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Only process RESPONSE packets while the service connection is still in
RXRPC_CONN_SERVICE_CHALLENGING. Check that state under state_lock before
running response verification and security initialization, then use a local
secured flag to decide whether to queue the secured-connection work after
the state transition. This keeps duplicate or late RESPONSE packets from
re-running the setup path and removes the unlocked post-transition state
test.
Fixes: 17926a79320a ("[AF_RXRPC]: Provide secure RxRPC sockets for use by userspace and kernel both")
Reported-by: Yifan Wu <yifanwucs@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Juefei Pu <tomapufckgml@gmail.com>
Co-developed-by: Yuan Tan <yuantan098@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Yuan Tan <yuantan098@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Xin Liu <bird@lzu.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Jie Wang <jiewang2024@lzu.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Yang Yang <n05ec@lzu.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
cc: Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@auristor.com>
cc: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260408121252.2249051-21-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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Fix rxgk_do_verify_authenticator() to check the buffer size before checking
the nonce.
Fixes: 9d1d2b59341f ("rxrpc: rxgk: Implement the yfs-rxgk security class (GSSAPI)")
Closes: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260401105614.1696001-10-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
cc: Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@auristor.com>
cc: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260408121252.2249051-20-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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Fix rxgk_verify_response() to clean up the rxgk context it creates.
Fixes: 9d1d2b59341f ("rxrpc: rxgk: Implement the yfs-rxgk security class (GSSAPI)")
Closes: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260401105614.1696001-10-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
cc: Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@auristor.com>
cc: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260408121252.2249051-19-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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In rxgk_verify_response(), there's a potential integer overflow due to
rounding up token_len before checking it, thereby allowing the length check to
be bypassed.
Fix this by checking the unrounded value against len too (len is limited as
the response must fit in a single UDP packet).
Fixes: 9d1d2b59341f ("rxrpc: rxgk: Implement the yfs-rxgk security class (GSSAPI)")
Closes: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260401105614.1696001-10-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
cc: Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@auristor.com>
cc: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260408121252.2249051-18-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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Add error checking for failure of crypto_skcipher_en/decrypt() to various
rxkad function as the crypto functions can fail with ENOMEM at least.
Fixes: 17926a79320a ("[AF_RXRPC]: Provide secure RxRPC sockets for use by userspace and kernel both")
Closes: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260401105614.1696001-10-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
cc: Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@auristor.com>
cc: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260408121252.2249051-17-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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An AF_RXRPC socket can be both client and server at the same time. When
sending new calls (ie. it's acting as a client), it uses rx->key to set the
security, and when accepting incoming calls (ie. it's acting as a server),
it uses rx->securities.
setsockopt(RXRPC_SECURITY_KEY) sets rx->key to point to an rxrpc-type key
and setsockopt(RXRPC_SECURITY_KEYRING) sets rx->securities to point to a
keyring of rxrpc_s-type keys.
Now, it should be possible to use both rx->key and rx->securities on the
same socket - but for userspace AF_RXRPC sockets rxrpc_setsockopt()
prevents that.
Fix this by:
(1) Remove the incorrect check rxrpc_setsockopt(RXRPC_SECURITY_KEYRING)
makes on rx->key.
(2) Move the check that rxrpc_setsockopt(RXRPC_SECURITY_KEY) makes on
rx->key down into rxrpc_request_key().
(3) Remove rxrpc_request_key()'s check on rx->securities.
This (in combination with a previous patch) pushes the checks down into the
functions that set those pointers and removes the cross-checks that prevent
both key and keyring being set.
Fixes: 17926a79320a ("[AF_RXRPC]: Provide secure RxRPC sockets for use by userspace and kernel both")
Closes: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260401105614.1696001-10-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
cc: Anderson Nascimento <anderson@allelesecurity.com>
cc: Luxiao Xu <rakukuip@gmail.com>
cc: Yuan Tan <yuantan098@gmail.com>
cc: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260408121252.2249051-16-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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This patch fixes a reference count leak in rxrpc_server_keyring()
by checking if rx->securities is already set.
