diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86')
152 files changed, 4877 insertions, 854 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig index f6946b81f74a..52e36adb5112 100644 --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig @@ -100,6 +100,7 @@ config X86 select ARCH_WANT_DEFAULT_BPF_JIT if X86_64 select ARCH_WANTS_DYNAMIC_TASK_STRUCT select ARCH_WANT_HUGE_PMD_SHARE + select ARCH_WANT_LD_ORPHAN_WARN select ARCH_WANTS_THP_SWAP if X86_64 select BUILDTIME_TABLE_SORT select CLKEVT_I8253 @@ -1930,6 +1931,23 @@ config X86_INTEL_TSX_MODE_AUTO side channel attacks- equals the tsx=auto command line parameter. endchoice +config X86_SGX + bool "Software Guard eXtensions (SGX)" + depends on X86_64 && CPU_SUP_INTEL + depends on CRYPTO=y + depends on CRYPTO_SHA256=y + select SRCU + select MMU_NOTIFIER + help + Intel(R) Software Guard eXtensions (SGX) is a set of CPU instructions + that can be used by applications to set aside private regions of code + and data, referred to as enclaves. An enclave's private memory can + only be accessed by code running within the enclave. Accesses from + outside the enclave, including other enclaves, are disallowed by + hardware. + + If unsure, say N. + config EFI bool "EFI runtime service support" depends on ACPI diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig.debug b/arch/x86/Kconfig.debug index 27b5e2bc6a01..80b57e7f4947 100644 --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig.debug +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig.debug @@ -62,9 +62,6 @@ config EARLY_PRINTK_USB_XDBC You should normally say N here, unless you want to debug early crashes or need a very simple printk logging facility. -config COPY_MC_TEST - def_bool n - config EFI_PGT_DUMP bool "Dump the EFI pagetable" depends on EFI diff --git a/arch/x86/Makefile b/arch/x86/Makefile index 154259f18b8b..7116da3980be 100644 --- a/arch/x86/Makefile +++ b/arch/x86/Makefile @@ -24,14 +24,7 @@ endif # How to compile the 16-bit code. Note we always compile for -march=i386; # that way we can complain to the user if the CPU is insufficient. -# -# The -m16 option is supported by GCC >= 4.9 and clang >= 3.5. For -# older versions of GCC, include an *assembly* header to make sure that -# gcc doesn't play any games behind our back. -CODE16GCC_CFLAGS := -m32 -Wa,$(srctree)/arch/x86/boot/code16gcc.h -M16_CFLAGS := $(call cc-option, -m16, $(CODE16GCC_CFLAGS)) - -REALMODE_CFLAGS := $(M16_CFLAGS) -g -Os -DDISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING \ +REALMODE_CFLAGS := -m16 -g -Os -DDISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING \ -Wall -Wstrict-prototypes -march=i386 -mregparm=3 \ -fno-strict-aliasing -fomit-frame-pointer -fno-pic \ -mno-mmx -mno-sse @@ -209,9 +202,6 @@ ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 LDFLAGS_vmlinux += -z max-page-size=0x200000 endif -# We never want expected sections to be placed heuristically by the -# linker. All sections should be explicitly named in the linker script. -LDFLAGS_vmlinux += $(call ld-option, --orphan-handling=warn) archscripts: scripts_basic $(Q)$(MAKE) $(build)=arch/x86/tools relocs diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/code16gcc.h b/arch/x86/boot/code16gcc.h deleted file mode 100644 index e19fd7536307..000000000000 --- a/arch/x86/boot/code16gcc.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,12 +0,0 @@ -/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ -# -# code16gcc.h -# -# This file is added to the assembler via -Wa when compiling 16-bit C code. -# This is done this way instead via asm() to make sure gcc does not reorder -# things around us. -# -# gcc 4.9+ has a real -m16 option so we can drop this hack long term. -# - - .code16gcc diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile index ee249088cbfe..40b8fd375d52 100644 --- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile @@ -61,7 +61,9 @@ KBUILD_LDFLAGS += $(call ld-option,--no-ld-generated-unwind-info) # Compressed kernel should be built as PIE since it may be loaded at any # address by the bootloader. LDFLAGS_vmlinux := -pie $(call ld-option, --no-dynamic-linker) -LDFLAGS_vmlinux += $(call ld-option, --orphan-handling=warn) +ifdef CONFIG_LD_ORPHAN_WARN +LDFLAGS_vmlinux += --orphan-handling=warn +endif LDFLAGS_vmlinux += -T hostprogs := mkpiggy diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S index 017de6cc87dc..e94874f4bbc1 100644 --- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S @@ -241,12 +241,12 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(startup_32) leal rva(startup_64)(%ebp), %eax #ifdef CONFIG_EFI_MIXED movl rva(efi32_boot_args)(%ebp), %edi - cmp $0, %edi + testl %edi, %edi jz 1f leal rva(efi64_stub_entry)(%ebp), %eax movl rva(efi32_boot_args+4)(%ebp), %esi movl rva(efi32_boot_args+8)(%ebp), %edx // saved bootparams pointer - cmpl $0, %edx + testl %edx, %edx jnz 1f /* * efi_pe_entry uses MS calling convention, which requires 32 bytes of @@ -592,7 +592,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START(trampoline_32bit_src) movl %eax, %cr0 /* Check what paging mode we want to be in after the trampoline */ - cmpl $0, %edx + testl %edx, %edx jz 1f /* We want 5-level paging: don't touch CR3 if it already points to 5-level page tables */ @@ -622,7 +622,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START(trampoline_32bit_src) /* Enable PAE and LA57 (if required) paging modes */ movl $X86_CR4_PAE, %eax - cmpl $0, %edx + testl %edx, %edx jz 1f orl $X86_CR4_LA57, %eax 1: diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/ident_map_64.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/ident_map_64.c index 39b2eded7bc2..f7213d0943b8 100644 --- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/ident_map_64.c +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/ident_map_64.c @@ -168,16 +168,6 @@ void initialize_identity_maps(void *rmode) write_cr3(top_level_pgt); } -/* - * This switches the page tables to the new level4 that has been built - * via calls to add_identity_map() above. If booted via startup_32(), - * this is effectively a no-op. - */ -void finalize_identity_maps(void) -{ - write_cr3(top_level_pgt); -} - static pte_t *split_large_pmd(struct x86_mapping_info *info, pmd_t *pmdp, unsigned long __address) { diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev-es.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev-es.c index 954cb2702e23..27826c265aab 100644 --- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev-es.c +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev-es.c @@ -32,13 +32,12 @@ struct ghcb *boot_ghcb; */ static bool insn_has_rep_prefix(struct insn *insn) { + insn_byte_t p; int i; insn_get_prefixes(insn); - for (i = 0; i < insn->prefixes.nbytes; i++) { - insn_byte_t p = insn->prefixes.bytes[i]; - + for_each_insn_prefix(insn, i, p) { if (p == 0xf2 || p == 0xf3) return true; } diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/aes_glue.c b/arch/x86/crypto/aes_glue.c deleted file mode 100644 index 7b7dc05fa1a4..000000000000 --- a/arch/x86/crypto/aes_glue.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1 +0,0 @@ -// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_asm.S b/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_asm.S index 1852b19a73a0..d1436c37008b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_asm.S +++ b/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_asm.S @@ -318,7 +318,7 @@ _initial_blocks_\@: # Main loop - Encrypt/Decrypt remaining blocks - cmp $0, %r13 + test %r13, %r13 je _zero_cipher_left_\@ sub $64, %r13 je _four_cipher_left_\@ @@ -437,7 +437,7 @@ _multiple_of_16_bytes_\@: mov PBlockLen(%arg2), %r12 - cmp $0, %r12 + test %r12, %r12 je _partial_done\@ GHASH_MUL %xmm8, %xmm13, %xmm9, %xmm10, %xmm11, %xmm5, %xmm6 @@ -474,7 +474,7 @@ _T_8_\@: add $8, %r10 sub $8, %r11 psrldq $8, %xmm0 - cmp $0, %r11 + test %r11, %r11 je _return_T_done_\@ _T_4_\@: movd %xmm0, %eax @@ -482,7 +482,7 @@ _T_4_\@: add $4, %r10 sub $4, %r11 psrldq $4, %xmm0 - cmp $0, %r11 + test %r11, %r11 je _return_T_done_\@ _T_123_\@: movd %xmm0, %eax @@ -619,7 +619,7 @@ _get_AAD_blocks\@: /* read the last <16B of AAD */ _get_AAD_rest\@: - cmp $0, %r11 + test %r11, %r11 je _get_AAD_done\@ READ_PARTIAL_BLOCK %r10, %r11, \TMP1, \TMP7 @@ -640,7 +640,7 @@ _get_AAD_done\@: .macro PARTIAL_BLOCK CYPH_PLAIN_OUT PLAIN_CYPH_IN PLAIN_CYPH_LEN DATA_OFFSET \ AAD_HASH operation mov PBlockLen(%arg2), %r13 - cmp $0, %r13 + test %r13, %r13 je _partial_block_done_\@ # Leave Macro if no partial blocks # Read in input data without over reading cmp $16, \PLAIN_CYPH_LEN @@ -692,7 +692,7 @@ _no_extra_mask_1_\@: pshufb %xmm2, %xmm3 pxor %xmm3, \AAD_HASH - cmp $0, %r10 + test %r10, %r10 jl _partial_incomplete_1_\@ # GHASH computation for the last <16 Byte block @@ -727,7 +727,7 @@ _no_extra_mask_2_\@: pshufb %xmm2, %xmm9 pxor %xmm9, \AAD_HASH - cmp $0, %r10 + test %r10, %r10 jl _partial_incomplete_2_\@ # GHASH computation for the last <16 Byte block @@ -747,7 +747,7 @@ _encode_done_\@: pshufb %xmm2, %xmm9 .endif # output encrypted Bytes - cmp $0, %r10 + test %r10, %r10 jl _partial_fill_\@ mov %r13, %r12 mov $16, %r13 @@ -2720,7 +2720,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_END(aesni_ctr_enc) */ SYM_FUNC_START(aesni_xts_crypt8) FRAME_BEGIN - cmpb $0, %cl + testb %cl, %cl movl $0, %ecx movl $240, %r10d leaq _aesni_enc4, %r11 diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_avx-x86_64.S b/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_avx-x86_64.S index 5fee47956f3b..2cf8e94d986a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_avx-x86_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_avx-x86_64.S @@ -369,7 +369,7 @@ _initial_num_blocks_is_0\@: _initial_blocks_encrypted\@: - cmp $0, %r13 + test %r13, %r13 je _zero_cipher_left\@ sub $128, %r13 @@ -528,7 +528,7 @@ _multiple_of_16_bytes\@: vmovdqu HashKey(arg2), %xmm13 mov PBlockLen(arg2), %r12 - cmp $0, %r12 + test %r12, %r12 je _partial_done\@ #GHASH computation for the last <16 Byte block @@ -573,7 +573,7 @@ _T_8\@: add $8, %r10 sub $8, %r11 vpsrldq $8, %xmm9, %xmm9 - cmp $0, %r11 + test %r11, %r11 je _return_T_done\@ _T_4\@: vmovd %xmm9, %eax @@ -581,7 +581,7 @@ _T_4\@: add $4, %r10 sub $4, %r11 vpsrldq $4, %xmm9, %xmm9 - cmp $0, %r11 + test %r11, %r11 je _return_T_done\@ _T_123\@: vmovd %xmm9, %eax @@ -625,7 +625,7 @@ _get_AAD_blocks\@: cmp $16, %r11 jge _get_AAD_blocks\@ vmovdqu \T8, \T7 - cmp $0, %r11 + test %r11, %r11 je _get_AAD_done\@ vpxor \T7, \T7, \T7 @@ -644,7 +644,7 @@ _get_AAD_rest8\@: vpxor \T1, \T7, \T7 jmp _get_AAD_rest8\@ _get_AAD_rest4\@: - cmp $0, %r11 + test %r11, %r11 jle _get_AAD_rest0\@ mov (%r10), %eax movq %rax, \T1 @@ -749,7 +749,7 @@ _done_read_partial_block_\@: .macro PARTIAL_BLOCK GHASH_MUL CYPH_PLAIN_OUT PLAIN_CYPH_IN PLAIN_CYPH_LEN DATA_OFFSET \ AAD_HASH ENC_DEC mov PBlockLen(arg2), %r13 - cmp $0, %r13 + test %r13, %r13 je _partial_block_done_\@ # Leave Macro if no partial blocks # Read in input data without over reading cmp $16, \PLAIN_CYPH_LEN @@ -801,7 +801,7 @@ _no_extra_mask_1_\@: vpshufb %xmm2, %xmm3, %xmm3 vpxor %xmm3, \AAD_HASH, \AAD_HASH - cmp $0, %r10 + test %r10, %r10 jl _partial_incomplete_1_\@ # GHASH computation for the last <16 Byte block @@ -836,7 +836,7 @@ _no_extra_mask_2_\@: vpshufb %xmm2, %xmm9, %xmm9 vpxor %xmm9, \AAD_HASH, \AAD_HASH - cmp $0, %r10 + test %r10, %r10 jl _partial_incomplete_2_\@ # GHASH computation for the last <16 Byte block @@ -856,7 +856,7 @@ _encode_done_\@: vpshufb %xmm2, %xmm9, %xmm9 .endif # output encrypted Bytes - cmp $0, %r10 + test %r10, %r10 jl _partial_fill_\@ mov %r13, %r12 mov $16, %r13 diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/poly1305-x86_64-cryptogams.pl b/arch/x86/crypto/poly1305-x86_64-cryptogams.pl index 7d568012cc15..71fae5a09e56 100644 --- a/arch/x86/crypto/poly1305-x86_64-cryptogams.pl +++ b/arch/x86/crypto/poly1305-x86_64-cryptogams.pl @@ -251,7 +251,7 @@ $code.=<<___; mov %rax,8($ctx) mov %rax,16($ctx) - cmp \$0,$inp + test $inp,$inp je .Lno_key ___ $code.=<<___ if (!$kernel); diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/poly1305_glue.c b/arch/x86/crypto/poly1305_glue.c index c44aba290fbb..646da46e8d10 100644 --- a/arch/x86/crypto/poly1305_glue.c +++ b/arch/x86/crypto/poly1305_glue.c @@ -210,7 +210,7 @@ void poly1305_final_arch(struct poly1305_desc_ctx *dctx, u8 *dst) } poly1305_simd_emit(&dctx->h, dst, dctx->s); - *dctx = (struct poly1305_desc_ctx){}; + memzero_explicit(dctx, sizeof(*dctx)); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(poly1305_final_arch); diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/sha1_ssse3_glue.c b/arch/x86/crypto/sha1_ssse3_glue.c index 18200135603f..44340a1139e0 100644 --- a/arch/x86/crypto/sha1_ssse3_glue.c +++ b/arch/x86/crypto/sha1_ssse3_glue.c @@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ #include <linux/module.h> #include <linux/mm.h> #include <linux/types.h> -#include <crypto/sha.h> +#include <crypto/sha1.h> #include <crypto/sha1_base.h> #include <asm/simd.h> diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/sha256_ssse3_glue.c b/arch/x86/crypto/sha256_ssse3_glue.c index dd06249229e1..3a5f6be7dbba 100644 --- a/arch/x86/crypto/sha256_ssse3_glue.c +++ b/arch/x86/crypto/sha256_ssse3_glue.c @@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ #include <linux/module.h> #include <linux/mm.h> #include <linux/types.h> -#include <crypto/sha.h> +#include <crypto/sha2.h> #include <crypto/sha256_base.h> #include <linux/string.h> #include <asm/simd.h> diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/sha512-avx-asm.S b/arch/x86/crypto/sha512-avx-asm.S index 63470fd6ae32..684d58c8bc4f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/crypto/sha512-avx-asm.S +++ b/arch/x86/crypto/sha512-avx-asm.S @@ -278,7 +278,7 @@ frame_size = frame_GPRSAVE + GPRSAVE_SIZE # "blocks" is the message length in SHA512 blocks ######################################################################## SYM_FUNC_START(sha512_transform_avx) - cmp $0, msglen + test msglen, msglen je nowork # Allocate Stack Space diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/sha512-ssse3-asm.S b/arch/x86/crypto/sha512-ssse3-asm.S index 7946a1bee85b..50812af0b083 100644 --- a/arch/x86/crypto/sha512-ssse3-asm.S +++ b/arch/x86/crypto/sha512-ssse3-asm.S @@ -280,7 +280,7 @@ frame_size = frame_GPRSAVE + GPRSAVE_SIZE ######################################################################## SYM_FUNC_START(sha512_transform_ssse3) - cmp $0, msglen + test msglen, msglen je nowork # Allocate Stack Space diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/sha512_ssse3_glue.c b/arch/x86/crypto/sha512_ssse3_glue.c index b0b05c93409e..30e70f4fe2f7 100644 --- a/arch/x86/crypto/sha512_ssse3_glue.c +++ b/arch/x86/crypto/sha512_ssse3_glue.c @@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ #include <linux/mm.h> #include <linux/string.h> #include <linux/types.h> -#include <crypto/sha.h> +#include <crypto/sha2.h> #include <crypto/sha512_base.h> #include <asm/simd.h> diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile index 21243747965d..02e3e42f380b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile +++ b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile @@ -27,9 +27,10 @@ VDSO32-$(CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION) := y vobjs-y := vdso-note.o vclock_gettime.o vgetcpu.o vobjs32-y := vdso32/note.o vdso32/system_call.o vdso32/sigreturn.o vobjs32-y += vdso32/vclock_gettime.o +vobjs-$(CONFIG_X86_SGX) += vsgx.o # files to link into kernel -obj-y += vma.o +obj-y += vma.o extable.o KASAN_SANITIZE_vma.o := y UBSAN_SANITIZE_vma.o := y KCSAN_SANITIZE_vma.o := y @@ -98,6 +99,7 @@ $(vobjs): KBUILD_CFLAGS := $(filter-out $(GCC_PLUGINS_CFLAGS) $(RETPOLINE_CFLAGS CFLAGS_REMOVE_vclock_gettime.o = -pg CFLAGS_REMOVE_vdso32/vclock_gettime.o = -pg CFLAGS_REMOVE_vgetcpu.o = -pg +CFLAGS_REMOVE_vsgx.o = -pg # # X32 processes use x32 vDSO to access 64bit kernel data. @@ -128,8 +130,8 @@ $(obj)/%-x32.o: $(obj)/%.o FORCE targets += vdsox32.lds $(vobjx32s-y) -$(obj)/%.so: OBJCOPYFLAGS := -S -$(obj)/%.so: $(obj)/%.so.dbg FORCE +$(obj)/%.so: OBJCOPYFLAGS := -S --remove-section __ex_table +$(obj)/%.so: $(obj)/%.so.dbg $(call if_changed,objcopy) $(obj)/vdsox32.so.dbg: $(obj)/vdsox32.lds $(vobjx32s) FORCE diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/extable.c b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/extable.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..afcf5b65beef --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/extable.c @@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +#include <linux/err.h> +#include <linux/mm.h> +#include <asm/current.h> +#include <asm/traps.h> +#include <asm/vdso.h> + +struct vdso_exception_table_entry { + int insn, fixup; +}; + +bool fixup_vdso_exception(struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr, + unsigned long error_code, unsigned long fault_addr) +{ + const struct vdso_image *image = current->mm->context.vdso_image; + const struct vdso_exception_table_entry *extable; + unsigned int nr_entries, i; + unsigned long base; + + /* + * Do not attempt to fixup #DB or #BP. It's impossible to identify + * whether or not a #DB/#BP originated from within an SGX enclave and + * SGX enclaves are currently the only use case for vDSO fixup. + */ + if (trapnr == X86_TRAP_DB || trapnr == X86_TRAP_BP) + return false; + + if (!current->mm->context.vdso) + return false; + + base = (unsigned long)current->mm->context.vdso + image->extable_base; + nr_entries = image->extable_len / (sizeof(*extable)); + extable = image->extable; + + for (i = 0; i < nr_entries; i++) { + if (regs->ip == base + extable[i].insn) { + regs->ip = base + extable[i].fixup; + regs->di = trapnr; + regs->si = error_code; + regs->dx = fault_addr; + return true; + } + } + + return false; +} diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/extable.h b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/extable.