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Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit f4c50a4034e62ab75f1d5cdd191dd5f9c77fdff4 upstream.
MSG_SPLICE_PAGES can attach pages from a pipe directly to an skb. TCP
marks such skbs with SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG after skb_splice_from_iter(),
so later paths that may modify packet data can first make a private
copy. The IPv4/IPv6 datagram append paths did not set this flag when
splicing pages into UDP skbs.
That leaves an ESP-in-UDP packet made from shared pipe pages looking
like an ordinary uncloned nonlinear skb. ESP input then takes the no-COW
fast path for uncloned skbs without a frag_list and decrypts in place
over data that is not owned privately by the skb.
Mark IPv4/IPv6 datagram splice frags with SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG, matching
TCP. Also make ESP input fall back to skb_cow_data() when the flag is
present, so ESP does not decrypt externally backed frags in place.
Private nonlinear skb frags still use the existing fast path.
This intentionally does not change ESP output. In esp_output_head(),
the path that appends the ESP trailer to existing skb tailroom without
calling skb_cow_data() is not reachable for nonlinear skbs:
skb_tailroom() returns zero when skb->data_len is nonzero, while ESP
tailen is positive. Thus ESP output will either use the separate
destination-frag path or fall back to skb_cow_data().
Fixes: cac2661c53f3 ("esp4: Avoid skb_cow_data whenever possible")
Fixes: 03e2a30f6a27 ("esp6: Avoid skb_cow_data whenever possible")
Fixes: 7da0dde68486 ("ip, udp: Support MSG_SPLICE_PAGES")
Fixes: 6d8192bd69bb ("ip6, udp6: Support MSG_SPLICE_PAGES")
Reported-by: Hyunwoo Kim <imv4bel@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Kuan-Ting Chen <h3xrabbit@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Hyunwoo Kim <imv4bel@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kuan-Ting Chen <h3xrabbit@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 27fdbab4221b375de54bf91919798d88520c6e28 upstream.
The build id returned by HYPERVISOR_xen_version(XENVER_build_id) is
neither NUL terminated nor a string.
The first causes a buffer overflow as sprintf in buildid_show will
read and copy till it finds a NUL.
00000000 f4 91 51 f4 dd 38 9e 9d 65 47 52 eb 10 71 db 50 |..Q..8..eGR..q.P|
00000010 b9 a8 01 42 6f 2e 32 |...Bo.2|
00000017
So use a memcpy instead of sprintf to have the correct value:
00000000 f4 91 51 f4 dd 00 9e 9d 65 47 52 eb 10 71 db 50 |..Q.....eGR..q.P|
00000010 b9 a8 01 42 |...B|
00000014
(the above have a hack to embed a zero inside and check it's
returned correctly).
This is XSA-485 / CVE-2026-31786
Fixes: 84b7625728ea ("xen: add sysfs node for hypervisor build id")
Signed-off-by: Frediano Ziglio <frediano.ziglio@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 24daca4fc07f3ff8cd0e3f629cd982187f48436a upstream.
privcmd_vm_ops defines .close (privcmd_close), but neither .may_split
nor .open. When userspace does a partial munmap() on a privcmd mapping,
the kernel splits the VMA via __split_vma(). Since may_split is NULL,
the split is allowed. vm_area_dup() copies vm_private_data (a pages
array allocated in alloc_empty_pages()) into the new VMA without any
fixup, because there is no .open callback.
Both VMAs now point to the same pages array. When the unmapped portion
is closed, privcmd_close() calls:
- xen_unmap_domain_gfn_range()
- xen_free_unpopulated_pages()
- kvfree(pages)
The surviving VMA still holds the dangling pointer. When it is later
destroyed, the same sequence runs again, which leads to a double free.
Fix this issue by adding a .may_split callback denying the VMA split.
This is XSA-487 / CVE-2026-31787
Fixes: d71f513985c2 ("xen: privcmd: support autotranslated physmap guests.")
Reported-by: Atharva Vartak <atharva.a.vartak@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Atharva Vartak <atharva.a.vartak@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 31d00156e50ecad37f2cb6cbf04aaa9a260505ef upstream.
When page reassignment was added to af_alg_pull_tsgl the original
loop wasn't updated so it may try to reassign one more page than
necessary.
Add the check to the reassignment so that this does not happen.
Also update the comment which still refers to the obsolete offset
argument.
Reported-by: syzbot+d23888375c2737c17ba5@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: e870456d8e7c ("crypto: algif_skcipher - overhaul memory management")
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 1f48ad3b19a9dfc947868edda0bb8e48e5b5a8fa upstream.
The src SG list offset wasn't set properly when decrypting in-place,
fix it.
Reported-by: Wolfgang Walter <linux@stwm.de>
Fixes: e02494114ebf ("crypto: authencesn - Do not place hiseq at end of dst for out-of-place decryption")
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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decryption
commit e02494114ebf7c8b42777c6cd6982f113bfdbec7 upstream.
When decrypting data that is not in-place (src != dst), there is
no need to save the high-order sequence bits in dst as it could
simply be re-copied from the source.
However, the data to be hashed need to be rearranged accordingly.
Reported-by: Taeyang Lee <0wn@theori.io>
Fixes: 104880a6b470 ("crypto: authencesn - Convert to new AEAD interface")
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit dbc4b1458e931e47198c3165ff5853bc1ad6bd7a upstream.
For copying data between two scatterlists, just use memcpy_sglist()
instead of the so-called "null skcipher". This is much simpler.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 5aa58c3a572b3e3b6c786953339f7978b845cc52 upstream.
AF_ALG AEAD AIO requests currently use the socket-wide IV buffer during
request processing. For async requests, later socket activity can
update that shared state before the original request has fully
completed, which can lead to inconsistent IV handling.
Snapshot the IV into per-request storage when preparing the AEAD
request, so in-flight operations no longer depend on mutable socket
state.
