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2018-04-12arm64: asid: Do not replace active_asids if already 0Catalin Marinas1-8/+11
[ Upstream commit a8ffaaa060b8d4da6138e0958cb0f45b73e1cb78 ] Under some uncommon timing conditions, a generation check and xchg(active_asids, A1) in check_and_switch_context() on P1 can race with an ASID roll-over on P2. If P2 has not seen the update to active_asids[P1], it can re-allocate A1 to a new task T2 on P2. P1 ends up waiting on the spinlock since the xchg() returned 0 while P2 can go through a second ASID roll-over with (T2,A1,G2) active on P2. This roll-over copies active_asids[P1] == A1,G1 into reserved_asids[P1] and active_asids[P2] == A1,G2 into reserved_asids[P2]. A subsequent scheduling of T1 on P1 and T2 on P2 would match reserved_asids and get their generation bumped to G3: P1 P2 -- -- TTBR0.BADDR = T0 TTBR0.ASID = A0 asid_generation = G1 check_and_switch_context(T1,A1,G1) generation match check_and_switch_context(T2,A0,G0) new_context() ASID roll-over asid_generation = G2 flush_context() active_asids[P1] = 0 asid_map[A1] = 0 reserved_asids[P1] = A0,G0 xchg(active_asids, A1) active_asids[P1] = A1,G1 xchg returns 0 spin_lock_irqsave() allocated ASID (T2,A1,G2) asid_map[A1] = 1 active_asids[P2] = A1,G2 ... check_and_switch_context(T3,A0,G0) new_context() ASID roll-over asid_generation = G3 flush_context() active_asids[P1] = 0 asid_map[A1] = 1 reserved_asids[P1] = A1,G1 reserved_asids[P2] = A1,G2 allocated ASID (T3,A2,G3) asid_map[A2] = 1 active_asids[P2] = A2,G3 new_context() check_update_reserved_asid(A1,G1) matches reserved_asid[P1] reserved_asid[P1] = A1,G3 updated T1 ASID to (T1,A1,G3) check_and_switch_context(T2,A1,G2) new_context() check_and_switch_context(A1,G2) matches reserved_asids[P2] reserved_asids[P2] = A1,G3 updated T2 ASID to (T2,A1,G3) At this point, we have two tasks, T1 and T2 both using ASID A1 with the latest generation G3. Any of them is allowed to be scheduled on the other CPU leading to two different tasks with the same ASID on the same CPU. This patch changes the xchg to cmpxchg so that the active_asids is only updated if non-zero to avoid a race with an ASID roll-over on a different CPU. The ASID allocation algorithm has been formally verified using the TLA+ model checker (see https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/cmarinas/kernel-tla.git/tree/asidalloc.tla for the spec). Reviewed-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-04-08crypto: arm,arm64 - Fix random regeneration of S_shippedLeonard Crestez1-0/+2
commit 6aaf49b495b446ff6eec0ac983f781ca0dc56a73 upstream. The decision to rebuild .S_shipped is made based on the relative timestamps of .S_shipped and .pl files but git makes this essentially random. This means that the perl script might run anyway (usually at most once per checkout), defeating the whole purpose of _shipped. Fix by skipping the rule unless explicit make variables are provided: REGENERATE_ARM_CRYPTO or REGENERATE_ARM64_CRYPTO. This can produce nasty occasional build failures downstream, for example for toolchains with broken perl. The solution is minimally intrusive to make it easier to push into stable. Another report on a similar issue here: https://lkml.org/lkml/2018/3/8/1379 Signed-off-by: Leonard Crestez <leonard.crestez@nxp.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com> Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-03-28mm/vmalloc: add interfaces to free unmapped page tableToshi Kani1-0/+10
commit b6bdb7517c3d3f41f20e5c2948d6bc3f8897394e upstream. On architectures with CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_HUGE_VMAP set, ioremap() may create pud/pmd mappings. A kernel panic was observed on arm64 systems with Cortex-A75 in the following steps as described by Hanjun Guo. 1. ioremap a 4K size, valid page table will build, 2. iounmap it, pte0 will set to 0; 3. ioremap the same address with 2M size, pgd/pmd is unchanged, then set the a new value for pmd; 4. pte0 is leaked; 5. CPU may meet exception because the old pmd is still in TLB, which will lead to kernel panic. This panic is not reproducible on x86. INVLPG, called from iounmap, purges all levels of entries associated with purged address on x86. x86 still has memory leak. The patch changes the ioremap path to free unmapped page table(s) since doing so in the unmap path has the following issues: - The iounmap() path is shared with vunmap(). Since vmap() only supports pte mappings, making vunmap() to free a pte page is an overhead for regular vmap users as they do not need a pte page freed up. - Checking if all entries in a pte page are cleared in the unmap path is racy, and serializing this check is expensive. - The unmap path calls free_vmap_area_noflush() to do lazy TLB purges. Clearing a pud/pmd entry before the lazy TLB purges needs extra TLB purge. Add two interfaces, pud_free_pmd_page() and pmd_free_pte_page(), which clear a given pud/pmd entry and free up a page for the lower level entries. This patch implements their stub functions on x86 and arm64, which work as workaround. