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2023-03-17KVM: x86: Move guts of kvm_arch_init() to standalone helperSean Christopherson1-0/+3
[ Upstream commit 4f8396b96a9fc672964842fe7adbe8ddca8a3adf ] Move the guts of kvm_arch_init() to a new helper, kvm_x86_vendor_init(), so that VMX can do _all_ arch and vendor initialization before calling kvm_init(). Calling kvm_init() must be the _very_ last step during init, as kvm_init() exposes /dev/kvm to userspace, i.e. allows creating VMs. No functional change intended. Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Message-Id: <20221130230934.1014142-14-seanjc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Stable-dep-of: e32b120071ea ("KVM: VMX: Do _all_ initialization before exposing /dev/kvm to userspace") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-01-12KVM: x86/xen: Avoid deadlock by adding kvm->arch.xen.xen_lock leaf node lockDavid Woodhouse1-0/+1
In commit 14243b387137a ("KVM: x86/xen: Add KVM_IRQ_ROUTING_XEN_EVTCHN and event channel delivery") the clever version of me left some helpful notes for those who would come after him: /* * For the irqfd workqueue, using the main kvm->lock mutex is * fine since this function is invoked from kvm_set_irq() with * no other lock held, no srcu. In future if it will be called * directly from a vCPU thread (e.g. on hypercall for an IPI) * then it may need to switch to using a leaf-node mutex for * serializing the shared_info mapping. */ mutex_lock(&kvm->lock); In commit 2fd6df2f2b47 ("KVM: x86/xen: intercept EVTCHNOP_send from guests") the other version of me ran straight past that comment without reading it, and introduced a potential deadlock by taking vcpu->mutex and kvm->lock in the wrong order. Solve this as originally suggested, by adding a leaf-node lock in the Xen state rather than using kvm->lock for it. Fixes: 2fd6df2f2b47 ("KVM: x86/xen: intercept EVTCHNOP_send from guests") Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Message-Id: <20230111180651.14394-4-dwmw2@infradead.org> [Rebase, add docs. - Paolo] Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2022-12-12Merge remote-tracking branch 'kvm/queue' into HEADPaolo Bonzini1-0/+2
x86 Xen-for-KVM: * Allow the Xen runstate information to cross a page boundary * Allow XEN_RUNSTATE_UPDATE flag behaviour to be configured * add support for 32-bit guests in SCHEDOP_poll x86 fixes: * One-off fixes for various emulation flows (SGX, VMXON, NRIPS=0). * Reinstate IBPB on emulated VM-Exit that was incorrectly dropped a few years back when eliminating unnecessary barriers when switching between vmcs01 and vmcs02. * Clean up the MSR filter docs. * Clean up vmread_error_trampoline() to make it more obvious that params must be passed on the stack, even for x86-64. * Let userspace set all supported bits in MSR_IA32_FEAT_CTL irrespective of the current guest CPUID. * Fudge around a race with TSC refinement that results in KVM incorrectly thinking a guest needs TSC scaling when running on a CPU with a constant TSC, but no hardware-enumerated TSC frequency. * Advertise (on AMD) that the SMM_CTL MSR is not supported * Remove unnecessary exports Selftests: * Fix an inverted check in the access tracking perf test, and restore support for asserting that there aren't too many idle pages when running on bare metal. * Fix an ordering issue in the AMX test introduced by recent conversions to use kvm_cpu_has(), and harden the code to guard against similar bugs in the future. Anything that tiggers caching of KVM's supported CPUID, kvm_cpu_has() in this case, effectively hides opt-in XSAVE features if the caching occurs before the test opts in via prctl(). * Fix build errors that occur in certain setups (unsure exactly what is unique about the problematic setup) due to glibc overriding static_assert() to a variant that requires a custom message. * Introduce actual atomics for clear/set_bit() in selftests Documentation: * Remove deleted ioctls from documentation * Various fixes
2022-12-09Merge tag 'kvmarm-6.2' of ↵Paolo Bonzini1-2/+0
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kvmarm/kvmarm into HEAD KVM/arm64 updates for 6.2 - Enable the per-vcpu dirty-ring tracking mechanism, together with an option to keep the good old dirty log around for pages that are dirtied by something other than a vcpu. - Switch to the relaxed parallel fault handling, using RCU to delay page table reclaim and giving better performance under load. - Relax the MTE ABI, allowing a VMM to use the MAP_SHARED mapping option, which multi-process VMMs such as crosvm rely on. - Merge the pKVM shadow vcpu state tracking that allows the hypervisor to have its own view of a vcpu, keeping that state private. - Add support for the PMUv3p5 architecture revision, bringing support for 64bit counters on systems that support it, and fix the no-quite-compliant CHAIN-ed counter support for the machines that actually exist out there. - Fix a handful of minor issues around 52bit VA/PA support (64kB pages only) as a prefix of the oncoming support for 4kB and 16kB pages. - Add/Enable/Fix a bunch of selftests covering memslots, breakpoints, stage-2 faults and access tracking. You name it, we got it, we probably broke it. - Pick a small set of documentation and spelling fixes, because no good merge window would be complete without those. As a side effect, this tag also drags: - The 'kvmarm-fixes-6.1-3' tag as a dependency to the dirty-ring series - A shared branch with the arm64 tree that repaints all the system registers to match the ARM ARM's naming, and resulting in interesting conflicts
2022-11-30KVM: x86/xen: Allow XEN_RUNSTATE_UPDATE flag behaviour to be configuredDavid Woodhouse1-0/+1