Fixes: d887c52d6ae4 ("crypto: algif_aead - overhaul memory management")
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Reported-by: Yuan Tan <yuantan098@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Yifan Wu <yifanwucs@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Juefei Pu <tomapufckgml@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Xin Liu <bird@lzu.edu.cn>
Co-developed-by: Luxing Yin <tr0jan@lzu.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Luxing Yin <tr0jan@lzu.edu.cn>
Tested-by: Yucheng Lu <kanolyc@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Douya Le <ldy3087146292@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ren Wei <n05ec@lzu.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit a664bf3d603dc3bdcf9ae47cc21e0daec706d7a5 upstream.
This mostly reverts commit 72548b093ee3 except for the copying of
the associated data.
There is no benefit in operating in-place in algif_aead since the
source and destination come from different mappings. Get rid of
all the complexity added for in-place operation and just copy the
AD directly.
Fixes: 72548b093ee3 ("crypto: algif_aead - copy AAD from src to dst")
Reported-by: Taeyang Lee <0wn@theori.io>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit f2804d0eee8ddd57aa79d0b82872b74c21e1b69b upstream.
For copying data between two scatterlists, just use memcpy_sglist()
instead of the so-called "null skcipher". This is much simpler.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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This backports the current implementation of memcpy_sglist() from
upstream commit 4dffc9bbffb9ccfcda730d899c97c553599e7ca8.
This function was rewritten twice. The earlier implementations had many
prerequisite commits, while the latest implementation is standalone.
It's much easier to just backport the latest code directly.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260424132532.812258529@linuxfoundation.org
Tested-by: Peter Schneider <pschneider1968@googlemail.com>
Tested-by: Florian Fainelli <florian.fainelli@broadcom.com>
Tested-by: Pavel Machek (CIP) <pavel@nabladev.com>
Tested-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>
Tested-by: Brett A C Sheffield <bacs@librecast.net>
Tested-by: Miguel Ojeda <ojeda@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Francesco Dolcini <francesco.dolcini@toradex.com>
Tested-by: Barry K. Nathan <barryn@pobox.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 93dec51e716db88f32d770dc9ab268964fff320b upstream.
If writemostly is enabled, alloc_behind_master_bio() will allocate a new
bio for rdev, with bi_opf set to 0. Later, raid1_write_request() will
clone from this bio, hence bi_opf is still 0 for the cloned bio. Submit
this cloned bio will end up to be read, causing write data lost.
Fix this problem by inheriting bi_opf from original bio for
behind_mast_bio.
Fixes: e879a0d9cb08 ("md/raid1,raid10: don't ignore IO flags")
Reported-and-tested-by: Ian Dall <ian@beware.dropbear.id.au>
Closes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=220507
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-raid/20250903014140.3690499-1-yukuai1@huaweicloud.com
Signed-off-by: Yu Kuai <yukuai3@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Li Nan <linan122@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit ac33733b10b484d666f97688561670afd5861383 upstream.
In rxrpc_preparse(), there are two paths for parsing key payloads: the
XDR path (for large payloads) and the non-XDR path (for payloads <= 28
bytes). While the XDR path (rxrpc_preparse_xdr_rxkad()) correctly
validates the ticket length against AFSTOKEN_RK_TIX_MAX, the non-XDR
path fails to do so.
This allows an unprivileged user to provide a very large ticket length.
When this key is later read via rxrpc_read(), the total
token size (toksize) calculation results in a value that exceeds
AFSTOKEN_LENGTH_MAX, triggering a WARN_ON().
[ 2001.302904] WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 2108 at net/rxrpc/key.c:778 rxrpc_read+0x109/0x5c0 [rxrpc]
Fix this by adding a check in the non-XDR parsing path of rxrpc_preparse()
to ensure the ticket length does not exceed AFSTOKEN_RK_TIX_MAX,
bringing it into parity with the XDR parsing logic.
Fixes: 8a7a3eb4ddbe ("KEYS: RxRPC: Use key preparsing")
Fixes: 84924aac08a4 ("rxrpc: Fix checker warning")
Reported-by: Anderson Nascimento <anderson@allelesecurity.com>
Signed-off-by: Anderson Nascimento <anderson@allelesecurity.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
cc: Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@auristor.com>
cc: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260422161438.2593376-7-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 4f685dbfa87c546e51d9dc6cab379d20f275e114 upstream.
When retrieving the ID for the CPU, don't attempt to copy the ID blob to
userspace if the firmware command failed. If the failure was due to an
invalid length, i.e. the userspace buffer+length was too small, copying
the number of bytes _firmware_ requires will overflow the kernel-allocated
buffer and leak data to userspace.
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in instrument_copy_to_user ../include/linux/instrumented.h:129 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in _inline_copy_to_user ../include/linux/uaccess.h:205 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in _copy_to_user+0x66/0xa0 ../lib/usercopy.c:26
Read of size 64 at addr ffff8881867f5960 by task syz.0.906/24388
CPU: 130 UID: 0 PID: 24388 Comm: syz.0.906 Tainted: G U O 7.0.0-smp-DEV #28 PREEMPTLAZY
Tainted: [U]=USER, [O]=OOT_MODULE
Hardware name: Google, Inc. Arcadia_IT_80/Arcadia_IT_80, BIOS 12.62.0-0 11/19/2025
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0xc5/0x110 ../lib/dump_stack.c:120
print_address_description ../mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline]
print_report+0xbc/0x260 ../mm/kasan/report.c:482
kasan_report+0xa2/0xe0 ../mm/kasan/report.c:595
check_region_inline ../mm/kasan/generic.c:-1 [inline]
kasan_check_range+0x264/0x2c0 ../mm/kasan/generic.c:200
instrument_copy_to_user ../include/linux/instrumented.h:129 [inline]
_inline_copy_to_user ../include/linux/uaccess.h:205 [inline]
_copy_to_user+0x66/0xa0 ../lib/usercopy.c:26
copy_to_user ../include/linux/uaccess.h:236 [inline]
sev_ioctl_do_get_id2+0x361/0x490 ../drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c:2222
sev_ioctl+0x25f/0x490 ../drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c:2575
vfs_ioctl ../fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl ../fs/ioctl.c:597 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl+0x11d/0x1b0 ../fs/ioctl.c:583
do_syscall_x64 ../arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xe0/0x800 ../arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
</TASK>
WARN if the driver says the command succeeded, but the firmware error code
says otherwise, as __sev_do_cmd_locked() is expected to return -EIO on any
firwmware error.