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix typo in pmd_free_pte_page() stub] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180314180155.19492-2-toshi.kani@hpe.com Fixes: e61ce6ade404e ("mm: change ioremap to set up huge I/O mappings") Reported-by: Lei Li <lious.lilei@hisilicon.com> Signed-off-by: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Wang Xuefeng <wxf.wang@hisilicon.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Hanjun Guo <guohanjun@huawei.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Chintan Pandya <cpandya@codeaurora.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-03-19arm64: dts: renesas: salvator-common: Add EthernetAVB PHY resetGeert Uytterhoeven1-0/+1
[ Upstream commit f5bbcd533a9d1af97b8a0862a421bb8455f1bf6d ] Describe the GPIO used to reset the Ethernet PHY for EthernetAVB. This allows the driver to reset the PHY during probe and after system resume. This fixes Ethernet operation after resume from s2ram on Salvator-XS, where the enable pin of the regulator providing PHY power is connected to PRESETn, and PSCI powers down the SoC during system suspend. On Salvator-X, the enable pin is always pulled high, but the driver may still need to reset the PHY if this wasn't done by the bootloader before. Inspired by patches in the BSP for the individual Salvator-X/XS boards by Kazuya Mizuguchi. Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be> Signed-off-by: Simon Horman <horms+renesas@verge.net.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-03-15arm64: mm: fix thinko in non-global page table attribute checkArd Biesheuvel1-4/+4
commit 753e8abc36b2c966caea075db0c845563c8a19bf upstream. The routine pgattr_change_is_safe() was extended in commit 4e6020565596 ("arm64: mm: Permit transitioning from Global to Non-Global without BBM") to permit changing the nG attribute from not set to set, but did so in a way that inadvertently disallows such changes if other permitted attribute changes take place at the same time. So update the code to take this into account. Fixes: 4e6020565596 ("arm64: mm: Permit transitioning from Global to ...") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.14.x- Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Acked-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-03-11bpf, arm64: fix out of bounds access in tail callDaniel Borkmann1-2/+3
[ upstream commit 16338a9b3ac30740d49f5dfed81bac0ffa53b9c7 ] I recently noticed a crash on arm64 when feeding a bogus index into BPF tail call helper. The crash would not occur when the interpreter is used, but only in case of JIT. Output looks as follows: [ 347.007486] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address fffb850e96492510 [...] [ 347.043065] [fffb850e96492510] address between user and kernel address ranges [ 347.050205] Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [#1] SMP [...] [ 347.190829] x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000 [ 347.196128] x11: fffc047ebe782800 x10: ffff808fd7d0fd10 [ 347.201427] x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : 0000000000000000 [ 347.206726] x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 001c991738000000 [ 347.212025] x5 : 0000000000000018 x4 : 000000000000ba5a [ 347.217325] x3 : 00000000000329c4 x2 : ffff808fd7cf0500 [ 347.222625] x1 : ffff808fd7d0fc00 x0 : ffff808fd7cf0500 [ 347.227926] Process test_verifier (pid: 4548, stack limit = 0x000000007467fa61) [ 347.235221] Call trace: [ 347.237656] 0xffff000002f3a4fc [ 347.240784] bpf_test_run+0x78/0xf8 [ 347.244260] bpf_prog_test_run_skb+0x148/0x230 [ 347.248694] SyS_bpf+0x77c/0x1110 [ 347.251999] el0_svc_naked+0x30/0x34 [ 347.255564] Code: 9100075a d280220a 8b0a002a d37df04b (f86b694b) [...] In this case the index used in BPF r3 is the same as in r1 at the time of the call, meaning we fed a pointer as index; here, it had the value 0xffff808fd7cf0500 which sits in x2. While I found tail calls to be working in general (also for hitting the error cases), I noticed the following in the code emission: # bpftool p d j i 988 [...] 