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This is partly for readability - using named arguments instead of
numbered ones makes it muchmore obvious just what is going on. Using
"%[efault]" instead of "%4" for the special -EFAULT constant just means
that you don't have to count the arguments to see what's up.
But the motivation for all this cleanup is that when we'll start to
conditionally use "asm goto" even for the __get_user_asm() case, the
argument numbers will depend on whether we have an error output, or an
error label we can just directly jump to.
So this moves us towards named arguments for the same reason that we
have to use named arguments for the asms that use SET_CC(): numbering
will eventually become similarly unreliable and depends on whether we
can use particular compiler features or not.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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This is the exact same thing as 3680785692fb ("x86: get rid of 'rtype'
argument to __put_user_goto() macro") except it's about __get_user_asm()
rather than __put_user_goto().
The reasons are the same: having the low-level asm access the argument
with a different size than the compiler thinks it does is fundamentally
wrong.
But unlike the __put_user_goto() case, we actually did tell the compiler
that we used a bigger variable (either long or long long), and then only
filled in the low bits, and ended up "fixing" this by casting the result
to the proper pointer type.
That's because we needed to use a non-qualified type (the user pointer
might be a const pointer!), and that makes this a bit more painful. Our
'__inttype()' macro used to be lazy and only differentiate between "fits
in a register" or "needs two registers".
So this fix had to also make that '__inttype()' macro more precise.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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The 'rtype' argument goes back to pre-git (and pre-BK) times, and comes
from the fact that we used to not necessarily have the same type sizes
for the arguments of the inline asm as we did for the actual accesses we
did.
So 'rtype' is the 'register type' - the override of the register size in
the inline asm when it doesn't match the actual size of the variable we
use as the output argument (for when you used "put_user()" on an "int"
value that was assigned to a byte-sized user space access etc).
That mismatch doesn't actually exist any more, and should probably never
have existed in the first place. It's a horrid bug just waiting to
happen (using more - or less - of the variable that the compiler
expected us to use).
I think we had some odd casting going on to hide the effects of that
oddity after-the-fact, but those are long gone, and these days we should
always have the right size value in the first place, using things like
__typeof__(*(ptr)) __pu_val = (x);
and gcc should thus have the right register size without any manual
'rtype' games.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Every remaining user just has the error case returning -EFAULT.
In fact, the exception was __get_user_asm_nozero(), which was removed in
commit 4b842e4e25b1 ("x86: get rid of small constant size cases in
raw_copy_{to,from}_user()"), and the other __get_user_xyz() macros just
followed suit for consistency.
Fix up some macro whitespace while at it.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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The last user was removed by commit 4b842e4e25b1 ("x86: get rid of small
constant size cases in raw_copy_{to,from}_user()"). Get rid of the
left-overs before somebody tries to use it again.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 cleanups from Ingo Molnar:
"This topic tree contains more commits than usual:
- most of it are uaccess cleanups/reorganization by Al
- there's a bunch of prototype declaration (--Wmissing-prototypes)
cleanups
- misc other cleanups all around the map"
* 'x86-cleanups-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (36 commits)
x86/mm/set_memory: Fix -Wmissing-prototypes warnings
x86/efi: Add a prototype for efi_arch_mem_reserve()
x86/mm: Mark setup_emu2phys_nid() static
x86/jump_label: Move 'inline' keyword placement
x86/platform/uv: Add a missing prototype for uv_bau_message_interrupt()
kill uaccess_try()
x86: unsafe_put-style macro for sigmask
x86: x32_setup_rt_frame(): consolidate uaccess areas
x86: __setup_rt_frame(): consolidate uaccess areas
x86: __setup_frame(): consolidate uaccess areas
x86: setup_sigcontext(): list user_access_{begin,end}() into callers
x86: get rid of put_user_try in __setup_rt_frame() (both 32bit and 64bit)
x86: ia32_setup_rt_frame(): consolidate uaccess areas
x86: ia32_setup_frame(): consolidate uaccess areas
x86: ia32_setup_sigcontext(): lift user_access_{begin,end}() into the callers
x86/alternatives: Mark text_poke_loc_init() static
x86/cpu: Fix a -Wmissing-prototypes warning for init_ia32_feat_ctl()
x86/mm: Drop pud_mknotpresent()
x86: Replace setup_irq() by request_irq()
x86/configs: Slightly reduce defconfigs
...
