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2017-06-07KVM: nVMX: Don't update vmcs12->xss_exit_bitmap on nested VM-exitJim Mattson1-2/+0
The XSS-exiting bitmap is a VMCS control field that does not change while the CPU is in non-root mode. Transferring the unchanged value from vmcs02 to vmcs12 is unnecessary. Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
2017-06-07kvm: vmx: Check value written to IA32_BNDCFGSJim Mattson1-0/+3
Bits 11:2 must be zero and the linear addess in bits 63:12 must be canonical. Otherwise, WRMSR(BNDCFGS) should raise #GP. Fixes: 0dd376e709975779 ("KVM: x86: add MSR_IA32_BNDCFGS to msrs_to_save") Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
2017-06-07kvm: x86: Guest BNDCFGS requires guest MPX supportJim Mattson1-2/+2
The BNDCFGS MSR should only be exposed to the guest if the guest supports MPX. (cf. the TSC_AUX MSR and RDTSCP.) Fixes: 0dd376e709975779 ("KVM: x86: add MSR_IA32_BNDCFGS to msrs_to_save") Change-Id: I3ad7c01bda616715137ceac878f3fa7e66b6b387 Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
2017-06-07kvm: vmx: Do not disable intercepts for BNDCFGSJim Mattson1-1/+0
The MSR permission bitmaps are shared by all VMs. However, some VMs may not be configured to support MPX, even when the host does. If the host supports VMX and the guest does not, we should intercept accesses to the BNDCFGS MSR, so that we can synthesize a #GP fault. Furthermore, if the host does not support MPX and the "ignore_msrs" kvm kernel parameter is set, then we should intercept accesses to the BNDCFGS MSR, so that we can skip over the rdmsr/wrmsr without raising a #GP fault. Fixes: da8999d31818fdc8 ("KVM: x86: Intel MPX vmx and msr handle") Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
2017-06-06KVM: nVMX: Fix exception injectionWanpeng Li1-1/+1
WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 2840 at arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c:10966 nested_vmx_vmexit+0xdcd/0xde0 [kvm_intel] CPU: 3 PID: 2840 Comm: qemu-system-x86 Tainted: G OE 4.12.0-rc3+ #23 RIP: 0010:nested_vmx_vmexit+0xdcd/0xde0 [kvm_intel] Call Trace: ? kvm_check_async_pf_completion+0xef/0x120 [kvm] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x79/0x80 vmx_queue_exception+0x104/0x160 [kvm_intel] ? vmx_queue_exception+0x104/0x160 [kvm_intel] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x1171/0x1ce0 [kvm] ? kvm_arch_vcpu_load+0x47/0x240 [kvm] ? kvm_arch_vcpu_load+0x62/0x240 [kvm] kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x384/0x7b0 [kvm] ? kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x384/0x7b0 [kvm] ? __fget+0xf3/0x210 do_vfs_ioctl+0xa4/0x700 ? __fget+0x114/0x210 SyS_ioctl+0x79/0x90 do_syscall_64+0x81/0x220 entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25 This is triggered occasionally by running both win7 and win2016 in L2, in addition, EPT is disabled on both L1 and L2. It can't be reproduced easily. Commit 0b6ac343fc (KVM: nVMX: Correct handling of exception injection) mentioned that "KVM wants to inject page-faults which it got to the guest. This function assumes it is called with the exit reason in vmcs02 being a #PF exception". Commit e011c663 (KVM: nVMX: Check all exceptions for intercept during delivery to L2) allows to check all exceptions for intercept during delivery to L2. However, there is no guarantee the exit reason is exception currently, when there is an external interrupt occurred on host, maybe a time interrupt for host which should not be injected to guest, and somewhere queues an exception, then the function nested_vmx_check_exception() will be called and the vmexit emulation codes will try to emulate the "Acknowledge interrupt on exit" behavior, the warning is triggered. Reusing the exit reason from the L2->L0 vmexit is wrong in this case, the reason must always be EXCEPTION_NMI when injecting an exception into L1 as a nested vmexit. Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@hotmail.com> Fixes: e011c663b9c7 ("KVM: nVMX: Check all exceptions for intercept during delivery to L2") Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
2017-06-05x86/mm, KVM: Teach KVM's VMX code that CR3 isn't a constantAndy Lutomirski1-3/+18
When PCID is enabled, CR3's PCID bits can change during context switches, so KVM won't be able to treat CR3 as a per-mm constant any more. I structured this like the existing CR4 handling. Under ordinary circumstances (PCID disabled or if the current PCID and the value that's already in the VMCS match), then we won't do an extra VMCS write, and we'll never do an extra direct CR3 read. The overhead should be minimal. I disallowed using the new helper in non-atomic context because PCID support will cause CR3 to stop being constant in non-atomic process context. (Frankly, it also scares me a bit that KVM ever treated CR3 as constant, but it looks like it was okay before.) Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com> Cc: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-06-01KVM: white space cleanup in nested_vmx_setup_ctls_msrs()Dan Carpenter1-1/+1
This should have been indented one more character over and it should use tabs. Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
2017-05-30KVM: nVMX: fix nested_vmx_check_vmptr failure paths under debuggingRadim Krčmář1-83/+57