Reported-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Reported-by: Sebastian Alba Vives <sebasjosue84@gmail.com>
Fixes: d6112ea0cb34 ("crypto: ccp - introduce SEV_GET_ID2 command")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit e76239fed3cffd6d304d8ca3ce23984fd24f57d3 upstream.
When retrieving the PDH cert, don't attempt to copy the blobs to userspace
if the firmware command failed. If the failure was due to an invalid
length, i.e. the userspace buffer+length was too small, copying the number
of bytes _firmware_ requires will overflow the kernel-allocated buffer and
leak data to userspace.
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in instrument_copy_to_user ../include/linux/instrumented.h:129 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in _inline_copy_to_user ../include/linux/uaccess.h:205 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in _copy_to_user+0x66/0xa0 ../lib/usercopy.c:26
Read of size 2084 at addr ffff8885c4ab8aa0 by task syz.0.186/21033
CPU: 51 UID: 0 PID: 21033 Comm: syz.0.186 Tainted: G U O 7.0.0-smp-DEV #28 PREEMPTLAZY
Tainted: [U]=USER, [O]=OOT_MODULE
Hardware name: Google, Inc. Arcadia_IT_80/Arcadia_IT_80, BIOS 34.84.12-0 11/17/2025
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0xc5/0x110 ../lib/dump_stack.c:120
print_address_description ../mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline]
print_report+0xbc/0x260 ../mm/kasan/report.c:482
kasan_report+0xa2/0xe0 ../mm/kasan/report.c:595
check_region_inline ../mm/kasan/generic.c:-1 [inline]
kasan_check_range+0x264/0x2c0 ../mm/kasan/generic.c:200
instrument_copy_to_user ../include/linux/instrumented.h:129 [inline]
_inline_copy_to_user ../include/linux/uaccess.h:205 [inline]
_copy_to_user+0x66/0xa0 ../lib/usercopy.c:26
copy_to_user ../include/linux/uaccess.h:236 [inline]
sev_ioctl_do_pdh_export+0x3d3/0x7c0 ../drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c:2347
sev_ioctl+0x2a2/0x490 ../drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c:2568
vfs_ioctl ../fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl ../fs/ioctl.c:597 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl+0x11d/0x1b0 ../fs/ioctl.c:583
do_syscall_x64 ../arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xe0/0x800 ../arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
</TASK>
WARN if the driver says the command succeeded, but the firmware error code
says otherwise, as __sev_do_cmd_locked() is expected to return -EIO on any
firwmware error.
Reported-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Reported-by: Sebastian Alba Vives <sebasjosue84@gmail.com>
Fixes: 76a2b524a4b1 ("crypto: ccp: Implement SEV_PDH_CERT_EXPORT ioctl command")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit abe4a6d6f606113251868c2c4a06ba904bb41eed upstream.
When retrieving the PEK CSR, don't attempt to copy the blob to userspace
if the firmware command failed. If the failure was due to an invalid
length, i.e. the userspace buffer+length was too small, copying the number
of bytes _firmware_ requires will overflow the kernel-allocated buffer and
leak data to userspace.
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in instrument_copy_to_user ../include/linux/instrumented.h:129 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in _inline_copy_to_user ../include/linux/uaccess.h:205 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in _copy_to_user+0x66/0xa0 ../lib/usercopy.c:26
Read of size 2084 at addr ffff898144612e20 by task syz.9.219/21405
CPU: 14 UID: 0 PID: 21405 Comm: syz.9.219 Tainted: G U O 7.0.0-smp-DEV #28 PREEMPTLAZY
Tainted: [U]=USER, [O]=OOT_MODULE
Hardware name: Google, Inc. Arcadia_IT_80/Arcadia_IT_80, BIOS 12.62.0-0 11/19/2025
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0xc5/0x110 ../lib/dump_stack.c:120
print_address_description ../mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline]
print_report+0xbc/0x260 ../mm/kasan/report.c:482
kasan_report+0xa2/0xe0 ../mm/kasan/report.c:595
check_region_inline ../mm/kasan/generic.c:-1 [inline]
kasan_check_range+0x264/0x2c0 ../mm/kasan/generic.c:200
instrument_copy_to_user ../include/linux/instrumented.h:129 [inline]
_inline_copy_to_user ../include/linux/uaccess.h:205 [inline]
_copy_to_user+0x66/0xa0 ../lib/usercopy.c:26
copy_to_user ../include/linux/uaccess.h:236 [inline]
sev_ioctl_do_pek_csr+0x31f/0x590 ../drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c:1872
sev_ioctl+0x3a4/0x490 ../drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c:2562
vfs_ioctl ../fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl ../fs/ioctl.c:597 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl+0x11d/0x1b0 ../fs/ioctl.c:583
do_syscall_x64 ../arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xe0/0x800 ../arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
</TASK>
WARN if the driver says the command succeeded, but the firmware error code
says otherwise, as __sev_do_cmd_locked() is expected to return -EIO on any
firwmware error.
Reported-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Reported-by: Sebastian Alba Vives <sebasjosue84@gmail.com>
Fixes: e799035609e1 ("crypto: ccp: Implement SEV_PEK_CSR ioctl command")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 6318fbe26e67f9c27a1917fe63936b0fc6000373 upstream.
The previous patch removed the ENOENT warning at the point of
allocation, but the overall self-test warning is still there.
Fix all of them by returning zero as the test result. This is
safe because if the algorithm has gone away, then it cannot be
marked as tested.
Fixes: 4eded6d14f5b ("crypto: testmgr - Hide ENOENT errors")
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Hamza Mahfooz <hamzamahfooz@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 4eded6d14f5b7bb857b68872970a40cf3105c015 upstream.
When a crypto algorithm with a higher priority is registered, it
kills the spawns of all lower-priority algorithms. Thus it is to
be expected for an algorithm to go away at any time, even during
a self-test. This is now much more common with asynchronous testing.