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Only one user left; the thing had been made polymorphic back in 2013
for the sake of MPX. No point keeping it now that MPX is gone.
Convert futex_atomic_cmpxchg_inatomic() to user_access_{begin,end}()
while we are at it.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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finally
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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no users left
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Very few call sites where that would be triggered remain, and none
of those is anywhere near hot enough to bother.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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rather than relying upon the magic in raw_copy_from_user()
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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In commit 9f79b78ef744 ("Convert filldir[64]() from __put_user() to
unsafe_put_user()") I made filldir() use unsafe_put_user(), which
improves code generation on x86 enormously.
But because we didn't have a "unsafe_copy_to_user()", the dirent name
copy was also done by hand with unsafe_put_user() in a loop, and it
turns out that a lot of other architectures didn't like that, because
unlike x86, they have various alignment issues.
Most non-x86 architectures trap and fix it up, and some (like xtensa)
will just fail unaligned put_user() accesses unconditionally. Which
makes that "copy using put_user() in a loop" not work for them at all.
I could make that code do explicit alignment etc, but the architectures
that don't like unaligned accesses also don't really use the fancy
"user_access_begin/end()" model, so they might just use the regular old
__copy_to_user() interface.
So this commit takes that looping implementation, turns it into the x86
version of "unsafe_copy_to_user()", and makes other architectures
implement the unsafe copy version as __copy_to_user() (the same way they
do for the other unsafe_xyz() accessor functions).
Note that it only does this for the copying _to_ user space, and we
still don't have a unsafe version of copy_from_user().
That's partly because we have no current users of it, but also partly
because the copy_from_user() case is slightly different and cannot
efficiently be implemented in terms of a unsafe_get_user() loop (because
gcc can't do asm goto with outputs).
It would be trivial to do this using "rep movsb", which would work
really nicely on newer x86 cores, but really badly on some older ones.
Al Viro is looking at cleaning up all our user copy routines to make
this all a non-issue, but for now we have this simple-but-stupid version
for x86 that works fine for the dirent name copy case because those
names are short strings and we simply don't need anything fancier.
Fixes: 9f79b78ef744 ("Convert filldir[64]() from __put_user() to unsafe_put_user()")
Reported-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Reported-and-tested-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Identical to __put_user(); the __get_user() argument evalution will too
leak UBSAN crud into the __uaccess_begin() / __uaccess_end() region.
While uncommon this was observed to happen for:
drivers/xen/gntdev.c: if (__get_user(old_status, batch->status[i]))
where UBSAN added array bound checking.
This complements commit:
6ae865615fc4 ("x86/uaccess: Dont leak the AC flag into __put_user() argument evaluation")
Tested-by Sedat Dilek <sedat.dilek@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: broonie@kernel.org
Cc: sfr@canb.auug.org.au
Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: mhocko@suse.cz
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190829082445.GM2369@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net
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WARN_ON_IN_IRQ() assumes that the access_ok() and following
user memory access can sleep. But this assumption is not
always correct; when the pagefault is disabled, following
memory access will just returns -EFAULT and never sleep.
Add pagefault_disabled() check in WARN_ON_ONCE() so that
it can ignore the case we call it with disabling pagefault.