kvm_skip_emulated_instruction() will return 0 if userspace is single-stepping the guest. kvm_skip_emulated_instruction() uses return status convention of exit handler: 0 means "exit to userspace" and 1 means "continue vm entries". The problem is that nested_vmx_check_vmptr() return status means something else: 0 is ok, 1 is error. This means we would continue executing after a failure. Static checker noticed it because vmptr was not initialized. Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Fixes: 6affcbedcac7 ("KVM: x86: Add kvm_skip_emulated_instruction and use it.") Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2017-05-26KVM: nVMX: Fix handling of lmsw instructionJan H. Schönherr1-2/+5
The decision whether or not to exit from L2 to L1 on an lmsw instruction is based on bogus values: instead of using the information encoded within the exit qualification, it uses the data also used for the mov-to-cr instruction, which boils down to using whatever is in %eax at that point. Use the correct values instead. Without this fix, an L1 may not get notified when a 32-bit Linux L2 switches its secondary CPUs to protected mode; the L1 is only notified on the next modification of CR0. This short time window poses a problem, when there is some other reason to exit to L1 in between. Then, L2 will be resumed in real mode and chaos ensues. Signed-off-by: Jan H. Schönherr <jschoenh@amazon.de> Reviewed-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@hotmail.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2017-05-15KVM: VMX: Don't enable EPT A/D feature if EPT feature is disabledWanpeng Li1-1/+1
We can observe eptad kvm_intel module parameter is still Y even if ept is disabled which is weird. This patch will not enable EPT A/D feature if EPT feature is disabled. Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@hotmail.com> Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
2017-05-15kvm: nVMX: off by one in vmx_write_pml_buffer()Dan Carpenter1-1/+1
There are PML_ENTITY_NUM elements in the pml_address[] array so the > should be >= or we write beyond the end of the array when we do: pml_address[vmcs12->guest_pml_index--] = gpa; Fixes: c5f983f6e845 ("nVMX: Implement emulated Page Modification Logging") Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
2017-05-09nVMX: Advertise PML to L1 hypervisorBandan Das1-5/+11
Advertise the PML bit in vmcs12 but don't try to enable it in hardware when running L2 since L0 is emulating it. Also, preserve L0's settings for PML since it may still want to log writes. Signed-off-by: Bandan Das <bsd@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2017-05-09nVMX: Implement emulated Page Modification LoggingBandan Das1-2/+79
With EPT A/D enabled, processor access to L2 guest paging structures will result in a write violation. When this happens, write the GUEST_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS to the pml buffer provided by L1 if the access is write and the dirty bit is being set. This patch also adds necessary checks during VMEntry if L1 has enabled PML. If the PML index overflows, we change the exit reason and run L1 to simulate a PML full event. Signed-off-by: Bandan Das <bsd@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2017-05-09kvm: nVMX: Validate CR3 target count on nested VM-entryJim Mattson1-0/+8
According to the SDM, the CR3-target count must not be greater than 4. Future processors may support a different number of CR3-target values. Software should read the VMX capability MSR IA32_VMX_MISC to determine the number of values supported. Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2017-05-08Merge tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvmLinus Torvalds1-220/+112
Pull KVM updates from Paolo Bonzini: "ARM: - HYP mode stub supports kexec/kdump on 32-bit - improved PMU support - virtual interrupt controller performance improvements - support for userspace virtual interrupt controller (slower, but necessary for KVM on the weird Broadcom SoCs used by the Raspberry Pi 3) MIPS: - basic support for hardware virtualization (ImgTec P5600/P6600/I6400 and Cavium Octeon III) PPC: - in-kernel acceleration for VFIO s390: - support for guests without storage keys - adapter interruption suppression x86: - usual range of nVMX improvements, notably nested EPT support for accessed and dirty bits - emulation of CPL3 CPUID faulting generic: - first part of VCPU thread request API - kvm_stat improvements" * tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm: (227 commits) kvm: nVMX: Don't validate disabled secondary controls KVM: put back #ifndef CONFIG_S390 around kvm_vcpu_kick Revert "KVM: Support vCPU-based gfn->hva cache" tools/kvm: fix top level makefile KVM: x86: don't hold kvm->lock in KVM_SET_GSI_ROUTING KVM: Documentation: remove VM mmap documentation kvm: nVMX: Remove superfluous VMX instruction fault checks KVM: x86: fix emulation of RSM and IRET instructions KVM: mark requests that need synchronization KVM: return if kvm_vcpu_wake_up() did wake up the VCPU KVM: add explicit barrier to kvm_vcpu_kick KVM: perform a wake_up in kvm_make_all_cpus_request KVM: mark requests that do not need a wakeup KVM: remove #ifndef CONFIG_S390 around kvm_vcpu_wake_up KVM: x86: always use kvm_make_request instead of set_bit KVM: add kvm_{test,clear}_request to replace {test,clear}_bit s390: kvm: Cpu model support for msa6, msa7 and msa8 KVM: x86: remove irq disablement around KVM_SET_CLOCK/KVM_GET_CLOCK kvm: better MWAIT emulation for guests KVM: x86: virtualize cpuid faulting ...