Remove the printk when an ENOENT is encountered during a self-test.
This is not really an error since the algorithm being tested is no
longer there (i.e., it didn't fail the test which is what we care
about).
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Hamza Mahfooz <hamzamahfooz@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 2c054e17d9d41f1020376806c7f750834ced4dc5 upstream.
In tpacket_snd(), when PACKET_VNET_HDR is enabled, vnet_hdr points
directly into the mmap'd TX ring buffer shared with userspace. The
kernel validates the header via __packet_snd_vnet_parse() but then
re-reads all fields later in virtio_net_hdr_to_skb(). A concurrent
userspace thread can modify the vnet_hdr fields between validation
and use, bypassing all safety checks.
The non-TPACKET path (packet_snd()) already correctly copies vnet_hdr
to a stack-local variable. All other vnet_hdr consumers in the kernel
(tun.c, tap.c, virtio_net.c) also use stack copies. The TPACKET TX
path is the only caller of virtio_net_hdr_to_skb() that reads directly
from user-controlled shared memory.
Fix this by copying vnet_hdr from the mmap'd ring buffer to a
stack-local variable before validation and use, consistent with the
approach used in packet_snd() and all other callers.
Fixes: 1d036d25e560 ("packet: tpacket_snd gso and checksum offload")
Signed-off-by: Bingquan Chen <patzilla007@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260418112006.78823-1-patzilla007@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 80bb50e2d459213cccff3111d5ef98ed4238c0d5 upstream.
The caiaq driver stores a pointer to the parent USB device in
cdev->chip.dev but never takes a reference on it. The card's
private_free callback, snd_usb_caiaq_card_free(), can run
asynchronously via snd_card_free_when_closed() after the USB
device has already been disconnected and freed, so any access to
cdev->chip.dev in that path dereferences a freed usb_device.
On top of the refcounting issue, the current card_free implementation
calls usb_reset_device(cdev->chip.dev). A reset in a free callback
is inappropriate: the device is going away, the call takes the
device lock in a teardown context, and the reset races with the
disconnect path that the callback is already cleaning up after.
Take a reference on the USB device in create_card() with
usb_get_dev(), drop it with usb_put_dev() in the free callback,
and remove the usb_reset_device() call.
Fixes: b04dcbb7f7b1 ("ALSA: caiaq: Use snd_card_free_when_closed() at disconnection")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Berk Cem Goksel <berkcgoksel@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260413034941.1131465-3-berkcgoksel@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 4513d3e0bbc0585b86ccf2631902593ff97e88f5 upstream.
It(ID 31b2:0111 JU Jiu) reports a MIN value -12800 for volume control, but
will mute when setting it less than -10880.
Thanks to my girlfriend Kagura for reporting this issue.
Cc: Kagura <me@mail.kagurach.uk>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Cryolitia PukNgae <cryolitia.pukngae@linux.dev>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260402-syy-v1-1-068d3bc30ddc@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 39d4ee19c1e7d753dd655aebee632271b171f43a upstream.
In f2fs_compress_write_end_io(), dec_page_count(sbi, type) can bring
the F2FS_WB_CP_DATA counter to zero, unblocking
f2fs_wait_on_all_pages() in f2fs_put_super() on a concurrent unmount
CPU. The unmount path then proceeds to call
f2fs_destroy_page_array_cache(sbi), which destroys
sbi->page_array_slab via kmem_cache_destroy(), and eventually
kfree(sbi). Meanwhile, the bio completion callback is still executing:
when it reaches page_array_free(sbi, ...), it dereferences
sbi->page_array_slab — a destroyed slab cache — to call
kmem_cache_free(), causing a use-after-free.
This is the same class of bug as CVE-2026-23234 (which fixed the
equivalent race in f2fs_write_end_io() in data.c), but in the
compressed writeback completion path that was not covered by that fix.
Fix this by moving dec_page_count() to after page_array_free(), so
that all sbi accesses complete before the counter decrement that can
unblock unmount. For non-last folios (where atomic_dec_return on
cic->pending_pages is nonzero), dec_page_count is called immediately
before returning — page_array_free is not reached on this path, so
there is no post-decrement sbi access. For the last folio,
page_array_free runs while the F2FS_WB_CP_DATA counter is still
nonzero (this folio has not yet decremented it), keeping sbi alive,
and dec_page_count runs as the final operation.
Fixes: 4c8ff7095bef ("f2fs: support data compression")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: George Saad <geoo115@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 299f962c0b02d048fb45d248b4da493d03f3175d upstream.
set_posix_acl_entries_dacl() and set_ntacl_dacl() accumulate ACE sizes
in u16 variables. When a file has many POSIX ACL entries, the
accumulated size can wrap past 65535, causing the pointer arithmetic
(char *)pndace + *size to land within already-written ACEs. Subsequent
writes then overwrite earlier entries, and pndacl->size gets a
truncated value.
Use check_add_overflow() at each accumulation point to detect the
wrap before it corrupts the buffer, consistent with existing
check_mul_overflow() usage elsewhere in smbacl.c.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: e2f34481b24d ("cifsd: add server-side procedures for SMB3")
Signed-off-by: Tristan Madani <tristan@talencesecurity.com>
Acked-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 30010c952077a1c89ecdd71fc4d574c75a8f5617 upstream.
smb2_get_ea() applies 4-byte alignment padding via memset() after
writing each EA entry. The bounds check on buf_free_len is performed
before the value memcpy, but the alignment memset fires unconditionally
afterward with no check on remaining space.
When the EA value exactly fills the remaining buffer (buf_free_len == 0
after value subtraction), the alignment memset writes 1-3 NUL bytes
past the buf_free_len boundary. In compound requests where the response
buffer is shared across commands, the first command (e.g., READ) can
consume most of the buffer, leaving a tight remainder for the QUERY_INFO
EA response. The alignment memset then overwrites past the physical
kvmalloc allocation into adjacent kernel heap memory.
Add a bounds check before the alignment memset to ensure buf_free_len
can accommodate the padding bytes.
