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Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260716133044.672218725@linuxfoundation.org
Tested-by: Brett A C Sheffield <bacs@librecast.net>
Tested-by: Florian Fainelli <florian.fainelli@broadcom.com>
Tested-by: Peter Schneider <pschneider1968@googlemail.com>
Tested-by: Miguel Ojeda <ojeda@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Ron Economos <re@w6rz.net>
Tested-by: Wentao Guan <guanwentao@uniontech.com>
Tested-by: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>
Tested-by: Pavel Machek (CIP) <pavel@nabladev.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260717101904.922623678@linuxfoundation.org
Tested-by: Brett A C Sheffield <bacs@librecast.net>
Tested-by: Florian Fainelli <florian.fainelli@broadcom.com>
Tested-by: Pavel Machek (CIP) <pavel@nabladev.com>
Tested-by: Peter Schneider <pschneider1968@googlemail.com>
Tested-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Miguel Ojeda <ojeda@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit ee248157da501f0c02688fb64e5359f2832b0b01 upstream.
LOLLM points out that we pass the wrong btree cursor here. We want the
rtrefcount btree cursor, not the non-rt one. This is fairly benign
since it only affects tracing data.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.14
Fixes: 91683bb3f264c0 ("xfs: cross-reference checks with the rt refcount btree")
Signed-off-by: "Darrick J. Wong" <djwong@kernel.org>
Assisted-by: LOLLM # finding obvious bugs
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Carlos Maiolino <cem@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 9af789fa274bc14b907f811f79fa988a6fc6d4e7 upstream.
The rtgroup superblock fixer should write the rtgroup superblock.
LOLLM noticed this, oops. :/
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.13
Fixes: 1433f8f9cead37 ("xfs: repair realtime group superblock")
Signed-off-by: "Darrick J. Wong" <djwong@kernel.org>
Assisted-by: LOLLM # finding obvious bugs
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Carlos Maiolino <cem@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 5d72a68f2007ba2a968d6bf47dba3f4620bd182e upstream.
LOLLM noticed an off-by-one error when computing the length of the
rtrmap to cross-check.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.14
Fixes: 037a44d8277adf ("xfs: cross-reference the realtime rmapbt")
Signed-off-by: "Darrick J. Wong" <djwong@kernel.org>
Assisted-by: LOLLM # finding obvious bugs
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Carlos Maiolino <cem@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 59c462b0f5cfa107794228051724b34ae9334168 upstream.
LOLLM noticed a discrepancy between the bmbt level checks in the libxfs
bmbt code vs. the inode repair code. We do actually allow a bmbt root
that proclaims to have a height of XFS_BM_MAXLEVELS.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.8
Fixes: e744cef2060559 ("xfs: zap broken inode forks")
Signed-off-by: "Darrick J. Wong" <djwong@kernel.org>
Assisted-by: LOLLM # finding obvious bugs
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Carlos Maiolino <cem@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit ba150ce63453ccd74bae1404c1dfedbd01ecfd55 upstream.
LOLLM noticed that the directory tree path checking declares the path to
be ok if the inumber in the parent pointer reaches the root directory.
Unfortunately, it neglects to check that the generation is correct. Fix
that by moving the generation check up.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.10
Fixes: 928b721a11789a ("xfs: teach online scrub to find directory tree structure problems")
Signed-off-by: "Darrick J. Wong" <djwong@kernel.org>
Assisted-by: LOLLM # finding obvious bugs
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Carlos Maiolino <cem@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 15e38a9366b31d3d61081ead115f1dff59379e24 upstream.
LOLLM noticed an off-by-one error in the nsec clamping; fix that so that
we never have tv_nsec == 1e9.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.8
Fixes: 2d295fe65776d1 ("xfs: repair inode records")
Signed-off-by: "Darrick J. Wong" <djwong@kernel.org>
Assisted-by: LOLLM # finding obvious bugs
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Carlos Maiolino <cem@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 353a5900bc85234e7df05caac37698042dc26348 upstream.
LOLLM noticed that two helper functions in the rtrmapbt scrub code don't
actually handle non-inode owners correctly -- CoW staging extents and
rgsuperblock extents are not shareable, but they are mergeable. Fix
these two helpers.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.14
Fixes: 2d9a3e98053e8c ("xfs: allow overlapping rtrmapbt records for shared data extents")
Signed-off-by: "Darrick J. Wong" <djwong@kernel.org>
Assisted-by: LOLLM # finding obvious bugs
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Carlos Maiolino <cem@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 540ddc626245f12f56326ee0c1601f71ebb41d64 upstream.
LOLLM noticed that we *disable* interruptible sorts when the KILLABLE
flag is set. This is backwards. Fix the incorrect logic, and rename
the variable to make the connection more obvious.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.10
Fixes: 271557de7cbfde ("xfs: reduce the rate of cond_resched calls inside scrub")
Signed-off-by: "Darrick J. Wong" <djwong@kernel.org>
Assisted-by: LOLLM # finding obvious bugs
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Carlos Maiolino <cem@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 881f2eb0fcdea2f46a50fa6a892fe9e3ccf19e01 upstream.
LOLLM also noticed that xchk_rtrmapbt_xref ought to be using the rtdev
version of the "is this a cow extent?" helper function, not the datadev
one.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.14
Fixes: 91683bb3f264c0 ("xfs: cross-reference checks with the rt refcount btree")
Signed-off-by: "Darrick J. Wong" <djwong@kernel.org>
Assisted-by: LOLLM # finding obvious bugs
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Carlos Maiolino <cem@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit ea6e2d9de25d2095845e0cdf2274e581fd40d636 upstream.
LOLLM noticed that we aren't grabbing the rtrmap btree when we check the
realtime group superblock. As a result, none of the cross-referencing
checks have ever run. Fix this.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.14
Fixes: 428e4884656db9 ("xfs: allow queued realtime intents to drain before scrubbing")
Signed-off-by: "Darrick J. Wong" <djwong@kernel.org>
Assisted-by: LOLLM # finding obvious bugs
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Carlos Maiolino <cem@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit d766e4e5e85d829629c3ba503802fe1303d7b591 upstream.
