid properly when CR4.OSXAVE or CR4.PKE is changed
x86/kvm: fix LAPIC timer drift when guest uses periodic mode
KVM: s390: vsie: fix < 8k check for the itdba
KVM: PPC: Book 3S HV: Do ptesync in radix guest exit path
KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: XIVE: Resend re-routed interrupts on CPU priority change
KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Make radix clear pte when unmapping
KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Make radix use correct tlbie sequence in kvmppc_radix_tlbie_page
KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Snapshot timebase offset on guest entry
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If the hypercall was called from userspace or real mode, KVM injects #UD
and then advances RIP, so it looks like #UD was caused by the following
instruction. This probably won't cause more than confusion, but could
give an unexpected access to guest OS' instruction emulator.
Also, refactor the code to count hv hypercalls that were handled by the
virt userspace.
Fixes: 6356ee0c9602 ("x86: Delay skip of emulated hypercall instruction")
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
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The CPUID bits of OSXSAVE (function=0x1) and OSPKE (func=0x7, leaf=0x0)
allows user apps to detect if OS has set CR4.OSXSAVE or CR4.PKE. KVM is
supposed to update these CPUID bits when CR4 is updated. Current KVM
code doesn't handle some special cases when updates come from emulator.
Here is one example:
Step 1: guest boots
Step 2: guest OS enables XSAVE ==> CR4.OSXSAVE=1 and CPUID.OSXSAVE=1
Step 3: guest hot reboot ==> QEMU reset CR4 to 0, but CPUID.OSXAVE==1
Step 4: guest os checks CPUID.OSXAVE, detects 1, then executes xgetbv
Step 4 above will cause an #UD and guest crash because guest OS hasn't
turned on OSXAVE yet. This patch solves the problem by comparing the the
old_cr4 with cr4. If the related bits have been changed,
kvm_update_cpuid() needs to be called.
Signed-off-by: Wei Huang <wei@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Bandan Das <bsd@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Merge speculative store buffer bypass fixes from Thomas Gleixner:
- rework of the SPEC_CTRL MSR management to accomodate the new fancy
SSBD (Speculative Store Bypass Disable) bit handling.
- the CPU bug and sysfs infrastructure for the exciting new Speculative
Store Bypass 'feature'.
- support for disabling SSB via LS_CFG MSR on AMD CPUs including
Hyperthread synchronization on ZEN.
- PRCTL support for dynamic runtime control of SSB
- SECCOMP integration to automatically disable SSB for sandboxed
processes with a filter flag for opt-out.
- KVM integration to allow guests fiddling with SSBD including the new
software MSR VIRT_SPEC_CTRL to handle the LS_CFG based oddities on
AMD.
- BPF protection against SSB
.. this is just the core and x86 side, other architecture support will
come separately.
* 'speck-v20' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (49 commits)
bpf: Prevent memory disambiguation attack
x86/bugs: Rename SSBD_NO to SSB_NO
KVM: SVM: Implement VIRT_SPEC_CTRL support for SSBD
x86/speculation, KVM: Implement support for VIRT_SPEC_CTRL/LS_CFG
x86/bugs: Rework spec_ctrl base and mask logic
x86/bugs: Remove x86_spec_ctrl_set()
x86/bugs: Expose x86_spec_ctrl_base directly
x86/bugs: Unify x86_spec_ctrl_{set_guest,restore_host}
x86/speculation: Rework speculative_store_bypass_update()
x86/speculation: Add virtualized speculative store bypass disable support
x86/bugs, KVM: Extend speculation control for VIRT_SPEC_CTRL
x86/speculation: Handle HT correctly on AMD
x86/cpufeatures: Add FEATURE_ZEN
x86/cpufeatures: Disentangle SSBD enumeration
x86/cpufeatures: Disentangle MSR_SPEC_CTRL enumeration from IBRS
x86/speculation: Use synthetic bits for IBRS/IBPB/STIBP
KVM: SVM: Move spec control call after restore of GS
x86/cpu: Make alternative_msr_write work for 32-bit code
x86/bugs: Fix the parameters alignment and missing void
x86/bugs: Make cpu_show_common() static
...
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Expose the new virtualized architectural mechanism, VIRT_SSBD, for using
speculative store bypass disable (SSBD) under SVM. This will allow guests
to use SSBD on hardware that uses non-architectural mechanisms for enabling
SSBD.
[ tglx: Folded the migration fixup from Paolo Bonzini ]
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
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Anthoine reported:
The period used by Windows change over time but it can be 1
milliseconds or less. I saw the limit_periodic_timer_frequency
print so 500 microseconds is sometimes reached.
As suggested by Paolo, lower the default timer frequency limit to a
smaller interval of 200 us (5000 Hz) to leave some headroom. This
is required due to Windows 10 changing the scheduler tick limit
from 1024 Hz to 2048 Hz.