Closer inspection of the Xen code shows that we aren't supposed to be using the XEN_RUNSTATE_UPDATE flag unconditionally. It should be explicitly enabled by guests through the HYPERVISOR_vm_assist hypercall. If we randomly set the top bit of ->state_entry_time for a guest that hasn't asked for it and doesn't expect it, that could make the runtimes fail to add up and confuse the guest. Without the flag it's perfectly safe for a vCPU to read its own vcpu_runstate_info; just not for one vCPU to read *another's*. I briefly pondered adding a word for the whole set of VMASST_TYPE_* flags but the only one we care about for HVM guests is this, so it seemed a bit pointless. Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Message-Id: <20221127122210.248427-3-dwmw2@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2022-11-30KVM: x86/xen: Compatibility fixes for shared runstate areaDavid Woodhouse1-0/+1
The guest runstate area can be arbitrarily byte-aligned. In fact, even when a sane 32-bit guest aligns the overall structure nicely, the 64-bit fields in the structure end up being unaligned due to the fact that the 32-bit ABI only aligns them to 32 bits. So setting the ->state_entry_time field to something|XEN_RUNSTATE_UPDATE is buggy, because if it's unaligned then we can't update the whole field atomically; the low bytes might be observable before the _UPDATE bit is. Xen actually updates the *byte* containing that top bit, on its own. KVM should do the same. In addition, we cannot assume that the runstate area fits within a single page. One option might be to make the gfn_to_pfn cache cope with regions that cross a page — but getting a contiguous virtual kernel mapping of a discontiguous set of IOMEM pages is a distinctly non-trivial exercise, and it seems this is the *only* current use case for the GPC which would benefit from it. An earlier version of the runstate code did use a gfn_to_hva cache for this purpose, but it still had the single-page restriction because it used the uhva directly — because it needs to be able to do so atomically when the vCPU is being scheduled out, so it used pagefault_disable() around the accesses and didn't just use kvm_write_guest_cached() which has a fallback path. So... use a pair of GPCs for the first and potential second page covering the runstate area. We can get away with locking both at once because nothing else takes more than one GPC lock at a time so we can invent a trivial ordering rule. The common case where it's all in the same page is kept as a fast path, but in both cases, the actual guest structure (compat or not) is built up from the fields in @vx, following preset pointers to the state and times fields. The only difference is whether those pointers point to the kernel stack (in the split case) or to guest memory directly via the GPC. The fast path is also fixed to use a byte access for the XEN_RUNSTATE_UPDATE bit, then the only real difference is the dual memcpy. Finally, Xen also does write the runstate area immediately when it's configured. Flip the kvm_xen_update_runstate() and …_guest() functions and call the latter directly when the runstate area is set. This means that other ioctls which modify the runstate also write it immediately to the guest when they do so, which is also intended. Update the xen_shinfo_test to exercise the pathological case where the XEN_RUNSTATE_UPDATE flag in the top byte of the state_entry_time is actually in a different page to the rest of the 64-bit word. Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2022-11-18KVM: nVMX: hyper-v: Cache VP assist page in 'struct kvm_vcpu_hv'Vitaly Kuznetsov1-0/+2
In preparation to enabling L2 TLB flush, cache VP assist page in 'struct kvm_vcpu_hv'. While on it, rename nested_enlightened_vmentry() to nested_get_evmptr() and make it return eVMCS GPA directly. No functional change intended. Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Message-Id: <20221101145426.251680-26-vkuznets@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2022-11-18KVM: x86: Introduce .hv_inject_synthetic_vmexit_post_tlb_flush() nested hookVitaly Kuznetsov1-0/+1
Hyper-V supports injecting synthetic L2->L1 exit after performing L2 TLB flush operation but the procedure is vendor specific. Introduce .hv_inject_synthetic_vmexit_post_tlb_flush nested hook for it. Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Message-Id: <20221101145426.251680-22-vkuznets@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2022-11-18KVM: nVMX: Keep track of hv_vm_id/hv_vp_id when eVMCS is in useVitaly Kuznetsov1-0/+6
To handle L2 TLB flush requests, KVM needs to keep track of L2's VM_ID/ VP_IDs which are set by L1 hypervisor. 'Partition assist page' address is also needed to handle post-flush exit to L1 upon request. Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Message-Id: <20221101145426.251680-20-vkuznets@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2022-11-18KVM: x86: hyper-v: Use preallocated buffer in 'struct kvm_vcpu_hv' instead ↵Vitaly Kuznetsov1-0/+3
of on-stack 'sparse_banks' To make kvm_hv_flush_tlb() ready to handle L2 TLB flush requests, KVM needs to allow for all 64 sparse vCPU banks regardless of KVM_MAX_VCPUs as L1 may use vCPU overcommit for L2. To avoid growing on-stack allocation, make 'sparse_banks' part of per-vCPU 'struct kvm_vcpu_hv' which is allocated dynamically. Note: sparse_set_to_vcpu_mask() can't currently be used to handle L2 requests as KVM does not keep L2 VM_ID -> L2 VCPU_ID -> L1 vCPU mappings, i.e. its vp_bitmap array is still bounded by the number of L1 vCPUs and so can remain an on-stack allocation. Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Message-Id: <20221101145426.251680-19-vkuznets@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2022-11-18KVM: x86: hyper-v: Create a separate fifo for L2 TLB flushVitaly Kuznetsov1-1/+7
