diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/evm/Kconfig | 42 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/evm/evm.h | 5 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 29 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 10 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c | 32 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 22 |
7 files changed, 114 insertions, 28 deletions
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig b/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig index d35b4915b00d..d606f3d12d6b 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig +++ b/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig @@ -12,15 +12,41 @@ config EVM If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. -config EVM_HMAC_VERSION - int "EVM HMAC version" +if EVM + +menu "EVM options" + +config EVM_ATTR_FSUUID + bool "FSUUID (version 2)" + default y depends on EVM - default 2 help - This options adds EVM HMAC version support. - 1 - original version - 2 - add per filesystem unique identifier (UUID) (default) + Include filesystem UUID for HMAC calculation. + + Default value is 'selected', which is former version 2. + if 'not selected', it is former version 1 - WARNING: changing the HMAC calculation method or adding + WARNING: changing the HMAC calculation method or adding additional info to the calculation, requires existing EVM - labeled file systems to be relabeled. + labeled file systems to be relabeled. + +config EVM_EXTRA_SMACK_XATTRS + bool "Additional SMACK xattrs" + depends on EVM && SECURITY_SMACK + default n + help + Include additional SMACK xattrs for HMAC calculation. + + In addition to the original security xattrs (eg. security.selinux, + security.SMACK64, security.capability, and security.ima) included + in the HMAC calculation, enabling this option includes newly defined + Smack xattrs: security.SMACK64EXEC, security.SMACK64TRANSMUTE and + security.SMACK64MMAP. + + WARNING: changing the HMAC calculation method or adding + additional info to the calculation, requires existing EVM + labeled file systems to be relabeled. + +endmenu + +endif diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm.h b/security/integrity/evm/evm.h index 37c88ddb3cfe..88bfe77efa1c 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm.h +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm.h @@ -24,7 +24,10 @@ extern int evm_initialized; extern char *evm_hmac; extern char *evm_hash; -extern int evm_hmac_version; + +#define EVM_ATTR_FSUUID 0x0001 + +extern int evm_hmac_attrs; extern struct crypto_shash *hmac_tfm; extern struct crypto_shash *hash_tfm; diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c index 6b540f1822e0..5e9687f02e1b 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c @@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ static void hmac_add_misc(struct shash_desc *desc, struct inode *inode, hmac_misc.gid = from_kgid(&init_user_ns, inode->i_gid); hmac_misc.mode = inode->i_mode; crypto_shash_update(desc, (const u8 *)&hmac_misc, sizeof(hmac_misc)); - if (evm_hmac_version > 1) + if (evm_hmac_attrs & EVM_ATTR_FSUUID) crypto_shash_update(desc, inode->i_sb->s_uuid, sizeof(inode->i_sb->s_uuid)); crypto_shash_final(desc, digest); diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c index 6e0bd933b6a9..3bcb80df4d01 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c @@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ static char *integrity_status_msg[] = { }; char *evm_hmac = "hmac(sha1)"; char *evm_hash = "sha1"; -int evm_hmac_version = CONFIG_EVM_HMAC_VERSION; +int evm_hmac_attrs; char *evm_config_xattrnames[] = { #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX @@ -40,6 +40,11 @@ char *evm_config_xattrnames[] = { #endif #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK XATTR_NAME_SMACK, +#ifdef CONFIG_EVM_EXTRA_SMACK_XATTRS + XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC, + XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE, + XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP, +#endif #endif #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE XATTR_NAME_IMA, @@ -57,6 +62,14 @@ static int __init evm_set_fixmode(char *str) } __setup("evm=", evm_set_fixmode); +static void __init evm_init_config(void) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_EVM_ATTR_FSUUID + evm_hmac_attrs |= EVM_ATTR_FSUUID; +#endif + pr_info("HMAC attrs: 0x%x\n", evm_hmac_attrs); +} + static int evm_find_protected_xattrs(struct dentry *dentry) { struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; @@ -287,12 +300,20 @@ out: * @xattr_value: pointer to the new extended attribute value * @xattr_value_len: pointer to the new extended attribute value length * - * Updating 'security.evm' requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileges and that - * the current value is valid. + * Before allowing the 