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2023-08-16x86/mm: Fix VDSO and VVAR placement on 5-level paging machinesKirill A. Shutemov1-2/+2
commit 1b8b1aa90c9c0e825b181b98b8d9e249dc395470 upstream. Yingcong has noticed that on the 5-level paging machine, VDSO and VVAR VMAs are placed above the 47-bit border: 8000001a9000-8000001ad000 r--p 00000000 00:00 0 [vvar] 8000001ad000-8000001af000 r-xp 00000000 00:00 0 [vdso] This might confuse users who are not aware of 5-level paging and expect all userspace addresses to be under the 47-bit border. So far problem has only been triggered with ASLR disabled, although it may also occur with ASLR enabled if the layout is randomized in a just right way. The problem happens due to custom placement for the VMAs in the VDSO code: vdso_addr() tries to place them above the stack and checks the result against TASK_SIZE_MAX, which is wrong. TASK_SIZE_MAX is set to the 56-bit border on 5-level paging machines. Use DEFAULT_MAP_WINDOW instead. Fixes: b569bab78d8d ("x86/mm: Prepare to expose larger address space to userspace") Reported-by: Yingcong Wu <yingcong.wu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230803151609.22141-1-kirill.shutemov%40linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2023-02-06exit: Add and use make_task_dead.Eric W. Biederman2-6/+6
commit 0e25498f8cd43c1b5aa327f373dd094e9a006da7 upstream. There are two big uses of do_exit. The first is it's design use to be the guts of the exit(2) system call. The second use is to terminate a task after something catastrophic has happened like a NULL pointer in kernel code. Add a function make_task_dead that is initialy exactly the same as do_exit to cover the cases where do_exit is called to handle catastrophic failure. In time this can probably be reduced to just a light wrapper around do_task_dead. For now keep it exactly the same so that there will be no behavioral differences introducing this new concept. Replace all of the uses of do_exit that use it for catastraphic task cleanup with make_task_dead to make it clear what the code is doing. As part of this rename rewind_stack_do_exit rewind_stack_and_make_dead. Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2023-02-06x86/entry/64: Add instruction suffix to SYSRETJan Beulich1-1/+1
commit b2b1d94cdfd4e906d3936dab2850096a4a0c2017 upstream. ignore_sysret() contains an unsuffixed SYSRET instruction. gas correctly interprets this as SYSRETL, but leaving it up to gas to guess when there is no register operand that implies a size is bad practice, and upstream gas is likely to warn about this in the future. Use SYSRETL explicitly. This does not change the assembled output. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/038a7c35-062b-a285-c6d2-653b56585844@suse.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-11-01x86/speculation: Fix RSB filling with CONFIG_RETPOLINE=nJosh Poimboeuf2-4/+0
commit b2620facef4889fefcbf2e87284f34dcd4189bce upstream. If a kernel is built with CONFIG_RETPOLINE=n, but the user still wants to mitigate Spectre v2 using IBRS or eIBRS, the RSB filling will be silently disabled. There's nothing retpoline-specific about RSB buffer filling. Remove the CONFIG_RETPOLINE guards around it. Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-11-01x86/entry: Add kernel IBRS implementationThadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo3-1/+102
commit 2dbb887e875b1de3ca8f40ddf26bcfe55798c609 upstream. Implement Kernel IBRS - currently the only known option to mitigate RSB underflow speculation issues on Skylake hardware. Note: since IBRS_ENTER requires fuller context established than UNTRAIN_RET, it must be placed after it. However, since UNTRAIN_RET itself implies a RET, it must come after IBRS_ENTER. This means IBRS_ENTER needs to also move UNTRAIN_RET. Note 2: KERNEL_IBRS is sub-optimal for XenPV. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> [cascardo: conflict at arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S] [cascardo: conflict fixups, no ANNOTATE_NOENDBR] Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> [ bp: Adjust context ] Signed-off-by: Suraj Jitindar Singh <surajjs@amazon.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-11-01x86/entry: Remove skip_r11rcxPeter Zijlstra2-11/+2
commit 1b331eeea7b8676fc5dbdf80d0a07e41be226177 upstream. Yes, r11 and rcx have been restored previously, but since they're being popped anyway (into rsi) might as well pop them into their own regs -- setting them to the value they already are. Less magical code. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220506121631.365070674@infradead.org Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-08-25x86: link vdso and boot with -z noexecstack --no-warn-rwx-segmentsNick Desaulniers1-1/+1
commit ffcf9c5700e49c0aee42dcba9a12ba21338e8136 upstream. Users of GNU ld (BFD) from binutils 2.39+ will observe multiple instances of a new warning when linking kernels in the form: ld: warning: arch/x86/boot/pmjump.o: missing .note.GNU-stack section implies executable stack ld: NOTE: This behaviour is deprecated and will be removed in a future version of the linker ld: warning: arch/x86/boot/compressed/vmlinux has a LOAD segment with RWX permissions Generally, we would like to avoid the stack being executable. Because there could be a need for the stack to be executable, assembler sources have to opt-in to this security feature via explicit creation of the .note.GNU-stack feature (which compilers create by default) or command line flag --noexecstack. Or we can simply tell the linker the production of such sections is irrelevant and to link the stack as --noexecstack. LLVM's LLD linker defaults to -z noexecstack, so this flag isn't strictly necessary when linking with LLD, only BFD, but it doesn't hurt to be explicit here for all linkers IMO. --no-warn-rwx-segments is currently BFD specific and only available in the current latest release, so it's wrapped in an ld-option check. While the kernel makes extensive usage of ELF sections, it doesn't use permissions from ELF segments. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-block/3af4127a-f453-4cf7-f133-a181cce06f73@kernel.dk/ Link: https://sourceware.org/git/?p=binutils-gdb.git;a=commit;h=ba951afb99912da01a6e8434126b8fac7aa75107 Link: https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/issues/57009 Reported-and-tested-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Suggested-by: Fangrui Song <maskray@google.com> Signed-off-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-06-14x86: Fix return value of __setup handlersRandy Dunlap1-1/+1
