1 files changed, 52 insertions, 4 deletions

diff --git a/drivers/net/xen-netfront.c b/drivers/net/xen-netfront.c
index 8c0b9546d5a2..2409007f1fd9 100644
--- a/drivers/net/xen-netfront.c
+++ b/drivers/net/xen-netfront.c
@@ -66,6 +66,10 @@ module_param_named(max_queues, xennet_max_queues, uint, 0644);
 MODULE_PARM_DESC(max_queues,
 		 "Maximum number of queues per virtual interface");
 
+static bool __read_mostly xennet_trusted = true;
+module_param_named(trusted, xennet_trusted, bool, 0644);
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(trusted, "Is the backend trusted");
+
 #define XENNET_TIMEOUT  (5 * HZ)
 
 static const struct ethtool_ops xennet_ethtool_ops;
@@ -173,6 +177,9 @@ struct netfront_info {
 	/* Is device behaving sane? */
 	bool broken;
 
+	/* Should skbs be bounced into a zeroed buffer? */
+	bool bounce;
+
 	atomic_t rx_gso_checksum_fixup;
 };
 
@@ -271,7 +278,8 @@ static struct sk_buff *xennet_alloc_one_rx_buffer(struct netfront_queue *queue)
 	if (unlikely(!skb))
 		return NULL;
 
-	page = page_pool_dev_alloc_pages(queue->page_pool);
+	page = page_pool_alloc_pages(queue->page_pool,
+				     GFP_ATOMIC | __GFP_NOWARN | __GFP_ZERO);
 	if (unlikely(!page)) {
 		kfree_skb(skb);
 		return NULL;
@@ -665,6 +673,33 @@ static int xennet_xdp_xmit(struct net_device *dev, int n,
 	return nxmit;
 }
 
+struct sk_buff *bounce_skb(const struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	unsigned int headerlen = skb_headroom(skb);
+	/* Align size to allocate full pages and avoid contiguous data leaks */
+	unsigned int size = ALIGN(skb_end_offset(skb) + skb->data_len,
+				  XEN_PAGE_SIZE);
+	struct sk_buff *n = alloc_skb(size, GFP_ATOMIC | __GFP_ZERO);
+
+	if (!n)
+		return NULL;
+
+	if (!IS_ALIGNED((uintptr_t)n->head, XEN_PAGE_SIZE)) {
+		WARN_ONCE(1, "misaligned skb allocated\n");
+		kfree_skb(n);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	/* Set the data pointer */
+	skb_reserve(n, headerlen);
+	/* Set the tail pointer and length */
+	skb_put(n, skb->len);
+
+	BUG_ON(skb_copy_bits(skb, -headerlen, n->head, headerlen + skb->len));
+
+	skb_copy_header(n, skb);
+	return n;
+}
 
 #define MAX_XEN_SKB_FRAGS (65536 / XEN_PAGE_SIZE + 1)
 
@@ -718,9 +753,13 @@ static netdev_tx_t xennet_start_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev
 
 	/* The first req should be at least ETH_HLEN size or the packet will be
 	 * dropped by netback.
+	 *
+	 * If the backend is not trusted bounce all data to zeroed pages to
+	 * avoid exposing contiguous data on the granted page not belonging to
+	 * the skb.
 	 */
-	if (unlikely(PAGE_SIZE - offset < ETH_HLEN)) {
-		nskb = skb_copy(skb, GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (np->bounce || unlikely(PAGE_SIZE - offset < ETH_HLEN)) {
+		nskb = bounce_skb(skb);
 		if (!nskb)
 			goto drop;
 		dev_consume_skb_any(skb);
@@ -1053,8 +1092,10 @@ static int xennet_get_responses(struct netfront_queue *queue,
 			}
 		}
 		rcu_read_unlock();
-next:
+
 		__skb_queue_tail(list, skb);
+
+next:
 		if (!(rx->flags & XEN_NETRXF_more_data))
 			break;
 
@@ -2214,6 +2255,10 @@ static int talk_to_netback(struct xenbus_device *dev,
 
 	info->netdev->irq = 0;
 
+	/* Check if backend is trusted. */
+	info->bounce = !xennet_trusted ||
+		       !xenbus_read_unsigned(dev->nodename, "trusted", 1);
+
 	/* Check if backend supports multiple queues */
 	max_queues = xenbus_read_unsigned(info->xbdev->otherend,
 					  "multi-queue-max-queues", 1);
@@ -2381,6 +2426,9 @@ static int xennet_connect(struct net_device *dev)
 		return err;
 	if (np->netback_has_xdp_headroom)
 		pr_info("backend supports XDP headroom\n");
+	if (np->bounce)
+		dev_info(&np->xbdev->dev,
+			 "bouncing transmitted data to zeroed pages\n");
 
 	/* talk_to_netback() sets the correct number of queues */
 	num_queues = dev->real_num_tx_queues;