diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/char/random.c')
-rw-r--r-- | drivers/char/random.c | 480 |
1 files changed, 382 insertions, 98 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 0158d3bff7e5..3efb3bf0ab83 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -249,6 +249,7 @@ #include <linux/genhd.h> #include <linux/interrupt.h> #include <linux/mm.h> +#include <linux/nodemask.h> #include <linux/spinlock.h> #include <linux/kthread.h> #include <linux/percpu.h> @@ -261,6 +262,7 @@ #include <linux/syscalls.h> #include <linux/completion.h> #include <linux/uuid.h> +#include <crypto/chacha20.h> #include <asm/processor.h> #include <asm/uaccess.h> @@ -413,6 +415,34 @@ static struct fasync_struct *fasync; static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(random_ready_list_lock); static LIST_HEAD(random_ready_list); +struct crng_state { + __u32 state[16]; + unsigned long init_time; + spinlock_t lock; +}; + +struct crng_state primary_crng = { + .lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(primary_crng.lock), +}; + +/* + * crng_init = 0 --> Uninitialized + * 1 --> Initialized + * 2 --> Initialized from input_pool + * + * crng_init is protected by primary_crng->lock, and only increases + * its value (from 0->1->2). + */ +static int crng_init = 0; +#define crng_ready() (likely(crng_init > 0)) +static int crng_init_cnt = 0; +#define CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH (2*CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE) +static void _extract_crng(struct crng_state *crng, + __u8 out[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE]); +static void _crng_backtrack_protect(struct crng_state *crng, + __u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE], int used); +static void process_random_ready_list(void); + /********************************************************************** * * OS independent entropy store. Here are the functions which handle @@ -442,10 +472,15 @@ struct entropy_store { __u8 last_data[EXTRACT_SIZE]; }; +static ssize_t extract_entropy(struct entropy_store *r, void *buf, + size_t nbytes, int min, int rsvd); +static ssize_t _extract_entropy(struct entropy_store *r, void *buf, + size_t nbytes, int fips); + +static void crng_reseed(struct crng_state *crng, struct entropy_store *r); static void push_to_pool(struct work_struct *work); static __u32 input_pool_data[INPUT_POOL_WORDS]; static __u32 blocking_pool_data[OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS]; -static __u32 nonblocking_pool_data[OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS]; static struct entropy_store input_pool = { .poolinfo = &poolinfo_table[0], @@ -466,16 +501,6 @@ static struct entropy_store blocking_pool = { push_to_pool), }; -static struct entropy_store nonblocking_pool = { - .poolinfo = &poolinfo_table[1], - .name = "nonblocking", - .pull = &input_pool, - .lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(nonblocking_pool.lock), - .pool = nonblocking_pool_data, - .push_work = __WORK_INITIALIZER(nonblocking_pool.push_work, - push_to_pool), -}; - static __u32 const twist_table[8] = { 0x00000000, 0x3b6e20c8, 0x76dc4190, 0x4db26158, 0xedb88320, 0xd6d6a3e8, 0x9b64c2b0, 0xa00ae278 }; @@ -678,12 +703,6 @@ retry: if (!r->initialized && r->entropy_total > 128) { r->initialized = 1; r->entropy_total = 0; - if (r == &nonblocking_pool) { - prandom_reseed_late(); - process_random_ready_list(); - wake_up_all(&urandom_init_wait); - pr_notice("random: %s pool is initialized\n", r->name); - } } trace_credit_entropy_bits(r->name, nbits, @@ -693,49 +712,266 @@ retry: if (r == &input_pool) { int entropy_bits = entropy_count >> ENTROPY_SHIFT; + if (crng_init < 2 && entropy_bits >= 128) { + crng_reseed(&primary_crng, r); + entropy_bits = r->entropy_count >> ENTROPY_SHIFT; + } + /* should we wake readers? */ if (entropy_bits >= random_read_wakeup_bits) { wake_up_interruptible(&random_read_wait); kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_IN); } /* If the input pool is getting full, send some - * entropy to the two output pools, flipping back and - * forth between them, until the output pools are 75% - * full. + * entropy to the blocking pool until it is 75% full. */ if (entropy_bits > random_write_wakeup_bits && r->initialized && r->entropy_total >= 2*random_read_wakeup_bits) { - static struct entropy_store *last = &blocking_pool; struct entropy_store *other = &blocking_pool; - if (last == &blocking_pool) - other = &nonblocking_pool; if (other->entropy_count <= - 3 * other->poolinfo->poolfracbits / 4) - last = other; - if (last->entropy_count <= - 3 * last->poolinfo->poolfracbits / 4) { - schedule_work(&last->push_work); + 3 * other->poolinfo->poolfracbits / 4) { + schedule_work(&other->push_work); r->entropy_total = 0; } } } } -static void credit_entropy_bits_safe(struct entropy_store *r, int nbits) +static int credit_entropy_bits_safe(struct entropy_store *r, int nbits) { const int nbits_max = (int)(~0U >> (ENTROPY_SHIFT + 1)); + if (nbits < 0) + return -EINVAL; + /* Cap the value to avoid overflows */ nbits = min(nbits, nbits_max); - nbits = max(nbits, -nbits_max); credit_entropy_bits(r, nbits); + return 0; } /********************************************************************* * + * CRNG using CHACHA20 + * + *********************************************************************/ + +#define CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL (300*HZ) + +static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(crng_init_wait); + +#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA +/* + * Hack to deal with crazy userspace progams when they are all trying + * to access /dev/urandom in parallel. The programs are almost + * certainly doing something terribly wrong, but we'll work around + * their brain damage. + */ +static struct crng_state **crng_node_pool __read_mostly; +#endif + +static void crng_initialize(struct crng_state *crng) +{ + int i; + unsigned long rv; + + memcpy(&crng->state[0], "expand 32-byte k", 16); + if (crng == &primary_crng) + _extract_entropy(&input_pool, &crng->state[4], + sizeof(__u32) * 12, 0); + else + get_random_bytes(&crng->state[4], sizeof(__u32) * 12); + for (i = 4; i < 16; i++) { + if (!arch_get_random_seed_long(&rv) && + !arch_get_random_long(&rv)) + rv = random_get_entropy(); + crng->state[i] ^= rv; + } + crng->init_time = jiffies - CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL - 1; +} + +static int crng_fast_load(const char *cp, size_t len) +{ + unsigned long flags; + char *p; + + if (!spin_trylock_irqsave(&primary_crng.lock, flags)) + return 0; + if (crng_ready()) { + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&primary_crng.lock, flags); + return 0; + } + p = (unsigned char *) &primary_crng.state[4]; + while (len > 0 && crng_init_cnt < CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH) { + p[crng_init_cnt % CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE] ^= *cp; + cp++; crng_init_cnt++; len--; + } + if (crng_init_cnt >= CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH) { + crng_init = 1; + wake_up_interruptible(&crng_init_wait); + pr_notice("random: fast init done\n"); + } + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&primary_crng.lock, flags); + return 1; +} + +static void crng_reseed(struct crng_state *crng, struct entropy_store *r) +{ + unsigned long flags; + int i, num; + union { + __u8 block[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE]; + __u32 key[8]; + } buf; + + if (r) { + num = extract_entropy(r, &buf, 32, 16, 0); + if (num == 0) + return; + } else { + _extract_crng(&primary_crng, buf.block); + _crng_backtrack_protect(&primary_crng, buf.block, + CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE); + } + spin_lock_irqsave(&primary_crng.lock, flags); + for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { + unsigned long rv; + if (!arch_get_random_seed_long(&rv) && + !arch_get_random_long(&rv)) + rv = random_get_entropy(); + crng->state[i+4] ^= buf.key[i] ^ rv; + } + memzero_explicit(&buf, sizeof(buf)); + crng->init_time = jiffies; + if (crng == &primary_crng && crng_init < 2) { + crng_init = 2; + process_random_ready_list(); + wake_up_interruptible(&crng_init_wait); + pr_notice("random: crng init done\n"); + } + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&primary_crng.lock, flags); +} + +static inline void maybe_reseed_primary_crng(void) +{ + if (crng_init > 2 && + time_after(jiffies, primary_crng.init_time + CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL)) + crng_reseed(&primary_crng, &input_pool); +} + +static inline void crng_wait_ready(void) +{ + wait_event_interruptible(crng_init_wait, crng_ready()); +} + +static void _extract_crng(struct crng_state *crng, + __u8 out[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE]) +{ + unsigned long v, flags; + + if (crng_init > 1 && + time_after(jiffies, crng->init_time + CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL)) + crng_reseed(crng, crng == &primary_crng ? &input_pool : NULL); + spin_lock_irqsave(&crng->lock, flags); + if (arch_get_random_long(&v)) + crng->state[14] ^= v; + chacha20_block(&crng->state[0], out); + if (crng->state[12] == 