[ Upstream commit 12441ccdf5e2f5a01a46e344976cbbd3d46845c9 ] __setup() handlers should return 1 to obsolete_checksetup() in init/main.c to indicate that the boot option has been handled. A return of 0 causes the boot option/value to be listed as an Unknown kernel parameter and added to init's (limited) argument (no '=') or environment (with '=') strings. So return 1 from these x86 __setup handlers. Examples: Unknown kernel command line parameters "apicpmtimer BOOT_IMAGE=/boot/bzImage-517rc8 vdso=1 ring3mwait=disable", will be passed to user space. Run /sbin/init as init process with arguments: /sbin/init apicpmtimer with environment: HOME=/ TERM=linux BOOT_IMAGE=/boot/bzImage-517rc8 vdso=1 ring3mwait=disable Fixes: 2aae950b21e4 ("x86_64: Add vDSO for x86-64 with gettimeofday/clock_gettime/getcpu") Fixes: 77b52b4c5c66 ("x86: add "debugpat" boot option") Fixes: e16fd002afe2 ("x86/cpufeature: Enable RING3MWAIT for Knights Landing") Fixes: b8ce33590687 ("x86_64: convert to clock events") Reported-by: Igor Zhbanov <i.zhbanov@omprussia.ru> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/64644a2f-4a20-bab3-1e15-3b2cdd0defe3@omprussia.ru Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220314012725.26661-1-rdunlap@infradead.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-05-22x86/cpu: Initialize MSR_TSC_AUX if RDTSCP *or* RDPID is supportedSean Christopherson1-1/+1
commit b6b4fbd90b155a0025223df2c137af8a701d53b3 upstream. Initialize MSR_TSC_AUX with CPU node information if RDTSCP or RDPID is supported. This fixes a bug where vdso_read_cpunode() will read garbage via RDPID if RDPID is supported but RDTSCP is not. While no known CPU supports RDPID but not RDTSCP, both Intel's SDM and AMD's APM allow for RDPID to exist without RDTSCP, e.g. it's technically a legal CPU model for a virtual machine. Note, technically MSR_TSC_AUX could be initialized if and only if RDPID is supported since RDTSCP is currently not used to retrieve the CPU node. But, the cost of the superfluous WRMSR is negigible, whereas leaving MSR_TSC_AUX uninitialized is just asking for future breakage if someone decides to utilize RDTSCP. Fixes: a582c540ac1b ("x86/vdso: Use RDPID in preference to LSL when available") Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210504225632.1532621-2-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-02-04x86/entry/64/compat: Fix "x86/entry/64/compat: Preserve r8-r11 in int $0x80"Andy Lutomirski1-8/+8
commit 22cd978e598618e82c3c3348d2069184f6884182 upstream. Commit: 8bb2610bc496 ("x86/entry/64/compat: Preserve r8-r11 in int $0x80") was busted: my original patch had a minor conflict with some of the nospec changes, but "git apply" is very clever and silently accepted the patch by making the same changes to a different function in the same file. There was obviously a huge offset, but "git apply" for some reason doesn't feel any need to say so. Move the changes to the correct function. Now the test_syscall_vdso_32 selftests passes. If anyone cares to observe the original problem, try applying the patch at: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/d4c4d9985fbe64f8c9e19291886453914b48caee.1523975710.git.luto@kernel.org/raw to the kernel at 316d097c4cd4e7f2ef50c40cff2db266593c4ec4: - "git am" and "git apply" accept the patch without any complaints at all - "patch -p1" at least prints out a message about the huge offset. Reported-by: zhijianx.li@intel.com Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org #v4.17+ Fixes: 8bb2610bc496 ("x86/entry/64/compat: Preserve r8-r11 in int $0x80") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/6012b922485401bc42676e804171ded262fc2ef2.1530078306.git.luto@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Alistair Delva <adelva@google.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-02-04x86/entry/64/compat: Preserve r8-r11 in int $0x80Andy Lutomirski1-4/+4
commit 8bb2610bc4967f19672444a7b0407367f1540028 upstream. 32-bit user code that uses int $80 doesn't care about r8-r11. There is, however, some 64-bit user code that intentionally uses int $0x80 to invoke 32-bit system calls. From what I've seen, basically all such code assumes that r8-r15 are all preserved, but the kernel clobbers r8-r11. Since I doubt that there's any code that depends on int $0x80 zeroing r8-r11, change the kernel to preserve them. I suspect that very little user code is broken by the old clobber, since r8-r11 are only rarely allocated by gcc, and they're clobbered by function calls, so they only way we'd see a problem is if the same function that invokes int $0x80 also spills something important to one of these registers. The current behavior seems to date back to the historical commit "[PATCH] x86-64 merge for 2.6.4". Before that, all regs were preserved. I can't find any explanation of why this change was made. Update the test_syscall_vdso_32 testcase as well to verify the new behavior, and it strengthens the test to make sure that the kernel doesn't accidentally permute r8..r15. Suggested-by: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/d4c4d9985fbe64f8c9e19291886453914b48caee.1523975710.git.luto@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Alistair Delva <adelva@google.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-01-09x86/entry/64: Add instruction suffixJan Beulich1-1/+1
commit a368d7fd2a3c6babb852fe974018dd97916bcd3b upstream. Omitting suffixes from instructions in AT&T mode is bad practice when operand size cannot be determined by the assembler from register operands, and is likely going to be warned about by upstream gas in the future (mine does already). Add the single missing suffix here. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/5A93F96902000078001ABAC8@prv-mh.provo.novell.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-05-20x86/entry/64: Fix unwind hints in register clearing codeJosh Poimboeuf1-17/+21