2017-05-05kvm: nVMX: Don't validate disabled secondary controlsJim Mattson1-3/+4
According to the SDM, if the "activate secondary controls" primary processor-based VM-execution control is 0, no checks are performed on the secondary processor-based VM-execution controls. Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2017-05-02Merge branch 'x86-mm-for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-8/+4
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 mm updates from Ingo Molnar: "The main x86 MM changes in this cycle were: - continued native kernel PCID support preparation patches to the TLB flushing code (Andy Lutomirski) - various fixes related to 32-bit compat syscall returning address over 4Gb in applications, launched from 64-bit binaries - motivated by C/R frameworks such as Virtuozzo. (Dmitry Safonov) - continued Intel 5-level paging enablement: in particular the conversion of x86 GUP to the generic GUP code. (Kirill A. Shutemov) - x86/mpx ABI corner case fixes/enhancements (Joerg Roedel) - ... plus misc updates, fixes and cleanups" * 'x86-mm-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (62 commits) mm, zone_device: Replace {get, put}_zone_device_page() with a single reference to fix pmem crash x86/mm: Fix flush_tlb_page() on Xen x86/mm: Make flush_tlb_mm_range() more predictable x86/mm: Remove flush_tlb() and flush_tlb_current_task() x86/vm86/32: Switch to flush_tlb_mm_range() in mark_screen_rdonly() x86/mm/64: Fix crash in remove_pagetable() Revert "x86/mm/gup: Switch GUP to the generic get_user_page_fast() implementation" x86/boot/e820: Remove a redundant self assignment x86/mm: Fix dump pagetables for 4 levels of page tables x86/mpx, selftests: Only check bounds-vs-shadow when we keep shadow x86/mpx: Correctly report do_mpx_bt_fault() failures to user-space Revert "x86/mm/numa: Remove numa_nodemask_from_meminfo()" x86/espfix: Add support for 5-level paging x86/kasan: Extend KASAN to support 5-level paging x86/mm: Add basic defines/helpers for CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL=y x86/paravirt: Add 5-level support to the paravirt code x86/mm: Define virtual memory map for 5-level paging x86/asm: Remove __VIRTUAL_MASK_SHIFT==47 assert x86/boot: Detect 5-level paging support x86/mm/numa: Remove numa_nodemask_from_meminfo() ...