0) + crng->state[13]++; + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&crng->lock, flags); +} + +static void extract_crng(__u8 out[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE]) +{ + struct crng_state *crng = NULL; + +#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA + if (crng_node_pool) + crng = crng_node_pool[numa_node_id()]; + if (crng == NULL) +#endif + crng = &primary_crng; + _extract_crng(crng, out); +} + +/* + * Use the leftover bytes from the CRNG block output (if there is + * enough) to mutate the CRNG key to provide backtracking protection. + */ +static void _crng_backtrack_protect(struct crng_state *crng, + __u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE], int used) +{ + unsigned long flags; + __u32 *s, *d; + int i; + + used = round_up(used, sizeof(__u32)); + if (used + CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE > CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE) { + extract_crng(tmp); + used = 0; + } + spin_lock_irqsave(&crng->lock, flags); + s = (__u32 *) &tmp[used]; + d = &crng->state[4]; + for (i=0; i < 8; i++) + *d++ ^= *s++; + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&crng->lock, flags); +} + +static void crng_backtrack_protect(__u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE], int used) +{ + struct crng_state *crng = NULL; + +#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA + if (crng_node_pool) + crng = crng_node_pool[numa_node_id()]; + if (crng == NULL) +#endif + crng = &primary_crng; + _crng_backtrack_protect(crng, tmp, used); +} + +static ssize_t extract_crng_user(void __user *buf, size_t nbytes) +{ + ssize_t ret = 0, i = CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE; + __u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE]; + int large_request = (nbytes > 256); + + while (nbytes) { + if (large_request && need_resched()) { + if (signal_pending(current)) { + if (ret == 0) + ret = -ERESTARTSYS; + break; + } + schedule(); + } + + extract_crng(tmp); + i = min_t(int, nbytes, CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE); + if (copy_to_user(buf, tmp, i)) { + ret = -EFAULT; + break; + } + + nbytes -= i; + buf += i; + ret += i; + } + crng_backtrack_protect(tmp, i); + + /* Wipe data just written to memory */ + memzero_explicit(tmp, sizeof(tmp)); + + return ret; +} + + +/********************************************************************* + * * Entropy input management * *********************************************************************/ @@ -750,12 +986,12 @@ struct timer_rand_state { #define INIT_TIMER_RAND_STATE { INITIAL_JIFFIES, }; /* - * Add device- or boot-specific data to the input and nonblocking - * pools to help initialize them to unique values. + * Add device- or boot-specific data to the input pool to help + * initialize it. * - * None of this adds any entropy, it is meant to avoid the - * problem of the nonblocking pool having similar initial state - * across largely identical devices. + * None of this adds any entropy; it is meant to avoid the problem of + * the entropy pool having similar initial state across largely + * identical devices. */ void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, unsigned int size) { @@ -767,11 +1003,6 @@ void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, unsigned int size) _mix_pool_bytes(&input_pool, buf, size); _mix_pool_bytes(&input_pool, &time, sizeof(time)); spin_unlock_irqrestore(&input_pool.lock, flags); - - spin_lock_irqsave(&nonblocking_pool.lock, flags); - _mix_pool_bytes(&nonblocking_pool, buf, size); - _mix_pool_bytes(&nonblocking_pool, &time, sizeof(time)); - spin_unlock_irqrestore(&nonblocking_pool.lock, flags); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(add_device_randomness); @@ -802,7 +1033,7 @@ static void add_timer_randomness(struct timer_rand_state *state, unsigned num) sample.jiffies = jiffies; sample.cycles = random_get_entropy(); sample.num = num; - r = nonblocking_pool.initialized ? &input_pool : &nonblocking_pool; + r = &input_pool; mix_pool_bytes(r, &sample, sizeof(sample)); /* @@ -918,11 +1149,21 @@ void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq, int irq_flags) fast_mix(fast_pool); add_interrupt_bench(cycles); + if (!crng_ready()) { + if ((fast_pool->count >= 64) && + crng_fast_load((char *) fast_pool->pool, + sizeof(fast_pool->pool))) { + fast_pool->count = 0; + fast_pool->last = now; + } + return; + } + if ((fast_pool->count < 64) && !time_after(now, fast_pool->last + HZ)) return; - r = nonblocking_pool.initialized ? &input_pool : &nonblocking_pool; + r = &input_pool; if (!spin_trylock(&r->lock)) return; @@ -946,6 +1187,7 @@ void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq, int irq_flags) /* award one bit for the contents of the fast pool */ credit_entropy_bits(r, credit + 1); } +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_interrupt_randomness); #ifdef CONFIG_BLOCK void add_disk_randomness(struct gendisk *disk) @@ -965,9 +1207,6 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_disk_randomness); * *********************************************************************/ -static ssize_t extract_entropy(struct entropy_store *r, void *buf, - size_t nbytes, int min, int rsvd); - /* * This utility inline function is responsible for transferring entropy * from the primary pool to the secondary extraction pool. We make @@ -1142,6 +1381,36 @@ static void extract_buf(struct entropy_store *r, __u8 *out) memzero_explicit(&hash, sizeof(hash)); } +static ssize_t _extract_entropy(struct entropy_store *r, void *buf, + size_t nbytes, int fips) +{ + ssize_t ret = 0, i; + __u8 tmp[EXTRACT_SIZE]; + unsigned long flags; + + while (nbytes) { + extract_buf(r, tmp); + + if (fips) { + spin_lock_irqsave(&r->lock, flags); + if (!memcmp(tmp, r->last_data, EXTRACT_SIZE)) + panic("Hardware RNG duplicated output!\n"); + memcpy(r->last_data, tmp, EXTRACT_SIZE); + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&r->lock, flags); + } + i = min_t(int, nbytes, EXTRACT_SIZE); + memcpy(buf, tmp, i); + nbytes -= i; + buf += i; + ret += i; + } + + /* Wipe data just returned from memory */ + memzero_explicit(tmp, sizeof(tmp)); + + return ret; +} + /* * This function extracts randomness from the "entropy pool", and * returns it in a buffer. @@ -1154,7 +1423,6 @@ static void extract_buf(struct entropy_store *r, __u8 *out) static ssize_t extract_entropy(struct entropy_store *r, void *buf, size_t nbytes, int min, int reserved) { - ssize_t ret = 0, i; __u8 tmp[EXTRACT_SIZE]; unsigned long flags; @@ -1178,27 +1446,7 @@ static ssize_t extract_entropy(struct entropy_store *r, void *buf, xfer_secondary_pool(r, nbytes); nbytes = account(r, nbytes, min, reserved); - while (nbytes) { - extract_buf(r, tmp); - - if (fips_enabled) { - spin_lock_irqsave(&r->lock, flags); - if (!memcmp(tmp, r->last_data, EXTRACT_SIZE)) - panic("Hardware RNG duplicated output!\n"); - memcpy(r->last_data, tmp, EXTRACT_SIZE); - spin_unlock_irqrestore(&r->lock, flags); - } - i = min_t(int, nbytes, EXTRACT_SIZE); - memcpy(buf, tmp, i); - nbytes -= i; - buf += i; - ret += i; - } - - /* Wipe data just returned from memory */ - memzero_explicit(tmp, sizeof(tmp)); - - return ret; + return _extract_entropy(r, buf, nbytes, fips_enabled); } /* @@ -1253,15 +1501,28 @@ static ssize_t extract_entropy_user(struct entropy_store *r, void __user *buf, */ void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes) { + __u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE]; + #if DEBUG_RANDOM_BOOT > 0 - if (unlikely(nonblocking_pool.initialized == 0)) + if (!crng_ready()) printk(KERN_NOTICE "random: %pF get_random_bytes called " - "with %d bits of entropy available\n", - (void *) _RET_IP_, - nonblocking_pool.entropy_total); + "with crng_init = %d\n", (void *) _RET_IP_, crng_init); #endif trace_get_random_bytes(nbytes, _RET_IP_); - extract_entropy(&nonblocking_pool, buf, nbytes, 0, 0); + + while (nbytes >= CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE) { + extract_crng(buf); + buf += CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE; + nbytes -= CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE; + } + + if (nbytes > 0) { + extract_crng(tmp); + memcpy(buf, tmp, nbytes); + crng_backtrack_protect(tmp, nbytes); + } else + crng_backtrack_protect(tmp, CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE); + memzero_explicit(tmp, sizeof(tmp)); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes); @@ -1279,7 +1540,7 @@ int add_random_ready_callback(struct random_ready_callback *rdy) unsigned long flags; int err = -EALREADY; - if (likely(nonblocking_pool.initialized)) + if (crng_ready()) return err; owner = rdy->owner; @@ -1287,7 +1548,7 @@ int add_random_ready_callback(struct random_ready_callback *rdy) return -ENOENT; spin_lock_irqsave(&random_ready_list_lock, flags); - if (nonblocking_pool.initialized) + if (crng_ready()) goto out; owner = NULL; @@ -1351,7 +1612,7 @@ void get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, int nbytes) } if (nbytes) - extract_entropy(&nonblocking_pool, p, nbytes, 0, 0); + get_random_bytes(p, nbytes); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes_arch); @@ -1394,9 +1655,28 @@ static void init_std_data(struct entropy_store *r) */ static int