diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/avc.c | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/hooks.c | 18 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/include/xfrm.h | 1 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/smack/smackfs.c | 8 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/yama/yama_lsm.c | 43 |
5 files changed, 57 insertions, 15 deletions
diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c index 68d82daed257..4d3fab47e643 100644 --- a/security/selinux/avc.c +++ b/security/selinux/avc.c @@ -274,7 +274,7 @@ static struct avc_node *avc_alloc_node(void) { struct avc_node *node; - node = kmem_cache_zalloc(avc_node_cachep, GFP_ATOMIC); + node = kmem_cache_zalloc(avc_node_cachep, GFP_ATOMIC|__GFP_NOMEMALLOC); if (!node) goto out; diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 689fe2d22165..6c77f63c7591 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -2129,7 +2129,7 @@ static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred, int fd; j++; - i = j * __NFDBITS; + i = j * BITS_PER_LONG; fdt = files_fdtable(files); if (i >= fdt->max_fds) break; @@ -2791,11 +2791,16 @@ static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the * context contains a nul and we should audit that */ - str = value; - if (str[size - 1] == '\0') - audit_size = size - 1; - else - audit_size = size; + if (value) { + str = value; + if (str[size - 1] == '\0') + audit_size = size - 1; + else + audit_size = size; + } else { + str = ""; + audit_size = 0; + } ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR); audit_log_format(ab, "op=setxattr invalid_context="); audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, value, audit_size); @@ -3180,6 +3185,7 @@ static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, case F_GETFL: case F_GETOWN: case F_GETSIG: + case F_GETOWNER_UIDS: /* Just check FD__USE permission */ err = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0); break; diff --git a/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h index c220f314709c..65f67cb0aefb 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h @@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ int selinux_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid, int ckall); static inline void selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload(void) { atomic_inc(&flow_cache_genid); + rt_genid_bump(&init_net); } #else static inline int selinux_xfrm_enabled(void) diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c index d31e6d957c21..b1b768e4049a 100644 --- a/security/smack/smackfs.c +++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c @@ -323,11 +323,11 @@ static int smk_parse_long_rule(const char *data, struct smack_rule *rule, int datalen; int rc = -1; - /* - * This is probably inefficient, but safe. - */ + /* This is inefficient */ datalen = strlen(data); - subject = kzalloc(datalen, GFP_KERNEL); + + /* Our first element can be 64 + \0 with no spaces */ + subject = kzalloc(datalen + 1, GFP_KERNEL); if (subject == NULL) return -1; object = kzalloc(datalen, GFP_KERNEL); diff --git a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c index 83554ee8a587..0cc99a3ea42d 100644 --- a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c +++ b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c @@ -279,12 +279,46 @@ static int yama_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, } if (rc) { - char name[sizeof(current->comm)]; printk_ratelimited(KERN_NOTICE "ptrace of pid %d was attempted by: %s (pid %d)\n", - child->pid, - get_task_comm(name, current), - current->pid); + child->pid, current->comm, current->pid); + } + + return rc; +} + +/** + * yama_ptrace_traceme - validate PTRACE_TRACEME calls + * @parent: task that will become the ptracer of the current task + * + * Returns 0 if following the ptrace is allowed, -ve on error. + */ +static int yama_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent) +{ + int rc; + + /* If standard caps disallows it, so does Yama. We should + * only tighten restrictions further. + */ + rc = cap_ptrace_traceme(parent); + if (rc) + return rc; + + /* Only disallow PTRACE_TRACEME on more aggressive settings. */ + switch (ptrace_scope) { + case YAMA_SCOPE_CAPABILITY: + if (!ns_capable(task_user_ns(parent), CAP_SYS_PTRACE)) + rc = -EPERM; + break; + case YAMA_SCOPE_NO_ATTACH: + rc = -EPERM; + break; + } + + if (rc) { + printk_ratelimited(KERN_NOTICE + "ptraceme of pid %d was attempted by: %s (pid %d)\n", + current->pid, parent->comm, parent->pid); } return rc; @@ -294,6 +328,7 @@ static struct security_operations yama_ops = { .name = "yama", .ptrace_access_check = yama_ptrace_access_check, + .ptrace_traceme = yama_ptrace_traceme, .task_prctl = yama_task_prctl, .task_free = yama_task_free, }; |