diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
26 files changed, 208 insertions, 175 deletions
diff --git a/security/Makefile b/security/Makefile index a5918e01a4f7..05f1c934d74b 100644 --- a/security/Makefile +++ b/security/Makefile @@ -16,14 +16,14 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_MMU) += min_addr.o # Object file lists obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY) += security.o capability.o obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITYFS) += inode.o -obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) += selinux/built-in.o -obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK) += smack/built-in.o +obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) += selinux/ +obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK) += smack/ obj-$(CONFIG_AUDIT) += lsm_audit.o -obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO) += tomoyo/built-in.o -obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) += apparmor/built-in.o -obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA) += yama/built-in.o +obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO) += tomoyo/ +obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) += apparmor/ +obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA) += yama/ obj-$(CONFIG_CGROUP_DEVICE) += device_cgroup.o # Object integrity file lists subdir-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY) += integrity -obj-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY) += integrity/built-in.o +obj-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY) += integrity/ diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c index 4257b7e2796b..998100093332 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c @@ -751,7 +751,7 @@ module_param_named(enabled, apparmor_enabled, bool, S_IRUGO); static int __init apparmor_enabled_setup(char *str) { unsigned long enabled; - int error = strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enabled); + int error = kstrtoul(str, 0, &enabled); if (!error) apparmor_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0; return 1; diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c index 21e2b9cae685..ad0d4de69944 100644 --- a/security/capability.c +++ b/security/capability.c @@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ static int cap_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode, struct qstr *name, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen) { - return 0; + return -EOPNOTSUPP; } static int cap_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode) diff --git a/security/integrity/Makefile b/security/integrity/Makefile index 0f9cffb1f9ad..0793f4811cb7 100644 --- a/security/integrity/Makefile +++ b/security/integrity/Makefile @@ -10,6 +10,6 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS) += digsig_asymmetric.o integrity-y := iint.o subdir-$(CONFIG_IMA) += ima -obj-$(CONFIG_IMA) += ima/built-in.o +obj-$(CONFIG_IMA) += ima/ subdir-$(CONFIG_EVM) += evm -obj-$(CONFIG_EVM) += evm/built-in.o +obj-$(CONFIG_EVM) += evm/ diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig b/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig index fea9749c3756..d35b4915b00d 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig +++ b/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig @@ -1,10 +1,10 @@ config EVM boolean "EVM support" - depends on SECURITY && KEYS && (TRUSTED_KEYS=y || TRUSTED_KEYS=n) + depends on SECURITY + select KEYS + select ENCRYPTED_KEYS select CRYPTO_HMAC - select CRYPTO_MD5 select CRYPTO_SHA1 - select ENCRYPTED_KEYS default n help EVM protects a file's security extended attributes against diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm.h b/security/integrity/evm/evm.h index 30bd1ec0232e..37c88ddb3cfe 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm.h +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm.h @@ -32,19 +32,19 @@ extern struct crypto_shash *hash_tfm; /* List of EVM protected security xattrs */ extern char *evm_config_xattrnames[]; -extern int evm_init_key(void); -extern int evm_update_evmxattr(struct dentry *dentry, - const char *req_xattr_name, - const char *req_xattr_value, - size_t req_xattr_value_len); -extern int evm_calc_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name, - const char *req_xattr_value, - size_t req_xattr_value_len, char *digest); -extern int evm_calc_hash(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name, - const char *req_xattr_value, - size_t req_xattr_value_len, char *digest); -extern int evm_init_hmac(struct inode *inode, const struct xattr *xattr, - char *hmac_val); -extern int evm_init_secfs(void); +int evm_init_key(void); +int evm_update_evmxattr(struct dentry *dentry, + const char *req_xattr_name, + const char *req_xattr_value, + size_t req_xattr_value_len); +int evm_calc_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name, + const char *req_xattr_value, + size_t req_xattr_value_len, char *digest); +int