2017-04-27kvm: nVMX: Remove superfluous VMX instruction fault checksJim Mattson1-43/+14
According to the Intel SDM, "Certain exceptions have priority over VM exits. These include invalid-opcode exceptions, faults based on privilege level*, and general-protection exceptions that are based on checking I/O permission bits in the task-state segment (TSS)." There is no need to check for faulting conditions that the hardware has already checked. * These include faults generated by attempts to execute, in virtual-8086 mode, privileged instructions that are not recognized in that mode. Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2017-04-27KVM: add kvm_{test,clear}_request to replace {test,clear}_bitRadim Krčmář1-1/+1
Users were expected to use kvm_check_request() for testing and clearing, but request have expanded their use since then and some users want to only test or do a faster clear. Make sure that requests are not directly accessed with bit operations. Reviewed-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Jones <drjones@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cornelia.huck@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2017-04-21kvm: better MWAIT emulation for guestsMichael S. Tsirkin1-2/+4
Guests that are heavy on futexes end up IPI'ing each other a lot. That can lead to significant slowdowns and latency increase for those guests when running within KVM. If only a single guest is needed on a host, we have a lot of spare host CPU time we can throw at the problem. Modern CPUs implement a feature called "MWAIT" which allows guests to wake up sleeping remote CPUs without an IPI - thus without an exit - at the expense of never going out of guest context. The decision whether this is something sensible to use should be up to the VM admin, so to user space. We can however allow MWAIT execution on systems that support it properly hardware wise. This patch adds a CAP to user space and a KVM cpuid leaf to indicate availability of native MWAIT execution. With that enabled, the worst a guest can do is waste as many cycles as a "jmp ." would do, so it's not a privilege problem. We consciously do *not* expose the feature in our CPUID bitmap, as most people will want to benefit from sleeping vCPUs to allow for over commit. Reported-by: "Gabriel L. Somlo" <gsomlo@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> [agraf: fix amd, change commit message] Signed-off-by: Alexander Graf <agraf@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2017-04-21KVM: VMX: drop vmm_exclusive module parameterDavid Hildenbrand1-31/+7
vmm_exclusive=0 leads to KVM setting X86_CR4_VMXE always and calling VMXON only when the vcpu is loaded. X86_CR4_VMXE is used as an indication in cpu_emergency_vmxoff() (called on kdump) if VMXOFF has to be called. This is obviously not the case if both are used independtly. Calling VMXOFF without a previous VMXON will result in an exception. In addition, X86_CR4_VMXE is used as a mean to test if VMX is already in use by another VMM in hardware_enable(). So there can't really be co-existance. If the other VMM is prepared for co-existance and does a similar check, only one VMM can exist. If the other VMM is not prepared and blindly sets/clears X86_CR4_VMXE, we will get inconsistencies with X86_CR4_VMXE. As we also had bug reports related to clearing of vmcs with vmm_exclusive=0 this seems to be pretty much untested. So let's better drop it. While at it, directly move setting/clearing X86_CR4_VMXE into kvm_cpu_vmxon/off. Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2017-04-13KVM: nVMX: fix AD condition when handling EPT violationRadim Krčmář1-1/+1
I have introduced this bug when applying and simplifying Paolo's patch as we agreed on the list. The original was "x &= ~y; if (z) x |= y;". Here is the story of a bad workflow: A maintainer was already testing with the intended change, but it was applied only to a testing repo on a different machine. When the time to push tested patches to kvm/next came, he realized that this change was missing and quickly added it to the maintenance repo, didn't test again (because the change is trivial, right), and pushed the world to fire. Fixes: ae1e2d1082ae ("kvm: nVMX: support EPT accessed/dirty bits") Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
2017-04-07KVM: nVMX: support RDRAND and RDSEED exitingPaolo Bonzini1-0/+5
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
2017-04-07kvm: nVMX: support EPT accessed/dirty bitsPaolo Bonzini1-4/+28
Now use bit 6 of EPTP to optionally enable A/D bits for EPTP. Another thing to change is that, when EPT accessed and dirty bits are not in use, VMX treats accesses to guest paging structures as data reads. When they are in use (bit 6 of EPTP is set), they are treated as writes and the corresponding EPT dirty bit is set. The MMU didn't know this detail, so this patch adds it. We also have to fix up the exit qualification. It may be wrong because KVM sets bit 6 but the guest might not. L1 emulates EPT A/D bits using write permissions, so in principle it may be possible for EPT A/D bits to be used by L1 even though not available in hardware. The problem is that guest page-table walks will be treated as reads rather than writes, so they would not cause an EPT violation. Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> [Fixed typo in walk_addr_generic() comment and changed bit clear + conditional-set pattern in handle_ept_violation() to conditional-clear] Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
