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Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit d5dc1e69fd7258ea605c9952e5d5947539159ae3 upstream.
A virtio_net_hdr (tun/tap, or AF_PACKET with PACKET_VNET_HDR) can mark
an IPv4 or IPv6 fragment as GSO; nothing relates gso_type to frag_off.
inet_frag_reasm_prepare()/inet_frag_reasm_finish() keep the first
fragment's skb as the head of the reassembled datagram, including its
shinfo->gso_size/gso_type/gso_segs, and chain the remaining fragments
on frag_list with whatever linear/paged layout they arrived with.
After ip_defrag() (ip_local_deliver(), nf_defrag_ipv4, ...) the
reassembled skb therefore still claims to be GSO (SKB_GSO_DODGY), and
the next software segmentation point - udp_rcv_segment() on local
delivery, validate_xmit_skb(), or the ip_finish_output_gso() slow
path - hands it to skb_segment(). skb_segment()'s frag_list walk
assumes GRO-shaped input and hits one of its BUG_ON()s. Two writes to
a tap by an unprivileged user in its own userns are enough:
kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:4899!
Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
CPU: 0 UID: 1000 PID: 82 Comm: poc Not tainted 7.2.0-pentest+ #2
RIP: 0010:skb_segment+0x20ca/0x48b0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__udp_gso_segment+0x29a/0x27d0
udp4_ufo_fragment+0x458/0x6c0
inet_gso_segment+0x429/0x1340
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x233/0x4f0
__skb_gso_segment+0x308/0x660
udp_queue_rcv_skb+0x440/0xad0
udp_unicast_rcv_skb+0xc7/0x2c0
udp_rcv+0x16ce/0x2260
ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x197/0x2d0
ip_local_deliver+0x430/0x690
ip_rcv+0x16f/0x1f0
__netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x15e/0x1c0
__netif_receive_skb+0x1e/0x110
netif_receive_skb+0xf6/0x5c0
tun_rx_batched.isra.0+0x3ab/0x790
tun_get_user+0x17c3/0x3550
tun_chr_write_iter+0xba/0x1b0
vfs_write+0x646/0x1130
</TASK>
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
This runs with BH disabled, so it is a panic rather than an oops. The
same is reachable with CAP_NET_RAW in a netns where a defrag point
precedes a GSO point, and from a guest whose VMM forwards
virtio_net_hdr to a tap. The SKB_GSO_DODGY frag_list checks added by
commit 3dcbdb134f32 ("net: gso: Fix skb_segment splat when splitting
gso_size mangled skb having linear-headed frag_list") and by
commit 9e4b7a99a03a ("net: gso: fix panic on frag_list with mixed head
alloc types") do not cover it: page-backed heads skip them, and kmalloc
heads skip them when gso_size == skb_headlen(head), which the sender
controls.
An skb entering a frag queue is an IP fragment by definition and
cannot legitimately carry GSO state: GRO does not merge fragments and
the stack segments before it fragments, so only untrusted sources are
affected. This has been reachable since
commit f43798c27684 ("tun: Allow GSO using virtio_net_hdr"), the first
path that let userspace attach GSO metadata to an IP fragment. Reset
the GSO fields of every fragment as it is queued, in
inet_frag_queue_insert(), which IPv4, IPv6, nf_conntrack_reasm and
6lowpan reassembly share; then neither the head nor the frag_list
members of the reassembled skb carry them (the members matter too:
the ip_do_fragment()/ip6_fragment() fast paths send them out as they
are). The head may remain CHECKSUM_PARTIAL; that is already accepted
on receive and resolved by skb_checksum_help() in
ip_do_fragment()/ip6_fragment() on forward.
Tested on top of net.git (dc4b95b8fee9), x86_64: the tap reproducer
above, two further IPv4 frag_list geometries that reach
BUG_ON(i >= nfrags) and BUG_ON(!list_skb->head_frag), and an IPv6
fragment-header variant (udp6_ufo_fragment()) each panic the unpatched
kernel; with this patch all four datagrams are delivered intact and
nothing is logged.
Fixes: f43798c27684 ("tun: Allow GSO using virtio_net_hdr")
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Xinyang Ge <xinyang@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/937926e509f2acd8e0e66520dc2b30fd6b4d1687.1787839506.git.pabeni@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260825132541.813800447@linuxfoundation.org
Tested-by: Florian Fainelli <florian.fainelli@broadcom.com>
Tested-by: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>
Tested-by: Ron Economos <re@w6rz.net>
Tested-by: Wentao Guan <guanwentao@uniontech.com>
Tested-by: Barry K. Nathan <barryn@pobox.com>
Tested-by: Brett A C Sheffield <bacs@librecast.net>
Tested-by: Miguel Ojeda <ojeda@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Peter Schneider <pschneider1968@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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When GRO attempts to aggregate packets beyond GRO_LEGACY_MAX_SIZE (64KB),
BIG TCP should only be permitted for plain IPv4 TCP and plain IPv6 TCP
(with sufficient MAC header room to insert the temporary HBH jumbo header).
However, commit b1a78b9b9886 ("net: add support for ipv4 big tcp")
loosened the check in skb_gro_receive(), leading to several issues:
1. skb_gro_receive() checked skb_headroom(p) instead of the actual space
before the MAC header (p->mac_header). Because skb_headroom(p) includes
mac_len, crafted frames (e.g. injected via AF_PACKET) can pass the check
with p->mac_header < 8 bytes. When ipv6_gro_complete() inserts the
temporary HBH jumbo header, the memmove() starts before skb->head,
causing an out-of-bounds write and wrapping skb->mac_header.
2. It allowed non-IP protocols such as software VLAN (ETH_P_8021Q /
ETH_P_8021AD) to aggregate beyond 64KB because
p->protocol != ETH_P_IPV6 was true.
3. It checked p->encapsulation instead of NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->encap_mark,
allowing encapsulated flows (e.g. SIT / IPv6-in-IPv4) to aggregate
beyond 64KB.
Fix skb_gro_receive() to strictly enforce:
- NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->proto == IPPROTO_TCP
- Not encapsulated (!NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->encap_mark && !p->encapsulation)
- Protocol must be either ETH_P_IP or ETH_P_IPV6
- If ETH_P_IPV6, p->mac_header must be at least
sizeof(struct hop_jumbo_hdr)
Returning -E2BIG from skb_gro_receive() ensures that packets which cannot
become BIG TCP are cleanly flushed at <= 64KB and delivered intact without
dropping.
This issue does not exist in mainline (7.0+) because the subsystem was
rewritten in commit 81be30c1f5f2 ("net/ipv6: Drop HBH for BIG TCP on RX
side"), making this fix relevant only for older stable branches like
6.18.y.
Fixes: 0fe79f28bfaf ("net: allow gro_max_size to exceed 65536")
Fixes: b1a78b9b9886 ("net: add support for ipv4 big tcp")
Reported-by: Sam Dlinn <sledge@meta.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 0acd4eeb4b225b9bebbf9ef96cc10cdd79b94899 upstream.
The Command Complete dispatch validates only the fixed part of the LE Set
CIG Parameters response. After that part is pulled from the skb,
hci_cc_le_set_cig_params() trusts num_handles and reads each entry in the
trailing handle array.
Matching num_handles against the command's num_cis does not guarantee
that the response contains the advertised handles. A truncated response
from a malfunctioning controller can therefore make the handler read
beyond the skb data.
Validate that the remaining skb data contains all advertised handles.
Include this in the existing response validation so malformed responses
also follow the established CIG failure handling.
Fixes: 26afbd826ee3 ("Bluetooth: Add initial implementation of CIS connections")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Laxman Acharya Padhya <acharyalaxman8848@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 33af47e847fe4a28b109673affb5874015d54f5a upstream.
hci_cc_reset() clears the LE accept and resolving lists without taking
hdev->lock. Other command-complete handlers serialize updates to these
lists with that lock, and the debugfs readers hold it while walking them.