[ Upstream commit 06a9750edcffa808494d56da939085c35904e618 ] The PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS macro zeroes each register immediately after pushing it. If an NMI or exception hits after a register is cleared, but before the UNWIND_HINT_REGS annotation, the ORC unwinder will wrongly think the previous value of the register was zero. This can confuse the unwinding process and cause it to exit early. Because ORC is simpler than DWARF, there are a limited number of unwind annotation states, so it's not possible to add an individual unwind hint after each push/clear combination. Instead, the register clearing instructions need to be consolidated and moved to after the UNWIND_HINT_REGS annotation. Fixes: 3f01daecd545 ("x86/entry/64: Introduce the PUSH_AND_CLEAN_REGS macro") Reviewed-by: Miroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Dave Jones <dsj@fb.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/68fd3d0bc92ae2d62ff7879d15d3684217d51f08.1587808742.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2020-05-20x86/entry/64: Fix unwind hints in rewind_stack_do_exit()Jann Horn1-1/+1
commit f977df7b7ca45a4ac4b66d30a8931d0434c394b1 upstream. The LEAQ instruction in rewind_stack_do_exit() moves the stack pointer directly below the pt_regs at the top of the task stack before calling do_exit(). Tell the unwinder to expect pt_regs. Fixes: 8c1f75587a18 ("x86/entry/64: Add unwind hint annotations") Reviewed-by: Miroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Dave Jones <dsj@fb.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/68c33e17ae5963854916a46f522624f8e1d264f2.1587808742.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-05-20x86/entry/64: Fix unwind hints in kernel exit pathJosh Poimboeuf1-1/+2
commit 1fb143634a38095b641a3a21220774799772dc4c upstream. In swapgs_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode, after the stack is switched to the trampoline stack, the existing UNWIND_HINT_REGS hint is no longer valid, which can result in the following ORC unwinder warning: WARNING: can't dereference registers at 000000003aeb0cdd for ip swapgs_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode+0x93/0xa0 For full correctness, we could try to add complicated unwind hints so the unwinder could continue to find the registers, but when when it's this close to kernel exit, unwind hints aren't really needed anymore and it's fine to just use an empty hint which tells the unwinder to stop. For consistency, also move the UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY in entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe to a similar location. Fixes: 3e3b9293d392 ("x86/entry/64: Return to userspace from the trampoline stack") Reported-by: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu> Reported-by: Dave Jones <dsj@fb.com> Reported-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com> Reported-by: Joe Mario <jmario@redhat.com> Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Reported-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Reviewed-by: Miroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/60ea8f562987ed2d9ace2977502fe481c0d7c9a0.1587808742.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-04-24x86/entry/32: Add missing ASM_CLAC to general_protection entryThomas Gleixner1-0/+1
commit 3d51507f29f2153a658df4a0674ec5b592b62085 upstream. All exception entry points must have ASM_CLAC right at the beginning. The general_protection entry is missing one. Fixes: e59d1b0a2419 ("x86-32, smap: Add STAC/CLAC instructions to 32-bit kernel entry") Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200225220216.219537887@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-02-28x86/vdso: Provide missing include fileValdis Klētnieks1-0/+1
[ Upstream commit bff47c2302cc249bcd550b17067f8dddbd4b6f77 ] When building with C=1, sparse issues a warning: CHECK arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso32-setup.c arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso32-setup.c:28:28: warning: symbol 'vdso32_enabled' was not declared. Should it be static? Provide the missing header file. Signed-off-by: Valdis Kletnieks <valdis.kletnieks@vt.edu> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/36224.1575599767@turing-police Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2019-08-06x86/speculation: Prepare entry code for Spectre v1 swapgs mitigationsJosh Poimboeuf2-2/+34
commit 18ec54fdd6d18d92025af097cd042a75cf0ea24c upstream Spectre v1 isn't only about array bounds checks. It can affect any conditional checks. The kernel entry code interrupt, exception, and NMI handlers all have conditional swapgs checks. Those may be problematic in the context of Spectre v1, as kernel code can speculatively run with a user GS. For example: if (coming from user space) swapgs mov %gs:<percpu_offset>, %reg mov (%reg), %reg1 When coming from user space, the CPU can speculatively skip the swapgs, and then do a speculative percpu load using the user GS value. So the user can speculatively force a read of any kernel value. If a gadget exists which uses the percpu value as an address in another load/store, then the contents of the kernel value may become visible via an L1 side channel attack. A similar attack exists when coming from kernel space. The CPU can speculatively do the swapgs, causing the user GS to get used for the rest of the speculative window. The mitigation is similar to a traditional Spectre v1 mitigation, except: a) index masking isn't possible; because the index (percpu offset) isn't user-controlled; and b) an lfence is needed in both the "from user" swapgs path and the "from kernel" non-swapgs path (because of the two attacks described above). The user entry swapgs paths already have SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3, which has a CR3 write when PTI is enabled. Since CR3 writes are serializing, the lfences can be skipped in those cases. On the other hand, the kernel entry swapgs paths don't depend on PTI. To avoid unnecessary lfences for the user entry case, create two separate features for alternative patching: X86_FEATURE_FENCE_SWAPGS_USER X86_FEATURE_FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL Use these features in entry code to patch in lfences where needed. The features aren't enabled yet, so there's no functional change. Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-08-06x86/vdso: Prevent segfaults due to hoisted vclock readsAndy Lutomirski1-2/+13