LOLLM noticed that q_id is an unsigned 32-bit variable. If it happens
to be set to XFS_DQ_ID_MAX due to a filesystem that actually has a dquot
for ID_MAX, then this addition will truncate to zero and the iteration
starts over. Fix this by casting to u64.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.8
Fixes: 21d7500929c8a0 ("xfs: improve dquot iteration for scrub")
Signed-off-by: "Darrick J. Wong" <djwong@kernel.org>
Assisted-by: LOLLM # finding obvious bugs
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Carlos Maiolino <cem@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 2f4acd0fcd862e22eab45690ec2c08c80b6ef2e7 upstream.
xfs_reflink_fill_{cow_hole,delalloc} are both presented with an inode,
a data fork mapping, and a cow fork mapping. Unfortunately, these two
helpers cycle the ILOCK to grab a transaction, which means that the
mappings are stale as soon as we reacquire the ILOCK. Currently we
refresh the cow fork mapping by re-calling xfs_find_trim_cow_extent, but
we don't refresh the data fork mapping beforehand, which means that the
xfs_bmap_trim_cow in that function queries the refcount btree about the
wrong physical blocks and returns an inaccurate value in *shared.
If *shared is now false, the directio write proceeds with a stale data
fork mapping. Fix this by querying the data fork mapping if the
sequence counter changes across the ILOCK cycle.
Cc: hch@lst.de
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.11
Fixes: 3c68d44a2b49a0 ("xfs: allocate direct I/O COW blocks in iomap_begin")
Signed-off-by: "Darrick J. Wong" <djwong@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Carlos Maiolino <cmaiolino@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Carlos Maiolino <cem@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 2094dab19d45c487285617b7b68913d0cc0c1211 upstream.
If the first op of a transaction is a bare transaction header
(len == sizeof(struct xfs_trans_header)), xlog_recover_add_to_trans()
adds an item but no region, leaving it on r_itemq with ri_cnt == 0 and
ri_buf == NULL.
The header can be split across op records, so later ops may still add
regions; the item is only invalid if the transaction commits with none.
The runtime commit path never emits such a transaction, so this only
happens on a crafted log. It came from an AI-assisted code audit of the
recovery parser.
xlog_recover_reorder_trans() calls ITEM_TYPE() on the item, which reads
*(unsigned short *)item->ri_buf[0].iov_base and faults on the NULL
ri_buf. Reject it there, before the commit handlers that also read
ri_buf[0].
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007]
RIP: 0010:xlog_recover_reorder_trans (fs/xfs/xfs_log_recover.c:1836)
xlog_recover_commit_trans (fs/xfs/xfs_log_recover.c:2043)
xlog_recover_process_data (fs/xfs/xfs_log_recover.c:2501)
xlog_do_recovery_pass (fs/xfs/xfs_log_recover.c:3244)
xlog_recover (fs/xfs/xfs_log_recover.c:3493)
xfs_log_mount (fs/xfs/xfs_log.c:618)
xfs_mountfs (fs/xfs/xfs_mount.c:1034)
xfs_fs_fill_super (fs/xfs/xfs_super.c:1938)
vfs_get_tree (fs/super.c:1695)
path_mount (fs/namespace.c:4161)
__x64_sys_mount (fs/namespace.c:4367)
Fixes: 89cebc847729 ("xfs: validate transaction header length on log recovery")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.3
Reported-by: Xiang Mei <xmei5@asu.edu>
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-8
Signed-off-by: Weiming Shi <bestswngs@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: "Darrick J. Wong" <djwong@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Carlos Maiolino <cem@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 9202ee546b0cd71004eed7598546efe4660097da upstream.
If dfp is not NULL we exit early here, when dfp is NULL it's allocated
in xfs_defer_alloc() but not assigned. The tracepoint tries to
dereference members of dfp struct.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Albershteyn <aalbersh@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.8
Fixes: 3f3cec031099c3 ("xfs: force small EFIs for reaping btree extents")
Reviewed-by: "Darrick J. Wong" <djwong@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Carlos Maiolino <cem@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 8986c932905ea508d66da421eb2eb6e676ace1fe upstream.
Commit 53b7c271f06b ("smb: client: restrict implied bcc[0] exemption to
responses without data area") restricted the implied bcc[0] length
exception to responses without a data area. However, the overlap
handling in __smb2_calc_size() clears data_length, which can make an
invalid response appear to have no data area and so qualify for the
exception.
Track data area overlap separately and reject such responses before
applying the length compatibility exceptions.
Fixes: 53b7c271f06b ("smb: client: restrict implied bcc[0] exemption to responses without data area")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Shoichiro Miyamoto <shoichiro.miyamoto@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit ccaba785821970f422c47770331c7e3271763f17 upstream.
This reverts commit 9609dd704725a40cd63d915f2ab6c44248a44598.
The kernel panics are keeping to be reported especially when the f2fs
partition get almost full. By investigation, we find that the reason is
one f2fs page got freed to buddy without being deleted from LRU and the
root cause is the race happened in [2] which is enrolled by this commit.
There are 3 race processes in this scenario, please find below for their
main activities.
The changed code in move_data_block() lets the GC path evict the tail-end
folio from the page cache through folio_end_dropbehind(). Once
folio_unmap_invalidate() removes the folio from mapping->i_pages, the
page-cache references for all pages in the folio are dropped. The folio
is then kept alive only by temporary external references, which allows a
later split to operate on a folio whose subpages are no longer protected
by page-cache references.
After the page-cache references are gone, split_folio_to_order() can
split the big folio into individual pages and put the resulting subpages
back on the LRU. For tail pages beyond EOF, split removes them from the
page cache and drops their page-cache references. A tail page can then
remain on the LRU with PG_lru set while holding only the split caller's
temporary reference. When free_folio_and_swap_cache() drops that final
reference, the page enters the final folio_put() release path.
In parallel, folio_isolate_lru() can observe the same tail page with a
non-zero refcount and PG_lru set. It clears PG_lru before taking its own
reference. If this races with the final folio_put() from the split path,
__folio_put() sees PG_lru already cleared and skips lruvec_del_folio().
The page is then freed back to the allocator while its lru links are
still present in the LRU list. A later LRU operation on a neighboring
page detects the stale link and reports list corruption.
[1]
[ 22.486082] list_del corruption. next->prev should be fffffffec10e0ac8, but was dead000000000122. (next=fffffffec10e0a88)
[ 22.486130] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 22.486134] kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:67!