For this purpose, this modified pagefault_disabled() as
an inline function.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/155789868664.26965.7932665824135793317.stgit@devnote2
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 asm updates from Ingo Molnar:
"This includes the following changes:
- cpu_has() cleanups
- sync_bitops.h modernization to the rmwcc.h facility, similarly to
bitops.h
- continued LTO annotations/fixes
- misc cleanups and smaller cleanups"
* 'x86-asm-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/um/vdso: Drop unnecessary cc-ldoption
x86/vdso: Rename variable to fix -Wshadow warning
x86/cpu/amd: Exclude 32bit only assembler from 64bit build
x86/asm: Mark all top level asm statements as .text
x86/build/vdso: Add FORCE to the build rule of %.so
x86/asm: Modernize sync_bitops.h
x86/mm: Convert some slow-path static_cpu_has() callers to boot_cpu_has()
x86: Convert some slow-path static_cpu_has() callers to boot_cpu_has()
x86/asm: Clarify static_cpu_has()'s intended use
x86/uaccess: Fix implicit cast of __user pointer
x86/cpufeature: Remove __pure attribute to _static_cpu_has()
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The __put_user() macro evaluates it's @ptr argument inside the
__uaccess_begin() / __uaccess_end() region. While this would normally
not be expected to be an issue, an UBSAN bug (it ignored -fwrapv,
fixed in GCC 8+) would transform the @ptr evaluation for:
drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_gem_execbuffer.c: if (unlikely(__put_user(offset, &urelocs[r-stack].presumed_offset))) {
into a signed-overflow-UB check and trigger the objtool AC validation.
Finish this commit:
2a418cf3f5f1 ("x86/uaccess: Don't leak the AC flag into __put_user() value evaluation")
and explicitly evaluate all 3 arguments early.
Reported-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> # build-tested
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: luto@kernel.org
Fixes: 2a418cf3f5f1 ("x86/uaccess: Don't leak the AC flag into __put_user() value evaluation")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190424072208.695962771@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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The first two arguments of __user_atomic_cmpxchg_inatomic() are:
- @uval is a kernel pointer into which the old value should be stored
- @ptr is the user pointer on which the cmpxchg should operate
This means that casting @uval to __typeof__(ptr) is wrong. Since @uval
is only used once inside the macro, just get rid of __uval and use
(uval) directly.
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Mukesh Ojha <mojha@codeaurora.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Qiaowei Ren <qiaowei.ren@intel.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190329214652.258477-4-jannh@google.com
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Introduce common helpers for when we need to safely suspend a
uaccess section; for instance to generate a {KA,UB}SAN report.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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If GCC out-of-lines it, the STAC and CLAC are in different fuctions
and objtool gets upset.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 cleanups from Ingo Molnar:
"Various cleanups and simplifications, none of them really stands out,
they are all over the place"
* 'x86-cleanups-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/uaccess: Remove unused __addr_ok() macro
x86/smpboot: Remove unused phys_id variable
x86/mm/dump_pagetables: Remove the unused prev_pud variable
x86/fpu: Move init_xstate_size() to __init section
x86/cpu_entry_area: Move percpu_setup_debug_store() to __init section
x86/mtrr: Remove unused variable
x86/boot/compressed/64: Explain paging_prepare()'s return value
x86/resctrl: Remove duplicate MSR_MISC_FEATURE_CONTROL definition
x86/asm/suspend: Drop ENTRY from local data
x86/hw_breakpoints, kprobes: Remove kprobes ifdeffery
x86/boot: Save several bytes in decompressor
x86/trap: Remove useless declaration
x86/mm/tlb: Remove unused cpu variable
x86/events: Mark expected switch-case fall-throughs
x86/asm-prototypes: Remove duplicate include <asm/page.h>
x86/kernel: Mark expected switch-case fall-throughs
x86/insn-eval: Mark expected switch-case fall-through
x86/platform/UV: Replace kmalloc() and memset() with k[cz]alloc() calls
x86/e820: Replace kmalloc() + memcpy() with kmemdup()
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The descriptions of userspace memory access functions had minor issues
with formatting that made kernel-doc unable to properly detect the
function/macro names and the return value sections:
./arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h:80: info: Scanning doc for
./arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h:139: info: Scanning doc for
./arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h:231: info: Scanning doc for
./arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h:505: info: Scanning doc for
./arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h:530: info: Scanning doc for
./arch/x86/lib/usercopy_32.c:58: info: Scanning doc for
./arch/x86/lib/usercopy_32.c:69: warning: No description found for return
value of 'clear_user'
./arch/x86/lib/usercopy_32.c:78: info: Scanning doc for
./arch/x86/lib/usercopy_32.c:90: warning: No description found for return
value of '__clear_user'
Fix the formatting.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1549549644-4903-3-git-send-email-rppt@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Every in-kernel use of this function defined it to KERNEL_DS (either as
an actual define, or as an inline function). It's an entirely
historical artifact, and long long long ago used to actually read the
segment selector valueof '%ds' on x86.