This is the same bug pattern fixed by commit beef2634f81f ("ksmbd: fix
potencial OOB in get_file_all_info() for compound requests") and
commit fda9522ed6af ("ksmbd: fix OOB write in QUERY_INFO for compound
requests"), both of which added bounds checks before unconditional
writes in QUERY_INFO response handlers.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: e2b76ab8b5c9 ("ksmbd: add support for read compound")
Signed-off-by: Tristan Madani <tristan@talencesecurity.com>
Acked-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit a58c5af19ff0d6f44f6e9fe31e33a2c92223f77e upstream.
smb2_ioctl_query_info() has two response-copy branches: PASSTHRU_FSCTL
and the default QUERY_INFO path. The QUERY_INFO branch clamps
qi.input_buffer_length to the server-reported OutputBufferLength and then
copies qi.input_buffer_length bytes from qi_rsp->Buffer to userspace, but
it never verifies that the flexible-array payload actually fits within
rsp_iov[1].iov_len.
A malicious server can return OutputBufferLength larger than the actual
QUERY_INFO response, causing copy_to_user() to walk past the response
buffer and expose adjacent kernel heap to userspace.
Guard the QUERY_INFO copy with a bounds check on the actual Buffer
payload. Use struct_size(qi_rsp, Buffer, qi.input_buffer_length)
rather than an open-coded addition so the guard cannot overflow on
32-bit builds.
Fixes: f5778c398713 ("SMB3: Allow SMB3 FSCTL queries to be sent to server from tools")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito@gmail.com>
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-6
Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5-4
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 2757ad3e4b6f9e0fed4c7739594e702abc5cab21 upstream.
parse_dacl() treats an ACE SID matching sid_unix_NFS_mode as an NFS
mode SID and reads sid.sub_auth[2] to recover the mode bits.
That assumes the ACE carries three subauthorities, but compare_sids()
only compares min(a, b) subauthorities. A malicious server can return
an ACE with num_subauth = 2 and sub_auth[] = {88, 3}, which still
matches sid_unix_NFS_mode and then drives the sub_auth[2] read four
bytes past the end of the ACE.
Require num_subauth >= 3 before treating the ACE as an NFS mode SID.
This keeps the fix local to the special-SID mode path without changing
compare_sids() semantics for the rest of cifsacl.
Fixes: e2f8fbfb8d09 ("cifs: get mode bits from special sid on stat")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-6
Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit ce23158bfe584bd90d1918f279fdf9de57802012 upstream.
The global max_connections check in ksmbd's TCP accept path counts
the newly accepted connection with atomic_inc_return(), but then
rejects the connection when the result is greater than or equal to
server_conf.max_connections.
That makes the effective limit one smaller than configured. For
example:
- max_connections=1 rejects the first connection
- max_connections=2 allows only one connection
The per-IP limit in the same function uses <= correctly because it
counts only pre-existing connections. The global limit instead checks
the post-increment total, so it should reject only when that total
exceeds the configured maximum.
Fix this by changing the comparison from >= to >, so exactly
max_connections simultaneous connections are allowed and the next one
is rejected. This matches the documented meaning of max_connections
in fs/smb/server/ksmbd_netlink.h as the "Number of maximum simultaneous
connections".
Fixes: 0d0d4680db22 ("ksmbd: add max connections parameter")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: DaeMyung Kang <charsyam@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 6551300dc452ac16a855a83dbd1e74899542d3b3 upstream.
Commit 77ffbcac4e56 ("smb: server: fix leak of active_num_conn in
ksmbd_tcp_new_connection()") addressed the kthread_run() failure
path. The earlier alloc_transport() == NULL path in the same
function has the same leak, is reachable pre-authentication via any
TCP connect to port 445, and was empirically reproduced on UML
(ARCH=um, v7.0-rc7): a small number of forced allocation failures
were sufficient to put ksmbd into a state where every subsequent
connection attempt was rejected for the remainder of the boot.
ksmbd_kthread_fn() increments active_num_conn before calling
ksmbd_tcp_new_connection() and discards the return value, so when
alloc_transport() returns NULL the socket is released and -ENOMEM
returned without decrementing the counter. Each such failure
permanently consumes one slot from the max_connections pool; once
cumulative failures reach the cap, atomic_inc_return() hits the
threshold on every subsequent accept and every new connection is
rejected. The counter is only reset by module reload.
An unauthenticated remote attacker can drive the server toward the
memory pressure that makes alloc_transport() fail by holding open
connections with large RFC1002 lengths up to MAX_STREAM_PROT_LEN
(0x00FFFFFF); natural transient allocation failures on a loaded
host produce the same drift more slowly.
Mirror the existing rollback pattern in ksmbd_kthread_fn(): on the
alloc_transport() failure path, decrement active_num_conn gated on
server_conf.max_connections.
Repro details: with the patch reverted, forced alloc_transport()
NULL returns leaked counter slots and subsequent connection
attempts -- including legitimate connects issued after the
forced-fail window had closed -- were all rejected with "Limit the
maximum number of connections". With this patch applied, the same
connect sequence produces no rejections and the counter cycles
cleanly between zero and one on every accept.
Fixes: 0d0d4680db22 ("ksmbd: add max connections parameter")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-6
Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5-4
Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 129a45f9755a89f573c6a513a6b9e3d234ce89b0 upstream.
gcc 15 complains about an uninitialized variable val that is passed by
reference into fuse_conn_limit_write:
control.c: In function ‘fuse_conn_congestion_threshold_write’:
include/asm-generic/rwonce.h:55:37: warning: ‘val’ may be used uninitialized [-Wmaybe-uninitialized]
55 | *(volatile typeof(x) *)&(x) = (val); \
| ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~^~~~~~~
include/asm-generic/rwonce.h:61:9: note: in expansion of macro ‘__WRITE_ONCE’
61 | __WRITE_ONCE(x, val); \
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~
control.c:178:9: note: in expansion of macro ‘WRITE_ONCE’
178 | WRITE_ONCE(fc->congestion_threshold, val);
| ^~~~~~~~~~
control.c:166:18: note: ‘val’ was declared here
166 | unsigned val;
| ^~~
Unfortunately there's enough macro spew involved in kstrtoul_from_user
that I think gcc gives up on its analysis and sprays the above warning.