Fixes: 17926a79320a ("[AF_RXRPC]: Provide secure RxRPC sockets for use by userspace and kernel both")
Reported-by: Yifan Wu <yifanwucs@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Juefei Pu <tomapufckgml@gmail.com>
Co-developed-by: Yuan Tan <yuantan098@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Yuan Tan <yuantan098@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Xin Liu <bird@lzu.edu.cn>
Tested-by: Ren Wei <enjou1224z@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Luxiao Xu <rakukuip@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ren Wei <n05ec@lzu.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
cc: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260408121252.2249051-15-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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rxgk_verify_response() decodes auth_len from the packet and is supposed
to verify that it fits in the remaining bytes. The existing check is
inverted, so oversized RESPONSE authenticators are accepted and passed
to rxgk_decrypt_skb(), which can later reach skb_to_sgvec() with an
impossible length and hit BUG_ON(len).
Decoded from the original latest-net reproduction logs with
scripts/decode_stacktrace.sh:
RIP: __skb_to_sgvec()
[net/core/skbuff.c:5285 (discriminator 1)]
Call Trace:
skb_to_sgvec() [net/core/skbuff.c:5305]
rxgk_decrypt_skb() [net/rxrpc/rxgk_common.h:81]
rxgk_verify_response() [net/rxrpc/rxgk.c:1268]
rxrpc_process_connection()
[net/rxrpc/conn_event.c:266 net/rxrpc/conn_event.c:364
net/rxrpc/conn_event.c:386]
process_one_work() [kernel/workqueue.c:3281]
worker_thread()
[kernel/workqueue.c:3353 kernel/workqueue.c:3440]
kthread() [kernel/kthread.c:436]
ret_from_fork() [arch/x86/kernel/process.c:164]
Reject authenticator lengths that exceed the remaining packet payload.
Fixes: 9d1d2b59341f ("rxrpc: rxgk: Implement the yfs-rxgk security class (GSSAPI)")
Signed-off-by: Keenan Dong <keenanat2000@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
cc: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260408121252.2249051-14-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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rxgk_verify_authenticator() copies auth_len bytes into a temporary
buffer and then passes p + auth_len as the parser limit to
rxgk_do_verify_authenticator(). Since p is a __be32 *, that inflates the
parser end pointer by a factor of four and lets malformed RESPONSE
authenticators read past the kmalloc() buffer.
Decoded from the original latest-net reproduction logs with
scripts/decode_stacktrace.sh:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in rxgk_verify_response()
Call Trace:
dump_stack_lvl() [lib/dump_stack.c:123]
print_report() [mm/kasan/report.c:379 mm/kasan/report.c:482]
kasan_report() [mm/kasan/report.c:597]
rxgk_verify_response()
[net/rxrpc/rxgk.c:1103 net/rxrpc/rxgk.c:1167
net/rxrpc/rxgk.c:1274]
rxrpc_process_connection()
[net/rxrpc/conn_event.c:266 net/rxrpc/conn_event.c:364
net/rxrpc/conn_event.c:386]
process_one_work() [kernel/workqueue.c:3281]
worker_thread()
[kernel/workqueue.c:3353 kernel/workqueue.c:3440]
kthread() [kernel/kthread.c:436]
ret_from_fork() [arch/x86/kernel/process.c:164]
Allocated by task 54:
rxgk_verify_response()
[include/linux/slab.h:954 net/rxrpc/rxgk.c:1155
net/rxrpc/rxgk.c:1274]
rxrpc_process_connection()
[net/rxrpc/conn_event.c:266 net/rxrpc/conn_event.c:364
net/rxrpc/conn_event.c:386]
Convert the byte count to __be32 units before constructing the parser
limit.
Fixes: 9d1d2b59341f ("rxrpc: rxgk: Implement the yfs-rxgk security class (GSSAPI)")
Signed-off-by: Keenan Dong <keenanat2000@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
cc: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260408121252.2249051-13-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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rxkad_decrypt_ticket() decrypts the RXKAD response ticket and then
parses the buffer as plaintext without checking whether
crypto_skcipher_decrypt() succeeded.
A malformed RESPONSE can therefore use a non-block-aligned ticket
length, make the decrypt operation fail, and still drive the ticket
parser with attacker-controlled bytes.
Check the decrypt result and abort the connection with RXKADBADTICKET
when ticket decryption fails.