Reported-by: Anthoine Bourgeois <anthoine.bourgeois@blade-group.com>
Suggested-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Anthoine Bourgeois <anthoine.bourgeois@blade-group.com>
Cc: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
Cc: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@web.de>
Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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If the PCIDE bit is not set in CR4, then the MSb of CR3 is a reserved
bit. If the guest tries to set it, that should cause a #GP fault. So
mask out the bit only when the PCIDE bit is set.
Signed-off-by: Junaid Shahid <junaids@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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The IP increment should be done after the hypercall emulation, after
calling the various handlers. In this way, these handlers can accurately
identify the the IP of the VMCALL if they need it.
This patch keeps the same functionality for the Hyper-V handler which does
not use the return code of the standard kvm_skip_emulated_instruction()
call.
Signed-off-by: Marian Rotariu <mrotariu@bitdefender.com>
[Hyper-V hypercalls also need kvm_skip_emulated_instruction() - Paolo]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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This is not specific to Intel/AMD anymore. The TSC offset is available
in vcpu->arch.tsc_offset.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Update 'tsc_offset' on vmentry/vmexit of L2 guests to ensure that it always
captures the TSC_OFFSET of the running guest whether it is the L1 or L2
guest.
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Suggested-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed@amazon.de>
[AMD changes, fix update_ia32_tsc_adjust_msr. - Paolo]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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If the processor does not have an "Always Running APIC Timer" (aka ARAT),
we should not give guests direct access to MWAIT. The LAPIC timer would
stop ticking in deep C-states, so any host deadlines would not wakeup the
host kernel.
The host kernel intel_idle driver handles this by switching to broadcast
mode when ARAT is not available and MWAIT is issued with a deep C-state
that would stop the LAPIC timer. When MWAIT is passed through, we can not
tell when MWAIT is issued.
So just disable this capability when LAPIC ARAT is not available. I am not
even sure if there are any CPUs with VMX support but no LAPIC ARAT or not.
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Wanpeng Li <kernellwp@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed@amazon.de>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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fix a "warning: no previous prototype".
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Peng Hao <peng.hao2@zte.com.cn>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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There is no easy way to force KVM to run an instruction through the emulator
(by design as that will expose the x86 emulator as a significant attack-surface).
However, we do wish to expose the x86 emulator in case we are testing it
(e.g. via kvm-unit-tests). Therefore, this patch adds a "force emulation prefix"
that is designed to raise #UD which KVM will trap and it's #UD exit-handler will
match "force emulation prefix" to run instruction after prefix by the x86 emulator.
To not expose the x86 emulator by default, we add a module parameter that should
be off by default.
A simple testcase here:
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#define HYPERVISOR_INFO 0x40000000
#define CPUID(idx, eax, ebx, ecx, edx) \
asm volatile (\
"ud2a; .ascii \"kvm\"; cpuid" \
:"=b" (*ebx), "=a" (*eax), "=c" (*ecx), "=d" (*edx) \
:"0"(idx) );
void main()
{
unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
char string[13];
CPUID(HYPERVISOR_INFO, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
*(unsigned int *)(string + 0) = ebx;
*(unsigned int *)(string + 4) = ecx;
*(unsigned int *)(string + 8) = edx;
string[12] = 0;
if (strncmp(string, "KVMKVMKVM\0\0\0", 12) == 0)
printf("kvm guest\n");
else
printf("bare hardware\n");
}
Suggested-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>
[Correctly handle usermode exits. - Paolo]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Introduce handle_ud() to handle invalid opcode, this function will be
used by later patches.
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Radim KrÄmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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pending
In case L2 VMExit to L0 during event-delivery, VMCS02 is filled with
IDT-vectoring-info which vmx_complete_interrupts() makes sure to
reinject before next resume of L2.
While handling the VMExit in L0, an IPI could be sent by another L1 vCPU
to the L1 vCPU which currently runs L2 and exited to L0.
When L0 will reach vcpu_enter_guest() and call inject_pending_event(),
it will note that a previous event was re-injected to L2 (by
IDT-vectoring-info) and therefore won't check if there are pending L1
events which require exit from L2 to L1. Thus, L0 enters L2 without
immediate VMExit even though there are pending L1 events!
This commit fixes the issue by making sure to check for L1 pending
events even if a previous event was reinjected to L2 and bailing out
from inject_pending_event() before evaluating a new pending event in
case an event was already reinjected.
The bug was observed by the following setup:
* L0 is a 64CPU machine which runs KVM.
* L1 is a 16CPU machine which runs KVM.
* L0 & L1 runs with APICv disabled.
(Also reproduced with APICv enabled but easier to analyze below info
with APICv disabled)
* L1 runs a 16CPU L2 Windows Server 2012 R2 guest.