evm_calc_hash(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name, + const char *req_xattr_value, + size_t req_xattr_value_len, char *digest); +int evm_init_hmac(struct inode *inode, const struct xattr *xattr, + char *hmac_val); +int evm_init_secfs(void); #endif diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c index 3bab89eb21d6..babd8626bf96 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c @@ -13,6 +13,8 @@ * Using root's kernel master key (kmk), calculate the HMAC */ +#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt + #include <linux/module.h> #include <linux/crypto.h> #include <linux/xattr.h> @@ -103,13 +105,13 @@ static void hmac_add_misc(struct shash_desc *desc, struct inode *inode, umode_t mode; } hmac_misc; - memset(&hmac_misc, 0, sizeof hmac_misc); + memset(&hmac_misc, 0, sizeof(hmac_misc)); hmac_misc.ino = inode->i_ino; hmac_misc.generation = inode->i_generation; hmac_misc.uid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, inode->i_uid); hmac_misc.gid = from_kgid(&init_user_ns, inode->i_gid); hmac_misc.mode = inode->i_mode; - crypto_shash_update(desc, (const u8 *)&hmac_misc, sizeof hmac_misc); + crypto_shash_update(desc, (const u8 *)&hmac_misc, sizeof(hmac_misc)); if (evm_hmac_version > 1) crypto_shash_update(desc, inode->i_sb->s_uuid, sizeof(inode->i_sb->s_uuid)); @@ -221,7 +223,7 @@ int evm_init_hmac(struct inode *inode, const struct xattr *lsm_xattr, desc = init_desc(EVM_XATTR_HMAC); if (IS_ERR(desc)) { - printk(KERN_INFO "init_desc failed\n"); + pr_info("init_desc failed\n"); return PTR_ERR(desc); } diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c index 336b3ddfe63f..996092f21b64 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c @@ -14,6 +14,8 @@ * evm_inode_removexattr, and evm_verifyxattr */ +#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt + #include <linux/module.h> #include <linux/crypto.h> #include <linux/audit.h> @@ -432,7 +434,7 @@ static int __init init_evm(void) error = evm_init_secfs(); if (error < 0) { - printk(KERN_INFO "EVM: Error registering secfs\n"); + pr_info("Error registering secfs\n"); goto err; } @@ -449,7 +451,7 @@ static int __init evm_display_config(void) char **xattrname; for (xattrname = evm_config_xattrnames; *xattrname != NULL; xattrname++) - printk(KERN_INFO "EVM: %s\n", *xattrname); + pr_info("%s\n", *xattrname); return 0; } diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c index 30f670ad6ac3..cf12a04717d3 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c @@ -13,6 +13,8 @@ * - Get the key and enable EVM */ +#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt + #include <linux/uaccess.h> #include <linux/module.h> #include "evm.h" @@ -79,9 +81,9 @@ static ssize_t evm_write_key(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, error = evm_init_key(); if (!error) { evm_initialized = 1; - pr_info("EVM: initialized\n"); + pr_info("initialized\n"); } else - pr_err("EVM: initialization failed\n"); + pr_err("initialization failed\n"); return count; } diff --git a/security/integrity/iint.c b/security/integrity/iint.c index c49d3f14cbec..a521edf4cbd6 100644 --- a/security/integrity/iint.c +++ b/security/integrity/iint.c @@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ static void init_once(void *foo) { struct integrity_iint_cache *iint = foo; - memset(iint, 0, sizeof *iint); + memset(iint, 0, sizeof(*iint)); iint->version = 0; iint->flags = 0UL; iint->ima_file_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h index 0356e1d437ca..f79fa8be203c 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h @@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ #include "../integrity.h" enum ima_show_type { IMA_SHOW_BINARY, IMA_SHOW_BINARY_NO_FIELD_LEN, - IMA_SHOW_ASCII }; + IMA_SHOW_BINARY_OLD_STRING_FMT, IMA_SHOW_ASCII }; enum tpm_pcrs { TPM_PCR0 = 0, TPM_PCR8 = 8 }; /* digest size for IMA, fits SHA1 or MD5 */ diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c index c38bbce8c6a6..ba9e4d792dd5 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c @@ -92,8 +92,8 @@ int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation, struct inode *inode, const unsigned char *filename) { - const char *op = "add_template_measure"; - const char *audit_cause = "hashing_error"; + static const char op[] = "add_template_measure"; + static const char audit_cause[] = "hashing_error"; char *template_name = entry->template_desc->name; int result; struct { @@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, const char *op, const char *cause) { struct ima_template_entry *entry; - struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode; + struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); int violation = 1; int result; @@ -160,10 +160,10 @@ err_out: * @function: calling function (FILE_CHECK, BPRM_CHECK, MMAP_CHECK, MODULE_CHECK) * * The policy is defined in terms of keypairs: - * subj=, obj=, type=, func=, mask=, fsmagic= + * subj=, obj=, type=, func=, mask=, fsmagic= * subj,obj, and type: are LSM