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2018-06-01dm thin: fix documentation relative to low water mark thresholdmulhern1-3/+5
commit 9b28a1102efc75d81298198166ead87d643a29ce upstream. Fixes: 1. The use of "exceeds" when the opposite of exceeds, falls below, was meant. 2. Properly speaking, a table can not exceed a threshold. It emphasizes the important point, which is that it is the userspace daemon's responsibility to check for low free space when a device is resumed, since it won't get a special event indicating low free space in that situation. Signed-off-by: mulhern <amulhern@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2018-06-01ext4: correct documentation for grpid mount optionErnesto A. Fernández1-1/+1
commit 9f0372488cc9243018a812e8cfbf27de650b187b upstream. The grpid option is currently described as being the same as nogrpid. Signed-off-by: Ernesto A. Fernández <ernesto.mnd.fernandez@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2018-03-19x86/paravirt: Remove 'noreplace-paravirt' cmdline optionJosh Poimboeuf1-2/+0
commit 12c69f1e94c89d40696e83804dd2f0965b5250cd upstream. The 'noreplace-paravirt' option disables paravirt patching, leaving the original pv indirect calls in place. That's highly incompatible with retpolines, unless we want to uglify paravirt even further and convert the paravirt calls to retpolines. As far as I can tell, the option doesn't seem to be useful for much other than introducing surprising corner cases and making the kernel vulnerable to Spectre v2. It was probably a debug option from the early paravirt days. So just remove it. Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@intel.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Jason Baron <jbaron@akamai.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Alok Kataria <akataria@vmware.com> Cc: Arjan Van De Ven <arjan.van.de.ven@intel.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180131041333.2x6blhxirc2kclrq@treble [bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust filename] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2018-03-19Documentation: Document array_index_nospecMark Rutland1-0/+90
commit f84a56f73dddaeac1dba8045b007f742f61cd2da upstream. Document the rationale and usage of the new array_index_nospec() helper. Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org Cc: alan@linux.intel.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151727413645.33451.15878817161436755393.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2018-03-19x86/pti: Document fix wrong indexzhenwei.pi1-1/+1
commit 98f0fceec7f84d80bc053e49e596088573086421 upstream. In section <2. Runtime Cost>, fix wrong index. Signed-off-by: zhenwei.pi <zhenwei.pi@youruncloud.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: dave.hansen@linux.intel.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1516237492-27739-1-git-send-email-zhenwei.pi@youruncloud.com Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2018-03-19x86/spectre: Add boot time option to select Spectre v2 mitigationDavid Woodhouse1-0/+28
commit da285121560e769cc31797bba6422eea71d473e0 upstream. Add a spectre_v2= option to select the mitigation used for the indirect branch speculation vulnerability. Currently, the only option available is retpoline, in its various forms. This will be expanded to cover the new IBRS/IBPB microcode features. The RETPOLINE_AMD feature relies on a serializing LFENCE for speculation control. For AMD hardware, only set RETPOLINE_AMD if LFENCE is a serializing instruction, which is indicated by the LFENCE_RDTSC feature. [ tglx: Folded back the LFENCE/AMD fixes and reworked it so IBRS integration becomes simple ] Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: thomas.lendacky@amd.com Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1515707194-20531-5-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk [bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust filename, context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2018-03-19sysfs/cpu: Fix typos in vulnerability documentationDavid Woodhouse1-2/+2
commit 9ecccfaa7cb5249bd31bdceb93fcf5bedb8a24d8 upstream. Fixes: 87590ce6e ("sysfs/cpu: Add vulnerability folder") Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2018-03-19sysfs/cpu: Add vulnerability folderThomas Gleixner1-0/+16
commit 87590ce6e373d1a5401f6539f0c59ef92dd924a9 upstream. As the meltdown/spectre problem affects several CPU architectures, it makes sense to have common way to express whether a system is affected by a particular vulnerability or not. If affected the way to express the mitigation should be common as well. Create /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities folder and files for meltdown, spectre_v1 and spectre_v2. Allow architectures to override the show function. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180107214913.096657732@linutronix.de [bwh: Backported to 3.2: CPU device class is a sysdev_class, not a normal device class] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2018-03-19x86/Documentation: Add PTI descriptionDave Hansen2-7/+200