To handle L2 TLB flush requests, KVM needs to use a separate fifo from regular (L1) Hyper-V TLB flush requests: e.g. when a request to flush something in L2 is made, the target vCPU can transition from L2 to L1, receive a request to flush a GVA for L1 and then try to enter L2 back. The first request needs to be processed at this point. Similarly, requests to flush GVAs in L1 must wait until L2 exits to L1. No functional change as KVM doesn't handle L2 TLB flush requests from L2 yet. Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Message-Id: <20221101145426.251680-18-vkuznets@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2022-11-18KVM: x86: hyper-v: Introduce TLB flush fifoVitaly Kuznetsov1-0/+20
To allow flushing individual GVAs instead of always flushing the whole VPID a per-vCPU structure to pass the requests is needed. Use standard 'kfifo' to queue two types of entries: individual GVA (GFN + up to 4095 following GFNs in the lower 12 bits) and 'flush all'. The size of the fifo is arbitrarily set to '16'. Note, kvm_hv_flush_tlb() only queues 'flush all' entries for now and kvm_hv_vcpu_flush_tlb() doesn't actually read the fifo just resets the queue before returning -EOPNOTSUPP (which triggers full TLB flush) so the functional change is very small but the infrastructure is prepared to handle individual GVA flush requests. Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Message-Id: <20221101145426.251680-10-vkuznets@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2022-11-18KVM: x86: hyper-v: Resurrect dedicated KVM_REQ_HV_TLB_FLUSH flagVitaly Kuznetsov1-0/+2
In preparation to implementing fine-grained Hyper-V TLB flush and L2 TLB flush, resurrect dedicated KVM_REQ_HV_TLB_FLUSH request bit. As KVM_REQ_TLB_FLUSH_GUEST is a stronger operation, clear KVM_REQ_HV_TLB_FLUSH request in kvm_vcpu_flush_tlb_guest(). The flush itself is temporary handled by kvm_vcpu_flush_tlb_guest(). No functional change intended. Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Message-Id: <20221101145426.251680-9-vkuznets@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2022-11-18KVM: x86: Rename 'enable_direct_tlbflush' to 'enable_l2_tlb_flush'Vitaly Kuznetsov1-1/+1
To make terminology between Hyper-V-on-KVM and KVM-on-Hyper-V consistent, rename 'enable_direct_tlbflush' to 'enable_l2_tlb_flush'. The change eliminates the use of confusing 'direct' and adds the missing underscore. No functional change. Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Message-Id: <20221101145426.251680-6-vkuznets@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2022-11-17KVM: x86/mmu: Use BIT{,_ULL}() for PFERR masksDavid Matlack1-10/+10
Use the preferred BIT() and BIT_ULL() to construct the PFERR masks rather than open-coding the bit shifting. No functional change intended. Signed-off-by: David Matlack <dmatlack@google.com> Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221102184654.282799-6-dmatlack@google.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2022-11-10KVM: Move declaration of kvm_cpu_dirty_log_size() to kvm_dirty_ring.hGavin Shan1-2/+0
Not all architectures like ARM64 need to override the function. Move its declaration to kvm_dirty_ring.h to avoid the following compiling warning on ARM64 when the feature is enabled. arch/arm64/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/dirty_ring.c:14:12: \ warning: no previous prototype for 'kvm_cpu_dirty_log_size' \ [-Wmissing-prototypes] \ int __weak kvm_cpu_dirty_log_size(void) Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Gavin Shan <gshan@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221110104914.31280-3-gshan@redhat.com
2022-11-09KVM: x86/pmu: Defer counter emulated overflow via pmc->prev_counterLike Xu1-2/+3
Defer reprogramming counters and handling overflow via KVM_REQ_PMU when incrementing counters. KVM skips emulated WRMSR in the VM-Exit fastpath, the fastpath runs with IRQs disabled, skipping instructions can increment and reprogram counters, reprogramming counters can sleep, and sleeping is disallowed while IRQs are disabled. [*] BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/mutex.c:580 [*] in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 1, non_block: 0, pid: 2981888, name: CPU 15/KVM [*] preempt_count: 1, expected: 0 [*] RCU nest depth: 0, expected: 0 [*] INFO: lockdep is turned off. [*] irq event stamp: 0 [*] hardirqs last enabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0 [*] hardirqs last disabled at (0): [<ffffffff8121222a>] copy_process+0x146a/0x62d0 [*] softirqs last enabled at (0): [<ffffffff81212269>] copy_process+0x14a9/0x62d0 [*] softirqs last disabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0 [*] Preemption disabled at: [*] [<ffffffffc2063fc1>] vcpu_enter_guest+0x1001/0x3dc0 [kvm] [*] CPU: 17 PID: 2981888 Comm: CPU 15/KVM Kdump: 5.19.0-rc1-g239111db364c-dirty #2 [*] Call Trace: [*] <TASK> [*] dump_stack_lvl+0x6c/0x9b [*] __might_resched.cold+0x22e/0x297 [*] __mutex_lock+0xc0/0x23b0 [*] perf_event_ctx_lock_nested+0x18f/0x340 [*] perf_event_pause+0x1a/0x110 [*] reprogram_counter+0x2af/0x1490 [kvm] [*] kvm_pmu_trigger_event+0x429/0x950 [kvm] [*] kvm_skip_emulated_instruction+0x48/0x90 [kvm] [*] handle_fastpath_set_msr_irqoff+0x349/0x3b0 [kvm] [*] vmx_vcpu_run+0x268e/0x3b80 [kvm_intel] [*] vcpu_enter_guest+0x1d22/0x3dc0 [kvm] Add a field to kvm_pmc to track the previous counter value in order to defer overflow detection to kvm_pmu_handle_event() (the counter must be paused before handling overflow, and that may increment the counter). Opportunistically shrink sizeof(struct kvm_pmc) a bit. Suggested-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com> Fixes: 9cd803d496e7 ("KVM: x86: Update vPMCs when retiring instructions") Signed-off-by: Like Xu <likexu@tencent.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220831085328.45489-6-likexu@tencent.com [sean: avoid re-triggering KVM_REQ_PMU on overflow, tweak changelog] Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Message-Id: <20220923001355.3741194-5-seanjc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2022-11-09KVM: x86/pmu: Defer reprogram_counter() to kvm_pmu_handle_event()Like Xu1-0/+1