specific. - * func: FILE_CHECK | BPRM_CHECK | MMAP_CHECK | MODULE_CHECK - * mask: contains the permission mask + * func: FILE_CHECK | BPRM_CHECK | MMAP_CHECK | MODULE_CHECK + * mask: contains the permission mask * fsmagic: hex value * * Returns IMA_MEASURE, IMA_APPRAISE mask. @@ -248,7 +248,7 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, * * We only get here if the inode has not already been measured, * but the measurement could already exist: - * - multiple copies of the same file on either the same or + * - multiple copies of the same file on either the same or * different filesystems. * - the inode was previously flushed as well as the iint info, * containing the hashing info. @@ -260,8 +260,8 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len) { - const char *op = "add_template_measure"; - const char *audit_cause = "ENOMEM"; + static const char op[] = "add_template_measure"; + static const char audit_cause[] = "ENOMEM"; int result = -ENOMEM; struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); struct ima_template_entry *entry; @@ -332,5 +332,5 @@ const char *ima_d_path(struct path *path, char **pathbuf) pathname = NULL; } } - return pathname; + return pathname ?: (const char *)path->dentry->d_name.name; } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c index 734e9468aca0..291bf0f3a46d 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c @@ -177,11 +177,11 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(int func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len) { + static const char op[] = "appraise_data"; + char *cause = "unknown"; struct dentry *dentry = file->f_dentry; struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; enum integrity_status status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; - const char *op = "appraise_data"; - char *cause = "unknown"; int rc = xattr_len, hash_start = 0; if (!ima_appraise) diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c index fdf60def52e9..1bde8e627766 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c @@ -10,9 +10,11 @@ * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License. * * File: ima_crypto.c - * Calculates md5/sha1 file hash, template hash, boot-aggreate hash + * Calculates md5/sha1 file hash, template hash, boot-aggreate hash */ +#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt + #include <linux/kernel.h> #include <linux/file.h> #include <linux/crypto.h> @@ -85,16 +87,20 @@ static int ima_calc_file_hash_tfm(struct file *file, if (rc != 0) return rc; - rbuf = kzalloc(PAGE_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!rbuf) { - rc = -ENOMEM; + i_size = i_size_read(file_inode(file)); + + if (i_size == 0) goto out; - } + + rbuf = kzalloc(PAGE_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!rbuf) + return -ENOMEM; + if (!(file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)) { file->f_mode |= FMODE_READ; read = 1; } - i_size = i_size_read(file_inode(file)); + while (offset < i_size) { int rbuf_len; @@ -111,12 +117,12 @@ static int ima_calc_file_hash_tfm(struct file *file, if (rc) break; } - kfree(rbuf); - if (!rc) - rc = crypto_shash_final(&desc.shash, hash->digest); if (read) file->f_mode &= ~FMODE_READ; + kfree(rbuf); out: + if (!rc) + rc = crypto_shash_final(&desc.shash, hash->digest); return rc; } @@ -161,15 +167,22 @@ static int ima_calc_field_array_hash_tfm(struct ima_field_data *field_data, return rc; for (i = 0; i < num_fields; i++) { + u8 buffer[IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX + 1] = { 0 }; + u8 *data_to_hash = field_data[i].data; + u32 datalen = field_data[i].len; + if (strcmp(td->name, IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME) != 0) { rc = crypto_shash_update(&desc.shash, (const u8 *) &field_data[i].len, sizeof(field_data[i].len)); if (rc) break; + } else if (strcmp(td->fields[i]->field_id, "n") == 0) { + memcpy(buffer, data_to_hash, datalen); + data_to_hash = buffer; + datalen = IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX + 1; } - rc = crypto_shash_update(&desc.shash, field_data[i].data, - field_data[i].len); + rc = crypto_shash_update(&desc.shash, data_to_hash, datalen); if (rc) break; } @@ -205,7 +218,7 @@ static void __init ima_pcrread(int idx, u8 *pcr) return; if (tpm_pcr_read(TPM_ANY_NUM, idx, pcr) != 0) - pr_err("IMA: Error Communicating to TPM chip\n"); + pr_err("Error Communicating to TPM chip\n"); } /* diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c index db01125926bd..da92fcc08d15 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c @@ -133,14 +133,14 @@ static int ima_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) * PCR used is always the same (config option) in * little-endian format */ - ima_putc(m, &pcr, sizeof pcr); + ima_putc(m, &pcr, sizeof(pcr)); /* 2nd: template digest */ ima_putc(m, e->digest, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); /* 3rd: template name size */ namelen = strlen(e->template_desc->name); - ima_putc(m, &namelen, sizeof