commit 01c9b17bf673b05bb401b76ec763e9730ccf1376 upstream. Add some details about how PTI works, what some of the downsides are, and how to debug it when things go wrong. Also document the kernel parameter: 'pti/nopti'. Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Moritz Lipp <moritz.lipp@iaik.tugraz.at> Cc: Daniel Gruss <daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at> Cc: Michael Schwarz <michael.schwarz@iaik.tugraz.at> Cc: Richard Fellner <richard.fellner@student.tugraz.at> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Andi Lutomirsky <luto@kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180105174436.1BC6FA2B@viggo.jf.intel.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2018-03-19gcov: compile specific gcov implementation based on gcc versionFrantisek Hrbata1-0/+4
commit 17c568d60af5a810208baf116dc174a2005c6c3e upstream. Compile the correct gcov implementation file for the specific gcc version. Signed-off-by: Frantisek Hrbata <fhrbata@redhat.com> Cc: Jan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Peter Oberparleiter <peter.oberparleiter@de.ibm.com> Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Andy Gospodarek <agospoda@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2018-02-13x86/smp: Don't ever patch back to UP if we unplug cpusRusty Russell1-3/+0
commit 816afe4ff98ee10b1d30fd66361be132a0a5cee6 upstream. We still patch SMP instructions to UP variants if we boot with a single CPU, but not at any other time. In particular, not if we unplug CPUs to return to a single cpu. Paul McKenney points out: mean offline overhead is 6251/48=130.2 milliseconds. If I remove the alternatives_smp_switch() from the offline path [...] the mean offline overhead is 550/42=13.1 milliseconds Basically, we're never going to get those 120ms back, and the code is pretty messy. We get rid of: 1) The "smp-alt-once" boot option. It's actually "smp-alt-boot", the documentation is wrong. It's now the default. 2) The skip_smp_alternatives flag used by suspend. 3) arch_disable_nonboot_cpus_begin() and arch_disable_nonboot_cpus_end() which were only used to set this one flag. Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Cc: Paul McKenney <paul.mckenney@us.ibm.com> Cc: Suresh Siddha <suresh.b.siddha@intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/87vcgwwive.fsf@rustcorp.com.au Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> [bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2018-01-07x86/kaiser: Check boottime cmdline paramsBorislav Petkov1-0/+6
AMD (and possibly other vendors) are not affected by the leak KAISER is protecting against. Keep the "nopti" for traditional reasons and add pti=<on|off|auto> like upstream. Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2018-01-07x86/kaiser: Rename and simplify X86_FEATURE_KAISER handlingBorislav Petkov1-1/+1
Concentrate it in arch/x86/mm/kaiser.c and use the upstream string "nopti". Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2018-01-07kaiser: add "nokaiser" boot option, using ALTERNATIVEHugh Dickins1-0/+2
Added "nokaiser" boot option: an early param like "noinvpcid". Most places now check int kaiser_enabled (#defined 0 when not CONFIG_KAISER) instead of #ifdef CONFIG_KAISER; but entry_64.S and entry_64_compat.S are using the ALTERNATIVE technique, which patches in the preferred instructions at runtime. That technique is tied to x86 cpu features, so X86_FEATURE_KAISER fabricated ("" in its comment so "kaiser" not magicked into /proc/cpuinfo). Prior to "nokaiser", Kaiser #defined _PAGE_GLOBAL 0: revert that, but be careful with both _PAGE_GLOBAL and CR4.PGE: setting them when nokaiser like when !CONFIG_KAISER, but not setting either when kaiser - neither matters on its own, but it's hard to be sure that _PAGE_GLOBAL won't get set in some obscure corner, or something add PGE into CR4. By omitting _PAGE_GLOBAL from __supported_pte_mask when kaiser_enabled, all page table setup which uses pte_pfn() masks it out of the ptes. It's slightly shameful that the same declaration versus definition of kaiser_enabled appears in not one, not two, but in three header files (asm/kaiser.h, asm/pgtable.h, asm/tlbflush.h). I felt safer that way, than with #including any of those in any of the others; and did not feel it worth an asm/kaiser_enabled.h - kernel/cpu/common.c includes them all, so we shall hear about it if they get out of synch. Cleanups while in the area: removed the silly #ifdef CONFIG_KAISER from kaiser.c; removed the unused native_get_normal_pgd(); removed the spurious reg clutter from SWITCH_*_CR3 macro stubs; corrected some comments. But more interestingly, set CR4.PSE in secondary_startup_64: the manual is clear that it does not matter whether it's 0 or 1 when 4-level-pts are enabled, but I was distracted to find cr4 different on BSP and auxiliaries - BSP alone was adding PSE, in init_memory_mapping(). (cherry picked from Change-Id: I8e5bec716944444359cbd19f6729311eff943e9a) Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2018-01-07x86/mm: Add the 'nopcid' boot option to turn off PCIDAndy Lutomirski1-0/+2
