diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_sriov.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_sriov.c | 40 |
1 files changed, 20 insertions, 20 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_sriov.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_sriov.c index aa11d07793d4..52c6bac41bf7 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_sriov.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_sriov.c @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ * queue and asynchronously sending message via * ice_sq_send_cmd() function */ -enum ice_status +int ice_aq_send_msg_to_vf(struct ice_hw *hw, u16 vfid, u32 v_opcode, u32 v_retval, u8 *msg, u16 msglen, struct ice_sq_cd *cd) { @@ -228,7 +228,7 @@ ice_mbx_traverse(struct ice_hw *hw, * sent per VF and marks the VF as malicious if it exceeds * the permissible number of messages to send. */ -static enum ice_status +static int ice_mbx_detect_malvf(struct ice_hw *hw, u16 vf_id, enum ice_mbx_snapshot_state *new_state, bool *is_malvf) @@ -236,7 +236,7 @@ ice_mbx_detect_malvf(struct ice_hw *hw, u16 vf_id, struct ice_mbx_snapshot *snap = &hw->mbx_snapshot; if (vf_id >= snap->mbx_vf.vfcntr_len) - return ICE_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE; + return -EIO; /* increment the message count in the VF array */ snap->mbx_vf.vf_cntr[vf_id]++; @@ -297,7 +297,7 @@ static void ice_mbx_reset_snapshot(struct ice_mbx_snapshot *snap) * Detect: If pending message count exceeds watermark traverse * the static snapshot and look for a malicious VF. */ -enum ice_status +int ice_mbx_vf_state_handler(struct ice_hw *hw, struct ice_mbx_data *mbx_data, u16 vf_id, bool *is_malvf) @@ -306,10 +306,10 @@ ice_mbx_vf_state_handler(struct ice_hw *hw, struct ice_mbx_snap_buffer_data *snap_buf; struct ice_ctl_q_info *cq = &hw->mailboxq; enum ice_mbx_snapshot_state new_state; - enum ice_status status = 0; + int status = 0; if (!is_malvf || !mbx_data) - return ICE_ERR_BAD_PTR; + return -EINVAL; /* When entering the mailbox state machine assume that the VF * is not malicious until detected. @@ -320,7 +320,7 @@ ice_mbx_vf_state_handler(struct ice_hw *hw, * interrupt is not less than the defined AVF message threshold. */ if (mbx_data->max_num_msgs_mbx <= ICE_ASYNC_VF_MSG_THRESHOLD) - return ICE_ERR_INVAL_SIZE; + return -EINVAL; /* The watermark value should not be lesser than the threshold limit * set for the number of asynchronous messages a VF can send to mailbox @@ -329,7 +329,7 @@ ice_mbx_vf_state_handler(struct ice_hw *hw, */ if (mbx_data->async_watermark_val < ICE_ASYNC_VF_MSG_THRESHOLD || mbx_data->async_watermark_val > mbx_data->max_num_msgs_mbx) - return ICE_ERR_PARAM; + return -EINVAL; new_state = ICE_MAL_VF_DETECT_STATE_INVALID; snap_buf = &snap->mbx_buf; @@ -383,7 +383,7 @@ ice_mbx_vf_state_handler(struct ice_hw *hw, default: new_state = ICE_MAL_VF_DETECT_STATE_INVALID; - status = ICE_ERR_CFG; + status = -EIO; } snap_buf->state = new_state; @@ -405,20 +405,20 @@ ice_mbx_vf_state_handler(struct ice_hw *hw, * the input vf_id against the bitmap to verify if the VF has been * detected in any previous mailbox iterations. */ -enum ice_status +int ice_mbx_report_malvf(struct ice_hw *hw, unsigned long *all_malvfs, u16 bitmap_len, u16 vf_id, bool *report_malvf) { if (!all_malvfs || !report_malvf) - return ICE_ERR_PARAM; + return -EINVAL; *report_malvf = false; if (bitmap_len < hw->mbx_snapshot.mbx_vf.vfcntr_len) - return ICE_ERR_INVAL_SIZE; + return -EINVAL; if (vf_id >= bitmap_len) - return ICE_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE; + return -EIO; /* If the vf_id is found in the bitmap set bit and boolean to true */ if (!test_and_set_bit(vf_id, all_malvfs)) @@ -441,19 +441,19 @@ ice_mbx_report_malvf(struct ice_hw *hw, unsigned long *all_malvfs, * that the new VF loaded is not considered malicious before going * through the overflow detection algorithm. */ -enum ice_status +int ice_mbx_clear_malvf(struct ice_mbx_snapshot *snap, unsigned long *all_malvfs, u16 bitmap_len, u16 vf_id) { if (!snap || !all_malvfs) - return ICE_ERR_PARAM; + return -EINVAL; if (bitmap_len < snap->mbx_vf.vfcntr_len) - return ICE_ERR_INVAL_SIZE; + return -EINVAL; /* Ensure VF ID value is not larger than bitmap or VF counter length */ if (vf_id >= bitmap_len || vf_id >= snap->mbx_vf.vfcntr_len) - return ICE_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE; + return -EIO; /* Clear VF ID bit in the bitmap tracking malicious VFs attached to PF */ clear_bit(vf_id, all_malvfs); @@ -482,7 +482,7 @@ ice_mbx_clear_malvf(struct ice_mbx_snapshot *snap, unsigned long *all_malvfs, * called to ensure that the vf_count can be compared against the number * of VFs supported as defined in the functional capabilities of the device. */ -enum ice_status ice_mbx_init_snapshot(struct ice_hw *hw, u16 vf_count) +int ice_mbx_init_snapshot(struct ice_hw *hw, u16 vf_count) { struct ice_mbx_snapshot *snap = &hw->mbx_snapshot; @@ -491,13 +491,13 @@ enum ice_status ice_mbx_init_snapshot(struct ice_hw *hw, u16 vf_count) * the functional capabilities of the PF. */ if (!vf_count || vf_count > hw->func_caps.num_allocd_vfs) - return ICE_ERR_INVAL_SIZE; + return -EINVAL; snap->mbx_vf.vf_cntr = devm_kcalloc(ice_hw_to_dev(hw), vf_count, sizeof(*snap->mbx_vf.vf_cntr), GFP_KERNEL); if (!snap->mbx_vf.vf_cntr) - return ICE_ERR_NO_MEMORY; + return -ENOMEM; /* Setting the VF counter length to the number of allocated * VFs for given PF's functional capabilities. |