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[ Upstream commit 6b1dd26544d045f6a79e8c73572c0c0db3ef3c1a ]
Set/clear DEBUGCTLMSR_FREEZE_IN_SMM in GUEST_IA32_DEBUGCTL based on the
host's pre-VM-Enter value, i.e. preserve the host's FREEZE_IN_SMM setting
while running the guest. When running with the "default treatment of SMIs"
in effect (the only mode KVM supports), SMIs do not generate a VM-Exit that
is visible to host (non-SMM) software, and instead transitions directly
from VMX non-root to SMM. And critically, DEBUGCTL isn't context switched
by hardware on SMI or RSM, i.e. SMM will run with whatever value was
resident in hardware at the time of the SMI.
Failure to preserve FREEZE_IN_SMM results in the PMU unexpectedly counting
events while the CPU is executing in SMM, which can pollute profiling and
potentially leak information into the guest.
Check for changes in FREEZE_IN_SMM prior to every entry into KVM's inner
run loop, as the bit can be toggled in IRQ context via IPI callback (SMP
function call), by way of /sys/devices/cpu/freeze_on_smi.
Add a field in kvm_x86_ops to communicate which DEBUGCTL bits need to be
preserved, as FREEZE_IN_SMM is only supported and defined for Intel CPUs,
i.e. explicitly checking FREEZE_IN_SMM in common x86 is at best weird, and
at worst could lead to undesirable behavior in the future if AMD CPUs ever
happened to pick up a collision with the bit.
Exempt TDX vCPUs, i.e. protected guests, from the check, as the TDX Module
owns and controls GUEST_IA32_DEBUGCTL.
WARN in SVM if KVM_RUN_LOAD_DEBUGCTL is set, mostly to document that the
lack of handling isn't a KVM bug (TDX already WARNs on any run_flag).
Lastly, explicitly reload GUEST_IA32_DEBUGCTL on a VM-Fail that is missed
by KVM but detected by hardware, i.e. in nested_vmx_restore_host_state().
Doing so avoids the need to track host_debugctl on a per-VMCS basis, as
GUEST_IA32_DEBUGCTL is unconditionally written by prepare_vmcs02() and
load_vmcs12_host_state(). For the VM-Fail case, even though KVM won't
have actually entered the guest, vcpu_enter_guest() will have run with
vmcs02 active and thus could result in vmcs01 being run with a stale value.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250610232010.162191-9-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 7d0cce6cbe71af6e9c1831bff101a2b9c249c4a2 ]
Introduce vmx_guest_debugctl_{read,write}() to handle all accesses to
vmcs.GUEST_IA32_DEBUGCTL. This will allow stuffing FREEZE_IN_SMM into
GUEST_IA32_DEBUGCTL based on the host setting without bleeding the state
into the guest, and without needing to copy+paste the FREEZE_IN_SMM
logic into every patch that accesses GUEST_IA32_DEBUGCTL.
No functional change intended.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
[sean: massage changelog, make inline, use in all prepare_vmcs02() cases]
Reviewed-by: Dapeng Mi <dapeng1.mi@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250610232010.162191-8-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Stable-dep-of: 6b1dd26544d0 ("KVM: VMX: Preserve host's DEBUGCTLMSR_FREEZE_IN_SMM while running the guest")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 095686e6fcb4150f0a55b1a25987fad3d8af58d6 ]
Add a consistency check for L2's guest_ia32_debugctl, as KVM only supports
a subset of hardware functionality, i.e. KVM can't rely on hardware to
detect illegal/unsupported values. Failure to check the vmcs12 value
would allow the guest to load any harware-supported value while running L2.
Take care to exempt BTF and LBR from the validity check in order to match
KVM's behavior for writes via WRMSR, but without clobbering vmcs12. Even
if VM_EXIT_SAVE_DEBUG_CONTROLS is set in vmcs12, L1 can reasonably expect
that vmcs12->guest_ia32_debugctl will not be modified if writes to the MSR
are being intercepted.
Arguably, KVM _should_ update vmcs12 if VM_EXIT_SAVE_DEBUG_CONTROLS is set
*and* writes to MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR are not being intercepted by L1, but
that would incur non-trivial complexity and wouldn't change the fact that
KVM's handling of DEBUGCTL is blatantly broken. I.e. the extra complexity
is not worth carrying.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250610232010.162191-7-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Stable-dep-of: 6b1dd26544d0 ("KVM: VMX: Preserve host's DEBUGCTLMSR_FREEZE_IN_SMM while running the guest")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Both SVM and VMX have similar implementation for executing an IBPB
between running different vCPUs on the same CPU to create separate
prediction domains for different vCPUs.
For VMX, when the currently loaded VMCS is changed in
vmx_vcpu_load_vmcs(), an IBPB is executed if there is no 'buddy', which
is the case on vCPU load. The intention is to execute an IBPB when
switching vCPUs, but not when switching the VMCS within the same vCPU.
Executing an IBPB on nested transitions within the same vCPU is handled
separately and conditionally in nested_vmx_vmexit().
For SVM, the current VMCB is tracked on vCPU load and an IBPB is
executed when it is changed. The intention is also to execute an IBPB
when switching vCPUs, although it is possible that in some cases an IBBP
is executed when switching VMCBs for the same vCPU. Executing an IBPB on
nested transitions should be handled separately, and is proposed at [1].