Batch reprogramming PMU counters by setting KVM_REQ_PMU and thus deferring reprogramming kvm_pmu_handle_event() to avoid reprogramming a counter multiple times during a single VM-Exit. Deferring programming will also allow KVM to fix a bug where immediately reprogramming a counter can result in sleeping (taking a mutex) while interrupts are disabled in the VM-Exit fastpath. Introduce kvm_pmu_request_counter_reprogam() to make it obvious that KVM is _requesting_ a reprogram and not actually doing the reprogram. Opportunistically refine related comments to avoid misunderstandings. Signed-off-by: Like Xu <likexu@tencent.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220831085328.45489-5-likexu@tencent.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Message-Id: <20220923001355.3741194-4-seanjc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2022-11-09KVM: x86/pmu: Force reprogramming of all counters on PMU filter changeSean Christopherson1-1/+10
Force vCPUs to reprogram all counters on a PMU filter change to provide a sane ABI for userspace. Use the existing KVM_REQ_PMU to do the programming, and take advantage of the fact that the reprogram_pmi bitmap fits in a u64 to set all bits in a single atomic update. Note, setting the bitmap and making the request needs to be done _after_ the SRCU synchronization to ensure that vCPUs will reprogram using the new filter. KVM's current "lazy" approach is confusing and non-deterministic. It's confusing because, from a developer perspective, the code is buggy as it makes zero sense to let userspace modify the filter but then not actually enforce the new filter. The lazy approach is non-deterministic because KVM enforces the filter whenever a counter is reprogrammed, not just on guest WRMSRs, i.e. a guest might gain/lose access to an event at random times depending on what is going on in the host. Note, the resulting behavior is still non-determinstic while the filter is in flux. If userspace wants to guarantee deterministic behavior, all vCPUs should be paused during the filter update. Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Fixes: 66bb8a065f5a ("KVM: x86: PMU Event Filter") Cc: Aaron Lewis <aaronlewis@google.com> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Message-Id: <20220923001355.3741194-2-seanjc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2022-11-09KVM: x86/mmu: Track the number of TDP MMU pages, but not the actual pagesSean Christopherson1-8/+3
Track the number of TDP MMU "shadow" pages instead of tracking the pages themselves. With the NX huge page list manipulation moved out of the common linking flow, elminating the list-based tracking means the happy path of adding a shadow page doesn't need to acquire a spinlock and can instead inc/dec an atomic. Keep the tracking as the WARN during TDP MMU teardown on leaked shadow pages is very, very useful for detecting KVM bugs. Tracking the number of pages will also make it trivial to expose the counter to userspace as a stat in the future, which may or may not be desirable. Note, the TDP MMU needs to use a separate counter (and stat if that ever comes to be) from the existing n_used_mmu_pages. The TDP MMU doesn't bother supporting the shrinker nor does it honor KVM_SET_NR_MMU_PAGES (because the TDP MMU consumes so few pages relative to shadow paging), and including TDP MMU pages in that counter would break both the shrinker and shadow MMUs, e.g. if a VM is using nested TDP. Cc: Yan Zhao <yan.y.zhao@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Mingwei Zhang <mizhang@google.com> Reviewed-by: David Matlack <dmatlack@google.com> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Reviewed-by: Yan Zhao <yan.y.zhao@intel.com> Message-Id: <20221019165618.927057-6-seanjc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2022-11-09KVM: x86/mmu: Rename NX huge pages fields/functions for consistencySean Christopherson1-4/+15
Rename most of the variables/functions involved in the NX huge page mitigation to provide consistency, e.g. lpage vs huge page, and NX huge vs huge NX, and also to provide clarity, e.g. to make it obvious the flag applies only to the NX huge page mitigation, not to any condition that prevents creating a huge page. Add a comment explaining what the newly named "possible_nx_huge_pages" tracks. Leave the nx_lpage_splits stat alone as the name is ABI and thus set in stone. Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Reviewed-by: Mingwei Zhang <mizhang@google.com> Message-Id: <20221019165618.927057-3-seanjc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2022-11-09KVM: x86: smm: use smram structs in the common codeMaxim Levitsky1-2/+3
Use kvm_smram union instad of raw arrays in the common smm code. Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com> Message-Id: <20221025124741.228045-18-mlevitsk@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2022-11-09KVM: x86: do not define SMM-related constants if SMM disabledPaolo Bonzini1-1/+2
The hidden processor flags HF_SMM_MASK and HF_SMM_INSIDE_NMI_MASK are not needed if CONFIG_KVM_SMM is turned off. Remove the definitions altogether and the code that uses them. Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2022-11-09KVM: x86: do not define KVM_REQ_SMI if SMM disabledPaolo Bonzini1-0/+2