commit ff17bbe0bb405ad8b36e55815d381841f9fdeebc upstream. GCC 5.5.0 sometimes cleverly hoists reads of the pvclock and/or hvclock pages before the vclock mode checks. This creates a path through vclock_gettime() in which no vclock is enabled at all (due to disabled TSC on old CPUs, for example) but the pvclock or hvclock page nevertheless read. This will segfault on bare metal. This fixes commit 459e3a21535a ("gcc-9: properly declare the {pv,hv}clock_page storage") in the sense that, before that commit, GCC didn't seem to generate the offending code. There was nothing wrong with that commit per se, and -stable maintainers should backport this to all supported kernels regardless of whether the offending commit was present, since the same crash could just as easily be triggered by the phase of the moon. On GCC 9.1.1, this doesn't seem to affect the generated code at all, so I'm not too concerned about performance regressions from this fix. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: x86@kernel.org Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Reported-by: Duncan Roe <duncan_roe@optusnet.com.au> Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-08-06gcc-9: properly declare the {pv,hv}clock_page storageLinus Torvalds1-2/+2
commit 459e3a21535ae3c7a9a123650e54f5c882b8fcbf upstream. The pvlock_page and hvclock_page variables are (as the name implies) addresses to pages, created by the linker script. But we declared them as just "extern u8" variables, which _works_, but now that gcc does some more bounds checking, it causes warnings like warning: array subscript 1 is outside array bounds of ‘u8[1]’ when we then access more than one byte from those variables. Fix this by simply making the declaration of the variables match reality, which makes the compiler happy too. Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-08-06xen/pv: Fix a boot up hang revealed by int3 self testZhenzhong Duan1-1/+0
[ Upstream commit b23e5844dfe78a80ba672793187d3f52e4b528d7 ] Commit 7457c0da024b ("x86/alternatives: Add int3_emulate_call() selftest") is used to ensure there is a gap setup in int3 exception stack which could be used for inserting call return address. This gap is missed in XEN PV int3 exception entry path, then below panic triggered: [ 0.772876] general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI [ 0.772886] CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.2.0+ #11 [ 0.772893] RIP: e030:int3_magic+0x0/0x7 [ 0.772905] RSP: 3507:ffffffff82203e98 EFLAGS: 00000246 [ 0.773334] Call Trace: [ 0.773334] alternative_instructions+0x3d/0x12e [ 0.773334] check_bugs+0x7c9/0x887 [ 0.773334] ? __get_locked_pte+0x178/0x1f0 [ 0.773334] start_kernel+0x4ff/0x535 [ 0.773334] ? set_init_arg+0x55/0x55 [ 0.773334] xen_start_kernel+0x571/0x57a For 64bit PV guests, Xen's ABI enters the kernel with using SYSRET, with %rcx/%r11 on the stack. To convert back to "normal" looking exceptions, the xen thunks do 'xen_*: pop %rcx; pop %r11; jmp *'. E.g. Extracting 'xen_pv_trap xenint3' we have: xen_xenint3: pop %rcx; pop %r11; jmp xenint3 As xenint3 and int3 entry code are same except xenint3 doesn't generate a gap, we can fix it by using int3 and drop useless xenint3. Signed-off-by: Zhenzhong Duan <zhenzhong.duan@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2019-05-25x86_64: Add gap to int3 to allow for call emulationJosh Poimboeuf1-2/+16
commit 2700fefdb2d9751c416ad56897e27d41e409324a upstream. To allow an int3 handler to emulate a call instruction, it must be able to push a return address onto the stack. Add a gap to the stack to allow the int3 handler to push the return address and change the return from int3 to jump straight to the emulated called function target. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181130183917.hxmti5josgq4clti@treble Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190502162133.GX2623@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net [ Note, this is needed to allow Live Kernel Patching to not miss calling a patched function when tracing is enabled. -- Steven Rostedt ] Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: b700e7f03df5 ("livepatch: kernel: add support for live patching") Tested-by: Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-05-21sched/x86: Save [ER]FLAGS on context switchPeter Zijlstra2-0/+4
commit 6690e86be83ac75832e461c141055b5d601c0a6d upstream. Effectively reverts commit: 2c7577a75837 ("sched/x86_64: Don't save flags on context switch") Specifically because SMAP uses FLAGS.AC which invalidates the claim that the kernel has clean flags. In particular; while preemption from interrupt return is fine (the IRET frame on the exception stack contains FLAGS) it breaks any code that does synchonous scheduling, including preempt_enable(). This has become a significant issue ever since commit: 5b24a7a2aa20 ("Add 'unsafe' user access functions for batched accesses") provided for means of having 'normal' C code between STAC / CLAC, exposing the FLAGS.AC state. So far this hasn't led to trouble, however fix it before it comes apart. Reported-by: Julien Thierry <julien.thierry@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: stable@kernel.org Fixes: 5b24a7a2aa20 ("Add 'unsafe' user access functions for batched accesses") Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-05-16x86/vdso: Pass --eh-frame-hdr to the linkerAlistair Strachan1-1/+2
[ Upstream commit cd01544a268ad8ee5b1dfe42c4393f1095f86879 ] Commit 379d98ddf413 ("x86: vdso: Use $LD instead of $CC to link") accidentally broke unwinding from userspace, because ld would strip the .eh_frame sections when linking. Originally, the compiler would implicitly add --eh-frame-hdr when invoking the linker, but when this Makefile was converted from invoking ld via the compiler, to invoking it directly (like vmlinux does), the flag was missed. (The EH_FRAME section is important for the VDSO shared libraries, but not for vmlinux.) Fix the problem by explicitly specifying --eh-frame-hdr, which restores parity with the old method. See relevant bug reports for additional info: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=201741 https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1659295 Fixes: 379d98ddf413 ("x86: vdso: Use $LD instead of $CC to link") Reported-by: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> Reported-by: Carlos O'Donell <carlos@redhat.com> Reported-by: "H. J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Alistair Strachan <astrachan@google.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Tested-by: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Carlos O'Donell <carlos@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Joel Fernandes <joel@joelfernandes.org> Cc: kernel-team@android.com Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: X86 ML <x86@kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181214223637.35954-1-astrachan@google.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
