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Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230809103636.615294317@linuxfoundation.org
Tested-by: Miguel Ojeda <ojeda@kernel.org> # Rust
Tested-by: Conor Dooley <conor.dooley@microchip.com>
Tested-by: Ron Economos <re@w6rz.net>
Tested-by: Takeshi Ogasawara <takeshi.ogasawara@futuring-girl.com>
Tested-by: Bagas Sanjaya <bagasdotme@gmail.com>
Tested-by: SeongJae Park <sj@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Joel Fernandes (Google) <joel@joelfernandes.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 77245f1c3c6495521f6a3af082696ee2f8ce3921 upstream.
Under certain circumstances, an integer division by 0 which faults, can
leave stale quotient data from a previous division operation on Zen1
microarchitectures.
Do a dummy division 0/1 before returning from the #DE exception handler
in order to avoid any leaks of potentially sensitive data.
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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This reverts commit 0fc6fea41c7122aa5f2088117f50144b507e13d7 which is
commit a2b6e99d8a623544f3bdccd28ee35b9c1b00daa5 upstream.
It is reported to cause regression issues, so it should be reverted from
the 6.1.y tree for now.
Reported-by: Thorsten Leemhuis <regressions@leemhuis.info>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/f0870e8f-0c66-57fd-f95d-18d014a11939@leemhuis.info
Link: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/intel/-/issues/8419
Cc: Manasi Navare <navaremanasi@google.com>
Cc: Drew Davenport <ddavenport@chromium.org>
Cc: Jouni Högander <jouni.hogander@intel.com>
Cc: Imre Deak <imre.deak@intel.com>
Cc: Ville Syrjälä <ville.syrjala@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jani Nikula <jani.nikula@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit db3b5cb64a9ca301d14ed027e470834316720e42 upstream
Use the generic term fw_reserved_memory for FW reserve region. This
region may also hold discovery TMR in addition to other reserve
regions. This region size could be larger than discovery tmr size, hence
don't change the discovery tmr size based on this.
Signed-off-by: Lijo Lazar <lijo.lazar@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Le Ma <le.ma@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
[ This change fixes reading IP discovery from debugfs.
It needed to be hand modified because:
* GC 9.4.3 support isn't introduced in older kernels until
228ce176434b ("drm/amdgpu: Handle VRAM dependencies on GFXIP9.4.3")
* It also changed because of 58ab2c08d708 (drm/amdgpu: use VRAM|GTT
for a bunch of kernel allocations) not being present.
Link: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/amd/-/issues/2748 ]
Signed-off-by: Mario Limonciello <mario.limonciello@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 3273f11675ef11959d25a56df3279f712bcd41b7 upstream
Remove the "domain" argument to amdgpu_bo_create_kernel_at() since this
function takes an "offset" argument which is the offset off of VRAM, and as
such allocation always takes place in VRAM. Thus, the "domain" argument is
unnecessary.
Cc: Alex Deucher <Alexander.Deucher@amd.com>
Cc: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Cc: AMD Graphics <amd-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org>
Signed-off-by: Luben Tuikov <luben.tuikov@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Mario Limonciello <mario.limonciello@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 4864f2ee9ee2acf4a1009b58fbc62f17fa086d4e upstream
Move TMR region from top of FB to 2MB for FFBM, so we need to
reserve TMR region firstly to make sure TMR can be allocated at 2MB
Signed-off-by: Tong Liu01 <Tong.Liu01@amd.com>
Acked-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Mario Limonciello <mario.limonciello@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 045aecdfcb2e060db142d83a0f4082380c465d2c upstream.
Systems which implement SME without also implementing SVE are
architecturally valid but were not initially supported by the kernel,
unfortunately we missed one issue in the ptrace code.
The SVE register setting code is shared between SVE and streaming mode
SVE. When we set full SVE register state we currently enable TIF_SVE
unconditionally, in the case where streaming SVE is being configured on a
system that supports vanilla SVE this is not an issue since we always
initialise enough state for both vector lengths but on a system which only
support SME it will result in us attempting to restore the SVE vector
length after having set streaming SVE registers.
Fix this by making the enabling of SVE conditional on setting SVE vector
state. If we set streaming SVE state and SVE was not already enabled this
will result in a SVE access trap on next use of normal SVE, this will cause
us to flush our register state but this is fine since the only way to
trigger a SVE access trap would be to exit streaming mode which will cause
the in register state to be flushed anyway.
Fixes: e12310a0d30f ("arm64/sme: Implement ptrace support for streaming mode SVE registers")
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230803-arm64-fix-ptrace-ssve-no-sve-v1-1-49df214bfb3e@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
[Fix up backport -- broonie]
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit d42334578eba1390859012ebb91e1e556d51db49 ]
exfat_extract_uni_name copies characters from a given file name entry into
the 'uniname' variable. This variable is actually defined on the stack of
the exfat_readdir() function. According to the definition of
the 'exfat_uni_name' type, the file name should be limited 255 characters
(+ null teminator space), but the exfat_get_uniname_from_ext_entry()
function can write more characters because there is no check if filename
entries exceeds max filename length. This patch add the check not to copy
filename characters when exceeding max filename length.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Yuezhang Mo <Yuezhang.Mo@sony.com>
Reported-by: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Sungjong Seo <sj1557.seo@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 458c15dfbce62c35fefd9ca637b20a051309c9f1 ]
syzbot reports a bug as below:
general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000009: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
RIP: 0010:__lock_acquire+0x69/0x2000 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4942
Call Trace:
lock_acquire+0x1e3/0x520 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5691
__raw_write_lock include/linux/rwlock_api_smp.h:209 [inline]
_raw_write_lock+0x2e/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:300
__drop_extent_tree+0x3ac/0x660 fs/f2fs/extent_cache.c:1100
f2fs_drop_extent_tree+0x17/0x30 fs/f2fs/extent_cache.c:1116
f2fs_insert_range+0x2d5/0x3c0 fs/f2fs/file.c:1664
f2fs_fallocate+0x4e4/0x6d0 fs/f2fs/file.c:1838
vfs_fallocate+0x54b/0x6b0 fs/open.c:324
ksys_fallocate fs/open.c:347 [inline]
__do_sys_fallocate fs/open.c:355 [inline]
__se_sys_fallocate fs/open.c:353 [inline]
__x64_sys_fallocate+0xbd/0x100 fs/open.c:353
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x41/0xc0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
The root cause is race condition as below:
- since it tries to remount rw filesystem, so that do_remount won't
call sb_prepare_remount_readonly to block fallocate, there may be race
condition in between remount and fallocate.
- in f2fs_remount(), default_options() will reset mount option to default
one, and then update it based on result of parse_options(), so there is
a hole which race condition can happen.
Thread A Thread B
- f2fs_fill_super
- parse_options
- clear_opt(READ_EXTENT_CACHE)
- f2fs_remount
- default_options
- set_opt(READ_EXTENT_CACHE)
- f2fs_fallocate
- f2fs_insert_range
- f2fs_drop_extent_tree
- __drop_extent_tree
- __may_extent_tree
- test_opt(READ_EXTENT_CACHE) return true
- write_lock(&et->lock) access NULL pointer
- parse_options
- clear_opt(READ_EXTENT_CACHE)
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: syzbot+d015b6c2fbb5c383bf08@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-f2fs-devel/20230522124203.3838360-1-chao@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 967eaad1fed5f6335ea97a47d45214744dc57925 ]
Some minor modifications to flush_merge and related parameters:
1.The FLUSH_MERGE opt is set by default only in non-ro mode.
2.When ro and merge are set at the same time, an error is reported.
3.Display noflush_merge mount opt.
