summaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/security
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
-rw-r--r--security/Kconfig2
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c4
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/domain.c9
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/include/perms.h3
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/ipc.c53
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c3
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c4
-rw-r--r--security/keys/keyring.c7
-rw-r--r--security/tomoyo/audit.c2
-rw-r--r--security/tomoyo/common.c4
-rw-r--r--security/tomoyo/common.h6
-rw-r--r--security/tomoyo/securityfs_if.c2
12 files changed, 55 insertions, 44 deletions
diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
index 3d4debd0257e..b0cb9a5f9448 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig
+++ b/security/Kconfig
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ config PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
ensuring that the majority of kernel addresses are not mapped
into userspace.
- See Documentation/x86/pagetable-isolation.txt for more details.
+ See Documentation/x86/pti.txt for more details.
config SECURITY_INFINIBAND
bool "Infiniband Security Hooks"
diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
index d4fa04d91439..4d202b73a0e1 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
@@ -571,10 +571,10 @@ static int ns_revision_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
return 0;
}
-static unsigned int ns_revision_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *pt)
+static __poll_t ns_revision_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *pt)
{
struct aa_revision *rev = file->private_data;
- unsigned int mask = 0;
+ __poll_t mask = 0;
if (rev) {
mutex_lock_nested(&rev->ns->lock, rev->ns->level);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c
index 04ba9d0718ea..6a54d2ffa840 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/domain.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c
@@ -330,10 +330,7 @@ static struct aa_profile *__attach_match(const char *name,
continue;
if (profile->xmatch) {
- if (profile->xmatch_len == len) {
- conflict = true;
- continue;
- } else if (profile->xmatch_len > len) {
+ if (profile->xmatch_len >= len) {
unsigned int state;
u32 perm;
@@ -342,6 +339,10 @@ static struct aa_profile *__attach_match(const char *name,
perm = dfa_user_allow(profile->xmatch, state);
/* any accepting state means a valid match. */
if (perm & MAY_EXEC) {
+ if (profile->xmatch_len == len) {
+ conflict = true;
+ continue;
+ }
candidate = profile;
len = profile->xmatch_len;
conflict = false;
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/perms.h b/security/apparmor/include/perms.h
index 2b27bb79aec4..d7b7e7115160 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/perms.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/perms.h
@@ -133,6 +133,9 @@ extern struct aa_perms allperms;
#define xcheck_labels_profiles(L1, L2, FN, args...) \
xcheck_ns_labels((L1), (L2), xcheck_ns_profile_label, (FN), args)
+#define xcheck_labels(L1, L2, P, FN1, FN2) \
+ xcheck(fn_for_each((L1), (P), (FN1)), fn_for_each((L2), (P), (FN2)))
+
void aa_perm_mask_to_str(char *str, const char *chrs, u32 mask);
void aa_audit_perm_names(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char **names, u32 mask);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/ipc.c b/security/apparmor/ipc.c
index 7ca0032e7ba9..b40678f3c1d5 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/ipc.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/ipc.c
@@ -64,40 +64,48 @@ static void audit_ptrace_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
FLAGS_NONE, GFP_ATOMIC);
}
+/* assumes check for PROFILE_MEDIATES is already done */
/* TODO: conditionals */
static int profile_ptrace_perm(struct aa_profile *profile,
- struct aa_profile *peer, u32 request,
