diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'include/asm-x86/stackprotector.h')
| -rw-r--r-- | include/asm-x86/stackprotector.h | 38 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 38 deletions
diff --git a/include/asm-x86/stackprotector.h b/include/asm-x86/stackprotector.h deleted file mode 100644 index 3baf7ad89be1..000000000000 --- a/include/asm-x86/stackprotector.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,38 +0,0 @@ -#ifndef _ASM_STACKPROTECTOR_H -#define _ASM_STACKPROTECTOR_H 1 - -#include <asm/tsc.h> - -/* - * Initialize the stackprotector canary value. - * - * NOTE: this must only be called from functions that never return, - * and it must always be inlined. - */ -static __always_inline void boot_init_stack_canary(void) -{ - u64 canary; - u64 tsc; - - /* - * If we're the non-boot CPU, nothing set the PDA stack - * canary up for us - and if we are the boot CPU we have - * a 0 stack canary. This is a good place for updating - * it, as we wont ever return from this function (so the - * invalid canaries already on the stack wont ever - * trigger). - * - * We both use the random pool and the current TSC as a source - * of randomness. The TSC only matters for very early init, - * there it already has some randomness on most systems. Later - * on during the bootup the random pool has true entropy too. - */ - get_random_bytes(&canary, sizeof(canary)); - tsc = __native_read_tsc(); - canary += tsc + (tsc << 32UL); - - current->stack_canary = canary; - write_pda(stack_canary, canary); -} - -#endif |