Suggested-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Yangtao Li <frank.li@vivo.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Stable-dep-of: 458c15dfbce6 ("f2fs: don't reset unchangable mount option in f2fs_remount()")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 3bcbc20942db5d738221cca31a928efc09827069 ]
To allow running rseq and KVM's rseq selftests as statically linked
binaries, initialize the various "trampoline" pointers to point directly
at the expect glibc symbols, and skip the dlysm() lookups if the rseq
size is non-zero, i.e. the binary is statically linked *and* the libc
registered its own rseq.
Define weak versions of the symbols so as not to break linking against
libc versions that don't support rseq in any capacity.
The KVM selftests in particular are often statically linked so that they
can be run on targets with very limited runtime environments, i.e. test
machines.
Fixes: 233e667e1ae3 ("selftests/rseq: Uplift rseq selftests for compatibility with glibc-2.35")
Cc: Aaron Lewis <aaronlewis@google.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20230721223352.2333911-1-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit a1c9a1e27022d13c70a14c4faeab6ce293ad043b upstream.
[Why]
Some dock and mst monitor don't like to receive CLEAR_PAYLOAD_ID_TABLE
when mst_en is set to 0. It doesn't make sense to do so in source
side, either.
[How]
Don't send CLEAR_PAYLOAD_ID_TABLE if mst_en is 0
Reviewed-by: George Shen <George.Shen@amd.com>
Acked-by: Qingqing Zhuo <qingqing.zhuo@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Peichen Huang <PeiChen.Huang@amd.com>
Tested-by: Daniel Wheeler <daniel.wheeler@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
[ 6.1.y doesn't have the file rename from
54618888d1ea7 ("drm/amd/display: break down dc_link.c") ]
Signed-off-by: Mario Limonciello <mario.limonciello@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit bb46a6a9bab134b9d15043ea8fa9d6c276e938b8 upstream.
The function dc_update_planes_and_stream handles multiple cases where DC
needs to remove and add planes in the commit tail phase. After Linux
started to use this function, some of the IGT kms_plane started to fail;
one good example to illustrate why the new sequence regressed IGT is the
subtest plane-position-hole which has the following diagram as a
template:
+--------------------+ +-----------------------+
| +-----+ | | +-----+ |
| | | | | | +-----+ |
| | +--+ | ==> | | | | | |
| |__| | | +-|---+ | |
| | | +-----+ |
| | | |
+--------------------+ +-----------------------+
(a) Final image (b) Composed image
IGT expects image (a) as the final result of two plane compositions as
described in figure (b). After the migration to the new sequence, the
last plane order is changed, and DC generates the following image:
+---------------------+
| +-----+ |
| | | |
| | | |
| +-----+ |
| |
+---------------------+
Notice that the generated image by DC is different because the small
square that should be composed on top of the primary plane is below the
primary plane. For this reason, the CRC will mismatch with the expected
value. Since the function dc_add_all_planes_for_stream re-append all the
new planes back to the dc_validation_set, this commit ensures that the
original sequence is maintained. After this change, all CI tests in all
ASICs start to pass again.
Reviewed-by: Harry Wentland <Harry.Wentland@amd.com>
Acked-by: Qingqing Zhuo <qingqing.zhuo@amd.com>
Suggested-by: Melissa Wen <mwen@igalia.com>
Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Siqueira <Rodrigo.Siqueira@amd.com>
Tested-by: Daniel Wheeler <daniel.wheeler@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Cc: Mario Limonciello <mario.limonciello@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit ee31742bf17636da1304af77b2cb1c29b5dda642 ]
When hactive is not aligned to 8 pixels, it is aligned accordingly and
hfront porch needs to be reduced the same amount. Unfortunately the front
porch is set to the difference rather than reducing it. There are some
Samsung TVs which can't cope with a front porch of instead of 70.
Fixes: 94dfec48fca7 ("drm/imx: Add 8 pixel alignment fix")
Signed-off-by: Alexander Stein <alexander.stein@ew.tq-group.com>
Reviewed-by: Philipp Zabel <p.zabel@pengutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230515072137.116211-1-alexander.stein@ew.tq-group.com
[p.zabel@pengutronix.de: Fixed subject]
Signed-off-by: Philipp Zabel <p.zabel@pengutronix.de>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20230515072137.116211-1-alexander.stein@ew.tq-group.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 6722b25712054c0f903b839b8f5088438dd04df3 ]
altmap->free includes the entire free space from which altmap blocks
can be allocated. So when checking whether the kernel is doing altmap
block free, compute the boundary correctly, otherwise memory hotunplug
can fail.
Fixes: 9ef34630a461 ("powerpc/mm: Fallback to RAM if the altmap is unusable")
Signed-off-by: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://msgid.link/20230724181320.471386-1-aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit c6abce60338aa2080973cd95be0aedad528bb41f ]
'op-cs' is copied in 'fun->mchip_number' which is used to access the
'mchip_offsets' and the 'rnb_gpio' arrays.
These arrays have NAND_MAX_CHIPS elements, so the index must be below this
limit.
Fix the sanity check in order to avoid the NAND_MAX_CHIPS value. This
would lead to out-of-bound accesses.
Fixes: 54309d657767 ("mtd: rawnand: fsl_upm: Implement exec_op()")
Signed-off-by: Christophe JAILLET <christophe.jaillet@wanadoo.fr>
Reviewed-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Miquel Raynal <miquel.raynal@bootlin.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mtd/cd01cba1c7eda58bdabaae174c78c067325803d2.1689803636.git.christophe.jaillet@wanadoo.fr
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit ea690ad78dd611e3906df5b948a516000b05c1cb ]
Currently, read/write_page_hwecc() and read/write_page_raw() are not
aligned: there is a mismatch in the OOB bytes which are not
read/written at the same offset in both cases (raw vs. hwecc).
This is a real problem when relying on the presence of the Page
Addresses (PA) when using the NAND chip as a boot device, as the
BootROM expects additional data in the OOB area at specific locations.
Rockchip boot blocks are written per 4 x 512 byte sectors per page.
Each page with boot blocks must have a page address (PA) pointer in OOB
to the next page. Pages are written in a pattern depending on the NAND chip ID.
Generate boot block page address and pattern for hwecc in user space
and copy PA data to/from the already reserved last 4 bytes before ECC
in the chip->oob_poi data layout.
Align the different helpers. This change breaks existing jffs2 users.
Fixes: 058e0e847d54 ("mtd: rawnand: rockchip: NFC driver for RK3308, RK2928 and others")
Signed-off-by: Johan Jonker <jbx6244@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Miquel Raynal <miquel.raynal@bootlin.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mtd/5e782c08-862b-51ae-47ff-3299940928ca@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit d0ca3b92b7a6f42841ea9da8492aaf649db79780 ]
Rockchip boot blocks are written per 4 x 512 byte sectors per page.
Each page with boot blocks must have a page address (PA) pointer in OOB
to the next page.
The currently advertised free OOB area starts at offset 6, like
if 4 PA bytes were located right after the BBM. This is wrong as the
PA bytes are located right before the ECC bytes.
Fix the layout by allowing access to all bytes between the BBM and the
PA bytes instead of reserving 4 bytes right after the BBM.
This change breaks existing jffs2 users.
Fixes: 058e0e847d54 ("mtd: rawnand: rockchip: NFC driver for RK3308, RK2928 and others")
Signed-off-by: Johan Jonker <jbx6244@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Miquel Raynal <miquel.raynal@bootlin.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mtd/d202f12d-188c-20e8-f2c2-9cc874ad4d22@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit d8403b9eeee66d5dd81ecb9445800b108c267ce3 ]
Once the ECC word endianness is converted to BE32, we force cast it
to u32 so we can use elm_write_reg() which in turn uses writel().