This ensures that all the relevant code is compiled out, in fact the process_smi stub can be removed too. Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com> Message-Id: <20220929172016.319443-9-pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2022-11-09KVM: x86: remove SMRAM address space if SMM is not supportedPaolo Bonzini1-5/+8
If CONFIG_KVM_SMM is not defined HF_SMM_MASK will always be zero, and we can spare userspace the hassle of setting up the SMRAM address space simply by reporting that only one address space is supported. Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com> Message-Id: <20220929172016.319443-8-pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2022-11-09KVM: x86: compile out vendor-specific code if SMM is disabledPaolo Bonzini1-0/+2
Vendor-specific code that deals with SMI injection and saving/restoring SMM state is not needed if CONFIG_KVM_SMM is disabled, so remove the four callbacks smi_allowed, enter_smm, leave_smm and enable_smi_window. The users in svm/nested.c and x86.c also have to be compiled out; the amount of #ifdef'ed code is small and it's not worth moving it to smm.c. enter_smm is now used only within #ifdef CONFIG_KVM_SMM, and the stub can therefore be removed. Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com> Message-Id: <20220929172016.319443-7-pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2022-11-09KVM: x86: move SMM entry to a new filePaolo Bonzini1-0/+1
Some users of KVM implement the UEFI variable store through a paravirtual device that does not require the "SMM lockbox" component of edk2, and would like to compile out system management mode. In preparation for that, move the SMM entry code out of x86.c and into a new file. Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com> Message-Id: <20220929172016.319443-3-pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2022-11-09KVM: x86: start moving SMM-related functions to new filesPaolo Bonzini1-6/+0
Create a new header and source with code related to system management mode emulation. Entry and exit will move there too; for now, opportunistically rename put_smstate to PUT_SMSTATE while moving it to smm.h, and adjust the SMM state saving code. Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com> Message-Id: <20220929172016.319443-2-pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2022-11-09KVM: x86: remove obsolete kvm_mmu_gva_to_gpa_fetch()Miaohe Lin1-2/+0
There's no caller. Remove it. Signed-off-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Message-Id: <20220913090537.25195-1-linmiaohe@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2022-11-09KVM: x86/pmu: Limit the maximum number of supported AMD GP countersLike Xu1-0/+1
The AMD PerfMonV2 specification allows for a maximum of 16 GP counters, but currently only 6 pairs of MSRs are accepted by KVM. While AMD64_NUM_COUNTERS_CORE is already equal to 6, increasing without adjusting msrs_to_save_all[] could result in out-of-bounds accesses. Therefore introduce a macro (named KVM_AMD_PMC_MAX_GENERIC) to refer to the number of counters supported by KVM. Signed-off-by: Like Xu <likexu@tencent.com> Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Message-Id: <20220919091008.60695-3-likexu@tencent.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2022-11-09KVM: x86/pmu: Limit the maximum number of supported Intel GP countersLike Xu1-1/+5
The Intel Architectural IA32_PMCx MSRs addresses range allows for a maximum of 8 GP counters, and KVM cannot address any more. Introduce a local macro (named KVM_INTEL_PMC_MAX_GENERIC) and use it consistently to refer to the number of counters supported by KVM, thus avoiding possible out-of-bound accesses. Suggested-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Signed-off-by: Like Xu <likexu@tencent.com> Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Message-Id: <20220919091008.60695-2-likexu@tencent.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2022-09-30kvm: mmu: fix typos in struct kvm_archPeng Hao1-6/+6
No 'kvmp_mmu_pages', it should be 'kvm_mmu_page'. And struct kvm_mmu_pages and struct kvm_mmu_page are different structures, here should be kvm_mmu_page. kvm_mmu_pages is defined in arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c. Suggested-by: David Matlack <dmatlack@google.com> Signed-off-by: Peng Hao <flyingpeng@tencent.com> Reviewed-by: David Matlack <dmatlack@google.com> Message-Id: <CAPm50aL=0smbohhjAcK=ciUwcQJ=uAQP1xNQi52YsE7U8NFpEw@mail.gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2022-09-30Merge tag 'kvm-x86-6.1-2' of https://github.com/sean-jc/linux into HEADPaolo Bonzini1-16/+23
KVM x86 updates for 6.1, batch #2: - Misc PMU fixes and cleanups. - Fixes for Hyper-V hypercall selftest
2022-09-26KVM: x86: make vendor code check for all nested eventsPaolo Bonzini1-1/+1
Interrupts, NMIs etc. sent while in guest mode are already handled properly by the *_interrupt_allowed callbacks, but other events can cause a vCPU to be runnable that are specific to guest mode. In the case of VMX there are two, the preemption timer and the monitor trap. The VMX preemption timer is already special cased via the hv_timer_pending callback, but the purpose of the callback can be easily extended to MTF or in fact any other event that can occur only in guest mode. Rename the callback and add an MTF check; kvm_arch_vcpu_runnable() now can return true if an MTF is pending, without relying on kvm_vcpu_running()'s call to kvm_check_nested_events(). Until that call is removed, however, the patch introduces no functional change. Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Message-Id: <20220921003201.1441511-2-seanjc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2022-09-26KVM: x86: Morph pending exceptions to pending VM-Exits at queue timeSean Christopherson1-5/+7