This permits the reset completion and a debugfs read to interleave as
follows:
hci_rx_work debugfs reader
----------- --------------
lock hdev->lock
fetch current entry
list_del(entry)
kfree(entry)
read entry fields
The reader then dereferences a freed list entry and may follow its stale
next pointer.
KASAN reported:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in white_list_show+0x15f/0x180
Read of size 1 at addr ffff8881015dab16 by task poc/95
Call Trace:
white_list_show+0x15f/0x180
seq_read_iter+0x3ff/0x1190
seq_read+0x267/0x3d0
vfs_read+0x177/0xa20
ksys_read+0xf7/0x1c0
Allocated by task 91:
hci_bdaddr_list_add+0x1a6/0x3a0
hci_cc_le_add_to_accept_list+0xab/0x140
hci_cmd_complete_evt+0x26c/0x9a0
hci_event_packet+0x454/0xb20
hci_rx_work+0x293/0x730
Freed by task 90:
kfree+0x131/0x3c0
hci_bdaddr_list_clear+0xd8/0x160
hci_cc_reset+0x28a/0x370
hci_cmd_complete_evt+0x26c/0x9a0
hci_event_packet+0x454/0xb20
hci_rx_work+0x293/0x730
Take hdev->lock around both list clears. This matches the existing
mutation and traversal locking convention.
Fixes: a4d5504d5c39 ("Bluetooth: Clear LE white list when resetting controller")
Fixes: cfdb0c2d095a ("Bluetooth: Store Resolv list size")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Chengfeng Ye <nicoyip.dev@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 934b7778aa7b7c8f6bb073d2a73ba3674885bae0 upstream.
The Hyper-V synthetic HID host supplies SYNTH_HID_INITIAL_DEVICE_INFO
messages that contain a HID descriptor followed by the report descriptor
bytes. mousevsc_on_receive_device_info() trusts bLength and
wDescriptorLength without checking that the received packet contains both
byte ranges.
A malformed host or backend message can therefore make the guest read
past the received VMBus packet while copying the report descriptor. Pass
the received initial-device-info size into the parser and reject
descriptor lengths that exceed the packet.
Impact: A malicious Hyper-V host or backend can crash a guest by sending
a short initial device-info message with an oversized HID report
descriptor length.
Fixes: b95f5bcb811e ("HID: Move the hid-hyperv driver out of staging")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5-5-xhigh
Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit ad8fb82b04422f49530d2aa2753cc81d1c60102c upstream.
enable_sensor_store() can call set_power_report_state(), which
dereferences sensor_inst->power_state and sensor_inst->report_state.
These pointers refer to entries in sensor_inst->fields.
Create the field attributes before exposing the enable_sensor sysfs
attribute, so enable_sensor cannot be accessed before the state it
depends on has been initialized.
On remove, delete enable_sensor before freeing the field attributes,
so a concurrent sysfs write cannot dereference freed memory through
power_state or report_state.
Reported-by: Sashiko AI Review <sashiko-bot@kernel.org>
Link: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260623021950.1736413-1-haoxiang_li2024@163.com?part=1
Fixes: 4a7de0519df5 ("HID: sensor: Custom and Generic sensor support")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Haoxiang Li <haoxiang_li2024@163.com>
Acked-by: Srinivas Pandruvada <srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 28abce951343fcec26e397610868efa4e1395c3f upstream.
When fetch_item() is called by hid_scan_report() on an item with
HID_ITEM_TAG_LONG, it stores a pointer to the item data in
item->data.longdata instead of storing a value directly in
item->data.{u8/u16/u32}.
When item_udata() or item_sdata() encounters such an item, it incorrectly
assumes that the item is in short format, and therefore returns the lower
part of a kernel pointer reinterpreted as a number.
When a HID device is connected whose descriptor contains a
HID_GLOBAL_ITEM_TAG_REPORT_SIZE encoded in long format with size=4, this
causes the lower half of a kernel pointer to be printed into dmesg as a
number, like this:
hid (null): invalid report_size 107953555
To fix it, let item_udata() and item_sdata() verify that the item is in
short format.
Note that this bug only affects hid_scan_report(), while the main parsing
pass hid_parse_collections() will always bail out when encountering a long
item.
Sidenote: There are currently no users of data.longdata; maybe we should
just remove any parsing of long-format descriptors as a follow-up.
Fixes: 3dc8fc083dbf ("HID: Use hid_parser for pre-scanning the report descriptors")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 27b376b945c0aac46fcdfcc950b14a85b874b557 upstream.
joycon_ctlr_read_handler() casts an incoming HID input report to
struct joycon_input_report and parses it, guarding the cast only with a
12-byte length check:
if (size >= 12) /* make sure it contains the input report */
joycon_parse_report(ctlr, (struct joycon_input_report *)data);
struct joycon_input_report is 49 bytes: a 13-byte header followed by a
union whose IMU arm is 36 bytes. For an IMU report joycon_parse_report()
-> joycon_parse_imu_report() walks that union (struct offsets 13..48),
so a report of exactly 12 bytes with data[0] == JC_INPUT_IMU_DATA passes
the guard yet is read up to 37 bytes past its declared length. The
over-read bytes are decoded into accelerometer/gyroscope values and
forwarded to userspace through the "(IMU)" input device, leaking
driver-internal memory. data[0] and size are fully controlled by a
malicious or spoofed Joy-Con/Pro Controller.
Receive buffers are sized to the maximum report length, so this is an
over-read within the allocation rather than a slab OOB, but the decoded
bytes still reach userspace.
The sibling subcmd path in joycon_ctlr_handle_event() already bounds the
same cast correctly:
if (size < sizeof(struct joycon_input_report) ||
data[0] != JC_INPUT_SUBCMD_REPLY)
break;
Use the same sizeof(struct joycon_input_report) bound here.
Fixes: 2af16c1f846b ("HID: nintendo: add nintendo switch controller driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ibrahim Hashimov <security@auditcode.ai>
Assisted-by: AuditCode-AI:2026.07
Reviewed-by: Silvan Jegen <s.jegen@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit efc33b5102ff859bacd390a5f30112d8e0c084c0 ]
mptcp_pm_destroy() empties msk->pm.anno_list and
msk->pm.userspace_pm_local_addr_list under msk->pm.lock during socket
teardown, dropping the lock between the two.
A concurrent userspace PM genl ANNOUNCE on the same msk holds a sock
reference via mptcp_token_get_sock() and, in
mptcp_pm_nl_announce_doit(), calls
mptcp_userspace_pm_append_new_local_addr() and
mptcp_pm_announced_alloc(). Both take msk->pm.lock briefly to add to
their respective lists. Because the genl handler holds a sock reference,
mptcp_pm_destroy() may run on the same msk via mptcp_disconnect(), which
invokes mptcp_destroy_common() without dropping the sock refcount,
before the handler completes.
If the lock acquisitions interleave such that mptcp_pm_destroy() empties
a list first, the later alloc adds its entry to a list head that nothing
else iterates for this msk, and the entry leaks. kmemleak reports both
mptcp_pm_add_addr objects (from mptcp_pm_announced_alloc()) and
mptcp_pm_addr_entry objects (from
mptcp_userspace_pm_append_new_local_addr()) under sustained concurrent
ANNOUNCE + close load against the userspace PM.
Add an MPTCP_PM_DESTROYING bit in msk->pm.status, set by
mptcp_pm_destroy() under pm.lock before the lists are emptied and
checked under pm.lock by the alloc paths. Either the alloc takes pm.lock
first, in which case its entry is on the list when mptcp_pm_destroy()
frees it; or mptcp_pm_destroy() takes pm.lock first, in which case the
later alloc observes the bit and refuses.
Found by an MPTCP protocol-flow harness extending BRF (arXiv:2305.08782).
