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Add new module parameter to allow users to use SEV_INIT_EX instead of
SEV_INIT. This helps users who lock their SPI bus to use the PSP for SEV
functionality. The 'init_ex_path' parameter defaults to NULL which means
the kernel will use SEV_INIT, if a path is specified SEV_INIT_EX will be
used with the data found at the path. On certain PSP commands this
file is written to as the PSP updates the NV memory region. Depending on
file system initialization this file open may fail during module init
but the CCP driver for SEV already has sufficient retries for platform
initialization. During normal operation of PSP system and SEV commands
if the PSP has not been initialized it is at run time. If the file at
'init_ex_path' does not exist the PSP will not be initialized. The user
must create the file prior to use with 32Kb of 0xFFs per spec.
Signed-off-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Co-developed-by: Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Marc Orr <marcorr@google.com>
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Acked-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Marc Orr <marcorr@google.com>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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The SYSCFG MSR continued being updated beyond the K8 family; drop the K8
name from it.
Suggested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210427111636.1207-4-brijesh.singh@amd.com
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Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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The command finalize the guest receiving process and make the SEV guest
ready for the execution.
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Steve Rutherford <srutherford@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Message-Id: <d08914dc259644de94e29b51c3b68a13286fc5a3.1618498113.git.ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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The command is used for copying the incoming buffer into the
SEV guest memory space.
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Steve Rutherford <srutherford@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Message-Id: <c5d0e3e719db7bb37ea85d79ed4db52e9da06257.1618498113.git.ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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The command is used to create the encryption context for an incoming
SEV guest. The encryption context can be later used by the hypervisor
to import the incoming data into the SEV guest memory space.
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Steve Rutherford <srutherford@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Message-Id: <c7400111ed7458eee01007c4d8d57cdf2cbb0fc2.1618498113.git.ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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After completion of SEND_START, but before SEND_FINISH, the source VMM can
issue the SEND_CANCEL command to stop a migration. This is necessary so
that a cancelled migration can restart with a new target later.
Reviewed-by: Nathan Tempelman <natet@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Rutherford <srutherford@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210412194408.2458827-1-srutherford@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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The command is used to finailize the encryption context created with
KVM_SEV_SEND_START command.
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Steve Rutherford <srutherford@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Message-Id: <5082bd6a8539d24bc55a1dd63a1b341245bb168f.1618498113.git.ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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The command is used for encrypting the guest memory region using the encryption
context created with KVM_SEV_SEND_START.
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by : Steve Rutherford <srutherford@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Message-Id: <d6a6ea740b0c668b30905ae31eac5ad7da048bb3.1618498113.git.ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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The command is used to create an outgoing SEV guest encryption context.
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Steve Rutherford <srutherford@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Venu Busireddy <venu.busireddy@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Message-Id: <2f1686d0164e0f1b3d6a41d620408393e0a48376.1618498113.git.ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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The SEV FW version >= 0.23 added a new command that can be used to query
the attestation report containing the SHA-256 digest of the guest memory
encrypted through the KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_{DATA, VMSA} commands and
sign the report with the Platform Endorsement Key (PEK).
See the SEV FW API spec section 6.8 for more details.
Note there already exist a command (KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_MEASURE) that can be
used to get the SHA-256 digest. The main difference between the
KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_MEASURE and KVM_SEV_ATTESTATION_REPORT is that the latter
can be called while the guest is running and the measurement value is
signed with PEK.
Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Tested-by: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Message-Id: <20210104151749.30248-1-brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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The actual symbol that is exported and usable is
'KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP', not 'KVM_MEM_ENCRYPT_OP'
$ git grep -l KVM_MEM_ENCRYPT_OP
Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst
$ git grep -l KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP
Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
tools/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
While we're in there, update the KVM API category for
KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP. It is called on a VM file descriptor.
Signed-off-by: Connor Kuehl <ckuehl@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200819211952.251984-1-ckuehl@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
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Rationale:
Reduces attack surface on kernel devs opening the links for MITM
as HTTPS traffic is much harder to manipulate.
Deterministic algorithm:
For each file:
If not .svg:
For each line:
If doesn't contain `\bxmlns\b`:
For each link, `\bhttp://[^# \t\r\n]*(?:\w|/)`:
If neither `\bgnu\.org/license`, nor `\bmozilla\.org/MPL\b`:
If both the HTTP and HTTPS versions
return 200 OK and serve the same content:
Replace HTTP with HTTPS.
Signed-off-by: Alexander A. Klimov <grandmaster@al2klimov.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200713114719.33839-1-grandmaster@al2klimov.de
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
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This fixes
Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst:76: WARNING: Inline literal start-string without end-string.
Fixes: 2da1ed62d55c ("KVM: SVM: document KVM_MEM_ENCRYPT_OP, let userspace detect if SEV is available")
Signed-off-by: Stephen Kitt <steve@sk2.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200424152637.120876-1-steve@sk2.org
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
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Userspace has no way to query if SEV has been disabled with the
sev module parameter of kvm-amd.ko. Actually it has one, but it
is a hack: do ioctl(KVM_MEM_ENCRYPT_OP, NULL) and check if it
returns EFAULT. Make it a little nicer by returning zero for
SEV enabled and NULL argument, and while at it document the
ioctl arguments.
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Renaming docs seems to be en vogue at the moment, so fix on of the
grossly misnamed directories. We usually never use "virtual" as
a shortcut for virtualization in the kernel, but always virt,
as seen in the virt/ top-level directory. Fix up the documentation
to match that.
Fixes: ed16648eb5b8 ("Move kvm, uml, and lguest subdirectories under a common "virtual" directory, I.E:")
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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