[ 22.486141] Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1] SMP
[ 22.488502] Tainted: [W]=WARN, [O]=OOT_MODULE
[ 22.488506] Hardware name: Spreadtrum UMS9230 1H10 SoC (DT)
[ 22.488511] pstate: 604000c5 (nZCv daIF +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
[ 22.488517] pc : __list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0x14c/0x154
[ 22.488531] lr : __list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0x14c/0x154
[ 22.488539] sp : ffffffc08006b830
[ 22.488542] x29: ffffffc08006b868 x28: 0000000000003020 x27: 0000000000000000
[ 22.488553] x26: 0000000000000000 x25: 0000000000000004 x24: fffffffec10e0ac0
[ 22.488564] x23: 00000000000000e8 x22: 0000000000000024 x21: dead000000000122
[ 22.488574] x20: fffffffec10e0a88 x19: fffffffec10e0ac8 x18: ffffffc080061060
[ 22.488585] x17: 20747562202c3863 x16: 6130653031636566 x15: 0000000000000058
[ 22.488595] x14: 0000000000000004 x13: ffffff80f91e0000 x12: 0000000000000003
[ 22.488605] x11: 0000000000000003 x10: 0000000000000001 x9 : ffe85721f0e25f00
[ 22.488615] x8 : ffe85721f0e25f00 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 6c65645f7473696c
[ 22.488625] x5 : ffffffed39b23026 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000010
[ 22.488636] x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : 000000000000006d
[ 22.488647] Call trace:
[ 22.488651] __list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0x14c/0x154 (P)
[ 22.488661] __folio_put+0x2bc/0x434
[ 22.488670] folio_put+0x28/0x58
[ 22.488678] do_garbage_collect+0x1a34/0x2584
[ 22.488689] f2fs_gc+0x230/0x9b4
[ 22.488697] f2fs_fallocate+0xb90/0xdf4
[ 22.488706] vfs_fallocate+0x1b4/0x2bc
[ 22.488716] __arm64_sys_fallocate+0x44/0x78
[ 22.488725] invoke_syscall+0x58/0xe4
[ 22.488732] do_el0_svc+0x48/0xdc
[ 22.488739] el0_svc+0x3c/0x98
[ 22.488747] el0t_64_sync_handler+0x20/0x130
[ 22.488754] el0t_64_sync+0x1c4/0x1c8
[2]
CPU0 (f2fs GC) CPU1 (split_folio_to_order) CPU2 (folio_isolate_lru)
F: pagecache refs = n
F: extra refs = GC + split
F: PG_lru set
move_data_block()
folio = f2fs_grab_cache_folio(F)
...
__folio_set_dropbehind(F)
folio_unlock(F)
folio_end_dropbehind(F)
folio_unmap_invalidate(F)
__filemap_remove_folio(F)
folio_put_refs(F, n)
folio_put(F)
split_folio_to_order(F)
folio_ref_freeze(F, 1)
...
lru_add_split_folio(T)
list_add_tail(&T->lru, &F->lru)
folio_set_lru(T)
__filemap_remove_folio(T)
folio_put_refs(T, 1)
/* T refcount == 1, PageLRU set */
folio_isolate_lru(T)
folio_test_clear_lru(T)
free_folio_and_swap_cache(T)
folio_put(T)
/* refcount: 1 -> 0 */
__folio_put(T)
__page_cache_release(T)
folio_test_lru(T) == false
/* skip lruvec_del_folio(T) */
free_frozen_pages(T)
folio_get(T)
lruvec_del_folio(T)
later:
list_del(adjacent->lru)
next == &T->lru
next->prev == LIST_POISON / PCP freelist
BUG
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 9609dd704725 ("f2fs: remove non-uptodate folio from the page cache in move_data_block")
Signed-off-by: Zhaoyang Huang <zhaoyang.huang@unisoc.com>
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit d38eaf611839b85ade3dd3db309dbc8aaaaf0095 upstream.
b66774b48dd9 ("Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix UAF in channel timeout by holding
conn ref") don't reset the chan->conn to NULL anymore making the bt#
netdev not be remove once the last l2cap_chan_del is removed.
Instead of restoring the original behavior this remove the logic of
keeping the interface after the last channel is removed because it
never worked as intended and the l2cap_chan_del always detach its
l2cap_conn which results in always removing the channel anyway.
Fixes: b66774b48dd9 ("Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix UAF in channel timeout by holding conn ref")
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 8fa30821180a9a19e78e9f4df1c0ba710252801e upstream.
Commit f24df84cbe05 ("time/jiffies: Register jiffies clocksource before
usage") moved the jiffies clocksource registration into
clocksource_default_clock(), so that it is registered lazily on the first
call. __clocksource_register() acquires clocksource_mutex, but the first
caller is timekeeping_init(), which invokes clocksource_default_clock()
while holding tk_core.lock, a raw spinlock.
Acquiring a sleeping mutex while holding a raw spinlock is invalid.
The default clocksource only has to be registered before
tk_setup_internals() consumes its mult/shift/maxadj. Neither
clocksource_default_clock(), the ->enable() callback, nor the registration
itself need tk_core.lock, so fetch and enable the clock before acquiring
the lock. This preserves the "register before usage" ordering while
keeping clocksource_mutex out of the raw spinlock section.
clocksource_default_clock() has a second caller,
clocksource_done_booting(), which invokes it with clocksource_mutex already
held. That path avoids a recursive lock because timekeeping_init() has
already run and set cs_jiffies_registered, so the registration is skipped
there. This change does not alter that; it only fixes the invalid wait
context in timekeeping_init().
Fixes: f24df84cbe05 ("time/jiffies: Register jiffies clocksource before usage")
Signed-off-by: Mikhail Gavrilov <mikhail.v.gavrilov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org>
Reported-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
Reported-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260616070914.65818-1-mikhail.v.gavrilov@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 82cfd4739011bdc7e87b5d585703427e89ddfaa5 upstream.
When parsing endpoint descriptors, ffs_data_got_descs() generates the
eps_addrmap which contains the endpoint direction. However, epfile->in
was previously only populated in ffs_func_eps_enable() which executes
upon USB host connection. As a result, early userspace ioctls like
FUNCTIONFS_DMABUF_ATTACH that run before the host connects would see
epfile->in as 0, leading to incorrect DMA directions.
By moving the initialization to ffs_epfiles_create(), epfile->in is
accurate before userspace opens the endpoint files.
Fixes: 7b07a2a7ca02 ("usb: gadget: functionfs: Add DMABUF import interface")
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Assisted-by: Antigravity:gemini-3.1-pro
Signed-off-by: Neill Kapron <nkapron@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260619040609.4010746-2-nkapron@google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 82d6e01a0699800efd8b048eb584c907ccb47b7a upstream.
Load imbalance is observed when the workload frequently forks new threads.
Due to CPU affinity, the workload can run on CPU 0-7 in the first
group, and only on CPU 8-11 in the second group. CPU 12-15 are always idle.