38: ldr w10, [x1,x10] 3c: cmp w2, w10 40: b.ge 0x000000000000007c <-- signed cmp 44: mov x10, #0x20 // #32 48: cmp x26, x10 4c: b.gt 0x000000000000007c 50: add x26, x26, #0x1 54: mov x10, #0x110 // #272 58: add x10, x1, x10 5c: lsl x11, x2, #3 60: ldr x11, [x10,x11] <-- faulting insn (f86b694b) 64: cbz x11, 0x000000000000007c [...] Meaning, the tests passed because commit ddb55992b04d ("arm64: bpf: implement bpf_tail_call() helper") was using signed compares instead of unsigned which as a result had the test wrongly passing. Change this but also the tail call count test both into unsigned and cap the index as u32. Latter we did as well in 90caccdd8cc0 ("bpf: fix bpf_tail_call() x64 JIT") and is needed in addition here, too. Tested on HiSilicon Hi1616. Result after patch: # bpftool p d j i 268 [...] 38: ldr w10, [x1,x10] 3c: add w2, w2, #0x0 40: cmp w2, w10 44: b.cs 0x0000000000000080 48: mov x10, #0x20 // #32 4c: cmp x26, x10 50: b.hi 0x0000000000000080 54: add x26, x26, #0x1 58: mov x10, #0x110 // #272 5c: add x10, x1, x10 60: lsl x11, x2, #3 64: ldr x11, [x10,x11] 68: cbz x11, 0x0000000000000080 [...] Fixes: ddb55992b04d ("arm64: bpf: implement bpf_tail_call() helper") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-28arm64: __show_regs: Only resolve kernel symbols when running at EL1Will Deacon1-2/+9
commit a06f818a70de21b4b3b4186816094208fc7accf9 upstream. __show_regs pretty prints PC and LR by attempting to map them to kernel function names to improve the utility of crash reports. Unfortunately, this mapping is applied even when the pt_regs corresponds to user mode, resulting in a KASLR oracle. Avoid this issue by only looking up the function symbols when the register state indicates that we're actually running at EL1. Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Reported-by: NCSC Security <security@ncsc.gov.uk> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-28arm64: cpufeature: Fix CTR_EL0 field definitionsWill Deacon1-2/+4
commit be68a8aaf925aaf35574260bf820bb09d2f9e07f upstream. Our field definitions for CTR_EL0 suffer from a number of problems: - The IDC and DIC fields are missing, which causes us to enable CTR trapping on CPUs with either of these returning non-zero values. - The ERG is FTR_LOWER_SAFE, whereas it should be treated like CWG as FTR_HIGHER_SAFE so that applications can use it to avoid false sharing. - [nit] A RES1 field is described as "RAO" This patch updates the CTR_EL0 field definitions to fix these issues. Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Cc: Shanker Donthineni <shankerd@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-28arm64: Disable unhandled signal log messages by defaultMichael Weiser1-1/+1
commit 5ee39a71fd89ab7240c5339d04161c44a8e03269 upstream. aarch64 unhandled signal kernel messages are very verbose, suggesting them to be more of a debugging aid: sigsegv[33]: unhandled level 2 translation fault (11) at 0x00000000, esr 0x92000046, in sigsegv[400000+71000] CPU: 1 PID: 33 Comm: sigsegv Tainted: G W 4.15.0-rc3+ #3 Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) pstate: 60000000 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO) pc : 0x4003f4 lr : 0x4006bc sp : 0000fffffe94a060 x29: 0000fffffe94a070 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: 0000000000000000 x26: 0000000000000000 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: 00000000004001b0 x23: 0000000000486ac8 x22: 00000000004001c8 x21: 0000000000000000 x20: 0000000000400be8 x19: 0000000000400b30 x18: 0000000000484728 x17: 000000000865ffc8 x16: 000000000000270f x15: 00000000000000b0 x14: 0000000000000002 x13: 0000000000000001 x12: 0000000000000000 x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0008000020008008 x9 : 000000000000000f x8 : ffffffffffffffff x7 : 0004000000000000 x6 : ffffffffffffffff x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 00000000004003e4 x2 : 0000fffffe94a1e8 x1 : 000000000000000a x0 : 0000000000000000 Disable them by default, so they can be enabled using /proc/sys/debug/exception-trace. Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Michael Weiser <michael.weiser@gmx.de> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-28arm64: Remove unimplemented syscall log messageMichael Weiser1-8/+0