Which in the kernel is always KERNEL_DS.
Inspired by a patch from Jann Horn that just did this for a very small
subset of users (the ones in fs/), along with Al who suggested a script.
I then just took it to the logical extreme and removed all the remaining
gunk.
Roughly scripted with
git grep -l '(get_ds())' -- :^tools/ | xargs sed -i 's/(get_ds())/(KERNEL_DS)/'
git grep -lw 'get_ds' -- :^tools/ | xargs sed -i '/^#define get_ds()/d'
plus manual fixups to remove a few unusual usage patterns, the couple of
inline function cases and to fix up a comment that had become stale.
The 'get_ds()' function remains in an x86 kvm selftest, since in user
space it actually does something relevant.
Inspired-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Inspired-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 fixes from Thomas Gleixner:
"Two last minute fixes:
- Prevent value evaluation via functions happening in the user access
enabled region of __put_user() (put another way: make sure to
evaluate the value to be stored in user space _before_ enabling
user space accesses)
- Correct the definition of a Hyper-V hypercall constant"
* 'x86-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/hyper-v: Fix definition of HV_MAX_FLUSH_REP_COUNT
x86/uaccess: Don't leak the AC flag into __put_user() value evaluation
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This was caught while staring at the whole {set,get}_fs() machinery.
It's last user, the 32-bit version of strnlen_user() went away with
5723aa993d83 ("x86: use the new generic strnlen_user() function")
so drop it.
No functional changes.
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: the arch/x86 maintainers <x86@kernel.org>
Cc: "Tobin C. Harding" <tobin@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190225191109.7671-1-bp@alien8.de
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When calling __put_user(foo(), ptr), the __put_user() macro would call
foo() in between __uaccess_begin() and __uaccess_end(). If that code
were buggy, then those bugs would be run without SMAP protection.
Fortunately, there seem to be few instances of the problem in the
kernel. Nevertheless, __put_user() should be fixed to avoid doing this.
Therefore, evaluate __put_user()'s argument before setting AC.
This issue was noticed when an objtool hack by Peter Zijlstra complained
about genregs_get() and I compared the assembly output to the C source.
[ bp: Massage commit message and fixed up whitespace. ]
Fixes: 11f1a4b9755f ("x86: reorganize SMAP handling in user space accesses")
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190225125231.845656645@infradead.org
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Commit 594cc251fdd0 ("make 'user_access_begin()' do 'access_ok()'")
makes the access_ok() check part of the user_access_begin() preceding a
series of 'unsafe' accesses. This has the desirable effect of ensuring
that all 'unsafe' accesses have been range-checked, without having to
pick through all of the callsites to verify whether the appropriate
checking has been made.
However, the consolidated range check does not inhibit speculation, so
it is still up to the caller to ensure that they are not susceptible to
any speculative side-channel attacks for user addresses that ultimately
fail the access_ok() check.
This is an oversight, so use __uaccess_begin_nospec() to ensure that
speculation is inhibited until the access_ok() check has passed.
Reported-by: Julien Thierry <julien.thierry@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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This actually enables the __put_user_goto() functionality in
unsafe_put_user().
For an example of the effect of this, this is the code generated for the
unsafe_put_user(signo, &infop->si_signo, Efault);
in the waitid() system call:
movl %ecx,(%rbx) # signo, MEM[(struct __large_struct *)_2]
It's just one single store instruction, along with generating an
exception table entry pointing to the Efault label case in case that
instruction faults.
Before, we would generate this:
xorl %edx, %edx
movl %ecx,(%rbx) # signo, MEM[(struct __large_struct *)_3]
testl %edx, %edx
jne .L309
with the exception table generated for that 'mov' instruction causing us
to jump to a stub that set %edx to -EFAULT and then jumped back to the
'testl' instruction.
So not only do we now get rid of the extra code in the normal sequence,
we also avoid unnecessarily keeping that extra error register live
across it all.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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This is finally the actual reason for the odd error handling in the
"unsafe_get/put_user()" functions, introduced over three years ago.