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..b56f6b012941 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/extable.h @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +#ifndef __VDSO_EXTABLE_H +#define __VDSO_EXTABLE_H + +/* + * Inject exception fixup for vDSO code. Unlike normal exception fixup, + * vDSO uses a dedicated handler the addresses are relative to the overall + * exception table, not each individual entry. + */ +#ifdef __ASSEMBLY__ +#define _ASM_VDSO_EXTABLE_HANDLE(from, to) \ + ASM_VDSO_EXTABLE_HANDLE from to + +.macro ASM_VDSO_EXTABLE_HANDLE from:req to:req + .pushsection __ex_table, "a" + .long (\from) - __ex_table + .long (\to) - __ex_table + .popsection +.endm +#else +#define _ASM_VDSO_EXTABLE_HANDLE(from, to) \ + ".pushsection __ex_table, \"a\"\n" \ + ".long (" #from ") - __ex_table\n" \ + ".long (" #to ") - __ex_table\n" \ + ".popsection\n" +#endif + +#endif /* __VDSO_EXTABLE_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso-layout.lds.S b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso-layout.lds.S index 4d152933547d..dc8da7695859 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso-layout.lds.S +++ b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso-layout.lds.S @@ -75,11 +75,18 @@ SECTIONS * stuff that isn't used at runtime in between. */ - .text : { *(.text*) } :text =0x90909090, + .text : { + *(.text*) + *(.fixup) + } :text =0x90909090, + + .altinstructions : { *(.altinstructions) } :text .altinstr_replacement : { *(.altinstr_replacement) } :text + __ex_table : { *(__ex_table) } :text + /DISCARD/ : { *(.discard) *(.discard.*) diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso.lds.S b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso.lds.S index 36b644e16272..4bf48462fca7 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso.lds.S +++ b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso.lds.S @@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ VERSION { __vdso_time; clock_getres; __vdso_clock_getres; + __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave; local: *; }; } diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso2c.h b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso2c.h index 6f46e11ce539..1c7cfac7e64a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso2c.h +++ b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso2c.h @@ -5,6 +5,41 @@ * are built for 32-bit userspace. */ +static void BITSFUNC(copy)(FILE *outfile, const unsigned char *data, size_t len) +{ + size_t i; + + for (i = 0; i < len; i++) { + if (i % 10 == 0) + fprintf(outfile, "\n\t"); + fprintf(outfile, "0x%02X, ", (int)(data)[i]); + } +} + + +/* + * Extract a section from the input data into a standalone blob. Used to + * capture kernel-only data that needs to persist indefinitely, e.g. the + * exception fixup tables, but only in the kernel, i.e. the section can + * be stripped from the final vDSO image. + */ +static void BITSFUNC(extract)(const unsigned char *data, size_t data_len, + FILE *outfile, ELF(Shdr) *sec, const char *name) +{ + unsigned long offset; + size_t len; + + offset = (unsigned long)GET_LE(&sec->sh_offset); + len = (size_t)GET_LE(&sec->sh_size); + + if (offset + len > data_len) + fail("section to extract overruns input data"); + + fprintf(outfile, "static const unsigned char %s[%lu] = {", name, len); + BITSFUNC(copy)(outfile, data + offset, len); + fprintf(outfile, "\n};\n\n"); +} + static void BITSFUNC(go)(void *raw_addr, size_t raw_len, void *stripped_addr, size_t stripped_len, FILE *outfile, const char *image_name) @@ -15,7 +50,7 @@ static void BITSFUNC(go)(void *raw_addr, size_t raw_len, ELF(Ehdr) *hdr = (ELF(Ehdr) *)raw_addr; unsigned long i, syms_nr; ELF(Shdr) *symtab_hdr = NULL, *strtab_hdr, *secstrings_hdr, - *alt_sec = NULL; + *alt_sec = NULL, *extable_sec = NULL; ELF(Dyn) *dyn = 0, *dyn_end = 0; const char *secstrings; INT_BITS syms[NSYMS] = {}; @@ -77,6 +112,8 @@ static void BITSFUNC(go)(void *raw_addr, size_t raw_len, if (!strcmp(secstrings + GET_LE(&sh->sh_name), ".altinstructions")) alt_sec = sh; + if (!strcmp(secstrings + GET_LE(&sh->sh_name), "__ex_table")) + extable_sec = sh; } if (!symtab_hdr) @@ -155,6 +192,9 @@ static void BITSFUNC(go)(void *raw_addr, size_t raw_len, (int)((unsigned char *)stripped_addr)[i]); } fprintf(outfile, "\n};\n\n"); + if (extable_sec) + BITSFUNC(extract)(raw_addr, raw_len, outfile, + extable_sec, "extable"); fprintf(outfile, "const struct vdso_image %s = {\n", image_name); fprintf(outfile, "\t.data = raw_data,\n"); @@ -165,6 +205,14 @@ static void BITSFUNC(go)(void *raw_addr, size_t raw_len, fprintf(outfile, "\t.alt_len = %lu,\n", (unsigned long)GET_LE(&alt_sec->sh_size)); } + if (extable_sec) { + fprintf(outfile, "\t.extable_base = %lu,\n", + (unsigned long)GET_LE(&extable_sec->sh_offset)); + fprintf(outfile, "\t.extable_len = %lu,\n", + (unsigned long)GET_LE(&extable_sec->sh_size)); + fprintf(outfile, "\t.extable = extable,\n"); + } + for (i = 0; i < NSYMS; i++) { if (required_syms[i].export && syms[i]) fprintf(outfile, "\t.sym_%s = %" PRIi64 ",\n", diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vma.c b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vma.c index 9185cb1d13b9..50e5d3a2e70a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vma.c +++ b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vma.c @@ -413,10 +413,10 @@ int arch_setup_additional_pages(struct linux_binprm *bprm, int uses_interp) #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT int compat_arch_setup_additional_pages(struct linux_binprm *bprm, - int uses_interp) + int uses_interp, bool x32) { #ifdef CONFIG_X86_X32_ABI - if (test_thread_flag(TIF_X32)) { + if (x32) { if (!vdso64_enabled) return 0; return map_vdso_randomized(&vdso_image_x32); diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vsgx.S b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vsgx.S new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..86a0e94f68df --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vsgx.S @@ -0,0 +1,151 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ + +#include <linux/linkage.h> +#include <asm/export.h> +#include <asm/errno.h> +#include <asm/enclu.h> + +#include "extable.h" + +/* Relative to %rbp. */ +#define SGX_ENCLAVE_OFFSET_OF_RUN 16 + +/* The offsets relative to struct sgx_enclave_run. */ +#define SGX_ENCLAVE_RUN_TCS 0 +#define SGX_ENCLAVE_RUN_LEAF 8 +#define SGX_ENCLAVE_RUN_EXCEPTION_VECTOR 12 +#define SGX_ENCLAVE_RUN_EXCEPTION_ERROR_CODE 14 +#define SGX_ENCLAVE_RUN_EXCEPTION_ADDR 16 +#define SGX_ENCLAVE_RUN_USER_HANDLER 24 +#define SGX_ENCLAVE_RUN_USER_DATA 32 /* not used */ +#define SGX_ENCLAVE_RUN_RESERVED_START 40 +#define SGX_ENCLAVE_RUN_RESERVED_END 256 + +.code64 +.section .text, "ax" + +SYM_FUNC_START(__vdso_sgx_enter_enclave) + /* Prolog */ + .cfi_startproc + push %rbp + .cfi_adjust_cfa_offset 8 + .cfi_rel_offset %rbp, 0 + mov %rsp, %rbp + .cfi_def_cfa_register %rbp + push %rbx + .cfi_rel_offset %rbx, -8 + + mov %ecx, %eax +.Lenter_enclave: + /* EENTER <= function <= ERESUME */ + cmp $EENTER, %eax + jb .Linvalid_input + cmp $ERESUME, %eax + ja .Linvalid_input + + mov SGX_ENCLAVE_OFFSET_OF_RUN(%rbp), %rcx + + /* Validate that the reserved area contains only zeros. */ + mov $SGX_ENCLAVE_RUN_RESERVED_START, %rbx +1: + cmpq $0, (%rcx, %rbx) + jne .Linvalid_input + add $8, %rbx + cmpq $SGX_ENCLAVE_RUN_RESERVED_END, %rbx + jne 1b + + /* Load TCS and AEP */ + mov SGX_ENCLAVE_RUN_TCS(%rcx), %rbx + lea .Lasync_exit_pointer(%rip), %rcx + + /* Single ENCLU serving as both EENTER and AEP (ERESUME) */ +.Lasync_exit_pointer: +.Lenclu_eenter_eresume: + enclu + + /* EEXIT jumps here unless the enclave is doing something fancy. */ + mov SGX_ENCLAVE_OFFSET_OF_RUN(%rbp), %rbx + + /* Set exit_reason. */ + movl $EEXIT, SGX_ENCLAVE_RUN_LEAF(%rbx) + + /* Invoke userspace's exit handler if one was provided. */ +.Lhandle_exit: + cmpq $0, SGX_ENCLAVE_RUN_USER_HANDLER(%rbx) + jne .Linvoke_userspace_handler + + /* Success, in the sense that ENCLU was attempted. */ + xor %eax, %eax + +.Lout: + pop %rbx + leave + .cfi_def_cfa %rsp, 8 + ret + + /* The out-of-line code runs with the pre-leave stack frame. */ + .cfi_def_cfa %rbp, 16 + +.Linvalid_input: + mov $(-EINVAL), %eax + jmp .Lout + +.Lhandle_exception: + mov SGX_ENCLAVE_OFFSET_OF_RUN(%rbp), %rbx + + /* Set the exception info. */ + mov %eax, (SGX_ENCLAVE_RUN_LEAF)(%rbx) + mov %di, (SGX_ENCLAVE_RUN_EXCEPTION_VECTOR)(%rbx) + mov %si, (SGX_ENCLAVE_RUN_EXCEPTION_ERROR_CODE)(%rbx) + mov %rdx, (SGX_ENCLAVE_RUN_EXCEPTION_ADDR)(%rbx) + jmp .Lhandle_exit + +.Linvoke_userspace_handler: + /* Pass the untrusted RSP (at exit) to the callback via %rcx. */ + mov %rsp, %rcx + + /* Save struct sgx_enclave_exception %rbx is about to be clobbered. */ + mov %rbx, %rax + + /* Save the untrusted RSP offset in %rbx (non-volatile register). */ + mov %rsp, %rbx + and $0xf, %rbx + + /* + * Align stack per x86_64 ABI. Note, %rsp needs to be 16-byte aligned + * _after_ pushing the parameters on the stack, hence the bonus push. + */ + and $-0x10, %rsp + push %rax + + /* Push struct sgx_enclave_exception as a param to the callback. */ + push %rax + + /* Clear RFLAGS.DF per x86_64 ABI */ + cld + + /* + * Load the callback pointer to %rax and lfence for LVI (load value + * injection) protection before making the call. + */ + mov SGX_ENCLAVE_RUN_USER_HANDLER(%rax), %rax + lfence + call *%rax + + /* Undo the post-exit %rsp adjustment. */ + lea 0x10(%rsp, %rbx), %rsp + + /* + * If the return from callback is zero or negative, return immediately, + * else re-execute ENCLU with the postive return value interpreted as + * the requested ENCLU function. + */ + cmp $0, %eax + jle .Lout + jmp .Lenter_enclave + + .cfi_endproc + +_ASM_VDSO_EXTABLE_HANDLE(.Lenclu_eenter_eresume, .Lhandle_exception) + +SYM_FUNC_END(__vdso_sgx_enter_enclave) diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c b/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c index 44c33103a955..1b40b9297083 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c +++ b/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c @@ -316,7 +316,7 @@ static struct vm_area_struct gate_vma __ro_after_init = { struct vm_area_struct *get_gate_vma(struct mm_struct *mm) { #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT - if (!mm || mm->context.ia32_compat) + if (!mm || !(mm->context.flags & MM_CONTEXT_HAS_VSYSCALL)) return NULL; #endif if (vsyscall_mode == NONE) diff --git a/arch/x86/events/amd/core.c b/arch/x86/events/amd/core.c index 39eb276d0277..2c1791c4a518 100644 --- a/arch/x86/events/amd/core.c +++ b/arch/x86/events/amd/core.c @@ -538,7 +538,7 @@ static void amd_pmu_cpu_starting(int cpu) if (!x86_pmu.amd_nb_constraints) return; - nb_id = amd_get_nb_id(cpu); + nb_id = topology_die_id(cpu); WARN_ON_ONCE(nb_id == BAD_APICID); for_each_online_cpu(i) { diff --git a/arch/x86/events/core.c b/arch/x86/events/core.c index a88c94d65693..77b963e5e70a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/events/core.c +++ b/arch/x86/events/core.c @@ -2602,7 +2602,7 @@ perf_callchain_user32(struct pt_regs *regs, struct perf_callchain_entry_ctx *ent struct stack_frame_ia32 frame; const struct stack_frame_ia32 __user *fp; - if (!test_thread_flag(TIF_IA32)) + if (user_64bit_mode(regs)) return 0; cs_base = get_segment_base(regs->cs); diff --git a/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c b/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c index f1926e9f2143..af457f8cb29d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c +++ b/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c @@ -2630,7 +2630,7 @@ static int handle_pmi_common(struct pt_regs *regs, u64 status) u64 pebs_enabled = cpuc->pebs_enabled; handled++; - x86_pmu.drain_pebs(regs); + x86_pmu.drain_pebs(regs, &data); status &= x86_pmu.intel_ctrl | GLOBAL_STATUS_TRACE_TOPAPMI; /* @@ -4987,6 +4987,12 @@ __init int intel_pmu_init(void) x86_add_quirk(intel_arch_events_quirk); /* Install first, so it runs last */ + if (version >= 5) { + x86_pmu.intel_cap.anythread_deprecated = edx.split.anythread_deprecated; + if (x86_pmu.intel_cap.anythread_deprecated) + pr_cont(" AnyThread deprecated, "); + } + /* * Install the hw-cache-events table: */ @@ -5512,6 +5518,10 @@ __init int intel_pmu_init(void) x86_pmu.intel_ctrl |= ((1LL << x86_pmu.num_counters_fixed)-1) << INTEL_PMC_IDX_FIXED; + /* AnyThread may be deprecated on arch perfmon v5 or later */ + if (x86_pmu.intel_cap.anythread_deprecated) + x86_pmu.format_attrs = intel_arch_formats_attr; + if (x86_pmu.event_constraints) { /* * event on fixed counter2 (REF_CYCLES) only works on this diff --git a/arch/x86/events/intel/cstate.c b/arch/x86/events/intel/cstate.c index 442e1ed4acd4..4eb7ee5fed72 100644 --- a/arch/x86/events/intel/cstate.c +++ b/arch/x86/events/intel/cstate.c @@ -107,14 +107,14 @@ MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); #define DEFINE_CSTATE_FORMAT_ATTR(_var, _name, _format) \ -static ssize_t __cstate_##_var##_show(struct kobject *kobj, \ - struct kobj_attribute *attr, \ +static ssize_t __cstate_##_var##_show(struct device *dev, \ + struct device_attribute *attr, \ char *page) \ { \ BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(_format) >= PAGE_SIZE); \ return sprintf(page, _format "\n"); \ } \ -static struct kobj_attribute format_attr_##_var = \ +static struct device_attribute format_attr_##_var = \ __ATTR(_name, 0444, __cstate_##_var##_show, NULL) static ssize_t cstate_get_attr_cpumask(struct device *dev, diff --git a/arch/x86/events/intel/ds.c b/arch/x86/events/intel/ds.c index 404315df1e16..a5c6ff5f1b4c 100644 --- a/arch/x86/events/intel/ds.c +++ b/arch/x86/events/intel/ds.c @@ -642,8 +642,8 @@ int intel_pmu_drain_bts_buffer(void) rcu_read_lock(); perf_prepare_sample(&header, &data, event, ®s); - if (perf_output_begin(&handle, event, header.size * - (top - base - skip))) + if (perf_output_begin(&handle, &data, event, + header.size * (top - base - skip))) goto unlock; for (at = base; at < top; at++) { @@ -670,7 +670,9 @@ unlock: static inline void intel_pmu_drain_pebs_buffer(void) { - x86_pmu.drain_pebs(NULL); + struct perf_sample_data data; + + x86_pmu.drain_pebs(NULL, &data); } /* @@ -1259,7 +1261,7 @@ static int intel_pmu_pebs_fixup_ip(struct pt_regs *regs) old_to = to; #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 - is_64bit = kernel_ip(to) || !test_thread_flag(TIF_IA32); + is_64bit = kernel_ip(to) || any_64bit_mode(regs); #endif insn_init(&insn, kaddr, size, is_64bit); insn_get_length(&insn); @@ -1719,23 +1721,24 @@ intel_pmu_save_and_restart_reload(struct perf_event *event, int count) return 0; } -static void __intel_pmu_pebs_event(struct perf_event *event, - struct pt_regs *iregs, - void *base, void *top, - int bit, int count, - void (*setup_sample)(struct perf_event *, - struct pt_regs *, - void *, - struct perf_sample_data *, - struct pt_regs *)) +static __always_inline void +__intel_pmu_pebs_event(struct perf_event *event, + struct pt_regs *iregs, + struct perf_sample_data *data, + void *base, void *top, + int bit, int count, + void (*setup_sample)(struct perf_event *, + struct pt_regs *, + void *, + struct perf_sample_data *, + struct pt_regs *)) { struct cpu_hw_events *cpuc = this_cpu_ptr(&cpu_hw_events); struct hw_perf_event *hwc = &event->hw; - struct perf_sample_data data; struct x86_perf_regs perf_regs; struct pt_regs *regs = &perf_regs.regs; void *at = get_next_pebs_record_by_bit(base, top, bit); - struct pt_regs dummy_iregs; + static struct pt_regs dummy_iregs; if (hwc->flags & PERF_X86_EVENT_AUTO_RELOAD) { /* @@ -1752,14 +1755,14 @@ static void __intel_pmu_pebs_event(struct perf_event *event, iregs = &dummy_iregs; while (count > 1) { - setup_sample(event, iregs, at, &data, regs); - perf_event_output(event, &data, regs); + setup_sample(event, iregs, at, data, regs); + perf_event_output(event, data, regs); at += cpuc->pebs_record_size; at = get_next_pebs_record_by_bit(at, top, bit); count--; } - setup_sample(event, iregs, at, &data, regs); + setup_sample(event, iregs, at, data, regs); if (iregs == &dummy_iregs) { /* * The PEBS records may be drained in the non-overflow context, @@ -1767,18 +1770,18 @@ static void __intel_pmu_pebs_event(struct perf_event *event, * last record the same as other PEBS records, and doesn't * invoke the generic overflow handler. */ - perf_event_output(event, &data, regs); + perf_event_output(event, data, regs); } else { /* * All but the last records are processed. * The last one is left to be able to call the overflow handler. */ - if (perf_event_overflow(event, &data, regs)) + if (perf_event_overflow(event, data, regs)) x86_pmu_stop(event, 0); } } -static void intel_pmu_drain_pebs_core(struct pt_regs *iregs) +static void intel_pmu_drain_pebs_core(struct pt_regs *iregs, struct perf_sample_data *data) { struct cpu_hw_events *cpuc = this_cpu_ptr(&cpu_hw_events); struct debug_store *ds = cpuc->ds; @@ -1812,7 +1815,7 @@ static void intel_pmu_drain_pebs_core(struct pt_regs *iregs) return; } - __intel_pmu_pebs_event(event, iregs, at, top, 0, n, + __intel_pmu_pebs_event(event, iregs, data, at, top, 0, n, setup_pebs_fixed_sample_data); } @@ -1835,7 +1838,7 @@ static void intel_pmu_pebs_event_update_no_drain(struct cpu_hw_events *cpuc, int } } -static void intel_pmu_drain_pebs_nhm(struct pt_regs *iregs) +static void intel_pmu_drain_pebs_nhm(struct pt_regs *iregs, struct perf_sample_data *data) { struct cpu_hw_events *cpuc = this_cpu_ptr(&cpu_hw_events); struct debug_store *ds = cpuc->ds; @@ -1913,7 +1916,7 @@ static void intel_pmu_drain_pebs_nhm(struct pt_regs *iregs) * that caused the PEBS record. It's called collision. * If collision happened, the record will be dropped. */ - if (p->status != (1ULL << bit)) { + if (pebs_status != (1ULL << bit)) { for_each_set_bit(i, (unsigned long *)&pebs_status, size) error[i]++; continue; @@ -1937,19 +1940,19 @@ static void intel_pmu_drain_pebs_nhm(struct pt_regs *iregs) if (error[bit]) { perf_log_lost_samples(event, error[bit]); - if (perf_event_account_interrupt(event)) + if (iregs && perf_event_account_interrupt(event)) x86_pmu_stop(event, 0); } if (counts[bit]) { - __intel_pmu_pebs_event(event, iregs, base, + __intel_pmu_pebs_event(event, iregs, data, base, top, bit, counts[bit], setup_pebs_fixed_sample_data); } } } -static void intel_pmu_drain_pebs_icl(struct pt_regs *iregs) +static void intel_pmu_drain_pebs_icl(struct pt_regs *iregs, struct perf_sample_data *data) { short counts[INTEL_PMC_IDX_FIXED + MAX_FIXED_PEBS_EVENTS] = {}; struct cpu_hw_events *cpuc = this_cpu_ptr(&cpu_hw_events); @@ -1997,7 +2000,7 @@ static void intel_pmu_drain_pebs_icl(struct pt_regs *iregs) if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!event->attr.precise_ip)) continue; - __intel_pmu_pebs_event(event, iregs, base, + __intel_pmu_pebs_event(event, iregs, data, base, top, bit, counts[bit], setup_pebs_adaptive_sample_data); } diff --git a/arch/x86/events/intel/lbr.c b/arch/x86/events/intel/lbr.c index 8961653c5dd2..1aadb253d296 100644 --- a/arch/x86/events/intel/lbr.c +++ b/arch/x86/events/intel/lbr.c @@ -1221,7 +1221,7 @@ static int branch_type(unsigned long from, unsigned long to, int abort) * on 64-bit systems running 32-bit apps */ #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 - is64 = kernel_ip((unsigned long)addr) || !test_thread_flag(TIF_IA32); + is64 = kernel_ip((unsigned long)addr) || any_64bit_mode(current_pt_regs()); #endif insn_init(&insn, addr, bytes_read, is64); insn_get_opcode(&insn); diff --git a/arch/x86/events/intel/uncore.c b/arch/x86/events/intel/uncore.c index 86d012b3e0b4..80d52cbe2fde 100644 --- a/arch/x86/events/intel/uncore.c +++ b/arch/x86/events/intel/uncore.c @@ -94,8 +94,8 @@ end: return map; } -ssize_t uncore_event_show(struct kobject *kobj, - struct kobj_attribute *attr, char *buf) +ssize_t uncore_event_show(struct device *dev, + struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf) { struct uncore_event_desc *event = container_of(attr, struct uncore_event_desc, attr); diff --git a/arch/x86/events/intel/uncore.h b/arch/x86/events/intel/uncore.h index 83d2a7d490e0..9efea154349d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/events/intel/uncore.h +++ b/arch/x86/events/intel/uncore.h @@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ struct intel_uncore_box { #define UNCORE_BOX_FLAG_CFL8_CBOX_MSR_OFFS 2 struct uncore_event_desc { - struct kobj_attribute attr; + struct device_attribute attr; const char *config; }; @@ -179,8 +179,8 @@ struct pci2phy_map { struct pci2phy_map *__find_pci2phy_map(int segment); int uncore_pcibus_to_physid(struct pci_bus *bus); -ssize_t uncore_event_show(struct kobject *kobj, - struct kobj_attribute *attr, char *buf); +ssize_t uncore_event_show(struct device *dev, + struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf); static inline struct intel_uncore_pmu *dev_to_uncore_pmu(struct device *dev) { @@ -201,14 +201,14 @@ extern int __uncore_max_dies; } #define DEFINE_UNCORE_FORMAT_ATTR(_var, _name, _format) \ -static ssize_t __uncore_##_var##_show(struct kobject *kobj, \ - struct kobj_attribute *attr, \ +static ssize_t __uncore_##_var##_show(struct device *dev, \ + struct device_attribute *attr, \ char *page) \ { \ BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(_format) >= PAGE_SIZE); \ return sprintf(page, _format "\n"); \ } \ -static struct kobj_attribute format_attr_##_var = \ +static struct device_attribute format_attr_##_var = \ __ATTR(_name, 0444, __uncore_##_var##_show, NULL) static inline bool uncore_pmc_fixed(int idx) diff --git a/arch/x86/events/intel/uncore_snb.c b/arch/x86/events/intel/uncore_snb.c index 39e632ed6ca9..bbd1120ae161 100644 --- a/arch/x86/events/intel/uncore_snb.c +++ b/arch/x86/events/intel/uncore_snb.c @@ -475,7 +475,7 @@ enum perf_snb_uncore_imc_freerunning_types { static struct freerunning_counters snb_uncore_imc_freerunning[] = { [SNB_PCI_UNCORE_IMC_DATA_READS] = { SNB_UNCORE_PCI_IMC_DATA_READS_BASE, 0x0, 0x0, 1, 32 }, - [SNB_PCI_UNCORE_IMC_DATA_READS] = { SNB_UNCORE_PCI_IMC_DATA_WRITES_BASE, + [SNB_PCI_UNCORE_IMC_DATA_WRITES] = { SNB_UNCORE_PCI_IMC_DATA_WRITES_BASE, 0x0, 0x0, 1, 32 }, [SNB_PCI_UNCORE_IMC_GT_REQUESTS] = { SNB_UNCORE_PCI_IMC_GT_REQUESTS_BASE, 0x0, 0x0, 1, 32 }, diff --git a/arch/x86/events/perf_event.h b/arch/x86/events/perf_event.h index ee2b9b9fc2a5..6a8edfe59b09 100644 --- a/arch/x86/events/perf_event.h +++ b/arch/x86/events/perf_event.h @@ -585,6 +585,7 @@ union perf_capabilities { u64 pebs_baseline:1; u64 perf_metrics:1; u64 pebs_output_pt_available:1; + u64 anythread_deprecated:1; }; u64 capabilities; }; @@ -727,7 +728,7 @@ struct x86_pmu { int pebs_record_size; int pebs_buffer_size; int max_pebs_events; - void (*drain_pebs)(struct pt_regs *regs); + void (*drain_pebs)(struct pt_regs *regs, struct perf_sample_data *data); struct event_constraint *pebs_constraints; void (*pebs_aliases)(struct perf_event *event); unsigned long large_pebs_flags; diff --git a/arch/x86/events/rapl.c b/arch/x86/events/rapl.c index 7c0120e2e957..7dbbeaacd995 100644 --- a/arch/x86/events/rapl.c +++ b/arch/x86/events/rapl.c @@ -93,18 +93,6 @@ static const char *const rapl_domain_names[NR_RAPL_DOMAINS] __initconst = { * any other bit is reserved */ #define RAPL_EVENT_MASK 0xFFULL - -#define DEFINE_RAPL_FORMAT_ATTR(_var, _name, _format) \ -static ssize_t __rapl_##_var##_show(struct kobject *kobj, \ - struct kobj_attribute *attr, \ - char *page) \ -{ \ - BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(_format) >= PAGE_SIZE); \ - return sprintf(page, _format "\n"); \ -} \ -static struct kobj_attribute format_attr_##_var = \ - __ATTR(_name, 0444, __rapl_##_var##_show, NULL) - #define RAPL_CNTR_WIDTH 32 #define RAPL_EVENT_ATTR_STR(_name, v, str) \ @@ -441,7 +429,7 @@ static struct attribute_group rapl_pmu_events_group = { .attrs = attrs_empty, }; -DEFINE_RAPL_FORMAT_ATTR(event, event, "config:0-7"); +PMU_FORMAT_ATTR(event, "config:0-7"); static struct attribute *rapl_formats_attr[] = { &format_attr_event.attr, NULL, diff --git a/arch/x86/ia32/ia32_signal.c b/arch/x86/ia32/ia32_signal.c index 81cf22398cd1..5e3d9b7fd5fb 100644 --- a/arch/x86/ia32/ia32_signal.c +++ b/arch/x86/ia32/ia32_signal.c @@ -347,7 +347,7 @@ int ia32_setup_rt_frame(int sig, struct ksignal *ksig, */ unsafe_put_user(*((u64 *)&code), (u64 __user *)frame->retcode, Efault); unsafe_put_sigcontext32(&frame->uc.uc_mcontext, fp, regs, set, Efault); - unsafe_put_user(*(__u64 *)set, (__u64 *)&frame->uc.uc_sigmask, Efault); + unsafe_put_user(*(__u64 *)set, (__u64 __user *)&frame->uc.uc_sigmask, Efault); user_access_end(); if (__copy_siginfo_to_user32(&frame->info, &ksig->info)) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/acpi.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/acpi.h index 6d2df1ee427b..65064d9f7fa6 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/acpi.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/acpi.h @@ -159,6 +159,8 @@ static inline u64 x86_default_get_root_pointer(void) extern int x86_acpi_numa_init(void); #endif /* CONFIG_ACPI_NUMA */ +struct cper_ia_proc_ctx; + #ifdef CONFIG_ACPI_APEI static inline pgprot_t arch_apei_get_mem_attribute(phys_addr_t addr) { @@ -177,6 +179,15 @@ static inline pgprot_t arch_apei_get_mem_attribute(phys_addr_t addr) */ return PAGE_KERNEL_NOENC; } + +int arch_apei_report_x86_error(struct cper_ia_proc_ctx *ctx_info, + u64 lapic_id); +#else +static inline int arch_apei_report_x86_error(struct cper_ia_proc_ctx *ctx_info, + u64 lapic_id) +{ + return -EINVAL; +} #endif #define ACPI_TABLE_UPGRADE_MAX_PHYS (max_low_pfn_mapped << PAGE_SHIFT) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cacheinfo.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cacheinfo.h index 86b63c7feab7..86b2e0dcc4bf 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cacheinfo.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cacheinfo.h @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ #ifndef _ASM_X86_CACHEINFO_H #define _ASM_X86_CACHEINFO_H -void cacheinfo_amd_init_llc_id(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c, int cpu, u8 node_id); -void cacheinfo_hygon_init_llc_id(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c, int cpu, u8 node_id); +void cacheinfo_amd_init_llc_id(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c, int cpu); +void cacheinfo_hygon_init_llc_id(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c, int cpu); #endif /* _ASM_X86_CACHEINFO_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/compat.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/compat.h index 0e327a01f50f..f145e3326c6d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/compat.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/compat.h @@ -177,14 +177,13 @@ typedef struct user_regs_struct compat_elf_gregset_t; static inline void __user *arch_compat_alloc_user_space(long len) { - compat_uptr_t sp; - - if (test_thread_flag(TIF_IA32)) { - sp = task_pt_regs(current)->sp; - } else { - /* -128 for the x32 ABI redzone */ - sp = task_pt_regs(current)->sp - 128; - } + compat_uptr_t sp = task_pt_regs(current)->sp; + + /* + * -128 for the x32 ABI redzone. For IA32, it is not strictly + * necessary, but not harmful. + */ + sp -= 128; return (void __user *)round_down(sp - len, 16); } diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/copy_mc_test.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/copy_mc_test.h deleted file mode 100644 index e4991ba96726..000000000000 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/copy_mc_test.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,75 +0,0 @@ -/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ -#ifndef _COPY_MC_TEST_H_ -#define _COPY_MC_TEST_H_ - -#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__ -#ifdef CONFIG_COPY_MC_TEST -extern unsigned long copy_mc_test_src; -extern unsigned long copy_mc_test_dst; - -static inline void copy_mc_inject_src(void *addr) -{ - if (addr) - copy_mc_test_src = (unsigned long) addr; - else - copy_mc_test_src = ~0UL; -} - -static inline void copy_mc_inject_dst(void *addr) -{ - if (addr) - copy_mc_test_dst = (unsigned long) addr; - else - copy_mc_test_dst = ~0UL; -} -#else /* CONFIG_COPY_MC_TEST */ -static inline void copy_mc_inject_src(void *addr) -{ -} - -static inline void copy_mc_inject_dst(void *addr) -{ -} -#endif /* CONFIG_COPY_MC_TEST */ - -#else /* __ASSEMBLY__ */ -#include <asm/export.h> - -#ifdef CONFIG_COPY_MC_TEST -.macro COPY_MC_TEST_CTL - .pushsection .data - .align 8 - .globl copy_mc_test_src - copy_mc_test_src: - .quad 0 - EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(copy_mc_test_src) - .globl copy_mc_test_dst - copy_mc_test_dst: - .quad 0 - EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(copy_mc_test_dst) - .popsection -.endm - -.macro COPY_MC_TEST_SRC reg count target - leaq \count(\reg), %r9 - cmp copy_mc_test_src, %r9 - ja \target -.endm - -.macro COPY_MC_TEST_DST reg count target - leaq \count(\reg), %r9 - cmp copy_mc_test_dst, %r9 - ja \target -.endm -#else -.macro COPY_MC_TEST_CTL -.endm - -.macro COPY_MC_TEST_SRC reg count target -.endm - -.macro COPY_MC_TEST_DST reg count target -.endm -#endif /* CONFIG_COPY_MC_TEST */ -#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */ -#endif /* _COPY_MC_TEST_H_ */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h index dad350d42ecf..f5ef2d5b9231 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h @@ -241,6 +241,7 @@ /* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:0 (EBX), word 9 */ #define X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE ( 9*32+ 0) /* RDFSBASE, WRFSBASE, RDGSBASE, WRGSBASE instructions*/ #define X86_FEATURE_TSC_ADJUST ( 9*32+ 1) /* TSC adjustment MSR 0x3B */ +#define X86_FEATURE_SGX ( 9*32+ 2) /* Software Guard Extensions */ #define X86_FEATURE_BMI1 ( 9*32+ 3) /* 1st group bit manipulation extensions */ #define X86_FEATURE_HLE ( 9*32+ 4) /* Hardware Lock Elision */ #define X86_FEATURE_AVX2 ( 9*32+ 5) /* AVX2 instructions */ @@ -356,6 +357,7 @@ #define X86_FEATURE_MOVDIRI (16*32+27) /* MOVDIRI instruction */ #define X86_FEATURE_MOVDIR64B (16*32+28) /* MOVDIR64B instruction */ #define X86_FEATURE_ENQCMD (16*32+29) /* ENQCMD and ENQCMDS instructions */ +#define X86_FEATURE_SGX_LC (16*32+30) /* Software Guard Extensions Launch Control */ /* AMD-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x80000007 (EBX), word 17 */ #define X86_FEATURE_OVERFLOW_RECOV (17*32+ 0) /* MCA overflow recovery support */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h index 5861d34f9771..7947cb1782da 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h @@ -62,6 +62,12 @@ # define DISABLE_ENQCMD (1 << (X86_FEATURE_ENQCMD & 31)) #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_SGX +# define DISABLE_SGX 0 +#else +# define DISABLE_SGX (1 << (X86_FEATURE_SGX & 31)) +#endif + /* * Make sure to add features to the correct mask */ @@ -74,7 +80,7 @@ #define DISABLED_MASK6 0 #define DISABLED_MASK7 (DISABLE_PTI) #define DISABLED_MASK8 0 -#define DISABLED_MASK9 (DISABLE_SMAP) +#define DISABLED_MASK9 (DISABLE_SMAP|DISABLE_SGX) #define DISABLED_MASK10 0 #define DISABLED_MASK11 0 #define DISABLED_MASK12 0 diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h index b9a5d488f1a5..44a9b9940535 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h @@ -186,8 +186,9 @@ static inline void elf_common_init(struct thread_struct *t, #define COMPAT_ELF_PLAT_INIT(regs, load_addr) \ elf_common_init(¤t->thread, regs, __USER_DS) -void compat_start_thread(struct pt_regs *regs, u32 new_ip, u32 new_sp); -#define compat_start_thread compat_start_thread +void compat_start_thread(struct pt_regs *regs, u32 new_ip, u32 new_sp, bool x32); +#define COMPAT_START_THREAD(ex, regs, new_ip, new_sp) \ + compat_start_thread(regs, new_ip, new_sp, ex->e_machine == EM_X86_64) void set_personality_ia32(bool); #define COMPAT_SET_PERSONALITY(ex) \ @@ -361,7 +362,7 @@ do { \ #define AT_SYSINFO 32 #define COMPAT_ARCH_DLINFO \ -if (test_thread_flag(TIF_X32)) \ +if (exec->e_machine == EM_X86_64) \ ARCH_DLINFO_X32; \ else \ ARCH_DLINFO_IA32 @@ -382,8 +383,10 @@ struct linux_binprm; extern int arch_setup_additional_pages(struct linux_binprm *bprm, int uses_interp); extern int compat_arch_setup_additional_pages(struct linux_binprm *bprm, - int uses_interp); -#define compat_arch_setup_additional_pages compat_arch_setup_additional_pages + int uses_interp, bool x32); +#define COMPAT_ARCH_SETUP_ADDITIONAL_PAGES(bprm, ex, interpreter) \ + compat_arch_setup_additional_pages(bprm, interpreter, \ + (ex->e_machine == EM_X86_64)) /* Do not change the values. See get_align_mask() */ enum align_flags { diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/enclu.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/enclu.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..b1314e41a744 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/enclu.h @@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +#ifndef _ASM_X86_ENCLU_H +#define _ASM_X86_ENCLU_H + +#define EENTER 0x02 +#define ERESUME 0x03 +#define EEXIT 0x04 + +#endif /* _ASM_X86_ENCLU_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/insn.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/insn.h index 5c1ae3eff9d4..a8c3d284fa46 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/insn.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/insn.h @@ -201,6 +201,21 @@ static inline int insn_offset_immediate(struct insn *insn) return insn_offset_displacement(insn) + insn->displacement.nbytes; } +/** + * for_each_insn_prefix() -- Iterate prefixes in the instruction + * @insn: Pointer to struct insn. + * @idx: Index storage. + * @prefix: Prefix byte. + * + * Iterate prefix bytes of given @insn. Each prefix byte is stored in @prefix + * and the index is stored in @idx (note that this @idx is just for a cursor, + * do not change it.) + * Since prefixes.nbytes can be bigger than 4 if some prefixes + * are repeated, it cannot be used for looping over the prefixes. + */ +#define for_each_insn_prefix(insn, idx, prefix) \ + for (idx = 0; idx < ARRAY_SIZE(insn->prefixes.bytes) && (prefix = insn->prefixes.bytes[idx]) != 0; idx++) + #define POP_SS_OPCODE 0x1f #define MOV_SREG_OPCODE 0x8e diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/inst.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/inst.h index bd7f02480ca1..438ccd4f3cc4 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/inst.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/inst.h @@ -143,21 +143,6 @@ .macro MODRM mod opd1 opd2 .byte \mod | (\opd1 & 7) | ((\opd2 & 7) << 3) .endm - -.macro RDPID opd - REG_TYPE rdpid_opd_type \opd - .if rdpid_opd_type == REG_TYPE_R64 - R64_NUM rdpid_opd \opd - .else - R32_NUM rdpid_opd \opd - .endif - .byte 0xf3 - .if rdpid_opd > 7 - PFX_REX rdpid_opd 0 - .endif - .byte 0x0f, 0xc7 - MODRM 0xc0 rdpid_opd 0x7 -.endm #endif #endif diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h index d44858b69353..7e5f33a0d0e2 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h @@ -639,6 +639,7 @@ struct kvm_vcpu_arch { int cpuid_nent; struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *cpuid_entries; + unsigned long cr3_lm_rsvd_bits; int maxphyaddr; int max_tdp_level; @@ -1655,6 +1656,7 @@ int kvm_test_age_hva(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long hva); int kvm_set_spte_hva(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long hva, pte_t pte); int kvm_cpu_has_injectable_intr(struct kvm_vcpu *v); int kvm_cpu_has_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); +int kvm_cpu_has_extint(struct kvm_vcpu *v); int kvm_arch_interrupt_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); int kvm_cpu_get_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *v); void kvm_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event); diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mce.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mce.h index a0f147893a04..56cdeaac76a0 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mce.