diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/nfsd/nfsfh.c')
-rw-r--r-- | fs/nfsd/nfsfh.c | 61 |
1 files changed, 47 insertions, 14 deletions
diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfsfh.c b/fs/nfsd/nfsfh.c index 100ae5641162..cd25d91895a1 100644 --- a/fs/nfsd/nfsfh.c +++ b/fs/nfsd/nfsfh.c @@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ static int nfsd_acceptable(void *expv, struct dentry *dentry) /* make sure parents give x permission to user */ int err; parent = dget_parent(tdentry); - err = permission(parent->d_inode, MAY_EXEC, NULL); + err = inode_permission(parent->d_inode, MAY_EXEC); if (err < 0) { dput(parent); break; @@ -176,9 +176,24 @@ static __be32 nfsd_set_fh_dentry(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_fh *fhp) if (IS_ERR(exp)) return nfserrno(PTR_ERR(exp)); - error = nfsd_setuser_and_check_port(rqstp, exp); - if (error) - goto out; + if (exp->ex_flags & NFSEXP_NOSUBTREECHECK) { + /* Elevate privileges so that the lack of 'r' or 'x' + * permission on some parent directory will + * not stop exportfs_decode_fh from being able + * to reconnect a directory into the dentry cache. + * The same problem can affect "SUBTREECHECK" exports, + * but as nfsd_acceptable depends on correct + * access control settings being in effect, we cannot + * fix that case easily. + */ + current->cap_effective = + cap_raise_nfsd_set(current->cap_effective, + current->cap_permitted); + } else { + error = nfsd_setuser_and_check_port(rqstp, exp); + if (error) + goto out; + } /* * Look up the dentry using the NFS file handle. @@ -215,6 +230,14 @@ static __be32 nfsd_set_fh_dentry(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_fh *fhp) goto out; } + if (exp->ex_flags & NFSEXP_NOSUBTREECHECK) { + error = nfsd_setuser_and_check_port(rqstp, exp); + if (error) { + dput(dentry); + goto out; + } + } + if (S_ISDIR(dentry->d_inode->i_mode) && (dentry->d_flags & DCACHE_DISCONNECTED)) { printk("nfsd: find_fh_dentry returned a DISCONNECTED directory: %s/%s\n", @@ -279,17 +302,27 @@ fh_verify(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_fh *fhp, int type, int access) if (error) goto out; - if (!(access & MAY_LOCK)) { - /* - * pseudoflavor restrictions are not enforced on NLM, - * which clients virtually always use auth_sys for, - * even while using RPCSEC_GSS for NFS. - */ - error = check_nfsd_access(exp, rqstp); - if (error) - goto out; - } + /* + * pseudoflavor restrictions are not enforced on NLM, + * which clients virtually always use auth_sys for, + * even while using RPCSEC_GSS for NFS. + */ + if (access & NFSD_MAY_LOCK) + goto skip_pseudoflavor_check; + /* + * Clients may expect to be able to use auth_sys during mount, + * even if they use gss for everything else; see section 2.3.2 + * of rfc 2623. + */ + if (access & NFSD_MAY_BYPASS_GSS_ON_ROOT + && exp->ex_path.dentry == dentry) + goto skip_pseudoflavor_check; + + error = check_nfsd_access(exp, rqstp); + if (error) + goto out; +skip_pseudoflavor_check: /* Finally, check access permissions. */ error = nfsd_permission(rqstp, exp, dentry, access); |