Fixes: 9ab4807c84a4 ("mptcp: netlink: Add MPTCP_PM_CMD_ANNOUNCE")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Shardul Bankar <shardul.b@mpiricsoftware.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260803-net-mptcp-misc-fixes-7-2-rc6-v2-6-b8f496d71664@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
[ Inlined `mptcp_pm_destroy()` at its call site in `mptcp_destroy_common()` and moved the fences into the pre-rename `mptcp_pm_alloc_anno_list()`/`mptcp_free_local_addr_list()` equivalents, deleting the `mptcp_pm_is_userspace()` guard from inside the callee instead of the call site. ]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 410c44b1096789d0c40fbee706520e981dba7bc1 ]
The internal keyboard on the HONOR ZQC-P (HONOR MagicBook Pro 14 2026)
does not work after boot.
Using the kernel command line 'i8042.dumbkbd=1' makes the keyboard
functional, but the CapsLock LED does not work. Adding the
'atkbd_deactivate_fixup' quirk fixes the keyboard and CapsLock LED
natively without requiring boot parameters.
DMI: HONOR ZQC-P/ZQC-P-PCB, BIOS 1.09 03/19/2026
Fixes: 9cf6e24c9fbf ("Input: atkbd - do not skip atkbd_deactivate() when skipping ATKBD_CMD_GETID")
Signed-off-by: Donglin Lyu <donglin_lyu@outlook.com>
Tested-by: Ruslan Shevchenko <adefka@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260801151115.52709-1-donglin_lyu@outlook.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
[dtor: keep all HONOR entries together]
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 2aaf33c6e1e82561d7dce2345298a985a2483266 ]
After commit 9cf6e24c9fbf17e52de9fff07f12be7565ea6d61 ("Input: atkbd -
do not skip atkbd_deactivate() when skipping ATKBD_CMD_GETID"), HONOR
FMB-P, aka HONOR MagicBook Pro 14 2025's internal keyboard stops
working. Adding the atkbd_deactivate_fixup quirk fixes it.
DMI: HONOR FMB-P/FMB-P-PCB, BIOS 1.13 05/08/2025
Fixes: 9cf6e24c9fbf17e52de9fff07f12be7565ea6d61 ("Input: atkbd - do not skip atkbd_deactivate() when skipping ATKBD_CMD_GETID")
Reported-by: Mikura Kyouka <mikurakyouka@aosc.io>
Reported-by: foad.elkhattabi <foad.elkhattabi@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Cryolitia PukNgae <cryolitia.pukngae@linux.dev>
Reviewed-by: Hans de Goede <hansg@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251022-honor-v1-1-ff894ed271a9@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
Stable-dep-of: 410c44b10967 ("Input: atkbd - skip deactivate for HONOR ZQC-P")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit cdc36db204ffd97b947d64374cf23a210dc74777 ]
hci_find_adv_instance() returns an adv_info pointer that is valid only
while hdev->lock is held. The advertising command-sync paths perform
instance lookups without that lock and, in some cases, retain the pointer
while waiting for a controller response.
An advertising termination event can therefore interleave as follows:
hci_cmd_sync_work hci_rx_work
hci_find_adv_instance()
__hci_cmd_sync_status()
wait for controller reply hci_dev_lock()
hci_remove_adv_instance()
kfree(adv)
adv->scan_rsp_changed = false
KASAN reported:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in hci_set_ext_scan_rsp_data_sync+0x2e1/0x300
Write of size 1 at addr ffff88810a45d21d by task kworker/u17:0/88
Workqueue: hci0 hci_cmd_sync_work
Call Trace:
hci_set_ext_scan_rsp_data_sync+0x2e1/0x300
hci_schedule_adv_instance_sync+0x390/0x4c0
hci_cmd_sync_work+0x173/0x300
Allocated by task 87:
hci_add_adv_instance+0x538/0xac0
add_advertising+0x885/0x1160
Freed by task 89:
kfree+0x131/0x3c0
hci_remove_adv_instance+0x1d8/0x3b0
hci_le_ext_adv_term_evt+0x17b/0x730
Protect the instance lookup and payload construction in the extended
advertising, scan response, and periodic advertising data paths. Snapshot
the advertising parameters under hdev->lock, but release the lock before
waiting for the controller.
Clear advertising-data dirty bits before issuing their commands and
restore them after a failure using a fresh lookup. Likewise, update the
reported transmit power through a fresh lookup after the parameter command
completes. No adv_info pointer then survives an HCI command wait.
Fixes: cba6b758711c ("Bluetooth: hci_sync: Make use of hci_cmd_sync_queue set 2")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Suggested-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.dentz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Chengfeng Ye <nicoyip.dev@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit c283e9ada7fcb7dd4b10592623086b2e6d2f9925 ]
xfrm_user_policy() clears the socket dst cache with __sk_dst_reset(),
i.e. the non-atomic __sk_dst_set(sk, NULL): it reads sk_dst_cache with
rcu_dereference_protected(), stores NULL and dst_release()s the old dst.
That is only safe if no other thread modifies sk_dst_cache concurrently.
For a connected UDP socket that does not hold: the transmit fast path
(udp_sendmsg -> sk_dst_check -> sk_dst_reset) resets the cache locklessly
with an atomic xchg(). A per-socket policy change racing a send can make
both sides observe the same old dst and each dst_release() it, dropping
the socket's single reference twice and freeing the xfrm_dst bundle while
it is still referenced:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in dst_release
Write of size 4 at addr ffff88801897b6c0 by task exploit/155
Call Trace:
...
dst_release (... ./include/linux/rcuref.h:109)
xfrm_user_policy (./include/net/sock.h:2239 ./include/net/sock.h:2256 net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c:3053)
do_ip_setsockopt (net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c:1347)
ip_setsockopt (net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c:1417)
do_sock_setsockopt (net/socket.c:2368)
__sys_setsockopt (net/socket.c:2393)
__x64_sys_setsockopt (net/socket.c:2396)
do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94)
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121)
Reachable by an unprivileged user via a user+network namespace.
Use the atomic sk_dst_reset() so the cache is cleared and released with a
single xchg(): whichever side wins releases the dst once, the other sees
NULL and does nothing. Behaviour is otherwise unchanged.
Fixes: 2b06cdf3e688 ("xfrm: Clear sk_dst_cache when applying per-socket policy.")
Fixes: be8f8284cd89 ("net: xfrm: allow clearing socket xfrm policies.")
Reported-by: AutonomousCodeSecurity@microsoft.com
Signed-off-by: Xiang Mei (Microsoft) <xmei5@asu.edu>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit a13cdb19fcb223ed41bdab3bab42b98dba87e90b upstream.
hid_set_field() hands field->usage + offset to hid_dump_input() before
the guard that bounds offset:
hid_dump_input(field->report->device, field->usage + offset, value);
if (offset >= field->report_count) {
hid_err(...);
return -1;
}
Under CONFIG_DEBUG_FS hid_dump_input() dereferences that pointer, with
buf = hid_resolv_usage(usage->hid, NULL). The usage[] array is
allocated inline with the hid_field in hid_register_field() and holds
field->maxusage entries, so an offset past it reads off the end of the
kvzalloc()ed allocation and into a neighbouring object. Had the guard
run first, offset < report_count <= maxusage would already have confined
the pointer to the array.
A caller supplies such an offset today. picolcd_fb_send_tile()
validates only report->maxfield before issuing
hid_set_field(report->field[0], 11 + i, ...) for i = 0..31, so its
offsets are fixed at 11..42 and are never checked against the bound
field. When the device registers that field with fewer usages, the
framebuffer deferred-io work drives the read on every tile. KASAN
reports a 4-byte slab-out-of-bounds read in hid_dump_input() below
hid_set_field(), and the same boot logs "offset (1) exceeds
report_count (1)" from the guard that runs only afterwards.