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mce.h @@ -177,7 +177,8 @@ enum mce_notifier_prios { MCE_PRIO_EXTLOG, MCE_PRIO_UC, MCE_PRIO_EARLY, - MCE_PRIO_CEC + MCE_PRIO_CEC, + MCE_PRIO_HIGHEST = MCE_PRIO_CEC }; struct notifier_block; @@ -198,16 +199,22 @@ static inline void enable_copy_mc_fragile(void) } #endif +struct cper_ia_proc_ctx; + #ifdef CONFIG_X86_MCE int mcheck_init(void); void mcheck_cpu_init(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c); void mcheck_cpu_clear(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c); void mcheck_vendor_init_severity(void); +int apei_smca_report_x86_error(struct cper_ia_proc_ctx *ctx_info, + u64 lapic_id); #else static inline int mcheck_init(void) { return 0; } static inline void mcheck_cpu_init(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) {} static inline void mcheck_cpu_clear(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) {} static inline void mcheck_vendor_init_severity(void) {} +static inline int apei_smca_report_x86_error(struct cper_ia_proc_ctx *ctx_info, + u64 lapic_id) { return -EINVAL; } #endif #ifdef CONFIG_X86_ANCIENT_MCE diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu.h index 9257667d13c5..5d7494631ea9 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu.h @@ -6,6 +6,12 @@ #include <linux/rwsem.h> #include <linux/mutex.h> #include <linux/atomic.h> +#include <linux/bits.h> + +/* Uprobes on this MM assume 32-bit code */ +#define MM_CONTEXT_UPROBE_IA32 BIT(0) +/* vsyscall page is accessible on this MM */ +#define MM_CONTEXT_HAS_VSYSCALL BIT(1) /* * x86 has arch-specific MMU state beyond what lives in mm_struct. @@ -33,8 +39,7 @@ typedef struct { #endif #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 - /* True if mm supports a task running in 32 bit compatibility mode. */ - unsigned short ia32_compat; + unsigned short flags; #endif struct mutex lock; diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h index d98016b83755..054a79157323 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h @@ -177,7 +177,7 @@ static inline void arch_exit_mmap(struct mm_struct *mm) static inline bool is_64bit_mm(struct mm_struct *mm) { return !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION) || - !(mm->context.ia32_compat == TIF_IA32); + !(mm->context.flags & MM_CONTEXT_UPROBE_IA32); } #else static inline bool is_64bit_mm(struct mm_struct *mm) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h index 972a34d93505..6a5085a5f9d8 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h @@ -139,6 +139,7 @@ #define MSR_IA32_MCG_CAP 0x00000179 #define MSR_IA32_MCG_STATUS 0x0000017a #define MSR_IA32_MCG_CTL 0x0000017b +#define MSR_ERROR_CONTROL 0x0000017f #define MSR_IA32_MCG_EXT_CTL 0x000004d0 #define MSR_OFFCORE_RSP_0 0x000001a6 @@ -609,6 +610,8 @@ #define FEAT_CTL_LOCKED BIT(0) #define FEAT_CTL_VMX_ENABLED_INSIDE_SMX BIT(1) #define FEAT_CTL_VMX_ENABLED_OUTSIDE_SMX BIT(2) +#define FEAT_CTL_SGX_LC_ENABLED BIT(17) +#define FEAT_CTL_SGX_ENABLED BIT(18) #define FEAT_CTL_LMCE_ENABLED BIT(20) #define MSR_IA32_TSC_ADJUST 0x0000003b @@ -628,6 +631,12 @@ #define MSR_IA32_UCODE_WRITE 0x00000079 #define MSR_IA32_UCODE_REV 0x0000008b +/* Intel SGX Launch Enclave Public Key Hash MSRs */ +#define MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH0 0x0000008C +#define MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH1 0x0000008D +#define MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH2 0x0000008E +#define MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH3 0x0000008F + #define MSR_IA32_SMM_MONITOR_CTL 0x0000009b #define MSR_IA32_SMBASE 0x0000009e diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mwait.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mwait.h index e039a933aca3..29dd27b5a339 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mwait.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mwait.h @@ -88,8 +88,6 @@ static inline void __mwaitx(unsigned long eax, unsigned long ebx, static inline void __sti_mwait(unsigned long eax, unsigned long ecx) { - trace_hardirqs_on(); - mds_idle_clear_cpu_buffers(); /* "mwait %eax, %ecx;" */ asm volatile("sti; .byte 0x0f, 0x01, 0xc9;" diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/page_32_types.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/page_32_types.h index f462895a33e4..faf9cc1c14bb 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/page_32_types.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/page_32_types.h @@ -53,7 +53,13 @@ #define STACK_TOP_MAX STACK_TOP /* - * Kernel image size is limited to 512 MB (see in arch/x86/kernel/head_32.S) + * In spite of the name, KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE is a limit on the maximum virtual + * address for the kernel image, rather than the limit on the size itself. On + * 32-bit, this is not a strict limit, but this value is used to limit the + * link-time virtual address range of the kernel, and by KASLR to limit the + * randomized address from which the kernel is executed. A relocatable kernel + * can be loaded somewhat higher than KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE as long as enough space + * remains for the vmalloc area. */ #define KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE (512 * 1024 * 1024) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/page_64_types.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/page_64_types.h index 3f49dac03617..645bd1d0ee07 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/page_64_types.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/page_64_types.h @@ -98,8 +98,10 @@ #define STACK_TOP_MAX TASK_SIZE_MAX /* - * Maximum kernel image size is limited to 1 GiB, due to the fixmap living - * in the next 1 GiB (see level2_kernel_pgt in arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S). + * In spite of the name, KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE is a limit on the maximum virtual + * address for the kernel image, rather than the limit on the size itself. + * This can be at most 1 GiB, due to the fixmap living in the next 1 GiB (see + * level2_kernel_pgt in arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S). * * On KASLR use 1 GiB by default, leaving 1 GiB for modules once the * page tables are fully set up. diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt.h index d25cc6830e89..f8dce11d2bc1 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt.h @@ -812,17 +812,6 @@ extern void default_banner(void); #endif /* CONFIG_PARAVIRT_XXL */ #endif /* CONFIG_X86_64 */ -#ifdef CONFIG_PARAVIRT_XXL - -#define GET_CR2_INTO_AX \ - PARA_SITE(PARA_PATCH(PV_MMU_read_cr2), \ - ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; \ - call PARA_INDIRECT(pv_ops+PV_MMU_read_cr2); \ - ) - -#endif /* CONFIG_PARAVIRT_XXL */ - - #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */ #else /* CONFIG_PARAVIRT */ # define default_banner x86_init_noop diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/perf_event.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/perf_event.h index 6960cd6d1f23..b9a7fd0a27e2 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/perf_event.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/perf_event.h @@ -137,7 +137,9 @@ union cpuid10_edx { struct { unsigned int num_counters_fixed:5; unsigned int bit_width_fixed:8; - unsigned int reserved:19; + unsigned int reserved1:2; + unsigned int anythread_deprecated:1; + unsigned int reserved2:16; } split; unsigned int full; }; diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_32.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_32.h index d7acae4120d5..7c9c968a42ef 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_32.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_32.h @@ -57,19 +57,13 @@ do { \ #endif /* - * This is how much memory in addition to the memory covered up to - * and including _end we need mapped initially. - * We need: - * (KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE/4096) / 1024 pages (worst case, non PAE) - * (KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE/4096) / 512 + 4 pages (worst case for PAE) + * This is used to calculate the .brk reservation for initial pagetables. + * Enough space is reserved to allocate pagetables sufficient to cover all + * of LOWMEM_PAGES, which is an upper bound on the size of the direct map of + * lowmem. * - * Modulo rounding, each megabyte assigned here requires a kilobyte of - * memory, which is currently unreclaimed. - * - * This should be a multiple of a page. - * - * KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE should be greater than pa(_end) - * and small than max_low_pfn, otherwise will waste some page table entries + * With PAE paging (PTRS_PER_PMD > 1), we allocate PTRS_PER_PGD == 4 pages for + * the PMD's in addition to the pages required for the last level pagetables. */ #if PTRS_PER_PMD > 1 #define PAGE_TABLE_SIZE(pages) (((pages) / PTRS_PER_PMD) + PTRS_PER_PGD) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h index 816b31c68550..394757ee030a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h @@ -155,6 +155,7 @@ enum page_cache_mode { #define _PAGE_ENC (_AT(pteval_t, sme_me_mask)) #define _PAGE_CACHE_MASK (_PAGE_PWT | _PAGE_PCD | _PAGE_PAT) +#define _PAGE_LARGE_CACHE_MASK (_PAGE_PWT | _PAGE_PCD | _PAGE_PAT_LARGE) #define _PAGE_NOCACHE (cachemode2protval(_PAGE_CACHE_MODE_UC)) #define _PAGE_CACHE_WP (cachemode2protval(_PAGE_CACHE_MODE_WP)) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h index 82a08b585818..c20a52b5534b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h @@ -813,10 +813,8 @@ extern int set_tsc_mode(unsigned int val); DECLARE_PER_CPU(u64, msr_misc_features_shadow); #ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SUP_AMD -extern u16 amd_get_nb_id(int cpu); extern u32 amd_get_nodes_per_socket(void); #else -static inline u16 amd_get_nb_id(int cpu) { return 0; } static inline u32 amd_get_nodes_per_socket(void) { return 0; } #endif diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sparsemem.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/sparsemem.h index 6bfc878f6771..6a9ccc1b2be5 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/sparsemem.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sparsemem.h @@ -28,4 +28,14 @@ #endif #endif /* CONFIG_SPARSEMEM */ + +#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__ +#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA_KEEP_MEMINFO +extern int phys_to_target_node(phys_addr_t start); +#define phys_to_target_node phys_to_target_node +extern int memory_add_physaddr_to_nid(u64 start); +#define memory_add_physaddr_to_nid memory_add_physaddr_to_nid +#endif +#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */ + #endif /* _ASM_X86_SPARSEMEM_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/stacktrace.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/stacktrace.h index 49600643faba..f248eb2ac2d4 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/stacktrace.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/stacktrace.h @@ -88,9 +88,6 @@ get_stack_pointer(struct task_struct *task, struct pt_regs *regs) return (unsigned long *)task->thread.sp; } -void show_trace_log_lvl(struct task_struct *task, struct pt_regs *regs, - unsigned long *stack, const char *log_lvl); - /* The form of the top of the frame on the stack */ struct stack_frame { struct stack_frame *next_frame; diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sync_core.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/sync_core.h index 0fd4a9dfb29c..ab7382f92aff 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/sync_core.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sync_core.h @@ -98,12 +98,13 @@ static inline void sync_core_before_usermode(void) /* With PTI, we unconditionally serialize before running user code. */ if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PTI)) return; + /* - * Return from interrupt and NMI is done through iret, which is core - * serializing. + * Even if we're in an interrupt, we might reschedule before returning, + * in which case we could switch to a different thread in the same mm + * and return using SYSRET or SYSEXIT. Instead of trying to keep + * track of our need to sync the core, just sync right away. */ - if (in_irq() || in_nmi()) - return; sync_core(); } diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h index 44733a4bfc42..a12b9644193b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h @@ -91,7 +91,6 @@ struct thread_info { #define TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD 14 /* load FPU on return to userspace */ #define TIF_NOCPUID 15 /* CPUID is not accessible in userland */ #define TIF_NOTSC 16 /* TSC is not accessible in userland */ -#define TIF_IA32 17 /* IA32 compatibility process */ #define TIF_SLD 18 /* Restore split lock detection on context switch */ #define TIF_MEMDIE 20 /* is terminating due to OOM killer */ #define TIF_POLLING_NRFLAG 21 /* idle is polling for TIF_NEED_RESCHED */ @@ -101,7 +100,6 @@ struct thread_info { #define TIF_LAZY_MMU_UPDATES 27 /* task is updating the mmu lazily */ #define TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT 28 /* syscall tracepoint instrumentation */ #define TIF_ADDR32 29 /* 32-bit address space on 64 bits */ -#define TIF_X32 30 /* 32-bit native x86-64 binary */ #define _TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE (1 << TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE) #define _TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME (1 << TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME) @@ -120,7 +118,6 @@ struct thread_info { #define _TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD (1 << TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD) #define _TIF_NOCPUID (1 << TIF_NOCPUID) #define _TIF_NOTSC (1 << TIF_NOTSC) -#define _TIF_IA32 (1 << TIF_IA32) #define _TIF_SLD (1 << TIF_SLD) #define _TIF_POLLING_NRFLAG (1 << TIF_POLLING_NRFLAG) #define _TIF_IO_BITMAP (1 << TIF_IO_BITMAP) @@ -129,7 +126,6 @@ struct thread_info { #define _TIF_LAZY_MMU_UPDATES (1 << TIF_LAZY_MMU_UPDATES) #define _TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT (1 << TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT) #define _TIF_ADDR32 (1 << TIF_ADDR32) -#define _TIF_X32 (1 << TIF_X32) /* flags to check in __switch_to() */ #define _TIF_WORK_CTXSW_BASE \ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/trap_pf.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/trap_pf.h index 305bc1214aef..10b1de500ab1 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/trap_pf.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/trap_pf.h @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ * bit 3 == 1: use of reserved bit detected * bit 4 == 1: fault was an instruction fetch * bit 5 == 1: protection keys block access + * bit 15 == 1: SGX MMU page-fault */ enum x86_pf_error_code { X86_PF_PROT = 1 << 0, @@ -19,6 +20,7 @@ enum x86_pf_error_code { X86_PF_RSVD = 1 << 3, X86_PF_INSTR = 1 << 4, X86_PF_PK = 1 << 5, + X86_PF_SGX = 1 << 15, }; #endif /* _ASM_X86_TRAP_PF_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/uv/bios.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/uv/bios.h index 08b3d810dfba..1b6455f881f9 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uv/bios.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uv/bios.h @@ -28,6 +28,20 @@ enum uv_bios_cmd { UV_BIOS_SET_LEGACY_VGA_TARGET }; +#define UV_BIOS_EXTRA 0x10000 +#define UV_BIOS_GET_PCI_TOPOLOGY 0x10001 +#define UV_BIOS_GET_GEOINFO 0x10003 + +#define UV_BIOS_EXTRA_OP_MEM_COPYIN 0x1000 +#define UV_BIOS_EXTRA_OP_MEM_COPYOUT 0x2000 +#define UV_BIOS_EXTRA_OP_MASK 0x0fff +#define UV_BIOS_EXTRA_GET_HEAPSIZE 1 +#define UV_BIOS_EXTRA_INSTALL_HEAP 2 +#define UV_BIOS_EXTRA_MASTER_NASID 3 +#define UV_BIOS_EXTRA_OBJECT_COUNT (10|UV_BIOS_EXTRA_OP_MEM_COPYOUT) +#define UV_BIOS_EXTRA_ENUM_OBJECTS (12|UV_BIOS_EXTRA_OP_MEM_COPYOUT) +#define UV_BIOS_EXTRA_ENUM_PORTS (13|UV_BIOS_EXTRA_OP_MEM_COPYOUT) + /* * Status values returned from a BIOS call. */ @@ -109,6 +123,32 @@ struct uv_systab { } entry[1]; /* additional entries follow */ }; extern struct uv_systab *uv_systab; + +#define UV_BIOS_MAXSTRING 128 +struct uv_bios_hub_info { + unsigned int id; + union { + struct { + unsigned long long this_part:1; + unsigned long long is_shared:1; + unsigned long long is_disabled:1; + } fields; + struct { + unsigned long long flags; + unsigned long long reserved; + } b; + } f; + char name[UV_BIOS_MAXSTRING]; + char location[UV_BIOS_MAXSTRING]; + unsigned int ports; +}; + +struct uv_bios_port_info { + unsigned int port; + unsigned int conn_id; + unsigned int conn_port; +}; + /* (... end of definitions from UV BIOS ...) */ enum { @@ -142,6 +182,15 @@ extern s64 uv_bios_change_memprotect(u64, u64, enum uv_memprotect); extern s64 uv_bios_reserved_page_pa(u64, u64 *, u64 *, u64 *); extern int uv_bios_set_legacy_vga_target(bool decode, int domain, int bus); +extern s64 uv_bios_get_master_nasid(u64 sz, u64 *nasid); +extern s64 uv_bios_get_heapsize(u64 nasid, u64 sz, u64 *heap_sz); +extern s64 uv_bios_install_heap(u64 nasid, u64 sz, u64 *heap); +extern s64 uv_bios_obj_count(u64 nasid, u64 sz, u64 *objcnt); +extern s64 uv_bios_enum_objs(u64 nasid, u64 sz, u64 *objbuf); +extern s64 uv_bios_enum_ports(u64 nasid, u64 obj_id, u64 sz, u64 *portbuf); +extern s64 uv_bios_get_geoinfo(u64 nasid, u64 sz, u64 *geo); +extern s64 uv_bios_get_pci_topology(u64 sz, u64 *buf); + extern int uv_bios_init(void); extern unsigned long get_uv_systab_phys(bool msg); @@ -151,6 +200,8 @@ extern long sn_partition_id; extern long sn_coherency_id; extern long sn_region_size; extern long system_serial_number; +extern ssize_t uv_get_archtype(char *buf, int len); +extern int uv_get_hubless_system(void); extern struct kobject *sgi_uv_kobj; /* /sys/firmware/sgi_uv */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/uv/uv.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/uv/uv.h index 172d3e4a9e4b..648eb23fe7f0 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uv/uv.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uv/uv.h @@ -2,14 +2,8 @@ #ifndef _ASM_X86_UV_UV_H #define _ASM_X86_UV_UV_H -#include <asm/tlbflush.h> - enum uv_system_type {UV_NONE, UV_LEGACY_APIC, UV_X2APIC}; -struct cpumask; -struct mm_struct; -struct flush_tlb_info; - #ifdef CONFIG_X86_UV #include <linux/efi.h> @@ -44,10 +38,6 @@ static inline int is_uv_system(void) { return 0; } static inline int is_uv_hubbed(int uv) { return 0; } static inline void uv_cpu_init(void) { } static inline void uv_system_init(void) { } -static inline const struct cpumask * -uv_flush_tlb_others(const struct cpumask *cpumask, - const struct flush_tlb_info *info) -{ return cpumask; } #endif /* X86_UV */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/uv/uv_geo.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/uv/uv_geo.