Fixes below sparse warnings:
drivers/mtd/nand/raw/omap_elm.c:180:37: sparse: expected unsigned int [usertype] val
drivers/mtd/nand/raw/omap_elm.c:180:37: sparse: got restricted __be32 [usertype]
drivers/mtd/nand/raw/omap_elm.c:185:37: sparse: expected unsigned int [usertype] val
drivers/mtd/nand/raw/omap_elm.c:185:37: sparse: got restricted __be32 [usertype]
drivers/mtd/nand/raw/omap_elm.c:190:37: sparse: expected unsigned int [usertype] val
drivers/mtd/nand/raw/omap_elm.c:190:37: sparse: got restricted __be32 [usertype]
>> drivers/mtd/nand/raw/omap_elm.c:200:40: sparse: sparse: restricted __be32 degrades to integer
drivers/mtd/nand/raw/omap_elm.c:206:39: sparse: sparse: restricted __be32 degrades to integer
drivers/mtd/nand/raw/omap_elm.c:210:37: sparse: expected unsigned int [assigned] [usertype] val
drivers/mtd/nand/raw/omap_elm.c:210:37: sparse: got restricted __be32 [usertype]
drivers/mtd/nand/raw/omap_elm.c:213:37: sparse: expected unsigned int [assigned] [usertype] val
drivers/mtd/nand/raw/omap_elm.c:213:37: sparse: got restricted __be32 [usertype]
drivers/mtd/nand/raw/omap_elm.c:216:37: sparse: expected unsigned int [assigned] [usertype] val
drivers/mtd/nand/raw/omap_elm.c:216:37: sparse: got restricted __be32 [usertype]
drivers/mtd/nand/raw/omap_elm.c:219:37: sparse: expected unsigned int [assigned] [usertype] val
drivers/mtd/nand/raw/omap_elm.c:219:37: sparse: got restricted __be32 [usertype]
drivers/mtd/nand/raw/omap_elm.c:222:37: sparse: expected unsigned int [assigned] [usertype] val
drivers/mtd/nand/raw/omap_elm.c:222:37: sparse: got restricted __be32 [usertype]
drivers/mtd/nand/raw/omap_elm.c:225:37: sparse: expected unsigned int [assigned] [usertype] val
drivers/mtd/nand/raw/omap_elm.c:225:37: sparse: got restricted __be32 [usertype]
drivers/mtd/nand/raw/omap_elm.c:228:39: sparse: sparse: restricted __be32 degrades to integer
Fixes: bf22433575ef ("mtd: devices: elm: Add support for ELM error correction")
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202306212211.WDXokuWh-lkp@intel.com/
Signed-off-by: Roger Quadros <rogerq@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Miquel Raynal <miquel.raynal@bootlin.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mtd/20230624184021.7740-1-rogerq@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 5498bf28d8f2bd63a46ad40f4427518615fb793f upstream.
It's racy to read ->cached_cq_tail without taking proper measures
(usually grabbing ->completion_lock) as timeout requests with CQE
offsets do, however they have never had a good semantics for from
when they start counting. Annotate racy reads with data_race().
Reported-by: syzbot+cb265db2f3f3468ef436@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/4de3685e185832a92a572df2be2c735d2e21a83d.1684506056.git.asml.silence@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit a6ec83786ab9f13f25fb18166dee908845713a95 upstream.
syzbot reports below bug:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in f2fs_truncate_data_blocks_range+0x122a/0x14c0 fs/f2fs/file.c:574
Read of size 4 at addr ffff88802a25c000 by task syz-executor148/5000
CPU: 1 PID: 5000 Comm: syz-executor148 Not tainted 6.4.0-rc7-syzkaller-00041-ge660abd551f1 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 05/27/2023
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0xd9/0x150 lib/dump_stack.c:106
print_address_description.constprop.0+0x2c/0x3c0 mm/kasan/report.c:351
print_report mm/kasan/report.c:462 [inline]
kasan_report+0x11c/0x130 mm/kasan/report.c:572
f2fs_truncate_data_blocks_range+0x122a/0x14c0 fs/f2fs/file.c:574
truncate_dnode+0x229/0x2e0 fs/f2fs/node.c:944
f2fs_truncate_inode_blocks+0x64b/0xde0 fs/f2fs/node.c:1154
f2fs_do_truncate_blocks+0x4ac/0xf30 fs/f2fs/file.c:721
f2fs_truncate_blocks+0x7b/0x300 fs/f2fs/file.c:749
f2fs_truncate.part.0+0x4a5/0x630 fs/f2fs/file.c:799
f2fs_truncate include/linux/fs.h:825 [inline]
f2fs_setattr+0x1738/0x2090 fs/f2fs/file.c:1006
notify_change+0xb2c/0x1180 fs/attr.c:483
do_truncate+0x143/0x200 fs/open.c:66
handle_truncate fs/namei.c:3295 [inline]
do_open fs/namei.c:3640 [inline]
path_openat+0x2083/0x2750 fs/namei.c:3791
do_filp_open+0x1ba/0x410 fs/namei.c:3818
do_sys_openat2+0x16d/0x4c0 fs/open.c:1356
do_sys_open fs/open.c:1372 [inline]
__do_sys_creat fs/open.c:1448 [inline]
__se_sys_creat fs/open.c:1442 [inline]
__x64_sys_creat+0xcd/0x120 fs/open.c:1442
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x39/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
The root cause is, inodeA references inodeB via inodeB's ino, once inodeA
is truncated, it calls truncate_dnode() to truncate data blocks in inodeB's
node page, it traverse mapping data from node->i.i_addr[0] to
node->i.i_addr[ADDRS_PER_BLOCK() - 1], result in out-of-boundary access.
This patch fixes to add sanity check on dnode page in truncate_dnode(),
so that, it can help to avoid triggering such issue, and once it encounters
such issue, it will record newly introduced ERROR_INVALID_NODE_REFERENCE
error into superblock, later fsck can detect such issue and try repairing.
Also, it removes f2fs_truncate_data_blocks() for cleanup due to the
function has only one caller, and uses f2fs_truncate_data_blocks_range()
instead.
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+12cb4425b22169b52036@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-f2fs-devel/000000000000f3038a05fef867f8@google.com
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit d8ccbd21918fd7fa6ce3226cffc22c444228e8ad upstream.
At add_new_free_space() we have these BUG_ON()'s that are there to deal
with any failure to add free space to the in memory free space cache.
Such failures are mostly -ENOMEM that should be very rare. However there's
no need to have these BUG_ON()'s, we can just return any error to the
caller and all callers and their upper call chain are already dealing with
errors.
So just make add_new_free_space() return any errors, while removing the
BUG_ON()'s, and returning the total amount of added free space to an
optional u64 pointer argument.
Reported-by: syzbot+3ba856e07b7127889d8c@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/000000000000e9cb8305ff4e8327@google.com/
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit 404615d7f1dcd4cca200e9a7a9df3a1dcae1dd62 upstream.
Ext2 has fields in superblock reserved for subblock allocation support.
However that never landed. Drop the many years dead code.
Reported-by: syzbot+af5e10f73dbff48f70af@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
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commit c541dce86c537714b6761a79a969c1623dfa222b upstream.
The reconfigure / remount code takes a lot of effort to protect
filesystem's reconfiguration code from racing writes on remounting
read-only. However during remounting read-only filesystem to read-write
mode userspace writes can start immediately once we clear SB_RDONLY
flag. This is inconvenient for example for ext4 because we need to do
some writes to the filesystem (such as preparation of quota files)
before we can take userspace writes so we are clearing SB_RDONLY flag
before we are fully ready to accept userpace writes and syzbot has found
a way to exploit this [1]. Also as far as I'm reading the code
the filesystem remount code was protected from racing writes in the
legacy mount path by the mount's MNT_READONLY flag so this is relatively
new problem. It is actually fairly easy to protect remount read-write
from racing writes using sb->s_readonly_remount flag so let's just do
that instead of having to workaround these races in the filesystem code.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/00000000000006a0df05f6667499@google.com/T/
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Message-Id: <20230615113848.8439-1-jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit 5e1627cb43ddf1b24b92eb26f8d958a3f5676ccb upstream.