Unify the logic by tracking the last loaded vCPU and execuintg the IBPB
on vCPU change in kvm_arch_vcpu_load() instead. When a vCPU is
destroyed, make sure all references to it are removed from any CPU. This
is similar to how SVM clears the current_vmcb tracking on vCPU
destruction. Remove the current VMCB tracking in SVM as it is no longer
required, as well as the 'buddy' parameter to vmx_vcpu_load_vmcs().
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20250221163352.3818347-4-yosry.ahmed@linux.dev
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250320013759.3965869-1-yosry.ahmed@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Yosry Ahmed <yosry.ahmed@linux.dev>
[sean: tweak comment to stay at/under 80 columns]
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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Move emulation_required from struct vcpu_vmx to struct vcpu_vt so that
vmx_handle_exit_irqoff() can be reused by TDX code.
No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com>
Message-ID: <20250222014757.897978-14-binbin.wu@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Move common fields of struct vcpu_vmx and struct vcpu_tdx to struct
vcpu_vt, to share the code between VMX/TDX as much as possible and to make
TDX exit handling more VMX like.
No functional change intended.
[Adrian: move code that depends on struct vcpu_vmx back to vmx.h]
Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/Z1suNzg2Or743a7e@google.com
Signed-off-by: Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Message-ID: <20250129095902.16391-5-adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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TDX KVM doesn't support PMU yet, it's future work of TDX KVM support as
another patch series. For now, handle TDX by updating vcpu_to_lbr_desc()
and vcpu_to_lbr_records() to return NULL.
Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@intel.com>
Co-developed-by: Tony Lindgren <tony.lindgren@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Tony Lindgren <tony.lindgren@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
---
- Add pragma poison for to_vmx() (Paolo)
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Add vt_init() and vt_exit() as the new module init/exit functions and
refactor existing vmx_init()/vmx_exit() as helper to make room for TDX
specific initialization and teardown.
To support TDX, KVM will need to enable TDX during KVM module loading
time. Enabling TDX requires enabling hardware virtualization first so
that all online CPUs (and the new CPU going online) are in post-VMXON
state.
Currently, the vmx_init() flow is:
1) hv_init_evmcs(),
2) kvm_x86_vendor_init(),
3) Other VMX specific initialization,
4) kvm_init()
The kvm_x86_vendor_init() invokes kvm_x86_init_ops::hardware_setup() to
do VMX specific hardware setup and calls kvm_update_ops() to initialize
kvm_x86_ops to VMX's version.
TDX will have its own version for most of kvm_x86_ops callbacks. It
would be nice if kvm_x86_init_ops::hardware_setup() could also be used
for TDX, but in practice it cannot. The reason is, as mentioned above,
TDX initialization requires hardware virtualization having been enabled,
which must happen after kvm_update_ops(), but hardware_setup() is done
before that.
Also, TDX is based on VMX, and it makes sense to only initialize TDX
after VMX has been initialized. If VMX fails to initialize, TDX is
likely broken anyway.
So the new flow of KVM module init function will be:
1) Current VMX initialization code in vmx_init() before kvm_init(),
2) TDX initialization,
3) kvm_init()
Split vmx_init() into two parts based on above 1) and 3) so that TDX
initialization can fit in between. Make part 1) as the new helper
vmx_init(). Introduce vt_init() as the new module init function which
calls vmx_init() and kvm_init(). TDX initialization will be added
later.
Do the same thing for vmx_exit()/vt_exit().
Signed-off-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Message-ID: <3f23f24098bdcf42e213798893ffff7cdc7103be.1731664295.git.kai.huang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Move KVM's snapshot of DEBUGCTL to kvm_vcpu_arch and take the snapshot in
common x86, so that SVM can also use the snapshot.
Opportunistically change the field to a u64. While bits 63:32 are reserved
on AMD, not mentioned at all in Intel's SDM, and managed as an "unsigned
long" by the kernel, DEBUGCTL is an MSR and therefore a 64-bit value.
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-and-tested-by: Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@amd.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250227222411.3490595-4-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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Rename PML_ENTITY_NUM to PML_LOG_NR_ENTRIES
Add PML_HEAD_INDEX to specify the first entry that CPU writes.
No functional change intended.
Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241219221034.903927-2-mlevitsk@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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If KVM emulates an EOI for L1's virtual APIC while L2 is active, defer
updating GUEST_INTERUPT_STATUS.SVI, i.e. the VMCS's cache of the highest
in-service IRQ, until L1 is active, as vmcs01, not vmcs02, needs to track
vISR. The missed SVI update for vmcs01 can result in L1 interrupts being
incorrectly blocked, e.g. if there is a pending interrupt with lower
priority than the interrupt that was EOI'd.
This bug only affects use cases where L1's vAPIC is effectively passed
through to L2, e.g. in a pKVM scenario where L2 is L1's depriveleged host,
as KVM will only emulate an EOI for L1's vAPIC if Virtual Interrupt
Delivery (VID) is disabled in vmc12, and L1 isn't intercepting L2 accesses
to its (virtual) APIC page (or if x2APIC is enabled, the EOI MSR).
WARN() if KVM updates L1's ISR while L2 is active with VID enabled, as an
EOI from L2 is supposed to affect L2's vAPIC, but still defer the update,
to try to keep L1 alive. Specifically, KVM forwards all APICv-related
VM-Exits to L1 via nested_vmx_l1_wants_exit():
case EXIT_REASON_APIC_ACCESS:
case EXIT_REASON_APIC_WRITE:
case EXIT_REASON_EOI_INDUCED:
/*
* The controls for "virtualize APIC accesses," "APIC-
* register virtualization," and "virtual-interrupt
* delivery" only come from vmcs12.