2017-04-07KVM: VMX: remove bogus check for invalid EPT violationPaolo Bonzini1-14/+0
handle_ept_violation is checking for "guest-linear-address invalid" + "not a paging-structure walk". However, _all_ EPT violations without a valid guest linear address are paging structure walks, because those EPT violations happen when loading the guest PDPTEs. Therefore, the check can never be true, and even if it were, KVM doesn't care about the guest linear address; it only uses the guest *physical* address VMCS field. So, remove the check altogether. Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
2017-04-07KVM: nVMX: we support 1GB EPT pagesPaolo Bonzini1-3/+3
Large pages at the PDPE level can be emulated by the MMU, so the bit can be set unconditionally in the EPT capabilities MSR. The same is true of 2MB EPT pages, though all Intel processors with EPT in practice support those. Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2017-04-07KVM: VMX: require virtual NMI supportPaolo Bonzini1-105/+38
Virtual NMIs are only missing in Prescott and Yonah chips. Both are obsolete for virtualization usage---Yonah is 32-bit only even---so drop vNMI emulation. Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2017-04-07KVM: nVMX: single function for switching between vmcsDavid Hildenbrand1-15/+8
Let's combine it in a single function vmx_switch_vmcs(). Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
2017-04-07kvm: vmx: Don't use INVVPID when EPT is enabledJim Mattson1-1/+2
According to the Intel SDM, volume 3, section 28.3.2: Creating and Using Cached Translation Information, "No linear mappings are used while EPT is in use." INVEPT will invalidate both the guest-physical mappings and the combined mappings in the TLBs and paging-structure caches, so an INVVPID is superfluous. Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
2017-04-04KVM: nVMX: initialize PML fields in vmcs02Ladi Prosek1-0/+12
L2 was running with uninitialized PML fields which led to incomplete dirty bitmap logging. This manifested as all kinds of subtle erratic behavior of the nested guest. Fixes: 843e4330573c ("KVM: VMX: Add PML support in VMX") Signed-off-by: Ladi Prosek <lprosek@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
2017-04-04KVM: nVMX: do not leak PML full vmexit to L1Ladi Prosek1-0/+3
The PML feature is not exposed to guests so we should not be forwarding the vmexit either. This commit fixes BSOD 0x20001 (HYPERVISOR_ERROR) when running Hyper-V enabled Windows Server 2016 in L1 on hardware that supports PML. Fixes: 843e4330573c ("KVM: VMX: Add PML support in VMX") Signed-off-by: Ladi Prosek <lprosek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
2017-04-03Merge tag 'v4.11-rc5' into x86/mm, to refresh the branchIngo Molnar1-12/+32
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-03-28KVM: nVMX: fix nested EPT detectionLadi Prosek1-4/+1
The nested_ept_enabled flag introduced in commit 7ca29de2136 was not computed correctly. We are interested only in L1's EPT state, not the the combined L0+L1 value. In particular, if L0 uses EPT but L1 does not, nested_ept_enabled must be false to make sure that PDPSTRs are loaded based on CR3 as usual, because the special case described in 26.3.2.4 Loading Page-Directory- Pointer-Table Entries does not apply. Fixes: 7ca29de21362 ("KVM: nVMX: fix CR3 load if L2 uses PAE paging and EPT") Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org Reported-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@hotmail.com> Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Ladi Prosek <lprosek@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2017-03-23KVM: VMX: Fix enable VPID conditionsWanpeng Li1-1/+8
This can be reproduced by running L2 on L1, and disable VPID on L0 if w/o commit "KVM: nVMX: Fix nested VPID vmx exec control", the L2 crash as below: KVM: entry failed, hardware error 0x7 EAX=00000000 EBX=00000000 ECX=00000000 EDX=000306c3 ESI=00000000 EDI=00000000 EBP=00000000 ESP=00000000 EIP=0000fff0 EFL=00000002 [-------] CPL=0 II=0 A20=1 SMM=0 HLT=0 ES =0000 00000000 0000ffff 00009300 CS =f000 ffff0000 0000ffff 00009b00 SS =0000 00000000 0000ffff 00009300 DS =0000 00000000 0000ffff 00009300 FS =0000 00000000 0000ffff 00009300 GS =0000 00000000 0000ffff 00009300 LDT=0000 00000000 0000ffff 00008200 TR =0000 00000000 0000ffff 00008b00 GDT= 00000000 0000ffff IDT= 00000000 0000ffff CR0=60000010 CR2=00000000 CR3=00000000 CR4=00000000 DR0=0000000000000000 DR1=0000000000000000 DR2=0000000000000000 DR3=0000000000000000 DR6=00000000ffff0ff0 DR7=0000000000000400 EFER=0000000000000000 Reference SDM 30.3 INVVPID: Protected Mode Exceptions - #UD - If not in VMX operation. - If the logical processor does not support VPIDs (IA32_VMX_PROCBASED_CTLS2[37]=0). - If the logical processor supports VPIDs (IA32_VMX_PROCBASED_CTLS2[37]=1) but does not support the INVVPID instruction (IA32_VMX_EPT_VPID_CAP[32]=0). So we should check both VPID enable bit in vmx exec control and INVVPID support bit in vmx capability MSRs to enable VPID. This patch adds the guarantee to not enable VPID if either INVVPID or single-context/all-context invalidation is not exposed in vmx capability MSRs. Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@hotmail.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2017-03-23KVM: nVMX: Fix nested VPID vmx exec controlWanpeng Li1-3/+4