The syzbot fuzzer identified a problem in the usbnet driver:
usb 1-1: BOGUS urb xfer, pipe 3 != type 1
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 754 at drivers/usb/core/urb.c:504 usb_submit_urb+0xed6/0x1880 drivers/usb/core/urb.c:504
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 754 Comm: kworker/0:2 Not tainted 6.4.0-rc7-syzkaller-00014-g692b7dc87ca6 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 05/27/2023
Workqueue: mld mld_ifc_work
RIP: 0010:usb_submit_urb+0xed6/0x1880 drivers/usb/core/urb.c:504
Code: 7c 24 18 e8 2c b4 5b fb 48 8b 7c 24 18 e8 42 07 f0 fe 41 89 d8 44 89 e1 4c 89 ea 48 89 c6 48 c7 c7 a0 c9 fc 8a e8 5a 6f 23 fb <0f> 0b e9 58 f8 ff ff e8 fe b3 5b fb 48 81 c5 c0 05 00 00 e9 84 f7
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000463f568 EFLAGS: 00010086
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: ffff88801eb28000 RSI: ffffffff814c03b7 RDI: 0000000000000001
RBP: ffff8881443b7190 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000003
R13: ffff88802a77cb18 R14: 0000000000000003 R15: ffff888018262500
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880b9800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000556a99c15a18 CR3: 0000000028c71000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
usbnet_start_xmit+0xfe5/0x2190 drivers/net/usb/usbnet.c:1453
__netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4918 [inline]
netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4932 [inline]
xmit_one net/core/dev.c:3578 [inline]
dev_hard_start_xmit+0x187/0x700 net/core/dev.c:3594
...
This bug is caused by the fact that usbnet trusts the bulk endpoint
addresses its probe routine receives in the driver_info structure, and
it does not check to see that these endpoints actually exist and have
the expected type and directions.
The fix is simply to add such a check.
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+63ee658b9a100ffadbe2@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-usb/000000000000a56e9105d0cec021@google.com/
Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
CC: Oliver Neukum <oneukum@suse.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/ea152b6d-44df-4f8a-95c6-4db51143dcc1@rowland.harvard.edu
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit 8b64d420fe2450f82848178506d3e3a0bd195539 upstream.
syzbot is reporting false a positive ODEBUG message immediately after
ODEBUG was disabled due to OOM.
[ 1062.309646][T22911] ODEBUG: Out of memory. ODEBUG disabled
[ 1062.886755][ T5171] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 1062.892770][ T5171] ODEBUG: assert_init not available (active state 0) object: ffffc900056afb20 object type: timer_list hint: process_timeout+0x0/0x40
CPU 0 [ T5171] CPU 1 [T22911]
-------------- --------------
debug_object_assert_init() {
if (!debug_objects_enabled)
return;
db = get_bucket(addr);
lookup_object_or_alloc() {
debug_objects_enabled = 0;
return NULL;
}
debug_objects_oom() {
pr_warn("Out of memory. ODEBUG disabled\n");
// all buckets get emptied here, and
}
lookup_object_or_alloc(addr, db, descr, false, true) {
// this bucket is already empty.
return ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
}
// Emits false positive warning.
debug_print_object(&o, "assert_init");
}
Recheck debug_object_enabled in debug_print_object() to avoid that.
Reported-by: syzbot <syzbot+7937ba6a50bdd00fffdf@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/492fe2ae-5141-d548-ebd5-62f5fe2e57f7@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=7937ba6a50bdd00fffdf
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit 1728137b33c00d5a2b5110ed7aafb42e7c32e4a1 upstream.
l2cap_sock_release(sk) frees sk. However, sk's children are still alive
and point to the already free'd sk's address.
To fix this, l2cap_sock_release(sk) also cleans sk's children.
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in l2cap_sock_ready_cb+0xb7/0x100 net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c:1650
Read of size 8 at addr ffff888104617aa8 by task kworker/u3:0/276
CPU: 0 PID: 276 Comm: kworker/u3:0 Not tainted 6.2.0-00001-gef397bd4d5fb-dirty #59
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014
Workqueue: hci2 hci_rx_work
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x72/0x95 lib/dump_stack.c:106
print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:306 [inline]
print_report+0x175/0x478 mm/kasan/report.c:417
kasan_report+0xb1/0x130 mm/kasan/report.c:517
l2cap_sock_ready_cb+0xb7/0x100 net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c:1650
l2cap_chan_ready+0x10e/0x1e0 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:1386
l2cap_config_req+0x753/0x9f0 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:4480
l2cap_bredr_sig_cmd net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:5739 [inline]
l2cap_sig_channel net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:6509 [inline]
l2cap_recv_frame+0xe2e/0x43c0 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:7788
l2cap_recv_acldata+0x6ed/0x7e0 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:8506
hci_acldata_packet net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:3813 [inline]
hci_rx_work+0x66e/0xbc0 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:4048
process_one_work+0x4ea/0x8e0 kernel/workqueue.c:2289
worker_thread+0x364/0x8e0 kernel/workqueue.c:2436
kthread+0x1b9/0x200 kernel/kthread.c:376
ret_from_fork+0x2c/0x50 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:308
</TASK>
Allocated by task 288:
kasan_save_stack+0x22/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:45
kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:52
____kasan_kmalloc mm/kasan/common.c:374 [inline]
__kasan_kmalloc+0x82/0x90 mm/kasan/common.c:383
kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:211 [inline]
__do_kmalloc_node mm/slab_common.c:968 [inline]
__kmalloc+0x5a/0x140 mm/slab_common.c:981
kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:584 [inline]
sk_prot_alloc+0x113/0x1f0 net/core/sock.c:2040
sk_alloc+0x36/0x3c0 net/core/sock.c:2093
l2cap_sock_alloc.constprop.0+0x39/0x1c0 net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c:1852
l2cap_sock_create+0x10d/0x220 net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c:1898
bt_sock_create+0x183/0x290 net/bluetooth/af_bluetooth.c:132
__sock_create+0x226/0x380 net/socket.c:1518
sock_create net/socket.c:1569 [inline]
__sys_socket_create net/socket.c:1606 [inline]
__sys_socket_create net/socket.c:1591 [inline]
__sys_socket+0x112/0x200 net/socket.c:1639
__do_sys_socket net/socket.c:1652 [inline]
__se_sys_socket net/socket.c:1650 [inline]
__x64_sys_socket+0x40/0x50 net/socket.c:1650
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x3f/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc
Freed by task 288:
kasan_save_stack+0x22/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:45
kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:52
kasan_save_free_info+0x2e/0x50 mm/kasan/generic.c:523
____kasan_slab_free mm/kasan/common.c:236 [inline]
____kasan_slab_free mm/kasan/common.c:200 [inline]
__kasan_slab_free+0x10a/0x190 mm/kasan/common.c:244
kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:177 [inline]
slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1781 [inline]
slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1807 [inline]
slab_free mm/slub.c:3787 [inline]
__kmem_cache_free+0x88/0x1f0 mm/slub.c:3800
sk_prot_free net/core/sock.c:2076 [inline]
__sk_destruct+0x347/0x430 net/core/sock.c:2168
sk_destruct+0x9c/0xb0 net/core/sock.c:2183
__sk_free+0x82/0x220 net/core/sock.c:2194
sk_free+0x7c/0xa0 net/core/sock.c:2205
sock_put include/net/sock.h:1991 [inline]
l2cap_sock_kill+0x256/0x2b0 net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c:1257
l2cap_sock_release+0x1a7/0x220 net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c:1428
__sock_release+0x80/0x150 net/socket.c:650
sock_close+0x19/0x30 net/socket.c:1368
__fput+0x17a/0x5c0 fs/file_table.c:320
task_work_run+0x132/0x1c0 kernel/task_work.c:179
resume_user_mode_work include/linux/resume_user_mode.h:49 [inline]
exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:171 [inline]
exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x113/0x120 kernel/entry/common.c:203
__syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:285 [inline]
syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x21/0x50 kernel/entry/common.c:296
do_syscall_64+0x4c/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:86
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888104617800
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-1k of size 1024
The buggy address is located 680 bytes inside of
1024-byte region [ffff888104617800, ffff888104617c00)
The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
page:00000000dbca6a80 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0xffff888104614000 pfn:0x104614
head:00000000dbca6a80 order:2 compound_mapcount:0 subpages_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0
flags: 0x200000000010200(slab|head|node=0|zone=2)
raw: 0200000000010200 ffff888100041dc0 ffffea0004212c10 ffffea0004234b10
raw: ffff888104614000 0000000000080002 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff888104617980: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff888104617a00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
>ffff888104617a80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
^
ffff888104617b00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff888104617b80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
==================================================================
Ack: This bug is found by FuzzBT with a modified Syzkaller. Other
contributors are Ruoyu Wu and Hui Peng.