Fixes: 17926a79320a ("[AF_RXRPC]: Provide secure RxRPC sockets for use by userspace and kernel both")
Reported-by: Yifan Wu <yifanwucs@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Juefei Pu <tomapufckgml@gmail.com>
Co-developed-by: Yuan Tan <yuantan098@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Yuan Tan <yuantan098@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Xin Liu <bird@lzu.edu.cn>
Tested-by: Ren Wei <enjou1224z@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Yuqi Xu <xuyuqiabc@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ren Wei <n05ec@lzu.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
cc: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260408121252.2249051-12-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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rxrpc_input_packet_on_conn() can process a to-client packet after the
current client call on the channel has already been torn down. In that
case chan->call is NULL, rxrpc_try_get_call() returns NULL and there is
no reference to drop.
The client-side implicit-end error path does not account for that and
unconditionally calls rxrpc_put_call(). This turns a protocol error
path into a kernel crash instead of rejecting the packet.
Only drop the call reference if one was actually acquired. Keep the
existing protocol error handling unchanged.
Fixes: 5e6ef4f1017c ("rxrpc: Make the I/O thread take over the call and local processor work")
Reported-by: Yifan Wu <yifanwucs@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Juefei Pu <tomapufckgml@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Douya Le <ldy3087146292@gmail.com>
Co-developed-by: Yuan Tan <tanyuan98@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Yuan Tan <tanyuan98@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Xin Liu <bird@lzu.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Ao Zhou <n05ec@lzu.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
cc: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260408121252.2249051-11-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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Peers may only send immediate acks for every 2 UDP packets received.
When sending a jumbogram, it is important to check that there is
sufficient window space to send another same sized jumbogram following
the current one, and request an ack if there isn't. Failure to do so may
cause the call to stall waiting for an ack until the resend timer fires.
Where jumbograms are in use this causes a very significant drop in
performance.
Fixes: fe24a5494390 ("rxrpc: Send jumbo DATA packets")
Signed-off-by: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@auristor.com>
cc: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260408121252.2249051-10-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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When creating a client call in rxrpc_alloc_client_call(), the code obtains
a reference to the key. This is never cleaned up and gets leaked when the
call is destroyed.
Fix this by freeing call->key in rxrpc_destroy_call().
Before the patch, it shows the key reference counter elevated:
$ cat /proc/keys | grep afs@54321
1bffe9cd I--Q--i 8053480 4169w 3b010000 1000 1000 rxrpc afs@54321: ka
$
After the patch, the invalidated key is removed when the code exits:
$ cat /proc/keys | grep afs@54321
$
Fixes: f3441d4125fc ("rxrpc: Copy client call parameters into rxrpc_call earlier")
Signed-off-by: Anderson Nascimento <anderson@allelesecurity.com>
Co-developed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@auristor.com>
cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
cc: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260408121252.2249051-9-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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rxrpc_rack_timer_expired() clears call->rack_timer_mode to OFF before
the switch. The default case warning therefore always prints OFF and
doesn't identify the unexpected timer mode.
Log the saved mode value instead so the warning reports the actual
unexpected rack timer mode.
Fixes: 7c482665931b ("rxrpc: Implement RACK/TLP to deal with transmission stalls [RFC8985]")
Signed-off-by: Alok Tiwari <alok.a.tiwari@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@auristor.com>
cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260408121252.2249051-8-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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In rxrpc_post_response(), the code should be comparing the challenge serial
number from the cached response before deciding to switch to a newer
response, but looks at the newer packet private data instead, rendering the
comparison always false.
Fix this by switching to look at the older packet.
Fix further[1] to substitute the new packet in place of the old one if
newer and also to release whichever we don't use.
Fixes: 5800b1cf3fd8 ("rxrpc: Allow CHALLENGEs to the passed to the app for a RESPONSE")
Signed-off-by: Alok Tiwari <alok.a.tiwari@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@auristor.com>
cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
cc: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260319150150.4189381-1-dhowells%40redhat.com [1]
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260408121252.2249051-7-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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rxrpc_preparse_xdr_yfs_rxgk() reads the raw key length and ticket length
from the XDR token as u32 values and passes each through round_up(x, 4)
before using the rounded value for validation and allocation. When the raw
length is >= 0xfffffffd, round_up() wraps to 0, so the bounds check and
kzalloc both use 0 while the subsequent memcpy still copies the original
~4 GiB value, producing a heap buffer overflow reachable from an
unprivileged add_key() call.