namelen); + ima_putc(m, &namelen, sizeof(namelen)); /* 4th: template name */ ima_putc(m, e->template_desc->name, namelen); @@ -160,6 +160,8 @@ static int ima_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) if (is_ima_template && strcmp(field->field_id, "d") == 0) show = IMA_SHOW_BINARY_NO_FIELD_LEN; + if (is_ima_template && strcmp(field->field_id, "n") == 0) + show = IMA_SHOW_BINARY_OLD_STRING_FMT; field->field_show(m, show, &e->template_data[i]); } return 0; @@ -290,7 +292,7 @@ static atomic_t policy_opencount = ATOMIC_INIT(1); /* * ima_open_policy: sequentialize access to the policy file */ -static int ima_open_policy(struct inode * inode, struct file * filp) +static int ima_open_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp) { /* No point in being allowed to open it if you aren't going to write */ if (!(filp->f_flags & O_WRONLY)) diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c index 37122768554a..e8f9d70a465d 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c @@ -14,6 +14,9 @@ * File: ima_init.c * initialization and cleanup functions */ + +#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt + #include <linux/module.h> #include <linux/scatterlist.h> #include <linux/slab.h> @@ -42,10 +45,10 @@ int ima_used_chip; */ static void __init ima_add_boot_aggregate(void) { + static const char op[] = "add_boot_aggregate"; + const char *audit_cause = "ENOMEM"; struct ima_template_entry *entry; struct integrity_iint_cache tmp_iint, *iint = &tmp_iint; - const char *op = "add_boot_aggregate"; - const char *audit_cause = "ENOMEM"; int result = -ENOMEM; int violation = 0; struct { @@ -93,7 +96,7 @@ int __init ima_init(void) ima_used_chip = 1; if (!ima_used_chip) - pr_info("IMA: No TPM chip found, activating TPM-bypass!\n"); + pr_info("No TPM chip found, activating TPM-bypass!\n"); rc = ima_init_crypto(); if (rc) diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index 149ee1119f87..52ac6cf41f88 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -71,15 +71,14 @@ __setup("ima_hash=", hash_setup); * ima_rdwr_violation_check * * Only invalidate the PCR for measured files: - * - Opening a file for write when already open for read, + * - Opening a file for write when already open for read, * results in a time of measure, time of use (ToMToU) error. * - Opening a file for read when already open for write, - * could result in a file measurement error. + * could result in a file measurement error. * */ static void ima_rdwr_violation_check(struct file *file) { - struct dentry *dentry = file->f_path.dentry; struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); fmode_t mode = file->f_mode; int must_measure; @@ -111,8 +110,6 @@ out: return; pathname = ima_d_path(&file->f_path, &pathbuf); - if (!pathname || strlen(pathname) > IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX) - pathname = dentry->d_name.name; if (send_tomtou) ima_add_violation(file, pathname, "invalid_pcr", "ToMToU"); @@ -220,9 +217,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const char *filename, if (rc != 0) goto out_digsig; - pathname = !filename ? ima_d_path(&file->f_path, &pathbuf) : filename; - if (!pathname) - pathname = (const char *)file->f_dentry->d_name.name; + pathname = filename ?: ima_d_path(&file->f_path, &pathbuf); if (action & IMA_MEASURE) ima_store_measurement(iint, file, pathname, diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index a9c3d3cd1990..93873a450ff7 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License. * * ima_policy.c - * - initialize default measure policy rules + * - initialize default measure policy rules * */ #include <linux/module.h> @@ -21,8 +21,8 @@ #include "ima.h" /* flags definitions */ -#define IMA_FUNC 0x0001 -#define IMA_MASK 0x0002 +#define IMA_FUNC 0x0001 +#define IMA_MASK 0x0002 #define IMA_FSMAGIC 0x0004 #define IMA_UID 0x0008 #define IMA_FOWNER 0x0010 @@ -69,35 +69,35 @@ struct ima_rule_entry { * and running executables. */ static struct ima_rule_entry default_rules[] = { - {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = PROC_SUPER_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, - {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = SYSFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, - {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = DEBUGFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, - {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = TMPFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, - {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, - {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = BINFMTFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, - {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, - {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = SELINUX_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, - {.action = MEASURE,.func = MMAP_CHECK,.mask = MAY_EXEC, + {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = PROC_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, + {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = SYSFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, + {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = DEBUGFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, + {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = TMPFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, + {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, + {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = BINFMTFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, + {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, + {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = SELINUX_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, + {.action = MEASURE, .func = MMAP_CHECK, .mask = MAY_EXEC, .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK}, - {.action = MEASURE,.func = BPRM_CHECK,.mask = MAY_EXEC, + {.action = MEASURE, .func = BPRM_CHECK, .mask = MAY_EXEC, .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK}, - {.action = MEASURE,.func = FILE_CHECK,.mask = MAY_READ,.uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, + {.action = MEASURE, .func = FILE_CHECK, .mask = MAY_READ, .uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK | IMA_UID}, - {.action = MEASURE,.func = MODULE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC}, + {.action = MEASURE, .func = MODULE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC}, }; static struct ima_rule_entry default_appraise_rules[] = { - {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = PROC_SUPER_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, - {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = SYSFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, - {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = DEBUGFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, - {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = TMPFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, - {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = RAMFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, - {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, - {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = BINFMTFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, - {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, - {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = SELINUX_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, - {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, - {.action = APPRAISE,.fowner = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID,.flags = IMA_FOWNER}, + {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = PROC_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, + {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = SYSFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, + {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = DEBUGFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, + {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = TMPFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, + {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = RAMFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, + {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, + {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = BINFMTFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, + {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, + {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = SELINUX_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, + {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, + {.action = APPRAISE, .fowner = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .flags = IMA_FOWNER}, }; static LIST_HEAD(ima_default_rules); @@ -122,12 +122,12 @@ static int __init default_appraise_policy_setup(char *str) } __setup("ima_appraise_tcb", default_appraise_policy_setup); -/* +/* * Although the IMA policy does not change, the LSM policy can be * reloaded, leaving the IMA LSM based rules referring to the old, * stale LSM policy. * - * Update the IMA LSM based rules to reflect the reloaded LSM policy. + * Update the IMA LSM based rules to reflect the reloaded LSM policy. * We assume the rules still exist; and BUG_ON() if they don't. */ static void ima_lsm_update_rules(void) @@ -167,9 +167,11 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); int i; - if ((rule->flags & IMA_FUNC) && rule->func != func) + if ((rule->flags & IMA_FUNC) && + (rule->func != func && func != POST_SETATTR)) return false; - if ((rule->flags & IMA_MASK) && rule->mask != mask) + if ((rule->flags & IMA_MASK) && + (rule->mask != mask && func != POST_SETATTR)) return false; if ((rule->flags & IMA_FSMAGIC) && rule->fsmagic != inode->i_sb->s_magic) @@ -216,7 +218,7 @@ retry: retried = 1; ima_lsm_update_rules(); goto retry; - } + } if (!rc) return false; } @@ -232,7 +234,7 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, int func) if (!