commit 0790c9aad84901ca1bdc14746175549c8b5da215 upstream. The parameter is only present on x86_64 systems to save a few bytes, as PCID is always disabled on x86_32. Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/8bbb2e65bcd249a5f18bfb8128b4689f08ac2b60.1498751203.git.luto@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> [Hugh Dickins: Backported to 3.2: - Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt (not in this tree) - Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt (patched instead of that)] Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2018-01-07x86/mm: Add a 'noinvpcid' boot option to turn off INVPCIDAndy Lutomirski1-0/+2
commit d12a72b844a49d4162f24cefdab30bed3f86730e upstream. This adds a chicken bit to turn off INVPCID in case something goes wrong. It's an early_param() because we do TLB flushes before we parse __setup() parameters. Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@suse.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/f586317ed1bc2b87aee652267e515b90051af385.1454096309.git.luto@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2017-10-12cpuset: PF_SPREAD_PAGE and PF_SPREAD_SLAB should be atomic flagsZefan Li1-3/+3
commit 2ad654bc5e2b211e92f66da1d819e47d79a866f0 upstream. When we change cpuset.memory_spread_{page,slab}, cpuset will flip PF_SPREAD_{PAGE,SLAB} bit of tsk->flags for each task in that cpuset. This should be done using atomic bitops, but currently we don't, which is broken. Tetsuo reported a hard-to-reproduce kernel crash on RHEL6, which happened when one thread tried to clear PF_USED_MATH while at the same time another thread tried to flip PF_SPREAD_PAGE/PF_SPREAD_SLAB. They both operate on the same task. Here's the full report: https://lkml.org/lkml/2014/9/19/230 To fix this, we make PF_SPREAD_PAGE and PF_SPREAD_SLAB atomic flags. v4: - updated mm/slab.c. (Fengguang Wu) - updated Documentation. Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Miao Xie <miaox@cn.fujitsu.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Fixes: 950592f7b991 ("cpusets: update tasks' page/slab spread flags in time") Reported-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Zefan Li <lizefan@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> [lizf: Backported to 3.4: - adjust context - check current->flags & PF_MEMPOLICY rather than current->mempolicy] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2017-07-02mm: larger stack guard gap, between vmasHugh Dickins1-0/+7
commit 1be7107fbe18eed3e319a6c3e83c78254b693acb upstream. Stack guard page is a useful feature to reduce a risk of stack smashing into a different mapping. We have been using a single page gap which is sufficient to prevent having stack adjacent to a different mapping. But this seems to be insufficient in the light of the stack usage in userspace. E.g. glibc uses as large as 64kB alloca() in many commonly used functions. Others use constructs liks gid_t buffer[NGROUPS_MAX] which is 256kB or stack strings with MAX_ARG_STRLEN. This will become especially dangerous for suid binaries and the default no limit for the stack size limit because those applications can be tricked to consume a large portion of the stack and a single glibc call could jump over the guard page. These attacks are not theoretical, unfortunatelly. Make those attacks less probable by increasing the stack guard gap to 1MB (on systems with 4k pages; but make it depend on the page size because systems with larger base pages might cap stack allocations in the PAGE_SIZE units) which should cover larger alloca() and VLA stack allocations. It is obviously not a full fix because the problem is somehow inherent, but it should reduce attack space a lot. One could argue that the gap size should be configurable from userspace, but that can be done later when somebody finds that the new 1MB is wrong for some special case applications. For now, add a kernel command line option (stack_guard_gap) to specify the stack gap size (in page units). Implementation wise, first delete all the old code for stack guard page: because although we could get away with accounting one extra page in a stack vma, accounting a larger gap can break userspace - case in point, a program run with "ulimit -S -v 20000" failed when the 1MB gap was counted for RLIMIT_AS; similar problems could come with RLIMIT_MLOCK and strict non-overcommit mode. Instead of keeping gap inside the stack vma, maintain the stack guard gap as a gap between vmas: using vm_start_gap() in place of vm_start (or vm_end_gap() in place of vm_end if VM_GROWSUP) in just those few places which need to respect the gap - mainly arch_get_unmapped_area(), and and the vma tree's subtree_gap support for that. Original-patch-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Original-patch-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Tested-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> # parisc Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> [Hugh Dickins: Backported to 3.2] [bwh: Fix more instances of vma->vm_start in sparc64 impl. of arch_get_unmapped_area_topdown() and generic impl. of hugetlb_get_unmapped_area()] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2016-11-20fs: Give dentry to inode_change_ok() instead of inodeJan Kara1-2/+2