commit 1962682d2b2fbe6cfa995a85c53c069fadda473e upstream. Stop printing a (ratelimited) kernel message for each instance of an unimplemented syscall being called. Userland making an unimplemented syscall is not necessarily misbehaviour and to be expected with a current userland running on an older kernel. Also, the current message looks scary to users but does not actually indicate a real problem nor help them narrow down the cause. Just rely on sys_ni_syscall() to return -ENOSYS. Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Acked-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Weiser <michael.weiser@gmx.de> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-28arm64: mm: don't write garbage into TTBR1_EL1 registerArd Biesheuvel1-1/+1
Stable backport commit 173358a49173 ("arm64: kpti: Add ->enable callback to remap swapper using nG mappings") of upstream commit f992b4dfd58b did not survive the backporting process unscathed, and ends up writing garbage into the TTBR1_EL1 register, rather than pointing it to the zero page to disable translations. Fix that. Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> #v4.14 Reported-by: Nicolas Dechesne <nicolas.dechesne@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Acked-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-25arm64: dts: add #cooling-cells to CPU nodesArnd Bergmann1-0/+2
commit acbf76ee05067c3942852019993f7beb69a0f45f upstream. dtc complains about the lack of #coolin-cells properties for the CPU nodes that are referred to as "cooling-device": arch/arm64/boot/dts/mediatek/mt8173-evb.dtb: Warning (cooling_device_property): Missing property '#cooling-cells' in node /cpus/cpu@0 or bad phandle (referred from /thermal-zones/cpu_thermal/cooling-maps/map@0:cooling-device[0]) arch/arm64/boot/dts/mediatek/mt8173-evb.dtb: Warning (cooling_device_property): Missing property '#cooling-cells' in node /cpus/cpu@100 or bad phandle (referred from /thermal-zones/cpu_thermal/cooling-maps/map@1:cooling-device[0]) Apparently this property must be '<2>' to match the binding. Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Tested-by: Chunfeng Yun <chunfeng.yun@mediatek.com> Signed-off-by: Olof Johansson <olof@lixom.net> [arnd: backported to 4.15] Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-22arm64: dts: msm8916: Add missing #phy-cellsBjorn Andersson1-0/+1
commit b0ab681285aa66064f2de5b74191c0cabba381ff upstream. Add a missing #phy-cells to the dsi-phy, to silence dtc warning. Cc: Archit Taneja <architt@codeaurora.org> Fixes: 305410ffd1b2 ("arm64: dts: msm8916: Add display support") Signed-off-by: Bjorn Andersson <bjorn.andersson@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Archit Taneja <architt@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: Andy Gross <andy.gross@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-22arm64: proc: Set PTE_NG for table entries to avoid traversing them twiceWill Deacon1-5/+9
commit 2ce77f6d8a9ae9ce6d80397d88bdceb84a2004cd upstream. When KASAN is enabled, the swapper page table contains many identical mappings of the zero page, which can lead to a stall during boot whilst the G -> nG code continually walks the same page table entries looking for global mappings. This patch sets the nG bit (bit 11, which is IGNORED) in table entries after processing the subtree so we can easily skip them if we see them a second time. Tested-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-22arm64: Add missing Falkor part number for branch predictor hardeningShanker Donthineni2-1/+12
commit 16e574d762ac5512eb922ac0ac5eed360b7db9d8 upstream. References to CPU part number MIDR_QCOM_FALKOR were dropped from the mailing list patch due to mainline/arm64 branch dependency. So this patch adds the missing part number. Fixes: ec82b567a74f ("arm64: Implement branch predictor hardening for Falkor") Acked-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Shanker Donthineni <shankerd@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-22arm64: dts: msm8916: Correct ipc references for smsmBjorn Andersson1-2/+2