{ 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 } {8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15}
* * * * * * * * * * * *
When looking for dst group for newly forked threads, in many times
update_sg_wakeup_stats() reports the second group has more idle CPUs
than the first group. The scheduler thinks the second group is less
busy. Then it selects least busy CPUs among CPU 8-11. Therefore CPU 8-11
can be crowded with newly forked threads, at the same time CPU 0-7
can be idle.
A task may not use all the CPUs in a schedule group due to CPU affinity.
Only update schedule group statistics for allowed CPUs.
Signed-off-by: Adam Li <adamli@os.amperecomputing.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Erwan Velu <e.velu@criteo.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 1c57a69be962d459c5e705f5cb4355b841b3461c upstream.
If a copy into the userspace ring buffer fails, a request will be
terminated and fuse_uring_req_end() will set ent->fuse_req to NULL but
it will leave the entry on ent_w_req_queue in FRRS_FUSE_REQ state. This
can lead to a NULL deref if the request expiration logic scans
ent_w_req_queue in the window before the entry is moved off it.
Fix this by taking the entry off ent_w_req_queue and changing its state
from FRRS_FUSE_REQ to FRRS_INVALID before terminating the request.
Fixes: 4fea593e625c ("fuse: optimize over-io-uring request expiration check")
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Joanne Koong <joannelkoong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 1efd3d474fc0ba74dfd984249bca78807d739812 upstream.
Bad userspace might try to trick us and send commit SQEs request
unique / commit-id of requests that are not even send to
fuse-server (io_uring_cmd_done() not called) yet.
fuse_uring_commit_fetch() ends the fuse request when the ring entry
has a wrong state, but that could have caused a use-after-free
with the memcpy operations in fuse_uring_send_in_task().
In order to avoid such races the call of fuse_uring_add_to_pq()
is moved after the copy operations and just before completing
the io-uring request - malicious userspace cannot find the request
anymore until all prepration work in fuse-client/kernel is completed.
This also moves fuse_uring_add_to_pq() a bit up in the code to
avoid a forward declaration. Also not with a preparation commit,
to make it easier to back port to older kernels.
Reported-by: xlabai <xlabai@tencent.com>
Reported-by: Berkant Koc <me@berkoc.com>
Fixes: c090c8abae4b6b ("fuse: Add io-uring sqe commit and fetch support")
Cc: stable@kernel.org # 6.14
Signed-off-by: Bernd Schubert <bernd@bsbernd.com>
Reviewed-by: Joanne Koong <joannelkoong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit b70a3aca16934c196f92abb17b01c1647b9bb63c upstream.
There are several readers of queue->stopped that check the value
under lock, but fuse_uring_commit_fetch() did not and actually
the value was not set under the lock in fuse_uring_abort_end_requests()
either. Especially in fuse_uring_commit_fetch it is important
to check under a lock, because due to races 'struct fuse_req'
might be freed with fuse_request_end, but another thread/cpu
might already do teardown work.
Cc: stable@kernel.org # 6.14
Fixes: 4a9bfb9b6850fec ("fuse: {io-uring} Handle teardown of ring entries")
Reported-by: Berkant Koc <me@berkoc.com>
Reported-by: xlabai <xlabai@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Bernd Schubert <bernd@bsbernd.com>
Reviewed-by: Joanne Koong <joannelkoong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit d351da75066955144515cb2f9aa959f24a04287a upstream.
fuse_uring_async_stop_queues() might run when the last reference
on ring->queue_refs was already dropped.
In order to avoid an early destruction a reference on struct fuse_conn
is now taken before starting fuse_uring_async_stop_queues() and that
reference is only released when that delayed work queue terminates.
Fixes: 4a9bfb9b6850 ("fuse: {io-uring} Handle teardown of ring entries")
Cc: stable@kernel.org # 6.14
Reported-by: Berkant Koc <me@berkoc.com>
Signed-off-by: Bernd Schubert <bernd@bsbernd.com>
Reviewed-by: Joanne Koong <joannelkoong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit bea4fe98204b6ce7eb8e29f7bf867dd7619b3ddd upstream.
When io_uring delivers task work with tw.cancel set (PF_EXITING,
PF_KTHREAD fallback, or percpu_ref_is_dying on the ring context),
fuse_uring_send_in_task() takes the cancel branch, assigns
-ECANCELED, and falls through to fuse_uring_send(). That path only
flips the entry to FRRS_USERSPACE and completes the io_uring cmd;
it never discharges the ring entry's owning reference to the
fuse_req that fuse_uring_add_req_to_ring_ent() handed it at
dispatch time.
fuse_uring_send_in_task()
tw.cancel == true
err = -ECANCELED
fuse_uring_send(ent, cmd, err, issue_flags)
ent->state = FRRS_USERSPACE
list_move(&ent->list, &queue->ent_in_userspace)
ent->cmd = NULL
io_uring_cmd_done(-ECANCELED)
/* ent->fuse_req still set, req still hashed */
The fuse_req stays linked on fpq->processing[hash] and
fuse_request_end() is never invoked. The originating syscall
thread blocks in D-state in request_wait_answer() until
fuse_abort_conn() runs, which can be the entire connection
lifetime. For FR_BACKGROUND requests fc->num_background is never
decremented either, so repeated cancels inflate the counter until
max_background is hit and all later background ops stall. tw.cancel does
not imply a connection abort (e.g. a single io_uring worker thread exits
while the fuse connection stays up), so this cannot be left for
fuse_abort_conn() to clean up.
Ending the req but still routing the entry through fuse_uring_send()
is not enough: that leaves a req-less entry on ent_in_userspace, and
ent_list_request_expired() dereferences ent->fuse_req unconditionally
on the head of that list, which would then NULL-deref.
Fix the cancel branch to release the entry directly. Remove it from the
queue, complete the io_uring cmd, end the fuse_req, free the entry, and
drop its queue_refs (waking the teardown waiter if it was the last).
Fixes: c2c9af9a0b13 ("fuse: Allow to queue fg requests through io-uring")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Joanne Koong <joannelkoong@gmail.com>
Assisted-by: kres (claude-opus-4-7)
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <clm@meta.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 198f45eeb9f78b2a2d6d8be95e4e43468eb2c6bc upstream.
fuse_uring_cancel() moves entries that are available (these have no reqs
attached) to the ent_in_userspace list. ent_list_request_expired()
checks the first entry on ent_in_userspace and dereferences
ent->fuse_req unconditionally, which will crash on a cancelled entry
that was moved to this list.
Fix this by freeing the entry and dropping queue_refs directly in
fuse_uring_cancel(). This is safe because cancel is the cancel handler
itself - after io_uring_cmd_done(), no more cancels will be dispatched
for this command, and teardown serializes with cancel via queue->lock.