Morph pending exceptions to pending VM-Exits (due to interception) when the exception is queued instead of waiting until nested events are checked at VM-Entry. This fixes a longstanding bug where KVM fails to handle an exception that occurs during delivery of a previous exception, KVM (L0) and L1 both want to intercept the exception (e.g. #PF for shadow paging), and KVM determines that the exception is in the guest's domain, i.e. queues the new exception for L2. Deferring the interception check causes KVM to esclate various combinations of injected+pending exceptions to double fault (#DF) without consulting L1's interception desires, and ends up injecting a spurious #DF into L2. KVM has fudged around the issue for #PF by special casing emulated #PF injection for shadow paging, but the underlying issue is not unique to shadow paging in L0, e.g. if KVM is intercepting #PF because the guest has a smaller maxphyaddr and L1 (but not L0) is using shadow paging. Other exceptions are affected as well, e.g. if KVM is intercepting #GP for one of SVM's workaround or for the VMware backdoor emulation stuff. The other cases have gone unnoticed because the #DF is spurious if and only if L1 resolves the exception, e.g. KVM's goofs go unnoticed if L1 would have injected #DF anyways. The hack-a-fix has also led to ugly code, e.g. bailing from the emulator if #PF injection forced a nested VM-Exit and the emulator finds itself back in L1. Allowing for direct-to-VM-Exit queueing also neatly solves the async #PF in L2 mess; no need to set a magic flag and token, simply queue a #PF nested VM-Exit. Deal with event migration by flagging that a pending exception was queued by userspace and check for interception at the next KVM_RUN, e.g. so that KVM does the right thing regardless of the order in which userspace restores nested state vs. event state. When "getting" events from userspace, simply drop any pending excpetion that is destined to be intercepted if there is also an injected exception to be migrated. Ideally, KVM would migrate both events, but that would require new ABI, and practically speaking losing the event is unlikely to be noticed, let alone fatal. The injected exception is captured, RIP still points at the original faulting instruction, etc... So either the injection on the target will trigger the same intercepted exception, or the source of the intercepted exception was transient and/or non-deterministic, thus dropping it is ok-ish. Fixes: a04aead144fd ("KVM: nSVM: fix running nested guests when npt=0") Fixes: feaf0c7dc473 ("KVM: nVMX: Do not generate #DF if #PF happens during exception delivery into L2") Cc: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220830231614.3580124-22-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2022-09-26KVM: x86: Make kvm_queued_exception a properly named, visible structSean Christopherson1-10/+13
Move the definition of "struct kvm_queued_exception" out of kvm_vcpu_arch in anticipation of adding a second instance in kvm_vcpu_arch to handle exceptions that occur when vectoring an injected exception and are morphed to VM-Exit instead of leading to #DF. Opportunistically take advantage of the churn to rename "nr" to "vector". No functional change intended. Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220830231614.3580124-15-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2022-09-26KVM: x86: Rename kvm_x86_ops.queue_exception to inject_exceptionSean Christopherson1-1/+1
Rename the kvm_x86_ops hook for exception injection to better reflect reality, and to align with pretty much every other related function name in KVM. No functional change intended. Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220830231614.3580124-14-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2022-09-26KVM: x86: hyper-v: Cache HYPERV_CPUID_NESTED_FEATURES CPUID leafVitaly Kuznetsov1-0/+2
KVM has to check guest visible HYPERV_CPUID_NESTED_FEATURES.EBX CPUID leaf to know which Enlightened VMCS definition to use (original or 2022 update). Cache the leaf along with other Hyper-V CPUID feature leaves to make the check quick. Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220830133737.1539624-12-vkuznets@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2022-09-23KVM: x86: Reinstate kvm_vcpu_arch.guest_supported_xcr0Sean Christopherson1-0/+1
Reinstate the per-vCPU guest_supported_xcr0 by partially reverting commit 988896bb6182; the implicit assessment that guest_supported_xcr0 is always the same as guest_fpu.fpstate->user_xfeatures was incorrect. kvm_vcpu_after_set_cpuid() isn't the only place that sets user_xfeatures, as user_xfeatures is set to fpu_user_cfg.default_features when guest_fpu is allocated via fpu_alloc_guest_fpstate() => __fpstate_reset(). guest_supported_xcr0 on the other hand is zero-allocated. If userspace never invokes KVM_SET_CPUID2, supported XCR0 will be '0', whereas the allowed user XFEATURES will be non-zero. Practically speaking, the edge case likely doesn't matter as no sane userspace will live migrate a VM without ever doing KVM_SET_CPUID2. The primary motivation is to prepare for KVM intentionally and explicitly setting bits in user_xfeatures that are not set in guest_supported_xcr0. Because KVM_{G,S}ET_XSAVE can be used to svae/restore FP+SSE state even if the host doesn't support XSAVE, KVM needs to set the FP+SSE bits in user_xfeatures even if they're not allowed in XCR0, e.g. because XCR0 isn't exposed to the guest. At that point, the simplest fix is to track the two things separately (allowed save/restore vs. allowed XCR0). Fixes: 988896bb6182 ("x86/kvm/fpu: Remove kvm_vcpu_arch.guest_supported_xcr0") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Leonardo Bras <leobras@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Message-Id: <20220824033057.3576315-2-seanjc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2022-08-19KVM: Rename KVM_PRIVATE_MEM_SLOTS to KVM_INTERNAL_MEM_SLOTSChao Peng1-1/+1