*/
return true;
Fixes: c7c9c56ca26f ("x86, apicv: add virtual interrupt delivery support")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/20230312180048.1778187-1-jason.cj.chen@intel.com
Reported-by: Markku Ahvenjärvi <mankku@gmail.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240920080012.74405-1-mankku@gmail.com
Cc: Janne Karhunen <janne.karhunen@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
[sean: drop request, handle in VMX, write changelog]
Tested-by: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241128000010.4051275-3-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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KVM x86 misc changes for 6.13
- Clean up and optimize KVM's handling of writes to MSR_IA32_APICBASE.
- Quirk KVM's misguided behavior of initialized certain feature MSRs to
their maximum supported feature set, which can result in KVM creating
invalid vCPU state. E.g. initializing PERF_CAPABILITIES to a non-zero
value results in the vCPU having invalid state if userspace hides PDCM
from the guest, which can lead to save/restore failures.
- Fix KVM's handling of non-canonical checks for vCPUs that support LA57
to better follow the "architecture", in quotes because the actual
behavior is poorly documented. E.g. most MSR writes and descriptor
table loads ignore CR4.LA57 and operate purely on whether the CPU
supports LA57.
- Bypass the register cache when querying CPL from kvm_sched_out(), as
filling the cache from IRQ context is generally unsafe, and harden the
cache accessors to try to prevent similar issues from occuring in the
future.
- Advertise AMD_IBPB_RET to userspace, and fix a related bug where KVM
over-advertises SPEC_CTRL when trying to support cross-vendor VMs.
- Minor cleanups
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When querying guest CPL to determine if a vCPU was preempted while in
kernel mode, bypass the register cache, i.e. always read SS.AR_BYTES from
the VMCS on Intel CPUs. If the kernel is running with full preemption
enabled, using the register cache in the preemption path can result in
stale and/or uninitialized data being cached in the segment cache.
In particular the following scenario is currently possible:
- vCPU is just created, and the vCPU thread is preempted before
SS.AR_BYTES is written in vmx_vcpu_reset().
- When scheduling out the vCPU task, kvm_arch_vcpu_in_kernel() =>
vmx_get_cpl() reads and caches '0' for SS.AR_BYTES.
- vmx_vcpu_reset() => seg_setup() configures SS.AR_BYTES, but doesn't
invoke vmx_segment_cache_clear() to invalidate the cache.
As a result, KVM retains a stale value in the cache, which can be read,
e.g. via KVM_GET_SREGS. Usually this is not a problem because the VMX
segment cache is reset on each VM-Exit, but if the userspace VMM (e.g KVM
selftests) reads and writes system registers just after the vCPU was
created, _without_ modifying SS.AR_BYTES, userspace will write back the
stale '0' value and ultimately will trigger a VM-Entry failure due to
incorrect SS segment type.
Note, the VM-Enter failure can also be avoided by moving the call to
vmx_segment_cache_clear() until after the vmx_vcpu_reset() initializes all
segments. However, while that change is correct and desirable (and will
come along shortly), it does not address the underlying problem that
accessing KVM's register caches from !task context is generally unsafe.
In addition to fixing the immediate bug, bypassing the cache for this
particular case will allow hardening KVM register caching log to assert
that the caches are accessed only when KVM _knows_ it is safe to do so.
Fixes: de63ad4cf497 ("KVM: X86: implement the logic for spinlock optimization")
Reported-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240716022014.240960-3-mlevitsk@redhat.com
Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241009175002.1118178-2-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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Remove vcpu_vmx.msr_bitmap_map and instead use an on-stack structure in
the one function that uses the map, nested_vmx_prepare_msr_bitmap().
Tested-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Tested-by: Dmitry Osipenko <dmitry.osipenko@collabora.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Message-ID: <20241010182427.1434605-25-seanjc@google.com>
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KVM VMX changes for 6.12:
- Set FINAL/PAGE in the page fault error code for EPT Violations if and only
if the GVA is valid. If the GVA is NOT valid, there is no guest-side page
table walk and so stuffing paging related metadata is nonsensical.
- Fix a bug where KVM would incorrectly synthesize a nested VM-Exit instead of
emulating posted interrupt delivery to L2.
- Add a lockdep assertion to detect unsafe accesses of vmcs12 structures.
- Harden eVMCS loading against an impossible NULL pointer deref (really truly
should be impossible).
- Minor SGX fix and a cleanup.
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Move VMX's MSR_TYPE_{R,W,RW} #defines to x86.h, as enums, so that they can
be used by common x86 code, e.g. instead of doing "bool write".
Opportunistically tweak the definitions to make it more obvious that the
values are bitmasks, not arbitrary ascending values.
No functional change intended.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240802181935.292540-3-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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In prepare_vmcs02_rare(), call vmx_segment_cache_clear() instead of
setting segment_cache.bitmask directly. Using the helper minimizes the
chances of prepare_vmcs02_rare() doing the wrong thing in the future, e.g.
if KVM ends up doing more than just zero the bitmask when purging the
cache.
No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240725175232.337266-2-mlevitsk@redhat.com
[sean: massage changelog]
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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KVM VMX changes for 6.11
- Remove an unnecessary EPT TLB flush when enabling hardware.