Since cancel now decrements queue_refs, fuse_uring_abort() must no
longer gate fuse_uring_abort_end_requests() on queue_refs > 0, as
cancelled entries may have already dropped queue_refs while requests are
still queued. Remove the gate so abort always flushes requests and stops
queues.
Reported-by: Heechan Kang <gganji11@naver.com>
Tested-by: Heechan Kang <gganji11@naver.com>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Schubert <bernd@bsbernd.com>
Fixes: 4fea593e625c ("fuse: optimize over-io-uring request expiration check")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Suggested-by: Jian Huang Li <ali@ddn.com>
Suggested-by: Horst Birthelmer <horst@birthelmer.de>
Signed-off-by: Joanne Koong <joannelkoong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 46725a0056c884cf58a6897f222892807327d82d upstream.
On weakly-ordered architectures, the store to fiq->ops can be
reordered past the store to ring->ready, allowing a CPU that sees
ring->ready == true via fuse_uring_ready() to dispatch requests
through a stale fiq->ops pointer. Upgrade the store to
smp_store_release() and the load in fuse_uring_ready() to
smp_load_acquire() so that the preceding WRITE_ONCE(fiq->ops, ...)
is visible to any CPU that observes ring->ready == true.
Additionally, fuse_uring_do_register() publishes ring->ready with
WRITE_ONCE() but the fast-path check reads it with a plain load.
This is a marked-vs-unmarked access that KCSAN will flag. Wrap it in
READ_ONCE() to mark it without adding unnecessary ordering.
Also wrap the fc->ring load in fuse_uring_ready() in READ_ONCE() to
prevent the compiler from reloading it between the NULL check and the
dereference.
Fixes: c2c9af9a0b13 ("fuse: Allow to queue fg requests through io-uring")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Joanne Koong <joannelkoong@gmail.com>
Assisted-by: kres (claude-opus-4-7)
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <clm@meta.com>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Schubert <bernd@bsbernd.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 3a0a8bc51a13951c5141262bf770eeea3e0b6228 upstream.
copy_from_user() returns the number of bytes not copied as an unsigned
residual on failure (1..sizeof(struct fuse_out_header)). fuse_uring_commit
stores that residual in ssize_t err, sets req->out.h.error to -EFAULT,
then jumps to out: with err still holding the positive residual.
err = copy_from_user(&req->out.h, &ent->headers->in_out,
sizeof(req->out.h));
if (err) {
req->out.h.error = -EFAULT;
goto out; /* err is the positive residual */
}
...
out:
fuse_uring_req_end(ent, req, err);
fuse_uring_req_end() then runs
if (error)
req->out.h.error = error;
which overwrites the just-assigned -EFAULT with the positive residual.
FUSE callers such as fuse_simple_request() test err < 0 to detect
failure, so the positive value is interpreted as success and the
caller proceeds with an uninitialised or partial req->out.args.
Fix by assigning err = -EFAULT in the failure branch before jumping
to out, so fuse_uring_req_end() receives a negative errno and sets
req->out.h.error to -EFAULT.
Fixes: c090c8abae4b ("fuse: Add io-uring sqe commit and fetch support")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Joanne Koong <joannelkoong@gmail.com>
Assisted-by: kres (claude-opus-4-7)
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <clm@meta.com>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Schubert <bernd@bsbernd.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit f8fce75fedf73ac72aa09163deb8f4291fdcaad2 upstream.
When fuse_resend() moves a request from fpq->processing back to
fiq->pending, it sets FR_PENDING and clears FR_SENT but does not
remove the requests intr_entry from fiq->interrupts. If the
request had FR_INTERRUPTED set from a prior signal, intr_entry
remains dangling on fiq->interrupts. When the requesting task
then receives a fatal signal, fuse_remove_pending_req() sees
FR_PENDING=1, removes the request from fiq->pending and frees it
via the refcount path, also without cleaning intr_entry. The
stale intr_entry causes use-after-free when fuse_read_interrupt()
iterates fiq->interrupts:
- list_del_init(&req->intr_entry) -> UAF write on freed slab
- req->in.h.unique -> UAF read, data leaked to userspace
Remove intr_entry from fiq->interrupts in fuse_resend() for
interrupted requests before they are placed back on fiq->pending.
Add a WARN_ON if the intr_entry is not empty on request destruction.
Fixes: 760eac73f9f6 ("fuse: Introduce a new notification type for resend pending requests")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.9
Signed-off-by: Ji'an Zhou <eilaimemedsnaimel@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 31da059891bd3be9c6e59280b8e1777ead90db34 upstream.
When a background request completes via the io_uring path, the
background queue gets flushed to dispatch pending background requests,
but this is done before the connection-level background counters
(fc->num_background, fc->active_background) are properly accounted,
which may reduce effective queue depth to one.
The connection-level counters are decremented in fuse_request_end(), but
flush_bg_queue() flushes the /dev/fuse path queue (fc->bg_queue), not
the io_uring per-queue bg one, which means pending uring background
requests on the queue are never dispatched in this path.
Fix this by accounting the connection-level background counters first
before flushing the queue's background queue. Since
fuse_request_bg_finish() clears FR_BACKGROUND, fuse_request_end() will
skip the background cleanup branch entirely, which avoids any
double-decrements; it will call the wake_up(&req->waitq) branch but this
is effectively a no-op as background requests have no waiters on
req->waitq.
Reviewed-by: Bernd Schubert <bernd@bsbernd.com>
Fixes: 857b0263f30e ("fuse: Allow to queue bg requests through io-uring")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Joanne Koong <joannelkoong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit b5befa80fdbe287a98480effed9564712924add5 upstream.
fuse_ref_folio() unlocks the request but does not re-lock it before
returning. fuse_chan_abort() can end the request and the async end
callback (eg fuse_writepage_free()) can free the args while the
subsequent copy chain logic after fuse_ref_folio() accesses them,
leading to use-after-free issues.
Fix this by locking the request in fuse_ref_folio() before returning.
Fixes: c3021629a0d8 ("fuse: support splice() reading from fuse device")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Joanne Koong <joannelkoong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 9fa4f7a53406430ee9982f2f636a15b338185122 upstream.
If device_add() succeeds during CUSE initialization but a subsequent
step (cdev_alloc() or cdev_add()) fails, the error path calls
put_device() without first calling device_del(). This leaks the
devtmpfs entry created by device_add(), leaving a stale /dev/<name>
node that persists until reboot.
Since the cuse_conn is never linked into cuse_conntbl on the failure
path, cuse_channel_release() sees cc->dev == NULL and skips
device_unregister(), so no other code path cleans up the node.
