diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'include/linux/bpf_verifier.h')
-rw-r--r-- | include/linux/bpf_verifier.h | 66 |
1 files changed, 53 insertions, 13 deletions
diff --git a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h index 9e1e6965f407..53d175cbaa02 100644 --- a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h +++ b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h @@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ */ #define BPF_MAX_VAR_SIZ (1 << 29) /* size of type_str_buf in bpf_verifier. */ -#define TYPE_STR_BUF_LEN 64 +#define TYPE_STR_BUF_LEN 128 /* Liveness marks, used for registers and spilled-regs (in stack slots). * Read marks propagate upwards until they find a write mark; they record that @@ -223,6 +223,11 @@ struct bpf_reference_state { * exiting a callback function. */ int callback_ref; + /* Mark the reference state to release the registers sharing the same id + * on bpf_spin_unlock (for nodes that we will lose ownership to but are + * safe to access inside the critical section). + */ + bool release_on_unlock; }; /* state of the program: @@ -268,9 +273,9 @@ struct bpf_id_pair { u32 cur; }; -/* Maximum number of register states that can exist at once */ -#define BPF_ID_MAP_SIZE (MAX_BPF_REG + MAX_BPF_STACK / BPF_REG_SIZE) #define MAX_CALL_FRAMES 8 +/* Maximum number of register states that can exist at once */ +#define BPF_ID_MAP_SIZE ((MAX_BPF_REG + MAX_BPF_STACK / BPF_REG_SIZE) * MAX_CALL_FRAMES) struct bpf_verifier_state { /* call stack tracking */ struct bpf_func_state *frame[MAX_CALL_FRAMES]; @@ -323,8 +328,23 @@ struct bpf_verifier_state { u32 branches; u32 insn_idx; u32 curframe; - u32 active_spin_lock; + /* For every reg representing a map value or allocated object pointer, + * we consider the tuple of (ptr, id) for them to be unique in verifier + * context and conside them to not alias each other for the purposes of + * tracking lock state. + */ + struct { + /* This can either be reg->map_ptr or reg->btf. If ptr is NULL, + * there's no active lock held, and other fields have no + * meaning. If non-NULL, it indicates that a lock is held and + * id member has the reg->id of the register which can be >= 0. + */ + void *ptr; + /* This will be reg->id */ + u32 id; + } active_lock; bool speculative; + bool active_rcu_lock; /* first and last insn idx of this verifier state */ u32 first_insn_idx; @@ -419,16 +439,20 @@ struct bpf_insn_aux_data { */ struct bpf_loop_inline_state loop_inline_state; }; + u64 obj_new_size; /* remember the size of type passed to bpf_obj_new to rewrite R1 */ + struct btf_struct_meta *kptr_struct_meta; u64 map_key_state; /* constant (32 bit) key tracking for maps */ int ctx_field_size; /* the ctx field size for load insn, maybe 0 */ u32 seen; /* this insn was processed by the verifier at env->pass_cnt */ bool sanitize_stack_spill; /* subject to Spectre v4 sanitation */ bool zext_dst; /* this insn zero extends dst reg */ + bool storage_get_func_atomic; /* bpf_*_storage_get() with atomic memory alloc */ u8 alu_state; /* used in combination with alu_limit */ /* below fields are initialized once */ unsigned int orig_idx; /* original instruction index */ bool prune_point; + bool jmp_point; }; #define MAX_USED_MAPS 64 /* max number of maps accessed by one eBPF program */ @@ -508,11 +532,11 @@ struct bpf_verifier_env { bool explore_alu_limits; bool allow_ptr_leaks; bool allow_uninit_stack; - bool allow_ptr_to_map_access; bool bpf_capable; bool bypass_spec_v1; bool bypass_spec_v4; bool seen_direct_write; + bool rcu_tag_supported; struct bpf_insn_aux_data *insn_aux_data; /* array of per-insn state */ const struct bpf_line_info *prev_linfo; struct bpf_verifier_log log; @@ -589,15 +613,11 @@ int check_ptr_off_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int check_func_arg_reg_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int regno, enum bpf_arg_type arg_type); -int check_kfunc_mem_size_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg, - u32 regno); int check_mem_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u32 regno, u32 mem_size); -bool is_dynptr_reg_valid_init(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, - struct bpf_reg_state *reg); -bool is_dynptr_type_expected(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, - struct bpf_reg_state *reg, - enum bpf_arg_type arg_type); +struct bpf_call_arg_meta; +int process_dynptr_func(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, + enum bpf_arg_type arg_type, struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta); /* this lives here instead of in bpf.h because it needs to dereference tgt_prog */ static inline u64 bpf_trampoline_compute_key(const struct bpf_prog *tgt_prog, @@ -642,10 +662,30 @@ static inline u32 type_flag(u32 type) } /* only use after check_attach_btf_id() */ -static inline enum bpf_prog_type resolve_prog_type(struct bpf_prog *prog) +static inline enum bpf_prog_type resolve_prog_type(const struct bpf_prog *prog) { return prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT ? prog->aux->dst_prog->type : prog->type; } +static inline bool bpf_prog_check_recur(const struct bpf_prog *prog) +{ + switch (resolve_prog_type(prog)) { + case BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING: + return prog->expected_attach_type != BPF_TRACE_ITER; + case BPF_PROG_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS: + case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM: + return false; + default: + return true; + } +} + +#define BPF_REG_TRUSTED_MODIFIERS (MEM_ALLOC | PTR_TRUSTED) + +static inline bool bpf_type_has_unsafe_modifiers(u32 type) +{ + return type_flag(type) & ~BPF_REG_TRUSTED_MODIFIERS; +} + #endif /* _LINUX_BPF_VERIFIER_H */ |