AFAICT it's not actually a bug, but we could just zero-initialize the
variable to enable using -Wmaybe-uninitialized to find real problems.
Previously we would use some weird uninitialized_var annotation to quiet
down the warnings, so clearly this code has been like this for quite
some time.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.9
Fixes: 3f649ab728cda8 ("treewide: Remove uninitialized_var() usage")
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 59ba47b6be9cd0146ef9a55c6e32e337e11e7625 upstream.
xfstest generic/074 and generic/075 complain result in kernel
warning messages / page dumps.
This is easily reproducible (on 6.19) with
CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE_SHMEM_HUGE_ALWAYS=y
CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE_TMPFS_HUGE_ALWAYS=y
This just adds a test for large folios fuse_try_move_folio
with the same page copy fallback, but to avoid the warnings
from fuse_check_folio().
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Bernd Schubert <bschubert@ddn.com>
Signed-off-by: Horst Birthelmer <hbirthelmer@ddn.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 51a8de6c50bf947c8f534cd73da4c8f0a13e7bed upstream.
fuse_add_dirent_to_cache() computes a serialized dirent size from the
server-controlled namelen field and copies the dirent into a single
page-cache page. The existing logic only checks whether the dirent fits
in the remaining space of the current page and advances to a fresh page
if not. It never checks whether the dirent itself exceeds PAGE_SIZE.
As a result, a malicious FUSE server can return a dirent with
namelen=4095, producing a serialized record size of 4120 bytes. On 4 KiB
page systems this causes memcpy() to overflow the cache page by 24 bytes
into the following kernel page.
Reject dirents that cannot fit in a single page before copying them into
the readdir cache.
Fixes: 69e34551152a ("fuse: allow caching readdir")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.16+
Assisted-by: Bynario AI
Signed-off-by: Samuel Page <sam@bynar.io>
Reported-by: Qi Tang <tpluszz77@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Zijun Hu <nightu@northwestern.edu>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260420090139.662772-1-mszeredi@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 3cf11e6f36c170050c12171dd6fd3142711478fc upstream.
syzbot reported a f2fs bug as below:
BUG: memory leak
unreferenced object 0xffff888127f70830 (size 16):
comm "syz.0.23", pid 6144, jiffies 4294943712
hex dump (first 16 bytes):
3c af 57 72 5b e6 8f ad 6e 8e fd 33 42 39 03 ff <.Wr[...n..3B9..
backtrace (crc 925f8a80):
kmemleak_alloc_recursive include/linux/kmemleak.h:44 [inline]
slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:4520 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:4844 [inline]
__do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:5237 [inline]
__kmalloc_noprof+0x3bd/0x560 mm/slub.c:5250
kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:954 [inline]
fscrypt_setup_filename+0x15e/0x3b0 fs/crypto/fname.c:364
f2fs_setup_filename+0x52/0xb0 fs/f2fs/dir.c:143
f2fs_rename+0x159/0xca0 fs/f2fs/namei.c:961
f2fs_rename2+0xd5/0xf20 fs/f2fs/namei.c:1308
vfs_rename+0x7ff/0x1250 fs/namei.c:6026
filename_renameat2+0x4f4/0x660 fs/namei.c:6144
__do_sys_renameat2 fs/namei.c:6173 [inline]
__se_sys_renameat2 fs/namei.c:6168 [inline]
__x64_sys_renameat2+0x59/0x80 fs/namei.c:6168
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xe2/0xf80 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
The root cause is in commit 40b2d55e0452 ("f2fs: fix to create selinux
label during whiteout initialization"), we added a call to
f2fs_setup_filename() without a matching call to f2fs_free_filename(),
fix it.
Fixes: 40b2d55e0452 ("f2fs: fix to create selinux label during whiteout initialization")
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Reported-by: syzbot+cf7946ab25b21abc4b66@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-f2fs-devel/69a75fe1.a70a0220.b118c.0014.GAE@google.com
Suggested-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 0ca0485e4b2e837ebb6cbd4f2451aba665a03e4b upstream.
check_file_record() validates rec->total against the record size but
never validates rec->used. The do_action() journal-replay handlers read
rec->used from disk and use it to compute memmove lengths:
DeleteAttribute: memmove(attr, ..., used - asize - roff)
CreateAttribute: memmove(..., attr, used - roff)
change_attr_size: memmove(..., used - PtrOffset(rec, next))
When rec->used is smaller than the offset of a validated attribute, or
larger than the record size, these subtractions can underflow allowing
us to copy huge amounts of memory in to a 4kb buffer, generally
considered a bad idea overall.
This requires a corrupted filesystem, which isn't a threat model the
kernel really needs to worry about, but checking for such an obvious
out-of-bounds value is good to keep things robust, especially on journal
replay
Fix this up by bounding rec->used correctly.
This is much like commit b2bc7c44ed17 ("fs/ntfs3: Fix slab-out-of-bounds
read in DeleteIndexEntryRoot") which checked different values in this
same switch statement.
Cc: Konstantin Komarov <almaz.alexandrovich@paragon-software.com>
Fixes: b46acd6a6a62 ("fs/ntfs3: Add NTFS journal")
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Assisted-by: gregkh_clanker_t1000
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Komarov <almaz.alexandrovich@paragon-software.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit c43ffdcfdbb5567b1f143556df8a04b4eeea041c ]
Only process RESPONSE packets while the service connection is still in
RXRPC_CONN_SERVICE_CHALLENGING. Check that state under state_lock before
running response verification and security initialization, then use a local
secured flag to decide whether to queue the secured-connection work after
the state transition. This keeps duplicate or late RESPONSE packets from
re-running the setup path and removes the unlocked post-transition state
test.