During L2 boot, L1 hangs completely and analyzing the hang reveals that
one L1 vCPU is holding KVM's mmu_lock and is waiting forever on an IPI
that he has sent for another L1 vCPU. And all other L1 vCPUs are
currently attempting to grab mmu_lock. Therefore, all L1 vCPUs are stuck
forever (as L1 runs with kernel-preemption disabled).
Observing /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/trace_pipe reveals the following
series of events:
(1) qemu-system-x86-19066 [030] kvm_nested_vmexit: rip:
0xfffff802c5dca82f reason: EPT_VIOLATION ext_inf1: 0x0000000000000182
ext_inf2: 0x00000000800000d2 ext_int: 0x00000000 ext_int_err: 0x00000000
(2) qemu-system-x86-19054 [028] kvm_apic_accept_irq: apicid f
vec 252 (Fixed|edge)
(3) qemu-system-x86-19066 [030] kvm_inj_virq: irq 210
(4) qemu-system-x86-19066 [030] kvm_entry: vcpu 15
(5) qemu-system-x86-19066 [030] kvm_exit: reason EPT_VIOLATION
rip 0xffffe00069202690 info 83 0
(6) qemu-system-x86-19066 [030] kvm_nested_vmexit: rip:
0xffffe00069202690 reason: EPT_VIOLATION ext_inf1: 0x0000000000000083
ext_inf2: 0x0000000000000000 ext_int: 0x00000000 ext_int_err: 0x00000000
(7) qemu-system-x86-19066 [030] kvm_nested_vmexit_inject: reason:
EPT_VIOLATION ext_inf1: 0x0000000000000083 ext_inf2: 0x0000000000000000
ext_int: 0x00000000 ext_int_err: 0x00000000
(8) qemu-system-x86-19066 [030] kvm_entry: vcpu 15
Which can be analyzed as follows:
(1) L2 VMExit to L0 on EPT_VIOLATION during delivery of vector 0xd2.
Therefore, vmx_complete_interrupts() will set KVM_REQ_EVENT and reinject
a pending-interrupt of 0xd2.
(2) L1 sends an IPI of vector 0xfc (CALL_FUNCTION_VECTOR) to destination
vCPU 15. This will set relevant bit in LAPIC's IRR and set KVM_REQ_EVENT.
(3) L0 reach vcpu_enter_guest() which calls inject_pending_event() which
notes that interrupt 0xd2 was reinjected and therefore calls
vmx_inject_irq() and returns. Without checking for pending L1 events!
Note that at this point, KVM_REQ_EVENT was cleared by vcpu_enter_guest()
before calling inject_pending_event().
(4) L0 resumes L2 without immediate-exit even though there is a pending
L1 event (The IPI pending in LAPIC's IRR).
We have already reached the buggy scenario but events could be
furthered analyzed:
(5+6) L2 VMExit to L0 on EPT_VIOLATION. This time not during
event-delivery.
(7) L0 decides to forward the VMExit to L1 for further handling.
(8) L0 resumes into L1. Note that because KVM_REQ_EVENT is cleared, the
LAPIC's IRR is not examined and therefore the IPI is still not delivered
into L1!
Signed-off-by: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Nikita Leshenko <nikita.leshchenko@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
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The reason that exception.pending should block re-injection of
NMI/interrupt is not described correctly in comment in code.
Instead, it describes why a pending exception should be injected
before a pending NMI/interrupt.
Therefore, move currently present comment to code-block evaluating
a new pending event which explains why exception.pending is evaluated
first.
In addition, create a new comment describing that exception.pending
blocks re-injection of NMI/interrupt because the exception was
queued by handling vmexit which was due to NMI/interrupt delivery.
Signed-off-by: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Nikita Leshenko <nikita.leshchenko@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Krish Sadhukhan <krish.sadhukhan@orcle.com>
[Used a comment from Sean J <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>. - Radim]
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
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For exceptions & NMIs events, KVM code use the following
coding convention:
*) "pending" represents an event that should be injected to guest at
some point but it's side-effects have not yet occurred.
*) "injected" represents an event that it's side-effects have already
occurred.
However, interrupts don't conform to this coding convention.
All current code flows mark interrupt.pending when it's side-effects
have already taken place (For example, bit moved from LAPIC IRR to
ISR). Therefore, it makes sense to just rename
interrupt.pending to interrupt.injected.
This change follows logic of previous commit 664f8e26b00c ("KVM: X86:
Fix loss of exception which has not yet been injected") which changed
exception to follow this coding convention as well.
It is important to note that in case !lapic_in_kernel(vcpu),
interrupt.pending usage was and still incorrect.