- Fix a series of bugs that cause KVM to fail to detect nested pending posted
interrupts as valid wake eents for a vCPU executing HLT in L2 (with
HLT-exiting disable by L1).
- Misc cleanups
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Move the non-VMX chunk of the "interrupt blocked" checks to a separate
helper so that KVM can reuse the code to detect if interrupts are blocked
for L2, e.g. to determine if a virtual interrupt _for L2_ is a valid wake
event. If L1 disables HLT-exiting for L2, nested APICv is enabled, and L2
HLTs, then L2 virtual interrupts are valid wake events, but if and only if
interrupts are unblocked for L2.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240607172609.3205077-4-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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Move shadow_phys_bits into "struct kvm_host_values", i.e. into KVM's
global "kvm_host" variable, so that it is automatically exported for use
in vendor modules. Rename the variable/field to maxphyaddr to more
clearly capture what value it holds, now that it's used outside of the
MMU (and because the "shadow" part is more than a bit misleading as the
variable is not at all unique to shadow paging).
Recomputing the raw/true host.MAXPHYADDR on every use can be subtly
expensive, e.g. it will incur a VM-Exit on the CPUID if KVM is running as
a nested hypervisor. Vendor code already has access to the information,
e.g. by directly doing CPUID or by invoking kvm_get_shadow_phys_bits(), so
there's no tangible benefit to making it MMU-only.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240423221521.2923759-5-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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Pull KVM updates from Paolo Bonzini:
"ARM:
- Move a lot of state that was previously stored on a per vcpu basis
into a per-CPU area, because it is only pertinent to the host while
the vcpu is loaded. This results in better state tracking, and a
smaller vcpu structure.
- Add full handling of the ERET/ERETAA/ERETAB instructions in nested
virtualisation. The last two instructions also require emulating
part of the pointer authentication extension. As a result, the trap
handling of pointer authentication has been greatly simplified.
- Turn the global (and not very scalable) LPI translation cache into
a per-ITS, scalable cache, making non directly injected LPIs much
cheaper to make visible to the vcpu.
- A batch of pKVM patches, mostly fixes and cleanups, as the
upstreaming process seems to be resuming. Fingers crossed!
- Allocate PPIs and SGIs outside of the vcpu structure, allowing for
smaller EL2 mapping and some flexibility in implementing more or
less than 32 private IRQs.
- Purge stale mpidr_data if a vcpu is created after the MPIDR map has
been created.
- Preserve vcpu-specific ID registers across a vcpu reset.
- Various minor cleanups and improvements.
LoongArch:
- Add ParaVirt IPI support
- Add software breakpoint support
- Add mmio trace events support
RISC-V:
- Support guest breakpoints using ebreak
- Introduce per-VCPU mp_state_lock and reset_cntx_lock
- Virtualize SBI PMU snapshot and counter overflow interrupts
- New selftests for SBI PMU and Guest ebreak
- Some preparatory work for both TDX and SNP page fault handling.
This also cleans up the page fault path, so that the priorities of
various kinds of fauls (private page, no memory, write to read-only
slot, etc.) are easier to follow.
x86:
- Minimize amount of time that shadow PTEs remain in the special
REMOVED_SPTE state.
This is a state where the mmu_lock is held for reading but
concurrent accesses to the PTE have to spin; shortening its use
allows other vCPUs to repopulate the zapped region while the zapper
finishes tearing down the old, defunct page tables.
- Advertise the max mappable GPA in the "guest MAXPHYADDR" CPUID
field, which is defined by hardware but left for software use.
This lets KVM communicate its inability to map GPAs that set bits
51:48 on hosts without 5-level nested page tables. Guest firmware
is expected to use the information when mapping BARs; this avoids
that they end up at a legal, but unmappable, GPA.
- Fixed a bug where KVM would not reject accesses to MSR that aren't
supposed to exist given the vCPU model and/or KVM configuration.
- As usual, a bunch of code cleanups.
x86 (AMD):
- Implement a new and improved API to initialize SEV and SEV-ES VMs,
which will also be extendable to SEV-SNP.
The new API specifies the desired encryption in KVM_CREATE_VM and
then separately initializes the VM. The new API also allows
customizing the desired set of VMSA features; the features affect
the measurement of the VM's initial state, and therefore enabling
them cannot be done tout court by the hypervisor.
While at it, the new API includes two bugfixes that couldn't be
applied to the old one without a flag day in userspace or without
affecting the initial measurement. When a SEV-ES VM is created with
the new VM type, KVM_GET_REGS/KVM_SET_REGS and friends are rejected
once the VMSA has been encrypted. Also, the FPU and AVX state will
be synchronized and encrypted too.
- Support for GHCB version 2 as applicable to SEV-ES guests.
This, once more, is only accessible when using the new
KVM_SEV_INIT2 flow for initialization of SEV-ES VMs.
x86 (Intel):
- An initial bunch of prerequisite patches for Intel TDX were merged.
They generally don't do anything interesting. The only somewhat
user visible change is a new debugging mode that checks that KVM's
MMU never triggers a #VE virtualization exception in the guest.
- Clear vmcs.EXIT_QUALIFICATION when synthesizing an EPT Misconfig
VM-Exit to L1, as per the SDM.
Generic:
- Use vfree() instead of kvfree() for allocations that always use
vcalloc() or __vcalloc().