This has several consequences:
- The device name is permanently poisoned: any subsequent attempt to
create a CUSE device with the same name hits the stale sysfs entry,
device_add() fails, and the new device is aborted.
- The collision manifests as ENODEV returned to userspace with no
dmesg diagnostic, making it very difficult to debug.
- The failure is self-perpetuating: once a name is leaked, all future
attempts with that name fail identically.
Fix this by introducing an err_dev label that calls device_del() to
undo device_add() before falling through to err_unlock. The existing
err_unlock path from a device_add() failure correctly skips device_del()
since the device was never added.
Testing instructions can be found at the lore link below.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260408-wip-cuse-leak-fix-v1-0-1c028d575e97@redhat.com/
Signed-off-by: Alberto Ruiz <aruiz@redhat.com>
Fixes: 151060ac1314 ("CUSE: implement CUSE - Character device in Userspace")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 54243797cedf55447b4c5d560e8cd709900061ae upstream.
FUSE_NOTIFY_PRUNE validates the nodeid payload length with:
size - sizeof(outarg) != outarg.count * sizeof(u64)
On 32-bit kernels, size_t is also 32 bits, so the daemon-controlled
count multiplication can wrap. A prune notification with count
0x20000000 and no nodeid payload passes the check, enters the copy
loop, and asks the device copy path to read nodeids that are not
present in the userspace write buffer. In QEMU this reaches the
fuse_copy_fill() BUG_ON(!err) path.
Validate the payload length with array_size() instead. That accepts
exactly the same valid messages, but avoids wrapping arithmetic before
the copy loop consumes the count.
Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5.5-cyber-preview
Fixes: 3f29d59e92a9 ("fuse: add prune notification")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Samuel Moelius <sam.moelius@trailofbits.com>
Reviewed-by: Joanne Koong <joannelkoong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 4dd6f6d3085a84e74b0a1efec3a05ed0b5125dce upstream.
Commit dabb90391028 ("fuse: increase readdir buffer size") changed
fuse_readdir_uncached() to size its temporary buffer from ctx->count.
This is useful for overlayfs and other in-kernel callers that use
INT_MAX to indicate an unlimited directory read.
The larger buffer is currently supplied as a kvec output argument. For
virtiofs, kvec arguments are copied through req->argbuf, which is
allocated with kmalloc(..., GFP_ATOMIC). A large uncached readdir buffer
can therefore require a multi-megabyte contiguous atomic allocation
before the request is queued.
Avoid the large bounce-buffer allocation by backing uncached readdir
output with pages and setting out_pages. Transports such as virtiofs can
then pass the pages as scatter-gather entries instead of copying the
output through argbuf.
Map the pages with vm_map_ram() only while parsing the returned dirents.
The existing parser can then continue to use a linear kernel mapping.
[SzM: separate allocation of pages into a helper function]
Fixes: dabb90391028 ("fuse: increase readdir buffer size")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Matthew R. Ochs <mochs@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 7d29f7e9dbd844cae4d3e559cf78324b9642fd6b upstream.
In drivers/infiniband/sw/siw/siw_qp_rx.c, siw_proc_rresp() places each
inbound Read Response DDP segment at sge->laddr + wqe->processed and then
accumulates wqe->processed, but it never checks the running total against
the sink buffer length on continuation segments. siw_check_sge() resolves
and validates the sink memory only on the first fragment (the if (!*mem)
branch), and siw_rresp_check_ntoh() compares the cumulative length against
wqe->bytes only on the final segment (the !frx->more_ddp_segs guard).
A connected siw peer that answers an outstanding RREAD with Read Response
segments that keep the DDP Last flag clear, carrying more total payload
than the RREAD requested, drives wqe->processed past the validated sink
buffer; the next siw_rx_data() call writes out of bounds at
sge->laddr + wqe->processed. siw runs iWARP over ordinary routable TCP,
so the peer is the remote end of an established RDMA connection and needs
no local privilege.
Bound every segment before placement, exactly as siw_proc_send() and
siw_proc_write() already do for their tagged and untagged paths, and
terminate the connection with a base-or-bounds DDP error when the
Read Response would overrun the sink buffer.
This is the second receive-path length fix for this file. A separate
change rejects an MPA FPDU length that underflows the per-fragment
remainder in the header decode; that guard does not cover this case,
because here each individual segment length is self-consistent and only
the accumulated placement offset overruns the buffer.
Fixes: 8b6a361b8c48 ("rdma/siw: receive path")
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/r/20260602194700.2273758-1-michael.bommarito@gmail.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-8
Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 942cd47faa2047b46dfd85745603eba9006973e6 upstream.
When rdma_resolve_addr() is invoked with a broadcast destination on an
IPoIB interface, is_dst_local() inspects the resolved route and
incorrectly concludes that the address is local. As a result, the
resolution fails with -ENODEV.
The issue stems from using '&' to compare rt_type with RTN_LOCAL. The
RTN_* values form a sequential enum, not a bitmask (RTN_LOCAL=2,
RTN_BROADCAST=3). Thus, "rt_type & RTN_LOCAL" yields a non-zero result
for a broadcast route as well.
Replace '&' with '==' when comparing rt_type against RTN_LOCAL.
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/r/20260609-fix-rdma-resolve-addr-v1-1-449b8b4e6c09@nvidia.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: c31e4038c97f ("RDMA/core: Use route entry flag to decide on loopback traffic")
Signed-off-by: Maher Sanalla <msanalla@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Vlad Dumitrescu <vdumitrescu@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Edward Srouji <edwards@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Parav Pandit <parav@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 963af8d97a8c6a117134a8d0db1415e0489200b1 upstream.
When the server answers an RTRS READ, rdma_write_sg() builds the source
scatter/gather entry for the IB_WR_RDMA_WRITE that returns data to the
peer. Its length is taken directly from the wire descriptor:
plist->length = le32_to_cpu(id->rd_msg->desc[0].len);
rd_msg points into the chunk buffer that the remote peer filled via
RDMA-WRITE-WITH-IMM (rtrs_srv_rdma_done() -> process_io_req() ->
process_read()), so desc[0].len is attacker-controlled and, before this
change, was only rejected when zero. The source address is the fixed
chunk start (dma_addr[msg_id]) and the source lkey is the PD-wide
local_dma_lkey, which is not tied to the chunk's MR mapping, so the verbs
layer does not constrain the transfer length to max_chunk_size. msg_id
and off are bounded against queue_depth and max_chunk_size in
rtrs_srv_rdma_done(), but desc[0].len is a separate field that was not
checked against the chunk size.