Fix this by:
(1) Rejecting raw key lengths above AFSTOKEN_GK_KEY_MAX and raw ticket
lengths above AFSTOKEN_GK_TOKEN_MAX before rounding, consistent with
the caps that the RxKAD path already enforces via AFSTOKEN_RK_TIX_MAX.
(2) Sizing the flexible-array allocation from the validated raw key
length via struct_size_t() instead of the rounded value.
(3) Caching the raw lengths so that the later field assignments and
memcpy calls do not re-read from the token, eliminating a class of
TOCTOU re-parse.
The control path (valid token with lengths within bounds) is unaffected.
Fixes: 0ca100ff4df6 ("rxrpc: Add YFS RxGK (GSSAPI) security class")
Signed-off-by: Oleh Konko <security@1seal.org>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@auristor.com>
cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
cc: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260408121252.2249051-6-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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Fix rxrpc call removal from the rxnet->calls list to use list_del_rcu()
rather than list_del_init() to prevent stuffing up reading
/proc/net/rxrpc/calls from potentially getting into an infinite loop.
This, however, means that list_empty() no longer works on an entry that's
been deleted from the list, making it harder to detect prior deletion. Fix
this by:
Firstly, make rxrpc_destroy_all_calls() only dump the first ten calls that
are unexpectedly still on the list. Limiting the number of steps means
there's no need to call cond_resched() or to remove calls from the list
here, thereby eliminating the need for rxrpc_put_call() to check for that.
rxrpc_put_call() can then be fixed to unconditionally delete the call from
the list as it is the only place that the deletion occurs.
Fixes: 2baec2c3f854 ("rxrpc: Support network namespacing")
Closes: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260319150150.4189381-1-dhowells%40redhat.com
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
cc: Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@auristor.com>
cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
cc: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260408121252.2249051-5-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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In rxrpc_new_client_call_for_sendmsg(), a key with no payload is meant to
be substituted for a NULL key pointer, but the variable this is done with
is subsequently not used.
Fix this by using "key" rather than "rx->key" when filling in the
connection parameters.
Note that this only affects direct use of AF_RXRPC; the kAFS filesystem
doesn't use sendmsg() directly and so bypasses the issue. Further,
AF_RXRPC passes a NULL key in if no key is set, so using an anonymous key
in that manner works. Since this hasn't been noticed to this point, it
might be better just to remove the "key" variable and the code that sets it
- and, arguably, rxrpc_init_client_call_security() would be a better place
to handle it.
Fixes: 19ffa01c9c45 ("rxrpc: Use structs to hold connection params and protocol info")
Closes: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260319150150.4189381-1-dhowells%40redhat.com
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
cc: Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@auristor.com>
cc: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260408121252.2249051-4-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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In rxrpc_preparse_xdr_yfs_rxgk(), the memory attached to token->rxgk can be
leaked in a few error paths after it's allocated.
Fix this by freeing it in the "reject_token:" case.
Fixes: 0ca100ff4df6 ("rxrpc: Add YFS RxGK (GSSAPI) security class")
Closes: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260319150150.4189381-1-dhowells%40redhat.com
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
cc: Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@auristor.com>
cc: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260408121252.2249051-3-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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In the rxrpc key preparsing, every token extracted sets the proposed quota
value, but for multitoken keys, this will overwrite the previous proposed
quota, losing it.
Fix this by adding to the proposed quota instead.
Fixes: 8a7a3eb4ddbe ("KEYS: RxRPC: Use key preparsing")
Closes: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260319150150.4189381-1-dhowells%40redhat.com
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
cc: Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@auristor.com>
cc: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260408121252.2249051-2-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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Extend the verifier_ld_ind BPF selftests with subprogs containing
ld_{abs,ind} and craft the test in a way where the invalid register
read is rejected in the fixed case. Also add a success case each,
and add additional coverage related to the BTF return type enforcement.
# LDLIBS=-static PKG_CONFIG='pkg-config --static' ./vmtest.sh -- ./test_progs -t verifier_ld_ind
[...]