Using a "jump to error label" interface is somewhat odd, but very
convenient as a programming interface, and more importantly, it fits
very well with simply making the target be the exception handler address
directly from the inline asm.
The reason it took over three years to actually do this? We need "asm
goto" support for it, which only became the default on x86 last year.
It's now been a year that we've forced asm goto support (see commit
e501ce957a78 "x86: Force asm-goto"), and so let's just do it here too.
[ Side note: this commit was originally done back in 2016. The above
commentary about timing is obviously about it only now getting merged
into my real upstream tree - Linus ]
Sadly, gcc still only supports "asm goto" with asms that do not have any
outputs, so we are limited to only the put_user case for this. Maybe in
several more years we can do the get_user case too.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Originally, the rule used to be that you'd have to do access_ok()
separately, and then user_access_begin() before actually doing the
direct (optimized) user access.
But experience has shown that people then decide not to do access_ok()
at all, and instead rely on it being implied by other operations or
similar. Which makes it very hard to verify that the access has
actually been range-checked.
If you use the unsafe direct user accesses, hardware features (either
SMAP - Supervisor Mode Access Protection - on x86, or PAN - Privileged
Access Never - on ARM) do force you to use user_access_begin(). But
nothing really forces the range check.
By putting the range check into user_access_begin(), we actually force
people to do the right thing (tm), and the range check vill be visible
near the actual accesses. We have way too long a history of people
trying to avoid them.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Nobody has actually used the type (VERIFY_READ vs VERIFY_WRITE) argument
of the user address range verification function since we got rid of the
old racy i386-only code to walk page tables by hand.
It existed because the original 80386 would not honor the write protect
bit when in kernel mode, so you had to do COW by hand before doing any
user access. But we haven't supported that in a long time, and these
days the 'type' argument is a purely historical artifact.
A discussion about extending 'user_access_begin()' to do the range
checking resulted this patch, because there is no way we're going to
move the old VERIFY_xyz interface to that model. And it's best done at
the end of the merge window when I've done most of my merges, so let's
just get this done once and for all.
This patch was mostly done with a sed-script, with manual fix-ups for
the cases that weren't of the trivial 'access_ok(VERIFY_xyz' form.
There were a couple of notable cases:
- csky still had the old "verify_area()" name as an alias.
- the iter_iov code had magical hardcoded knowledge of the actual
values of VERIFY_{READ,WRITE} (not that they mattered, since nothing
really used it)
- microblaze used the type argument for a debug printout
but other than those oddities this should be a total no-op patch.
I tried to fix up all architectures, did fairly extensive grepping for
access_ok() uses, and the changes are trivial, but I may have missed
something. Any missed conversion should be trivially fixable, though.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Currently, most fixups for attempting to access userspace memory are
handled using _ASM_EXTABLE, which is also used for various other types of
fixups (e.g. safe MSR access, IRET failures, and a bunch of other things).
In order to make it possible to add special safety checks to uaccess fixups
(in particular, checking whether the fault address is actually in
userspace), introduce a new exception table handler ex_handler_uaccess()
and wire it up to all the user access fixups (excluding ones that
already use _ASM_EXTABLE_EX).
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: dvyukov@google.com
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: "Naveen N. Rao" <naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Anil S Keshavamurthy <anil.s.keshavamurthy@intel.com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180828201421.157735-5-jannh@google.com
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Quoting Linus:
I do think that it would be a good idea to very expressly document
the fact that it's not that the user access itself is unsafe. I do
agree that things like "get_user()" want to be protected, but not
because of any direct bugs or problems with get_user() and friends,
but simply because get_user() is an excellent source of a pointer
that is obviously controlled from a potentially attacking user
space. So it's a prime candidate for then finding _subsequent_
accesses that can then be used to perturb the cache.
__uaccess_begin_nospec() covers __get_user() and copy_from_iter() where the
limit check is far away from the user pointer de-reference. In those cases
a barrier_nospec() prevents speculation with a potential pointer to
privileged memory. uaccess_try_nospec covers get_user_try.