A peer that advertises desc[0].len larger than max_chunk_size can make
the posted RDMA write read past the chunk's mapped region. The resulting
behaviour depends on the IOMMU configuration: with no IOMMU or in
passthrough mode the read may extend into memory adjacent to the chunk
and be returned to the peer, which can disclose host memory; with a
translating IOMMU the out-of-range access is expected to fault and abort
the connection. In either case the transfer exceeds what the protocol
permits and is driven by a remote peer.
Reject a descriptor length above max_chunk_size, mirroring the existing
off >= max_chunk_size bound in rtrs_srv_rdma_done(). Legitimate clients
do not exceed it: the client sets desc[0].len to its MR length, which is
capped at the negotiated max_io_size (max_chunk_size - MAX_HDR_SIZE).
Fixes: 9cb837480424 ("RDMA/rtrs: server: main functionality")
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/r/20260612-master-v1-1-70cde5c6fdc9@gmail.com
Reported-by: Yuhao Jiang <danisjiang@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Zhenhao Wan <whi4ed0g@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Md Haris Iqbal <haris.iqbal@ionos.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit fe938ee497d58c644f6910cfe6ae155f6fb3e523 upstream.
Set maple driver data before calling input_register_device() to
ensure that it is available if the device is opened immediately and
the callback is triggered.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Assisted-by: Antigravity:gemini-3.5-flash
Tested-by: Florian Fuchs <fuchsfl@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/akNYib9hQFNN1fA9@google.com
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 738f24bbbc95dd50cb4229d1ed62a05f29db2bda upstream.
Set maple driver data before calling input_register_device() to
ensure that it is available if the device is opened immediately and
the callback is triggered.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Assisted-by: Antigravity:gemini-3.5-flash
Tested-by: Florian Fuchs <fuchsfl@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/akNXw45L_8bxD6QV@google.com
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 536394ec81419b67d9f4f0028812c4372397be1b upstream.
Set maple driver data before calling input_register_device() to
ensure that it is available if the device is opened immediately and
the callback is triggered.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Assisted-by: Antigravity:gemini-3.5-flash
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit adea84ee6cdea611146c4251d3c1616f5a09feca upstream.
If the touchscreen controller reports a touch ID of 0, the driver
calculates the slot ID as touch->id - 1, which underflows to UINT_MAX.
This is passed to input_mt_slot() as -1.
Since the input core ignores negative slot values, the active slot remains
unchanged. The driver then reports the touch coordinates for the previously
active slot, corrupting its state.
Fix this by rejecting touch reports with ID 0.
Fixes: 07b8481d4aff ("Input: add MELFAS mms114 touchscreen driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
Assisted-by: Antigravity:gemini-3.5-flash
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260704060115.353049-1-dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit ee89db004238bd0b034f2a6176e175561658750b upstream.
Commit 555c765b0cc2 ("Input: mouse - drop unnecessary calls to
input_set_drvdata") dropped the input_set_drvdata() call in probe
because the data appeared to be unused. However, dc_mouse_open() and
dc_mouse_close() were using maple_get_drvdata(to_maple_dev(&dev->dev)).
This appears to be accessing the data attached to an instance of
maple_device structure, while in reality this actually retrieves driver
data from the input device's embedded struct device (doing invalid
conversion of input device structure to maple device). After
input_set_drvdata() was removed, that lookup started returning NULL and
opening the input device dereferences mse->mdev.
Restore input_set_drvdata() and convert open() and close() to use
input_get_drvdata() so the dependency is no longer hidden.
Fixes: 6b3480855aad ("maple: input: fix up maple mouse driver")
Fixes: 555c765b0cc2 ("Input: mouse - drop unnecessary calls to input_set_drvdata")
Signed-off-by: Florian Fuchs <fuchsfl@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260628230715.2982552-1-fuchsfl@gmail.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit d86d4f8cbb5a55a3b9b86f7b5ab8c4cdda600a3f upstream.
Commit 44f920069911 ("Input: gscps2 - use guard notation when
acquiring spinlock") moved the receive loop into gscps2_read_data()
and gscps2_report_data().
While moving the code, it preserved the writes to
buffer[ps2port->append], but omitted the following producer index
update from the original loop:
ps2port->append = (ps2port->append + 1) & BUFFER_SIZE;
As a result, append never advances. Since gscps2_report_data() only
reports bytes while act != append, the receive buffer always appears
empty and no keyboard or mouse data reaches the serio core.
Restore the omitted index update.
Fixes: 44f920069911 ("Input: gscps2 - use guard notation when acquiring spinlock")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.13+
Signed-off-by: Xu Rao <raoxu@uniontech.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/460B5655BA580C60+20260624094739.850306-1-raoxu@uniontech.com
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 66725039f7090afe14c31bd259e2059a68f04023 upstream.
mms114_interrupt() reads a packet of touch data from the device into a
fixed-size on-stack buffer
struct mms114_touch touch[MMS114_MAX_TOUCH];
which holds MMS114_MAX_TOUCH (10) events of MMS114_EVENT_SIZE (8) bytes,
i.e. 80 bytes. The length of the I2C read into it is taken verbatim from
the device:
packet_size = mms114_read_reg(data, MMS114_PACKET_SIZE);
if (packet_size <= 0)
goto out;
...
error = __mms114_read_reg(data, MMS114_INFORMATION, packet_size,
(u8 *)touch);
packet_size is a single device register byte (0x0F) and the only check
is the lower bound packet_size <= 0; it is never bounded against the
size of touch[]. A malfunctioning, malicious or counterfeit controller
(or an attacker tampering with the I2C bus) can report a packet_size of
up to 255, so __mms114_read_reg() writes up to 175 bytes past the end of
touch[] on the IRQ-thread stack: a stack out-of-bounds write that can
overwrite the stack canary, saved registers and the return address.
A well-formed device never reports more than the buffer holds, so reject
an oversized packet and drop the report, consistent with the handler's
other error paths, rather than reading past the buffer.
Fixes: 07b8481d4aff ("Input: add MELFAS mms114 touchscreen driver")
Signed-off-by: Bryam Vargas <hexlabsecurity@proton.me>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260612-b4-disp-dc4b8dc4-v1-1-d7cb0a828d92@proton.me
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 478cdd736f2ce3114f90e775d7358136d3977b94 upstream.
tw_interrupt() accumulates each non-zero serial byte into a fixed
three-byte buffer with a running index that is only reset once a full
packet has been received *and* the device's two Y bytes agree:
tw->data[tw->idx++] = data;
if (tw->idx == TW_LENGTH && tw->data[1] == tw->data[2]) {
...
tw->idx = 0;
}
The reset is gated on tw->data[1] == tw->data[2], a value the device
controls. A malicious, malfunctioning or counterfeit Touchwindow
peripheral can stream non-zero bytes whose 2nd and 3rd bytes differ: the
index reaches TW_LENGTH without the equality holding, is never reset, and
keeps growing, so tw->data[tw->idx++] walks off the end of the three-byte
array and the rest of the heap-allocated struct tw, one attacker-chosen
byte at a time -- an unbounded, device-driven heap out-of-bounds write.