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..f241451035fb --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uv/uv_geo.h @@ -0,0 +1,103 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later + * + * This file is subject to the terms and conditions of the GNU General Public + * License. See the file "COPYING" in the main directory of this archive + * for more details. + * + * Copyright (C) 2020 Hewlett Packard Enterprise Development LP. All rights reserved. + */ + +#ifndef _ASM_UV_GEO_H +#define _ASM_UV_GEO_H + +/* Type declaractions */ + +/* Size of a geoid_s structure (must be before decl. of geoid_u) */ +#define GEOID_SIZE 8 + +/* Fields common to all substructures */ +struct geo_common_s { + unsigned char type; /* What type of h/w is named by this geoid_s */ + unsigned char blade; + unsigned char slot; /* slot is IRU */ + unsigned char upos; + unsigned char rack; +}; + +/* Additional fields for particular types of hardware */ +struct geo_node_s { + struct geo_common_s common; /* No additional fields needed */ +}; + +struct geo_rtr_s { + struct geo_common_s common; /* No additional fields needed */ +}; + +struct geo_iocntl_s { + struct geo_common_s common; /* No additional fields needed */ +}; + +struct geo_pcicard_s { + struct geo_iocntl_s common; + char bus; /* Bus/widget number */ + char slot; /* PCI slot number */ +}; + +/* Subcomponents of a node */ +struct geo_cpu_s { + struct geo_node_s node; + unsigned char socket:4, /* Which CPU on the node */ + thread:4; + unsigned char core; +}; + +struct geo_mem_s { + struct geo_node_s node; + char membus; /* The memory bus on the node */ + char memslot; /* The memory slot on the bus */ +}; + +union geoid_u { + struct geo_common_s common; + struct geo_node_s node; + struct geo_iocntl_s iocntl; + struct geo_pcicard_s pcicard; + struct geo_rtr_s rtr; + struct geo_cpu_s cpu; + struct geo_mem_s mem; + char padsize[GEOID_SIZE]; +}; + +/* Defined constants */ + +#define GEO_MAX_LEN 48 + +#define GEO_TYPE_INVALID 0 +#define GEO_TYPE_MODULE 1 +#define GEO_TYPE_NODE 2 +#define GEO_TYPE_RTR 3 +#define GEO_TYPE_IOCNTL 4 +#define GEO_TYPE_IOCARD 5 +#define GEO_TYPE_CPU 6 +#define GEO_TYPE_MEM 7 +#define GEO_TYPE_MAX (GEO_TYPE_MEM+1) + +static inline int geo_rack(union geoid_u g) +{ + return (g.common.type == GEO_TYPE_INVALID) ? + -1 : g.common.rack; +} + +static inline int geo_slot(union geoid_u g) +{ + return (g.common.type == GEO_TYPE_INVALID) ? + -1 : g.common.upos; +} + +static inline int geo_blade(union geoid_u g) +{ + return (g.common.type == GEO_TYPE_INVALID) ? + -1 : g.common.blade * 2 + g.common.slot; +} + +#endif /* _ASM_UV_GEO_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/vdso.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/vdso.h index bbcdc7b8f963..b5d23470f56b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/vdso.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/vdso.h @@ -15,6 +15,8 @@ struct vdso_image { unsigned long size; /* Always a multiple of PAGE_SIZE */ unsigned long alt, alt_len; + unsigned long extable_base, extable_len; + const void *extable; long sym_vvar_start; /* Negative offset to the vvar area */ @@ -45,6 +47,9 @@ extern void __init init_vdso_image(const struct vdso_image *image); extern int map_vdso_once(const struct vdso_image *image, unsigned long addr); +extern bool fixup_vdso_exception(struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr, + unsigned long error_code, + unsigned long fault_addr); #endif /* __ASSEMBLER__ */ #endif /* _ASM_X86_VDSO_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..9034f3007c4e --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h @@ -0,0 +1,168 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note */ +/* + * Copyright(c) 2016-20 Intel Corporation. + */ +#ifndef _UAPI_ASM_X86_SGX_H +#define _UAPI_ASM_X86_SGX_H + +#include <linux/types.h> +#include <linux/ioctl.h> + +/** + * enum sgx_page_flags - page control flags + * %SGX_PAGE_MEASURE: Measure the page contents with a sequence of + * ENCLS[EEXTEND] operations. + */ +enum sgx_page_flags { + SGX_PAGE_MEASURE = 0x01, +}; + +#define SGX_MAGIC 0xA4 + +#define SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_CREATE \ + _IOW(SGX_MAGIC, 0x00, struct sgx_enclave_create) +#define SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES \ + _IOWR(SGX_MAGIC, 0x01, struct sgx_enclave_add_pages) +#define SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_INIT \ + _IOW(SGX_MAGIC, 0x02, struct sgx_enclave_init) +#define SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_PROVISION \ + _IOW(SGX_MAGIC, 0x03, struct sgx_enclave_provision) + +/** + * struct sgx_enclave_create - parameter structure for the + * %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_CREATE ioctl + * @src: address for the SECS page data + */ +struct sgx_enclave_create { + __u64 src; +}; + +/** + * struct sgx_enclave_add_pages - parameter structure for the + * %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGE ioctl + * @src: start address for the page data + * @offset: starting page offset + * @length: length of the data (multiple of the page size) + * @secinfo: address for the SECINFO data + * @flags: page control flags + * @count: number of bytes added (multiple of the page size) + */ +struct sgx_enclave_add_pages { + __u64 src; + __u64 offset; + __u64 length; + __u64 secinfo; + __u64 flags; + __u64 count; +}; + +/** + * struct sgx_enclave_init - parameter structure for the + * %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_INIT ioctl + * @sigstruct: address for the SIGSTRUCT data + */ +struct sgx_enclave_init { + __u64 sigstruct; +}; + +/** + * struct sgx_enclave_provision - parameter structure for the + * %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_PROVISION ioctl + * @fd: file handle of /dev/sgx_provision + */ +struct sgx_enclave_provision { + __u64 fd; +}; + +struct sgx_enclave_run; + +/** + * typedef sgx_enclave_user_handler_t - Exit handler function accepted by + * __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() + * @run: The run instance given by the caller + * + * The register parameters contain the snapshot of their values at enclave + * exit. An invalid ENCLU function number will cause -EINVAL to be returned + * to the caller. + * + * Return: + * - <= 0: The given value is returned back to the caller. + * - > 0: ENCLU function to invoke, either EENTER or ERESUME. + */ +typedef int (*sgx_enclave_user_handler_t)(long rdi, long rsi, long rdx, + long rsp, long r8, long r9, + struct sgx_enclave_run *run); + +/** + * struct sgx_enclave_run - the execution context of __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() + * @tcs: TCS used to enter the enclave + * @function: The last seen ENCLU function (EENTER, ERESUME or EEXIT) + * @exception_vector: The interrupt vector of the exception + * @exception_error_code: The exception error code pulled out of the stack + * @exception_addr: The address that triggered the exception + * @user_handler: User provided callback run on exception + * @user_data: Data passed to the user handler + * @reserved Reserved for future extensions + * + * If @user_handler is provided, the handler will be invoked on all return paths + * of the normal flow. The user handler may transfer control, e.g. via a + * longjmp() call or a C++ exception, without returning to + * __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave(). + */ +struct sgx_enclave_run { + __u64 tcs; + __u32 function; + __u16 exception_vector; + __u16 exception_error_code; + __u64 exception_addr; + __u64 user_handler; + __u64 user_data; + __u8 reserved[216]; +}; + +/** + * typedef vdso_sgx_enter_enclave_t - Prototype for __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave(), + * a vDSO function to enter an SGX enclave. + * @rdi: Pass-through value for RDI + * @rsi: Pass-through value for RSI + * @rdx: Pass-through value for RDX + * @function: ENCLU function, must be EENTER or ERESUME + * @r8: Pass-through value for R8 + * @r9: Pass-through value for R9 + * @run: struct sgx_enclave_run, must be non-NULL + * + * NOTE: __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() does not ensure full compliance with the + * x86-64 ABI, e.g. doesn't handle XSAVE state. Except for non-volatile + * general purpose registers, EFLAGS.DF, and RSP alignment, preserving/setting + * state in accordance with the x86-64 ABI is the responsibility of the enclave + * and its runtime, i.e. __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() cannot be called from C + * code without careful consideration by both the enclave and its runtime. + * + * All general purpose registers except RAX, RBX and RCX are passed as-is to the + * enclave. RAX, RBX and RCX are consumed by EENTER and ERESUME and are loaded + * with @function, asynchronous exit pointer, and @run.tcs respectively. + * + * RBP and the stack are used to anchor __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() to the + * pre-enclave state, e.g. to retrieve @run.exception and @run.user_handler + * after an enclave exit. All other registers are available for use by the + * enclave and its runtime, e.g. an enclave can push additional data onto the + * stack (and modify RSP) to pass information to the optional user handler (see + * below). + * + * Most exceptions reported on ENCLU, including those that occur within the + * enclave, are fixed up and reported synchronously instead of being delivered + * via a standard signal. Debug Exceptions (#DB) and Breakpoints (#BP) are + * never fixed up and are always delivered via standard signals. On synchrously + * reported exceptions, -EFAULT is returned and details about the exception are + * recorded in @run.exception, the optional sgx_enclave_exception struct. + * + * Return: + * - 0: ENCLU function was successfully executed. + * - -EINVAL: Invalid ENCL number (neither EENTER nor ERESUME). + */ +typedef int (*vdso_sgx_enter_enclave_t)(unsigned long rdi, unsigned long rsi, + unsigned long rdx, unsigned int function, + unsigned long r8, unsigned long r9, + struct sgx_enclave_run *run); + +#endif /* _UAPI_ASM_X86_SGX_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/apei.c b/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/apei.c index c22fb55abcfd..0916f00a992e 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/apei.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/apei.c @@ -43,3 +43,8 @@ void arch_apei_report_mem_error(int sev, struct cper_sec_mem_err *mem_err) apei_mce_report_mem_error(sev, mem_err); #endif } + +int arch_apei_report_x86_error(struct cper_ia_proc_ctx *ctx_info, u64 lapic_id) +{ + return apei_smca_report_x86_error(ctx_info, lapic_id); +} diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c index 2400ad62f330..8d778e46725d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c @@ -1374,7 +1374,7 @@ void __ref text_poke_queue(void *addr, const void *opcode, size_t len, const voi * @addr: address to patch * @opcode: opcode of new instruction * @len: length to copy - * @handler: address to jump to when the temporary breakpoint is hit + * @emulate: instruction to be emulated * * Update a single instruction with the vector in the stack, avoiding * dynamically allocated memory. This function should be used when it is diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/amd_nb.c b/arch/x86/kernel/amd_nb.c index 18f6b7c4bd79..b4396952c9a6 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/amd_nb.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/amd_nb.c @@ -384,7 +384,7 @@ struct resource *amd_get_mmconfig_range(struct resource *res) int amd_get_subcaches(int cpu) { - struct pci_dev *link = node_to_amd_nb(amd_get_nb_id(cpu))->link; + struct pci_dev *link = node_to_amd_nb(topology_die_id(cpu))->link; unsigned int mask; if (!amd_nb_has_feature(AMD_NB_L3_PARTITIONING)) @@ -398,7 +398,7 @@ int amd_get_subcaches(int cpu) int amd_set_subcaches(int cpu, unsigned long mask) { static unsigned int reset, ban; - struct amd_northbridge *nb = node_to_amd_nb(amd_get_nb_id(cpu)); + struct amd_northbridge *nb = node_to_amd_nb(topology_die_id(cpu)); unsigned int reg; int cuid; diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/vector.c b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/vector.c index 1eac53632786..758bbf25ef74 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/vector.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/vector.c @@ -273,20 +273,24 @@ static int assign_irq_vector_any_locked(struct irq_data *irqd) const struct cpumask *affmsk = irq_data_get_affinity_mask(irqd); int node = irq_data_get_node(irqd); - if (node == NUMA_NO_NODE) - goto all; - /* Try the intersection of @affmsk and node mask */ - cpumask_and(vector_searchmask, cpumask_of_node(node), affmsk); - if (!assign_vector_locked(irqd, vector_searchmask)) - return 0; - /* Try the node mask */ - if (!assign_vector_locked(irqd, cpumask_of_node(node))) - return 0; -all: + if (node != NUMA_NO_NODE) { + /* Try the intersection of @affmsk and node mask */ + cpumask_and(vector_searchmask, cpumask_of_node(node), affmsk); + if (!assign_vector_locked(irqd, vector_searchmask)) + return 0; + } + /* Try the full affinity mask */ cpumask_and(vector_searchmask, affmsk, cpu_online_mask); if (!assign_vector_locked(irqd, vector_searchmask)) return 0; + + if (node != NUMA_NO_NODE) { + /* Try the node mask */ + if (!assign_vector_locked(irqd, cpumask_of_node(node))) + return 0; + } + /* Try the full online mask */ return assign_vector_locked(irqd, cpu_online_mask); } diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/x2apic_uv_x.c b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/x2apic_uv_x.c index 3115caa7d7d0..4bde125a5bf1 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/x2apic_uv_x.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/x2apic_uv_x.c @@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ static union uvh_apicid uvh_apicid; static int uv_node_id; /* Unpack AT/OEM/TABLE ID's to be NULL terminated strings */ -static u8 uv_archtype[UV_AT_SIZE]; +static u8 uv_archtype[UV_AT_SIZE + 1]; static u8 oem_id[ACPI_OEM_ID_SIZE + 1]; static u8 oem_table_id[ACPI_OEM_TABLE_ID_SIZE + 1]; @@ -161,7 +161,7 @@ static int __init early_set_hub_type(void) /* UV4/4A only have a revision difference */ case UV4_HUB_PART_NUMBER: uv_min_hub_revision_id = node_id.s.revision - + UV4_HUB_REVISION_BASE; + + UV4_HUB_REVISION_BASE - 1; uv_hub_type_set(UV4); if (uv_min_hub_revision_id == UV4A_HUB_REVISION_BASE) uv_hub_type_set(UV4|UV4A); @@ -320,7 +320,7 @@ static int __init decode_arch_type(unsigned long ptr) if (n > 0 && n < sizeof(uv_ate->archtype)) { pr_info("UV: UVarchtype received from BIOS\n"); - uv_stringify(UV_AT_SIZE, uv_archtype, uv_ate->archtype); + uv_stringify(sizeof(uv_archtype), uv_archtype, uv_ate->archtype); return 1; } return 0; @@ -378,7 +378,7 @@ static int __init uv_set_system_type(char *_oem_id, char *_oem_table_id) if (!early_get_arch_type()) /* If not use OEM ID for UVarchtype */ - uv_stringify(UV_AT_SIZE, uv_archtype, _oem_id); + uv_stringify(sizeof(uv_archtype), uv_archtype, oem_id); /* Check if not hubbed */ if (strncmp(uv_archtype, "SGI", 3) != 0) { @@ -502,6 +502,18 @@ enum uv_system_type get_uv_system_type(void) return uv_system_type; } +int uv_get_hubless_system(void) +{ + return uv_hubless_system; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(uv_get_hubless_system); + +ssize_t uv_get_archtype(char *buf, int len) +{ + return scnprintf(buf, len, "%s/%s", uv_archtype, oem_table_id); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(uv_get_archtype); + int is_uv_system(void) { return uv_system_type != UV_NONE; @@ -1603,21 +1615,30 @@ static void check_efi_reboot(void) reboot_type = BOOT_ACPI; } -/* Setup user proc fs files */ +/* + * User proc fs file handling now deprecated. + * Recommend using /sys/firmware/sgi_uv/... instead. + */ static int __maybe_unused proc_hubbed_show(struct seq_file *file, void *data) { + pr_notice_once("%s: using deprecated /proc/sgi_uv/hubbed, use /sys/firmware/sgi_uv/hub_type\n", + current->comm); seq_printf(file, "0x%x\n", uv_hubbed_system); return 0; } static int __maybe_unused proc_hubless_show(struct seq_file *file, void *data) { + pr_notice_once("%s: using deprecated /proc/sgi_uv/hubless, use /sys/firmware/sgi_uv/hubless\n", + current->comm); seq_printf(file, "0x%x\n", uv_hubless_system); return 0; } static int __maybe_unused proc_archtype_show(struct seq_file *file, void *data) { + pr_notice_once("%s: using deprecated /proc/sgi_uv/archtype, use /sys/firmware/sgi_uv/archtype\n", + current->comm); seq_printf(file, "%s/%s\n", uv_archtype, oem_table_id); return 0; } diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c b/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c index 70b7154f4bdd..60b9f42ce3c1 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c @@ -66,7 +66,6 @@ static void __used common(void) OFFSET(PV_IRQ_irq_disable, paravirt_patch_template, irq.irq_disable); OFFSET(PV_IRQ_irq_enable, paravirt_patch_template, irq.irq_enable); OFFSET(PV_CPU_iret, paravirt_patch_template, cpu.iret); - OFFSET(PV_MMU_read_cr2, paravirt_patch_template, mmu.read_cr2); #endif #ifdef CONFIG_XEN diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/Makefile b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/Makefile index 93792b457b81..637b499450d1 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/Makefile +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/Makefile @@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_X86_MCE) += mce/ obj-$(CONFIG_MTRR) += mtrr/ obj-$(CONFIG_MICROCODE) += microcode/ obj-$(CONFIG_X86_CPU_RESCTRL) += resctrl/ +obj-$(CONFIG_X86_SGX) += sgx/ obj-$(CONFIG_X86_LOCAL_APIC) += perfctr-watchdog.o diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c index 6062ce586b95..f8ca66f3d861 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c @@ -23,7 +23,6 @@ #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 # include <asm/mmconfig.h> -# include <asm/set_memory.h> #endif #include "cpu.h" @@ -330,7 +329,6 @@ static void legacy_fixup_core_id(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) */ static void amd_get_topology(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) { - u8 node_id; int cpu = smp_processor_id(); /* get information required for multi-node processors */ @@ -340,7 +338,7 @@ static void amd_get_topology(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) cpuid(0x8000001e, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx); - node_id = ecx & 0xff; + c->cpu_die_id = ecx & 0xff; if (c->x86 == 0x15) c->cu_id = ebx & 0xff; @@ -360,15 +358,15 @@ static void amd_get_topology(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) if (!err) c->x86_coreid_bits = get_count_order(c->x86_max_cores); - cacheinfo_amd_init_llc_id(c, cpu, node_id); + cacheinfo_amd_init_llc_id(c, cpu); } else if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_NODEID_MSR)) { u64 value; rdmsrl(MSR_FAM10H_NODE_ID, value); - node_id = value & 7; + c->cpu_die_id = value & 7; - per_cpu(cpu_llc_id, cpu) = node_id; + per_cpu(cpu_llc_id, cpu) = c->cpu_die_id; } else return; @@ -393,7 +391,7 @@ static void amd_detect_cmp(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) /* Convert the initial APIC ID into the socket ID */ c->phys_proc_id = c->initial_apicid >> bits; /* use socket ID also for last level cache */ - per_cpu(cpu_llc_id, cpu) = c->phys_proc_id; + per_cpu(cpu_llc_id, cpu) = c->cpu_die_id = c->phys_proc_id; } static void amd_detect_ppin(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) @@ -425,12 +423,6 @@ clear_ppin: clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_PPIN); } -u16 amd_get_nb_id(int cpu) -{ - return per_cpu(cpu_llc_id, cpu); -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(amd_get_nb_id); - u32 amd_get_nodes_per_socket(void) { return nodes_per_socket; @@ -516,26 +508,6 @@ static void early_init_amd_mc(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) static void bsp_init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) { - -#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 - if (c->x86 >= 0xf) { - unsigned long long tseg; - - /* - * Split up direct mapping around the TSEG SMM area. - * Don't do it for gbpages because there seems very little - * benefit in doing so. - */ - if (!rdmsrl_safe(MSR_K8_TSEG_ADDR, &tseg)) { - unsigned long pfn = tseg >> PAGE_SHIFT; - - pr_debug("tseg: %010llx\n", tseg); - if (pfn_range_is_mapped(pfn, pfn + 1)) - set_memory_4k((unsigned long)__va(tseg), 1); - } - } -#endif - if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_CONSTANT_TSC)) { if (c->x86 > 0x10 || diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index 581fb7223ad0..d41b70fe4918 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -739,11 +739,13 @@ spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd) if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB)) { setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB); + spectre_v2_user_ibpb = mode; switch (cmd) { case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_FORCE: case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_PRCTL_IBPB: case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_SECCOMP_IBPB: static_branch_enable(&switch_mm_always_ibpb); + spectre_v2_user_ibpb = SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT; break; case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_PRCTL: case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO: @@ -757,8 +759,6 @@ spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd) pr_info("mitigation: Enabling %s Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier\n", static_key_enabled(&switch_mm_always_ibpb) ? "always-on" : "conditional"); - - spectre_v2_user_ibpb = mode; } /* diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cacheinfo.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cacheinfo.c index 57074cf3ad7c..3ca9be482a9e 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cacheinfo.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cacheinfo.c @@ -580,7 +580,7 @@ static void amd_init_l3_cache(struct _cpuid4_info_regs *this_leaf, int index) if (index < 3) return; - node = amd_get_nb_id(smp_processor_id()); + node = topology_die_id(smp_processor_id()); this_leaf->nb = node_to_amd_nb(node); if (this_leaf->nb && !this_leaf->nb->l3_cache.indices) amd_calc_l3_indices(this_leaf->nb); @@ -646,7 +646,7 @@ static int find_num_cache_leaves(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) return i; } -void cacheinfo_amd_init_llc_id(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c, int cpu, u8 node_id) +void cacheinfo_amd_init_llc_id(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c, int cpu) { /* * We may have multiple LLCs if L3 caches exist, so check if we @@ -657,7 +657,7 @@ void cacheinfo_amd_init_llc_id(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c, int cpu, u8 node_id) if (c->x86 < 0x17) { /* LLC is at the node level. */ - per_cpu(cpu_llc_id, cpu) = node_id; + per_cpu(cpu_llc_id, cpu) = c->cpu_die_id; } else if (c->x86 == 0x17 && c->x86_model <= 0x1F) { /* * LLC is at the core complex level. @@ -684,7 +684,7 @@ void cacheinfo_amd_init_llc_id(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c, int cpu, u8 node_id) } } -void cacheinfo_hygon_init_llc_id(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c, int cpu, u8 node_id) +void cacheinfo_hygon_init_llc_id(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c, int cpu) { /* * We may have multiple LLCs if L3 caches exist, so check if we diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/feat_ctl.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/feat_ctl.c index 29a3bedabd06..3b1b01f2b248 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/feat_ctl.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/feat_ctl.c @@ -93,16 +93,41 @@ static void init_vmx_capabilities(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) } #endif /* CONFIG_X86_VMX_FEATURE_NAMES */ +static void clear_sgx_caps(void) +{ + setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SGX); + setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SGX_LC); +} + +static int __init nosgx(char *str) +{ + clear_sgx_caps(); + + return 0; +} + +early_param("nosgx", nosgx); + void init_ia32_feat_ctl(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) { bool tboot = tboot_enabled(); + bool enable_sgx; u64 msr; if (rdmsrl_safe(MSR_IA32_FEAT_CTL, &msr)) { clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_VMX); + clear_sgx_caps(); return; } + /* + * Enable SGX if and only if the kernel supports SGX and Launch Control + * is supported, i.e. disable SGX if the LE hash MSRs can't be written. + */ + enable_sgx = cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SGX) && + cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SGX_LC) && + IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_SGX); + if (msr & FEAT_CTL_LOCKED) goto update_caps; @@ -124,13 +149,16 @@ void init_ia32_feat_ctl(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) msr |= FEAT_CTL_VMX_ENABLED_INSIDE_SMX; } + if (enable_sgx) + msr |= FEAT_CTL_SGX_ENABLED | FEAT_CTL_SGX_LC_ENABLED; + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_FEAT_CTL, msr); update_caps: set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_MSR_IA32_FEAT_CTL); if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_VMX)) - return; + goto update_sgx; if ( (tboot && !(msr & FEAT_CTL_VMX_ENABLED_INSIDE_SMX)) || (!tboot && !(msr & FEAT_CTL_VMX_ENABLED_OUTSIDE_SMX))) { @@ -143,4 +171,12 @@ update_caps: init_vmx_capabilities(c); #endif } + +update_sgx: + if (!(msr & FEAT_CTL_SGX_ENABLED) || + !(msr & FEAT_CTL_SGX_LC_ENABLED) || !enable_sgx) { + if (enable_sgx) + pr_err_once("SGX disabled by BIOS\n"); + clear_sgx_caps(); + } } diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/hygon.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/hygon.c index ac6c30e5801d..ae59115d18f9 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/hygon.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/hygon.c @@ -14,9 +14,6 @@ #include <asm/cacheinfo.h> #include <asm/spec-ctrl.h> #include <asm/delay.h> -#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 -# include <asm/set_memory.h> -#endif #include "cpu.h" @@ -65,7 +62,6 @@ static void hygon_get_topology_early(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) */ static void hygon_get_topology(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) { - u8 node_id; int cpu = smp_processor_id(); /* get information required for multi-node processors */ @@ -75,7 +71,7 @@ static void hygon_get_topology(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) cpuid(0x8000001e, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx); - node_id = ecx & 0xff; + c->cpu_die_id = ecx & 0xff; c->cpu_core_id = ebx & 0xff; @@ -93,14 +89,14 @@ static void hygon_get_topology(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) /* Socket ID is ApicId[6] for these processors. */ c->phys_proc_id = c->apicid >> APICID_SOCKET_ID_BIT; - cacheinfo_hygon_init_llc_id(c, cpu, node_id); + cacheinfo_hygon_init_llc_id(c, cpu); } else if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_NODEID_MSR)) { u64 value; rdmsrl(MSR_FAM10H_NODE_ID, value); - node_id = value & 7; + c->cpu_die_id = value & 7; - per_cpu(cpu_llc_id, cpu) = node_id; + per_cpu(cpu_llc_id, cpu) = c->cpu_die_id; } else return; @@ -123,7 +119,7 @@ static void hygon_detect_cmp(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) /* Convert the initial APIC ID into the socket ID */ c->phys_proc_id = c->initial_apicid >> bits; /* use socket ID also for last level cache */ - per_cpu(cpu_llc_id, cpu) = c->phys_proc_id; + per_cpu(cpu_llc_id, cpu) = c->cpu_die_id = c->phys_proc_id; } static void srat_detect_node(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) @@ -204,23 +200,6 @@ static void early_init_hygon_mc(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) static void bsp_init_hygon(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) { -#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 - unsigned long long tseg; - - /* - * Split up direct mapping around the TSEG SMM area. - * Don't do it for gbpages because there seems very little - * benefit in doing so. - */ - if (!rdmsrl_safe(MSR_K8_TSEG_ADDR, &tseg)) { - unsigned long pfn = tseg >> PAGE_SHIFT; - - pr_debug("tseg: %010llx\n", tseg); - if (pfn_range_is_mapped(pfn, pfn + 1)) - set_memory_4k((unsigned long)__va(tseg), 1); - } -#endif - if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_CONSTANT_TSC)) { u64 val; diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/amd.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/amd.c index 0c6b02dd744c..e486f96b3cb3 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/amd.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/amd.c @@ -1341,7 +1341,7 @@ static int threshold_create_bank(struct threshold_bank **bp, unsigned int cpu, return -ENODEV; if (is_shared_bank(bank)) { - nb = node_to_amd_nb(amd_get_nb_id(cpu)); + nb = node_to_amd_nb(topology_die_id(cpu)); /* threshold descriptor already initialized on this node? */ if (nb && nb->bank4) { @@ -1445,7 +1445,7 @@ static void threshold_remove_bank(struct threshold_bank *bank) * The last CPU on this node using the shared bank is going * away, remove that bank now. */ - nb = node_to_amd_nb(amd_get_nb_id(smp_processor_id())); + nb = node_to_amd_nb(topology_die_id(smp_processor_id())); nb->bank4 = NULL; } diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/apei.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/apei.c index af8d37962586..b58b85380ddb 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/apei.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/apei.c @@ -51,6 +51,67 @@ void apei_mce_report_mem_error(int severity, struct cper_sec_mem_err *mem_err) } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(apei_mce_report_mem_error); +int apei_smca_report_x86_error(struct cper_ia_proc_ctx *ctx_info, u64 lapic_id) +{ + const u64 *i_mce = ((const u64 *) (ctx_info + 1)); + unsigned int cpu; + struct mce m; + + if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SMCA)) + return -EINVAL; + + /* + * The starting address of the register array extracted from BERT must + * match with the first expected register in the register layout of + * SMCA address space. This address corresponds to banks's MCA_STATUS + * register. + * + * Match any MCi_STATUS register by turning off bank numbers. + */ + if ((ctx_info->msr_addr & MSR_AMD64_SMCA_MC0_STATUS) != + MSR_AMD64_SMCA_MC0_STATUS) + return -EINVAL; + + /* + * The register array size must be large enough to include all the + * SMCA registers which need to be extracted. + * + * The number of registers in the register array is determined by + * Register Array Size/8 as defined in UEFI spec v2.8, sec N.2.4.2.2. + * The register layout is fixed and currently the raw data in the + * register array includes 6 SMCA registers which the kernel can + * extract. + */ + if (ctx_info->reg_arr_size < 48) + return -EINVAL; + + mce_setup(&m); + + m.extcpu = -1; + m.socketid = -1; + + for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) { + if (cpu_data(cpu).initial_apicid == lapic_id) { + m.extcpu = cpu; + m.socketid = cpu_data(m.extcpu).phys_proc_id; + break; + } + } + + m.apicid = lapic_id; + m.bank = (ctx_info->msr_addr >> 4) & 0xFF; + m.status = *i_mce; + m.addr = *(i_mce + 1); + m.misc = *(i_mce + 2); + /* Skipping MCA_CONFIG */ + m.ipid = *(i_mce + 4); + m.synd = *(i_mce + 5); + + mce_log(&m); + + return 0; +} + #define CPER_CREATOR_MCE \ GUID_INIT(0x75a574e3, 0x5052, 0x4b29, 0x8a, 0x8e, 0xbe, 0x2c, \ 0x64, 0x90, 0xb8, 0x9d) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/core.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/core.c index 4102b866e7c0..6af6a3c0698f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/core.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/core.c @@ -162,7 +162,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mce_log); void mce_register_decode_chain(struct notifier_block *nb) { - if (WARN_ON(nb->priority > MCE_PRIO_MCELOG && nb->priority < MCE_PRIO_EDAC)) + if (WARN_ON(nb->priority < MCE_PRIO_LOWEST || + nb->priority > MCE_PRIO_HIGHEST)) return; blocking_notifier_chain_register(&x86_mce_decoder_chain, nb); @@ -1265,14 +1266,14 @@ static void kill_me_maybe(struct callback_head *cb) } } -static void queue_task_work(struct mce *m, int kill_it) +static void queue_task_work(struct mce *m, int kill_current_task) { current->mce_addr = m->addr; current->mce_kflags = m->kflags; current->mce_ripv = !!(m->mcgstatus & MCG_STATUS_RIPV); current->mce_whole_page = whole_page(m); - if (kill_it) + if (kill_current_task) current->mce_kill_me.func = kill_me_now; else current->mce_kill_me.func = kill_me_maybe; @@ -1320,10 +1321,10 @@ noinstr void do_machine_check(struct pt_regs *regs) int no_way_out = 0; /* - * If kill_it gets set, there might be a way to recover from this + * If kill_current_task is not set, there might be a way to recover from this * error. */ - int kill_it = 0; + int kill_current_task = 0; /* * MCEs are always local on AMD. Same is determined by MCG_STATUS_LMCES @@ -1350,8 +1351,7 @@ noinstr void do_machine_check(struct pt_regs *regs) * severity is MCE_AR_SEVERITY we have other options. */ if (!(m.mcgstatus & MCG_STATUS_RIPV)) - kill_it = 1; - + kill_current_task = (cfg->tolerant == 3) ? 0 : 1; /* * Check if this MCE is signaled to only this logical processor, * on Intel, Zhaoxin only. @@ -1368,7 +1368,7 @@ noinstr void do_machine_check(struct pt_regs *regs) * to see it will clear it. */ if (lmce) { - if (no_way_out) + if (no_way_out && cfg->tolerant < 3) mce_panic("Fatal local machine check", &m, msg); } else { order = mce_start(&no_way_out); @@ -1384,8 +1384,13 @@ noinstr void do_machine_check(struct pt_regs *regs) * When there's any problem use only local no_way_out state. */ if (!lmce) { - if (mce_end(order) < 0) - no_way_out = worst >= MCE_PANIC_SEVERITY; + if (mce_end(order) < 0) { + if (!no_way_out) + no_way_out = worst >= MCE_PANIC_SEVERITY; + + if (no_way_out && cfg->tolerant < 3) + mce_panic("Fatal machine check on current CPU", &m, msg); + } } else { /* * If there was a fatal machine check we should have @@ -1401,19 +1406,7 @@ noinstr void do_machine_check(struct pt_regs *regs) } } - /* - * If tolerant is at an insane level we drop requests to kill - * processes and continue even when there is no way out. - */ - if (cfg->tolerant == 3) - kill_it = 0; - else if (no_way_out) - mce_panic("Fatal machine check on current CPU", &m, msg); - - if (worst > 0) - irq_work_queue(&mce_irq_work); - - if (worst != MCE_AR_SEVERITY && !kill_it) + if (worst != MCE_AR_SEVERITY && !kill_current_task) goto out; /* Fault was in user mode and we need to take some action */ @@ -1421,7 +1414,7 @@ noinstr void do_machine_check(struct pt_regs *regs) /* If this triggers there is no way to recover. Die hard. */ BUG_ON(!on_thread_stack() || !user_mode(regs)); - queue_task_work(&m, kill_it); + queue_task_work(&m, kill_current_task); } else { /* @@ -1439,7 +1432,7 @@ noinstr void do_machine_check(struct pt_regs *regs) } if (m.kflags & MCE_IN_KERNEL_COPYIN) - queue_task_work(&m, kill_it); + queue_task_work(&m, kill_current_task); } out: mce_wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCG_STATUS, 0); @@ -1581,7 +1574,7 @@ static void __mcheck_cpu_mce_banks_init(void) * __mcheck_cpu_init_clear_banks() does the final bank setup. */ b->ctl = -1ULL; - b->init = 1; + b->init = true; } } @@ -1762,7 +1755,7 @@ static int __mcheck_cpu_apply_quirks(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) */ if (c->x86 == 6 && c->x86_model < 0x1A && this_cpu_read(mce_num_banks) > 0) - mce_banks[0].init = 0; + mce_banks[0].init = false; /* * All newer Intel systems support MCE broadcasting. Enable @@ -1811,11 +1804,9 @@ static int __mcheck_cpu_ancient_init(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) case X86_VENDOR_INTEL: intel_p5_mcheck_init(c); return 1; - break; case X86_VENDOR_CENTAUR: winchip_mcheck_init(c); return 1; - break; default: return 0; } diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/inject.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/inject.c index 3a44346f2276..7b360731fc2d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/inject.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/inject.c @@ -522,8 +522,8 @@ static void do_inject(void) if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_DCM) && b == 4 && boot_cpu_data.x86 < 0x17) { - toggle_nb_mca_mst_cpu(amd_get_nb_id(cpu)); - cpu = get_nbc_for_node(amd_get_nb_id(cpu)); + toggle_nb_mca_mst_cpu(topology_die_id(cpu)); + cpu = get_nbc_for_node(topology_die_id(cpu)); } get_online_cpus(); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/intel.