#611/1 verifier_ld_ind/ld_ind: check calling conv, r1:OK
#611/2 verifier_ld_ind/ld_ind: check calling conv, r1 @unpriv:OK
#611/3 verifier_ld_ind/ld_ind: check calling conv, r2:OK
#611/4 verifier_ld_ind/ld_ind: check calling conv, r2 @unpriv:OK
#611/5 verifier_ld_ind/ld_ind: check calling conv, r3:OK
#611/6 verifier_ld_ind/ld_ind: check calling conv, r3 @unpriv:OK
#611/7 verifier_ld_ind/ld_ind: check calling conv, r4:OK
#611/8 verifier_ld_ind/ld_ind: check calling conv, r4 @unpriv:OK
#611/9 verifier_ld_ind/ld_ind: check calling conv, r5:OK
#611/10 verifier_ld_ind/ld_ind: check calling conv, r5 @unpriv:OK
#611/11 verifier_ld_ind/ld_ind: check calling conv, r7:OK
#611/12 verifier_ld_ind/ld_ind: check calling conv, r7 @unpriv:OK
#611/13 verifier_ld_ind/ld_abs: subprog early exit on ld_abs failure:OK
#611/14 verifier_ld_ind/ld_ind: subprog early exit on ld_ind failure:OK
#611/15 verifier_ld_ind/ld_abs: subprog with both paths safe:OK
#611/16 verifier_ld_ind/ld_ind: subprog with both paths safe:OK
#611/17 verifier_ld_ind/ld_abs: reject void return subprog:OK
#611/18 verifier_ld_ind/ld_ind: reject void return subprog:OK
#611 verifier_ld_ind:OK
Summary: 1/18 PASSED, 0 SKIPPED, 0 FAILED
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260408191242.526279-4-daniel@iogearbox.net
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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The local subprog pointer in create_jt() and visit_abnormal_return_insn()
was declared static.
It is unconditionally assigned via bpf_find_containing_subprog() before
every use. Thus, the static qualifier serves no purpose and rather creates
confusion. Just remove it.
Fixes: e40f5a6bf88a ("bpf: correct stack liveness for tail calls")
Fixes: 493d9e0d6083 ("bpf, x86: add support for indirect jumps")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Anton Protopopov <a.s.protopopov@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260408191242.526279-3-daniel@iogearbox.net
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Usage of ld_{abs,ind} instructions got extended into subprogs some time
ago via commit 09b28d76eac4 ("bpf: Add abnormal return checks."). These
are only allowed in subprograms when the latter are BTF annotated and
have scalar return types.
The code generator in bpf_gen_ld_abs() has an abnormal exit path (r0=0 +
exit) from legacy cBPF times. While the enforcement is on scalar return
types, the verifier must also simulate the path of abnormal exit if the
packet data load via ld_{abs,ind} failed.
This is currently not the case. Fix it by having the verifier simulate
both success and failure paths, and extend it in similar ways as we do
for tail calls. The success path (r0=unknown, continue to next insn) is
pushed onto stack for later validation and the r0=0 and return to the
caller is done on the fall-through side.
Fixes: 09b28d76eac4 ("bpf: Add abnormal return checks.")
Reported-by: STAR Labs SG <info@starlabs.sg>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260408191242.526279-2-daniel@iogearbox.net
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Commit e40f5a6bf88a ("bpf: correct stack liveness for tail calls") added
visit_tailcall_insn() but did not check its return value.
Fixes: e40f5a6bf88a ("bpf: correct stack liveness for tail calls")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260408191242.526279-1-daniel@iogearbox.net
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Switch to device_for_each_child_node_scoped() to auto-release fwnode
references on early exit.
Fixes: 24e31e474769 ("net: mdio: Add RTL9300 MDIO driver")
Signed-off-by: Felix Gu <ustc.gu@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260405-rtl9300-v1-1-08e4499cf944@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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As far as I can tell, CRYPTO_MD5 has been unnecessary here ever since it
was added by commit c899e4ef96f0 ("[SCSI] open-iscsi/linux-iscsi-5
Initiator: Kconfig update") in 2005.
CRYPTO was needed until commit 92186c1455a2 ("scsi: iscsi_tcp: Switch to
using the crc32c library"), but is no longer needed.