commit 31051c85b5e2aaaf6315f74c72a732673632a905 upstream. inode_change_ok() will be resposible for clearing capabilities and IMA extended attributes and as such will need dentry. Give it as an argument to inode_change_ok() instead of an inode. Also rename inode_change_ok() to setattr_prepare() to better relect that it does also some modifications in addition to checks. Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> [bwh: Backported to 3.2: - Drop changes to f2fs, lustre, orangefs, overlayfs - Adjust filenames, context - In nfsd, pass dentry to nfsd_sanitize_attrs() - In xfs, pass dentry to xfs_change_file_space(), xfs_set_mode(), xfs_setattr_nonsize(), and xfs_setattr_size() - Update ext3 as well - Mark pohmelfs as BROKEN; it's long dead upstream] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2016-06-15USB: uas: Add a new NO_REPORT_LUNS quirkHans de Goede1-0/+2
commit 1363074667a6b7d0507527742ccd7bbed5e3ceaa upstream. Add a new NO_REPORT_LUNS quirk and set it for Seagate drives with an usb-id of: 0bc2:331a, as these will fail to respond to a REPORT_LUNS command. Reported-and-tested-by: David Webb <djw@noc.ac.uk> Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com> Acked-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> [bwh: Backported to 3.2: - Adjust context - Drop the UAS changes] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2016-05-01net/ipv6: add sysctl option accept_ra_min_hop_limitHangbin Liu1-0/+8
[ Upstream commit 8013d1d7eafb0589ca766db6b74026f76b7f5cb4 ] Commit 6fd99094de2b ("ipv6: Don't reduce hop limit for an interface") disabled accept hop limit from RA if it is smaller than the current hop limit for security stuff. But this behavior kind of break the RFC definition. RFC 4861, 6.3.4. Processing Received Router Advertisements A Router Advertisement field (e.g., Cur Hop Limit, Reachable Time, and Retrans Timer) may contain a value denoting that it is unspecified. In such cases, the parameter should be ignored and the host should continue using whatever value it is already using. If the received Cur Hop Limit value is non-zero, the host SHOULD set its CurHopLimit variable to the received value. So add sysctl option accept_ra_min_hop_limit to let user choose the minimum hop limit value they can accept from RA. And set default to 1 to meet RFC standards. Signed-off-by: Hangbin Liu <liuhangbin@gmail.com> Acked-by: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <hideaki.yoshifuji@miraclelinux.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> [bwh: Backported to 3.2: - Adjust filename, context - Number DEVCONF enumerators explicitly to match upstream] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2016-02-27pipe: limit the per-user amount of pages allocated in pipesWilly Tarreau1-0/+23
commit 759c01142a5d0f364a462346168a56de28a80f52 upstream. On no-so-small systems, it is possible for a single process to cause an OOM condition by filling large pipes with data that are never read. A typical process filling 4000 pipes with 1 MB of data will use 4 GB of memory. On small systems it may be tricky to set the pipe max size to prevent this from happening. This patch makes it possible to enforce a per-user soft limit above which new pipes will be limited to a single page, effectively limiting them to 4 kB each, as well as a hard limit above which no new pipes may be created for this user. This has the effect of protecting the system against memory abuse without hurting other users, and still allowing pipes to work correctly though with less data at once. The limit are controlled by two new sysctls : pipe-user-pages-soft, and pipe-user-pages-hard. Both may be disabled by setting them to zero. The default soft limit allows the default number of FDs per process (1024) to create pipes of the default size (64kB), thus reaching a limit of 64MB before starting to create only smaller pipes. With 256 processes limited to 1024 FDs each, this results in 1024*64kB + (256*1024 - 1024) * 4kB = 1084 MB of memory allocated for a user. The hard limit is disabled by default to avoid breaking existing applications that make intensive use of pipes (eg: for splicing). Reported-by: socketpair@gmail.com Reported-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Mitigates: CVE-2013-4312 (Linux 2.0+) Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> [bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2016-01-23i2c: i801: add Intel Lewisburg device IDsAlexandra Yates1-0/+1
