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-rw-r--r--crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c10
-rw-r--r--crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c40
-rw-r--r--crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c32
-rw-r--r--crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c50
4 files changed, 113 insertions, 19 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
index 4fa769c4bcdb..f0d4ff3c20a8 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
@@ -79,16 +79,16 @@ static int pkcs7_digest(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
}
if (sinfo->msgdigest_len != sig->digest_size) {
- pr_debug("Sig %u: Invalid digest size (%u)\n",
- sinfo->index, sinfo->msgdigest_len);
+ pr_warn("Sig %u: Invalid digest size (%u)\n",
+ sinfo->index, sinfo->msgdigest_len);
ret = -EBADMSG;
goto error;
}
if (memcmp(sig->digest, sinfo->msgdigest,
sinfo->msgdigest_len) != 0) {
- pr_debug("Sig %u: Message digest doesn't match\n",
- sinfo->index);
+ pr_warn("Sig %u: Message digest doesn't match\n",
+ sinfo->index);
ret = -EKEYREJECTED;
goto error;
}
@@ -478,7 +478,7 @@ int pkcs7_supply_detached_data(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
const void *data, size_t datalen)
{
if (pkcs7->data) {
- pr_debug("Data already supplied\n");
+ pr_warn("Data already supplied\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
pkcs7->data = data;
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c
index 6b1ac5f5896a..276bdb627498 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c
@@ -108,6 +108,46 @@ int restrict_link_by_signature(struct key *dest_keyring,
return ret;
}
+/**
+ * restrict_link_by_ca - Restrict additions to a ring of CA keys
+ * @dest_keyring: Keyring being linked to.
+ * @type: The type of key being added.
+ * @payload: The payload of the new key.
+ * @trust_keyring: Unused.
+ *
+ * Check if the new certificate is a CA. If it is a CA, then mark the new
+ * certificate as being ok to link.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if the new certificate was accepted, -ENOKEY if the
+ * certificate is not a CA. -ENOPKG if the signature uses unsupported
+ * crypto, or some other error if there is a matching certificate but
+ * the signature check cannot be performed.
+ */
+int restrict_link_by_ca(struct key *dest_keyring,
+ const struct key_type *type,
+ const union key_payload *payload,
+ struct key *trust_keyring)
+{
+ const struct public_key *pkey;
+
+ if (type != &key_type_asymmetric)
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+ pkey = payload->data[asym_crypto];
+ if (!pkey)
+ return -ENOPKG;
+ if (!test_bit(KEY_EFLAG_CA, &pkey->key_eflags))
+ return -ENOKEY;
+ if (!test_bit(KEY_EFLAG_KEYCERTSIGN, &pkey->key_eflags))
+ return -ENOKEY;
+ if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_CA_MACHINE_KEYRING_MAX))
+ return 0;
+ if (test_bit(KEY_EFLAG_DIGITALSIG, &pkey->key_eflags))
+ return -ENOKEY;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
static bool match_either_id(const struct asymmetric_key_id **pair,
const struct asymmetric_key_id *single)
{
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c
index 7553ab18db89..22beaf2213a2 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ static int pefile_parse_binary(const void *pebuf, unsigned int pelen,
break;
default:
- pr_debug("Unknown PEOPT magic = %04hx\n", pe32->magic);
+ pr_warn("Unknown PEOPT magic = %04hx\n", pe32->magic);
return -ELIBBAD;
}
@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ static int pefile_parse_binary(const void *pebuf, unsigned int pelen,
ctx->certs_size = ddir->certs.size;
if (!ddir->certs.virtual_address || !ddir->certs.size) {
- pr_debug("Unsigned PE binary\n");
+ pr_warn("Unsigned PE binary\n");
return -ENODATA;
}
@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ static int pefile_strip_sig_wrapper(const void *pebuf,
unsigned len;
if (ctx->sig_len < sizeof(wrapper)) {
- pr_debug("Signature wrapper too short\n");
+ pr_warn("Signature wrapper too short\n");
return -ELIBBAD;
}
@@ -135,19 +135,23 @@ static int pefile_strip_sig_wrapper(const void *pebuf,
pr_debug("sig wrapper = { %x, %x, %x }\n",
wrapper.length, wrapper.revision, wrapper.cert_type);
- /* Both pesign and sbsign round up the length of certificate table
- * (in optional header data directories) to 8 byte alignment.
+ /* sbsign rounds up the length of certificate table (in optional
+ * header data directories) to 8 byte alignment. However, the PE
+ * specification states that while entries are 8-byte aligned, this is
+ * not included in their length, and as a result, pesign has not
+ * rounded up since 0.110.