Signed-off-by: Sungwoo Kim <iam@sung-woo.kim>
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit ea2b62f305893992156a798f665847e0663c9f41 upstream.
sb_getblk(inode->i_sb, parent) return a null ptr and taking lock on
that leads to the null-ptr-deref bug.
Reported-by: syzbot+aad58150cbc64ba41bdc@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=aad58150cbc64ba41bdc
Signed-off-by: Prince Kumar Maurya <princekumarmaurya06@gmail.com>
Message-Id: <20230531013141.19487-1-princekumarmaurya06@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit ea303f72d70ce2f0b0aa94ab127085289768c5a6 upstream.
syzbot is reporting too large allocation at ntfs_load_attr_list(), for
a crafted filesystem can have huge data_size.
Reported-by: syzbot <syzbot+89dbb3a789a5b9711793@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=89dbb3a789a5b9711793
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Komarov <almaz.alexandrovich@paragon-software.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit 3b8abb3239530c423c0b97e42af7f7e856e1ee96 upstream.
KCSAN found an issue in obj_stock_flush_required():
stock->cached_objcg can be reset between the check and dereference:
==================================================================
BUG: KCSAN: data-race in drain_all_stock / drain_obj_stock
write to 0xffff888237c2a2f8 of 8 bytes by task 19625 on cpu 0:
drain_obj_stock+0x408/0x4e0 mm/memcontrol.c:3306
refill_obj_stock+0x9c/0x1e0 mm/memcontrol.c:3340
obj_cgroup_uncharge+0xe/0x10 mm/memcontrol.c:3408
memcg_slab_free_hook mm/slab.h:587 [inline]
__cache_free mm/slab.c:3373 [inline]
__do_kmem_cache_free mm/slab.c:3577 [inline]
kmem_cache_free+0x105/0x280 mm/slab.c:3602
__d_free fs/dcache.c:298 [inline]
dentry_free fs/dcache.c:375 [inline]
__dentry_kill+0x422/0x4a0 fs/dcache.c:621
dentry_kill+0x8d/0x1e0
dput+0x118/0x1f0 fs/dcache.c:913
__fput+0x3bf/0x570 fs/file_table.c:329
____fput+0x15/0x20 fs/file_table.c:349
task_work_run+0x123/0x160 kernel/task_work.c:179
resume_user_mode_work include/linux/resume_user_mode.h:49 [inline]
exit_to_user_mode_loop+0xcf/0xe0 kernel/entry/common.c:171
exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x6a/0xa0 kernel/entry/common.c:203
__syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:285 [inline]
syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x26/0x140 kernel/entry/common.c:296
do_syscall_64+0x4d/0xc0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:86
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
read to 0xffff888237c2a2f8 of 8 bytes by task 19632 on cpu 1:
obj_stock_flush_required mm/memcontrol.c:3319 [inline]
drain_all_stock+0x174/0x2a0 mm/memcontrol.c:2361
try_charge_memcg+0x6d0/0xd10 mm/memcontrol.c:2703
try_charge mm/memcontrol.c:2837 [inline]
mem_cgroup_charge_skmem+0x51/0x140 mm/memcontrol.c:7290
sock_reserve_memory+0xb1/0x390 net/core/sock.c:1025
sk_setsockopt+0x800/0x1e70 net/core/sock.c:1525
udp_lib_setsockopt+0x99/0x6c0 net/ipv4/udp.c:2692
udp_setsockopt+0x73/0xa0 net/ipv4/udp.c:2817
sock_common_setsockopt+0x61/0x70 net/core/sock.c:3668
__sys_setsockopt+0x1c3/0x230 net/socket.c:2271
__do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2282 [inline]
__se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2279 [inline]
__x64_sys_setsockopt+0x66/0x80 net/socket.c:2279
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x41/0xc0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
value changed: 0xffff8881382d52c0 -> 0xffff888138893740
Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
CPU: 1 PID: 19632 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 6.3.0-rc2-syzkaller-00387-g534293368afa #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 03/02/2023
Fix it by using READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() for all accesses to
stock->cached_objcg.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230502160839.361544-1-roman.gushchin@linux.dev
Fixes: bf4f059954dc ("mm: memcg/slab: obj_cgroup API")
Signed-off-by: Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@linux.dev>
Reported-by: syzbot+774c29891415ab0fd29d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/CACT4Y+ZfucZhM60YPphWiCLJr6+SGFhT+jjm8k1P-a_8Kkxsjg@mail.gmail.com/T/#t
Reviewed-by: Yosry Ahmed <yosryahmed@google.com>
Acked-by: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit 797964253d358cf8d705614dda394dbe30120223 upstream.
In commit 20ea1e7d13c1 ("file: always lock position for
FMODE_ATOMIC_POS") we ended up always taking the file pos lock, because
pidfd_getfd() could get a reference to the file even when it didn't have
an elevated file count due to threading of other sharing cases.
But Mateusz Guzik reports that the extra locking is actually measurable,
so let's re-introduce the optimization, and only force the locking for
directory traversal.
Directories need the lock for correctness reasons, while regular files
only need it for "POSIX semantics". Since pidfd_getfd() is about
debuggers etc special things that are _way_ outside of POSIX, we can
relax the rules for that case.
Reported-by: Mateusz Guzik <mjguzik@gmail.com>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-fsdevel/20230803095311.ijpvhx3fyrbkasul@f/
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 640a604585aa30f93e39b17d4d6ba69fcb1e66c9 upstream.
The following warning was reported when running stress-mode enabled
xdp_redirect_cpu with some RT threads:
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 4 PID: 65 at kernel/bpf/cpumap.c:135
CPU: 4 PID: 65 Comm: kworker/4:1 Not tainted 6.5.0-rc2+ #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996)
Workqueue: events cpu_map_kthread_stop
RIP: 0010:put_cpu_map_entry+0xda/0x220
......
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? show_regs+0x65/0x70
? __warn+0xa5/0x240
......
? put_cpu_map_entry+0xda/0x220
cpu_map_kthread_stop+0x41/0x60
process_one_work+0x6b0/0xb80
worker_thread+0x96/0x720
kthread+0x1a5/0x1f0
ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x70
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30
</TASK>
The root cause is the same as commit 436901649731 ("bpf: cpumap: Fix memory
leak in cpu_map_update_elem"). The kthread is stopped prematurely by
kthread_stop() in cpu_map_kthread_stop(), and kthread() doesn't call
cpu_map_kthread_run() at all but XDP program has already queued some
frames or skbs into ptr_ring. So when __cpu_map_ring_cleanup() checks
the ptr_ring, it will find it was not emptied and report a warning.