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/intel.c index abe9fe0fb851..c2476fe0682e 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/intel.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/intel.c @@ -509,12 +509,33 @@ static void intel_ppin_init(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) } } +/* + * Enable additional error logs from the integrated + * memory controller on processors that support this. + */ +static void intel_imc_init(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) +{ + u64 error_control; + + switch (c->x86_model) { + case INTEL_FAM6_SANDYBRIDGE_X: + case INTEL_FAM6_IVYBRIDGE_X: + case INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_X: + if (rdmsrl_safe(MSR_ERROR_CONTROL, &error_control)) + return; + error_control |= 2; + wrmsrl_safe(MSR_ERROR_CONTROL, error_control); + break; + } +} + void mce_intel_feature_init(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) { intel_init_thermal(c); intel_init_cmci(); intel_init_lmce(); intel_ppin_init(c); + intel_imc_init(c); } void mce_intel_feature_clear(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/amd.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/amd.c index 3f6b137ef4e6..3d4a48336084 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/amd.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/amd.c @@ -215,7 +215,6 @@ static unsigned int __verify_patch_size(u8 family, u32 sh_psize, size_t buf_size default: WARN(1, "%s: WTF family: 0x%x\n", __func__, family); return 0; - break; } if (sh_psize > min_t(u32, buf_size, max_size)) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/intel.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/intel.c index 6a99535d7f37..7e8e07bddd5f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/intel.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/intel.c @@ -100,53 +100,6 @@ static int has_newer_microcode(void *mc, unsigned int csig, int cpf, int new_rev return find_matching_signature(mc, csig, cpf); } -/* - * Given CPU signature and a microcode patch, this function finds if the - * microcode patch has matching family and model with the CPU. - * - * %true - if there's a match - * %false - otherwise - */ -static bool microcode_matches(struct microcode_header_intel *mc_header, - unsigned long sig) -{ - unsigned long total_size = get_totalsize(mc_header); - unsigned long data_size = get_datasize(mc_header); - struct extended_sigtable *ext_header; - unsigned int fam_ucode, model_ucode; - struct extended_signature *ext_sig; - unsigned int fam, model; - int ext_sigcount, i; - - fam = x86_family(sig); - model = x86_model(sig); - - fam_ucode = x86_family(mc_header->sig); - model_ucode = x86_model(mc_header->sig); - - if (fam == fam_ucode && model == model_ucode) - return true; - - /* Look for ext. headers: */ - if (total_size <= data_size + MC_HEADER_SIZE) - return false; - - ext_header = (void *) mc_header + data_size + MC_HEADER_SIZE; - ext_sig = (void *)ext_header + EXT_HEADER_SIZE; - ext_sigcount = ext_header->count; - - for (i = 0; i < ext_sigcount; i++) { - fam_ucode = x86_family(ext_sig->sig); - model_ucode = x86_model(ext_sig->sig); - - if (fam == fam_ucode && model == model_ucode) - return true; - - ext_sig++; - } - return false; -} - static struct ucode_patch *memdup_patch(void *data, unsigned int size) { struct ucode_patch *p; @@ -164,7 +117,7 @@ static struct ucode_patch *memdup_patch(void *data, unsigned int size) return p; } -static void save_microcode_patch(void *data, unsigned int size) +static void save_microcode_patch(struct ucode_cpu_info *uci, void *data, unsigned int size) { struct microcode_header_intel *mc_hdr, *mc_saved_hdr; struct ucode_patch *iter, *tmp, *p = NULL; @@ -210,6 +163,9 @@ static void save_microcode_patch(void *data, unsigned int size) if (!p) return; + if (!find_matching_signature(p->data, uci->cpu_sig.sig, uci->cpu_sig.pf)) + return; + /* * Save for early loading. On 32-bit, that needs to be a physical * address as the APs are running from physical addresses, before @@ -344,13 +300,14 @@ scan_microcode(void *data, size_t size, struct ucode_cpu_info *uci, bool save) size -= mc_size; - if (!microcode_matches(mc_header, uci->cpu_sig.sig)) { + if (!find_matching_signature(data, uci->cpu_sig.sig, + uci->cpu_sig.pf)) { data += mc_size; continue; } if (save) { - save_microcode_patch(data, mc_size); + save_microcode_patch(uci, data, mc_size); goto next; } @@ -483,14 +440,14 @@ static void show_saved_mc(void) * Save this microcode patch. It will be loaded early when a CPU is * hot-added or resumes. */ -static void save_mc_for_early(u8 *mc, unsigned int size) +static void save_mc_for_early(struct ucode_cpu_info *uci, u8 *mc, unsigned int size) { /* Synchronization during CPU hotplug. */ static DEFINE_MUTEX(x86_cpu_microcode_mutex); mutex_lock(&x86_cpu_microcode_mutex); - save_microcode_patch(mc, size); + save_microcode_patch(uci, mc, size); show_saved_mc(); mutex_unlock(&x86_cpu_microcode_mutex); @@ -935,7 +892,7 @@ static enum ucode_state generic_load_microcode(int cpu, struct iov_iter *iter) * permanent memory. So it will be loaded early when a CPU is hot added * or resumes. */ - save_mc_for_early(new_mc, new_mc_size); + save_mc_for_early(uci, new_mc, new_mc_size); pr_debug("CPU%d found a matching microcode update with version 0x%x (current=0x%x)\n", cpu, new_rev, uci->cpu_sig.rev); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/mtrr.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/mtrr.c index 6a80f36b5d59..08a30c8e9431 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/mtrr.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/mtrr.c @@ -813,7 +813,8 @@ void mtrr_ap_init(void) } /** - * Save current fixed-range MTRR state of the first cpu in cpu_online_mask. + * mtrr_save_state - Save current fixed-range MTRR state of the first + * cpu in cpu_online_mask. */ void mtrr_save_state(void) { diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/core.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/core.c index e5f4ee8f4c3b..698bb26aeb6e 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/core.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/core.c @@ -570,6 +570,8 @@ static void domain_add_cpu(int cpu, struct rdt_resource *r) if (d) { cpumask_set_cpu(cpu, &d->cpu_mask); + if (r->cache.arch_has_per_cpu_cfg) + rdt_domain_reconfigure_cdp(r); return; } @@ -893,6 +895,10 @@ static __init void __check_quirks_intel(void) set_rdt_options("!cmt,!mbmtotal,!mbmlocal,!l3cat"); else set_rdt_options("!l3cat"); + fallthrough; + case INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_X: + intel_rdt_mbm_apply_quirk(); + break; } } @@ -923,6 +929,7 @@ static __init void rdt_init_res_defs_intel(void) r->rid == RDT_RESOURCE_L2CODE) { r->cache.arch_has_sparse_bitmaps = false; r->cache.arch_has_empty_bitmaps = false; + r->cache.arch_has_per_cpu_cfg = false; } else if (r->rid == RDT_RESOURCE_MBA) { r->msr_base = MSR_IA32_MBA_THRTL_BASE; r->msr_update = mba_wrmsr_intel; @@ -943,6 +950,7 @@ static __init void rdt_init_res_defs_amd(void) r->rid == RDT_RESOURCE_L2CODE) { r->cache.arch_has_sparse_bitmaps = true; r->cache.arch_has_empty_bitmaps = true; + r->cache.arch_has_per_cpu_cfg = true; } else if (r->rid == RDT_RESOURCE_MBA) { r->msr_base = MSR_IA32_MBA_BW_BASE; r->msr_update = mba_wrmsr_amd; diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/internal.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/internal.h index 80fa997fae60..ee71c47844cb 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/internal.h +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/internal.h @@ -264,7 +264,7 @@ void __exit rdtgroup_exit(void); struct rftype { char *name; umode_t mode; - struct kernfs_ops *kf_ops; + const struct kernfs_ops *kf_ops; unsigned long flags; unsigned long fflags; @@ -360,6 +360,8 @@ struct msr_param { * executing entities * @arch_has_sparse_bitmaps: True if a bitmap like f00f is valid. * @arch_has_empty_bitmaps: True if the '0' bitmap is valid. + * @arch_has_per_cpu_cfg: True if QOS_CFG register for this cache + * level has CPU scope. */ struct rdt_cache { unsigned int cbm_len; @@ -369,6 +371,7 @@ struct rdt_cache { unsigned int shareable_bits; bool arch_has_sparse_bitmaps; bool arch_has_empty_bitmaps; + bool arch_has_per_cpu_cfg; }; /** @@ -616,6 +619,7 @@ void mon_event_read(struct rmid_read *rr, struct rdt_resource *r, void mbm_setup_overflow_handler(struct rdt_domain *dom, unsigned long delay_ms); void mbm_handle_overflow(struct work_struct *work); +void __init intel_rdt_mbm_apply_quirk(void); bool is_mba_sc(struct rdt_resource *r); void setup_default_ctrlval(struct rdt_resource *r, u32 *dc, u32 *dm); u32 delay_bw_map(unsigned long bw, struct rdt_resource *r); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/monitor.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/monitor.c index 54dffe574e67..7ac31210e452 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/monitor.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/monitor.c @@ -64,6 +64,69 @@ unsigned int rdt_mon_features; */ unsigned int resctrl_cqm_threshold; +#define CF(cf) ((unsigned long)(1048576 * (cf) + 0.5)) + +/* + * The correction factor table is documented in Documentation/x86/resctrl.rst. + * If rmid > rmid threshold, MBM total and local values should be multiplied + * by the correction factor. + * + * The original table is modified for better code: + * + * 1. The threshold 0 is changed to rmid count - 1 so don't do correction + * for the case. + * 2. MBM total and local correction table indexed by core counter which is + * equal to (x86_cache_max_rmid + 1) / 8 - 1 and is from 0 up to 27. + * 3. The correction factor is normalized to 2^20 (1048576) so it's faster + * to calculate corrected value by shifting: + * corrected_value = (original_value * correction_factor) >> 20 + */ +static const struct mbm_correction_factor_table { + u32 rmidthreshold; + u64 cf; +} mbm_cf_table[] __initdata = { + {7, CF(1.000000)}, + {15, CF(1.000000)}, + {15, CF(0.969650)}, + {31, CF(1.000000)}, + {31, CF(1.066667)}, + {31, CF(0.969650)}, + {47, CF(1.142857)}, + {63, CF(1.000000)}, + {63, CF(1.185115)}, + {63, CF(1.066553)}, + {79, CF(1.454545)}, + {95, CF(1.000000)}, + {95, CF(1.230769)}, + {95, CF(1.142857)}, + {95, CF(1.066667)}, + {127, CF(1.000000)}, + {127, CF(1.254863)}, + {127, CF(1.185255)}, + {151, CF(1.000000)}, + {127, CF(1.066667)}, + {167, CF(1.000000)}, + {159, CF(1.454334)}, + {183, CF(1.000000)}, + {127, CF(0.969744)}, + {191, CF(1.280246)}, + {191, CF(1.230921)}, + {215, CF(1.000000)}, + {191, CF(1.143118)}, +}; + +static u32 mbm_cf_rmidthreshold __read_mostly = UINT_MAX; +static u64 mbm_cf __read_mostly; + +static inline u64 get_corrected_mbm_count(u32 rmid, unsigned long val) +{ + /* Correct MBM value. */ + if (rmid > mbm_cf_rmidthreshold) + val = (val * mbm_cf) >> 20; + + return val; +} + static inline struct rmid_entry *__rmid_entry(u32 rmid) { struct rmid_entry *entry; @@ -260,7 +323,8 @@ static int __mon_event_count(u32 rmid, struct rmid_read *rr) m->chunks += chunks; m->prev_msr = tval; - rr->val += m->chunks; + rr->val += get_corrected_mbm_count(rmid, m->chunks); + return 0; } @@ -279,8 +343,7 @@ static void mbm_bw_count(u32 rmid, struct rmid_read *rr) return; chunks = mbm_overflow_count(m->prev_bw_msr, tval, rr->r->mbm_width); - m->chunks += chunks; - cur_bw = (chunks * r->mon_scale) >> 20; + cur_bw = (get_corrected_mbm_count(rmid, chunks) * r->mon_scale) >> 20; if (m->delta_comp) m->delta_bw = abs(cur_bw - m->prev_bw); @@ -450,15 +513,14 @@ static void mbm_update(struct rdt_resource *r, struct rdt_domain *d, int rmid) } if (is_mbm_local_enabled()) { rr.evtid = QOS_L3_MBM_LOCAL_EVENT_ID; + __mon_event_count(rmid, &rr); /* * Call the MBA software controller only for the * control groups and when user has enabled * the software controller explicitly. */ - if (!is_mba_sc(NULL)) - __mon_event_count(rmid, &rr); - else + if (is_mba_sc(NULL)) mbm_bw_count(rmid, &rr); } } @@ -644,3 +706,17 @@ int rdt_get_mon_l3_config(struct rdt_resource *r) return 0; } + +void __init intel_rdt_mbm_apply_quirk(void) +{ + int cf_index; + + cf_index = (boot_cpu_data.x86_cache_max_rmid + 1) / 8 - 1; + if (cf_index >= ARRAY_SIZE(mbm_cf_table)) { + pr_info("No MBM correction factor available\n"); + return; + } + + mbm_cf_rmidthreshold = mbm_cf_table[cf_index].rmidthreshold; + mbm_cf = mbm_cf_table[cf_index].cf; +} diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/rdtgroup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/rdtgroup.c index af323e2e3100..29ffb95b25ff 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/rdtgroup.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/rdtgroup.c @@ -240,13 +240,13 @@ static ssize_t rdtgroup_file_write(struct kernfs_open_file *of, char *buf, return -EINVAL; } -static struct kernfs_ops rdtgroup_kf_single_ops = { +static const struct kernfs_ops rdtgroup_kf_single_ops = { .atomic_write_len = PAGE_SIZE, .write = rdtgroup_file_write, .seq_show = rdtgroup_seqfile_show, }; -static struct kernfs_ops kf_mondata_ops = { +static const struct kernfs_ops kf_mondata_ops = { .atomic_write_len = PAGE_SIZE, .seq_show = rdtgroup_mondata_show, }; @@ -507,6 +507,24 @@ unlock: return ret ?: nbytes; } +/** + * rdtgroup_remove - the helper to remove resource group safely + * @rdtgrp: resource group to remove + * + * On resource group creation via a mkdir, an extra kernfs_node reference is + * taken to ensure that the rdtgroup structure remains accessible for the + * rdtgroup_kn_unlock() calls where it is removed. + * + * Drop the extra reference here, then free the rdtgroup structure. + * + * Return: void + */ +static void rdtgroup_remove(struct rdtgroup *rdtgrp) +{ + kernfs_put(rdtgrp->kn); + kfree(rdtgrp); +} + struct task_move_callback { struct callback_head work; struct rdtgroup *rdtgrp; @@ -529,7 +547,7 @@ static void move_myself(struct callback_head *head) (rdtgrp->flags & RDT_DELETED)) { current->closid = 0; current->rmid = 0; - kfree(rdtgrp); + rdtgroup_remove(rdtgrp); } if (unlikely(current->flags & PF_EXITING)) @@ -1769,7 +1787,6 @@ static int rdtgroup_mkdir_info_resdir(struct rdt_resource *r, char *name, if (IS_ERR(kn_subdir)) return PTR_ERR(kn_subdir); - kernfs_get(kn_subdir); ret = rdtgroup_kn_set_ugid(kn_subdir); if (ret) return ret; @@ -1792,7 +1809,6 @@ static int rdtgroup_create_info_dir(struct kernfs_node *parent_kn) kn_info = kernfs_create_dir(parent_kn, "info", parent_kn->mode, NULL); if (IS_ERR(kn_info)) return PTR_ERR(kn_info); - kernfs_get(kn_info); ret = rdtgroup_add_files(kn_info, RF_TOP_INFO); if (ret) @@ -1813,12 +1829,6 @@ static int rdtgroup_create_info_dir(struct kernfs_node *parent_kn) goto out_destroy; } - /* - * This extra ref will be put in kernfs_remove() and guarantees - * that @rdtgrp->kn is always accessible. - */ - kernfs_get(kn_info); - ret = rdtgroup_kn_set_ugid(kn_info); if (ret) goto out_destroy; @@ -1847,12 +1857,6 @@ mongroup_create_dir(struct kernfs_node *parent_kn, struct rdtgroup *prgrp, if (dest_kn) *dest_kn = kn; - /* - * This extra ref will be put in kernfs_remove() and guarantees - * that @rdtgrp->kn is always accessible. - */ - kernfs_get(kn); - ret = rdtgroup_kn_set_ugid(kn); if (ret) goto out_destroy; @@ -1905,8 +1909,13 @@ static int set_cache_qos_cfg(int level, bool enable) r_l = &rdt_resources_all[level]; list_for_each_entry(d, &r_l->domains, list) { - /* Pick one CPU from each domain instance to update MSR */ - cpumask_set_cpu(cpumask_any(&d->cpu_mask), cpu_mask); + if (r_l->cache.arch_has_per_cpu_cfg) + /* Pick all the CPUs in the domain instance */ + for_each_cpu(cpu, &d->cpu_mask) + cpumask_set_cpu(cpu, cpu_mask); + else + /* Pick one CPU from each domain instance to update MSR */ + cpumask_set_cpu(cpumask_any(&d->cpu_mask), cpu_mask); } cpu = get_cpu(); /* Update QOS_CFG MSR on this cpu if it's in cpu_mask. */ @@ -2079,8 +2088,7 @@ void rdtgroup_kn_unlock(struct kernfs_node *kn) rdtgrp->mode == RDT_MODE_PSEUDO_LOCKED) rdtgroup_pseudo_lock_remove(rdtgrp); kernfs_unbreak_active_protection(kn); - kernfs_put(rdtgrp->kn); - kfree(rdtgrp); + rdtgroup_remove(rdtgrp); } else { kernfs_unbreak_active_protection(kn); } @@ -2139,13 +2147,11 @@ static int rdt_get_tree(struct fs_context *fc) &kn_mongrp); if (ret < 0) goto out_info; - kernfs_get(kn_mongrp); ret = mkdir_mondata_all(rdtgroup_default.kn, &rdtgroup_default, &kn_mondata); if (ret < 0) goto out_mongrp; - kernfs_get(kn_mondata); rdtgroup_default.mon.mon_data_kn = kn_mondata; } @@ -2357,7 +2363,7 @@ static void free_all_child_rdtgrp(struct rdtgroup *rdtgrp) if (atomic_read(&sentry->waitcount) != 0) sentry->flags = RDT_DELETED; else - kfree(sentry); + rdtgroup_remove(sentry); } } @@ -2399,7 +2405,7 @@ static void rmdir_all_sub(void) if (atomic_read(&rdtgrp->waitcount) != 0) rdtgrp->flags = RDT_DELETED; else - kfree(rdtgrp); + rdtgroup_remove(rdtgrp); } /* Notify online CPUs to update per cpu storage and PQR_ASSOC MSR */ update_closid_rmid(cpu_online_mask, &rdtgroup_default); @@ -2499,11 +2505,6 @@ static int mkdir_mondata_subdir(struct kernfs_node *parent_kn, if (IS_ERR(kn)) return PTR_ERR(kn); - /* - * This extra ref will be put in kernfs_remove() and guarantees - * that kn is always accessible. - */ - kernfs_get(kn); ret = rdtgroup_kn_set_ugid(kn); if (ret) goto out_destroy; @@ -2838,8 +2839,8 @@ static int mkdir_rdt_prepare(struct kernfs_node *parent_kn, /* * kernfs_remove() will drop the reference count on "kn" which * will free it. But we still need it to stick around for the - * rdtgroup_kn_unlock(kn} call below. Take one extra reference - * here, which will be dropped inside rdtgroup_kn_unlock(). + * rdtgroup_kn_unlock(kn) call. Take one extra reference here, + * which will be dropped by kernfs_put() in rdtgroup_remove(). */ kernfs_get(kn); @@ -2880,6 +2881,7 @@ static int mkdir_rdt_prepare(struct kernfs_node *parent_kn, out_idfree: free_rmid(rdtgrp->mon.rmid); out_destroy: + kernfs_put(rdtgrp->kn); kernfs_remove(rdtgrp->kn); out_free_rgrp: kfree(rdtgrp); @@ -2892,7 +2894,7 @@ static void mkdir_rdt_prepare_clean(struct rdtgroup *rgrp) { kernfs_remove(rgrp->kn); free_rmid(rgrp->mon.rmid); - kfree(rgrp); + rdtgroup_remove(rgrp); } /* @@ -3021,8 +3023,7 @@ static int rdtgroup_mkdir(struct kernfs_node *parent_kn, const char *name, return -EPERM; } -static int rdtgroup_rmdir_mon(struct kernfs_node *kn, struct rdtgroup *rdtgrp, - cpumask_var_t tmpmask) +static int rdtgroup_rmdir_mon(struct rdtgroup *rdtgrp, cpumask_var_t tmpmask) { struct rdtgroup *prdtgrp = rdtgrp->mon.parent; int cpu; @@ -3049,33 +3050,21 @@ static int rdtgroup_rmdir_mon(struct kernfs_node *kn, struct rdtgroup *rdtgrp, WARN_ON(list_empty(&prdtgrp->mon.crdtgrp_list)); list_del(&rdtgrp->mon.crdtgrp_list); - /* - * one extra hold on this, will drop when we kfree(rdtgrp) - * in rdtgroup_kn_unlock() - */ - kernfs_get(kn); kernfs_remove(rdtgrp->kn); return 0; } -static int rdtgroup_ctrl_remove(struct kernfs_node *kn, - struct rdtgroup *rdtgrp) +static int rdtgroup_ctrl_remove(struct rdtgroup *rdtgrp) { rdtgrp->flags = RDT_DELETED; list_del(&rdtgrp->rdtgroup_list); - /* - * one extra hold on this, will drop when we kfree(rdtgrp) - * in rdtgroup_kn_unlock() - */ - kernfs_get(kn); kernfs_remove(rdtgrp->kn); return 0; } -static int rdtgroup_rmdir_ctrl(struct kernfs_node *kn, struct rdtgroup *rdtgrp, - cpumask_var_t tmpmask) +static int rdtgroup_rmdir_ctrl(struct rdtgroup *rdtgrp, cpumask_var_t tmpmask) { int cpu; @@ -3102,7 +3091,7 @@ static int rdtgroup_rmdir_ctrl(struct kernfs_node *kn, struct rdtgroup *rdtgrp, closid_free(rdtgrp->closid); free_rmid(rdtgrp->mon.rmid); - rdtgroup_ctrl_remove(kn, rdtgrp); + rdtgroup_ctrl_remove(rdtgrp); /* * Free all the child monitor group rmids. @@ -3139,13 +3128,13 @@ static int rdtgroup_rmdir(struct kernfs_node *kn) rdtgrp != &rdtgroup_default) { if (rdtgrp->mode == RDT_MODE_PSEUDO_LOCKSETUP || rdtgrp->mode == RDT_MODE_PSEUDO_LOCKED) { - ret = rdtgroup_ctrl_remove(kn, rdtgrp); + ret = rdtgroup_ctrl_remove(rdtgrp); } else { - ret = rdtgroup_rmdir_ctrl(kn, rdtgrp, tmpmask); + ret = rdtgroup_rmdir_ctrl(rdtgrp, tmpmask); } } else if (rdtgrp->type == RDTMON_GROUP && is_mon_groups(parent_kn, kn->name)) { - ret = rdtgroup_rmdir_mon(kn, rdtgrp, tmpmask); + ret = rdtgroup_rmdir_mon(rdtgrp, tmpmask); } else { ret = -EPERM; } diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/Makefile b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/Makefile new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..91d3dc784a29 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/Makefile @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +obj-y += \ + driver.o \ + encl.o \ + ioctl.o \ + main.o diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/arch.