commit cdc5a3110e7c3ae793f367285789a6bc39c962dc upstream. Adding Intel codename Lewisburg platform device IDs for SMBus. Signed-off-by: Alexandra Yates <alexandra.yates@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jean Delvare <jdelvare@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa@the-dreams.de> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2016-01-23i2c: i801: Document Intel DNV and BroxtonJarkko Nikula1-0/+2
commit 2b630df721ee4c286d286ab5d5d958d34c86f067 upstream. Add missing entries into i2c-i801 documentation and Kconfig about recently added Intel DNV and Broxton. Reported-by: Jean Delvare <jdelvare@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Nikula <jarkko.nikula@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jean Delvare <jdelvare@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa@the-dreams.de> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2016-01-23i2c: i801: Add DeviceIDs for SunrisePoint LPDevin Ryles1-0/+1
commit 3eee1799aed90e990e02a73a89bfcff1982c74dd upstream. Signed-off-by: Devin Ryles <devin.ryles@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jean Delvare <jdelvare@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa@the-dreams.de> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2016-01-23i2c: i801: Add Device IDs for Intel Sunrise Point PCHjames.d.ralston@intel.com1-0/+1
commit 3e27a8445c21f8056517f188303827450590d868 upstream. This patch adds the I2C/SMBus Device IDs for the Intel Sunrise Point PCH. Signed-off-by: James Ralston <james.d.ralston@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa@the-dreams.de> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2016-01-23i2c: i801: Add device ID for Intel Wildcat Point PCHJean Delvare1-0/+1
commit b299de839157852c563b9f133c8b7e630545a9c3 upstream. Signed-off-by: Jean Delvare <jdelvare@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa@the-dreams.de> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2016-01-23i2c: i801: enable Intel BayTrail SMBUSChew, Kean ho1-0/+1
commit 1b31e9b76ef8c62291e698dfdb973499986a7f68 upstream. Add Device ID of Intel BayTrail SMBus Controller. Signed-off-by: Chew, Kean ho <kean.ho.chew@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Chew, Chiau Ee <chiau.ee.chew@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jean Delvare <jdelvare@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa@the-dreams.de> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2016-01-23i2c: i801: Add Device IDs for Intel Wildcat Point-LP PCHJames Ralston1-0/+1
commit afc659241258b40b683998ec801d25d276529f43 upstream. This patch adds the SMBus Device IDs for the Intel Wildcat Point-LP PCH. Signed-off-by: James Ralston <james.d.ralston@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa@the-dreams.de> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2016-01-23i2c: i801: SMBus patch for Intel Coleto Creek DeviceIDsSeth Heasley1-0/+1
commit f39901c1befa556bc91902516a3e2e460000b4a8 upstream. This patch adds the i801 SMBus Controller DeviceIDs for the Intel Coleto Creek PCH. Signed-off-by: Seth Heasley <seth.heasley@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa@the-dreams.de> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2016-01-23i2c: i801: Add Device IDs for Intel Wellsburg PCHJames Ralston1-0/+1
commit a3fc0ff00a46c4b32e7214961a5be9a1dc39b60e upstream. This patch adds the SMBus Device IDs for the Intel Wellsburg PCH Signed-off-by: James Ralston <james.d.ralston@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jean Delvare <khali@linux-fr.org> Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang <wolfram@the-dreams.de> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2016-01-23i2c: i801: SMBus patch for Intel Avoton DeviceIDsSeth Heasley1-0/+1
commit c2db409cbc8751ccc7e6d2cc2e41af0d12ea637f upstream. This patch adds the PCU SMBus DeviceID for the Intel Avoton SOC. Signed-off-by: Seth Heasley <seth.heasley@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jean Delvare <khali@linux-fr.org> Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang <w.sang@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2015-11-27fs: make dumpable=2 require fully qualified pathKees Cook1-6/+12
commit 9520628e8ceb69fa9a4aee6b57f22675d9e1b709 upstream. When the suid_dumpable sysctl is set to "2", and there is no core dump pipe defined in the core_pattern sysctl, a local user can cause core files to be written to root-writable directories, potentially with user-controlled content. This means an admin can unknowningly reintroduce a variation of CVE-2006-2451, allowing local users to gain root privileges. $ cat /proc/sys/fs/suid_dumpable 2 $ cat /proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern core $ ulimit -c unlimited $ cd / $ ls -l core ls: cannot access core: No such file or directory $ touch core touch: cannot touch `core': Permission denied $ OHAI="evil-string-here" ping localhost >/dev/null 2>&1 & $ pid=$! $ sleep 1 $ kill -SEGV $pid $ ls -l core -rw------- 1 root kees 458752 Jun 21 11:35 core $ sudo strings core | grep evil