diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/char')
-rw-r--r-- | drivers/char/ds1620.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | drivers/char/dtlk.c | 3 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | drivers/char/hpet.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | drivers/char/hw_random/omap-rng.c | 1 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | drivers/char/hw_random/stm32-rng.c | 9 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_devintf.c | 3 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_dmi.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_msghandler.c | 4 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_plat_data.c | 27 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_plat_data.h | 3 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_si_hardcode.c | 1 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_si_hotmod.c | 1 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_si_intf.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_si_platform.c | 6 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_ssif.c | 11 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_watchdog.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | drivers/char/pcmcia/cm4000_cs.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | drivers/char/pcmcia/scr24x_cs.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | drivers/char/random.c | 199 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | drivers/char/tb0219.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig | 1 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | drivers/char/virtio_console.c | 3 |
22 files changed, 190 insertions, 98 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/char/ds1620.c b/drivers/char/ds1620.c index a5ecf6dae02e..373f549525fe 100644 --- a/drivers/char/ds1620.c +++ b/drivers/char/ds1620.c @@ -212,7 +212,7 @@ static void ds1620_read_state(struct therm *therm) static int ds1620_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) { - return nonseekable_open(inode, file); + return stream_open(inode, file); } static ssize_t diff --git a/drivers/char/dtlk.c b/drivers/char/dtlk.c index f882460b5a44..4fed8fafa0f0 100644 --- a/drivers/char/dtlk.c +++ b/drivers/char/dtlk.c @@ -298,12 +298,11 @@ static int dtlk_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) { TRACE_TEXT("(dtlk_open"); - nonseekable_open(inode, file); switch (iminor(inode)) { case DTLK_MINOR: if (dtlk_busy) return -EBUSY; - return nonseekable_open(inode, file); + return stream_open(inode, file); default: return -ENXIO; diff --git a/drivers/char/hpet.c b/drivers/char/hpet.c index d0ad85900b79..3a1e6b3ccd10 100644 --- a/drivers/char/hpet.c +++ b/drivers/char/hpet.c @@ -973,6 +973,8 @@ static acpi_status hpet_resources(struct acpi_resource *res, void *data) if (ACPI_SUCCESS(status)) { hdp->hd_phys_address = addr.address.minimum; hdp->hd_address = ioremap(addr.address.minimum, addr.address.address_length); + if (!hdp->hd_address) + return AE_ERROR; if (hpet_is_known(hdp)) { iounmap(hdp->hd_address); diff --git a/drivers/char/hw_random/omap-rng.c b/drivers/char/hw_random/omap-rng.c index b65ff6962899..e9b6ac61fb7f 100644 --- a/drivers/char/hw_random/omap-rng.c +++ b/drivers/char/hw_random/omap-rng.c @@ -443,6 +443,7 @@ static int omap_rng_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) priv->rng.read = omap_rng_do_read; priv->rng.init = omap_rng_init; priv->rng.cleanup = omap_rng_cleanup; + priv->rng.quality = 900; priv->rng.priv = (unsigned long)priv; platform_set_drvdata(pdev, priv); diff --git a/drivers/char/hw_random/stm32-rng.c b/drivers/char/hw_random/stm32-rng.c index 042860d97b15..0ef5b6a3f560 100644 --- a/drivers/char/hw_random/stm32-rng.c +++ b/drivers/char/hw_random/stm32-rng.c @@ -161,6 +161,7 @@ static int stm32_rng_probe(struct platform_device *ofdev) #endif priv->rng.read = stm32_rng_read, priv->rng.priv = (unsigned long) dev; + priv->rng.quality = 900; pm_runtime_set_autosuspend_delay(dev, 100); pm_runtime_use_autosuspend(dev); @@ -169,6 +170,13 @@ static int stm32_rng_probe(struct platform_device *ofdev) return devm_hwrng_register(dev, &priv->rng); } +static int stm32_rng_remove(struct platform_device *ofdev) +{ + pm_runtime_disable(&ofdev->dev); + + return 0; +} + #ifdef CONFIG_PM static int stm32_rng_runtime_suspend(struct