In this case, interrrupt.pending can only be set using one of the
following ioctls: KVM_INTERRUPT, KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS and
KVM_SET_SREGS. Looking at how QEMU uses these ioctls, one can see that
QEMU uses them either to re-set an "interrupt.pending" state it has
received from KVM (via KVM_GET_VCPU_EVENTS interrupt.pending or
via KVM_GET_SREGS interrupt_bitmap) or by dispatching a new interrupt
from QEMU's emulated LAPIC which reset bit in IRR and set bit in ISR
before sending ioctl to KVM. So it seems that indeed "interrupt.pending"
in this case is also suppose to represent "interrupt.injected".
However, kvm_cpu_has_interrupt() & kvm_cpu_has_injectable_intr()
is misusing (now named) interrupt.injected in order to return if
there is a pending interrupt.
This leads to nVMX/nSVM not be able to distinguish if it should exit
from L2 to L1 on EXTERNAL_INTERRUPT on pending interrupt or should
re-inject an injected interrupt.
Therefore, add a FIXME at these functions for handling this issue.
This patch introduce no semantics change.
Signed-off-by: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Nikita Leshenko <nikita.leshchenko@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Krish Sadhukhan <krish.sadhukhan@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
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kvm_inject_realmode_interrupt() is called from one of the injection
functions which writes event-injection to VMCS: vmx_queue_exception(),
vmx_inject_irq() and vmx_inject_nmi().
All these functions are called just to cause an event-injection to
guest. They are not responsible of manipulating the event-pending
flag. The only purpose of kvm_inject_realmode_interrupt() should be
to emulate real-mode interrupt-injection.
This was also incorrect when called from vmx_queue_exception().
Signed-off-by: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Nikita Leshenko <nikita.leshchenko@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Krish Sadhukhan <krish.sadhukhan@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
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The assist page has been used only for the paravirtual EOI so far, hence
the "APIC" in the MSR name. Renaming to match the Hyper-V TLFS where it's
called "Virtual VP Assist MSR".
Signed-off-by: Ladi Prosek <lprosek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
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KVM and perf have a special backdoor mechanism to report the IP for interrupts
re-executed after vm exit. This works for the NMIs that perf normally uses.
However when perf is in timer mode it doesn't work because the timer interrupt
doesn't get this special treatment. This is common when KVM is running
nested in another hypervisor which may not implement the PMU, so only
timer mode is available.
Call the functions to set up the backdoor IP also for non NMI interrupts.
I renamed the functions to set up the backdoor IP reporting to be more
appropiate for their new use. The SVM change is only compile tested.
v2: Moved the functions inline.
For the normal interrupt case the before/after functions are now
called from x86.c, not arch specific code.
For the NMI case we still need to call it in the architecture
specific code, because it's already needed in the low level *_run
functions.
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
[Removed unnecessary calls from arch handle_external_intr. - Radim]
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
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Add kvm_x86_ops->set_identity_map_addr and set ept_identity_map_addr
in VMX specific code so that ept_identity_map_addr can be moved out
of 'struct kvm_arch' in a future patch.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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When L1 IOAPIC redirection-table is written, a request of
KVM_REQ_SCAN_IOAPIC is set on all vCPUs. This is done such that
all vCPUs will now recalc their IOAPIC handled vectors and load
it to their EOI-exitmap.
However, it could be that one of the vCPUs is currently running
L2. In this case, load_eoi_exitmap() will be called which would
write to vmcs02->eoi_exit_bitmap, which is wrong because
vmcs02->eoi_exit_bitmap should always be equal to
vmcs12->eoi_exit_bitmap. Furthermore, at this point
KVM_REQ_SCAN_IOAPIC was already consumed and therefore we will
never update vmcs01->eoi_exit_bitmap. This could lead to remote_irr
of some IOAPIC level-triggered entry to remain set forever.
Fix this issue by delaying the load of EOI-exitmap to when vCPU
is running L1.
One may wonder why not just delay entire KVM_REQ_SCAN_IOAPIC
processing to when vCPU is running L1. This is done in order to handle
correctly the case where LAPIC & IO-APIC of L1 is pass-throughed into
L2. In this case, vmcs12->virtual_interrupt_delivery should be 0. In
current nVMX implementation, that results in
vmcs02->virtual_interrupt_delivery to also be 0. Thus,
vmcs02->eoi_exit_bitmap is not used. Therefore, every L2 EOI cause
a #VMExit into L0 (either on MSR_WRITE to x2APIC MSR or
APIC_ACCESS/APIC_WRITE/EPT_MISCONFIG to APIC MMIO page).
In order for such L2 EOI to be broadcasted, if needed, from LAPIC
to IO-APIC, vcpu->arch.ioapic_handled_vectors must be updated
while L2 is running. Therefore, patch makes sure to delay only the
loading of EOI-exitmap but not the update of
vcpu->arch.ioapic_handled_vectors.