Move the hid_dump_input() call below the guard. Because
field->maxusage >= field->report_count, the guard then establishes that
field->usage + offset lies inside the array before it is dereferenced,
for every caller and without changing behaviour on the valid path.
Discovered by XBOW, triaged by Baul Lee <baul.lee@xbow.com>
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reported-by: Federico Kirschbaum <federico.kirschbaum@xbow.com>
Reported-by: Baul Lee <baul.lee@xbow.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Baul Lee <baul.lee@xbow.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit d93ba918a185aca2594da63e92fdc5495b559c0f upstream.
It is currently possible for a malicious or misconfigured USB device to
cause an out-of-bounds (OOB) read when submitting reports using
DOUBLE_REPORT_ID by specifying a large report length and providing a
smaller one.
Let's prevent that by comparing the specified report length with the
actual size of the data read in from userspace. If the actual data
length ends up being smaller than specified, we'll politely warn the
user and prevent any further processing.
Signed-off-by: Lee Jones <lee@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 0af3b89705688af01aa06025b84fa7a1e06ba6cc upstream.
magicmouse_input_mapping() caches the first hid_input's input_dev in
msc->input while the report descriptor is parsed, and the rest of the
driver treats a non-NULL msc->input as proof that an input device was
registered.
That does not hold on the hid-input error path. If hidinput_connect()
fails -- for instance because input_register_device() returns an error --
it unwinds through hidinput_disconnect(), which frees every input_dev it
created, including the one cached in msc->input.
The failure does not abort the probe. hid_connect() only skips the claim:
if ((connect_mask & HID_CONNECT_HIDINPUT) && !hidinput_connect(hdev,
connect_mask & HID_CONNECT_HIDINPUT_FORCE))
hdev->claimed |= HID_CLAIMED_INPUT;
and the "device has no listeners" bailout below it does not fire for this
driver, which sets ->raw_event; on the USB Magic Mouse 2 / Magic Trackpad
2 paths hidraw and hiddev are claimed as well. hid_hw_start() therefore
returns 0 and magicmouse_probe() continues with msc->input pointing at
freed memory. Being non-NULL, it passes the "input not registered" check
in probe and the NULL checks in ->raw_event and ->event, so the next
input report dereferences freed memory.
Clear msc->input when the HID core did not claim an input device, so the
existing NULL checks cover this case as well.
Fixes: f1a9a149abc8 ("HID: magicmouse: fix race between input_register() and probe()")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-input/20260728185542.65F091F000E9@smtp.kernel.org/
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jose Villaseñor Montfort <pepemontfort@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Alec Hall <signshop.alec@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Alec Hall <signshop.alec@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit a1556b48efc157fdda07b52ecc56c7bd1e1786f0 upstream.
The Apple Magic Trackpad 2 (USB-C) reports a wildly wrong battery
capacity over Bluetooth, for example a constant 4% for a pack that is
actually at 74%.
The device's battery input report (0x90) is laid out as
[report-id][status][charge]. hid-input's synchronous capacity query,
hidinput_query_battery_capacity(), assumes the common
[report-id][capacity] layout and returns buf[1], which for this device
is the status byte rather than the charge (buf[2]).
magicmouse_fetch_battery(), which requests the battery report through
hid_hw_request() so the reply is decoded via the report descriptor at
the correct field offset, is gated to the USB models and never runs
over Bluetooth. The device does not push battery reports on its own
either, except a single one at connect time, which is delivered while
probe holds driver_input_lock and is silently dropped. All userspace
reads therefore go through the misparsing query, and the device is
stuck reporting its status byte as the capacity.
Enabling the fetch for Bluetooth is not sufficient on its own: user
space reacts to the power_supply registration immediately, so a query
is typically already in flight when the fetch reply is parsed.
hidinput_get_battery_property() stores the query result and marks the
battery as queried without rechecking whether a report arrived while
it was waiting, clobbering the just-reported correct value with the
misparsed one.
Fix this by adding HID_BATTERY_QUIRK_AVOID_QUERY for the Bluetooth
Magic Trackpad USB-C so the misparsing query path is never used, and
by fetching the battery at the end of probe for this device. hidp has
no asynchronous request() callback, so the fetch is serviced
synchronously via __hid_request() while probe still holds
driver_input_lock; call hid_device_io_start() first so the reply is
processed instead of being discarded.
Tested with a Magic Trackpad USB-C (004c:0324) over Bluetooth on
6.18.37: the reported capacity now matches the device (verified against
a raw GET_REPORT of report 0x90) and updates on reconnect.
Fixes: 87a2f10395c8 ("HID: magicmouse: Apple Magic Trackpad 2 USB-C driver support")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andrei Fed <andfed.net@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit a7aad5b69d3bdaec20a3ed9284e184502450c0cd ]
The timer callback reads entry->retrans_times outside pm.lock to decide
whether to call mptcp_pm_subflow_established(). Since
mptcp_pm_announced_del_timer() can concurrently set retrans_times =
ADD_ADDR_RETRANS_MAX under pm.lock, a race condition exists.
I discovered this issue while studying the code. AI tools helped me to
verify the issue can potentially happen under race conditions.
Use a local 'retransmit' flag set inside pm.lock to capture whether
retransmission is still possible when the lock is taken. This allows to
call mptcp_pm_subflow_established() accordingly, and not depending on
the situation that can be different when checked outside the pm.lock.
Fixes: 348d5c1dec60 ("mptcp: move to next addr when timeout")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Qing Luo <luoqing@kylinos.cn>
Reviewed-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260803-net-mptcp-misc-fixes-7-2-rc6-v2-4-b8f496d71664@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
[ applied to mptcp_pm_add_timer() in pm_netlink.c instead of pm.c and collapsed the adaptive backoff branch to `if (!retransmit) timeout = 0;` since the tree lacks exponential ADD_ADDR retransmission timeouts ]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 1ba381759e45d5d0442452cfa5c42e836191a568 ]
The "DEC0 MODE" to "DEC7 MODE" controls are enumerated, but
tx_macro_dec_mode_get() and tx_macro_dec_mode_put() access their
value through ucontrol->value.integer.value[0] (a long) instead of
ucontrol->value.enumerated.item[0] (an unsigned int).
This same pattern was fixed in the sibling drivers by
commit bcfe5f76cc40 ("ASoC: codecs: rx-macro: fix accessing array
out of bounds for enum type") and
commit 0ea5eff7c606 ("ASoC: codecs: va-macro: fix accessing array
out of bounds for enum type"), but tx-macro was missed.
On 64-bit kernels built with CONFIG_SND_CTL_DEBUG, the elem value
sanity check catches the 4 bytes written past the enumerated item
and every read of these controls fails with -EINVAL:
snd-sm8250 sound: control 2:0:0:DEC0 MODE:0: access overflow
Fixes: c39667ddcfc5 ("ASoC: codecs: lpass-tx-macro: add support for lpass tx macro")
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-fable-5
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dawid Wróbel <me@dawidwrobel.com>
Reviewed-by: Srinivas Kandagatla <srinivas.kandagatla@oss.qualcomm.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260730-worktree-lpass-tx-macro-enum-fix-v2-1-6d091c736116@dawidwrobel.com
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
[ kept `snd_soc_kcontrol_component()` context line instead of upstream's renamed `snd_kcontrol_chip()` ]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 17661c67b206612cb3ba65d5ae726cd2015d0a53 ]
Ignore IPC errors for pipeline state change if the firmware state is
crashed or the IPC has timed out.
If the firmware has crashed the kernel still needs to go through the state
changes to reset its internal to be able to correctly work the next time
the DSP is booted up.
The case with IPC timeout is a bit more problematic, but it has been
rootcaused to be the result of system scheduling blockage and the firmware
did actually received and handled the message, but the reply handling got
blocked by issues outside of the SOF stack.