*/
- if (round_up(wrapper.length, 8) != ctx->sig_len) {
- pr_debug("Signature wrapper len wrong\n");
+ if (wrapper.length > ctx->sig_len) {
+ pr_warn("Signature wrapper bigger than sig len (%x > %x)\n",
+ ctx->sig_len, wrapper.length);
return -ELIBBAD;
}
if (wrapper.revision != WIN_CERT_REVISION_2_0) {
- pr_debug("Signature is not revision 2.0\n");
+ pr_warn("Signature is not revision 2.0\n");
return -ENOTSUPP;
}
if (wrapper.cert_type != WIN_CERT_TYPE_PKCS_SIGNED_DATA) {
- pr_debug("Signature certificate type is not PKCS\n");
+ pr_warn("Signature certificate type is not PKCS\n");
return -ENOTSUPP;
}
@@ -160,7 +164,7 @@ static int pefile_strip_sig_wrapper(const void *pebuf,
ctx->sig_offset += sizeof(wrapper);
ctx->sig_len -= sizeof(wrapper);
if (ctx->sig_len < 4) {
- pr_debug("Signature data missing\n");
+ pr_warn("Signature data missing\n");
return -EKEYREJECTED;
}
@@ -194,7 +198,7 @@ check_len:
return 0;
}
not_pkcs7:
- pr_debug("Signature data not PKCS#7\n");
+ pr_warn("Signature data not PKCS#7\n");
return -ELIBBAD;
}
@@ -337,8 +341,8 @@ static int pefile_digest_pe(const void *pebuf, unsigned int pelen,
digest_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm);
if (digest_size != ctx->digest_len) {
- pr_debug("Digest size mismatch (%zx != %x)\n",
- digest_size, ctx->digest_len);
+ pr_warn("Digest size mismatch (%zx != %x)\n",
+ digest_size, ctx->digest_len);
ret = -EBADMSG;
goto error_no_desc;
}
@@ -369,7 +373,7 @@ static int pefile_digest_pe(const void *pebuf, unsigned int pelen,
* PKCS#7 certificate.
*/
if (memcmp(digest, ctx->digest, ctx->digest_len) != 0) {
- pr_debug("Digest mismatch\n");
+ pr_warn("Digest mismatch\n");
ret = -EKEYREJECTED;
} else {
pr_debug("The digests match!\n");
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
index 7a9b084e2043..0a7049b470c1 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
@@ -579,6 +579,34 @@ int x509_process_extension(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
return 0;
}
+ if (ctx->last_oid == OID_keyUsage) {
+ /*
+ * Get hold of the keyUsage bit string
+ * v[1] is the encoding size
+ * (Expect either 0x02 or 0x03, making it 1 or 2 bytes)
+ * v[2] is the number of unused bits in the bit string
+ * (If >= 3 keyCertSign is missing when v[1] = 0x02)
+ * v[3] and possibly v[4] contain the bit string
+ *
+ * From RFC 5280 4.2.1.3:
+ * 0x04 is where keyCertSign lands in this bit string
+ * 0x80 is where digitalSignature lands in this bit string
+ */
+ if (v[0] != ASN1_BTS)
+ return -EBADMSG;
+ if (vlen < 4)
+ return -EBADMSG;
+ if (v[2] >= 8)
+ return -EBADMSG;
+ if (v[3] & 0x80)
+ ctx->cert->pub->key_eflags |= 1 << KEY_EFLAG_DIGITALSIG;
+ if (v[1] == 0x02 && v[2] <= 2 && (v[3] & 0x04))
+ ctx->cert->pub->key_eflags |= 1 << KEY_EFLAG_KEYCERTSIGN;
+ else if (vlen > 4 && v[1] == 0x03 && (v[3] & 0x04))
+ ctx->cert->pub->key_eflags |= 1 << KEY_EFLAG_KEYCERTSIGN;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
if (ctx->last_oid == OID_authorityKeyIdentifier) {
/* Get hold of the CA key fingerprint */
ctx->raw_akid = v;
@@ -586,6 +614,28 @@ int x509_process_extension(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
return 0;
}
+ if (ctx->last_oid == OID_basicConstraints) {
+ /*
+ * Get hold of the basicConstraints
+ * v[1] is the encoding size
+ * (Expect 0x2 or greater, making it 1 or more bytes)
+ * v[2] is the encoding type
+ * (Expect an ASN1_BOOL for the CA)
+ * v[3] is the contents of the ASN1_BOOL
+ * (Expect 1 if the CA is TRUE)
+ * vlen should match the entire extension size
+ */
+ if (v[0] != (ASN1_CONS_BIT | ASN1_SEQ))
+ return -EBADMSG;
+ if (vlen < 2)
+ return -EBADMSG;
+ if (v[1] != vlen - 2)
+ return -EBADMSG;
+ if (vlen >= 4 && v[1] != 0 && v[2] == ASN1_BOOL && v[3] == 1)
+ ctx->cert->pub->key_eflags |= 1 << KEY_EFLAG_CA;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
return 0;
}
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.39.0) at 2024-12-11 21:23:58 +0300