Fixes: 17926a79320a ("[AF_RXRPC]: Provide secure RxRPC sockets for use by userspace and kernel both")
Reported-by: Yifan Wu <yifanwucs@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Juefei Pu <tomapufckgml@gmail.com>
Co-developed-by: Yuan Tan <yuantan098@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Yuan Tan <yuantan098@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Xin Liu <bird@lzu.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Jie Wang <jiewang2024@lzu.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Yang Yang <n05ec@lzu.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
cc: Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@auristor.com>
cc: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260408121252.2249051-21-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
[ adapted spin_lock_irq/spin_unlock_irq calls to spin_lock/spin_unlock ]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
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[ Upstream commit 6a59d84b4fc2f27f7b40e348506cc686712e260b ]
In rxrpc_new_client_call_for_sendmsg(), a key with no payload is meant to
be substituted for a NULL key pointer, but the variable this is done with
is subsequently not used.
Fix this by using "key" rather than "rx->key" when filling in the
connection parameters.
Note that this only affects direct use of AF_RXRPC; the kAFS filesystem
doesn't use sendmsg() directly and so bypasses the issue. Further,
AF_RXRPC passes a NULL key in if no key is set, so using an anonymous key
in that manner works. Since this hasn't been noticed to this point, it
might be better just to remove the "key" variable and the code that sets it
- and, arguably, rxrpc_init_client_call_security() would be a better place
to handle it.
Fixes: 19ffa01c9c45 ("rxrpc: Use structs to hold connection params and protocol info")
Closes: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260319150150.4189381-1-dhowells%40redhat.com
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
cc: Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@auristor.com>
cc: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260408121252.2249051-4-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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This patch is for stable only. Commit 5a09df20872c ("scripts/dtc: Update
to upstream version v1.7.2-69-g53373d135579") upstream applied it as
part of a regular scripts/dtc sync, which may be unsuitable for older
versions of stable where the warning it fixes is present.
A recent strengthening of -Wunused-but-set-variable (enabled with -Wall)
in clang under a new subwarning, -Wunused-but-set-global, points out an
unused static global variable in dtc-lexer.lex.c (compiled from
dtc-lexer.l):
scripts/dtc/dtc-lexer.lex.c:641:12: warning: variable 'dts_version' set but not used [-Wunused-but-set-global]
641 | static int dts_version = 1;
| ^
Remove it to clear up the warning, as it is truly unused.
Fixes: 658f29a51e98 ("of/flattree: Update dtc to current mainline.")
Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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This reverts commit 4d7a05da767e5cbcf4db511b9289d7ebd380dc56 which is commit
e1696c8bd0056bc1a5f7766f58ac333adc203e8a upstream.
The reverted patch introduced a deadlock. The locking situation in mainline is
totally different, so it is incorrect to directly backport the commit from mainline.
Signed-off-by: Guocai He <guocai.he.cn@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 7bc5da4842bed3252d26e742213741a4d0ac1b14 ]
KASAN reports a use-after-free write of 4086 bytes in
ocfs2_write_end_inline, called from ocfs2_write_end_nolock during a
copy_file_range splice fallback on a corrupted ocfs2 filesystem mounted on
a loop device. The actual bug is an out-of-bounds write past the inode
block buffer, not a true use-after-free. The write overflows into an
adjacent freed page, which KASAN reports as UAF.
The root cause is that ocfs2_try_to_write_inline_data trusts the on-disk
id_count field to determine whether a write fits in inline data. On a
corrupted filesystem, id_count can exceed the physical maximum inline data
capacity, causing writes to overflow the inode block buffer.
Call trace (crash path):
vfs_copy_file_range (fs/read_write.c:1634)
do_splice_direct
splice_direct_to_actor
iter_file_splice_write
ocfs2_file_write_iter
generic_perform_write
ocfs2_write_end
ocfs2_write_end_nolock (fs/ocfs2/aops.c:1949)
ocfs2_write_end_inline (fs/ocfs2/aops.c:1915)
memcpy_from_folio <-- KASAN: write OOB
So add id_count upper bound check in ocfs2_validate_inode_block() to
alongside the existing i_size check to fix it.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20260403063830.3662739-1-joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com
Signed-off-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Reported-by: syzbot+62c1793956716ea8b28a@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=62c1793956716ea8b28a
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Cc: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 1524af3685b35feac76662cc551cbc37bd14775f ]
When reading an inode from disk, ocfs2_validate_inode_block() performs
various sanity checks but does not validate the size of inline data. If
the filesystem is corrupted, an inode's i_size can exceed the actual
inline data capacity (id_count).
This causes ocfs2_dir_foreach_blk_id() to iterate beyond the inline data
buffer, triggering a use-after-free when accessing directory entries from
freed memory.
In the syzbot report:
- i_size was 1099511627576 bytes (~1TB)
- Actual inline data capacity (id_count) is typically <256 bytes
- A garbage rec_len (54648) caused ctx->pos to jump out of bounds
- This triggered a UAF in ocfs2_check_dir_entry()
Fix by adding a validation check in ocfs2_validate_inode_block() to ensure
inodes with inline data have i_size <= id_count. This catches the
corruption early during inode read and prevents all downstream code from
operating on invalid data.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20251212052132.16750-1-kartikey406@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Deepanshu Kartikey <kartikey406@gmail.com>
Reported-by: syzbot+c897823f699449cc3eb4@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=c897823f699449cc3eb4
Tested-by: syzbot+c897823f699449cc3eb4@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20251211115231.3560028-1-kartikey406@gmail.com/T/ [v1]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20251212040400.6377-1-kartikey406@gmail.com/T/ [v2]
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Cc: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Stable-dep-of: 7bc5da4842be ("ocfs2: fix out-of-bounds write in ocfs2_write_end_inline")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit a2b1c419ff72ec62ff5831684e30cd1d4f0b09ee ]
In 'ocfs2_validate_inode_block()', add an extra check whether an inode
with inline data (i.e. self-contained) has no clusters, thus preventing
an invalid inode from being passed to 'ocfs2_evict_inode()' and below.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20251023141650.417129-1-dmantipov@yandex.ru
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Antipov <dmantipov@yandex.ru>
Reported-by: syzbot+c16daba279a1161acfb0@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=c16daba279a1161acfb0
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Joseph Qi <jiangqi903@gmail.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Cc: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Stable-dep-of: 7bc5da4842be ("ocfs2: fix out-of-bounds write in ocfs2_write_end_inline")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit bdbfead6d38979475df0c2f4bad2b19394fe9bdc ]
In the rxrpc key preparsing, every token extracted sets the proposed quota
value, but for multitoken keys, this will overwrite the previous proposed
quota, losing it.