So far the best way to handle this is to continue with setting the state.
Fixes: c40aad7c81e5 ("ASoC: SOF: ipc4-pcm: Workaround for crashed firmware on system suspend")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Peter Ujfalusi <peter.ujfalusi@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Kai Vehmanen <kai.vehmanen@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260730112343.26687-1-peter.ujfalusi@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 860693187c597645b28a421d8acb26428b8afd3f ]
Introduce spcm_dbg() and spcm_err() macros to provide consistent printing
for debug and error messages which includes usable information in the
print's prefix.
Update the prints in pcm.c, ipc3-pcm.c and ipc4-pcm.c to take advantage of
the features provided by the macros.
Signed-off-by: Peter Ujfalusi <peter.ujfalusi@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Liam Girdwood <liam.r.girdwood@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Bard Liao <yung-chuan.liao@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Ranjani Sridharan <ranjani.sridharan@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250206092828.7569-4-peter.ujfalusi@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Stable-dep-of: 17661c67b206 ("ASoC: SOF: ipc4-pcm: Continue the pipeline trigger in case of IPC timeout")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 4d2ea16576c8aa1437048cf436bff85653f139fe ]
The platform specific pcm_open call via snd_sof_pcm_platform_open() can
modify the initial buffer configuration via constraints.
Move the prints as last step in the sof_pcm_open() function to reflect the
final setup.
Signed-off-by: Peter Ujfalusi <peter.ujfalusi@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Liam Girdwood <liam.r.girdwood@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Bard Liao <yung-chuan.liao@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Ranjani Sridharan <ranjani.sridharan@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250206092828.7569-3-peter.ujfalusi@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Stable-dep-of: 17661c67b206 ("ASoC: SOF: ipc4-pcm: Continue the pipeline trigger in case of IPC timeout")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 169ec0a541aac8afb215ab591b0fd53276686014 ]
Move the sof_pcm_stream_free() from sof-audio.c to pcm.c as static function
and add wrapper to free all active stream, which is going to be used in
ipc3/4 topology code (removes duplicated code).
With this change most of the PCM stream related code is located in one
source file for easier lookup and simplified flow.
Signed-off-by: Peter Ujfalusi <peter.ujfalusi@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Liam Girdwood <liam.r.girdwood@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Bard Liao <yung-chuan.liao@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Ranjani Sridharan <ranjani.sridharan@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250206092828.7569-2-peter.ujfalusi@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Stable-dep-of: 17661c67b206 ("ASoC: SOF: ipc4-pcm: Continue the pipeline trigger in case of IPC timeout")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit cda4aa0069b73e3404ee61864b4814ccc7b7a6ad ]
We already have snd_pcm_direction_name(). Let's use it.
Signed-off-by: Kuninori Morimoto <kuninori.morimoto.gx@renesas.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/87mslzk51h.wl-kuninori.morimoto.gx@renesas.com
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Stable-dep-of: 17661c67b206 ("ASoC: SOF: ipc4-pcm: Continue the pipeline trigger in case of IPC timeout")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 737a3b535247226f6e1a7988fd9d6e63e7d6fc71 upstream.
When fuzzing the nvme target code, I tripped a kernel warning in
nvmet_tcp_map_data() because the length passed into the allocator is
controlled by the remote initiator.
A remote initiator that sends a command with an SGL claiming a huge
number, can create a scatterlist and iovec allocation of over 1 million
entries, which causes the backing kmalloc call to exceed MAX_PAGE_ORDER
and then the page allocator will trip on a WARN_ON_ONCE_GFP() message:
WARNING: mm/page_alloc.c:5280 __alloc_frozen_pages_noprof
Workqueue: nvmet_tcp_wq nvmet_tcp_io_work
...
sgl_alloc_order
nvmet_tcp_map_data
nvmet_tcp_try_recv_pdu
As it's never good to trip a kernel warning remotely due to many systems
having panic-on-warn enabled, let's silence it by just add GFP_NOWARN to
the allocation flags.
Assisted-by: gkh_clanker_2000
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Keith Busch <kbusch@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit ba98d6796d12258e837ece065d2ecb59d76ce4ff upstream.
nvmet_fc_alloc_ls_iodlist() advances iod while initializing the LS IOD
array. If an rqstbuf allocation or response buffer DMA mapping fails,
the unwind loop decrements iod past the start of the array. The final
kfree(iod) therefore frees an address before the allocated object.
This can be reproduced with nvme-fcloop and failslab by setting
fail-nth to 6 before creating a target port. KASAN reports:
BUG: KASAN: invalid-free in nvmet_fc_register_targetport
Free of addr ffff88816cf8ff48 by task nvmet_fail_nth/9552
Free the original allocation base stored in tgtport->iod instead. With
this fix applied, the same sysfs write with fail-nth=6 returns -ENOMEM
without any KASAN report.
Fixes: c53432030d86 ("nvme-fabrics: Add target support for FC transport")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Maurizio Lombardi <mlombard@redhat.com>
Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5
Signed-off-by: Jiang HongHui <jiang_hh2019@163.com>
Signed-off-by: Keith Busch <kbusch@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 3ddcfb013322aa37eaa7a0d344b73079c38dfa21 upstream.
nvmet_execute_auth_receive() allocates the response buffer with kmalloc()
sized by the host-supplied AUTH_RECEIVE allocation length, but the
DH-HMAC-CHAP builders write only a fixed-size message into it. The full
allocation length is then copied to the wire by nvmet_copy_to_sgl(), so a
remote initiator receives the bytes past the built message -- up to nearly
a page of uninitialized slab -- during the pre-authentication handshake.
Allocate the buffer with kzalloc() so the unwritten tail is zeroed before
it is sent; conforming responses are unaffected.
Fixes: db1312dd9548 ("nvmet: implement basic In-Band Authentication")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Bryam Vargas <hexlabsecurity@proton.me>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Keith Busch <kbusch@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit d0d48d999b0eee6bb176ef4e39d9be868fa80f7e upstream.
ip6_finish_output2() caches a pointer to the IPv6 destination
address (daddr) before invoking lwtunnel_xmit(). The LWT-BPF
transmit path or other encapsulation operations within
lwtunnel_xmit() can reallocate the skb head, freeing the memory
that daddr points to. When lwtunnel_xmit() returns
LWTUNNEL_XMIT_CONTINUE, the function continues to use the stale
daddr pointer to compute the nexthop and to look up or create the
neighbour entry. This results in a use-after-free read, which can
leak sensitive kernel data, pollute the neighbour table with
arbitrary values, misdirect traffic, or crash the system.
Fix this by re-fetching the IPv6 header and the destination
address pointer after lwtunnel_xmit() returns
LWTUNNEL_XMIT_CONTINUE, ensuring that the subsequent nexthop
computation and neighbour lookup operate on valid memory.
Fixes: e415ed3a4b8b ("ipv6: use skb_expand_head in ip6_finish_output2")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Vega <vega@nebusec.ai>
Signed-off-by: Luxiao Xu <rakukuip@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ren Wei <weir@nebusec.ai>
Reviewed-by: Vadim Fedorenko <vadim.fedorenko@linux.dev>
Reviewed-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/4aa3f53bc44e79572c6dd2340ec7b68ef1a3d87d.1786516730.git.rakukuip@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit c0726f0caf8c6b3208552949e17d23634a2f3129 upstream.
ip_do_fragment() subtracts the IPv4 header length from the effective
MTU and passes the resulting payload MTU to ip_frag_next().
If the effective MTU is smaller than hlen + 8, ip_frag_next() rounds
the fragment payload length down to zero. The fragmentation state then
never makes forward progress: state->left, state->ptr and state->offset
stay unchanged while ip_do_fragment() keeps allocating and transmitting
header-only fragments until the softlockup detector fires.