(rule->flags & IMA_FUNC)) return IMA_FILE_APPRAISE; - switch(func) { + switch (func) { case MMAP_CHECK: return IMA_MMAP_APPRAISE; case BPRM_CHECK: @@ -304,7 +306,7 @@ void __init ima_init_policy(void) measure_entries = ima_use_tcb ? ARRAY_SIZE(default_rules) : 0; appraise_entries = ima_use_appraise_tcb ? ARRAY_SIZE(default_appraise_rules) : 0; - + for (i = 0; i < measure_entries + appraise_entries; i++) { if (i < measure_entries) list_add_tail(&default_rules[i].list, @@ -329,7 +331,7 @@ void __init ima_init_policy(void) */ void ima_update_policy(void) { - const char *op = "policy_update"; + static const char op[] = "policy_update"; const char *cause = "already exists"; int result = 1; int audit_info = 0; @@ -520,8 +522,7 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) break; } - result = strict_strtoul(args[0].from, 16, - &entry->fsmagic); + result = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 16, &entry->fsmagic); if (!result) entry->flags |= IMA_FSMAGIC; break; @@ -547,7 +548,7 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) break; } - result = strict_strtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lnum); + result = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lnum); if (!result) { entry->uid = make_kuid(current_user_ns(), (uid_t)lnum); if (!uid_valid(entry->uid) || (((uid_t)lnum) != lnum)) @@ -564,7 +565,7 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) break; } - result = strict_strtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lnum); + result = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lnum); if (!result) { entry->fowner = make_kuid(current_user_ns(), (uid_t)lnum); if (!uid_valid(entry->fowner) || (((uid_t)lnum) != lnum)) @@ -645,7 +646,7 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) */ ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule) { - const char *op = "update_policy"; + static const char op[] = "update_policy"; char *p; struct ima_rule_entry *entry; ssize_t result, len; diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c index d85e99761f4f..552705d5a78d 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c @@ -18,6 +18,9 @@ * The measurement list is append-only. No entry is * ever removed or changed during the boot-cycle. */ + +#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt + #include <linux/module.h> #include <linux/rculist.h> #include <linux/slab.h> @@ -72,7 +75,7 @@ static int ima_add_digest_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry) qe = kmalloc(sizeof(*qe), GFP_KERNEL); if (qe == NULL) { - pr_err("IMA: OUT OF MEMORY ERROR creating queue entry.\n"); + pr_err("OUT OF MEMORY ERROR creating queue entry\n"); return -ENOMEM; } qe->entry = entry; @@ -95,8 +98,7 @@ static int ima_pcr_extend(const u8 *hash) result = tpm_pcr_extend(TPM_ANY_NUM, CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX, hash); if (result != 0) - pr_err("IMA: Error Communicating to TPM chip, result: %d\n", - result); + pr_err("Error Communicating to TPM chip, result: %d\n", result); return result; } @@ -115,7 +117,7 @@ int ima_add_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation, mutex_lock(&ima_extend_list_mutex); if (!violation) { - memcpy(digest, entry->digest, sizeof digest); + memcpy(digest, entry->digest, sizeof(digest)); if (ima_lookup_digest_entry(digest)) { audit_cause = "hash_exists"; result = -EEXIST; @@ -131,7 +133,7 @@ int ima_add_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation, } if (violation) /* invalidate pcr */ - memset(digest, 0xff, sizeof digest); + memset(digest, 0xff, sizeof(digest)); tpmresult = ima_pcr_extend(digest); if (tpmresult != 0) { diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c index 635695f6a185..a076a967ec47 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c @@ -12,6 +12,9 @@ * File: ima_template.c * Helpers to manage template descriptors. */ + +#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt + #include <crypto/hash_info.h> #include "ima.h" @@ -19,20 +22,20 @@ static struct ima_template_desc defined_templates[] = { {.name = IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME, .fmt = IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_FMT}, - {.name = "ima-ng",.fmt = "d-ng|n-ng"}, - {.name = "ima-sig",.fmt = "d-ng|n-ng|sig"}, + {.name = "ima-ng", .fmt = "d-ng|n-ng"}, + {.name = "ima-sig", .fmt = "d-ng|n-ng|sig"}, }; static struct ima_template_field supported_fields[] = { - {.field_id = "d",.field_init = ima_eventdigest_init, + {.field_id = "d", .field_init = ima_eventdigest_init, .field_show = ima_show_template_digest}, - {.field_id = "n",.field_init = ima_eventname_init, + {.field_id = "n", .field_init = ima_eventname_init, .field_show = ima_show_template_string}, - {.field_id = "d-ng",.field_init = ima_eventdigest_ng_init, + {.field_id = "d-ng", .field_init = ima_eventdigest_ng_init, .field_show = ima_show_template_digest_ng}, - {.field_id = "n-ng",.field_init = ima_eventname_ng_init, + {.field_id = "n-ng", .field_init = ima_eventname_ng_init, .field_show = ima_show_template_string}, - {.field_id = "sig",.field_init = ima_eventsig_init, + {.field_id = "sig", .field_init = ima_eventsig_init, .field_show = ima_show_template_sig}, }; @@ -58,7 +61,7 @@ static int __init ima_template_setup(char *str) */ if (template_len == 3 && strcmp(str, IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME) == 0 && ima_hash_algo != HASH_ALGO_SHA1 && ima_hash_algo != HASH_ALGO_MD5) { - pr_err("IMA: template does not support hash alg\n"); + pr_err("template does not support hash alg\n"); return 1; } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c index 1683bbf289a4..1506f0248572 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c @@ -27,7 +27,6 @@ static bool ima_template_hash_algo_allowed(u8 algo) enum data_formats { DATA_FMT_DIGEST = 0, DATA_FMT_DIGEST_WITH_ALGO, - DATA_FMT_EVENT_NAME, DATA_FMT_STRING, DATA_FMT_HEX }; @@ -37,18 +36,10 @@ static int ima_write_template_field_data(const void *data, const u32 datalen, struct ima_field_data *field_data) { u8 *buf, *buf_ptr; - u32 buflen; + u32 buflen = datalen; - switch (datafmt) { - case DATA_FMT_EVENT_NAME: - buflen = IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX + 1; - break; - case DATA_FMT_STRING: + if (datafmt == DATA_FMT_STRING) buflen = datalen + 1; - break; - default: - buflen = datalen; - } buf = kzalloc(buflen, GFP_KERNEL); if (!buf) @@ -63,7 +54,7 @@ static int ima_write_template_field_data(const void *data, const u32 datalen, * split into multiple template fields (the space is the delimitator * character for measurements lists in ASCII format). */ - if (datafmt == DATA_FMT_EVENT_NAME || datafmt == DATA_FMT_STRING) { + if (datafmt == DATA_FMT_STRING) { for (buf_ptr = buf; buf_ptr - buf < datalen; buf_ptr++) if (*buf_ptr == ' ') *buf_ptr = '_'; @@ -109,13 +100,16 @@ static void ima_show_template_data_binary(struct seq_file *m, enum data_formats datafmt, struct ima_field_data *field_data) { + u32 len = (show == IMA_SHOW_BINARY_OLD_STRING_FMT) ? + strlen(field_data->data) : field_data->len; + if (show != IMA_SHOW_BINARY_NO_FIELD_LEN) - ima_putc(m, &field_data->len, sizeof(u32)); + ima_putc(m, &len, sizeof(len)); - if (!field_data->len) + if (!len) return; - ima_putc(m, field_data->data, field_data->len); + ima_putc(m, field_data->data, len); } static void ima_show_template_field_data(struct seq_file *m, @@ -129,6 +123,7 @@ static void ima_show_template_field_data(struct seq_file *m, break; case IMA_SHOW_BINARY: case IMA_SHOW_BINARY_NO_FIELD_LEN: + case IMA_SHOW_BINARY_OLD_STRING_FMT: ima_show_template_data_binary(m, show, datafmt, field_data); break; default: @@ -277,8 +272,6 @@ static int ima_eventname_init_common(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, { const char *cur_filename = NULL; u32 cur_filename_len = 0; - enum data_formats fmt = size_limit ? - DATA_FMT_EVENT_NAME : DATA_FMT_STRING; BUG_ON(filename == NULL && file == NULL); @@ -301,7 +294,7 @@ static int ima_eventname_init_common(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, cur_filename_len = IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX; out: return ima_write_template_field_data(cur_filename, cur_filename_len, - fmt, field_data); + DATA_FMT_STRING, field_data); } /* diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity_audit.c b/security/integrity/integrity_audit.c index d7efb30404aa..aab9fa5a8231 100644 --- a/security/integrity/integrity_audit.c +++ b/security/integrity/integrity_audit.c @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License. * * File: integrity_audit.c - * Audit calls for the integrity subsystem + * Audit calls for the integrity subsystem */ #include <linux/fs.h> @@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ static int __init integrity_audit_setup(char *str) { unsigned long audit; - if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &audit)) + if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &audit)) integrity_audit_info = audit ? 1 : 0; return 1; } @@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode, const char *cause, int result, int audit_info) { struct audit_buffer *ab; + char name[TASK_COMM_LEN]; if (!integrity_audit_info && audit_info == 1) /* Skip info messages */ return; @@ -49,7 +50,7 @@ void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode, audit_log_format(ab, " cause="); audit_log_string(ab, cause); audit_log_format(ab, " comm="); - audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, current->comm); + audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, get_task_comm(name, current)); if (fname) { audit_log_format(ab, " name="); audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, fname); diff --git a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c index 9e1e005c7596..5fe443d120af 100644 --- a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c +++ b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c @@ -609,7 +609,7 @@ static struct encrypted_key_payload *encrypted_key_alloc(struct key *key, long