KVM_INTERNAL_MEM_SLOTS better reflects the fact those slots are KVM internally used (invisible to userspace) and avoids confusion to future private slots that can have different meaning. Signed-off-by: Chao Peng <chao.p.peng@linux.intel.com> Message-Id: <20220816125322.1110439-2-chao.p.peng@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2022-08-10KVM: x86: Tag kvm_mmu_x86_module_init() with __initSean Christopherson1-1/+1
Mark kvm_mmu_x86_module_init() with __init, the entire reason it exists is to initialize variables when kvm.ko is loaded, i.e. it must never be called after module initialization. Fixes: 1d0e84806047 ("KVM: x86/mmu: Resolve nx_huge_pages when kvm.ko is loaded") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com> Tested-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Message-Id: <20220803224957.1285926-2-seanjc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2022-07-14KVM: x86: Restrict get_mt_mask() to a u8, use KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL_RET0Sean Christopherson1-1/+1
Restrict get_mt_mask() to a u8 and reintroduce using a RET0 static_call for the SVM implementation. EPT stores the memtype information in the lower 8 bits (bits 6:3 to be precise), and even returns a shifted u8 without an explicit cast to a larger type; there's no need to return a full u64. Note, RET0 doesn't play nice with a u64 return on 32-bit kernels, see commit bf07be36cd88 ("KVM: x86: do not use KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL_RET0 for get_mt_mask"). Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Message-Id: <20220714153707.3239119-1-seanjc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2022-07-14KVM: x86: Tweak name of MONITOR/MWAIT #UD quirk to make it #UD specificSean Christopherson1-1/+1
Add a "UD" clause to KVM_X86_QUIRK_MWAIT_NEVER_FAULTS to make it clear that the quirk only controls the #UD behavior of MONITOR/MWAIT. KVM doesn't currently enforce fault checks when MONITOR/MWAIT are supported, but that could change in the future. SVM also has a virtualization hole in that it checks all faults before intercepts, and so "never faults" is already a lie when running on SVM. Fixes: bfbcc81bb82c ("KVM: x86: Add a quirk for KVM's "MONITOR/MWAIT are NOPs!" behavior") Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220711225753.1073989-4-seanjc@google.com
2022-07-13KVM: x86/mmu: Replace UNMAPPED_GVA with INVALID_GPA for gva_to_gpa()Hou Wenlong1-1/+0
The result of gva_to_gpa() is physical address not virtual address, it is odd that UNMAPPED_GVA macro is used as the result for physical address. Replace UNMAPPED_GVA with INVALID_GPA and drop UNMAPPED_GVA macro. No functional change intended. Signed-off-by: Hou Wenlong <houwenlong.hwl@antgroup.com> Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/6104978956449467d3c68f1ad7f2c2f6d771d0ee.1656667239.git.houwenlong.hwl@antgroup.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2022-06-24KVM: SVM: Introduce hybrid-AVIC modeSuravee Suthikulpanit1-5/+0
Currently, AVIC is inhibited when booting a VM w/ x2APIC support. because AVIC cannot virtualize x2APIC MSR register accesses. However, the AVIC doorbell can be used to accelerate interrupt injection into a running vCPU, while all guest accesses to x2APIC MSRs will be intercepted and emulated by KVM. With hybrid-AVIC support, the APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_X2APIC is no longer enforced. Suggested-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Suravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com> Message-Id: <20220519102709.24125-14-suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2022-06-24KVM: x86: Add emulation for MSR_IA32_MCx_CTL2 MSRs.Jue Wang1-0/+1
This patch adds the emulation of IA32_MCi_CTL2 registers to KVM. A separate mci_ctl2_banks array is used to keep the existing mce_banks register layout intact. In Machine Check Architecture, in addition to MCG_CMCI_P, bit 30 of the per-bank register IA32_MCi_CTL2 controls whether Corrected Machine Check error reporting is enabled. Signed-off-by: Jue Wang <juew@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Message-Id: <20220610171134.772566-7-juew@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2022-06-24KVM: x86/mmu: Extend Eager Page Splitting to nested MMUsDavid Matlack1-0/+22
Add support for Eager Page Splitting pages that are mapped by nested MMUs. Walk through the rmap first splitting all 1GiB pages to 2MiB pages, and then splitting all 2MiB pages to 4KiB pages. Note, Eager Page Splitting is limited to nested MMUs as a policy rather than due to any technical reason (the sp->role.guest_mode check could just be deleted and Eager Page Splitting would work correctly for all shadow MMU pages). There is really no reason to support Eager Page Splitting for tdp_mmu=N, since such support will eventually be phased out, and there is no current use case supporting Eager Page Splitting on hosts where TDP is either disabled or unavailable in hardware. Furthermore, future improvements to nested MMU scalability may diverge the code from the legacy shadow paging implementation. These improvements will be simpler to make if Eager Page Splitting does not have to worry about legacy shadow paging. Splitting huge pages mapped by nested MMUs