An alternative fix is to use __cpu_map_ring_cleanup() to drop these
pending frames or skbs when kthread_stop() returns -EINTR, but it may
confuse the user, because these frames or skbs have been handled
correctly by XDP program. So instead of dropping these frames or skbs,
just make sure the per-cpu kthread is running before
__cpu_map_entry_alloc() returns.
After apply the fix, the error handle for kthread_stop() will be
unnecessary because it will always return 0, so just remove it.
Fixes: 6710e1126934 ("bpf: introduce new bpf cpu map type BPF_MAP_TYPE_CPUMAP")
Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Pu Lehui <pulehui@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <hawk@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230729095107.1722450-2-houtao@huaweicloud.com
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit a29b2fccf5f2689a9637be85ff1f51c834c6fb33 upstream.
smatch reports:
drivers/clk/imx/clk-imx93.c:294 imx93_clocks_probe() error: uninitialized symbol 'base'.
Indeed, in case of an error, the wrong (yet uninitialized) variable is
converted to an error code and returned.
Fix this by propagating the error code in the correct variable.
Fixes: e02ba11b45764705 ("clk: imx93: fix memory leak and missing unwind goto in imx93_clocks_probe")
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@linaro.org>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/9c2acd81-3ad8-485d-819e-9e4201277831@kadam.mountain
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/202306161533.4YDmL22b-lkp@intel.com/
Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230711150812.3562221-1-geert+renesas@glider.be
Reviewed-by: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Boyd <sboyd@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit d14560ac1b595aa2e792365e91fea6aeaee66c2b upstream.
Fix the 'NV' definition postfix that is supposed to be INV.
Take the chance to also order properly the registers based on
their address and call the GEN12_GFX_CCS_AUX_INV address as
GEN12_CCS_AUX_INV like all the other similar registers.
Remove also VD1, VD3 and VE1 registers that don't exist and add
BCS0 and CCS0.
Signed-off-by: Andi Shyti <andi.shyti@linux.intel.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v5.8+
Reviewed-by: Nirmoy Das <nirmoy.das@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrzej Hajda <andrzej.hajda@intel.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20230725001950.1014671-2-andi.shyti@linux.intel.com
(cherry picked from commit 2f0b927d3ca3440445975ebde27f3df1c3ed6f76)
Signed-off-by: Tvrtko Ursulin <tvrtko.ursulin@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit a337b64f0d5717248a0c894e2618e658e6a9de9f upstream.
Infinite waits for completion of GPU activity have been observed in CI,
mostly inside __i915_active_wait(), triggered by igt@gem_barrier_race or
igt@perf@stress-open-close. Root cause analysis, based of ftrace dumps
generated with a lot of extra trace_printk() calls added to the code,
revealed loops of request dependencies being accidentally built,
preventing the requests from being processed, each waiting for completion
of another one's activity.
After we substitute a new request for a last active one tracked on a
timeline, we set up a dependency of our new request to wait on completion
of current activity of that previous one. While doing that, we must take
care of keeping the old request still in memory until we use its
attributes for setting up that await dependency, or we can happen to set
up the await dependency on an unrelated request that already reuses the
memory previously allocated to the old one, already released. Combined
with perf adding consecutive kernel context remote requests to different
user context timelines, unresolvable loops of await dependencies can be
built, leading do infinite waits.
We obtain a pointer to the previous request to wait upon when we
substitute it with a pointer to our new request in an active tracker,
e.g. in intel_timeline.last_request. In some processing paths we protect
that old request from being freed before we use it by getting a reference
to it under RCU protection, but in others, e.g. __i915_request_commit()
-> __i915_request_add_to_timeline() -> __i915_request_ensure_ordering(),
we don't. But anyway, since the requests' memory is SLAB_FAILSAFE_BY_RCU,
that RCU protection is not sufficient against reuse of memory.
We could protect i915_request's memory from being prematurely reused by
calling its release function via call_rcu() and using rcu_read_lock()
consequently, as proposed in v1. However, that approach leads to
significant (up to 10 times) increase of SLAB utilization by i915_request
SLAB cache. Another potential approach is to take a reference to the
previous active fence.
When updating an active fence tracker, we first lock the new fence,
substitute a pointer of the current active fence with the new one, then we
lock the substituted fence. With this approach, there is a time window
after the substitution and before the lock when the request can be
concurrently released by an interrupt handler and its memory reused, then
we may happen to lock and return a new, unrelated request.
Always get a reference to the current active fence first, before
replacing it with a new one. Having it protected from premature release
and reuse, lock it and then replace with the new one but only if not
yet signalled via a potential concurrent interrupt nor replaced with
another one by a potential concurrent thread, otherwise retry, starting
from getting a reference to the new current one. Adjust users to not
get a reference to the previous active fence themselves and always put the
reference got by __i915_active_fence_set() when no longer needed.
v3: Fix lockdep splat reports and other issues caused by incorrect use of
try_cmpxchg() (use (cmpxchg() != prev) instead)
v2: Protect request's memory by getting a reference to it in favor of
delegating its release to call_rcu() (Chris)
Closes: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/intel/-/issues/8211
Fixes: df9f85d8582e ("drm/i915: Serialise i915_active_fence_set() with itself")
Suggested-by: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Janusz Krzysztofik <janusz.krzysztofik@linux.intel.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v5.6+
Reviewed-by: Andi Shyti <andi.shyti@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andi Shyti <andi.shyti@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20230720093543.832147-2-janusz.krzysztofik@linux.intel.com
(cherry picked from commit 946e047a3d88d46d15b5c5af0414098e12b243f7)
Signed-off-by: Tvrtko Ursulin <tvrtko.ursulin@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 2dedcf414bb01b8d966eb445db1d181d92304fb2 upstream.
Add a check to avoid null pointer dereference as below:
[ 90.002283] general protection fault, probably for non-canonical
address 0xdffffc0000000000: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI
[ 90.002292] KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range
[0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007]
[ 90.002346] ? exc_general_protection+0x159/0x240
[ 90.002352] ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x26/0x30
[ 90.002357] ? ttm_bo_evict_swapout_allowable+0x322/0x5e0 [ttm]
[ 90.002365] ? ttm_bo_evict_swapout_allowable+0x42e/0x5e0 [ttm]
[ 90.002373] ttm_bo_swapout+0x134/0x7f0 [ttm]
[ 90.002383] ? __pfx_ttm_bo_swapout+0x10/0x10 [ttm]
[ 90.002391] ? lock_acquire+0x44d/0x4f0
[ 90.002398] ? ttm_device_swapout+0xa5/0x260 [ttm]
[ 90.002412] ? lock_acquired+0x355/0xa00
[ 90.002416] ? do_raw_spin_trylock+0xb6/0x190
[ 90.002421] ? __pfx_lock_acquired+0x10/0x10
[ 90.002426] ? ttm_global_swapout+0x25/0x210 [ttm]
[ 90.002442] ttm_device_swapout+0x198/0x260 [ttm]
[ 90.002456] ? __pfx_ttm_device_swapout+0x10/0x10 [ttm]
[ 90.002472] ttm_global_swapout+0x75/0x210 [ttm]
[ 90.002486] ttm_tt_populate+0x187/0x3f0 [ttm]
[ 90.002501] ttm_bo_handle_move_mem+0x437/0x590 [ttm]
[ 90.002517] ttm_bo_validate+0x275/0x430 [ttm]
[ 90.002530] ? __pfx_ttm_bo_validate+0x10/0x10 [ttm]
[ 90.002544] ? kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60
[ 90.002550] ? kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30
[ 90.002554] ? __kasan_kmalloc+0x8f/0xa0
[ 90.002558] ? amdgpu_gtt_mgr_new+0x81/0x420 [amdgpu]
[ 90.003023] ? ttm_resource_alloc+0xf6/0x220 [ttm]
[ 90.003038] amdgpu_bo_pin_restricted+0x2dd/0x8b0 [amdgpu]
[ 90.003210] ? __x64_sys_ioctl+0x131/0x1a0
[ 90.003210] ? do_syscall_64+0x60/0x90
Fixes: a2848d08742c ("drm/ttm: never consider pinned BOs for eviction&swap")
Tested-by: Mikhail Gavrilov <mikhail.v.gavrilov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Guchun Chen <guchun.chen@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20230724024229.1118444-1-guchun.chen@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit a0fc452a5d7fed986205539259df1d60546f536c upstream.