OHAI=evil-string-here While cron has been fixed to abort reading a file when there is any parse error, there are still other sensitive directories that will read any file present and skip unparsable lines. Instead of introducing a suid_dumpable=3 mode and breaking all users of mode 2, this only disables the unsafe portion of mode 2 (writing to disk via relative path). Most users of mode 2 (e.g. Chrome OS) already use a core dump pipe handler, so this change will not break them. For the situations where a pipe handler is not defined but mode 2 is still active, crash dumps will only be written to fully qualified paths. If a relative path is defined (e.g. the default "core" pattern), dump attempts will trigger a printk yelling about the lack of a fully qualified path. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Alan Cox <alan@linux.intel.com> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com> Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> [bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2015-08-07RDS: Documentation: Document AF_RDS, PF_RDS and SOL_RDS correctly.Sowmini Varadhan1-5/+4
commit ebe96e641dee2cbd135ee802ae7e40c361640088 upstream. AF_RDS, PF_RDS and SOL_RDS are available in header files, and there is no need to get their values from /proc. Document this correctly. Fixes: 0c5f9b8830aa ("RDS: Documentation") Signed-off-by: Sowmini Varadhan <sowmini.varadhan@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2015-08-07pinctrl: fix example .get_group_pins implementation signatureBaruch Siach1-2/+2
commit 838d030bda9e2da5f9dcf7251f4e117c6258cb2f upstream. The callback function signature has changed in commit a5818a8bd0 (pinctrl: get_group_pins() const fixes) Fixes: a5818a8bd0 ('pinctrl: get_group_pins() const fixes') Cc: Stephen Warren <swarren@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Baruch Siach <baruch@tkos.co.il> Signed-off-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2015-05-10USB: serial: keyspan_pda: fix Entrega company name spellingMark Knibbs1-1/+1
commit 5f9f975b7984ffec0a25f55e58246aebf68794f4 upstream. Entrega is misspelled as Entregra or Entrgra, so fix that. Signed-off-by: Mark Knibbs <markk@clara.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org> [bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2015-02-20Input: i8042 - reset keyboard to fix Elantech touchpad detectionSrihari Vijayaraghavan1-0/+1
commit 148e9a711e034e06310a8c36b64957934ebe30f2 upstream. On some laptops, keyboard needs to be reset in order to successfully detect touchpad (e.g., some Gigabyte laptop models with Elantech touchpads). Without resettin keyboard touchpad pretends to be completely dead. Based on the original patch by Mateusz Jończyk this version has been expanded to include DMI based detection & application of the fix automatically on the affected models of laptops. This has been confirmed to fix problem by three users already on three different models of laptops. Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=81331 Signed-off-by: Srihari Vijayaraghavan <linux.bug.reporting@gmail.com> Acked-by: Mateusz Jończyk <mat.jonczyk@o2.pl> Tested-by: Srihari Vijayaraghavan <linux.bug.reporting@gmail.com> Tested by: Zakariya Dehlawi <zdehlawi@gmail.com> Tested-by: Guillaum Bouchard <guillaum.bouchard@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2014-12-14Documentation: lzo: document part of the encodingWilly Tarreau1-0/+164
commit d98a0526434d27e261f622cf9d2e0028b5ff1a00 upstream. Add a complete description of the LZO format as processed by the decompressor. I have not found a public specification of this format hence this analysis, which will be used to better understand the code. Cc: Willem Pinckaers <willem@lekkertech.net> Cc: "Don A. Bailey" <donb@securitymouse.com> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2014-09-14x86-64, espfix: Don't leak bits 31:16 of %esp returning to 16-bit stackH. Peter Anvin1-0/+2
commit 3891a04aafd668686239349ea58f3314ea2af86b upstream. The IRET instruction, when returning to a 16-bit segment, only restores the bottom 16 bits of the user space stack pointer. This causes some 16-bit software to break, but it also leaks kernel state to user space. We have a software workaround for that ("espfix") for the 32-bit kernel, but it relies on a nonzero stack segment base which is not available in 64-bit mode. In checkin: b3b42ac2cbae x86-64, modify_ldt: Ban 16-bit segments on 64-bit kernels we "solved" this by forbidding 16-bit segments on 64-bit kernels, with the logic that 16-bit support is crippled on 64-bit kernels anyway (no V86 support), but it turns out that people are doing stuff like running old Win16 binaries under Wine and expect it to work. This works around this by creating percpu "ministacks", each of which is mapped 2^16 times 64K apart. When we detect that the return SS is on the LDT, we copy the IRET frame to the ministack and use the relevant alias to return to userspace. The ministacks are mapped readonly, so if IRET faults we