commit 566bd8902e7fa20bd412ed753e09e89c1c96939c upstream. SMSM is not symmetrical, the incoming bits from WCNSS are available at index 6, but the outgoing host id for WCNSS is 3. Further more, upstream references the base of APCS (in contrast to downstream), so the register offset of 8 must be included. Fixes: 1fb47e0a9ba4 ("arm64: dts: qcom: msm8916: Add smsm and smp2p nodes") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Ramon Fried <rfried@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: Bjorn Andersson <bjorn.andersson@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Andy Gross <andy.gross@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-16arm64: dts: marvell: add Ethernet aliasesYan Markman3-0/+19
commit 474c5885582c4a79c21bcf01ed98f98c935f1f4a upstream. This patch adds Ethernet aliases in the Marvell Armada 7040 DB, 8040 DB and 8040 mcbin device trees so that the bootloader setup the MAC addresses correctly. Signed-off-by: Yan Markman <ymarkman@marvell.com> [Antoine: commit message, small fixes] Signed-off-by: Antoine Tenart <antoine.tenart@free-electrons.com> Signed-off-by: Gregory CLEMENT <gregory.clement@free-electrons.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-16crypto: hash - annotate algorithms taking optional keyEric Biggers1-0/+2
commit a208fa8f33031b9e0aba44c7d1b7e68eb0cbd29e upstream. We need to consistently enforce that keyed hashes cannot be used without setting the key. To do this we need a reliable way to determine whether a given hash algorithm is keyed or not. AF_ALG currently does this by checking for the presence of a ->setkey() method. However, this is actually slightly broken because the CRC-32 algorithms implement ->setkey() but can also be used without a key. (The CRC-32 "key" is not actually a cryptographic key but rather represents the initial state. If not overridden, then a default initial state is used.) Prepare to fix this by introducing a flag CRYPTO_ALG_OPTIONAL_KEY which indicates that the algorithm has a ->setkey() method, but it is not required to be called. Then set it on all the CRC-32 algorithms. The same also applies to the Adler-32 implementation in Lustre. Also, the cryptd and mcryptd templates have to pass through the flag from their underlying algorithm. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-16arm64: Kill PSCI_GET_VERSION as a variant-2 workaroundMarc Zyngier3-70/+13
Commit 3a0a397ff5ff upstream. Now that we've standardised on SMCCC v1.1 to perform the branch prediction invalidation, let's drop the previous band-aid. If vendors haven't updated their firmware to do SMCCC 1.1, they haven't updated PSCI either, so we don't loose anything. Tested-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-16arm64: Add ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 BP hardening supportMarc Zyngier2-1/+87
Commit b092201e0020 upstream. Add the detection and runtime code for ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1. It is lovely. Really. Tested-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-16arm64: KVM: Add SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 fast handlingMarc Zyngier1-2/+18
Commit f72af90c3783 upstream. We want SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 to be fast. As fast as possible. So let's intercept it as early as we can by testing for the function call number as soon as we've identified a HVC call coming from the guest. Tested-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-16arm64: KVM: Report SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 BP hardening supportMarc Zyngier1-0/+5
Commit 6167ec5c9145 upstream. A new feature of SMCCC 1.1 is that it offers firmware-based CPU workarounds. In particular, SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 provides BP hardening for CVE-2017-5715. If the host has some mitigation for this issue, report that we deal with it using SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1, as we apply the host workaround on every guest exit. Tested-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Conflicts: arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_host.h arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-16arm/arm64: KVM: Turn kvm_psci_version into a static inlineMarc Zyngier1-8/+12
Commit a4097b351118 upstream. We're about to need kvm_psci_version in HYP too. So let's turn it into a static inline, and pass the kvm structure as a second parameter (so that HYP can do a kern_hyp_va on it). Tested-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-16arm64: KVM: Make PSCI_VERSION a fast pathMarc Zyngier1-0/+13
Commit 90348689d500 upstream. For those CPUs that require PSCI to perform a BP invalidation, going all the way to the PSCI code for not much is a waste of precious cycles. Let's terminate that call as early as possible. Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-16arm/arm64: KVM: Advertise SMCCC v1.1Marc Zyngier1-1/+1