requires dealing with some extra complexity beyond that of the TDP MMU: (1) The shadow MMU has a limit on the number of shadow pages that are allowed to be allocated. So, as a policy, Eager Page Splitting refuses to split if there are KVM_MIN_FREE_MMU_PAGES or fewer pages available. (2) Splitting a huge page may end up re-using an existing lower level shadow page tables. This is unlike the TDP MMU which always allocates new shadow page tables when splitting. (3) When installing the lower level SPTEs, they must be added to the rmap which may require allocating additional pte_list_desc structs. Case (2) is especially interesting since it may require a TLB flush, unlike the TDP MMU which can fully split huge pages without any TLB flushes. Specifically, an existing lower level page table may point to even lower level page tables that are not fully populated, effectively unmapping a portion of the huge page, which requires a flush. As of this commit, a flush is always done always after dropping the huge page and before installing the lower level page table. This TLB flush could instead be delayed until the MMU lock is about to be dropped, which would batch flushes for multiple splits. However these flushes should be rare in practice (a huge page must be aliased in multiple SPTEs and have been split for NX Huge Pages in only some of them). Flushing immediately is simpler to plumb and also reduces the chances of tripping over a CPU bug (e.g. see iTLB multihit). [ This commit is based off of the original implementation of Eager Page Splitting from Peter in Google's kernel from 2016. ] Suggested-by: Peter Feiner <pfeiner@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Matlack <dmatlack@google.com> Message-Id: <20220516232138.1783324-23-dmatlack@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2022-06-24KVM: x86/mmu: Cache the access bits of shadowed translationsDavid Matlack1-1/+1
Splitting huge pages requires allocating/finding shadow pages to replace the huge page. Shadow pages are keyed, in part, off the guest access permissions they are shadowing. For fully direct MMUs, there is no shadowing so the access bits in the shadow page role are always ACC_ALL. But during shadow paging, the guest can enforce whatever access permissions it wants. In particular, eager page splitting needs to know the permissions to use for the subpages, but KVM cannot retrieve them from the guest page tables because eager page splitting does not have a vCPU. Fortunately, the guest access permissions are easy to cache whenever page faults or FNAME(sync_page) update the shadow page tables; this is an extension of the existing cache of the shadowed GFNs in the gfns array of the shadow page. The access bits only take up 3 bits, which leaves 61 bits left over for gfns, which is more than enough. Now that the gfns array caches more information than just GFNs, rename it to shadowed_translation. While here, preemptively fix up the WARN_ON() that detects gfn mismatches in direct SPs. The WARN_ON() was paired with a pr_err_ratelimited(), which means that users could sometimes see the WARN without the accompanying error message. Fix this by outputting the error message as part of the WARN splat, and opportunistically make them WARN_ONCE() because if these ever fire, they are all but guaranteed to fire a lot and will bring down the kernel. Signed-off-by: David Matlack <dmatlack@google.com> Message-Id: <20220516232138.1783324-18-dmatlack@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2022-06-24KVM: x86/MMU: Allow NX huge pages to be disabled on a per-vm basisBen Gardon1-0/+2
In some cases, the NX hugepage mitigation for iTLB multihit is not needed for all guests on a host. Allow disabling the mitigation on a per-VM basis to avoid the performance hit of NX hugepages on trusted workloads. In order to disable NX hugepages on a VM, ensure that the userspace actor has permission to reboot the system. Since disabling NX hugepages would allow a guest to crash the system, it is similar to reboot permissions. Ideally, KVM would require userspace to prove it has access to KVM's nx_huge_pages module param, e.g. so that userspace can opt out without needing full reboot permissions. But getting access to the module param file info is difficult because it is buried in layers of sysfs and module glue. Requiring CAP_SYS_BOOT is sufficient for all known use cases. Suggested-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Reviewed-by: David Matlack <dmatlack@google.com> Reviewed-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Gardon <bgardon@google.com> Message-Id: <20220613212523.3436117-9-bgardon@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2022-06-20KVM: x86: Add a quirk for KVM's "MONITOR/MWAIT are NOPs!" behaviorSean Christopherson1-1/+2
Add a quirk for KVM's behavior of emulating intercepted MONITOR/MWAIT instructions a NOPs regardless of whether or not they are supported in guest CPUID. KVM's current behavior was likely motiviated by a certain fruity operating system that expects MONITOR/MWAIT to be supported unconditionally and blindly executes MONITOR/MWAIT without first checking CPUID. And because KVM does NOT advertise MONITOR/MWAIT to userspace, that's effectively the default setup for any VMM that regurgitates KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID to KVM_SET_CPUID2. Note, this quirk interacts with KVM_X86_QUIRK_MISC_ENABLE_NO_MWAIT. The behavior is actually desirable, as userspace VMMs that want to unconditionally hide MONITOR/MWAIT from the guest can leave the MISC_ENABLE quirk enabled. Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Message-Id: <20220608224516.3788274-2-seanjc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>