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Suggested-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: alan@linux.intel.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151727416953.33451.10508284228526170604.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com
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For __get_user() paths, do not allow the kernel to speculate on the value
of a user controlled pointer. In addition to the 'stac' instruction for
Supervisor Mode Access Protection (SMAP), a barrier_nospec() causes the
access_ok() result to resolve in the pipeline before the CPU might take any
speculative action on the pointer value. Given the cost of 'stac' the
speculation barrier is placed after 'stac' to hopefully overlap the cost of
disabling SMAP with the cost of flushing the instruction pipeline.
Since __get_user is a major kernel interface that deals with user
controlled pointers, the __uaccess_begin_nospec() mechanism will prevent
speculative execution past an access_ok() permission check. While
speculative execution past access_ok() is not enough to lead to a kernel
memory leak, it is a necessary precondition.
To be clear, __uaccess_begin_nospec() is addressing a class of potential
problems near __get_user() usages.
Note, that while the barrier_nospec() in __uaccess_begin_nospec() is used
to protect __get_user(), pointer masking similar to array_index_nospec()
will be used for get_user() since it incorporates a bounds check near the
usage.
uaccess_try_nospec provides the same mechanism for get_user_try.
No functional changes.
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Suggested-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Suggested-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: alan@linux.intel.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151727415922.33451.5796614273104346583.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com
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Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.
By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.
Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.
This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.
How this work was done:
Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
- file had no licensing information it it.
- file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
- file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,
Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.
The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.
The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
- Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
- Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
lines of source
- File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
lines).
All documentation files were explicitly excluded.
The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.
- when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
COPYING file license applied.
For non */uapi/* files that summary was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 11139
and resulted in the first patch in this series.
If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930
and resulted in the second patch in this series.
- if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
it (per prior point). Results summary:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270
GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17
LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15
GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14
((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5
LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4
LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1
and that resulted in the third patch in this series.
- when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
the concluded license(s).
- when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.
- In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).
- When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
- If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
in time.
In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.
Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.
In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.
Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
- a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
license ids and scores
- reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
- reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
SPDX license was correct
This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.
These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Don't cast away the __user in __get_user_asm_u64() on x86-32.
Prevents sparse getting upset.
Signed-off-by: Ville Syrjälä <ville.syrjala@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Benjamin LaHaise <bcrl@kvack.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170912164000.13745-1-ville.syrjala@linux.intel.com
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For inline asm statements which have a CALL instruction, we list the
stack pointer as a constraint to convince GCC to ensure the frame
pointer is set up first:
static inline void foo()
{
register void *__sp asm(_ASM_SP);
asm("call bar" : "+r" (__sp))
}
Unfortunately, that pattern causes Clang to corrupt the stack pointer.
The fix is easy: convert the stack pointer register variable to a global
variable.
It should be noted that the end result is different based on the GCC
version. With GCC 6.4, this patch has exactly the same result as
before:
defconfig defconfig-nofp distro distro-nofp
before 9820389 9491555 8816046 8516940
after 9820389 9491555 8816046 8516940
With GCC 7.2, however, GCC's behavior has changed. It now changes its
behavior based on the conversion of the register variable to a global.
That somehow convinces it to *always* set up the frame pointer before
inserting *any* inline asm. (Therefore, listing the variable as an
output constraint is a no-op and is no longer necessary.) It's a bit
overkill, but the performance impact should be negligible. And in fact,
there's a nice improvement with frame pointers disabled:
defconfig defconfig-nofp distro distro-nofp
before 9796316 9468236 9076191 8790305
after 9796957 9464267 9076381 8785949
So in summary, while listing the stack pointer as an output constraint
is no longer necessary for newer versions of GCC, it's still needed for
older versions.