Remove these unnecessary kconfig selections.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260404203003.33738-1-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
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Report an error for './runner foo' (positional arg instead of -t) and
for './runner -t foo' when the filter matches no tests. Previously both
cases produced no error output.
Pre-scan the test list before the main loop so the error is reported
immediately, avoiding spurious SKIP output from '-s' when no tests
match.
Signed-off-by: Cheng-Yang Chou <yphbchou0911@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
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Add a selftest to ensure that kprobe_multi programs cannot be attached
using the BPF_F_SLEEPABLE flag. This test succeeds when the kernel
rejects attachment of kprobe_multi when the BPF_F_SLEEPABLE flag is set.
Suggested-by: Leon Hwang <leon.hwang@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Varun R Mallya <varunrmallya@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260408190137.101418-3-varunrmallya@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Move find_linfo() as bpf_find_linfo() into core.c to allow for its use
in the verifier in subsequent patches.
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Mykyta Yatsenko <yatsenko@meta.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260408021359.3786905-4-memxor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Extract bpf_get_linfo_file_line as its own function so that the logic to
obtain the file, line, and line number for a given program can be shared
in subsequent patches.
Reviewed-by: Puranjay Mohan <puranjay@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Mykyta Yatsenko <yatsenko@meta.com>
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260408021359.3786905-3-memxor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Currently the two callers of truncate_upper handle passing information
very differently. ecryptfs_truncate passes a zeroed lower_ia and expects
truncate_upper to fill it in from the upper ia created just for that,
while ecryptfs_setattr passes a fully initialized lower_ia copied from
the upper one. Both of them then call notify_change on the lower_ia.
Switch to only passing the upper ia, and derive the lower ia from it
inside truncate_upper, and call notify_change inside the function itself.
Because the old name is misleading now, rename the resulting function to
__ecryptfs_truncate as it deals with both the lower and upper inodes.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <code@tyhicks.com>
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Prepare for using the code to create a lower struct iattr in multiple
places.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <code@tyhicks.com>
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Both callers of ecryptfs_inode_newsize_ok call truncate_upper right
after. Merge ecryptfs_inode_newsize_ok into truncate_upper to simplify
the logic.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <code@tyhicks.com>
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Simplify the logic in ecryptfs_setattr by combining the two ATTR_SIZE
blocks. This initializes lower_ia before the size check, which is
obviously correct as the size check doesn't look at it.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <code@tyhicks.com>
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Use the existing pre-zeroed memory instead of allocating a new chunk.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <code@tyhicks.com>
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Use a few strategic gotos to reduce indentation and keep the main flow
outside of branches. Switch all touched comments to normal kernel style
and avoid breaks in printed strings for all the code touched.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <code@tyhicks.com>
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Initialize variables at declaration time where applicable and reformat
conditionals to match the kernel coding style.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <code@tyhicks.com>
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Move SEV+ VM initialization to sev.c (as sev_vm_init()) so that
kvm_sev_info (and all usage) can be gated on CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV=y without
needing more #ifdefs. As a bonus, isolating the logic will make it easier
to harden the flow, e.g. to WARN if the vm_type is unknown.
No functional change intended (SEV, SEV_ES, and SNP VM types are only
supported if CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV=y).
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260310234829.2608037-12-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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Now that all external usage of the VM-scoped APIs to detect SEV+ guests is
gone, drop the stubs provided for CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV=n builds and bury the
"standard" APIs in sev.c.
No functional change intended.
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260310234829.2608037-11-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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Use the "unsafe" API to check for an SEV-ES+ guest when determining whether
or not SMBASE is a supported MSR, i.e. whether or not emulated SMM is
supported. This will eventually allow adding lockdep assertings to the
APIs for detecting SEV+ VMs without triggering "real" false positives.
While svm_has_emulated_msr() doesn't hold kvm->lock, i.e. can get both
false positives *and* false negatives, both are completely fine, as the
only time the result isn't stable is when userspace is the sole consumer
of the result. I.e. userspace can confuse itself, but that's it.
No functional change intended.
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260310234829.2608037-10-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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Add "unsafe" quad-underscore versions of the SEV+ guest detectors in
anticipation of hardening the APIs via lockdep assertions. This will allow
adding exceptions for usage that is known to be safe in advance of the
lockdep assertions.