Reviewed-by: Arbel Moshe <arbel.moshe@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Krish Sadhukhan <krish.sadhukhan@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Allow to disable pause loop exit/pause filtering on a per VM basis.
If some VMs have dedicated host CPUs, they won't be negatively affected
due to needlessly intercepted PAUSE instructions.
Thanks to Jan H. Schönherr's initial patch.
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Jan H. Schönherr <jschoenh@amazon.de>
Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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If host CPUs are dedicated to a VM, we can avoid VM exits on HLT.
This patch adds the per-VM capability to disable them.
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Jan H. Schönherr <jschoenh@amazon.de>
Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Allowing a guest to execute MWAIT without interception enables a guest
to put a (physical) CPU into a power saving state, where it takes
longer to return from than what may be desired by the host.
Don't give a guest that power over a host by default. (Especially,
since nothing prevents a guest from using MWAIT even when it is not
advertised via CPUID.)
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Jan H. Schönherr <jschoenh@amazon.de>
Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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VMware exposes the following Pseudo PMCs:
0x10000: Physical host TSC
0x10001: Elapsed real time in ns
0x10002: Elapsed apparent time in ns
For more info refer to:
https://www.vmware.com/files/pdf/techpaper/Timekeeping-In-VirtualMachines.pdf
VMware allows access to these Pseduo-PMCs even when read via RDPMC
in Ring3 and CR4.PCE=0. Therefore, commit modifies x86 emulator
to allow access to these PMCs in this situation. In addition,
emulation of these PMCs were added to kvm_pmu_rdpmc().
Signed-off-by: Arbel Moshe <arbel.moshe@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Access to VMware backdoor ports is done by one of the IN/OUT/INS/OUTS
instructions. These ports must be allowed access even if TSS I/O
permission bitmap don't allow it.
To handle this, VMX/SVM will be changed in future commits
to intercept #GP which was raised by such access and
handle it by calling x86 emulator to emulate instruction.
If it was one of these instructions, the x86 emulator already handles
it correctly (Since commit "KVM: x86: Always allow access to VMware
backdoor I/O ports") by not checking these ports against TSS I/O
permission bitmap.
One may wonder why checking for specific instructions is necessary
as we can just forward all #GPs to the x86 emulator.
There are multiple reasons for doing so:
1. We don't want the x86 emulator to be reached easily
by guest by just executing an instruction that raises #GP as that
exposes the x86 emulator as a bigger attack surface.
2. The x86 emulator is incomplete and therefore certain instructions
that can cause #GP cannot be emulated. Such an example is "INT x"
(opcode 0xcd) which reaches emulate_int() which can only emulate
the instruction if vCPU is in real-mode.
Signed-off-by: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Nikita Leshenko <nikita.leshchenko@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Next commits are going introduce support for accessing VMware backdoor
ports even though guest's TSS I/O permissions bitmap doesn't allow
access. This mimic VMware hypervisor behavior.
In order to support this, next commits will change VMX/SVM to
intercept #GP which was raised by such access and handle it by calling
the x86 emulator to emulate instruction. Since commit "KVM: x86:
Always allow access to VMware backdoor I/O ports", the x86 emulator
handles access to these I/O ports by not checking these ports against
the TSS I/O permission bitmap.
However, there could be cases that CPU rasies a #GP on instruction
that fails to be disassembled by the x86 emulator (Because of
incomplete implementation for example).
In those cases, we would like the #GP intercept to just forward #GP
as-is to guest as if there was no intercept to begin with.
However, current emulator code always queues #UD exception in case
emulator fails (including disassembly failures) which is not what is
wanted in this flow.
This commit addresses this issue by adding a new emulation_type flag
that will allow the #GP intercept handler to specify that it wishes
to be aware when instruction emulation fails and doesn't want #UD
exception to be queued.
Signed-off-by: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Nikita Leshenko <nikita.leshchenko@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Support access to VMware backdoor requires KVM to intercept #GP
exceptions from guest which introduce slight performance hit.
Therefore, control this support by module parameter.
Note that module parameter is exported as it should be consumed by
kvm_intel & kvm_amd to determine if they should intercept #GP or not.
This commit doesn't change semantics.
It is done as a preparation for future commits.
Signed-off-by: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Nikita Leshenko <nikita.leshchenko@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Add kvm_fast_pio() to consolidate duplicate code in VMX and SVM.
Unexport kvm_fast_pio_in() and kvm_fast_pio_out().
Suggested-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Nested Hyper-V/Windows guest running on top of KVM will use TSC page
clocksource in two cases:
- L0 exposes invariant TSC (CPUID.80000007H:EDX[8]).
- L0 provides Hyper-V Reenlightenment support (CPUID.40000003H:EAX[13]).
