diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'mm/slab_common.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | mm/slab_common.c | 40 |
1 files changed, 14 insertions, 26 deletions
diff --git a/mm/slab_common.c b/mm/slab_common.c index adbace4256ef..7c8298c17145 100644 --- a/mm/slab_common.c +++ b/mm/slab_common.c @@ -197,7 +197,7 @@ struct kmem_cache *find_mergeable(unsigned int size, unsigned int align, size = ALIGN(size, sizeof(void *)); align = calculate_alignment(flags, align, size); size = ALIGN(size, align); - flags = kmem_cache_flags(size, flags, name, NULL); + flags = kmem_cache_flags(size, flags, name); if (flags & SLAB_NEVER_MERGE) return NULL; @@ -309,9 +309,6 @@ kmem_cache_create_usercopy(const char *name, const char *cache_name; int err; - get_online_cpus(); - get_online_mems(); - mutex_lock(&slab_mutex); err = kmem_cache_sanity_check(name, size); @@ -360,9 +357,6 @@ kmem_cache_create_usercopy(const char *name, out_unlock: mutex_unlock(&slab_mutex); - put_online_mems(); - put_online_cpus(); - if (err) { if (flags & SLAB_PANIC) panic("kmem_cache_create: Failed to create slab '%s'. Error %d\n", @@ -486,9 +480,6 @@ void kmem_cache_destroy(struct kmem_cache *s) if (unlikely(!s)) return; - get_online_cpus(); - get_online_mems(); - mutex_lock(&slab_mutex); s->refcount--; @@ -503,9 +494,6 @@ void kmem_cache_destroy(struct kmem_cache *s) } out_unlock: mutex_unlock(&slab_mutex); - - put_online_mems(); - put_online_cpus(); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(kmem_cache_destroy); @@ -522,12 +510,10 @@ int kmem_cache_shrink(struct kmem_cache *cachep) { int ret; - get_online_cpus(); - get_online_mems(); + kasan_cache_shrink(cachep); ret = __kmem_cache_shrink(cachep); - put_online_mems(); - put_online_cpus(); + return ret; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(kmem_cache_shrink); @@ -912,8 +898,8 @@ void *kmalloc_order(size_t size, gfp_t flags, unsigned int order) page = alloc_pages(flags, order); if (likely(page)) { ret = page_address(page); - mod_node_page_state(page_pgdat(page), NR_SLAB_UNRECLAIMABLE_B, - PAGE_SIZE << order); + mod_lruvec_page_state(page, NR_SLAB_UNRECLAIMABLE_B, + PAGE_SIZE << order); } ret = kasan_kmalloc_large(ret, size, flags); /* As ret might get tagged, call kmemleak hook after KASAN. */ @@ -1232,19 +1218,21 @@ size_t ksize(const void *objp) size_t size; /* - * We need to check that the pointed to object is valid, and only then - * unpoison the shadow memory below. We use __kasan_check_read(), to - * generate a more useful report at the time ksize() is called (rather - * than later where behaviour is undefined due to potential - * use-after-free or double-free). + * We need to first check that the pointer to the object is valid, and + * only then unpoison the memory. The report printed from ksize() is + * more useful, then when it's printed later when the behaviour could + * be undefined due to a potential use-after-free or double-free. + * + * We use kasan_check_byte(), which is supported for the hardware + * tag-based KASAN mode, unlike kasan_check_read/write(). * - * If the pointed to memory is invalid we return 0, to avoid users of + * If the pointed to memory is invalid, we return 0 to avoid users of * ksize() writing to and potentially corrupting the memory region. * * We want to perform the check before __ksize(), to avoid potentially * crashing in __ksize() due to accessing invalid metadata. */ - if (unlikely(ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR(objp)) || !__kasan_check_read(objp, 1)) + if (unlikely(ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR(objp)) || !kasan_check_byte(objp)) return 0; size = __ksize(objp); |