device *dev) { @@ -210,6 +218,7 @@ static struct platform_driver stm32_rng_driver = { .of_match_table = stm32_rng_match, }, .probe = stm32_rng_probe, + .remove = stm32_rng_remove, }; module_platform_driver(stm32_rng_driver); diff --git a/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_devintf.c b/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_devintf.c index 99c9f581a1f3..f7b1c004a12b 100644 --- a/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_devintf.c +++ b/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_devintf.c @@ -29,7 +29,6 @@ struct ipmi_file_private struct ipmi_user *user; spinlock_t recv_msg_lock; struct list_head recv_msgs; - struct file *file; struct fasync_struct *fasync_queue; wait_queue_head_t wait; struct mutex recv_mutex; @@ -95,8 +94,6 @@ static int ipmi_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) if (!priv) return -ENOMEM; - priv->file = file; - rv = ipmi_create_user(if_num, &ipmi_hndlrs, priv, diff --git a/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_dmi.c b/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_dmi.c index f2411468f33f..f38e651dd1b5 100644 --- a/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_dmi.c +++ b/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_dmi.c @@ -47,9 +47,11 @@ static void __init dmi_add_platform_ipmi(unsigned long base_addr, memset(&p, 0, sizeof(p)); name = "dmi-ipmi-si"; + p.iftype = IPMI_PLAT_IF_SI; switch (type) { case IPMI_DMI_TYPE_SSIF: name = "dmi-ipmi-ssif"; + p.iftype = IPMI_PLAT_IF_SSIF; p.type = SI_TYPE_INVALID; break; case IPMI_DMI_TYPE_BT: diff --git a/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_msghandler.c b/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_msghandler.c index 00bf4b17edbf..1dc10740fc0f 100644 --- a/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_msghandler.c +++ b/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_msghandler.c @@ -635,7 +635,7 @@ static DEFINE_MUTEX(ipmidriver_mutex); static LIST_HEAD(ipmi_interfaces); static DEFINE_MUTEX(ipmi_interfaces_mutex); -struct srcu_struct ipmi_interfaces_srcu; +static struct srcu_struct ipmi_interfaces_srcu; /* * List of watchers that want to know when smi's are added and deleted. @@ -5179,7 +5179,7 @@ static void __exit cleanup_ipmi(void) * avoids problems with race conditions removing the timer * here. */ - atomic_inc(&stop_operation); + atomic_set(&stop_operation, 1); del_timer_sync(&ipmi_timer); initialized = false; diff --git a/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_plat_data.c b/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_plat_data.c index 8f0ca2a848eb..28471ff2a3a3 100644 --- a/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_plat_data.c +++ b/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_plat_data.c @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ struct platform_device *ipmi_platform_add(const char *name, unsigned int inst, struct ipmi_plat_data *p) { struct platform_device *pdev; - unsigned int num_r = 1, size, pidx = 0; + unsigned int num_r = 1, size = 0, pidx = 0; struct resource r[4]; struct property_entry pr[6]; u32 flags; @@ -21,19 +21,22 @@ struct platform_device *ipmi_platform_add(const char *name, unsigned int inst, memset(pr, 0, sizeof(pr)); memset(r, 0, sizeof(r)); - if (p->type == SI_BT) - size = 3; - else if (p->type == SI_TYPE_INVALID) - size = 0; - else - size = 2; + if (p->iftype == IPMI_PLAT_IF_SI) { + if (p->type == SI_BT) + size = 3; + else if (p->type != SI_TYPE_INVALID) + size = 2; + + if (p->regsize == 0) + p->regsize = DEFAULT_REGSIZE; + if (p->regspacing == 0) + p->regspacing = p->regsize; - if (p->regsize == 0) - p->regsize = DEFAULT_REGSIZE; - if (p->regspacing == 0) - p->regspacing = p->regsize; + pr[pidx++] = PROPERTY_ENTRY_U8("ipmi-type", p->type); + } else if (p->iftype == IPMI_PLAT_IF_SSIF) { + pr[pidx++] = PROPERTY_ENTRY_U16("i2c-addr", p->addr); + } - pr[pidx++] = PROPERTY_ENTRY_U8("ipmi-type", p->type); if (p->slave_addr) pr[pidx++] = PROPERTY_ENTRY_U8("slave-addr", p->slave_addr); pr[pidx++] = PROPERTY_ENTRY_U8("addr-source", p->addr_source); diff --git a/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_plat_data.h b/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_plat_data.h index 567cfcec8ada..9ba744ea9571 100644 --- a/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_plat_data.h +++ b/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_plat_data.h @@ -6,7 +6,10 @@ #include <linux/ipmi.h> +enum ipmi_plat_interface_type { IPMI_PLAT_IF_SI, IPMI_PLAT_IF_SSIF }; + struct ipmi_plat_data { + enum ipmi_plat_interface_type iftype; unsigned int type; /* si_type for si, SI_INVALID for others */ unsigned int space; /* addr_space for si, intf# for ssif. */ unsigned long addr; diff --git a/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_si_hardcode.c b/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_si_hardcode.c index 682221eebd66..f6ece7569504 100644 --- a/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_si_hardcode.c +++ b/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_si_hardcode.c @@ -83,6 +83,7 @@ static void __init ipmi_hardcode_init_one(const char *si_type_str, memset(&p, 0, sizeof(p)); + p.iftype = IPMI_PLAT_IF_SI; if (!si_type_str || !*si_type_str || strcmp(si_type_str, "kcs") == 0) { p.type = SI_KCS; } else if (strcmp(si_type_str, "smic") == 0) { diff --git a/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_si_hotmod.c b/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_si_hotmod.c index 03140f6cdf6f..42a925f8cf69 100644 --- a/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_si_hotmod.c +++ b/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_si_hotmod.c @@ -108,6 +108,7 @@ static int parse_hotmod_str(const char *curr, enum hotmod_op *op, int rv; unsigned int ival; + h->iftype = IPMI_PLAT_IF_SI; rv = parse_str(hotmod_ops, &ival, "operation", &curr); if (rv) return rv; diff --git a/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_si_intf.c b/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_si_intf.c index b1732882b97e..f124a2d2bb9f 100644 --- a/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_si_intf.c +++ b/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_si_intf.c @@ -1931,7 +1931,6 @@ static int try_smi_init(struct smi_info *new_smi) { int rv = 0; int i; - char *init_name = NULL; pr_info("Trying %s-specified %s state machine at %s address 0x%lx, slave address 0x%x, irq %d\n", ipmi_addr_src_to_str(new_smi->io.addr_source), @@ -2073,7 +2072,6 @@ static int try_smi_init(struct smi_info *new_smi) new_smi->io.io_cleanup = NULL; } - kfree(init_name); return rv; } diff --git a/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_si_platform.c b/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_si_platform.c index 54c7ded2a1ff..f2a91c4d8cab 100644 --- a/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_si_platform.c +++ b/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_si_platform.c @@ -188,12 +188,10 @@ static int platform_ipmi_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) return -EINVAL; rv = device_property_read_u8(&pdev->dev, "slave-addr", &slave_addr); - if (rv) { - dev_warn(&pdev->dev, "device has no slave-addr property\n"); + if (rv) io.slave_addr = 0x20; - } else { + else io.slave_addr = slave_addr; - } io.irq = platform_get_irq(pdev, 0); if (io.irq > 0) diff --git a/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_ssif.c b/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_ssif.c index 8b5aec5430f1..cf8156d6bc07 100644 --- a/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_ssif.c +++ b/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_ssif.c @@ -727,12 +727,16 @@ static void msg_done_handler(struct ssif_info *ssif_info, int result, /* End of read */ len = ssif_info->multi_len; data = ssif_info->data; - } else if (blocknum != ssif_info->multi_pos) { + } else if (blocknum + 1 != ssif_info->multi_pos) { /* * Out of sequence block, just abort. Block * numbers start at zero for the second block, * but multi_pos starts at one, so the +1. */ + if (ssif_info->ssif_debug & SSIF_DEBUG_MSG) + dev_dbg(&ssif_info->client->dev, + "Received message out of sequence, expected %u, got %u\n", + ssif_info->multi_pos - 1, blocknum); result = -EIO; } else { ssif_inc_stat(ssif_info, received_message_parts); @@ -1991,7 +1995,7 @@ static int dmi_ipmi_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) rv = device_property_read_u8(&pdev->dev, "slave-addr", &slave_addr); if (rv) - dev_warn(&pdev->dev, "device has no slave-addr property"); + slave_addr = 0x20; return new_ssif_client(i2c_addr, NULL, 0, slave_addr, SI_SMBIOS, &pdev->dev); @@ -2107,7 +2111,8 @@ static void cleanup_ipmi_ssif(void) kfree(ssif_i2c_driver.address_list); - platform_driver_unregister(&ipmi_driver); + if (ssif_trydmi) + platform_driver_unregister(&ipmi_driver); free_ssif_clients(); } diff --git a/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_watchdog.c b/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_watchdog.c index 2924a4bc4a32..74c6d1f34132 100644 --- a/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_watchdog.c +++ b/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_watchdog.c @@ -837,7 +837,7 @@ static int ipmi_open(struct inode *ino, struct file *filep) * first heartbeat. */ ipmi_start_timer_on_heartbeat = 1; - return nonseekable_open(ino, filep); + return stream_open(ino, filep); default: return (-ENODEV); diff --git a/drivers/char/pcmcia/cm4000_cs.c b/drivers/char/pcmcia/cm4000_cs.c index 7a4eb86aedac..15bf585af5d3 100644 --- a/drivers/char/pcmcia/cm4000_cs.c +++ b/drivers/char/pcmcia/cm4000_cs.c @@ -1682,7 +1682,7 @@ static int cmm_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp) link->open = 1; /* only one open per device */ DEBUGP(2, dev, "<- cmm_open\n"); - ret = nonseekable_open(inode, filp); + ret = stream_open(inode, filp); out: mutex_unlock(&cmm_mutex); return ret; diff --git a/drivers/char/pcmcia/scr24x_cs.c b/drivers/char/pcmcia/scr24x_cs.c index f6b43d9350f0..04b39c3596cc 100644 --- a/drivers/char/pcmcia/scr24x_cs.c +++ b/drivers/char/pcmcia/scr24x_cs.c @@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ static int scr24x_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp) kref_get(&dev->refcnt); filp->private_data = dev; - return nonseekable_open(inode, filp); + return stream_open(inode, filp); } static int scr24x_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 38c6d1af6d1c..a42b3d764da8 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -101,15 +101,13 @@ * Exported interfaces ---- output * =============================== * - * There are three exported interfaces; the first is one designed to - * be used from within the kernel: + * There are four exported interfaces; two for use within the kernel, + * and two or use from userspace. * - * void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes); - * - * This interface will return the requested number of random bytes, - * and place it in the requested buffer. + * Exported interfaces ---- userspace output + * ----------------------------------------- * - * The two other interfaces are two character devices /dev/random and + * The userspace interfaces are two character devices /dev/random and * /dev/urandom. /dev/random is suitable for use when very high * quality randomness is desired (for example, for key generation or * one-time pads), as it will only return a maximum of the number of @@ -122,6 +120,77 @@ * this will result in random numbers that are merely cryptographically * strong. For many applications, however, this is acceptable. * + * Exported interfaces ---- kernel output + * -------------------------------------- + * + * The primary kernel interface is + * + * void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes); + * + * This interface will return the requested number of random bytes, + * and place it in the requested buffer. This is equivalent to a + * read from /dev/urandom. + * + * For less critical applications, there are the functions: + * + * u32 get_random_u32() + * u64 get_random_u64() + * unsigned int get_random_int() + * unsigned long get_random_long() + * + * These are produced by a cryptographic RNG seeded from get_random_bytes, + * and so do not deplete the entropy pool as much. These are recommended + * for most in-kernel operations *if the result is going to be stored in + * the kernel*. + * + * Specifically, the get_random_int() family do not attempt to do + * "anti-backtracking". If you capture the state of the kernel (e.g. + * by snapshotting the VM), you can figure out previous get_random_int() + * return values. But if the value is stored in the kernel anyway, + * this is not a problem. + * + * It *is* safe to expose get_random_int() output to attackers (e.g. as + * network cookies); given outputs 1..n, it's not feasible to predict + * outputs 0 or n+1. The only concern is an attacker who breaks into + * the kernel later; the get_random_int() engine