2019-05-14x86/speculation/mds: Clear CPU buffers on exit to userThomas Gleixner1-0/+3
commit 04dcbdb8057827b043b3c71aa397c4c63e67d086 upstream Add a static key which controls the invocation of the CPU buffer clear mechanism on exit to user space and add the call into prepare_exit_to_usermode() and do_nmi() right before actually returning. Add documentation which kernel to user space transition this covers and explain why some corner cases are not mitigated. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com> Tested-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-04-17x86/vdso: Drop implicit common-page-size linker flagNick Desaulniers1-2/+2
commit ac3e233d29f7f77f28243af0132057d378d3ea58 upstream. GNU linker's -z common-page-size's default value is based on the target architecture. arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile sets it to the architecture default, which is implicit and redundant. Drop it. Fixes: 2aae950b21e4 ("x86_64: Add vDSO for x86-64 with gettimeofday/clock_gettime/getcpu") Reported-by: Dmitry Golovin <dima@golovin.in> Reported-by: Bill Wendling <morbo@google.com> Suggested-by: Dmitry Golovin <dima@golovin.in> Suggested-by: Rui Ueyama <ruiu@google.com> Signed-off-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org> Cc: Fangrui Song <maskray@google.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181206191231.192355-1-ndesaulniers@google.com Link: https://bugs.llvm.org/show_bug.cgi?id=38774 Link: https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/31 Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2019-04-17x86: vdso: Use $LD instead of $CC to linkAlistair Strachan1-13/+9
commit 379d98ddf41344273d9718556f761420f4dc80b3 upstream. The vdso{32,64}.so can fail to link with CC=clang when clang tries to find a suitable GCC toolchain to link these libraries with. /usr/bin/ld: arch/x86/entry/vdso/vclock_gettime.o: access beyond end of merged section (782) This happens because the host environment leaked into the cross compiler environment due to the way clang searches for suitable GCC toolchains. Clang is a retargetable compiler, and each invocation of it must provide --target=<something> --gcc-toolchain=<something> to allow it to find the correct binutils for cross compilation. These flags had been added to KBUILD_CFLAGS, but the vdso code uses CC and not KBUILD_CFLAGS (for various reasons) which breaks clang's ability to find the correct linker when cross compiling. Most of the time this goes unnoticed because the host linker is new enough to work anyway, or is incompatible and skipped, but this cannot be reliably assumed. This change alters the vdso makefile to just use LD directly, which bypasses clang and thus the searching problem. The makefile will just use ${CROSS_COMPILE}ld instead, which is always what we want. This matches the method used to link vmlinux. This drops references to DISABLE_LTO; this option doesn't seem to be set anywhere, and not knowing what its possible values are, it's not clear how to convert it from CC to LD flag. Signed-off-by: Alistair Strachan <astrachan@google.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: kernel-team@android.com Cc: joel@joelfernandes.org Cc: Andi Kleen <andi.kleen@intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180803173931.117515-1-astrachan@google.com Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2019-01-31x86/pvclock: add setter for pvclock_pvti_cpu0_vaJoao Martins1-1/+1
commit 9f08890ab906abaf9d4c1bad8111755cbd302260 upstream. Right now there is only a pvclock_pvti_cpu0_va() which is defined on kvmclock since: commit dac16fba6fc5 ("x86/vdso: Get pvclock data from the vvar VMA instead of the fixmap") The only user of this interface so far is kvm. This commit adds a setter function for the pvti page and moves pvclock_pvti_cpu0_va to pvclock, which is a more generic place to have it; and would allow other PV clocksources to use it, such as Xen. While moving pvclock_pvti_cpu0_va into pvclock, rename also this function to pvclock_get_pvti_cpu0_va (including its call sites) to be symmetric with the setter (pvclock_set_pvti_cpu0_va). Signed-off-by: Joao Martins <joao.m.martins@oracle.com> Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-10-13x86/vdso: Fix vDSO syscall fallback asm constraint regressionAndy Lutomirski1-4/+4
commit 02e425668f5c9deb42787d10001a3b605993ad15 upstream. When I added the missing memory outputs, I failed to update the index of the first argument (ebx) on 32-bit builds, which broke the fallbacks. Somehow I must have screwed up my testing or gotten lucky. Add another test to cover gettimeofday() as well. Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 715bd9d12f84 ("x86/vdso: Fix asm constraints on vDSO syscall fallbacks") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/21bd45ab04b6d838278fa5bebfa9163eceffa13c.1538608971.git.luto@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-10-13x86/vdso: Only enable vDSO retpolines when enabled and supportedAndy Lutomirski1-2/+14
commit 4f166564014aba65ad6f15b612f6711fd0f117ee upstream. When I fixed the vDSO build to use inline retpolines, I messed up the Makefile logic and made it unconditional. It should have depended on CONFIG_RETPOLINE and on the availability of compiler support. This broke the build on some older compilers. Reported-by: nikola.ciprich@linuxbox.cz Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Matt Rickard <matt@softrans.com.au> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: jason.vas.dias@gmail.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 2e549b2ee0e3 ("x86/vdso: Fix vDSO build if a retpoline is emitted") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/08a1f29f2c238dd1f493945e702a521f8a5aa3ae.1538540801.git.luto@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-10-13x86/vdso: Fix asm constraints on vDSO syscall fallbacksAndy Lutomirski1-8/+10