This can be reproduced by running kvm-unit-tests/vmx.flat on L0 w/ vpid disabled. Test suite: VPID Unhandled exception 6 #UD at ip 00000000004051a6 error_code=0000 rflags=00010047 cs=00000008 rax=0000000000000000 rcx=0000000000000001 rdx=0000000000000047 rbx=0000000000402f79 rbp=0000000000456240 rsi=0000000000000001 rdi=0000000000000000 r8=000000000000000a r9=00000000000003f8 r10=0000000080010011 r11=0000000000000000 r12=0000000000000003 r13=0000000000000708 r14=0000000000000000 r15=0000000000000000 cr0=0000000080010031 cr2=0000000000000000 cr3=0000000007fff000 cr4=0000000000002020 cr8=0000000000000000 STACK: @4051a6 40523e 400f7f 402059 40028f We should hide and forbid VPID in L1 if it is disabled on L0. However, nested VPID enable bit is set unconditionally during setup nested vmx exec controls though VPID is not exposed through nested VMX capablity. This patch fixes it by don't set nested VPID enable bit if it is disabled on L0. Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 5c614b3583e (KVM: nVMX: nested VPID emulation) Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@hotmail.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2017-03-23kvm: vmx: Flush TLB when the APIC-access address changesJim Mattson1-1/+17
Quoting from the Intel SDM, volume 3, section 28.3.3.4: Guidelines for Use of the INVEPT Instruction: If EPT was in use on a logical processor at one time with EPTP X, it is recommended that software use the INVEPT instruction with the "single-context" INVEPT type and with EPTP X in the INVEPT descriptor before a VM entry on the same logical processor that enables EPT with EPTP X and either (a) the "virtualize APIC accesses" VM-execution control was changed from 0 to 1; or (b) the value of the APIC-access address was changed. In the nested case, the burden falls on L1, unless L0 enables EPT in vmcs02 when L1 doesn't enable EPT in vmcs12. Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
2017-03-23x86/gdt: Get rid of the get_*_gdt_*_vaddr() helpersAndy Lutomirski1-2/+2
There's a single caller that is only there because it's passing a pointer into a function (vmcs_writel()) that takes an unsigned long. Let's just cast it in place rather than having a bunch of trivial helpers. Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/46108fb35e1699252b1b6a85039303ff562c9836.1490218061.git.luto@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-03-20KVM: nVMX: don't reset kvm mmu twiceWanpeng Li1-2/+0
kvm mmu is reset once successfully loading CR3 as part of emulating vmentry in nested_vmx_load_cr3(). We should not reset kvm mmu twice. Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@hotmail.com> Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
2017-03-20KVM: VMX: downgrade warning on unexpected exit codeRadim Krčmář1-1/+2
We never needed the call trace and we better rate-limit if it can be triggered by a guest. Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
2017-03-16x86: Make the GDT remapping read-only on 64-bitThomas Garnier1-8/+4
This patch makes the GDT remapped pages read-only, to prevent accidental (or intentional) corruption of this key data structure. This change is done only on 64-bit, because 32-bit needs it to be writable for TSS switches. The native_load_tr_desc function was adapted to correctly handle a read-only GDT. The LTR instruction always writes to the GDT TSS entry. This generates a page fault if the GDT is read-only. This change checks if the current GDT is a remap and swap GDTs as needed. This function was tested by booting multiple machines and checking hibernation works properly. KVM SVM and VMX were adapted to use the writeable GDT. On VMX, the per-cpu variable was removed for functions to fetch the original GDT. Instead of reloading the previous GDT, VMX will reload the fixmap GDT as expected. For testing, VMs were started and restored on multiple configurations. Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk> Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org> Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Lorenzo Stoakes <lstoakes@gmail.com> Cc: Luis R . Rodriguez <mcgrof@kernel.org> Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com> Cc: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Rafael J . Wysocki <rjw@rjwysocki.net> Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Cc: Stanislaw Gruszka <sgruszka@redhat.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: lguest@lists.ozlabs.org Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: linux-pm@vger.kernel.org Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org Cc: zijun_hu <zijun_hu@htc.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170314170508.100882-3-thgarnie@google.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-03-09KVM: nVMX: do not warn when MSR bitmap address is not backedRadim Krčmář1-3/+1