promote #GP to #DF which is an IST vector and thus has its own stack; we then do the fixup in the #DF handler. (Making #GP an IST exception would make the msr_safe functions unsafe in NMI/MC context, and quite possibly have other effects.) Special thanks to: - Andy Lutomirski, for the suggestion of using very small stack slots and copy (as opposed to map) the IRET frame there, and for the suggestion to mark them readonly and let the fault promote to #DF. - Konrad Wilk for paravirt fixup and testing. - Borislav Petkov for testing help and useful comments. Reported-by: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1398816946-3351-1-git-send-email-hpa@linux.intel.com Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Andrew Lutomriski <amluto@gmail.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Dirk Hohndel <dirk@hohndel.org> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan.van.de.ven@intel.com> Cc: comex <comexk@gmail.com> Cc: Alexander van Heukelum <heukelum@fastmail.fm> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2014-09-14ALSA: virtuoso: add Xonar Essence STX II supportClemens Ladisch1-2/+2
commit f42bb22243d2ae264d721b055f836059fe35321f upstream. Just add the PCI ID for the STX II. It appears to work the same as the STX, except for the addition of the not-yet-supported daughterboard. Tested-by: Mario <fugazzi99@gmail.com> Tested-by: corubba <corubba@gmx.de> Signed-off-by: Clemens Ladisch <clemens@ladisch.de> Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2014-09-14stable_kernel_rules: Add pointer to netdev-FAQ for network patchesDave Chiluk1-0/+3
commit b76fc285337b6b256e9ba20a40cfd043f70c27af upstream. Stable_kernel_rules should point submitters of network stable patches to the netdev_FAQ.txt as requests for stable network patches should go to netdev first. Signed-off-by: Dave Chiluk <chiluk@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2014-07-11Documentation: Update stable address in Chinese and Japanese translationsGeert Uytterhoeven4-6/+6
commit 98b0f811aade1b7c6e7806c86aa0befd5919d65f upstream. The English and Korean translations were updated, the Chinese and Japanese weren't. Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2014-06-09Input: elantech - fix touchpad initialization on Gigabyte U2442Hans de Goede1-1/+4
commit 36189cc3cd57ab0f1cd75241f93fe01de928ac06 upstream. The hw_version 3 Elantech touchpad on the Gigabyte U2442 does not accept 0x0b as initialization value for r10, this stand-alone version of the driver: http://planet76.com/drivers/elantech/psmouse-elantech-v6.tar.bz2 Uses 0x03 which does work, so this means not setting bit 3 of r10 which sets: "Enable Real H/W Resolution In Absolute mode" Which will result in half the x and y resolution we get with that bit set, so simply not setting it everywhere is not a solution. We've been unable to find a way to identify touchpads where setting the bit will fail, so this patch uses a dmi based blacklist for this. https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=61151 Reported-by: Philipp Wolfer <ph.wolfer@gmail.com> Tested-by: Philipp Wolfer <ph.wolfer@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com> [bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2014-04-30media: gspca: sn9c20x: add ID for Genius Look 1320 V2Wolfram Sang1-0/+1
commit 61f0319193c44adbbada920162d880b1fdb3aeb3 upstream. Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa@the-dreams.de> Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <m.chehab@samsung.com> [bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust filename] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2014-04-02mm, oom: base root bonus on current usageDavid Rientjes1-2/+2
commit 778c14affaf94a9e4953179d3e13a544ccce7707 upstream. A 3% of system memory bonus is sometimes too excessive in comparison to other processes. With commit a63d83f427fb ("oom: badness heuristic rewrite"), the OOM killer tries to avoid killing privileged tasks by subtracting 3% of overall memory (system or cgroup) from their per-task consumption. But as a result, all root tasks that consume less than 3% of overall memory are considered equal, and so it only takes 33+ privileged tasks pushing the system out of memory for the OOM killer to do something stupid and kill dhclient or other root-owned processes. For example, on a 32G machine it can't tell the difference between the 1M agetty and the 10G fork bomb member. The changelog describes this 3% boost as the equivalent to the global overcommit limit being 3% higher for privileged tasks, but this is not the same as discounting 3% of overall memory from _every privileged task individually_ during OOM selection. Replace the 3% of system memory bonus with a 3% of current memory usage bonus. By giving root tasks a bonus that is proportional to their actual size, they remain comparable even when relatively small. In the example above, the OOM killer will discount the 1M agetty's 256 badness points down to 179, and the 10G fork bomb's 262144 points down to 183500 points and make the right choice, instead of discounting both to 0 and killing agetty because it's first in the task list. Signed-off-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Reported-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> [bwh: Backported to 3.2: existing code changes 'points' directly rather than using 'adj' variable] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2014-04-02i2c: piix4: Add support for AMD ML and CZ SMBus changesShane Huang1-1/+1