commit 715bd9d12f84d8f5cc8ad21d888f9bc304a8eb0b upstream. The syscall fallbacks in the vDSO have incorrect asm constraints. They are not marked as writing to their outputs -- instead, they are marked as clobbering "memory", which is useless. In particular, gcc is smart enough to know that the timespec parameter hasn't escaped, so a memory clobber doesn't clobber it. And passing a pointer as an asm *input* does not tell gcc that the pointed-to value is changed. Add in the fact that the asm instructions weren't volatile, and gcc was free to omit them entirely unless their sole output (the return value) is used. Which it is (phew!), but that stops happening with some upcoming patches. As a trivial example, the following code: void test_fallback(struct timespec *ts) { vdso_fallback_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC, ts); } compiles to: 00000000000000c0 <test_fallback>: c0: c3 retq To add insult to injury, the RCX and R11 clobbers on 64-bit builds were missing. The "memory" clobber is also unnecessary -- no ordering with respect to other memory operations is needed, but that's going to be fixed in a separate not-for-stable patch. Fixes: 2aae950b21e4 ("x86_64: Add vDSO for x86-64 with gettimeofday/clock_gettime/getcpu") Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/2c0231690551989d2fafa60ed0e7b5cc8b403908.1538422295.git.luto@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-10-04x86/entry/64: Add two more instruction suffixesJan Beulich1-2/+2
[ Upstream commit 6709812f094d96543b443645c68daaa32d3d3e77 ] Sadly, other than claimed in: a368d7fd2a ("x86/entry/64: Add instruction suffix") ... there are two more instances which want to be adjusted. As said there, omitting suffixes from instructions in AT&T mode is bad practice when operand size cannot be determined by the assembler from register operands, and is likely going to be warned about by upstream gas in the future (mine does already). Add the other missing suffixes here as well. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/5B3A02DD02000078001CFB78@prv1-mh.provo.novell.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-09-05x86/vdso: Fix vDSO build if a retpoline is emittedAndy Lutomirski1-2/+4
commit 2e549b2ee0e358bc758480e716b881f9cabedb6a upstream. Currently, if the vDSO ends up containing an indirect branch or call, GCC will emit the "external thunk" style of retpoline, and it will fail to link. Fix it by building the vDSO with inline retpoline thunks. I haven't seen any reports of this triggering on an unpatched kernel. Fixes: commit 76b043848fd2 ("x86/retpoline: Add initial retpoline support") Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Matt Rickard <matt@softrans.com.au> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Jason Vas Dias <jason.vas.dias@gmail.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/c76538cd3afbe19c6246c2d1715bc6a60bd63985.1534448381.git.luto@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-08-06x86/entry/64: Remove %ebx handling from error_entry/exitAndy Lutomirski1-14/+4
commit b3681dd548d06deb2e1573890829dff4b15abf46 upstream. error_entry and error_exit communicate the user vs. kernel status of the frame using %ebx. This is unnecessary -- the information is in regs->cs. Just use regs->cs. This makes error_entry simpler and makes error_exit more robust. It also fixes a nasty bug. Before all the Spectre nonsense, the xen_failsafe_callback entry point returned like this: ALLOC_PT_GPREGS_ON_STACK SAVE_C_REGS SAVE_EXTRA_REGS ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER jmp error_exit And it did not go through error_entry. This was bogus: RBX contained garbage, and error_exit expected a flag in RBX. Fortunately, it generally contained *nonzero* garbage, so the correct code path was used. As part of the Spectre fixes, code was added to clear RBX to mitigate certain speculation attacks. Now, depending on kernel configuration, RBX got zeroed and, when running some Wine workloads, the kernel crashes. This was introduced by: commit 3ac6d8c787b8 ("x86/entry/64: Clear registers for exceptions/interrupts, to reduce speculation attack surface") With this patch applied, RBX is no longer needed as a flag, and the problem goes away. I suspect that malicious userspace could use this bug to crash the kernel even without the offending patch applied, though. [ Historical note: I wrote this patch as a cleanup before I was aware of the bug it fixed. ] [ Note to stable maintainers: this should probably get applied to all kernels. If you're nervous about that, a more conservative fix to add xorl %ebx,%ebx; incl %ebx before the jump to error_exit should also fix the problem. ] Reported-and-tested-by: M. Vefa Bicakci <m.v.b@runbox.com> Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org Fixes: 3ac6d8c787b8 ("x86/entry/64: Clear registers for exceptions/interrupts, to reduce speculation attack surface") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/b5010a090d3586b2d6e06c7ad3ec5542d1241c45.1532282627.git.luto@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-03-28x86/vsyscall/64: Use proper accessor to update P4D entryBoris Ostrovsky1-1/+1
commit 31ad7f8e7dc94d3b85ccf9b6141ce6dfd35a1781 upstream. Writing to it directly does not work for Xen PV guests. Fixes: 49275fef986a ("x86/vsyscall/64: Explicitly set _PAGE_USER in the pagetable hierarchy") Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180319143154.3742-1-boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-03-28x86/entry/64: Don't use IST entry for #BP stackAndy Lutomirski1-1/+1
commit d8ba61ba58c88d5207c1ba2f7d9a2280e7d03be9 upstream. There's nothing IST-worthy about #BP/int3. We don't allow kprobes in the small handful of places in the kernel that run at CPL0 with an invalid stack, and 32-bit kernels have used normal interrupt gates for #BP forever. Furthermore, we don't allow kprobes in places that have usergs while in kernel mode, so "paranoid" is also unnecessary. Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-03-15Revert "x86/retpoline: Simplify vmexit_fill_RSB()"David Woodhouse2-4/+2