Suggested-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Reported-by: Matthias Kaehlcke <mka@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Dmitriy Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Miguel Bernal Marin <miguel.bernal.marin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/3db862e970c432ae823cf515c52b54fec8270e0e.1505942196.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull syscall updates from Ingo Molnar:
"Improve the security of set_fs(): we now check the address limit on a
number of key platforms (x86, arm, arm64) before returning to
user-space - without adding overhead to the typical system call fast
path"
* 'x86-syscall-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
arm64/syscalls: Check address limit on user-mode return
arm/syscalls: Check address limit on user-mode return
x86/syscalls: Check address limit on user-mode return
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs
Pull uacess-unaligned removal from Al Viro:
"That stuff had just one user, and an exotic one, at that - binfmt_flat
on arm and m68k"
* 'work.uaccess-unaligned' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
kill {__,}{get,put}_user_unaligned()
binfmt_flat: flat_{get,put}_addr_from_rp() should be able to fail
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Ensure the address limit is a user-mode segment before returning to
user-mode. Otherwise a process can corrupt kernel-mode memory and elevate
privileges [1].
The set_fs function sets the TIF_SETFS flag to force a slow path on
return. In the slow path, the address limit is checked to be USER_DS if
needed.
The addr_limit_user_check function is added as a cross-architecture
function to check the address limit.
[1] https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=990
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Miroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz>
Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@mellanox.com>
Cc: Pratyush Anand <panand@redhat.com>
Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>
Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170615011203.144108-1-thgarnie@google.com
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs
Pull user access str* updates from Al Viro:
"uaccess str...() dead code removal"
* 'uaccess.strlen' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
s390 keyboard.c: don't open-code strndup_user()
mips: get rid of unused __strnlen_user()
get rid of unused __strncpy_from_user() instances
kill strlen_user()
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no users left
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
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The code to fetch a 64-bit value from user space was entirely buggered,
and has been since the code was merged in early 2016 in commit
b2f680380ddf ("x86/mm/32: Add support for 64-bit __get_user() on 32-bit
kernels").
Happily the buggered routine is almost certainly entirely unused, since
the normal way to access user space memory is just with the non-inlined
"get_user()", and the inlined version didn't even historically exist.
The normal "get_user()" case is handled by external hand-written asm in
arch/x86/lib/getuser.S that doesn't have either of these issues.
There were two independent bugs in __get_user_asm_u64():
- it still did the STAC/CLAC user space access marking, even though
that is now done by the wrapper macros, see commit 11f1a4b9755f
("x86: reorganize SMAP handling in user space accesses").
This didn't result in a semantic error, it just means that the
inlined optimized version was hugely less efficient than the
allegedly slower standard version, since the CLAC/STAC overhead is
quite high on modern Intel CPU's.
- the double register %eax/%edx was marked as an output, but the %eax
part of it was touched early in the asm, and could thus clobber other
inputs to the asm that gcc didn't expect it to touch.
In particular, that meant that the generated code could look like
this:
mov (%eax),%eax
mov 0x4(%eax),%edx
where the load of %edx obviously was _supposed_ to be from the 32-bit
word that followed the source of %eax, but because %eax was
overwritten by the first instruction, the source of %edx was
basically random garbage.
The fixes are trivial: remove the extraneous STAC/CLAC entries, and mark
the 64-bit output as early-clobber to let gcc know that no inputs should
alias with the output register.
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Benjamin LaHaise <bcrl@kvack.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@kernel.org # v4.8+
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Al noticed that unsafe_put_user() had type problems, and fixed them in
commit a7cc722fff0b ("fix unsafe_put_user()"), which made me look more
at those functions.
It turns out that unsafe_get_user() had a type issue too: it limited the
largest size of the type it could handle to "unsigned long". Which is
fine with the current users, but doesn't match our existing normal
get_user() semantics, which can also handle "u64" even when that does
not fit in a long.
While at it, also clean up the type cast in unsafe_put_user(). We
actually want to just make it an assignment to the expected type of the
pointer, because we actually do want warnings from types that don't
convert silently. And it makes the code more readable by not having
that one very long and complex line.
[ This patch might become stable material if we ever end up back-porting
any new users of the unsafe uaccess code, but as things stand now this
doesn't matter for any current existing uses. ]
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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__put_user_size() relies upon its first argument having the same type as what
the second one points to; the only other user makes sure of that and
unsafe_put_user() should do the same.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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no callers, no consistent semantics, no sane way to use it...
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
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Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
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Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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I recently encountered wreckage because access_ok() was used where it
should not be, add an explicit WARN when access_ok() is used wrongly.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
|