is not reseeded as + * often as the get_random_bytes() one. + * + * get_random_bytes() is needed for keys that need to stay secret after + * they are erased from the kernel. For example, any key that will + * be wrapped and stored encrypted. And session encryption keys: we'd + * like to know that after the session is closed and the keys erased, + * the plaintext is unrecoverable to someone who recorded the ciphertext. + * + * But for network ports/cookies, stack canaries, PRNG seeds, address + * space layout randomization, session *authentication* keys, or other + * applications where the sensitive data is stored in the kernel in + * plaintext for as long as it's sensitive, the get_random_int() family + * is just fine. + * + * Consider ASLR. We want to keep the address space secret from an + * outside attacker while the process is running, but once the address + * space is torn down, it's of no use to an attacker any more. And it's + * stored in kernel data structures as long as it's alive, so worrying + * about an attacker's ability to extrapolate it from the get_random_int() + * CRNG is silly. + * + * Even some cryptographic keys are safe to generate with get_random_int(). + * In particular, keys for SipHash are generally fine. Here, knowledge + * of the key authorizes you to do something to a kernel object (inject + * packets to a network connection, or flood a hash table), and the + * key is stored with the object being protected. Once it goes away, + * we no longer care if anyone knows the key. + * + * prandom_u32() + * ------------- + * + * For even weaker applications, see the pseudorandom generator + * prandom_u32(), prandom_max(), and prandom_bytes(). If the random + * numbers aren't security-critical at all, these are *far* cheaper. + * Useful for self-tests, random error simulation, randomized backoffs, + * and any other application where you trust that nobody is trying to + * maliciously mess with you by guessing the "random" numbers. + * * Exported interfaces ---- input * ============================== * @@ -295,7 +364,7 @@ * To allow fractional bits to be tracked, the entropy_count field is * denominated in units of 1/8th bits. * - * 2*(ENTROPY_SHIFT + log2(poolbits)) must <= 31, or the multiply in + * 2*(ENTROPY_SHIFT + poolbitshift) must <= 31, or the multiply in * credit_entropy_bits() needs to be 64 bits wide. */ #define ENTROPY_SHIFT 3 @@ -359,9 +428,9 @@ static int random_write_wakeup_bits = 28 * OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS; * polynomial which improves the resulting TGFSR polynomial to be * irreducible, which we have made here. */ -static struct poolinfo { - int poolbitshift, poolwords, poolbytes, poolbits, poolfracbits; -#define S(x) ilog2(x)+5, (x), (x)*4, (x)*32, (x) << (ENTROPY_SHIFT+5) +static const struct poolinfo { + int poolbitshift, poolwords, poolbytes, poolfracbits; +#define S(x) ilog2(x)+5, (x), (x)*4, (x) << (ENTROPY_SHIFT+5) int tap1, tap2, tap3, tap4, tap5; } poolinfo_table[] = { /* was: x^128 + x^103 + x^76 + x^51 +x^25 + x + 1 */ @@ -415,7 +484,7 @@ struct crng_state { spinlock_t lock; }; -struct crng_state primary_crng = { +static struct crng_state primary_crng = { .lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(primary_crng.lock), }; @@ -470,7 +539,6 @@ struct entropy_store { unsigned short add_ptr; unsigned short input_rotate; int entropy_count; - int entropy_total; unsigned int initialized:1; unsigned int last_data_init:1; __u8 last_data[EXTRACT_SIZE]; @@ -643,7 +711,7 @@ static void process_random_ready_list(void) */ static void credit_entropy_bits(struct entropy_store *r, int nbits) { - int entropy_count, orig; + int entropy_count, orig, has_initialized = 0; const int pool_size = r->poolinfo->poolfracbits; int nfrac = nbits << ENTROPY_SHIFT; @@ -698,23 +766,25 @@ retry: entropy_count = 0; } else if (entropy_count > pool_size) entropy_count = pool_size; + if ((r == &blocking_pool) && !r->initialized && + (entropy_count >> ENTROPY_SHIFT) > 128) + has_initialized = 1; if (cmpxchg(&r->entropy_count, orig, entropy_count) != orig) goto retry; - r->entropy_total += nbits; - if (!r->initialized && r->entropy_total > 128) { + if (has_initialized) r->initialized = 1; - r->entropy_total = 0; - } trace_credit_entropy_bits(r->name, nbits, - entropy_count >> ENTROPY_SHIFT, - r->entropy_total, _RET_IP_); + entropy_count >> ENTROPY_SHIFT, _RET_IP_); if (r == &input_pool) { int entropy_bits = entropy_count >> ENTROPY_SHIFT; + struct entropy_store *other = &blocking_pool; - if (crng_init < 2 && entropy_bits >= 128) { + if (crng_init < 2) { + if (entropy_bits < 128) + return; crng_reseed(&primary_crng, r); entropy_bits = r->entropy_count >> ENTROPY_SHIFT; } @@ -725,20 +795,14 @@ retry: wake_up_interruptible(&random_read_wait); kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_IN); } - /* If the input pool is getting full, send some - * entropy to the blocking pool until it is 75% full. + /* If the input pool is getting full, and the blocking + * pool has room, send some entropy to the blocking + * pool. */ - if (entropy_bits > random_write_wakeup_bits && - r->initialized && - r->entropy_total >= 2*random_read_wakeup_bits) { - struct entropy_store *other = &blocking_pool; - - if (other->entropy_count <= - 3 * other->poolinfo->poolfracbits / 4) { - schedule_work(&other->push_work); - r->entropy_total = 0; - } - } + if (!work_pending(&other->push_work) && + (ENTROPY_BITS(r) > 6 * r->poolinfo->poolbytes) && + (ENTROPY_BITS(other) <= 6 * other->poolinfo->poolbytes)) + schedule_work(&other->push_work); } } @@ -777,6 +841,7 @@ static struct crng_state **crng_node_pool __read_mostly; #endif static void invalidate_batched_entropy(void); +static void numa_crng_init(void); static bool trust_cpu __ro_after_init = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU); static int __init parse_trust_cpu(char *arg) @@ -805,7 +870,9 @@ static void crng_initialize(struct crng_state *crng) } crng->state[i] ^= rv; } - if (trust_cpu && arch_init) { + if (trust_cpu && arch_init && crng == &primary_crng) { + invalidate_batched_entropy(); + numa_crng_init(); crng_init = 2; pr_notice("random: crng done (trusting CPU's manufacturer)\n"); } @@ -1553,6 +1620,11 @@ static ssize_t extract_entropy_user(struct entropy_store *r, void __user *buf, int large_request = (nbytes > 256); trace_extract_entropy_user(r->name, nbytes, ENTROPY_BITS(r), _RET_IP_); + if (!r->initialized && r->pull) { + xfer_secondary_pool(r, ENTROPY_BITS(r->pull)/8); + if (!r->initialized) + return 0; + } xfer_secondary_pool(r, nbytes); nbytes = account(r, nbytes, 0, 0); @@ -1783,7 +1855,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes_arch); * data into the pool to prepare it for use. The pool is not cleared * as that can only decrease the entropy in the pool. */ -static void init_std_data(struct entropy_store *r) +static void __init init_std_data(struct entropy_store *r) { int i; ktime_t now = ktime_get_real(); @@ -1810,7 +1882,7 @@ static void init_std_data(struct entropy_store *r) * take care not to overwrite the precious per platform data * we were given. */ -static int rand_initialize(void) +int __init rand_initialize(void) { init_std_data(&input_pool); init_std_data(&blocking_pool); @@ -1822,7 +1894,6 @@ static int rand_initialize(void) } return 0; } -early_initcall(rand_initialize); #ifdef CONFIG_BLOCK void rand_initialize_disk(struct gendisk *disk) @@ -2211,8 +2282,8 @@ struct batched_entropy { u32 entropy_u32[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u32)]; }; unsigned int position; + spinlock_t batch_lock; }; -static rwlock_t batched_entropy_reset_lock = __RW_LOCK_UNLOCKED(batched_entropy_reset_lock); /* * Get a random word for internal kernel use only. The quality of the random @@ -2222,12 +2293,14 @@ static rwlock_t batched_entropy_reset_lock = __RW_LOCK_UNLOCKED(batched_entropy_ * wait_for_random_bytes() should be called and return 0 at least once * at any point prior. */ -static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct batched_entropy, batched_entropy_u64); +static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct batched_entropy, batched_entropy_u64) = { + .batch_lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(batched_entropy_u64.lock), +}; + u64 get_random_u64(void) { u64 ret; - bool use_lock; - unsigned long flags = 0; + unsigned long flags; struct batched_entropy *batch; static void *previous; @@ -2242,28 +2315,25 @@ u64 get_random_u64(void) warn_unseeded_randomness(&previous); - use_lock = READ_ONCE(crng_init) < 2; - batch = &get_cpu_var(batched_entropy_u64); - if (use_lock) - read_lock_irqsave(&batched_entropy_reset_lock, flags); + batch = raw_cpu_ptr(&batched_entropy_u64); + spin_lock_irqsave(&batch->batch_lock, flags); if (batch->position % ARRAY_SIZE(batch->entropy_u64) == 0) { extract_crng((u8 *)batch->entropy_u64); batch->position = 0; } ret = batch->entropy_u64[batch->position++]; - if (use_lock) - read_unlock_irqrestore(&batched_entropy_reset_lock, flags); - put_cpu_var(batched_entropy_u64); + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&batch->batch_lock, flags); return ret; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_u64); -static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct batched_entropy, batched_entropy_u32); +static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct batched_entropy, batched_entropy_u32) = { + .batch_lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(batched_entropy_u32.lock), +}; u32 get_random_u32(void) { u32 ret; - bool use_lock; - unsigned long flags = 0; + unsigned long flags; struct batched_entropy *batch; static void *previous; @@ -2272,18 +2342,14 @@ u32 get_random_u32(void) warn_unseeded_randomness(&previous); - use_lock = READ_ONCE(crng_init) < 2; - batch = &get_cpu_var(batched_entropy_u32); - if (use_lock) - read_lock_irqsave(&batched_entropy_reset_lock, flags); + batch = raw_cpu_ptr(&batched_entropy_u32); + spin_lock_irqsave(&batch->batch_lock, flags); if (batch->position % ARRAY_SIZE(batch->entropy_u32) == 0) { extract_crng((u8 *)batch->entropy_u32); batch->position = 0; } ret = batch->entropy_u32[batch->position++]; - if (use_lock) - read_unlock_irqrestore(&batched_entropy_reset_lock, flags); - put_cpu_var(batched_entropy_u32); + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&batch->batch_lock, flags); return ret; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_u32); @@ -2297,12 +2363,19 @@ static void invalidate_batched_entropy(void) int cpu; unsigned long flags; - write_lock_irqsave(&batched_entropy_reset_lock, flags); for_each_possible_cpu (cpu) { - per_cpu_ptr(&batched_entropy_u32, cpu)->position = 0; - per_cpu_ptr(&batched_entropy_u64, cpu)->position = 0; + struct batched_entropy *batched_entropy; + + batched_entropy = per_cpu_ptr(&batched_entropy_u32, cpu); + spin_lock_irqsave(&batched_entropy->batch_lock, flags); + batched_entropy->position = 0; + spin_unlock(&batched_entropy->batch_lock); + + batched_entropy = per_cpu_ptr(&batched_entropy_u64, cpu); + spin_lock(&batched_entropy->batch_lock); + batched_entropy->position = 0; + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&batched_entropy->batch_lock, flags); } - write_unlock_irqrestore(&batched_entropy_reset_lock, flags); } /** diff --git a/drivers/char/tb0219.c b/drivers/char/tb0219.c index 7c19d9b22785..e8614ea843e2 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tb0219.c +++ b/drivers/char/tb0219.c @@ -243,7 +243,7 @@ static int tanbac_tb0219_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) case 16 ... 23: case 32 ... 39: case 48 ... 55: - return nonseekable_open(inode, file); + return stream_open(inode, file); default: break; } diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig b/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig index 536e55d3919f..f3e4bc490cf0 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig @@ -157,7 +157,6 @@ config TCG_CRB config TCG_VTPM_PROXY tristate "VTPM Proxy Interface" depends on TCG_TPM - select ANON_INODES ---help--- This driver proxies for an emulated TPM (vTPM) running in userspace. A device /dev/vtpmx is provided that creates a device pair diff --git a/drivers/char/virtio_console.c b/drivers/char/virtio_console.c index fbeb71953526..05dbfdb9f4af 100644 --- a/drivers/char/virtio_console.c +++ b/drivers/char/virtio_console.c @@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ struct ports_driver_data { /* All the console devices handled by this driver */ struct list_head consoles; }; -static struct ports_driver_data pdrvdata; +static struct ports_driver_data pdrvdata = { .next_vtermno = 1}; static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(pdrvdata_lock); static DECLARE_COMPLETION(early_console_added); @@ -1394,6 +1394,7 @@ static int add_port(struct ports_device *portdev, u32 id) port->async_queue = NULL; port->cons.ws.ws_row = port->cons.ws.ws_col = 0; + port->cons.vtermno = 0; port->host_connected = port->guest_connected = false; port->stats = (struct port_stats) { 0 }; |