- Remove .change_pte() MMU notifier - the changes to non-KVM code are
small and Andrew Morton asked that I also take those through the
KVM tree.
The callback was only ever implemented by KVM (which was also the
original user of MMU notifiers) but it had been nonfunctional ever
since calls to set_pte_at_notify were wrapped with
invalidate_range_start and invalidate_range_end... in 2012.
Selftests:
- Enhance the demand paging test to allow for better reporting and
stressing of UFFD performance.
- Convert the steal time test to generate TAP-friendly output.
- Fix a flaky false positive in the xen_shinfo_test due to comparing
elapsed time across two different clock domains.
- Skip the MONITOR/MWAIT test if the host doesn't actually support
MWAIT.
- Avoid unnecessary use of "sudo" in the NX hugepage test wrapper
shell script, to play nice with running in a minimal userspace
environment.
- Allow skipping the RSEQ test's sanity check that the vCPU was able
to complete a reasonable number of KVM_RUNs, as the assert can fail
on a completely valid setup.
If the test is run on a large-ish system that is otherwise idle,
and the test isn't affined to a low-ish number of CPUs, the vCPU
task can be repeatedly migrated to CPUs that are in deep sleep
states, which results in the vCPU having very little net runtime
before the next migration due to high wakeup latencies.
- Define _GNU_SOURCE for all selftests to fix a warning that was
introduced by a change to kselftest_harness.h late in the 6.9
cycle, and because forcing every test to #define _GNU_SOURCE is
painful.
- Provide a global pseudo-RNG instance for all tests, so that library
code can generate random, but determinstic numbers.
- Use the global pRNG to randomly force emulation of select writes
from guest code on x86, e.g. to help validate KVM's emulation of
locked accesses.
- Allocate and initialize x86's GDT, IDT, TSS, segments, and default
exception handlers at VM creation, instead of forcing tests to
manually trigger the related setup.
Documentation:
- Fix a goof in the KVM_CREATE_GUEST_MEMFD documentation"
* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm: (225 commits)
selftests/kvm: remove dead file
KVM: selftests: arm64: Test vCPU-scoped feature ID registers
KVM: selftests: arm64: Test that feature ID regs survive a reset
KVM: selftests: arm64: Store expected register value in set_id_regs
KVM: selftests: arm64: Rename helper in set_id_regs to imply VM scope
KVM: arm64: Only reset vCPU-scoped feature ID regs once
KVM: arm64: Reset VM feature ID regs from kvm_reset_sys_regs()
KVM: arm64: Rename is_id_reg() to imply VM scope
KVM: arm64: Destroy mpidr_data for 'late' vCPU creation
KVM: arm64: Use hVHE in pKVM by default on CPUs with VHE support
KVM: arm64: Fix hvhe/nvhe early alias parsing
KVM: SEV: Allow per-guest configuration of GHCB protocol version
KVM: SEV: Add GHCB handling for termination requests
KVM: SEV: Add GHCB handling for Hypervisor Feature Support requests
KVM: SEV: Add support to handle AP reset MSR protocol
KVM: x86: Explicitly zero kvm_caps during vendor module load
KVM: x86: Fully re-initialize supported_mce_cap on vendor module load
KVM: x86: Fully re-initialize supported_vm_types on vendor module load
KVM: x86/mmu: Sanity check that __kvm_faultin_pfn() doesn't create noslot pfns
KVM: x86/mmu: Initialize kvm_page_fault's pfn and hva to error values
...
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/chenhuacai/linux-loongson into HEAD
LoongArch KVM changes for v6.10
1. Add ParaVirt IPI support.
2. Add software breakpoint support.
3. Add mmio trace events support.
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To prepare native usage of posted interrupts, move the PID declarations out
of VMX code such that they can be shared.
Signed-off-by: Jacob Pan <jacob.jun.pan@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240423174114.526704-2-jacob.jun.pan@linux.intel.com
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To support TDX, KVM is enhanced to operate with #VE. For TDX, KVM uses the
suppress #VE bit in EPT entries selectively, in order to be able to trap
non-present conditions. However, #VE isn't used for VMX and it's a bug
if it happens. To be defensive and test that VMX case isn't broken
introduce an option ept_violation_ve_test and when it's set, BUG the vm.
Suggested-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@intel.com>
Message-Id: <d6db6ba836605c0412e166359ba5c46a63c22f86.1705965635.git.isaku.yamahata@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Snapshot VMX's LBR capabilities once during module initialization instead
of calling into perf every time a vCPU reconfigures its vPMU. This will
allow massaging the LBR capabilities, e.g. if the CPU doesn't support
callstacks, without having to remember to update multiple locations.
Opportunistically tag vmx_get_perf_capabilities() with __init, as it's
only called from vmx_set_cpu_caps().
Reviewed-by: Mingwei Zhang <mizhang@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240307011344.835640-2-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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allow_smaller_maxphyaddr
Use the raw/true host.MAXPHYADDR when deciding whether or not KVM must
intercept #PFs when allow_smaller_maxphyaddr is enabled, as any adjustments
the kernel makes to boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits to account for MKTME KeyID
bits do not apply to the guest physical address space. I.e. the KeyID are
off-limits for host physical addresses, but are not reserved for GPAs as
far as hardware is concerned.
