1 files changed, 23 insertions, 12 deletions

diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
index 186bd2464fd5..6df1f61855d6 100644
--- a/fs/namei.c
+++ b/fs/namei.c
@@ -984,13 +984,15 @@ static bool safe_hardlink_source(struct inode *inode)
  */
 static int may_linkat(struct path *link)
 {
-	struct inode *inode;
+	struct inode *inode = link->dentry->d_inode;
+
+	/* Inode writeback is not safe when the uid or gid are invalid. */
+	if (!uid_valid(inode->i_uid) || !gid_valid(inode->i_gid))
+		return -EOVERFLOW;
 
 	if (!sysctl_protected_hardlinks)
 		return 0;
 
-	inode = link->dentry->d_inode;
-
 	/* Source inode owner (or CAP_FOWNER) can hardlink all they like,
 	 * otherwise, it must be a safe source.
 	 */
@@ -1438,10 +1440,8 @@ static int path_parent_directory(struct path *path)
 static int follow_dotdot(struct nameidata *nd)
 {
 	while(1) {
-		if (nd->path.dentry == nd->root.dentry &&
-		    nd->path.mnt == nd->root.mnt) {
+		if (path_equal(&nd->path, &nd->root))
 			break;
-		}
 		if (nd->path.dentry != nd->path.mnt->mnt_root) {
 			int ret = path_parent_directory(&nd->path);
 			if (ret)
@@ -2749,6 +2749,11 @@ static int may_delete(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *victim, bool isdir)
 	BUG_ON(!inode);
 
 	BUG_ON(victim->d_parent->d_inode != dir);
+
+	/* Inode writeback is not safe when the uid or gid are invalid. */
+	if (!uid_valid(inode->i_uid) || !gid_valid(inode->i_gid))
+		return -EOVERFLOW;
+
 	audit_inode_child(dir, victim, AUDIT_TYPE_CHILD_DELETE);
 
 	error = inode_permission(dir, MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC);
@@ -3367,7 +3372,9 @@ finish_open_created:
 		goto out;
 	*opened |= FILE_OPENED;
 opened:
-	error = ima_file_check(file, op->acc_mode, *opened);
+	error = open_check_o_direct(file);
+	if (!error)
+		error = ima_file_check(file, op->acc_mode, *opened);
 	if (!error && will_truncate)
 		error = handle_truncate(file);
 out:
@@ -3447,6 +3454,9 @@ static int do_tmpfile(struct nameidata *nd, unsigned flags,
 	error = finish_open(file, child, NULL, opened);
 	if (error)
 		goto out2;
+	error = open_check_o_direct(file);
+	if (error)
+		fput(file);
 out2:
 	mnt_drop_write(path.mnt);
 out:
@@ -3672,7 +3682,8 @@ int vfs_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, dev_t dev)
 	if (error)
 		return error;
 
-	if ((S_ISCHR(mode) || S_ISBLK(mode)) && !capable(CAP_MKNOD))
+	if ((S_ISCHR(mode) || S_ISBLK(mode)) &&
+	    !ns_capable(dentry->d_sb->s_user_ns, CAP_MKNOD))
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	if (!dir->i_op->mknod)
@@ -3847,11 +3858,11 @@ int vfs_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
 	if (error)
 		goto out;
 
-	shrink_dcache_parent(dentry);
 	error = dir->i_op->rmdir(dir, dentry);
 	if (error)
 		goto out;
 
+	shrink_dcache_parent(dentry);
 	dentry->d_inode->i_flags |= S_DEAD;
 	dont_mount(dentry);
 	detach_mounts(dentry);
@@ -4434,8 +4445,6 @@ int vfs_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
 		    old_dir->i_nlink >= max_links)
 			goto out;
 	}
-	if (is_dir && !(flags & RENAME_EXCHANGE) && target)
-		shrink_dcache_parent(new_dentry);
 	if (!is_dir) {
 		error = try_break_deleg(source, delegated_inode);
 		if (error)
@@ -4452,8 +4461,10 @@ int vfs_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
 		goto out;
 
 	if (!(flags & RENAME_EXCHANGE) && target) {
-		if (is_dir)
+		if (is_dir) {
+			shrink_dcache_parent(new_dentry);
 			target->i_flags |= S_DEAD;
+		}
 		dont_mount(new_dentry);
 		detach_mounts(new_dentry);
 	}