Commit 09e6be12effd upstream. The new SMC Calling Convention (v1.1) allows for a reduced overhead when calling into the firmware, and provides a new feature discovery mechanism. Make it visible to KVM guests. Tested-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-16arm/arm64: KVM: Consolidate the PSCI include filesMarc Zyngier2-28/+2
Commit 1a2fb94e6a77 upstream. As we're about to update the PSCI support, and because I'm lazy, let's move the PSCI include file to include/kvm so that both ARM architectures can find it. Acked-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org> Tested-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-16arm64: KVM: Increment PC after handling an SMC trapMarc Zyngier1-0/+9
Commit f5115e8869e1 upstream. When handling an SMC trap, the "preferred return address" is set to that of the SMC, and not the next PC (which is a departure from the behaviour of an SMC that isn't trapped). Increment PC in the handler, as the guest is otherwise forever stuck... Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: acfb3b883f6d ("arm64: KVM: Fix SMCCC handling of unimplemented SMC/HVC calls") Reviewed-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org> Tested-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-16arm64: Branch predictor hardening for Cavium ThunderX2Jayachandran C1-0/+10
Commit f3d795d9b360 upstream. Use PSCI based mitigation for speculative execution attacks targeting the branch predictor. We use the same mechanism as the one used for Cortex-A CPUs, we expect the PSCI version call to have a side effect of clearing the BTBs. Acked-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Jayachandran C <jnair@caviumnetworks.com> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-16arm64: Implement branch predictor hardening for FalkorShanker Donthineni6-3/+70
Commit ec82b567a74f upstream. Falkor is susceptible to branch predictor aliasing and can theoretically be attacked by malicious code. This patch implements a mitigation for these attacks, preventing any malicious entries from affecting other victim contexts. Signed-off-by: Shanker Donthineni <shankerd@codeaurora.org> [will: fix label name when !CONFIG_KVM and remove references to MIDR_FALKOR] Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-16arm64: Implement branch predictor hardening for affected Cortex-A CPUsWill Deacon2-0/+66
Commit aa6acde65e03 upstream. Cortex-A57, A72, A73 and A75 are susceptible to branch predictor aliasing and can theoretically be attacked by malicious code. This patch implements a PSCI-based mitigation for these CPUs when available. The call into firmware will invalidate the branch predictor state, preventing any malicious entries from affecting other victim contexts. Co-developed-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-16arm64: cputype: Add missing MIDR values for Cortex-A72 and Cortex-A75Will Deacon1-0/+4
Commit a65d219fe5dc upstream. Hook up MIDR values for the Cortex-A72 and Cortex-A75 CPUs, since they will soon need MIDR matches for hardening the branch predictor. Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-16arm64: entry: Apply BP hardening for suspicious interrupts from EL0Will Deacon2-0/+11
Commit 30d88c0e3ace upstream. It is possible to take an IRQ from EL0 following a branch to a kernel address in such a way that the IRQ is prioritised over the instruction abort. Whilst an attacker would need to get the stars to align here, it might be sufficient with enough calibration so perform BP hardening in the rare case that we see a kernel address in the ELR when handling an IRQ from EL0. Reported-by: Dan Hettena <dhettena@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-16arm64: entry: Apply BP hardening for high-priority synchronous exceptionsWill Deacon2-1/+13
Commit 5dfc6ed27710 upstream. Software-step and PC alignment fault exceptions have higher priority than instruction abort exceptions, so apply the BP hardening hooks there too if the user PC appears to reside in kernel space. Reported-by: Dan Hettena <dhettena@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-16arm64: KVM: Use per-CPU vector when BP hardening is enabledMarc Zyngier2-1/+39
Commit 6840bdd73d07 upstream. Now that we have per-CPU vectors, let's plug then in the KVM/arm64 code. Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Conflicts: arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-16arm64: Move BP hardening to check_and_switch_contextMarc Zyngier1-2/+3
