diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/md/dm-crypt.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/md/dm-crypt.c | 216 |
1 files changed, 202 insertions, 14 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c b/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c index 0fce0bc1a957..81b0fa660452 100644 --- a/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c +++ b/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c @@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ * Copyright (C) 2003 Christophe Saout <christophe@saout.de> * Copyright (C) 2004 Clemens Fruhwirth <clemens@endorphin.org> * Copyright (C) 2006-2009 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (C) 2013 Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com> * * This file is released under the GPL. */ @@ -98,6 +99,13 @@ struct iv_lmk_private { u8 *seed; }; +#define TCW_WHITENING_SIZE 16 +struct iv_tcw_private { + struct crypto_shash *crc32_tfm; + u8 *iv_seed; + u8 *whitening; +}; + /* * Crypt: maps a linear range of a block device * and encrypts / decrypts at the same time. @@ -139,6 +147,7 @@ struct crypt_config { struct iv_essiv_private essiv; struct iv_benbi_private benbi; struct iv_lmk_private lmk; + struct iv_tcw_private tcw; } iv_gen_private; sector_t iv_offset; unsigned int iv_size; @@ -171,7 +180,8 @@ struct crypt_config { unsigned long flags; unsigned int key_size; - unsigned int key_parts; + unsigned int key_parts; /* independent parts in key buffer */ + unsigned int key_extra_size; /* additional keys length */ u8 key[0]; }; @@ -230,6 +240,16 @@ static struct crypto_ablkcipher *any_tfm(struct crypt_config *cc) * version 3: the same as version 2 with additional IV seed * (it uses 65 keys, last key is used as IV seed) * + * tcw: Compatible implementation of the block chaining mode used + * by the TrueCrypt device encryption system (prior to version 4.1). + * For more info see: http://www.truecrypt.org + * It operates on full 512 byte sectors and uses CBC + * with an IV derived from initial key and the sector number. + * In addition, whitening value is applied on every sector, whitening + * is calculated from initial key, sector number and mixed using CRC32. + * Note that this encryption scheme is vulnerable to watermarking attacks + * and should be used for old compatible containers access only. + * * plumb: unimplemented, see: * http://article.gmane.org/gmane.linux.kernel.device-mapper.dm-crypt/454 */ @@ -530,7 +550,7 @@ static int crypt_iv_lmk_one(struct crypt_config *cc, u8 *iv, char ctx[crypto_shash_descsize(lmk->hash_tfm)]; } sdesc; struct md5_state md5state; - u32 buf[4]; + __le32 buf[4]; int i, r; sdesc.desc.tfm = lmk->hash_tfm; @@ -608,6 +628,153 @@ static int crypt_iv_lmk_post(struct crypt_config *cc, u8 *iv, return r; } +static void crypt_iv_tcw_dtr(struct crypt_config *cc) +{ + struct iv_tcw_private *tcw = &cc->iv_gen_private.tcw; + + kzfree(tcw->iv_seed); + tcw->iv_seed = NULL; + kzfree(tcw->whitening); + tcw->whitening = NULL; + + if (tcw->crc32_tfm && !IS_ERR(tcw->crc32_tfm)) + crypto_free_shash(tcw->crc32_tfm); + tcw->crc32_tfm = NULL; +} + +static int crypt_iv_tcw_ctr(struct crypt_config *cc, struct dm_target *ti, + const char *opts) +{ + struct iv_tcw_private *tcw = &cc->iv_gen_private.tcw; + + if (cc->key_size <= (cc->iv_size + TCW_WHITENING_SIZE)) { + ti->error = "Wrong key size for TCW"; + return -EINVAL; + } + + tcw->crc32_tfm = crypto_alloc_shash("crc32", 0, 0); + if (IS_ERR(tcw->crc32_tfm)) { + ti->error = "Error initializing CRC32 in TCW"; + return PTR_ERR(tcw->crc32_tfm); + } + + tcw->iv_seed = kzalloc(cc->iv_size, GFP_KERNEL); + tcw->whitening = kzalloc(TCW_WHITENING_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!tcw->iv_seed || !tcw->whitening) { + crypt_iv_tcw_dtr(cc); + ti->error = "Error allocating seed storage in TCW"; + return -ENOMEM; + } + + return 0; +} + +static int crypt_iv_tcw_init(struct crypt_config *cc) +{ + struct iv_tcw_private *tcw = &cc->iv_gen_private.tcw; + int key_offset = cc->key_size - cc->iv_size - TCW_WHITENING_SIZE; + + memcpy(tcw->iv_seed, &cc->key[key_offset], cc->iv_size); + memcpy(tcw->whitening, &cc->key[key_offset + cc->iv_size], + TCW_WHITENING_SIZE); + + return 0; +} + +static int crypt_iv_tcw_wipe(struct crypt_config *cc) +{ + struct iv_tcw_private *tcw = &cc->iv_gen_private.tcw; + + memset(tcw->iv_seed, 0, cc->iv_size); + memset(tcw->whitening, 0, TCW_WHITENING_SIZE); + + return 0; +} + +static int crypt_iv_tcw_whitening(struct crypt_config *cc, + struct dm_crypt_request *dmreq, + u8 *data) +{ + struct iv_tcw_private *tcw = &cc->iv_gen_private.tcw; + u64 sector = cpu_to_le64((u64)dmreq->iv_sector); + u8 buf[TCW_WHITENING_SIZE]; + struct { + struct shash_desc desc; + char ctx[crypto_shash_descsize(tcw->crc32_tfm)]; + } sdesc; + int i, r; + + /* xor whitening with sector number */ + memcpy(buf, tcw->whitening, TCW_WHITENING_SIZE); + crypto_xor(buf, (u8 *)§or, 8); + crypto_xor(&buf[8], (u8 *)§or, 8); + + /* calculate crc32 for every 32bit part and xor it */ + sdesc.desc.tfm = tcw->crc32_tfm; + sdesc.desc.flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP; + for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) { + r = crypto_shash_init(&sdesc.desc); + if (r) + goto out; + r = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc.desc, &buf[i * 4], 4); + if (r) + goto out; + r = crypto_shash_final(&sdesc.desc, &buf[i * 4]); + if (r) + goto out; + } + crypto_xor(&buf[0], &buf[12], 4); + crypto_xor(&buf[4], &buf[8], 4); + + /* apply whitening (8 bytes) to whole sector */ + for (i = 0; i < ((1 << SECTOR_SHIFT) / 8); i++) + crypto_xor(data + i * 8, buf, 8); +out: + memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); + return r; +} + +static int crypt_iv_tcw_gen(struct crypt_config *cc, u8 *iv, + struct dm_crypt_request *dmreq) +{ + struct iv_tcw_private *tcw = &cc->iv_gen_private.tcw; + u64 sector = cpu_to_le64((u64)dmreq->iv_sector); + u8 *src; + int r = 0; + + /* Remove whitening from ciphertext */ + if (bio_data_dir(dmreq->ctx->bio_in) != WRITE) { + src = kmap_atomic(sg_page(&dmreq->sg_in)); + r = crypt_iv_tcw_whitening(cc, dmreq, src + dmreq->sg_in.offset); + kunmap_atomic(src); + } + + /* Calculate IV */ + memcpy(iv, tcw->iv_seed, cc->iv_size); + crypto_xor(iv, (u8 *)§or, 8); + if (cc->iv_size > 8) + crypto_xor(&iv[8], (u8 *)§or, cc->iv_size - 8); + + return r; +} + +static int crypt_iv_tcw_post(struct crypt_config *cc, u8 *iv, + struct dm_crypt_request *dmreq) +{ + u8 *dst; + int r; + + if (bio_data_dir(dmreq->ctx->bio_in) != WRITE) + return 0; + + /* Apply whitening on ciphertext */ + dst = kmap_atomic(sg_page(&dmreq->sg_out)); + r = crypt_iv_tcw_whitening(cc, dmreq, dst + dmreq->sg_out.offset); + kunmap_atomic(dst); + + return r; +} + static struct crypt_iv_operations crypt_iv_plain_ops = { .generator = crypt_iv_plain_gen }; @@ -643,6 +810,15 @@ static struct crypt_iv_operations crypt_iv_lmk_ops = { .post = crypt_iv_lmk_post }; +static struct crypt_iv_operations crypt_iv_tcw_ops = { + .ctr = crypt_iv_tcw_ctr, + .dtr = crypt_iv_tcw_dtr, + .init = crypt_iv_tcw_init, + .wipe = crypt_iv_tcw_wipe, + .generator = crypt_iv_tcw_gen, + .post = crypt_iv_tcw_post +}; + static void crypt_convert_init(struct crypt_config *cc, struct convert_context *ctx, struct bio *bio_out, struct bio *bio_in, @@ -774,7 +950,7 @@ static int crypt_convert(struct crypt_config *cc, /* async */ case -EBUSY: wait_for_completion(&ctx->restart); - INIT_COMPLETION(ctx->restart); + reinit_completion(&ctx->restart); /* fall through*/ case -EINPROGRESS: this_cc->req = NULL; @@ -1274,9 +1450,12 @@ static int crypt_alloc_tfms(struct crypt_config *cc, char *ciphermode) static int crypt_setkey_allcpus(struct crypt_config *cc) { - unsigned subkey_size = cc->key_size >> ilog2(cc->tfms_count); + unsigned subkey_size; int err = 0, i, r; + /* Ignore extra keys (which are used for IV etc) */ + subkey_size = (cc->key_size - cc->key_extra_size) >> ilog2(cc->tfms_count); + for (i = 0; i < cc->tfms_count; i++) { r = crypto_ablkcipher_setkey(cc->tfms[i], cc->key + (i * subkey_size), @@ -1409,6 +1588,7 @@ static int crypt_ctr_cipher(struct dm_target *ti, return -EINVAL; } cc->key_parts = cc->tfms_count; + cc->key_extra_size = 0; cc->cipher = kstrdup(cipher, GFP_KERNEL); if (!cc->cipher) @@ -1460,13 +1640,6 @@ static int crypt_ctr_cipher(struct dm_target *ti, goto bad; } - /* Initialize and set key */ - ret = crypt_set_key(cc, key); - if (ret < 0) { - ti->error = "Error decoding and setting key"; - goto bad; - } - /* Initialize IV */ cc->iv_size = crypto_ablkcipher_ivsize(any_tfm(cc)); if (cc->iv_size) @@ -1493,18 +1666,33 @@ static int crypt_ctr_cipher(struct dm_target *ti, cc->iv_gen_ops = &crypt_iv_null_ops; else if (strcmp(ivmode, "lmk") == 0) { cc->iv_gen_ops = &crypt_iv_lmk_ops; - /* Version 2 and 3 is recognised according + /* + * Version 2 and 3 is recognised according * to length of provided multi-key string. * If present (version 3), last key is used as IV seed. + * All keys (including IV seed) are always the same size. */ - if (cc->key_size % cc->key_parts) + if (cc->key_size % cc->key_parts) { cc->key_parts++; + cc->key_extra_size = cc->key_size / cc->key_parts; + } + } else if (strcmp(ivmode, "tcw") == 0) { + cc->iv_gen_ops = &crypt_iv_tcw_ops; + cc->key_parts += 2; /* IV + whitening */ + cc->key_extra_size = cc->iv_size + TCW_WHITENING_SIZE; } else { ret = -EINVAL; ti->error = "Invalid IV mode"; goto bad; } + /* Initialize and set key */ + ret = crypt_set_key(cc, key); + if (ret < 0) { + ti->error = "Error decoding and setting key"; + goto bad; + } + /* Allocate IV */ if (cc->iv_gen_ops && cc->iv_gen_ops->ctr) { ret = cc->iv_gen_ops->ctr(cc, ti, ivopts); @@ -1817,7 +2005,7 @@ static int crypt_iterate_devices(struct dm_target *ti, static struct target_type crypt_target = { .name = "crypt", - .version = {1, 12, 1}, + .version = {1, 13, 0}, .module = THIS_MODULE, .ctr = crypt_ctr, .dtr = crypt_dtr, |