Fix this by adding to the proposed quota instead.
Fixes: 8a7a3eb4ddbe ("KEYS: RxRPC: Use key preparsing")
Closes: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260319150150.4189381-1-dhowells%40redhat.com
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
cc: Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@auristor.com>
cc: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260408121252.2249051-2-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
[ dropped hunk for rxrpc_preparse_xdr_yfs_rxgk() ]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 2619da73bb2f10d88f7e1087125c40144fdf0987 ]
Commit 94dfc73e7cf4 ("treewide: uapi: Replace zero-length arrays with
flexible-array members") broke the userspace API for C++.
These structures ending in VLAs are typically a *header*, which can be
followed by an arbitrary number of entries. Userspace typically creates
a larger structure with some non-zero number of entries, for example in
QEMU's kvm_arch_get_supported_msr_feature():
struct {
struct kvm_msrs info;
struct kvm_msr_entry entries[1];
} msr_data = {};
While that works in C, it fails in C++ with an error like:
flexible array member 'kvm_msrs::entries' not at end of 'struct msr_data'
Fix this by using __DECLARE_FLEX_ARRAY() for the VLA, which uses [0]
for C++ compilation.
Fixes: 94dfc73e7cf4 ("treewide: uapi: Replace zero-length arrays with flexible-array members")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/3abaf6aefd6e5efeff3b860ac38421d9dec908db.camel@infradead.org
[sean: tag for stable@]
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
[ applied `__DECLARE_FLEX_ARRAY(char, name)` change directly instead of inside missing `#ifdef __KERNEL__` else branch ]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 36c619f6bd793493294becb10a02fea370b67a91 ]
Add IDE support for host-side scripts written in Rust. This support has
been missing since these scripts were initially added in commit
9a8ff24ce584 ("scripts: add `generate_rust_target.rs`"), thus add it.
Change the existing instance of extension stripping to
`pathlib.Path.stem` to maintain code consistency.
Fixes: 9a8ff24ce584 ("scripts: add `generate_rust_target.rs`")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Daniel Almeida <daniel.almeida@collabora.com>
Reviewed-by: Fiona Behrens <me@kloenk.dev>
Reviewed-by: Trevor Gross <tmgross@umich.edu>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260122-rust-analyzer-scripts-v1-1-ff6ba278170e@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Tamir Duberstein <tamird@kernel.org>
[ changed `[std]` dep to `["std"]` and kept untyped `is_root_crate()` ]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit d799984233a50abd2667a7d17a9a710a3f10ebe2 ]
Disable the delayed work before clearing BAR mappings and doorbells to
avoid running the handler after resources have been torn down.
Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffff800083f46004
[...]
Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000007 [#1] SMP
[...]
Call trace:
epf_ntb_cmd_handler+0x54/0x200 [pci_epf_vntb] (P)
process_one_work+0x154/0x3b0
worker_thread+0x2c8/0x400
kthread+0x148/0x210
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
Fixes: e35f56bb0330 ("PCI: endpoint: Support NTB transfer between RC and EP")
Signed-off-by: Koichiro Den <den@valinux.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: Manivannan Sadhasivam <mani@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Frank Li <Frank.Li@nxp.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260226084142.2226875-4-den@valinux.co.jp
[ replaced disable_delayed_work_sync() with cancel_delayed_work_sync() ]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 2ef2b20cf4e04ac8a6ba68493f8780776ff84300 ]
skmsg (and probably other layers) are changing these pointers
while other cpus might read them concurrently.
Add corresponding READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() annotations
for UDP, TCP and AF_UNIX.
Fixes: 604326b41a6f ("bpf, sockmap: convert to generic sk_msg interface")
Reported-by: syzbot+87f770387a9e5dc6b79b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/699ee9fc.050a0220.1cd54b.0009.GAE@google.com/
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Cc: Jakub Sitnicki <jakub@cloudflare.com>
Cc: Willem de Bruijn <willemdebruijn.kernel@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260225131547.1085509-1-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Leon Chen <leonchen.oss@139.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 4b3d54a85bd37ebf2d9836f0d0de775c0ff21af9 ]
Using get_cpu() in the tracepoint assignment causes an obvious preempt
count leak because nothing invokes put_cpu() to undo it:
softirq: huh, entered softirq 3 NET_RX with preempt_count 00000100, exited with 00000101?
This clearly has seen a lot of testing in the last 3+ years...
Use smp_processor_id() instead.
Fixes: 6d4d584a7ea8 ("i40e: Add i40e_napi_poll tracepoint")
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org>
Cc: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com>
Cc: Przemek Kitszel <przemyslaw.kitszel@intel.com>
Cc: intel-wired-lan@lists.osuosl.org
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Joe Damato <joe@dama.to>
Reviewed-by: Aleksandr Loktionov <aleksandr.loktionov@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Charles Xu <charles_xu@189.cn>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 2dddb34dd0d07b01fa770eca89480a4da4f13153 upstream.
The PPE enforces output frame size limits via per-tag-layer VLAN_MTU
registers that the driver never initializes. The hardware defaults do
not account for PPPoE overhead, causing the PPE to punt encapsulated
frames back to the CPU instead of forwarding them.
Initialize the registers at PPE start and on MTU changes using the
maximum GMAC MTU. This is a conservative approximation -- the actual
per-PPE requirement depends on egress path, but using the global
maximum ensures the limits are never too small.
Fixes: ba37b7caf1ed ("net: ethernet: mtk_eth_soc: add support for initializing the PPE")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Golle <daniel@makrotopia.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/ec995ab8ce8be423267a1cc093147a74d2eb9d82.1775789829.git.daniel@makrotopia.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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