Before trying to do nested_get_page() in nested_vmx_merge_msr_bitmap(), we have already checked that the MSR bitmap address is valid (4k aligned and within physical limits). SDM doesn't specify what happens if the there is no memory mapped at the valid address, but Intel CPUs treat the situation as if the bitmap was configured to trap all MSRs. KVM already does that by returning false and a correct handling doesn't need the guest-trigerrable warning that was reported by syzkaller: (The warning was originally there to catch some possible bugs in nVMX.) ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 7832 at arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c:9709 nested_vmx_merge_msr_bitmap arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c:9709 [inline] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 7832 at arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c:9709 nested_get_vmcs12_pages+0xfb6/0x15c0 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c:9640 Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ... CPU: 0 PID: 7832 Comm: syz-executor1 Not tainted 4.10.0+ #229 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:15 [inline] dump_stack+0x2ee/0x3ef lib/dump_stack.c:51 panic+0x1fb/0x412 kernel/panic.c:179 __warn+0x1c4/0x1e0 kernel/panic.c:540 warn_slowpath_null+0x2c/0x40 kernel/panic.c:583 nested_vmx_merge_msr_bitmap arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c:9709 [inline] nested_get_vmcs12_pages+0xfb6/0x15c0 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c:9640 enter_vmx_non_root_mode arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c:10471 [inline] nested_vmx_run+0x6186/0xaab0 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c:10561 handle_vmlaunch+0x1a/0x20 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c:7312 vmx_handle_exit+0xfc0/0x3f00 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c:8526 vcpu_enter_guest arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:6982 [inline] vcpu_run arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:7044 [inline] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x1418/0x4840 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:7205 kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x673/0x1120 arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:2570 Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> [Jim Mattson explained the bare metal behavior: "I believe this behavior would be documented in the chipset data sheet rather than the SDM, since the chipset returns all 1s for an unclaimed read."] Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
2017-03-07KVM: nVMX: reset nested_run_pending if the vCPU is going to be resetWanpeng Li1-1/+3
Reported by syzkaller: WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 27742 at arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c:11029 nested_vmx_vmexit+0x5c35/0x74d0 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c:11029 CPU: 1 PID: 27742 Comm: a.out Not tainted 4.10.0+ #229 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:15 [inline] dump_stack+0x2ee/0x3ef lib/dump_stack.c:51 panic+0x1fb/0x412 kernel/panic.c:179 __warn+0x1c4/0x1e0 kernel/panic.c:540 warn_slowpath_null+0x2c/0x40 kernel/panic.c:583 nested_vmx_vmexit+0x5c35/0x74d0 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c:11029 vmx_leave_nested arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c:11136 [inline] vmx_set_msr+0x1565/0x1910 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c:3324 kvm_set_msr+0xd4/0x170 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:1099 do_set_msr+0x11e/0x190 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:1128 __msr_io arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:2577 [inline] msr_io+0x24b/0x450 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:2614 kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl+0x35b/0x46a0 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:3497 kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x232/0x1120 arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:2721 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:43 [inline] do_vfs_ioctl+0x1bf/0x1790 fs/ioctl.c:683 SYSC_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:698 [inline] SyS_ioctl+0x8f/0xc0 fs/ioctl.c:689 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xc2 The syzkaller folks reported a nested_run_pending warning during userspace clear VMX capability which is exposed to L1 before. The warning gets thrown while doing (*(uint32_t*)0x20aecfe8 = (uint32_t)0x1); (*(uint32_t*)0x20aecfec = (uint32_t)0x0); (*(uint32_t*)0x20aecff0 = (uint32_t)0x3a); (*(uint32_t*)0x20aecff4 = (uint32_t)0x0); (*(uint64_t*)0x20aecff8 = (uint64_t)0x0); r[29] = syscall(__NR_ioctl, r[4], 0x4008ae89ul, 0x20aecfe8ul, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0); i.e. KVM_SET_MSR ioctl with struct kvm_msrs { .nmsrs = 1, .pad = 0, .entries = { {.index = MSR_IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL, .reserved = 0, .data = 0} } } The VMLANCH/VMRESUME emulation should be stopped since the CPU is going to reset here. This patch resets the nested_run_pending since the CPU is going to be reset hence there should be nothing pending. Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Suggested-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@hotmail.com> Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
2017-03-06kvm: nVMX: VMCLEAR should not cause the vCPU to shut downJim Mattson1-18/+4
VMCLEAR should silently ignore a failure to clear the launch state of the VMCS referenced by the operand. Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> [Changed "kvm_write_guest(vcpu->kvm" to "kvm_vcpu_write_guest(vcpu".] Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
2017-03-01KVM: nVMX: Fix pending events injectionWanpeng Li1-2/+6