O_TMPFILE is actually __O_TMPFILE|O_DIRECTORY. This means that the old
fast-path check for RESOLVE_CACHED would reject all users passing
O_DIRECTORY with -EAGAIN, when in fact the intended test was to check
for __O_TMPFILE.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.12+
Fixes: 99668f618062 ("fs: expose LOOKUP_CACHED through openat2() RESOLVE_CACHED")
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Message-Id: <20230806-resolve_cached-o_tmpfile-v1-1-7ba16308465e@cyphar.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 507ea5dd92d23fcf10e4d1a68a443c86a49753ed upstream.
Currently we guard FPSIMD/SVE state conversions with a check for the system
supporting SVE but SME only systems may need to sync streaming mode SVE
state so add a check for SME support too. These functions are only used
by the ptrace code.
Fixes: e12310a0d30f ("arm64/sme: Implement ptrace support for streaming mode SVE registers")
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230803-arm64-fix-ptrace-ssve-no-sve-v1-2-49df214bfb3e@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit c9bb40b7f786662e33d71afe236442b0b61f0446 upstream.
When setting SME vector lengths we clear TIF_SME to reenable SME traps,
doing a reallocation of the backing storage on next use. We do this using
clear_thread_flag() which operates on the current thread, meaning that when
setting the vector length via ptrace we may both not force traps for the
target task and force a spurious flush of any SME state that the tracing
task may have.
Clear the flag in the target task.
Fixes: e12310a0d30f ("arm64/sme: Implement ptrace support for streaming mode SVE registers")
Reported-by: David Spickett <David.Spickett@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230803-arm64-fix-ptrace-tif-sme-v1-1-88312fd6fbfd@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 69af56ae56a48a2522aad906c4461c6c7c092737 upstream.
We have a function sve_sync_from_fpsimd_zeropad() which is used by the
ptrace code to update the SVE state when the user writes to the the
FPSIMD register set. Currently this checks that the task has SVE
enabled but this will miss updates for tasks which have streaming SVE
enabled if SVE has not been enabled for the thread, also do the
conversion if the task has streaming SVE enabled.
Fixes: e12310a0d30f ("arm64/sme: Implement ptrace support for streaming mode SVE registers")
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230803-arm64-fix-ptrace-ssve-no-sve-v1-3-49df214bfb3e@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 41a506ef71eb38d94fe133f565c87c3e06ccc072 upstream.
With ppc64 -mprofile-kernel and ppc32 -pg, profiling instructions to
call into ftrace are emitted right at function entry. The instruction
sequence used is minimal to reduce overhead. Crucially, a stackframe is
not created for the function being traced. This breaks stack unwinding
since the function being traced does not have a stackframe for itself.
As such, it never shows up in the backtrace:
/sys/kernel/debug/tracing # echo 1 > /proc/sys/kernel/stack_tracer_enabled
/sys/kernel/debug/tracing # cat stack_trace
Depth Size Location (17 entries)
----- ---- --------
0) 4144 32 ftrace_call+0x4/0x44
1) 4112 432 get_page_from_freelist+0x26c/0x1ad0
2) 3680 496 __alloc_pages+0x290/0x1280
3) 3184 336 __folio_alloc+0x34/0x90
4) 2848 176 vma_alloc_folio+0xd8/0x540
5) 2672 272 __handle_mm_fault+0x700/0x1cc0
6) 2400 208 handle_mm_fault+0xf0/0x3f0
7) 2192 80 ___do_page_fault+0x3e4/0xbe0
8) 2112 160 do_page_fault+0x30/0xc0
9) 1952 256 data_access_common_virt+0x210/0x220
10) 1696 400 0xc00000000f16b100
11) 1296 384 load_elf_binary+0x804/0x1b80
12) 912 208 bprm_execve+0x2d8/0x7e0
13) 704 64 do_execveat_common+0x1d0/0x2f0
14) 640 160 sys_execve+0x54/0x70
15) 480 64 system_call_exception+0x138/0x350
16) 416 416 system_call_common+0x160/0x2c4
Fix this by having ftrace create a dummy stackframe for the function
being traced. With this, backtraces now capture the function being
traced:
/sys/kernel/debug/tracing # cat stack_trace
Depth Size Location (17 entries)
----- ---- --------
0) 3888 32 _raw_spin_trylock+0x8/0x70
1) 3856 576 get_page_from_freelist+0x26c/0x1ad0
2) 3280 64 __alloc_pages+0x290/0x1280
3) 3216 336 __folio_alloc+0x34/0x90
4) 2880 176 vma_alloc_folio+0xd8/0x540
5) 2704 416 __handle_mm_fault+0x700/0x1cc0
6) 2288 96 handle_mm_fault+0xf0/0x3f0
7) 2192 48 ___do_page_fault+0x3e4/0xbe0
8) 2144 192 do_page_fault+0x30/0xc0
9) 1952 608 data_access_common_virt+0x210/0x220
10) 1344 16 0xc0000000334bbb50
11) 1328 416 load_elf_binary+0x804/0x1b80
12) 912 64 bprm_execve+0x2d8/0x7e0
13) 848 176 do_execveat_common+0x1d0/0x2f0
14) 672 192 sys_execve+0x54/0x70
15) 480 64 system_call_exception+0x138/0x350
16) 416 416 system_call_common+0x160/0x2c4
This results in two additional stores in the ftrace entry code, but
produces reliable backtraces.
Fixes: 153086644fd1 ("powerpc/ftrace: Add support for -mprofile-kernel ftrace ABI")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Naveen N Rao <naveen@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://msgid.link/20230621051349.759567-1-naveen@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit d62cc390c2e99ae267ffe4b8d7e2e08b6c758c32 upstream.
We received report [1] of kernel crash, which is caused by
using nesting protection without disabled preemption.
The bpf_event_output can be called by programs executed by
bpf_prog_run_array_cg function that disabled migration but
keeps preemption enabled.
This can cause task to be preempted by another one inside the
nesting protection and lead eventually to two tasks using same
perf_sample_data buffer and cause crashes like:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000001
#PF: supervisor instruction fetch in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0010) - not-present page
...
? perf_output_sample+0x12a/0x9a0
? finish_task_switch.isra.0+0x81/0x280
? perf_event_output+0x66/0xa0
? bpf_event_output+0x13a/0x190
? bpf_event_output_data+0x22/0x40
? bpf_prog_dfc84bbde731b257_cil_sock4_connect+0x40a/0xacb
? xa_load+0x87/0xe0
? __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_sock_addr+0xc1/0x1a0
? release_sock+0x3e/0x90
? sk_setsockopt+0x1a1/0x12f0
? udp_pre_connect+0x36/0x50
? inet_dgram_connect+0x93/0xa0
? __sys_connect+0xb4/0xe0
? udp_setsockopt+0x27/0x40
? __pfx_udp_push_pending_frames+0x10/0x10
? __sys_setsockopt+0xdf/0x1a0
? __x64_sys_connect+0xf/0x20
? do_syscall_64+0x3a/0x90
? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc
Fixing this by disabling preemption in bpf_event_output.