Commit a8e4c0a919ae upstream. We call arm64_apply_bp_hardening() from post_ttbr_update_workaround, which has the unexpected consequence of being triggered on every exception return to userspace when ARM64_SW_TTBR0_PAN is selected, even if no context switch actually occured. This is a bit suboptimal, and it would be more logical to only invalidate the branch predictor when we actually switch to a different mm. In order to solve this, move the call to arm64_apply_bp_hardening() into check_and_switch_context(), where we're guaranteed to pick a different mm context. Acked-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-16arm64: Add skeleton to harden the branch predictor against aliasing attacksWill Deacon11-3/+215
Commit 0f15adbb2861 upstream. Aliasing attacks against CPU branch predictors can allow an attacker to redirect speculative control flow on some CPUs and potentially divulge information from one context to another. This patch adds initial skeleton code behind a new Kconfig option to enable implementation-specific mitigations against these attacks for CPUs that are affected. Co-developed-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Conflicts: arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-16arm64: Move post_ttbr_update_workaround to C codeMarc Zyngier4-16/+11
Commit 95e3de3590e3 upstream. We will soon need to invoke a CPU-specific function pointer after changing page tables, so move post_ttbr_update_workaround out into C code to make this possible. Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Conflicts: arch/arm64/include/asm/assembler.h Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-16arm64: cpufeature: Pass capability structure to ->enable callbackWill Deacon1-2/+2
Commit 0a0d111d40fd upstream. In order to invoke the CPU capability ->matches callback from the ->enable callback for applying local-CPU workarounds, we need a handle on the capability structure. This patch passes a pointer to the capability structure to the ->enable callback. Reviewed-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-16arm64: Run enable method for errata work arounds on late CPUsSuzuki K Poulose1-3/+6
Commit 55b35d070c25 upstream. When a CPU is brought up after we have finalised the system wide capabilities (i.e, features and errata), we make sure the new CPU doesn't need a new errata work around which has not been detected already. However we don't run enable() method on the new CPU for the errata work arounds already detected. This could cause the new CPU running without potential work arounds. It is upto the "enable()" method to decide if this CPU should do something about the errata. Fixes: commit 6a6efbb45b7d95c84 ("arm64: Verify CPU errata work arounds on hotplugged CPU") Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com> Cc: Dave Martin <dave.martin@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-16arm64: cpufeature: __this_cpu_has_cap() shouldn't stop earlyJames Morse1-2/+1
Commit edf298cfce47 upstream. this_cpu_has_cap() tests caps->desc not caps->matches, so it stops walking the list when it finds a 'silent' feature, instead of walking to the end of the list. Prior to v4.6's 644c2ae198412 ("arm64: cpufeature: Test 'matches' pointer to find the end of the list") we always tested desc to find the end of a capability list. This was changed for dubious things like PAN_NOT_UAO. v4.7's e3661b128e53e ("arm64: Allow a capability to be checked on single CPU") added this_cpu_has_cap() using the old desc style test. CC: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> Acked-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-16arm64: futex: Mask __user pointers prior to dereferenceWill Deacon1-3/+6
Commit 91b2d3442f6a upstream. The arm64 futex code has some explicit dereferencing of user pointers where performing atomic operations in response to a futex command. This patch uses masking to limit any speculative futex operations to within the user address space. Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-16arm64: uaccess: Mask __user pointers for __arch_{clear, copy_*}_userWill Deacon4-14/+30
Commit f71c2ffcb20d upstream. Like we've done for get_user and put_user, ensure that user pointers are masked before invoking the underlying __arch_{clear,copy_*}_user operations. Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-16arm64: uaccess: Don't bother eliding access_ok checks in __{get, put}_userWill Deacon1-22/+32