Exposing invariant TSC effectively blocks migration to hosts with different
TSC frequencies, providing reenlightenment support will be needed when we
start migrating nested workloads.
Implement rudimentary support for reenlightenment MSRs. For now, these are
just read/write MSRs with no effect.
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Roman Kagan <rkagan@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
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Add support for AMD Core Performance counters in the guest. The base
event select and counter MSRs are changed. In addition, with the core
extension, there are 2 extra counters available for performance
measurements for a total of 6.
With the new MSRs, the logic to map them to the gp_counters[] is changed.
New functions are added to check the validity of the get/set MSRs.
If the guest has the X86_FEATURE_PERFCTR_CORE cpuid flag set, the number
of counters available to the vcpu is set to 6. It the flag is not set
then it is 4.
Signed-off-by: Janakarajan Natarajan <Janakarajan.Natarajan@amd.com>
[Squashed "Expose AMD Core Perf Extension flag to guests" - Radim.]
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
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Use the new MSR feature framework to tell userspace which VMX capabilities
are available for nested hypervisors. Before, these were only accessible
with the KVM_GET_MSR VCPU ioctl, after VCPUs had been created.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
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This commit implements an enhanced x86 version of S390
KVM_CAP_SYNC_REGS functionality. KVM_CAP_SYNC_REGS "allow[s]
userspace to access certain guest registers without having
to call SET/GET_*REGS”. This reduces ioctl overhead which
is particularly important when userspace is making synchronous
guest state modifications (e.g. when emulating and/or intercepting
instructions).
Originally implemented upstream for the S390, the x86 differences
follow:
- userspace can select the register sets to be synchronized with kvm_run
using bit-flags in the kvm_valid_registers and kvm_dirty_registers
fields.
- vcpu_events is available in addition to the regs and sregs register
sets.
Signed-off-by: Ken Hofsass <hofsass@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
[Removed wrapper around check for reserved kvm_valid_regs. - Radim]
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
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In Hyper-V, the fast guest->host notification mechanism is the
SIGNAL_EVENT hypercall, with a single parameter of the connection ID to
signal.
Currently this hypercall incurs a user exit and requires the userspace
to decode the parameters and trigger the notification of the potentially
different I/O context.
To avoid the costly user exit, process this hypercall and signal the
corresponding eventfd in KVM, similar to ioeventfd. The association
between the connection id and the eventfd is established via the newly
introduced KVM_HYPERV_EVENTFD ioctl, and maintained in an
(srcu-protected) IDR.
Signed-off-by: Roman Kagan <rkagan@virtuozzo.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
[asm/hyperv.h changes approved by KY Srinivasan. - Radim]
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
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Move kvm.arch.hyperv initialization and cleanup to separate functions.
For now only a mutex is inited in the former, and the latter is empty;
more stuff will go in there in a followup patch.
Signed-off-by: Roman Kagan <rkagan@virtuozzo.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
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Moving the code around broke this rare configuration.
Use this opportunity to finally call lapic reset from vcpu reset.
Reported-by: syzbot+fb7a33a4b6c35007a72b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Suggested-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Fixes: 0b2e9904c159 ("KVM: x86: move LAPIC initialization after VMCS creation")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
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Linux (among the others) has checks to make sure that certain features
aren't enabled on a certain family/model/stepping if the microcode version
isn't greater than or equal to a known good version.
By exposing the real microcode version, we're preventing buggy guests that
don't check that they are running virtualized (i.e., they should trust the
hypervisor) from disabling features that are effectively not buggy.
Suggested-by: Filippo Sironi <sironi@amazon.de>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>
Cc: Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
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Introduce kvm_get_msr_feature() to handle the msrs which are supported
by different vendors and sharing the same emulation logic.
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>
Cc: Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
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In order to determine if LFENCE is a serializing instruction on AMD
processors, MSR 0xc0011029 (MSR_F10H_DECFG) must be read and the state
of bit 1 checked. This patch will add support to allow a guest to
properly make this determination.
Add the MSR feature callback operation to svm.c and add MSR 0xc0011029
to the list of MSR-based features. If LFENCE is serializing, then the
feature is supported, allowing the hypervisor to set the value of the
MSR that guest will see. Support is also added to write (hypervisor only)
and read the MSR value for the guest. A write by the guest will result in
a #GP. A read by the guest will return the value as set by the host. In
this way, the support to expose the feature to the guest is controlled by
the hypervisor.
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
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Provide a new KVM capability that allows bits within MSRs to be recognized
as features. Two new ioctls are added to the /dev/kvm ioctl routine to
retrieve the list of these MSRs and then retrieve their values. A kvm_x86_ops
callback is used to determine support for the listed MSR-based features.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
[Tweaked documentation. - Radim]
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
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On x86, special KVM memslots such as the TSS region have anonymous
memory mappings created on behalf of userspace, and these mappings are
removed when the VM is destroyed.