commit d1c99108af3c5992640aa2afa7d2e88c3775c06e upstream. This reverts commit 1dde7415e99933bb7293d6b2843752cbdb43ec11. By putting the RSB filling out of line and calling it, we waste one RSB slot for returning from the function itself, which means one fewer actual function call we can make if we're doing the Skylake abomination of call-depth counting. It also changed the number of RSB stuffings we do on vmexit from 32, which was correct, to 16. Let's just stop with the bikeshedding; it didn't actually *fix* anything anyway. Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: arjan.van.de.ven@intel.com Cc: bp@alien8.de Cc: dave.hansen@intel.com Cc: jmattson@google.com Cc: karahmed@amazon.de Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: pbonzini@redhat.com Cc: rkrcmar@redhat.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1519037457-7643-4-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-03-15x86/entry/64: Use 'xorl' for faster register clearingDominik Brodowski2-35/+35
commit ced5d0bf603fa0baee8ea889e1d70971fd210894 upstream. On some x86 CPU microarchitectures using 'xorq' to clear general-purpose registers is slower than 'xorl'. As 'xorl' is sufficient to clear all 64 bits of these registers due to zero-extension [*], switch the x86 64-bit entry code to use 'xorl'. No change in functionality and no change in code size. [*] According to Intel 64 and IA-32 Architecture Software Developer's Manual, section 3.4.1.1, the result of 32-bit operands are "zero- extended to a 64-bit result in the destination general-purpose register." The AMD64 Architecture Programmer’s Manual Volume 3, Appendix B.1, describes the same behaviour. Suggested-by: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180214175924.23065-3-linux@dominikbrodowski.net [ Improved on the changelog a bit. ] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-03-15x86/entry: Reduce the code footprint of the 'idtentry' macroDominik Brodowski2-11/+18
commit 9e809d15d6b692fa061d74be7aaab1c79f6784b8 upstream. Play a little trick in the generic PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS macro to insert the GP registers "above" the original return address. This allows us to (re-)insert the macro in error_entry() and paranoid_entry() and to remove it from the idtentry macro. This reduces the static footprint significantly: text data bss dec hex filename 24307 0 0 24307 5ef3 entry_64.o-orig 20987 0 0 20987 51fb entry_64.o Co-developed-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180214175924.23065-2-linux@dominikbrodowski.net [ Small tweaks to comments. ] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-22x86/entry/64: Fix CR3 restore in paranoid_exit()Ingo Molnar1-0/+1
commit e48657573481a5dff7cfdc3d57005c80aa816500 upstream. Josh Poimboeuf noticed the following bug: "The paranoid exit code only restores the saved CR3 when it switches back to the user GS. However, even in the kernel GS case, it's possible that it needs to restore a user CR3, if for example, the paranoid exception occurred in the syscall exit path between SWITCH_TO_USER_CR3_STACK and SWAPGS." Josh also confirmed via targeted testing that it's possible to hit this bug. Fix the bug by also restoring CR3 in the paranoid_exit_no_swapgs branch. The reason we haven't seen this bug reported by users yet is probably because "paranoid" entry points are limited to the following cases: idtentry double_fault do_double_fault has_error_code=1 paranoid=2 idtentry debug do_debug has_error_code=0 paranoid=1 shift_ist=DEBUG_STACK idtentry int3 do_int3 has_error_code=0 paranoid=1 shift_ist=DEBUG_STACK idtentry machine_check do_mce has_error_code=0 paranoid=1 Amongst those entry points only machine_check is one that will interrupt an IRQS-off critical section asynchronously - and machine check events are rare. The other main asynchronous entries are NMI entries, which can be very high-freq with perf profiling, but they are special: they don't use the 'idtentry' macro but are open coded and restore user CR3 unconditionally so don't have this bug. Reported-and-tested-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180214073910.boevmg65upbk3vqb@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-22x86/entry/64: Remove the unused 'icebp' macroBorislav Petkov1-4/+0
commit b498c261107461d5c42140dfddd05df83d8ca078 upstream. That macro was touched around 2.5.8 times, judging by the full history linux repo, but it was unused even then. Get rid of it already. Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux@dominikbrodowski.net Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180212201318.GD14640@pd.tnic Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-22x86/entry/64: Fix paranoid_entry() frame pointer warningJosh Poimboeuf1-1/+2
commit b3ccefaed922529e6a67de7b30af5aa38c76ace9 upstream. With the following commit: f09d160992d1 ("x86/entry/64: Get rid of the ALLOC_PT_GPREGS_ON_STACK and SAVE_AND_CLEAR_REGS macros") ... one of my suggested improvements triggered a frame pointer warning: arch/x86/entry/entry_64.o: warning: objtool: paranoid_entry()+0x11: call without frame pointer save/setup The warning is correct for the build-time code, but it's actually not relevant at runtime because of paravirt patching. The paravirt swapgs call gets replaced with either a SWAPGS instruction or NOPs at runtime. Go back to the previous behavior by removing the ELF function annotation for paranoid_entry() and adding an unwind hint, which effectively silences the warning. Reported-by: kbuild test robot <fengguang.wu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: kbuild-all@01.org Cc: tipbuild@zytor.com Fixes: f09d160992d1 ("x86/entry/64: Get rid of the ALLOC_PT_GPREGS_ON_STACK and SAVE_AND_CLEAR_REGS macros") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180212174503.5acbymg5z6p32snu@treble Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-22x86/entry/64: Indent PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS and POP_REGS properlyDominik Brodowski1-4/+4
commit 92816f571af81e9a71cc6f3dc8ce1e2fcdf7b6b8 upstream. ... same as the other macros in arch/x86/entry/calling.h Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: dan.j.williams@intel.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180211104949.12992-8-linux@dominikbrodowski.net Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-22x86/entry/64: Get rid of the ALLOC_PT_GPREGS_ON_STACK and ↵Dominik Brodowski2-52/+10