Commit 84624087dd7e upstream. access_ok isn't an expensive operation once the addr_limit for the current thread has been loaded into the cache. Given that the initial access_ok check preceding a sequence of __{get,put}_user operations will take the brunt of the miss, we can make the __* variants identical to the full-fat versions, which brings with it the benefits of address masking. The likely cost in these sequences will be from toggling PAN/UAO, which we can address later by implementing the *_unsafe versions. Reviewed-by: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-16arm64: uaccess: Prevent speculative use of the current addr_limitWill Deacon1-0/+7
Commit c2f0ad4fc089 upstream. A mispredicted conditional call to set_fs could result in the wrong addr_limit being forwarded under speculation to a subsequent access_ok check, potentially forming part of a spectre-v1 attack using uaccess routines. This patch prevents this forwarding from taking place, but putting heavy barriers in set_fs after writing the addr_limit. Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-16arm64: entry: Ensure branch through syscall table is bounded under speculationWill Deacon2-0/+13
Commit 6314d90e6493 upstream. In a similar manner to array_index_mask_nospec, this patch introduces an assembly macro (mask_nospec64) which can be used to bound a value under speculation. This macro is then used to ensure that the indirect branch through the syscall table is bounded under speculation, with out-of-range addresses speculating as calls to sys_io_setup (0). Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-16arm64: Use pointer masking to limit uaccess speculationRobin Murphy1-3/+23
Commit 4d8efc2d5ee4 upstream. Similarly to x86, mitigate speculation past an access_ok() check by masking the pointer against the address limit before use. Even if we don't expect speculative writes per se, it is plausible that a CPU may still speculate at least as far as fetching a cache line for writing, hence we also harden put_user() and clear_user() for peace of mind. Signed-off-by: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-16arm64: Make USER_DS an inclusive limitRobin Murphy4-23/+33
Commit 51369e398d0d upstream. Currently, USER_DS represents an exclusive limit while KERNEL_DS is inclusive. In order to do some clever trickery for speculation-safe masking, we need them both to behave equivalently - there aren't enough bits to make KERNEL_DS exclusive, so we have precisely one option. This also happens to correct a longstanding false negative for a range ending on the very top byte of kernel memory. Mark Rutland points out that we've actually got the semantics of addresses vs. segments muddled up in most of the places we need to amend, so shuffle the {USER,KERNEL}_DS definitions around such that we can correct those properly instead of just pasting "-1"s everywhere. Signed-off-by: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-16arm64: Implement array_index_mask_nospec()Robin Murphy1-0/+21
Commit 022620eed3d0 upstream. Provide an optimised, assembly implementation of array_index_mask_nospec() for arm64 so that the compiler is not in a position to transform the code in ways which affect its ability to inhibit speculation (e.g. by introducing conditional branches). This is similar to the sequence used by x86, modulo architectural differences in the carry/borrow flags. Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-16arm64: barrier: Add CSDB macros to control data-value predictionWill Deacon2-0/+8
Commit 669474e772b9 upstream. For CPUs capable of data value prediction, CSDB waits for any outstanding predictions to architecturally resolve before allowing speculative execution to continue. Provide macros to expose it to the arch code. Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Conflicts: arch/arm64/include/asm/assembler.h Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-16arm64: idmap: Use "awx" flags for .idmap.text .pushsection directivesWill Deacon4-7/+7
Commit 439e70e27a51 upstream. The identity map is mapped as both writeable and executable by the SWAPPER_MM_MMUFLAGS and this is relied upon by the kpti code to manage a synchronisation flag. Update the .pushsection flags to reflect the actual mapping attributes. Reported-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>