Use a pile of underscores to try and communicate that use of the "unsafe"
shouldn't be done lightly.
No functional change intended.
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260310234829.2608037-9-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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Provide vCPU-scoped accessors for detecting if the vCPU belongs to an SEV,
SEV-ES, or SEV-SNP VM, partly to dedup a small amount of code, but mostly
to better document which usages are "safe". Generally speaking, using the
VM-scoped sev_guest() and friends outside of kvm->lock is unsafe, as they
can get both false positives and false negatives.
But for vCPUs, the accessors are guaranteed to provide a stable result as
KVM disallows initialization SEV+ state after vCPUs are created. I.e.
operating on a vCPU guarantees the VM can't "become" an SEV+ VM, and that
it can't revert back to a "normal" VM.
This will also allow dropping the stubs for the VM-scoped accessors, as
it's relatively easy to eliminate usage of the accessors from common SVM
once the vCPU-scoped checks are out of the way.
No functional change intended.
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260310234829.2608037-8-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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Lock and unlock all vCPUs in a single batch when synchronizing SEV-ES VMSAs
during launch finish, partly to dedup the code by a tiny amount, but mostly
so that sev_launch_update_vmsa() uses the same logic/flow as all other SEV
ioctls that lock all vCPUs.
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260310234829.2608037-7-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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Lock all vCPUs when synchronizing and encrypting VMSAs for SNP guests, as
allowing userspace to manipulate and/or run a vCPU while its state is being
synchronized would at best corrupt vCPU state, and at worst crash the host
kernel.
Opportunistically assert that vcpu->mutex is held when synchronizing its
VMSA (the SEV-ES path already locks vCPUs).
Fixes: ad27ce155566 ("KVM: SEV: Add KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_FINISH command")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260310234829.2608037-6-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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This commit adds battery status support for Rock Band 4 PS5 guitars.
The data is reported in the same way as the dualsense in hid-playstation
except it's located at byte 30.
Signed-off-by: Rosalie Wanders <rosalie@mailbox.org>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.com>
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This commit fixes inconsistent quirk names and also fixes all the
checkpatch.pl issues alongside inconsistent code, it also adds static
asserts to assert struct sizes at compile time.
Signed-off-by: Rosalie Wanders <rosalie@mailbox.org>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.com>
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hid-sony has been updated with new device support, update the
hid_have_special_driver list accordingly.
Signed-off-by: Rosalie Wanders <rosalie@mailbox.org>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.com>
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This patch adds support for the following instruments:
* Rock Band 1/2/3 Wii/PS3 instruments
* Rock Band 3 PS3 Pro instruments
* DJ Hero Turntable
Wii and PS3 instruments are the same besides the vendor and product ID.
This patch also fixes the mappings for the existing Guitar Hero
instruments.
Co-developed-by: Sanjay Govind <sanjay.govind9@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Sanjay Govind <sanjay.govind9@gmail.com>
Co-developed-by: Brenton Simpson <appsforartists@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Brenton Simpson <appsforartists@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Rosalie Wanders <rosalie@mailbox.org>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.com>
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Add support for Tegra PCIe core clock monitoring. Monitoring tracks rate
changes that may occur due to link speed changes and is useful for
detecting core clock changes not initiated by software. Parse the monitor
clock from device tree and enable it when present.
Signed-off-by: Vidya Sagar <vidyas@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Manikanta Maddireddy <mmaddireddy@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Manivannan Sadhasivam <mani@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Tested-by: Jon Hunter <jonathanh@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Jon Hunter <jonathanh@nvidia.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260324191000.1095768-8-mmaddireddy@nvidia.com
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Tegra supports PCIe core clock monitoring for any rate changes that may be
happening because of the link speed changes. This is useful in tracking
any changes in the core clock that are not initiated by the software.
Signed-off-by: Vidya Sagar <vidyas@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Manikanta Maddireddy <mmaddireddy@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Manivannan Sadhasivam <mani@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Tested-by: Jon Hunter <jonathanh@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Rob Herring (Arm) <robh@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Jon Hunter <jonathanh@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Vidya Sagar <vidyas@nvidia.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260324191000.1095768-7-mmaddireddy@nvidia.com
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