[1] https://github.com/cilium/cilium/issues/26756
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Oleg "livelace" Popov <o.popov@livelace.ru>
Closes: https://github.com/cilium/cilium/issues/26756
Fixes: 2a916f2f546c ("bpf: Use migrate_disable/enable in array macros and cgroup/lirc code.")
Acked-by: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230725084206.580930-3-jolsa@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 9d01e07fd1bfb4daae156ab528aa196f5ac2b2bc upstream.
Due to rbd_try_acquire_lock() effectively swallowing all but
EBLOCKLISTED error from rbd_try_lock() ("request lock anyway") and
rbd_request_lock() returning ETIMEDOUT error not only for an actual
notify timeout but also when the lock owner doesn't respond, a busy
loop inside of rbd_acquire_lock() between rbd_try_acquire_lock() and
rbd_request_lock() is possible.
Requesting the lock on EBUSY error (returned by get_lock_owner_info()
if an incompatible lock or invalid lock owner is detected) makes very
little sense. The same goes for ETIMEDOUT error (might pop up pretty
much anywhere if osd_request_timeout option is set) and many others.
Just fail I/O requests on rbd_dev->acquiring_list immediately on any
error from rbd_try_lock().
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 588159009d5b: rbd: retrieve and check lock owner twice before blocklisting
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Dongsheng Yang <dongsheng.yang@easystack.cn>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit d5ace2a776442d80674eff9ed42e737f7dd95056 upstream.
On hardware that supports Indirect Branch Tracking (IBT), Hyper-V VMs
with ConfigVersion 9.3 or later support IBT in the guest. However,
current versions of Hyper-V have a bug in that there's not an ENDBR64
instruction at the beginning of the hypercall page. Since hypercalls are
made with an indirect call to the hypercall page, all hypercall attempts
fail with an exception and Linux panics.
A Hyper-V fix is in progress to add ENDBR64. But guard against the Linux
panic by clearing X86_FEATURE_IBT if the hypercall page doesn't start
with ENDBR. The VM will boot and run without IBT.
If future Linux 32-bit kernels were to support IBT, additional hypercall
page hackery would be needed to make IBT work for such kernels in a
Hyper-V VM.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Michael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1690001476-98594-1-git-send-email-mikelley@microsoft.com
Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 421033deb91521aa6a9255e495cb106741a52275 upstream.
On DBDC devices the first (internal) phy is only capable of using
2.4 GHz band, and the 5 GHz band is exposed via a separate phy object,
so avoid the false advertising.
Reported-by: Rani Hod <rani.hod@gmail.com>
Closes: https://github.com/openwrt/openwrt/pull/12361
Fixes: 7660a1bd0c22 ("mt76: mt7615: register ext_phy if DBDC is detected")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Fertser <fercerpav@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@corigine.com>
Acked-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230605073408.8699-1-fercerpav@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 5c9241f3ceab3257abe2923a59950db0dc8bb737 upstream.
Commit 66b2c338adce initializes the "sk_uid" field in the protocol socket
(struct sock) from the "/dev/tapX" device node's owner UID. Per original
commit 86741ec25462 ("net: core: Add a UID field to struct sock.",
2016-11-04), that's wrong: the idea is to cache the UID of the userspace
process that creates the socket. Commit 86741ec25462 mentions socket() and
accept(); with "tap", the action that creates the socket is
open("/dev/tapX").
Therefore the device node's owner UID is irrelevant. In most cases,
"/dev/tapX" will be owned by root, so in practice, commit 66b2c338adce has
no observable effect:
- before, "sk_uid" would be zero, due to undefined behavior
(CVE-2023-1076),
- after, "sk_uid" would be zero, due to "/dev/tapX" being owned by root.
What matters is the (fs)UID of the process performing the open(), so cache
that in "sk_uid".
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Lorenzo Colitti <lorenzo@google.com>
Cc: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Cc: Pietro Borrello <borrello@diag.uniroma1.it>
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 66b2c338adce ("tap: tap_open(): correctly initialize socket uid")
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2173435
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 9bc3047374d5bec163e83e743709e23753376f0c upstream.
Commit a096ccca6e50 initializes the "sk_uid" field in the protocol socket
(struct sock) from the "/dev/net/tun" device node's owner UID. Per
original commit 86741ec25462 ("net: core: Add a UID field to struct
sock.", 2016-11-04), that's wrong: the idea is to cache the UID of the
userspace process that creates the socket. Commit 86741ec25462 mentions
socket() and accept(); with "tun", the action that creates the socket is
open("/dev/net/tun").
Therefore the device node's owner UID is irrelevant. In most cases,
"/dev/net/tun" will be owned by root, so in practice, commit a096ccca6e50
has no observable effect:
- before, "sk_uid" would be zero, due to undefined behavior
(CVE-2023-1076),
- after, "sk_uid" would be zero, due to "/dev/net/tun" being owned by root.
What matters is the (fs)UID of the process performing the open(), so cache
that in "sk_uid".
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Lorenzo Colitti <lorenzo@google.com>
Cc: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Cc: Pietro Borrello <borrello@diag.uniroma1.it>
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: a096ccca6e50 ("tun: tun_chr_open(): correctly initialize socket uid")
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2173435
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit db66795f61354c373ecdadbdae1ed253a96c47cb upstream.
The correct dts property for the SCL falling time is
"i2c-scl-falling-time-ns".
Fixes: c8da1d15b8a4 ("arm64: dts: stratix10: i2c clock running out of spec")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dinh Nguyen <dinguyen@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit f2c67a3e60d1071b65848efaa8c3b66c363dd025 upstream.
The nesting protection in bpf_perf_event_output relies on disabled
preemption, which is guaranteed for kprobes and tracepoints.
However bpf_perf_event_output can be also called from uprobes context
through bpf_prog_run_array_sleepable function which disables migration,
but keeps preemption enabled.
This can cause task to be preempted by another one inside the nesting
protection and lead eventually to two tasks using same perf_sample_data
buffer and cause crashes like:
kernel tried to execute NX-protected page - exploit attempt? (uid: 0)
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffffff82be3eea
...
Call Trace:
? __die+0x1f/0x70
? page_fault_oops+0x176/0x4d0
? exc_page_fault+0x132/0x230
? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30
? perf_output_sample+0x12b/0x910
? perf_event_output+0xd0/0x1d0
? bpf_perf_event_output+0x162/0x1d0
? bpf_prog_c6271286d9a4c938_krava1+0x76/0x87
? __uprobe_perf_func+0x12b/0x540
? uprobe_dispatcher+0x2c4/0x430
? uprobe_notify_resume+0x2da/0xce0
? atomic_notifier_call_chain+0x7b/0x110
? exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x13e/0x290
? irqentry_exit_to_user_mode+0x5/0x30
? asm_exc_int3+0x35/0x40
Fixing this by disabling preemption in bpf_perf_event_output.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 8c7dcb84e3b7 ("bpf: implement sleepable uprobes by chaining gps")
Acked-by: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230725084206.580930-2-jolsa@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 7e6b04f9238eab0f684fafd158c1f32ea65b9eaa upstream.
It is incorrect to calculate number of OOB bytes for ECC engine using
some "already known" ECC step size (1024 bytes here). Number of such
bytes for ECC engine must be whole OOB except 2 bytes for bad block
marker, while proper ECC step size and strength will be selected by
ECC logic.
Fixes: 8fae856c5350 ("mtd: rawnand: meson: add support for Amlogic NAND flash controller")
Cc: <Stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Arseniy Krasnov <AVKrasnov@sberdevices.ru>
Signed-off-by: Miquel Raynal <miquel.raynal@bootlin.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mtd/20230705065211.293500-1-AVKrasnov@sberdevices.ru
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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