'security.evm' protected xattr to be updated, + * verify the existing value is valid. As only the kernel should have + * access to the EVM encrypted key needed to calculate the HMAC, prevent + * userspace from writing HMAC value. Writing 'security.evm' requires + * requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileges. */ int evm_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len) { + const struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_data = xattr_value; + + if ((strcmp(xattr_name, XATTR_NAME_EVM) == 0) + && (xattr_data->type == EVM_XATTR_HMAC)) + return -EPERM; return evm_protect_xattr(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, xattr_value_len); } @@ -432,6 +453,8 @@ static int __init init_evm(void) { int error; + evm_init_config(); + error = evm_init_secfs(); if (error < 0) { pr_info("Error registering secfs\n"); diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c index 291bf0f3a46d..d3113d4aaa3c 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c @@ -341,7 +341,7 @@ static int ima_protect_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, return 0; } -static void ima_reset_appraise_flags(struct inode *inode) +static void ima_reset_appraise_flags(struct inode *inode, int digsig) { struct integrity_iint_cache *iint; @@ -353,18 +353,22 @@ static void ima_reset_appraise_flags(struct inode *inode) return; iint->flags &= ~IMA_DONE_MASK; + if (digsig) + iint->flags |= IMA_DIGSIG; return; } int ima_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len) { + const struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xvalue = xattr_value; int result; result = ima_protect_xattr(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, xattr_value_len); if (result == 1) { - ima_reset_appraise_flags(dentry->d_inode); + ima_reset_appraise_flags(dentry->d_inode, + (xvalue->type == EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG) ? 1 : 0); result = 0; } return result; @@ -376,7 +380,7 @@ int ima_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name) result = ima_protect_xattr(dentry, xattr_name, NULL, 0); if (result == 1) { - ima_reset_appraise_flags(dentry->d_inode); + ima_reset_appraise_flags(dentry->d_inode, 0); result = 0; } return result; diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c index 1bde8e627766..ccd0ac8fa9a0 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c @@ -27,6 +27,36 @@ static struct crypto_shash *ima_shash_tfm; +/** + * ima_kernel_read - read file content + * + * This is a function for reading file content instead of kernel_read(). + * It does not perform locking checks to ensure it cannot be blocked. + * It does not perform security checks because it is irrelevant for IMA. + * + */ +static int ima_kernel_read(struct file *file, loff_t offset, + char *addr, unsigned long count) +{ + mm_segment_t old_fs; + char __user *buf = addr; + ssize_t ret; + + if (!(file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)) + return -EBADF; + if (!file->f_op->read && !file->f_op->aio_read) + return -EINVAL; + + old_fs = get_fs(); + set_fs(get_ds()); + if (file->f_op->read) + ret = file->f_op->read(file, buf, count, &offset); + else + ret = do_sync_read(file, buf, count, &offset); + set_fs(old_fs); + return ret; +} + int ima_init_crypto(void) { long rc; @@ -104,7 +134,7 @@ static int ima_calc_file_hash_tfm(struct file *file, while (offset < i_size) { int rbuf_len; - rbuf_len = kernel_read(file, offset, rbuf, PAGE_SIZE); + rbuf_len = ima_kernel_read(file, offset, rbuf, PAGE_SIZE); if (rbuf_len < 0) { rc = rbuf_len; break; diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index dcc98cf542d8..09baa335ebc7 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -81,7 +81,6 @@ static void ima_rdwr_violation_check(struct file *file) { struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); fmode_t mode = file->f_mode; - int must_measure; bool send_tomtou = false, send_writers = false; char *pathbuf = NULL; const char *pathname; @@ -92,18 +91,19 @@ static void ima_rdwr_violation_check(struct file *file) mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex); /* file metadata: permissions, xattr */ if (mode & FMODE_WRITE) { - if (atomic_read(&inode->i_readcount) && IS_IMA(inode)) - send_tomtou = true; - goto out; + if (atomic_read(&inode->i_readcount) && IS_IMA(inode)) { + struct integrity_iint_cache *iint; + iint = integrity_iint_find(inode); + /* IMA_MEASURE is set from reader side */ + if (iint && (iint->flags & IMA_MEASURE)) + send_tomtou = true; + } + } else { + if ((atomic_read(&inode->i_writecount) > 0) && + ima_must_measure(inode, MAY_READ, FILE_CHECK)) + send_writers = true; } - must_measure = ima_must_measure(inode, MAY_READ, FILE_CHECK); - if (!must_measure) - goto out; - - if (atomic_read(&inode->i_writecount) > 0) - send_writers = true; -out: mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex); if (!send_tomtou && !send_writers) |