rand_initialize(void) { +#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA + int i; + struct crng_state *crng; + struct crng_state **pool; +#endif + init_std_data(&input_pool); init_std_data(&blocking_pool); - init_std_data(&nonblocking_pool); + crng_initialize(&primary_crng); + +#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA + pool = kcalloc(nr_node_ids, sizeof(*pool), GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_NOFAIL); + for_each_online_node(i) { + crng = kmalloc_node(sizeof(struct crng_state), + GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOFAIL, i); + spin_lock_init(&crng->lock); + crng_initialize(crng); + pool[i] = crng; + } + mb(); + crng_node_pool = pool; +#endif return 0; } early_initcall(rand_initialize); @@ -1458,18 +1738,22 @@ random_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, loff_t *ppos) static ssize_t urandom_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, loff_t *ppos) { + unsigned long flags; + static int maxwarn = 10; int ret; - if (unlikely(nonblocking_pool.initialized == 0)) - printk_once(KERN_NOTICE "random: %s urandom read " - "with %d bits of entropy available\n", - current->comm, nonblocking_pool.entropy_total); - + if (!crng_ready() && maxwarn > 0) { + maxwarn--; + printk(KERN_NOTICE "random: %s: uninitialized urandom read " + "(%zd bytes read)\n", + current->comm, nbytes); + spin_lock_irqsave(&primary_crng.lock, flags); + crng_init_cnt = 0; + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&primary_crng.lock, flags); + } nbytes = min_t(size_t, nbytes, INT_MAX >> (ENTROPY_SHIFT + 3)); - ret = extract_entropy_user(&nonblocking_pool, buf, nbytes); - - trace_urandom_read(8 * nbytes, ENTROPY_BITS(&nonblocking_pool), - ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool)); + ret = extract_crng_user(buf, nbytes); + trace_urandom_read(8 * nbytes, 0, ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool)); return ret; } @@ -1515,10 +1799,7 @@ static ssize_t random_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buffer, { size_t ret; - ret = write_pool(&blocking_pool, buffer, count); - if (ret) - return ret; - ret = write_pool(&nonblocking_pool, buffer, count); + ret = write_pool(&input_pool, buffer, count); if (ret) return ret; @@ -1543,8 +1824,7 @@ static long random_ioctl(struct file *f, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) return -EPERM; if (get_user(ent_count, p)) return -EFAULT; - credit_entropy_bits_safe(&input_pool, ent_count); - return 0; + return credit_entropy_bits_safe(&input_pool, ent_count); case RNDADDENTROPY: if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) return -EPERM; @@ -1558,8 +1838,7 @@ static long random_ioctl(struct file *f, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) size); if (retval < 0) return retval; - credit_entropy_bits_safe(&input_pool, ent_count); - return 0; + return credit_entropy_bits_safe(&input_pool, ent_count); case RNDZAPENTCNT: case RNDCLEARPOOL: /* @@ -1569,7 +1848,6 @@ static long random_ioctl(struct file *f, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) return -EPERM; input_pool.entropy_count = 0; - nonblocking_pool.entropy_count = 0; blocking_pool.entropy_count = 0; return 0; default: @@ -1611,11 +1889,10 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user *, buf, size_t, count, if (flags & GRND_RANDOM) return _random_read(flags & GRND_NONBLOCK, buf, count); - if (unlikely(nonblocking_pool.initialized == 0)) { + if (!crng_ready()) { if (flags & GRND_NONBLOCK) return -EAGAIN; - wait_event_interruptible(urandom_init_wait, - nonblocking_pool.initialized); + crng_wait_ready(); if (signal_pending(current)) return -ERESTARTSYS; } @@ -1773,13 +2050,15 @@ int random_int_secret_init(void) return 0; } +static DEFINE_PER_CPU(__u32 [MD5_DIGEST_WORDS], get_random_int_hash) + __aligned(sizeof(unsigned long)); + /* * Get a random word for internal kernel use only. Similar to urandom but * with the goal of minimal entropy pool depletion. As a result, the random * value is not cryptographically secure but for several uses the cost of * depleting entropy is too high */ -static DEFINE_PER_CPU(__u32 [MD5_DIGEST_WORDS], get_random_int_hash); unsigned int get_random_int(void) { __u32 *hash; @@ -1849,6 +2128,11 @@ void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const char *buffer, size_t count, { struct entropy_store *poolp = &input_pool; + if (!crng_ready()) { + crng_fast_load(buffer, count); + return; + } + /* Suspend writing if we're above the trickle threshold. * We'll be woken up again once below random_write_wakeup_thresh, * or when the calling thread is about to terminate. |