- struct common_audit_data *sa)
+ struct aa_label *peer, u32 request,
+ struct common_audit_data *sa)
{
struct aa_perms perms = { };
- /* need because of peer in cross check */
- if (profile_unconfined(profile) ||
- !PROFILE_MEDIATES(profile, AA_CLASS_PTRACE))
- return 0;
-
- aad(sa)->peer = &peer->label;
- aa_profile_match_label(profile, &peer->label, AA_CLASS_PTRACE, request,
+ aad(sa)->peer = peer;
+ aa_profile_match_label(profile, peer, AA_CLASS_PTRACE, request,
&perms);
aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms);
return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, sa, audit_ptrace_cb);
}
-static int cross_ptrace_perm(struct aa_profile *tracer,
- struct aa_profile *tracee, u32 request,
- struct common_audit_data *sa)
+static int profile_tracee_perm(struct aa_profile *tracee,
+ struct aa_label *tracer, u32 request,
+ struct common_audit_data *sa)
{
+ if (profile_unconfined(tracee) || unconfined(tracer) ||
+ !PROFILE_MEDIATES(tracee, AA_CLASS_PTRACE))
+ return 0;
+
+ return profile_ptrace_perm(tracee, tracer, request, sa);
+}
+
+static int profile_tracer_perm(struct aa_profile *tracer,
+ struct aa_label *tracee, u32 request,
+ struct common_audit_data *sa)
+{
+ if (profile_unconfined(tracer))
+ return 0;
+
if (PROFILE_MEDIATES(tracer, AA_CLASS_PTRACE))
- return xcheck(profile_ptrace_perm(tracer, tracee, request, sa),
- profile_ptrace_perm(tracee, tracer,
- request << PTRACE_PERM_SHIFT,
- sa));
- /* policy uses the old style capability check for ptrace */
- if (profile_unconfined(tracer) || tracer == tracee)
+ return profile_ptrace_perm(tracer, tracee, request, sa);
+
+ /* profile uses the old style capability check for ptrace */
+ if (&tracer->label == tracee)
return 0;
aad(sa)->label = &tracer->label;
- aad(sa)->peer = &tracee->label;
+ aad(sa)->peer = tracee;
aad(sa)->request = 0;
aad(sa)->error = aa_capable(&tracer->label, CAP_SYS_PTRACE, 1);
@@ -115,10 +123,13 @@ static int cross_ptrace_perm(struct aa_profile *tracer,
int aa_may_ptrace(struct aa_label *tracer, struct aa_label *tracee,
u32 request)
{
+ struct aa_profile *profile;
+ u32 xrequest = request << PTRACE_PERM_SHIFT;
DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(sa, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, OP_PTRACE);
- return xcheck_labels_profiles(tracer, tracee, cross_ptrace_perm,
- request, &sa);
+ return xcheck_labels(tracer, tracee, profile,
+ profile_tracer_perm(profile, tracee, request, &sa),
+ profile_tracee_perm(profile, tracer, xrequest, &sa));
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index c7e8db0ea4c0..c6ae42266270 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/xattr.h>
#include <linux/evm.h>
+#include <linux/iversion.h>
#include "ima.h"
@@ -215,7 +216,7 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
* which do not support i_version, support is limited to an initial
* measurement/appraisal/audit.
*/
- i_version = file_inode(file)->i_version;
+ i_version = inode_query_iversion(inode);
hash.hdr.algo = algo;
/* Initialize hash digest to 0's in case of failure */
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 770654694efc..06a70c5a2329 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/xattr.h>
#include <linux/ima.h>
+#include <linux/iversion.h>
#include "ima.h"
@@ -127,7 +128,8 @@ static void ima_check_last_writer(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
inode_lock(inode);
if (atomic_read(&inode->i_writecount) == 1) {
- if ((iint->version != inode->i_version) ||
+ if (!IS_I_VERSION(inode) ||
+ inode_cmp_iversion(inode, iint->version) ||
(iint->flags & IMA_NEW_FILE)) {
iint->flags &= ~(IMA_DONE_MASK | IMA_NEW_FILE);
iint->measured_pcrs = 0;
diff --git a/security/keys/keyring.c b/security/keys/keyring.c
index d0bccebbd3b5..41bcf57e96f2 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyring.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyring.c
@@ -713,7 +713,6 @@ descend_to_keyring:
* doesn't contain any keyring pointers.