Signed-off-by: Tao Su <tao1.su@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240319031111.495006-1-tao1.su@linux.intel.com
[sean: massage changelog]
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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Now that vmx->req_immediate_exit is used only in the scope of
vmx_vcpu_run(), use force_immediate_exit to detect that KVM should usurp
the VMX preemption to force a VM-Exit and let vendor code fully handle
forcing a VM-Exit.
Opportunsitically drop __kvm_request_immediate_exit() and just have
vendor code call smp_send_reschedule() directly. SVM already does this
when injecting an event while also trying to single-step an IRET, i.e.
it's not exactly secret knowledge that KVM uses a reschedule IPI to force
an exit.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240110012705.506918-7-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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KVM x86 support for virtualizing Linear Address Masking (LAM)
Add KVM support for Linear Address Masking (LAM). LAM tweaks the canonicality
checks for most virtual address usage in 64-bit mode, such that only the most
significant bit of the untranslated address bits must match the polarity of the
last translated address bit. This allows software to use ignored, untranslated
address bits for metadata, e.g. to efficiently tag pointers for address
sanitization.
LAM can be enabled separately for user pointers and supervisor pointers, and
for userspace LAM can be select between 48-bit and 57-bit masking
- 48-bit LAM: metadata bits 62:48, i.e. LAM width of 15.
- 57-bit LAM: metadata bits 62:57, i.e. LAM width of 6.
For user pointers, LAM enabling utilizes two previously-reserved high bits from
CR3 (similar to how PCID_NOFLUSH uses bit 63): LAM_U48 and LAM_U57, bits 62 and
61 respectively. Note, if LAM_57 is set, LAM_U48 is ignored, i.e.:
- CR3.LAM_U48=0 && CR3.LAM_U57=0 == LAM disabled for user pointers
- CR3.LAM_U48=1 && CR3.LAM_U57=0 == LAM-48 enabled for user pointers
- CR3.LAM_U48=x && CR3.LAM_U57=1 == LAM-57 enabled for user pointers
For supervisor pointers, LAM is controlled by a single bit, CR4.LAM_SUP, with
the 48-bit versus 57-bit LAM behavior following the current paging mode, i.e.:
- CR4.LAM_SUP=0 && CR4.LA57=x == LAM disabled for supervisor pointers
- CR4.LAM_SUP=1 && CR4.LA57=0 == LAM-48 enabled for supervisor pointers
- CR4.LAM_SUP=1 && CR4.LA57=1 == LAM-57 enabled for supervisor pointers
The modified LAM canonicality checks:
- LAM_S48 : [ 1 ][ metadata ][ 1 ]
63 47
- LAM_U48 : [ 0 ][ metadata ][ 0 ]
63 47
- LAM_S57 : [ 1 ][ metadata ][ 1 ]
63 56
- LAM_U57 + 5-lvl paging : [ 0 ][ metadata ][ 0 ]
63 56
- LAM_U57 + 4-lvl paging : [ 0 ][ metadata ][ 0...0 ]
63 56..47
The bulk of KVM support for LAM is to emulate LAM's modified canonicality
checks. The approach taken by KVM is to "fill" the metadata bits using the
highest bit of the translated address, e.g. for LAM-48, bit 47 is sign-extended
to bits 62:48. The most significant bit, 63, is *not* modified, i.e. its value
from the raw, untagged virtual address is kept for the canonicality check. This
untagging allows
Aside from emulating LAM's canonical checks behavior, LAM has the usual KVM
touchpoints for selectable features: enumeration (CPUID.7.1:EAX.LAM[bit 26],
enabling via CR3 and CR4 bits, etc.
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'hv_evmcs_vmptr'/'hv_evmcs_map'/'hv_evmcs' fields in 'struct nested_vmx'
should not be used when !CONFIG_KVM_HYPERV, hide them when
!CONFIG_KVM_HYPERV.
No functional change intended.
Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Jeremi Piotrowski <jpiotrowski@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231205103630.1391318-16-vkuznets@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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In preparation for making Hyper-V emulation optional, move Hyper-V specific
guest_cpuid_has_evmcs() to hyperv.h.
No functional change intended.
Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Jeremi Piotrowski <jpiotrowski@linux.microsoft.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231205103630.1391318-12-vkuznets@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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Stub in vmx_get_untagged_addr() and wire up calls from the emulator (via
get_untagged_addr()) and "direct" calls from various VM-Exit handlers in
VMX where LAM untagging is supposed to be applied. Defer implementing
the guts of vmx_get_untagged_addr() to future patches purely to make the
changes easier to consume.
LAM is active only for 64-bit linear addresses and several types of
accesses are exempted.
- Cases need to untag address (handled in get_vmx_mem_address())
Operand(s) of VMX instructions and INVPCID.
Operand(s) of SGX ENCLS.
- Cases LAM doesn't apply to (no change needed)
Operand of INVLPG.
Linear address in INVPCID descriptor.
Linear address in INVVPID descriptor.
BASEADDR specified in SECS of ECREATE.
Note:
- LAM doesn't apply to write to control registers or MSRs
- LAM masking is applied before walking page tables, i.e. the faulting
linear address in CR2 doesn't contain the metadata.
- The guest linear address saved in VMCS doesn't contain metadata.