dlen; int ret; - ret = strict_strtol(datalen, 10, &dlen); + ret = kstrtol(datalen, 10, &dlen); if (ret < 0 || dlen < MIN_DATA_SIZE || dlen > MAX_DATA_SIZE) return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); diff --git a/security/keys/trusted.c b/security/keys/trusted.c index e13fcf7636f7..6b804aa4529a 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted.c @@ -753,7 +753,7 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay, return -EINVAL; break; case Opt_keyhandle: - res = strict_strtoul(args[0].from, 16, &handle); + res = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 16, &handle); if (res < 0) return -EINVAL; opt->keytype = SEAL_keytype; @@ -782,7 +782,7 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay, return -EINVAL; break; case Opt_pcrlock: - res = strict_strtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lock); + res = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lock); if (res < 0) return -EINVAL; opt->pcrlock = lock; @@ -820,7 +820,7 @@ static int datablob_parse(char *datablob, struct trusted_key_payload *p, c = strsep(&datablob, " \t"); if (!c) return -EINVAL; - ret = strict_strtol(c, 10, &keylen); + ret = kstrtol(c, 10, &keylen); if (ret < 0 || keylen < MIN_KEY_SIZE || keylen > MAX_KEY_SIZE) return -EINVAL; p->key_len = keylen; diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index b332e2cc0954..869c2f1e0da1 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ int selinux_enforcing; static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str) { unsigned long enforcing; - if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enforcing)) + if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &enforcing)) selinux_enforcing = enforcing ? 1 : 0; return 1; } @@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE; static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str) { unsigned long enabled; - if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enabled)) + if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &enabled)) selinux_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0; return 1; } @@ -1418,15 +1418,33 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent isec->sid = sbsec->sid; if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) { - if (opt_dentry) { - isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode); - rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(opt_dentry, - isec->sclass, - &sid); - if (rc) - goto out_unlock; - isec->sid = sid; - } + /* We must have a dentry to determine the label on + * procfs inodes */ + if (opt_dentry) + /* Called from d_instantiate or + * d_splice_alias. */ + dentry = dget(opt_dentry); + else + /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to + * find a dentry. */ + dentry = d_find_alias(inode); + /* + * This can be hit on boot when a file is accessed + * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we + * may find inodes that have no dentry on the + * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as + * these will get fixed up the next time we go through + * inode_doinit() with a dentry, before these inodes + * could be used again by userspace. + */ + if (!dentry) + goto out_unlock; + isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode); + rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(dentry, isec->sclass, &sid); + dput(dentry); + if (rc) + goto out_unlock; + isec->sid = sid; } break; } @@ -3205,24 +3223,20 @@ error: static int selinux_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr) { - int rc = 0; - u32 sid = current_sid(); + int rc; + + /* do DAC check on address space usage */ + rc = cap_mmap_addr(addr); + if (rc) + return rc; - /* - * notice that we are intentionally putting the SELinux check before - * the secondary cap_file_mmap check. This is such a likely attempt - * at bad behaviour/exploit that we always want to get the AVC, even - * if DAC would have also denied the operation. - */ if (addr < CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR) { + u32 sid = current_sid(); rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT, MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL); - if (rc) - return rc; } - /* do DAC check on address space usage */ - return cap_mmap_addr(addr); + return rc; } static int selinux_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot, diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c index d60c0ee66387..c71737f6d1cc 100644 --- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c +++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c @@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ unsigned int selinux_checkreqprot = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE; static int __init checkreqprot_setup(char *str) { unsigned long checkreqprot; - if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &checkreqprot)) + if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &checkreqprot)) selinux_checkreqprot = checkreqprot ? 1 : 0; return 1; } |