L2 fails to boot on a non-APICv box dues to 'commit 0ad3bed6c5ec ("kvm: nVMX: move nested events check to kvm_vcpu_running")' KVM internal error. Suberror: 3 extra data[0]: 800000ef extra data[1]: 1 RAX=0000000000000000 RBX=ffffffff81f36140 RCX=0000000000000000 RDX=0000000000000000 RSI=0000000000000000 RDI=0000000000000000 RBP=ffff88007c92fe90 RSP=ffff88007c92fe90 R8 =ffff88007fccdca0 R9 =0000000000000000 R10=00000000fffedb3d R11=0000000000000000 R12=0000000000000003 R13=0000000000000000 R14=0000000000000000 R15=ffff88007c92c000 RIP=ffffffff810645e6 RFL=00000246 [---Z-P-] CPL=0 II=0 A20=1 SMM=0 HLT=0 ES =0000 0000000000000000 ffffffff 00c00000 CS =0010 0000000000000000 ffffffff 00a09b00 DPL=0 CS64 [-RA] SS =0000 0000000000000000 ffffffff 00c00000 DS =0000 0000000000000000 ffffffff 00c00000 FS =0000 0000000000000000 ffffffff 00c00000 GS =0000 ffff88007fcc0000 ffffffff 00c00000 LDT=0000 0000000000000000 ffffffff 00c00000 TR =0040 ffff88007fcd4200 00002087 00008b00 DPL=0 TSS64-busy GDT= ffff88007fcc9000 0000007f IDT= ffffffffff578000 00000fff CR0=80050033 CR2=00000000ffffffff CR3=0000000001e0a000 CR4=003406e0 DR0=0000000000000000 DR1=0000000000000000 DR2=0000000000000000 DR3=0000000000000000 DR6=00000000fffe0ff0 DR7=0000000000000400 EFER=0000000000000d01 We should try to reinject previous events if any before trying to inject new event if pending. If vmexit is triggered by L2 guest and L0 interested in, we should reinject IDT-vectoring info to L2 through vmcs02 if any, otherwise, we can consider new IRQs/NMIs which can be injected and call nested events callback to switch from L2 to L1 if needed and inject the proper vmexit events. However, 'commit 0ad3bed6c5ec ("kvm: nVMX: move nested events check to kvm_vcpu_running")' results in the handle events order reversely on non-APICv box. This patch fixes it by bailing out for pending events and not consider new events in this scenario. Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@siemens.com> Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@hotmail.com> Fixes: 0ad3bed6c5ec ("kvm: nVMX: move nested events check to kvm_vcpu_running") Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
2017-03-01x86/kvm/vmx: remove unused variable in segment_base()Jérémy Lefaure1-1/+0
The pointer 'struct desc_struct *d' is unused since commit 8c2e41f7ae12 ("x86/kvm/vmx: Simplify segment_base()") so let's remove it. Signed-off-by: Jérémy Lefaure <jeremy.lefaure@lse.epita.fr> Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
2017-02-21KVM: VMX: use correct vmcs_read/write for guest segment selector/baseChao Peng1-2/+2
Guest segment selector is 16 bit field and guest segment base is natural width field. Fix two incorrect invocations accordingly. Without this patch, build fails when aggressive inlining is used with ICC. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Chao Peng <chao.p.peng@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2017-02-21x86/kvm/vmx: Defer TR reload after VM exitAndy Lutomirski1-14/+9
Intel's VMX is daft and resets the hidden TSS limit register to 0x67 on VMX reload, and the 0x67 is not configurable. KVM currently reloads TR using the LTR instruction on every exit, but this is quite slow because LTR is serializing. The 0x67 limit is entirely harmless unless ioperm() is in use, so defer the reload until a task using ioperm() is actually running. Here's some poorly done benchmarking using kvm-unit-tests: Before: cpuid 1313 vmcall 1195 mov_from_cr8 11 mov_to_cr8 17 inl_from_pmtimer 6770 inl_from_qemu 6856 inl_from_kernel 2435 outl_to_kernel 1402 After: cpuid 1291 vmcall 1181 mov_from_cr8 11 mov_to_cr8 16 inl_from_pmtimer 6457 inl_from_qemu 6209 inl_from_kernel 2339 outl_to_kernel 1391 Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> [Force-reload TR in invalidate_tss_limit. - Paolo] Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2017-02-21x86/kvm/vmx: Simplify segment_base()Andy Lutomirski1-8/+7
Use actual pointer types for pointers (instead of unsigned long) and replace hardcoded constants with the appropriate self-documenting macros. The function is still a bit messy, but this seems a lot better than before to me. This is mostly borrowed from a patch by Thomas Garnier. Cc: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> Cc: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2017-02-21x86/kvm/vmx: Get rid of segment_base() on 64-bit kernelsAndy Lutomirski1-4/+7
It was a bit buggy (it didn't list all segment types that needed 64-bit fixups), but the bug was irrelevant because it wasn't called in any interesting context on 64-bit kernels and was only used for data segents on 32-bit kernels. To avoid confusion, make it explicitly 32-bit only. Cc: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> Cc: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2017-02-21x86/kvm/vmx: Don't fetch the TSS base from the GDTAndy Lutomirski1-10/+4
The current CPU's TSS base is a foregone conclusion, so there's no need to parse it out of the segment tables. This should save a couple cycles (as STR is surely microcoded and poorly optimized) but, more importantly, it's a cleanup and it means that segment_base() will never be called on 64-bit kernels. Cc: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> Cc: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.39.0) at 2025-09-28 01:27:21 +0300