This is reproducible with a route installed using "mtu lock 20", but it
is also reproducible without route MTU lock, for example by forwarding a
packet to a device whose MTU is 20.
Fix it in ip_do_fragment() by rejecting mtu < hlen + 8 with -EMSGSIZE,
matching the existing IPv6 fragmentation check.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Vega <vega@nebusec.ai>
Signed-off-by: Yong Wang <edragain@163.com>
Signed-off-by: Ren Wei <weir@nebusec.ai>
Reviewed-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/8809ef6314b98913681b0b370a05a85c2b6cd579.1786599079.git.edragain@163.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 00ead17c7de137a692edee59f2772e6af687e8eb upstream.
ceph_start_decoding() validates that struct_len bytes remain in the
buffer after the encoding header, but accepts struct_len=0 as valid:
ceph_decode_need(p, end, 0, bad) always passes. When a malicious or
compromised OSD sends an obj_list_watch_response_t reply with
struct_len=0, ceph_start_decoding() returns success with p == end,
leaving zero bytes guaranteed for subsequent reads.
The immediately following ceph_decode_32(p) in decode_watchers() has
no preceding bounds check. With p == end this is a 4-byte read past
the validated buffer boundary. The garbage value is then passed
directly to kzalloc_objs() as the watcher count.
The sibling function decode_watcher() already uses the safe variants
(ceph_decode_copy_safe, ceph_decode_64_safe, ceph_decode_skip_32)
after its own ceph_start_decoding() call. decode_watchers() is the
only site that uses the bare variant, confirming an oversight.
Fix by replacing ceph_decode_32(p) with ceph_decode_32_safe(p, end,
*num_watchers, bad), consistent with the established pattern.
Attacker model: a malicious or compromised OSD in a multi-tenant Ceph
deployment (e.g. cloud) can trigger this against any kernel client
that calls CEPH_OSD_OP_LIST_WATCHERS, without any further privileges
beyond OSD session establishment.
[ idryomov: trim changelog ]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: a4ed38d7a180 ("libceph: support for CEPH_OSD_OP_LIST_WATCHERS")
Signed-off-by: Pavitra Jha <jhapavitra98@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <Slava.Dubeyko@ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
[ kept the tree's `kcalloc()` context line instead of upstream's `kzalloc_objs()` ]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit c83e79c0842ed29860648bcce5022ef0ba5001c6 upstream.
byd_disconnect() uses timer_delete() before freeing the driver's private
data. This does not wait for a running byd_clear_touch() callback, which
dereferences the private data and its psmouse pointer. A callback racing
with disconnect can therefore access the private data after it has been
freed. The timer can also still be re-armed by byd_process_byte() while
the disconnect is in progress.
Use timer_shutdown_sync() before freeing the private data: it waits for
a running callback and turns any later re-arm attempt into a no-op.
Fixes: 2d5f5611dd0d ("Input: byd - enable absolute mode")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linmao Li <lilinmao@kylinos.cn>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260720061259.1601281-1-lilinmao@kylinos.cn
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
[ changed `del_timer()` to `timer_shutdown_sync()` since 6.12 predates the `del_timer()` → `timer_delete()` rename ]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 0784d83df3bfc977c13252a0599be924f0afa68d upstream.
ndisc_send_redirect() is always called under rcu_read_lock().
It can use dev_net_rcu() and avoid one redundant
rcu_read_lock()/rcu_read_unlock() pair.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250214140705.2105890-1-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Li Xiasong <lixiasong1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 2e65bafdfd3a8bba972b3d17b6a57816557530fc upstream.
When a connection is closed, nci_core_conn_close_rsp_packet() frees
conn_info but not conn_info->dest_params, which is a separate devm
allocation. Each connect/close cycle leaks one dest_params until the
NFC device is removed. Free dest_params along with conn_info.
Fixes: 9b8d1a4cf2aa ("nfc: nci: Add an additional parameter to identify a connection id")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linmao Li <lilinmao@kylinos.cn>
Reviewed-by: Vadim Fedorenko <vadim.fedorenko@linux.dev>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260721023518.1697625-1-lilinmao@kylinos.cn
Signed-off-by: David Heidelberg <david@ixit.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 8cbe06c1e699c0a165dae5093a2550e65f914818 upstream.
nci_rf_discover_ntf_packet() and nci_rf_intf_activated_ntf_packet() each
parse a notification into an on-stack struct (nci_rf_discover_ntf /
nci_rf_intf_activated_ntf) that is not initialised. The RF
technology-specific parameters are only extracted when
rf_tech_specific_params_len is non-zero, so a notification that reports a
zero length leaves the rf_tech_specific_params union uninitialised - and
both handlers then pass it to nci_add_new_protocol(), which reads it:
- discover: nci_add_new_target() -> nci_add_new_protocol();
- activated: nci_target_auto_activated() -> nci_add_new_protocol().
nci_add_new_protocol() uses nfca_poll->nfcid1_len as both a branch
condition and a memcpy() length and copies nfcid1/sens_res/sel_res into
ndev->targets, which is later exposed to user space via NFC_CMD_GET_TARGET.
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in nci_add_new_protocol+0x624/0x6c0
nci_add_new_protocol+0x624/0x6c0
nci_ntf_packet+0x25b2/0x3c30
nci_rx_work+0x318/0x5d0
process_scheduled_works+0x84b/0x17a0
worker_thread+0xc10/0x11b0
kthread+0x376/0x500
Local variable ntf.i created at:
nci_ntf_packet+0xbc2/0x3c30
Zero-initialise both on-stack notifications so the union reads back as
zero when no technology-specific parameters are present.
Fixes: 019c4fbaa790 ("NFC: Add NCI multiple targets support")
Fixes: e8c0dacd9836 ("NFC: Update names and structs to NCI spec 1.0 d18")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20260623172109.1105965-2-horms@kernel.org/
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Assisted-by: Bynario AI
Signed-off-by: Samuel Page <sam@bynar.io>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260626090301.2139500-1-sam@bynar.io
Signed-off-by: David Heidelberg <david@ixit.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit ac200079db50af81e6b04d058b33ec92901d8edd upstream.
nci_target_auto_activated() appends a target to the fixed-size array
ndev->targets[NCI_MAX_DISCOVERED_TARGETS] and increments ndev->n_targets
without first checking the array is full; unlike its sibling
nci_add_new_target(), which bails out when n_targets already equals
NCI_MAX_DISCOVERED_TARGETS.
ndev->n_targets is only cleared by nci_clear_target_list(), so an NFCC
that repeatedly re-runs discovery (RF_DISCOVER_RSP, which re-enters
NCI_DISCOVERY without clearing the target list) and reports an
auto-activated target (RF_INTF_ACTIVATED_NTF) drives n_targets past the
limit. The append then writes a struct nfc_target past the end of the
array (a slab out-of-bounds write), and nfc_targets_found() goes on to
walk the array with the inflated count:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in nci_add_new_protocol+0x94/0x2ac [nci]
Write of size 2 at addr ffff0000c7299a18 by task kworker/u8:0/12
Workqueue: nfc0_nci_rx_wq nci_rx_work [nci]
Call trace:
nci_add_new_protocol+0x94/0x2ac [nci]
nci_ntf_packet+0xddc/0x11a0 [nci]
nci_rx_work+0x15c/0x1e0 [nci]
process_one_work+0x2dc/0x500
worker_thread+0x240/0x460
kthread+0x1c0/0x1d0
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
The buggy address belongs to the cache kmalloc-2k of size 2048
The buggy address is located 1024 bytes to the right of
allocated 1560-byte region [ffff0000c7299000, ffff0000c7299618)
Guard nci_target_auto_activated() with the same check used by
nci_add_new_target().