It is however possible for removing these mappings via vm_munmap() to
fail. This can most easily happen if the thread receives SIGKILL while
it's waiting to acquire ->mmap_sem. This triggers the 'WARN_ON(r < 0)'
in __x86_set_memory_region(). syzkaller was able to hit this, using
'exit()' to send the SIGKILL. Note that while the vm_munmap() failure
results in the mapping not being removed immediately, it is not leaked
forever but rather will be freed when the process exits.
It's not really possible to handle this failure properly, so almost
every other caller of vm_munmap() doesn't check the return value. It's
a limitation of having the kernel manage these mappings rather than
userspace.
So just remove the WARN_ON() so that users can't spam the kernel log
with this warning.
Fixes: f0d648bdf0a5 ("KVM: x86: map/unmap private slots in __x86_set_memory_region")
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
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The initial reset of the local APIC is performed before the VMCS has been
created, but it tries to do a vmwrite:
vmwrite error: reg 810 value 4a00 (err 18944)
CPU: 54 PID: 38652 Comm: qemu-kvm Tainted: G W I 4.16.0-0.rc2.git0.1.fc28.x86_64 #1
Hardware name: Intel Corporation S2600CW/S2600CW, BIOS SE5C610.86B.01.01.0003.090520141303 09/05/2014
Call Trace:
vmx_set_rvi [kvm_intel]
vmx_hwapic_irr_update [kvm_intel]
kvm_lapic_reset [kvm]
kvm_create_lapic [kvm]
kvm_arch_vcpu_init [kvm]
kvm_vcpu_init [kvm]
vmx_create_vcpu [kvm_intel]
kvm_vm_ioctl [kvm]
Move it later, after the VMCS has been created.
Fixes: 4191db26b714 ("KVM: x86: Update APICv on APIC reset")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Pull KVM updates from Radim Krčmář:
"ARM:
- icache invalidation optimizations, improving VM startup time
- support for forwarded level-triggered interrupts, improving
performance for timers and passthrough platform devices
- a small fix for power-management notifiers, and some cosmetic
changes
PPC:
- add MMIO emulation for vector loads and stores
- allow HPT guests to run on a radix host on POWER9 v2.2 CPUs without
requiring the complex thread synchronization of older CPU versions
- improve the handling of escalation interrupts with the XIVE
interrupt controller
- support decrement register migration
- various cleanups and bugfixes.
s390:
- Cornelia Huck passed maintainership to Janosch Frank
- exitless interrupts for emulated devices
- cleanup of cpuflag handling
- kvm_stat counter improvements
- VSIE improvements
- mm cleanup
x86:
- hypervisor part of SEV
- UMIP, RDPID, and MSR_SMI_COUNT emulation
- paravirtualized TLB shootdown using the new KVM_VCPU_PREEMPTED bit
- allow guests to see TOPOEXT, GFNI, VAES, VPCLMULQDQ, and more
AVX512 features
- show vcpu id in its anonymous inode name
- many fixes and cleanups
- per-VCPU MSR bitmaps (already merged through x86/pti branch)
- stable KVM clock when nesting on Hyper-V (merged through
x86/hyperv)"
* tag 'kvm-4.16-1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm: (197 commits)
KVM: PPC: Book3S: Add MMIO emulation for VMX instructions
KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Branch inside feature section
KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Make HPT resizing work on POWER9
KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Fix handling of secondary HPTEG in HPT resizing code
KVM: PPC: Book3S PR: Fix broken select due to misspelling
KVM: x86: don't forget vcpu_put() in kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_set_sregs()
KVM: PPC: Book3S PR: Fix svcpu copying with preemption enabled
KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Drop locks before reading guest memory
kvm: x86: remove efer_reload entry in kvm_vcpu_stat
KVM: x86: AMD Processor Topology Information
x86/kvm/vmx: do not use vm-exit instruction length for fast MMIO when running nested
kvm: embed vcpu id to dentry of vcpu anon inode
kvm: Map PFN-type memory regions as writable (if possible)
x86/kvm: Make it compile on 32bit and with HYPYERVISOR_GUEST=n
KVM: arm/arm64: Fixup userspace irqchip static key optimization
KVM: arm/arm64: Fix userspace_irqchip_in_use counting
KVM: arm/arm64: Fix incorrect timer_is_pending logic
MAINTAINERS: update KVM/s390 maintainers
MAINTAINERS: add Halil as additional vfio-ccw maintainer
MAINTAINERS: add David as a reviewer for KVM/s390
...
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull spectre/meltdown updates from Thomas Gleixner:
"The next round of updates related to melted spectrum:
- The initial set of spectre V1 mitigations:
- Array index speculation blocker and its usage for syscall,
fdtable and the n180211 driver.