commit 032f708bc4f6da868ec49dac48ddf3670d8035d3 upstream. The locations of SMBus register base address and enablement bit are changed from AMD ML, which need this patch to be supported. Signed-off-by: Shane Huang <shane.huang@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Jean Delvare <khali@linux-fr.org> Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa@the-dreams.de> [bwh: Backported to 3.2: - Adjust context - Aux bus support is not included] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2014-02-15libata: disable a disk via libata.force paramsRobin H. Johnson1-0/+2
commit b8bd6dc36186fe99afa7b73e9e2d9a98ad5c4865 upstream. A user on StackExchange had a failing SSD that's soldered directly onto the motherboard of his system. The BIOS does not give any option to disable it at all, so he can't just hide it from the OS via the BIOS. The old IDE layer had hdX=noprobe override for situations like this, but that was never ported to the libata layer. This patch implements a disable flag for libata.force. Example use: libata.force=2.0:disable [v2 of the patch, removed the nodisable flag per Tejun Heo] Signed-off-by: Robin H. Johnson <robbat2@gentoo.org> Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Link: http://unix.stackexchange.com/questions/102648/how-to-tell-linux-kernel-3-0-to-completely-ignore-a-failing-disk Link: http://askubuntu.com/questions/352836/how-can-i-tell-linux-kernel-to-completely-ignore-a-disk-as-if-it-was-not-even-co Link: http://superuser.com/questions/599333/how-to-disable-kernel-probing-for-drive [bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2014-01-03vsprintf: check real user/group id for %pKRyan Mallon1-7/+18
commit 312b4e226951f707e120b95b118cbc14f3d162b2 upstream. Some setuid binaries will allow reading of files which have read permission by the real user id. This is problematic with files which use %pK because the file access permission is checked at open() time, but the kptr_restrict setting is checked at read() time. If a setuid binary opens a %pK file as an unprivileged user, and then elevates permissions before reading the file, then kernel pointer values may be leaked. This happens for example with the setuid pppd application on Ubuntu 12.04: $ head -1 /proc/kallsyms 00000000 T startup_32 $ pppd file /proc/kallsyms pppd: In file /proc/kallsyms: unrecognized option 'c1000000' This will only leak the pointer value from the first line, but other setuid binaries may leak more information. Fix this by adding a check that in addition to the current process having CAP_SYSLOG, that effective user and group ids are equal to the real ids. If a setuid binary reads the contents of a file which uses %pK then the pointer values will be printed as NULL if the real user is unprivileged. Update the sysctl documentation to reflect the changes, and also correct the documentation to state the kptr_restrict=0 is the default. This is a only temporary solution to the issue. The correct solution is to do the permission check at open() time on files, and to replace %pK with a function which checks the open() time permission. %pK uses in printk should be removed since no sane permission check can be done, and instead protected by using dmesg_restrict. Signed-off-by: Ryan Mallon <rmallon@gmail.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> [bwh: Backported to 3.2: - Adjust context - Compare ids directly instead of using {uid,gid}_eq()] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2013-07-27i2c-piix4: Add AMD CZ SMBus device IDShane Huang1-1/+1
commit b996ac90f595dda271cbd858b136b45557fc1a57 upstream. To add AMD CZ SMBus controller device ID. [bhelgaas: drop pci_ids.h update] Signed-off-by: Shane Huang <shane.huang@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Reviewed-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Jean Delvare <khali@linux-fr.org> [bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2013-05-30x86,efi: Implement efi_no_storage_paranoia parameterRichard Weinberger1-0/+6
commit 8c58bf3eec3b8fc8162fe557e9361891c20758f2 upstream. Using this parameter one can disable the storage_size/2 check if he is really sure that the UEFI does sane gc and fulfills the spec. This parameter is useful if a devices uses more than 50% of the storage by default. The Intel DQSW67 desktop board is such a sucker for exmaple. Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com> [bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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