Signed-off-by: Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
Tested-by: Xuelian Guo <xuelian.guo@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230913124227.12574-10-binbin.wu@linux.intel.com
[sean: massage changelog]
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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Track "VMX exposed to L1" via a governed feature flag instead of using a
dedicated helper to provide the same functionality. The main goal is to
drive convergence between VMX and SVM with respect to querying features
that are controllable via module param (SVM likes to cache nested
features), avoiding the guest CPUID lookups at runtime is just a bonus
and unlikely to provide any meaningful performance benefits.
Note, X86_FEATURE_VMX is set in kvm_cpu_caps if and only if "nested" is
true, and the CPU obviously supports VMX if KVM+VMX is running. I.e. the
check on "nested" is now implicitly down by the kvm_cpu_cap_has() check
in kvm_governed_feature_check_and_set().
No functional change intended.
Reviewed-by: Yuan Yao <yuan.yao@intel.com>
Reviwed-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230815203653.519297-8-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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Rename the XSAVES secondary execution control to follow KVM's preferred
style so that XSAVES related logic can use common macros that depend on
KVM's preferred style.
No functional change intended.
Reviewed-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230815203653.519297-6-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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Move the handling of GLOBAL_CTRL, GLOBAL_STATUS, and GLOBAL_OVF_CTRL,
a.k.a. GLOBAL_STATUS_RESET, from Intel PMU code to generic x86 PMU code.
AMD PerfMonV2 defines three registers that have the same semantics as
Intel's variants, just with different names and indices. Conveniently,
since KVM virtualizes GLOBAL_CTRL on Intel only for PMU v2 and above, and
AMD's version shows up in v2, KVM can use common code for the existence
check as well.
Signed-off-by: Like Xu <likexu@tencent.com>
Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230603011058.1038821-5-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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KVM x86 changes for 6.4:
- Optimize CR0.WP toggling by avoiding an MMU reload when TDP is enabled,
and by giving the guest control of CR0.WP when EPT is enabled on VMX
(VMX-only because SVM doesn't support per-bit controls)
- Add CR0/CR4 helpers to query single bits, and clean up related code
where KVM was interpreting kvm_read_cr4_bits()'s "unsigned long" return
as a bool
- Move AMD_PSFD to cpufeatures.h and purge KVM's definition
- Misc cleanups
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Virtualize FLUSH_L1D so that the guest can use the performant L1D flush
if one of the many mitigations might require a flush in the guest, e.g.
Linux provides an option to flush the L1D when switching mms.
Passthrough MSR_IA32_FLUSH_CMD for write when it's supported in hardware
and exposed to the guest, i.e. always let the guest write it directly if
FLUSH_L1D is fully supported.
Forward writes to hardware in host context on the off chance that KVM
ends up emulating a WRMSR, or in the really unlikely scenario where
userspace wants to force a flush. Restrict these forwarded WRMSRs to
the known command out of an abundance of caution. Passing through the
MSR means the guest can throw any and all values at hardware, but doing
so in host context is arguably a bit more dangerous.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CALMp9eTt3xzAEoQ038bJQ9LN0ZOXrSWsN7xnNUD%2B0SS%3DWwF7Pg%40mail.gmail.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230201132905.549148-2-eesposit@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20230322011440.2195485-6-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Guests like grsecurity that make heavy use of CR0.WP to implement kernel
level W^X will suffer from the implied VMEXITs.
With EPT there is no need to intercept a guest change of CR0.WP, so
simply make it a guest owned bit if we can do so.
This implies that a read of a guest's CR0.WP bit might need a VMREAD.
However, the only potentially affected user seems to be kvm_init_mmu()
which is a heavy operation to begin with. But also most callers already
cache the full value of CR0 anyway, so no additional VMREAD is needed.
The only exception is nested_vmx_load_cr3().
This change is VMX-specific, as SVM has no such fine grained control
register intercept control.
Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@grsecurity.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230322013731.102955-7-minipli@grsecurity.net
Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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Tag to_vmx() and to_kvm_vmx() __always_inline as they both just reflect
the passed in pointer (the embedded struct is the first field in the
container), and drop the @vmx param from vmx_vcpu_enter_exit(), which
likely existed purely to make noinstr validation happy.
Amusingly, when the compiler decides to not inline the helpers, e.g. for
KASAN builds, to_vmx() and to_kvm_vmx() may end up pointing at the same
symbol, which generates very confusing objtool warnings. E.g. the use of
to_vmx() in a future patch led to objtool complaining about to_kvm_vmx(),
and only once all use of to_kvm_vmx() was commented out did to_vmx() pop
up in the obj tool report.
vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: vmx_vcpu_enter_exit+0x160: call to to_kvm_vmx()
leaves .noinstr.text section
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221213060912.654668-5-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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Add an extra special noinstr-friendly helper to test+mark a "register"
available and use it when caching vmcs.EXIT_QUALIFICATION and
vmcs.VM_EXIT_INTR_INFO. Make the caching helpers __always_inline too so
that they can be used in noinstr functions.
A future fix will move VMX's handling of NMI exits into the noinstr
vmx_vcpu_enter_exit() so that the NMI is processed before any kind of
instrumentation can trigger a fault and thus IRET, i.e. so that KVM
doesn't invoke the NMI handler with NMIs enabled.
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221213060912.654668-2-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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As a preparation to reusing the result of setup_vmcs_config() in
nested VMX MSR setup, add the CPU based VM execution controls which KVM
doesn't use but supports for nVMX to KVM_OPT_VMX_CPU_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL
and filter them out in vmx_exec_control().
No functional change intended.