SAVE_AND_CLEAR_REGS macros commit dde3036d62ba3375840b10ab9ec0d568fd773b07 upstream. Previously, error_entry() and paranoid_entry() saved the GP registers onto stack space previously allocated by its callers. Combine these two steps in the callers, and use the generic PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS macro for that. This adds a significant amount ot text size. However, Ingo Molnar points out that: "these numbers also _very_ significantly over-represent the extra footprint. The assumptions that resulted in us compressing the IRQ entry code have changed very significantly with the new x86 IRQ allocation code we introduced in the last year: - IRQ vectors are usually populated in tightly clustered groups. With our new vector allocator code the typical per CPU allocation percentage on x86 systems is ~3 device vectors and ~10 fixed vectors out of ~220 vectors - i.e. a very low ~6% utilization (!). [...] The days where we allocated a lot of vectors on every CPU and the compression of the IRQ entry code text mattered are over. - Another issue is that only a small minority of vectors is frequent enough to actually matter to cache utilization in practice: 3-4 key IPIs and 1-2 device IRQs at most - and those vectors tend to be tightly clustered as well into about two groups, and are probably already on 2-3 cache lines in practice. For the common case of 'cache cold' IRQs it's the depth of the call chain and the fragmentation of the resulting I$ that should be the main performance limit - not the overall size of it. - The CPU side cost of IRQ delivery is still very expensive even in the best, most cached case, as in 'over a thousand cycles'. So much stuff is done that maybe contemporary x86 IRQ entry microcode already prefetches the IDT entry and its expected call target address."[*] [*] http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180208094710.qnjixhm6hybebdv7@gmail.com The "testb $3, CS(%rsp)" instruction in the idtentry macro does not need modification. Previously, %rsp was manually decreased by 15*8; with this patch, %rsp is decreased by 15 pushq instructions. [jpoimboe@redhat.com: unwind hint improvements] Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: dan.j.williams@intel.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180211104949.12992-7-linux@dominikbrodowski.net Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-22x86/entry/64: Use PUSH_AND_CLEAN_REGS in more casesDominik Brodowski2-65/+6
commit 30907fd13bb593202574bb20af58d67c70a1ee14 upstream. entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe() and nmi() can be converted to use PUSH_AND_CLEAN_REGS instead of opencoded variants thereof. Due to the interleaving, the additional XOR-based clearing of R8 and R9 in entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe() should not have any noticeable negative implications. Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: dan.j.williams@intel.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180211104949.12992-6-linux@dominikbrodowski.net Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-22x86/entry/64: Introduce the PUSH_AND_CLEAN_REGS macroDominik Brodowski2-4/+38
commit 3f01daecd545e818098d84fd1ad43e19a508d705 upstream. Those instances where ALLOC_PT_GPREGS_ON_STACK is called just before SAVE_AND_CLEAR_REGS can trivially be replaced by PUSH_AND_CLEAN_REGS. This macro uses PUSH instead of MOV and should therefore be faster, at least on newer CPUs. Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: dan.j.williams@intel.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180211104949.12992-5-linux@dominikbrodowski.net Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-22x86/entry/64: Interleave XOR register clearing with PUSH instructionsDominik Brodowski2-30/+40
commit f7bafa2b05ef25eda1d9179fd930b0330cf2b7d1 upstream. Same as is done for syscalls, interleave XOR with PUSH instructions for exceptions/interrupts, in order to minimize the cost of the additional instructions required for register clearing. Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: dan.j.williams@intel.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180211104949.12992-4-linux@dominikbrodowski.net Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-22x86/entry/64: Merge the POP_C_REGS and POP_EXTRA_REGS macros into a single ↵Dominik Brodowski2-26/+15
POP_REGS macro commit 502af0d70843c2a9405d7ba1f79b4b0305aaf5f5 upstream. The two special, opencoded cases for POP_C_REGS can be handled by ASM macros. Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: dan.j.williams@intel.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180211104949.12992-3-linux@dominikbrodowski.net Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-22x86/entry/64: Merge SAVE_C_REGS and SAVE_EXTRA_REGS, remove unused extensionsDominik Brodowski2-50/+19
commit 2e3f0098bc45f710a2f4cbcc94b80a1fae7a99a1 upstream. All current code paths call SAVE_C_REGS and then immediately SAVE_EXTRA_REGS. Therefore, merge these two macros and order the MOV sequeneces properly. While at it, remove the macros to save all except specific registers, as these macros have been unused for a long time. Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: dan.j.williams@intel.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180211104949.12992-2-linux@dominikbrodowski.net Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-22x86/entry/64: Clear registers for exceptions/interrupts, to reduce ↵Dan Williams2-1/+24
speculation attack surface commit 3ac6d8c787b835b997eb23e43e09aa0895ef7d58 upstream. Clear the 'extra' registers on entering the 64-bit kernel for exceptions and interrupts. The common registers are not cleared since they are likely clobbered well before they can be exploited in a speculative execution attack. Originally-From: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/151787989146.7847.15749181712358213254.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com [ Made small improvements to the changelog and the code comments. ] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>