Fixes: 019c4fbaa790 ("NFC: Add NCI multiple targets support")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Assisted-by: Bynario AI
Signed-off-by: Samuel Page <sam@bynar.io>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260622145243.3167276-1-sam@bynar.io
Signed-off-by: David Heidelberg <david@ixit.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 5cdcca5d62a66eda6b774110a44cba67bc1a8d1d upstream.
st21nfca_tm_recv_atr_req() checks that the received ATR_REQ frame is at
least ST21NFCA_ATR_REQ_MIN_SIZE and that the self-declared atr_req->length
is at least sizeof(struct st21nfca_atr_req), but never checks that
atr_req->length does not exceed the actual received length (skb->len).
st21nfca_tm_send_atr_res() then trusts the declared length:
gb_len = atr_req->length - sizeof(struct st21nfca_atr_req);
...
memcpy(atr_res->gbi, atr_req->gbi, gb_len);
so an RF peer that sends a short frame but sets atr_req->length larger
than the frame makes gb_len exceed the general bytes actually present,
and the memcpy reads out of bounds past the received skb. Those bytes are
placed in the ATR_RES and sent back to the peer (kernel-memory disclosure
to a proximity attacker); a larger declared length is an out-of-bounds
read (DoS).
Reject frames whose declared length exceeds the received length. The
adjacent nfc_tm_activated() path in the same function already derives its
general-bytes length from skb->len rather than the declared field.
Found by 0sec (https://0sec.ai) using automated source analysis; the
missing bound is evident from source. Compile-tested.
Fixes: 1892bf844ea0 ("NFC: st21nfca: Adding P2P support to st21nfca in Initiator & Target mode")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Assisted-by: 0sec:claude-opus-4-8
Signed-off-by: Doruk Tan Ozturk <doruk@0sec.ai>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260711071301.58071-1-doruk@0sec.ai
Signed-off-by: David Heidelberg <david@ixit.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 5718fc62198c38c2de5316020a90506f9e75e0bb upstream.
pn53x_common_clean() purges resp_q before freeing the common PN533 state,
but it leaves fragment_skb untouched. The fragmentation helpers queue
transmit fragments there while sending large initiator or target-mode
frames, and those skbs remain owned by the driver until they are sent or
discarded.
If the device is removed while fragments are still queued, the common
cleanup path frees the PN533 state without releasing the queued fragment
skbs, leaking them.
Purge fragment_skb during cleanup alongside resp_q.
Fixes: 963a82e07d4e ("NFC: pn533: Split large Tx frames in chunks")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Xu Rao <raoxu@uniontech.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/2D896607CAE4408E+20260720021444.3362044-1-raoxu@uniontech.com
Signed-off-by: David Heidelberg <david@ixit.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 95674f506c6376d6722a23144c9acd26609771ed upstream.
Every LLCP PDU begins with a two-byte header (DSAP/SSAP + PTYPE), but the
receive path never checked that a frame is at least LLCP_HEADER_SIZE bytes
before parsing it.
nfc_llcp_rx_skb() reads the header via nfc_llcp_ptype()/nfc_llcp_dsap()/
nfc_llcp_ssap(), which dereference pdu->data[0] and pdu->data[1], and a
CONNECT or CC PDU then computes
tlv_array_len = skb->len - LLCP_HEADER_SIZE;
as a size_t and hands it to the TLV walk. When the frame is shorter than
the header the subtraction wraps to a huge value and the walk runs far
past the buffer, an out-of-bounds read.
A nearby NFC device can reach this without authentication; LLCP link
activation happens automatically after NFC-DEP.
Guard the common receive choke point __nfc_llcp_recv(), shared by both the
target (nfc_llcp_data_received()) and initiator (nfc_llcp_recv()) paths, so
a short skb is dropped before the rx_work worker parses it. Use
pskb_may_pull() rather than a skb->len test so the two header bytes are
guaranteed to sit in the skb linear area even for a non-linear skb,
matching how the sibling NCI and HCI receive paths validate their headers.
Reproduced with a KFENCE out-of-bounds read via /dev/virtual_nci on
linux-next.
Found by 0sec automated security-research tooling (https://0sec.ai).
Fixes: d646960f7986 ("NFC: Initial LLCP support")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Suggested-by: David Laight <david.laight.linux@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Doruk Tan Ozturk <doruk@0sec.ai>
Reviewed-by: Vadim Fedorenko <vadim.fedorenko@linux.dev>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260714164631.75068-1-doruk@0sec.ai
Signed-off-by: David Heidelberg <david@ixit.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 78b20c8eeacd2e44a2d8a4cb5316d3c521d90911 upstream.
nfc_llcp_parse_gb_tlv() and nfc_llcp_parse_connection_tlv() contain
three related bugs in their TLV parsing loops:
1. 'offset' is declared u8 but tlv_array_len is u16. When TLV data
advances offset past 255 it silently wraps to zero, causing
infinite loops or double-processing of buffer data.
2. Before reading tlv[0] (type) and tlv[1] (length) there is no
check that offset+2 <= tlv_array_len. A truncated TLV causes
an OOB read of one byte past the buffer end.
3. After reading the length field, the value bytes are accessed
without checking offset+2+length <= tlv_array_len. A crafted
length=0xFF on a short buffer causes up to 255 bytes of OOB
read past the buffer end.
Both functions are reachable without authentication via
nfc_llcp_set_remote_gb() which feeds remote LLCP general bytes
directly into nfc_llcp_parse_gb_tlv() with no additional
validation.
Fix all three issues by widening offset from u8 to u16 and adding
bounds checks for both the TLV header and value field before each
access.
Fixes: 3df40eb3a2ea ("nfc: constify several pointers to u8, char and sk_buff")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260622131802.239035-1-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: David Heidelberg <david@ixit.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 55c68ac93e7dacc0f5f608b9c39dd4ff48cf28e8 upstream.
Commit 27256cdb290e ("nfc: llcp: bound SNL TLV parsing to the skb and
add length checks") fixed the unbounded TLV walk in nfc_llcp_recv_snl(),
and commit d8bd2dedbde5 ("nfc: llcp: fix OOB read and u8 offset wrap in
TLV parsers") subsequently bounded nfc_llcp_parse_gb_tlv() and
nfc_llcp_parse_connection_tlv(). One sibling parser sharing the same
pattern remains unbounded: nfc_llcp_connect_sn().
nfc_llcp_connect_sn() walks a TLV list, reading a two-byte header
(type, length) followed by length bytes of value, without checking that
the two header bytes or the declared length stay within the buffer. It
returns a pointer to a service name of up to 255 bytes that may point
past the end of the skb; it is subsequently consumed by memcmp() in
nfc_llcp_sock_from_sn(). In addition tlv_array_len was computed as
"skb->len - LLCP_HEADER_SIZE" in size_t, so a CONNECT/CC frame shorter
than the LLCP header underflows to a huge length and the walk runs far
past the buffer.
nfc_llcp_connect_sn() is reachable from nfc_llcp_recv_connect() and
nfc_llcp_recv_cc(), i.e. from received CONNECT and CC PDUs. A nearby
NFC device can reach this without authentication; LLCP link activation
happens automatically after NFC-DEP, and the nfc_llcp_rx_skb()
dispatcher applies no minimum-length guard.
Walk the TLV list by pointer, bounded by skb_tail_pointer(skb), and
validate each declared length before use, matching the approach already
used for nfc_llcp_recv_snl(). Starting the walk at
&skb->data[LLCP_HEADER_SIZE] against the tail pointer also removes the
size_t underflow for short frames.
Found by 0sec automated security-research tooling (https://0sec.ai).
Fixes: d646960f7986 ("NFC: Initial LLCP support")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Assisted-by: 0sec:claude-opus-4-8
Signed-off-by: Doruk Tan Ozturk <doruk@0sec.ai>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260709131229.44477-1-doruk@0sec.ai
Signed-off-by: David Heidelberg <david@ixit.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 25519469972ef57c3edb1805dabd6c5612b90211 upstream.
microread_target_discovered() parses target discovery payloads from
skb->data according to the HCI gate. The fixed field offsets and UID
copies were checked only against the destination nfc_target buffers, not
against the actual skb length.