Reset the index on every completed packet and report an event only when
the two Y bytes match, like the other serio touchscreen drivers do.
Fixes: 11ea3173d5f2 ("Input: add driver for Touchwin serial touchscreens")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Bryam Vargas <hexlabsecurity@proton.me>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260613-b4-disp-69921bfd-v1-1-82c036899959@proton.me
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 856668312685d9a8f32d49a135a89c429d309f81 upstream.
The workaround for XPT2046 clears the command register, giving the
touchscreen controller a NOP. The change incorrectly re-uses the
req->scratch variable which is used as rx_buf for xfer[5], so by
the time xfer[6] occurs, the contents of req->scratch may not be
0. It was found that the touchscreen controller can end up in
a completely unresponsive state due to it being given a command
the driver does not expect.
Instead, rely on the spi_transfer behavior of tx_buf being NULL to
transmit all 0 bits and use the scratch variable for the rx_buf for
both the 1 byte command to and 2 byte response from the controller.
Also relocates the scratch member of struct ser_req to force it
into a different cache line to prevent any potential issues of
DMA stepping on unrelated data in other struct members due to
sharing the same cache line.
This change was tested on real TSC2046 and ADS7843 controllers,
but not the XPT2046 the workaround was originally created for.
Confirming that the original modification to clear the command
register does not impact either real controller.
Fixes: 781a07da9bb94 ("Input: ads7846 - add dummy command register clearing cycle")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Co-developed-by: Mark Featherston <mark@embeddedTS.com>
Signed-off-by: Mark Featherston <mark@embeddedTS.com>
Signed-off-by: Kris Bahnsen <kris@embeddedTS.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260507164943.760009-1-kris@embeddedTS.com
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit a6ac4e24c1a8a533bb61035184fdcc7eede4cc8d upstream.
The MMS134S and MMS136 touch controllers have an event size of 6 bytes
rather than 8 bytes. When __mms114_read_reg() reads the touch data
packet from the device into the touch buffer, the events are packed
tightly at 6-byte intervals. However, the driver iterates through the
events using standard C array indexing (touch[index]), where each
element is sizeof(struct mms114_touch) (8 bytes) apart. As a result, any
touch events beyond the first one are read from incorrect offsets and
parsed improperly.
Fix this by explicitly calculating the byte offset for each touch event
based on the device's specific event size.
Fixes: 53fefdd1d3a3 ("Input: mms114 - support MMS136")
Fixes: ab108678195f ("Input: mms114 - support MMS134S")
Reported-by: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
Assisted-by: Antigravity:gemini-3.5-flash
Reviewed-by: Bryam Vargas <hexlabsecurity@proton.me>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260616050912.1531241-1-dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 0e9943d2e4c63496b6ca84bc66fd3c71d40558e2 upstream.
iforce_process_packet() handles a status report (packet id 0x02) by
taking a force-feedback effect index straight from the device wire and
using it to address the per-effect state array:
i = data[1] & 0x7f;
if (data[1] & 0x80) {
if (!test_and_set_bit(FF_CORE_IS_PLAYED,
iforce->core_effects[i].flags))
...
} else if (test_and_clear_bit(FF_CORE_IS_PLAYED,
iforce->core_effects[i].flags)) {
...
}
The index is masked only with 0x7f, so it ranges 0..127, but
core_effects[] holds only IFORCE_EFFECTS_MAX (32) entries. For an index
of 32..127 the test_and_set_bit()/test_and_clear_bit() is an
out-of-bounds single-bit read-modify-write past the array. core_effects[]
is the second-to-last member of struct iforce, so the write lands in the
trailing members and beyond the embedding kzalloc()'d iforce_serio /
iforce_usb object.
data[1] is unvalidated device payload on both transports (the USB
interrupt endpoint and serio), and the status path is not gated on force
feedback being present, so a malicious or counterfeit device can set or
clear a bit at an attacker-chosen offset past the object.
Reject an out-of-range index instead of indexing with it. Bound against
the array dimension IFORCE_EFFECTS_MAX rather than dev->ff->max_effects so
the check guarantees memory safety regardless of how many effects the
device registered. A legitimate "effect started/stopped" status always
carries an index below IFORCE_EFFECTS_MAX, so well-formed devices are
unaffected; the neighbouring mark_core_as_ready() loop is already bounded
and is left untouched.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Bryam Vargas <hexlabsecurity@proton.me>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260613-b4-disp-4828d263-v1-1-02320e1a89dd@proton.me
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 5ed62a96e06be4e94b8296b7932afee550a70e04 upstream.
goodix_ts_read_input_report() copies the number of touch points reported
by the device into an on-stack buffer
u8 point_data[2 + GOODIX_MAX_CONTACT_SIZE * GOODIX_MAX_CONTACTS];
which is sized for at most GOODIX_MAX_CONTACTS (10) contacts. The only
runtime check bounds the per-interrupt count against ts->max_touch_num,
but that value is taken verbatim from a 4-bit field of the device
configuration block and is never clamped:
ts->max_touch_num = ts->config[MAX_CONTACTS_LOC] & 0x0f;
The nibble can be 0..15, so a malfunctioning, malicious or counterfeit
controller (or an attacker tampering with the I2C bus) can advertise up
to 15 contacts. goodix_ts_read_input_report() then accepts a touch_num
of up to 15 and the second goodix_i2c_read() writes
ts->contact_size * (touch_num - 1) bytes past the one-contact header into
point_data - up to 30 bytes (45 with the 9-byte report format) beyond the
92-byte buffer: a stack out-of-bounds write.
Clamp max_touch_num to GOODIX_MAX_CONTACTS, the number of contacts
point_data[] is sized for, when reading it from the configuration.
Fixes: a7ac7c95d468 ("Input: goodix - use max touch number from device config")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Bryam Vargas <hexlabsecurity@proton.me>
Reviewed-by: Hans de Goede <johannes.goede@oss.qualcomm.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260612-b4-disp-6844625d-v1-1-df0aed080c9d@proton.me
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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