diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'security/Kconfig.hardening')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/Kconfig.hardening | 36 |
1 files changed, 35 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/security/Kconfig.hardening b/security/Kconfig.hardening index c9d5ca3d8d08..3fe9d7b945c4 100644 --- a/security/Kconfig.hardening +++ b/security/Kconfig.hardening @@ -127,6 +127,7 @@ choice repeating for all types and padding except float and double which use 0xFF repeating (-NaN). Clang on 32-bit uses 0xFF repeating for all types and padding. + GCC uses 0xFE repeating for all types, and zero for padding. config INIT_STACK_ALL_ZERO bool "zero-init everything (strongest and safest)" @@ -279,6 +280,39 @@ config ZERO_CALL_USED_REGS endmenu +menu "Bounds checking" + +config FORTIFY_SOURCE + bool "Harden common str/mem functions against buffer overflows" + depends on ARCH_HAS_FORTIFY_SOURCE + # https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/issues/53645 + depends on !X86_32 || !CC_IS_CLANG || CLANG_VERSION >= 160000 + help + Detect overflows of buffers in common string and memory functions + where the compiler can determine and validate the buffer sizes. + +config HARDENED_USERCOPY + bool "Harden memory copies between kernel and userspace" + imply STRICT_DEVMEM + help + This option checks for obviously wrong memory regions when + copying memory to/from the kernel (via copy_to_user() and + copy_from_user() functions) by rejecting memory ranges that + are larger than the specified heap object, span multiple + separately allocated pages, are not on the process stack, + or are part of the kernel text. This prevents entire classes + of heap overflow exploits and similar kernel memory exposures. + +config HARDENED_USERCOPY_DEFAULT_ON + bool "Harden memory copies by default" + depends on HARDENED_USERCOPY + default HARDENED_USERCOPY + help + This has the effect of setting "hardened_usercopy=on" on the kernel + command line. This can be disabled with "hardened_usercopy=off". + +endmenu + menu "Hardening of kernel data structures" config LIST_HARDENED @@ -310,7 +344,7 @@ config CC_HAS_RANDSTRUCT choice prompt "Randomize layout of sensitive kernel structures" - default RANDSTRUCT_FULL if COMPILE_TEST && (GCC_PLUGINS || CC_HAS_RANDSTRUCT) + default RANDSTRUCT_FULL if COMPILE_TEST && CC_HAS_RANDSTRUCT default RANDSTRUCT_NONE help If you enable this, the layouts of structures that are entirely |