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220830133737.1539624-27-vkuznets@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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As a preparation to reusing the result of setup_vmcs_config() in
nested VMX MSR setup, add the VMEXIT controls which KVM doesn't
use but supports for nVMX to KVM_OPT_VMX_VM_EXIT_CONTROLS and
filter them out in vmx_vmexit_ctrl().
No functional change intended.
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220830133737.1539624-26-vkuznets@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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When VMX controls macros are used to set or clear a control bit, make
sure that this bit was checked in setup_vmcs_config() and thus is properly
reflected in vmcs_config.
Opportunistically drop pointless "< 0" check for adjust_vmx_controls()'s
return value.
No functional change intended.
Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220830133737.1539624-24-vkuznets@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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When querying whether or not eVMCS is enabled on behalf of the guest,
treat eVMCS as enable if and only if Hyper-V is enabled/exposed to the
guest.
Note, flows that come from the host, e.g. KVM_SET_NESTED_STATE, must NOT
check for Hyper-V being enabled as KVM doesn't require guest CPUID to be
set before most ioctls().
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220830133737.1539624-7-vkuznets@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Now that the PMU is refreshed when MSR_IA32_PERF_CAPABILITIES is written
by host userspace, zero out the number of LBR records for a vCPU during
PMU refresh if PMU_CAP_LBR_FMT is not set in PERF_CAPABILITIES instead of
handling the check at run-time.
guest_cpuid_has() is expensive due to the linear search of guest CPUID
entries, intel_pmu_lbr_is_enabled() is checked on every VM-Enter, _and_
simply enumerating the same "Model" as the host causes KVM to set the
number of LBR records to a non-zero value.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220727233424.2968356-4-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Turn vcpu_to_lbr_desc() and vcpu_to_lbr_records() into functions in order
to provide type safety, to document exactly what they return, and to
allow consuming the helpers in vmx.h. Move the definitions as necessary
(the macros "reference" to_vmx() before its definition).
No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220727233424.2968356-3-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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KVM/s390, KVM/x86 and common infrastructure changes for 5.20
x86:
* Permit guests to ignore single-bit ECC errors
* Fix races in gfn->pfn cache refresh; do not pin pages tracked by the cache
* Intel IPI virtualization
* Allow getting/setting pending triple fault with KVM_GET/SET_VCPU_EVENTS
* PEBS virtualization
* Simplify PMU emulation by just using PERF_TYPE_RAW events
* More accurate event reinjection on SVM (avoid retrying instructions)
* Allow getting/setting the state of the speaker port data bit
* Refuse starting the kvm-intel module if VM-Entry/VM-Exit controls are inconsistent
* "Notify" VM exit (detect microarchitectural hangs) for Intel
* Cleanups for MCE MSR emulation
s390:
* add an interface to provide a hypervisor dump for secure guests
* improve selftests to use TAP interface
* enable interpretive execution of zPCI instructions (for PCI passthrough)
* First part of deferred teardown
* CPU Topology
* PV attestation
* Minor fixes
Generic:
* new selftests API using struct kvm_vcpu instead of a (vm, id) tuple
x86:
* Use try_cmpxchg64 instead of cmpxchg64
* Bugfixes
* Ignore benign host accesses to PMU MSRs when PMU is disabled
* Allow disabling KVM's "MONITOR/MWAIT are NOPs!" behavior
* x86/MMU: Allow NX huge pages to be disabled on a per-vm basis
* Port eager page splitting to shadow MMU as well
* Enable CMCI capability by default and handle injected UCNA errors
* Expose pid of vcpu threads in debugfs
* x2AVIC support for AMD
* cleanup PIO emulation
* Fixes for LLDT/LTR emulation
* Don't require refcounted "struct page" to create huge SPTEs
x86 cleanups:
* Use separate namespaces for guest PTEs and shadow PTEs bitmasks
* PIO emulation
* Reorganize rmap API, mostly around rmap destruction
* Do not workaround very old KVM bugs for L0 that runs with nesting enabled
* new selftests API for CPUID
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Add a helper to check of the guest PMU has PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL, which is
unintuitive _and_ diverges from Intel's architecturally defined behavior.
Even worse, KVM currently implements the check using two different (but
equivalent) checks, _and_ there has been at least one attempt to add a
_third_ flavor.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220722224409.1336532-4-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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On VMX, there are some balanced returns between the time the guest's
SPEC_CTRL value is written, and the vmenter.
Balanced returns (matched by a preceding call) are usually ok, but it's
at least theoretically possible an NMI with a deep call stack could
empty the RSB before one of the returns.
For maximum paranoia, don't allow *any* returns (balanced or otherwise)
between the SPEC_CTRL write and the vmenter.
[ bp: Fix 32-bit build. ]
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
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On eIBRS systems, the returns in the vmexit return path from
__vmx_vcpu_run() to vmx_vcpu_run() are exposed to RSB poisoning attacks.
Fix that by moving the post-vmexit spec_ctrl handling to immediately
after the vmexit.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
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Convert __vmx_vcpu_run()'s 'launched' argument to 'flags', in
preparation for doing SPEC_CTRL handling immediately after vmexit, which
will need another flag.
This is much easier than adding a fourth argument, because this code
supports both 32-bit and 64-bit, and the fourth argument on 32-bit would
have to be pushed on the stack.
Note that __vmx_vcpu_run_flags() is called outside of the noinstr
critical section because it will soon start calling potentially
traceable functions.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
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