Validate that each gate-specific payload contains the fixed fields and
UID bytes before reading or copying them.
Fixes: cfad1ba87150 ("NFC: Initial support for Inside Secure microread")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Pengpeng Hou <pengpeng@iscas.ac.cn>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260723103508.1-microread-v2-pengpeng@iscas.ac.cn
Signed-off-by: David Heidelberg <david@ixit.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 7ad21dcfeb5181af0c3ee2608808c0c0a5283aa1 upstream.
fdp_nci_i2c_read() takes the next packet length from two device-supplied
bytes and never validates it. The value is a u16 used as the
i2c_master_recv() count into a 261-byte on-stack buffer: a malicious,
counterfeit or malfunctioning controller (or an i2c bus interposer) can
drive it far past the buffer for a stack out-of-bounds write that
clobbers the canary and return address, or below the minimum frame size
(directly, or by truncating the computed sum) so the header/LRC strip
and the next length read run past a short receive. Reject a length
outside [FDP_NCI_I2C_MIN_PAYLOAD, FDP_NCI_I2C_MAX_PAYLOAD], as a
corrupted packet already is, and force resynchronization.
The same loop allocates one data skb per iteration and assumes a length
packet followed by a data packet; a device that sends two data packets
in one call leaks the first skb when the second allocation overwrites
it. Free a previously allocated skb before allocating the next.
Fixes: a06347c04c13 ("NFC: Add Intel Fields Peak NFC solution driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Suggested-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Bryam Vargas <hexlabsecurity@proton.me>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260616-b4-disp-b1f8ab4c-v2-1-2d1fe5955325@proton.me
Signed-off-by: David Heidelberg <david@ixit.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 344a56d7c8e0f3cbaff0bcb1bcd95a1a1db24b16 upstream.
digital_in_recv_sensf_res() memcpy()s resp->len bytes from a remote
NFC-F device response into the NFC_SENSF_RES_MAXSIZE-byte target.sensf_res
field without an upper-bound check. A nearby malicious NFC-F device can
send an oversized SENSF_RES response to overflow the stack-local struct
nfc_target.
Clamp resp->len to NFC_SENSF_RES_MAXSIZE before the copy.
Found by 0sec automated security-research tooling (https://0sec.ai).
Fixes: 8c0695e4998d ("NFC Digital: Add NFC-F technology support")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Doruk Tan Ozturk <doruk@0sec.ai>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Lobakin <aleksander.lobakin@intel.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260603141355.68156-1-doruk@0sec.ai
Signed-off-by: David Heidelberg <david@ixit.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 2a9c5154a5650c09ad44ff5e1dff74754e15a3c6 ]
dGPUs with an internal PCIe switch expose graphics functions below the
switch downstream port. The automatic ASPM check uses the display
endpoint and evaluates the internal link instead of the host link.
Use the switch upstream port for the check and report the selected
link.
Fixes: 0ab5d711ec74 ("drm/amd: Refactor `amdgpu_aspm` to be evaluated per device")
Signed-off-by: Yang Wang <kevinyang.wang@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Hawking Zhang <Hawking.Zhang@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Feng <kenneth.feng@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
(cherry picked from commit 4e0d6f2876e704fff707b18c40dbd383aea4a1c9)
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 2f9a5c0f018d4a1586ee892f81f1383219676415 ]
COLOR_SPACE_YCBCR2020_TYPE, which is selected for
COLOR_SPACE_2020_YCBCR_LIMITED color_space, has coefficients that are
incorrect for limited-range output. Its luma and chroma scaling is
full-range so output is too bright and colors are incorrect.
COLOR_SPACE_YCBCR2020_TYPE is closer to a full-range conversion matrix with
incorrect luma offset, so correct the luma offset for full-range and rename
it to COLOR_SPACE_YCBCR2020_FULL_TYPE.
Add COLOR_SPACE_YCBCR2020_LIMITED_TYPE with correct scaling and range for
limited-range output.
Fix related functions so COLOR_SPACE_YCBCR2020_LIMITED_TYPE and
COLOR_SPACE_YCBCR2020_FULL_TYPE are correctly selected based on
dc_color_space.
Derivation of both matrices follows ITU-T H.273:
Table 4, MatrixCoefficients 9, BT.2020-NCL weights:
KR = 0.2627, KB = 0.0593, KG = 1 - KR - KB = 0.6780.
Equations 45-47 in matrix form:
[ KR KG KB 0 ]
M2020_NCL = [ -KR/(2(1-KB)) -KG/(2(1-KB)) 1/2 0 ]
[ 1/2 -KG/(2(1-KR)) -KB/(2(1-KR)) 0 ]
[ 0 0 0 1 ]
Limited and Full transforms based on equations 30-32 and 36-38 with bit
depth 10, normalized by 1023:
[ 876/1023 0 0 64/1023 ]
MLimited = [ 0 896/1023 0 512/1023 ]
[ 0 0 896/1023 512/1023 ]
[ 0 0 0 1 ]
[ 1023/1023 0 0 0 ]
MFull = [ 0 1023/1023 0 512/1023 ]
[ 0 0 1023/1023 512/1023 ]
[ 0 0 0 1 ]
M2020_NCL_Limited = MLimited x M2020_NCL
M2020_NCL_Full = MFull x M2020_NCL
The upper three rows of M2020_NCL_* are stored in CR, Y, CB order. Each
M2020_NCL_* value is stored as Round(value * 8192) in its 16-bit
two's-complement representation.
Fixes: 973a9c810c78 ("drm/amd/display: Fix COLOR_SPACE_YCBCR2020_TYPE matrix")
Assisted-by: OpenAI-Codex:GPT-5.6-Sol
Tested-by: Igor Paunovic <royalnet026@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Satyajit Roy <sroy14@alum.utk.edu>
Signed-off-by: Nathan Lucas <nlucasgit@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
(cherry picked from commit 3b906e1dc7e3c9ff9f7940f6828b367a6a9ec73c)
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 07bc2dcbcf403d47d6f305ef7f0d3d489491c5fb ]
[Why]
BT2020 YCbCr input is not handled properly when full range
quantization is used and limited range is not supported at all.
[How]
- Add enums for BT2020 YCbCr limited/full range
- Add limited range CSC matrix
Reviewed-by: Krunoslav Kovac <krunoslav.kovac@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Bakoulin <Ilya.Bakoulin@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Roman Li <roman.li@amd.com>
Tested-by: Robert Mader <robert.mader@collabora.com>
Tested-by: Daniel Wheeler <daniel.wheeler@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Stable-dep-of: 2f9a5c0f018d ("drm/amd/display: fix BT.2020 YCbCr limited output CSC matrix")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit c770ef19673fb1defcbde2ee2b91c3c89bfcf164 ]
disable ASPM with some ASICs on some specific platforms.
required from PCIe controller owner.
Signed-off-by: Kenneth Feng <kenneth.feng@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Yang Wang <kevinyang.wang@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Stable-dep-of: 2a9c5154a565 ("drm/amdgpu: check ASPM on the dGPU host link")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 16b0798024c0e9117e395829ddbbe70981c79d9c upstream.
Unlike the channel_program struct, which covers synchronous I/O
submissions and asynchronous interrupts, the CRW region relies
exclusively on asynchronous events coming from hardware.
Implement a lock to manage the list of those payloads, to ensure
they are read cohesively.
Fixes: 3f02cb2fd9d2 ("vfio-ccw: Wire up the CRW irq and CRW region")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Matthew Rosato <mjrosato@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Farhan Ali <alifm@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Farman <farman@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>
[farman@linux.ibm.com: resolved merge conflict]
Signed-off-by: Eric Farman <farman@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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