- Speculation barrier and its usage in user access functions
- Make indirect calls in KVM speculation safe
- Blacklisting of known to be broken microcodes so IPBP/IBSR are not
touched.
- The initial IBPB support and its usage in context switch
- The exposure of the new speculation MSRs to KVM guests.
- A fix for a regression in x86/32 related to the cpu entry area
- Proper whitelisting for known to be safe CPUs from the mitigations.
- objtool fixes to deal proper with retpolines and alternatives
- Exclude __init functions from retpolines which speeds up the boot
process.
- Removal of the syscall64 fast path and related cleanups and
simplifications
- Removal of the unpatched paravirt mode which is yet another source
of indirect unproteced calls.
- A new and undisputed version of the module mismatch warning
- A couple of cleanup and correctness fixes all over the place
Yet another step towards full mitigation. There are a few things still
missing like the RBS underflow mitigation for Skylake and other small
details, but that's being worked on.
That said, I'm taking a belated christmas vacation for a week and hope
that everything is magically solved when I'm back on Feb 12th"
* 'x86-pti-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (37 commits)
KVM/SVM: Allow direct access to MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL
KVM/VMX: Allow direct access to MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL
KVM/VMX: Emulate MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES
KVM/x86: Add IBPB support
KVM/x86: Update the reverse_cpuid list to include CPUID_7_EDX
x86/speculation: Fix typo IBRS_ATT, which should be IBRS_ALL
x86/pti: Mark constant arrays as __initconst
x86/spectre: Simplify spectre_v2 command line parsing
x86/retpoline: Avoid retpolines for built-in __init functions
x86/kvm: Update spectre-v1 mitigation
KVM: VMX: make MSR bitmaps per-VCPU
x86/paravirt: Remove 'noreplace-paravirt' cmdline option
x86/speculation: Use Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier in context switch
x86/cpuid: Fix up "virtual" IBRS/IBPB/STIBP feature bits on Intel
x86/spectre: Fix spelling mistake: "vunerable"-> "vulnerable"
x86/spectre: Report get_user mitigation for spectre_v1
nl80211: Sanitize array index in parse_txq_params
vfs, fdtable: Prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution
x86/syscall: Sanitize syscall table de-references under speculation
x86/get_user: Use pointer masking to limit speculation
...
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux
Pull hardened usercopy whitelisting from Kees Cook:
"Currently, hardened usercopy performs dynamic bounds checking on slab
cache objects. This is good, but still leaves a lot of kernel memory
available to be copied to/from userspace in the face of bugs.
To further restrict what memory is available for copying, this creates
a way to whitelist specific areas of a given slab cache object for
copying to/from userspace, allowing much finer granularity of access
control.
Slab caches that are never exposed to userspace can declare no
whitelist for their objects, thereby keeping them unavailable to
userspace via dynamic copy operations. (Note, an implicit form of
whitelisting is the use of constant sizes in usercopy operations and
get_user()/put_user(); these bypass all hardened usercopy checks since
these sizes cannot change at runtime.)
This new check is WARN-by-default, so any mistakes can be found over
the next several releases without breaking anyone's system.
The series has roughly the following sections:
- remove %p and improve reporting with offset
- prepare infrastructure and whitelist kmalloc
- update VFS subsystem with whitelists
- update SCSI subsystem with whitelists
- update network subsystem with whitelists
- update process memory with whitelists
- update per-architecture thread_struct with whitelists
- update KVM with whitelists and fix ioctl bug
- mark all other allocations as not whitelisted
- update lkdtm for more sensible test overage"
* tag 'usercopy-v4.16-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux: (38 commits)
lkdtm: Update usercopy tests for whitelisting
usercopy: Restrict non-usercopy caches to size 0
kvm: x86: fix KVM_XEN_HVM_CONFIG ioctl
kvm: whitelist struct kvm_vcpu_arch
arm: Implement thread_struct whitelist for hardened usercopy
arm64: Implement thread_struct whitelist for hardened usercopy
x86: Implement thread_struct whitelist for hardened usercopy
fork: Provide usercopy whitelisting for task_struct
fork: Define usercopy region in thread_stack slab caches
fork: Define usercopy region in mm_struct slab caches
net: Restrict unwhitelisted proto caches to size 0
sctp: Copy struct sctp_sock.autoclose to userspace using put_user()
sctp: Define usercopy region in SCTP proto slab cache
caif: Define usercopy region in caif proto slab cache
ip: Define usercopy region in IP proto slab cache
net: Define usercopy region in struct proto slab cache
scsi: Define usercopy region in scsi_sense_cache slab cache
cifs: Define usercopy region in cifs_request slab cache
vxfs: Define usercopy region in vxfs_inode slab cache
ufs: Define usercopy region in ufs_inode_cache slab cache
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