*/
shortcut = assoc_array_ptr_to_shortcut(ptr);
- smp_read_barrier_depends();
if ((shortcut->index_key[0] & ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_MASK) != 0)
goto not_this_keyring;
@@ -723,8 +722,6 @@ descend_to_keyring:
}
node = assoc_array_ptr_to_node(ptr);
- smp_read_barrier_depends();
-
ptr = node->slots[0];
if (!assoc_array_ptr_is_meta(ptr))
goto begin_node;
@@ -736,7 +733,6 @@ descend_to_node:
kdebug("descend");
if (assoc_array_ptr_is_shortcut(ptr)) {
shortcut = assoc_array_ptr_to_shortcut(ptr);
- smp_read_barrier_depends();
ptr = READ_ONCE(shortcut->next_node);
BUG_ON(!assoc_array_ptr_is_node(ptr));
}
@@ -744,7 +740,6 @@ descend_to_node:
begin_node:
kdebug("begin_node");
- smp_read_barrier_depends();
slot = 0;
ascend_to_node:
/* Go through the slots in a node */
@@ -792,14 +787,12 @@ ascend_to_node:
if (ptr && assoc_array_ptr_is_shortcut(ptr)) {
shortcut = assoc_array_ptr_to_shortcut(ptr);
- smp_read_barrier_depends();
ptr = READ_ONCE(shortcut->back_pointer);
slot = shortcut->parent_slot;
}
if (!ptr)
goto not_this_keyring;
node = assoc_array_ptr_to_node(ptr);
- smp_read_barrier_depends();
slot++;
/* If we've ascended to the root (zero backpointer), we must have just
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/audit.c b/security/tomoyo/audit.c
index 0f73fe30e37a..558e3076d38c 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/audit.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/audit.c
@@ -458,7 +458,7 @@ void tomoyo_read_log(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head)
*
* Returns POLLIN | POLLRDNORM when ready to read an audit log.
*/
-unsigned int tomoyo_poll_log(struct file *file, poll_table *wait)
+__poll_t tomoyo_poll_log(struct file *file, poll_table *wait)
{
if (tomoyo_log_count)
return POLLIN | POLLRDNORM;
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/common.c b/security/tomoyo/common.c
index 25eed4b0b0e8..70c73bf66c88 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/common.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/common.c
@@ -2120,7 +2120,7 @@ static struct tomoyo_domain_info *tomoyo_find_domain_by_qid
*
* Waits for access requests which violated policy in enforcing mode.
*/
-static unsigned int tomoyo_poll_query(struct file *file, poll_table *wait)
+static __poll_t tomoyo_poll_query(struct file *file, poll_table *wait)
{
if (!list_empty(&tomoyo_query_list))
return POLLIN | POLLRDNORM;
@@ -2453,7 +2453,7 @@ int tomoyo_open_control(const u8 type, struct file *file)
* Returns POLLIN | POLLRDNORM | POLLOUT | POLLWRNORM if ready to read/write,
* POLLOUT | POLLWRNORM otherwise.
*/
-unsigned int tomoyo_poll_control(struct file *file, poll_table *wait)
+__poll_t tomoyo_poll_control(struct file *file, poll_table *wait)
{
struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head = file->private_data;
if (head->poll)
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/common.h b/security/tomoyo/common.h
index 7adccdd8e36d..539bcdd30bb8 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/common.h
+++ b/security/tomoyo/common.h
@@ -789,7 +789,7 @@ struct tomoyo_acl_param {
struct tomoyo_io_buffer {
void (*read) (struct tomoyo_io_buffer *);
int (*write) (struct tomoyo_io_buffer *);
- unsigned int (*poll) (struct file *file, poll_table *wait);
+ __poll_t (*poll) (struct file *file, poll_table *wait);
/* Exclusive lock for this structure. */
struct mutex io_sem;
char __user *read_user_buf;
@@ -981,8 +981,8 @@ int tomoyo_path_number_perm(const u8 operation, const struct path *path,
unsigned long number);
int tomoyo_path_perm(const u8 operation, const struct path *path,
const char *target);
-unsigned int tomoyo_poll_control(struct file *file, poll_table *wait);
-unsigned int tomoyo_poll_log(struct file *file, poll_table *wait);
+__poll_t tomoyo_poll_control(struct file *file, poll_table *wait);
+__poll_t tomoyo_poll_log(struct file *file, poll_table *wait);
int tomoyo_socket_bind_permission(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *addr,
int addr_len);
int tomoyo_socket_connect_permission(struct socket *sock,
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/securityfs_if.c b/security/tomoyo/securityfs_if.c
index 49393c2a3f8b..fb9bf99deb35 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/securityfs_if.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/securityfs_if.c
@@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ static int tomoyo_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
* Returns POLLIN | POLLRDNORM | POLLOUT | POLLWRNORM if ready to read/write,
* POLLOUT | POLLWRNORM otherwise.
*/
-static unsigned int tomoyo_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *wait)
+static __poll_t tomoyo_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *wait)
{
return tomoyo_poll_control(file, wait);
}
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.39.0) at 2024-11-23 06:11:00 +0300