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/arch.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..dd7602c44c72 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/arch.h @@ -0,0 +1,338 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/** + * Copyright(c) 2016-20 Intel Corporation. + * + * Contains data structures defined by the SGX architecture. Data structures + * defined by the Linux software stack should not be placed here. + */ +#ifndef _ASM_X86_SGX_ARCH_H +#define _ASM_X86_SGX_ARCH_H + +#include <linux/bits.h> +#include <linux/types.h> + +/* The SGX specific CPUID function. */ +#define SGX_CPUID 0x12 +/* EPC enumeration. */ +#define SGX_CPUID_EPC 2 +/* An invalid EPC section, i.e. the end marker. */ +#define SGX_CPUID_EPC_INVALID 0x0 +/* A valid EPC section. */ +#define SGX_CPUID_EPC_SECTION 0x1 +/* The bitmask for the EPC section type. */ +#define SGX_CPUID_EPC_MASK GENMASK(3, 0) + +/** + * enum sgx_return_code - The return code type for ENCLS, ENCLU and ENCLV + * %SGX_NOT_TRACKED: Previous ETRACK's shootdown sequence has not + * been completed yet. + * %SGX_INVALID_EINITTOKEN: EINITTOKEN is invalid and enclave signer's + * public key does not match IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH. + * %SGX_UNMASKED_EVENT: An unmasked event, e.g. INTR, was received + */ +enum sgx_return_code { + SGX_NOT_TRACKED = 11, + SGX_INVALID_EINITTOKEN = 16, + SGX_UNMASKED_EVENT = 128, +}; + +/* The modulus size for 3072-bit RSA keys. */ +#define SGX_MODULUS_SIZE 384 + +/** + * enum sgx_miscselect - additional information to an SSA frame + * %SGX_MISC_EXINFO: Report #PF or #GP to the SSA frame. + * + * Save State Area (SSA) is a stack inside the enclave used to store processor + * state when an exception or interrupt occurs. This enum defines additional + * information stored to an SSA frame. + */ +enum sgx_miscselect { + SGX_MISC_EXINFO = BIT(0), +}; + +#define SGX_MISC_RESERVED_MASK GENMASK_ULL(63, 1) + +#define SGX_SSA_GPRS_SIZE 184 +#define SGX_SSA_MISC_EXINFO_SIZE 16 + +/** + * enum sgx_attributes - the attributes field in &struct sgx_secs + * %SGX_ATTR_INIT: Enclave can be entered (is initialized). + * %SGX_ATTR_DEBUG: Allow ENCLS(EDBGRD) and ENCLS(EDBGWR). + * %SGX_ATTR_MODE64BIT: Tell that this a 64-bit enclave. + * %SGX_ATTR_PROVISIONKEY: Allow to use provisioning keys for remote + * attestation. + * %SGX_ATTR_KSS: Allow to use key separation and sharing (KSS). + * %SGX_ATTR_EINITTOKENKEY: Allow to use token signing key that is used to + * sign cryptographic tokens that can be passed to + * EINIT as an authorization to run an enclave. + */ +enum sgx_attribute { + SGX_ATTR_INIT = BIT(0), + SGX_ATTR_DEBUG = BIT(1), + SGX_ATTR_MODE64BIT = BIT(2), + SGX_ATTR_PROVISIONKEY = BIT(4), + SGX_ATTR_EINITTOKENKEY = BIT(5), + SGX_ATTR_KSS = BIT(7), +}; + +#define SGX_ATTR_RESERVED_MASK (BIT_ULL(3) | BIT_ULL(6) | GENMASK_ULL(63, 8)) + +/** + * struct sgx_secs - SGX Enclave Control Structure (SECS) + * @size: size of the address space + * @base: base address of the address space + * @ssa_frame_size: size of an SSA frame + * @miscselect: additional information stored to an SSA frame + * @attributes: attributes for enclave + * @xfrm: XSave-Feature Request Mask (subset of XCR0) + * @mrenclave: SHA256-hash of the enclave contents + * @mrsigner: SHA256-hash of the public key used to sign the SIGSTRUCT + * @config_id: a user-defined value that is used in key derivation + * @isv_prod_id: a user-defined value that is used in key derivation + * @isv_svn: a user-defined value that is used in key derivation + * @config_svn: a user-defined value that is used in key derivation + * + * SGX Enclave Control Structure (SECS) is a special enclave page that is not + * visible in the address space. In fact, this structure defines the address + * range and other global attributes for the enclave and it is the first EPC + * page created for any enclave. It is moved from a temporary buffer to an EPC + * by the means of ENCLS[ECREATE] function. + */ +struct sgx_secs { + u64 size; + u64 base; + u32 ssa_frame_size; + u32 miscselect; + u8 reserved1[24]; + u64 attributes; + u64 xfrm; + u32 mrenclave[8]; + u8 reserved2[32]; + u32 mrsigner[8]; + u8 reserved3[32]; + u32 config_id[16]; + u16 isv_prod_id; + u16 isv_svn; + u16 config_svn; + u8 reserved4[3834]; +} __packed; + +/** + * enum sgx_tcs_flags - execution flags for TCS + * %SGX_TCS_DBGOPTIN: If enabled allows single-stepping and breakpoints + * inside an enclave. It is cleared by EADD but can + * be set later with EDBGWR. + */ +enum sgx_tcs_flags { + SGX_TCS_DBGOPTIN = 0x01, +}; + +#define SGX_TCS_RESERVED_MASK GENMASK_ULL(63, 1) +#define SGX_TCS_RESERVED_SIZE 4024 + +/** + * struct sgx_tcs - Thread Control Structure (TCS) + * @state: used to mark an entered TCS + * @flags: execution flags (cleared by EADD) + * @ssa_offset: SSA stack offset relative to the enclave base + * @ssa_index: the current SSA frame index (cleard by EADD) + * @nr_ssa_frames: the number of frame in the SSA stack + * @entry_offset: entry point offset relative to the enclave base + * @exit_addr: address outside the enclave to exit on an exception or + * interrupt + * @fs_offset: offset relative to the enclave base to become FS + * segment inside the enclave + * @gs_offset: offset relative to the enclave base to become GS + * segment inside the enclave + * @fs_limit: size to become a new FS-limit (only 32-bit enclaves) + * @gs_limit: size to become a new GS-limit (only 32-bit enclaves) + * + * Thread Control Structure (TCS) is an enclave page visible in its address + * space that defines an entry point inside the enclave. A thread enters inside + * an enclave by supplying address of TCS to ENCLU(EENTER). A TCS can be entered + * by only one thread at a time. + */ +struct sgx_tcs { + u64 state; + u64 flags; + u64 ssa_offset; + u32 ssa_index; + u32 nr_ssa_frames; + u64 entry_offset; + u64 exit_addr; + u64 fs_offset; + u64 gs_offset; + u32 fs_limit; + u32 gs_limit; + u8 reserved[SGX_TCS_RESERVED_SIZE]; +} __packed; + +/** + * struct sgx_pageinfo - an enclave page descriptor + * @addr: address of the enclave page + * @contents: pointer to the page contents + * @metadata: pointer either to a SECINFO or PCMD instance + * @secs: address of the SECS page + */ +struct sgx_pageinfo { + u64 addr; + u64 contents; + u64 metadata; + u64 secs; +} __packed __aligned(32); + + +/** + * enum sgx_page_type - bits in the SECINFO flags defining the page type + * %SGX_PAGE_TYPE_SECS: a SECS page + * %SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TCS: a TCS page + * %SGX_PAGE_TYPE_REG: a regular page + * %SGX_PAGE_TYPE_VA: a VA page + * %SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TRIM: a page in trimmed state + */ +enum sgx_page_type { + SGX_PAGE_TYPE_SECS, + SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TCS, + SGX_PAGE_TYPE_REG, + SGX_PAGE_TYPE_VA, + SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TRIM, +}; + +#define SGX_NR_PAGE_TYPES 5 +#define SGX_PAGE_TYPE_MASK GENMASK(7, 0) + +/** + * enum sgx_secinfo_flags - the flags field in &struct sgx_secinfo + * %SGX_SECINFO_R: allow read + * %SGX_SECINFO_W: allow write + * %SGX_SECINFO_X: allow execution + * %SGX_SECINFO_SECS: a SECS page + * %SGX_SECINFO_TCS: a TCS page + * %SGX_SECINFO_REG: a regular page + * %SGX_SECINFO_VA: a VA page + * %SGX_SECINFO_TRIM: a page in trimmed state + */ +enum sgx_secinfo_flags { + SGX_SECINFO_R = BIT(0), + SGX_SECINFO_W = BIT(1), + SGX_SECINFO_X = BIT(2), + SGX_SECINFO_SECS = (SGX_PAGE_TYPE_SECS << 8), + SGX_SECINFO_TCS = (SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TCS << 8), + SGX_SECINFO_REG = (SGX_PAGE_TYPE_REG << 8), + SGX_SECINFO_VA = (SGX_PAGE_TYPE_VA << 8), + SGX_SECINFO_TRIM = (SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TRIM << 8), +}; + +#define SGX_SECINFO_PERMISSION_MASK GENMASK_ULL(2, 0) +#define SGX_SECINFO_PAGE_TYPE_MASK (SGX_PAGE_TYPE_MASK << 8) +#define SGX_SECINFO_RESERVED_MASK ~(SGX_SECINFO_PERMISSION_MASK | \ + SGX_SECINFO_PAGE_TYPE_MASK) + +/** + * struct sgx_secinfo - describes attributes of an EPC page + * @flags: permissions and type + * + * Used together with ENCLS leaves that add or modify an EPC page to an + * enclave to define page permissions and type. + */ +struct sgx_secinfo { + u64 flags; + u8 reserved[56]; +} __packed __aligned(64); + +#define SGX_PCMD_RESERVED_SIZE 40 + +/** + * struct sgx_pcmd - Paging Crypto Metadata (PCMD) + * @enclave_id: enclave identifier + * @mac: MAC over PCMD, page contents and isvsvn + * + * PCMD is stored for every swapped page to the regular memory. When ELDU loads + * the page back it recalculates the MAC by using a isvsvn number stored in a + * VA page. Together these two structures bring integrity and rollback + * protection. + */ +struct sgx_pcmd { + struct sgx_secinfo secinfo; + u64 enclave_id; + u8 reserved[SGX_PCMD_RESERVED_SIZE]; + u8 mac[16]; +} __packed __aligned(128); + +#define SGX_SIGSTRUCT_RESERVED1_SIZE 84 +#define SGX_SIGSTRUCT_RESERVED2_SIZE 20 +#define SGX_SIGSTRUCT_RESERVED3_SIZE 32 +#define SGX_SIGSTRUCT_RESERVED4_SIZE 12 + +/** + * struct sgx_sigstruct_header - defines author of the enclave + * @header1: constant byte string + * @vendor: must be either 0x0000 or 0x8086 + * @date: YYYYMMDD in BCD + * @header2: costant byte string + * @swdefined: software defined value + */ +struct sgx_sigstruct_header { + u64 header1[2]; + u32 vendor; + u32 date; + u64 header2[2]; + u32 swdefined; + u8 reserved1[84]; +} __packed; + +/** + * struct sgx_sigstruct_body - defines contents of the enclave + * @miscselect: additional information stored to an SSA frame + * @misc_mask: required miscselect in SECS + * @attributes: attributes for enclave + * @xfrm: XSave-Feature Request Mask (subset of XCR0) + * @attributes_mask: required attributes in SECS + * @xfrm_mask: required XFRM in SECS + * @mrenclave: SHA256-hash of the enclave contents + * @isvprodid: a user-defined value that is used in key derivation + * @isvsvn: a user-defined value that is used in key derivation + */ +struct sgx_sigstruct_body { + u32 miscselect; + u32 misc_mask; + u8 reserved2[20]; + u64 attributes; + u64 xfrm; + u64 attributes_mask; + u64 xfrm_mask; + u8 mrenclave[32]; + u8 reserved3[32]; + u16 isvprodid; + u16 isvsvn; +} __packed; + +/** + * struct sgx_sigstruct - an enclave signature + * @header: defines author of the enclave + * @modulus: the modulus of the public key + * @exponent: the exponent of the public key + * @signature: the signature calculated over the fields except modulus, + * @body: defines contents of the enclave + * @q1: a value used in RSA signature verification + * @q2: a value used in RSA signature verification + * + * Header and body are the parts that are actual signed. The remaining fields + * define the signature of the enclave. + */ +struct sgx_sigstruct { + struct sgx_sigstruct_header header; + u8 modulus[SGX_MODULUS_SIZE]; + u32 exponent; + u8 signature[SGX_MODULUS_SIZE]; + struct sgx_sigstruct_body body; + u8 reserved4[12]; + u8 q1[SGX_MODULUS_SIZE]; + u8 q2[SGX_MODULUS_SIZE]; +} __packed; + +#define SGX_LAUNCH_TOKEN_SIZE 304 + +#endif /* _ASM_X86_SGX_ARCH_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..f2eac41bb4ff --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c @@ -0,0 +1,194 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* Copyright(c) 2016-20 Intel Corporation. */ + +#include <linux/acpi.h> +#include <linux/miscdevice.h> +#include <linux/mman.h> +#include <linux/security.h> +#include <linux/suspend.h> +#include <asm/traps.h> +#include "driver.h" +#include "encl.h" + +u64 sgx_attributes_reserved_mask; +u64 sgx_xfrm_reserved_mask = ~0x3; +u32 sgx_misc_reserved_mask; + +static int sgx_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) +{ + struct sgx_encl *encl; + int ret; + + encl = kzalloc(sizeof(*encl), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!encl) + return -ENOMEM; + + kref_init(&encl->refcount); + xa_init(&encl->page_array); + mutex_init(&encl->lock); + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&encl->va_pages); + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&encl->mm_list); + spin_lock_init(&encl->mm_lock); + + ret = init_srcu_struct(&encl->srcu); + if (ret) { + kfree(encl); + return ret; + } + + file->private_data = encl; + + return 0; +} + +static int sgx_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) +{ + struct sgx_encl *encl = file->private_data; + struct sgx_encl_mm *encl_mm; + + /* + * Drain the remaining mm_list entries. At this point the list contains + * entries for processes, which have closed the enclave file but have + * not exited yet. The processes, which have exited, are gone from the + * list by sgx_mmu_notifier_release(). + */ + for ( ; ; ) { + spin_lock(&encl->mm_lock); + + if (list_empty(&encl->mm_list)) { + encl_mm = NULL; + } else { + encl_mm = list_first_entry(&encl->mm_list, + struct sgx_encl_mm, list); + list_del_rcu(&encl_mm->list); + } + + spin_unlock(&encl->mm_lock); + + /* The enclave is no longer mapped by any mm. */ + if (!encl_mm) + break; + + synchronize_srcu(&encl->srcu); + mmu_notifier_unregister(&encl_mm->mmu_notifier, encl_mm->mm); + kfree(encl_mm); + } + + kref_put(&encl->refcount, sgx_encl_release); + return 0; +} + +static int sgx_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma) +{ + struct sgx_encl *encl = file->private_data; + int ret; + + ret = sgx_encl_may_map(encl, vma->vm_start, vma->vm_end, vma->vm_flags); + if (ret) + return ret; + + ret = sgx_encl_mm_add(encl, vma->vm_mm); + if (ret) + return ret; + + vma->vm_ops = &sgx_vm_ops; + vma->vm_flags |= VM_PFNMAP | VM_DONTEXPAND | VM_DONTDUMP | VM_IO; + vma->vm_private_data = encl; + + return 0; +} + +static unsigned long sgx_get_unmapped_area(struct file *file, + unsigned long addr, + unsigned long len, + unsigned long pgoff, + unsigned long flags) +{ + if ((flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_PRIVATE) + return -EINVAL; + + if (flags & MAP_FIXED) + return addr; + + return current->mm->get_unmapped_area(file, addr, len, pgoff, flags); +} + +#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT +static long sgx_compat_ioctl(struct file *filep, unsigned int cmd, + unsigned long arg) +{ + return sgx_ioctl(filep, cmd, arg); +} +#endif + +static const struct file_operations sgx_encl_fops = { + .owner = THIS_MODULE, + .open = sgx_open, + .release = sgx_release, + .unlocked_ioctl = sgx_ioctl, +#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT + .compat_ioctl = sgx_compat_ioctl, +#endif + .mmap = sgx_mmap, + .get_unmapped_area = sgx_get_unmapped_area, +}; + +const struct file_operations sgx_provision_fops = { + .owner = THIS_MODULE, +}; + +static struct miscdevice sgx_dev_enclave = { + .minor = MISC_DYNAMIC_MINOR, + .name = "sgx_enclave", + .nodename = "sgx_enclave", + .fops = &sgx_encl_fops, +}; + +static struct miscdevice sgx_dev_provision = { + .minor = MISC_DYNAMIC_MINOR, + .name = "sgx_provision", + .nodename = "sgx_provision", + .fops = &sgx_provision_fops, +}; + +int __init sgx_drv_init(void) +{ + unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx; + u64 attr_mask; + u64 xfrm_mask; + int ret; + + if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SGX_LC)) + return -ENODEV; + + cpuid_count(SGX_CPUID, 0, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx); + + if (!(eax & 1)) { + pr_err("SGX disabled: SGX1 instruction support not available.\n"); + return -ENODEV; + } + + sgx_misc_reserved_mask = ~ebx | SGX_MISC_RESERVED_MASK; + + cpuid_count(SGX_CPUID, 1, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx); + + attr_mask = (((u64)ebx) << 32) + (u64)eax; + sgx_attributes_reserved_mask = ~attr_mask | SGX_ATTR_RESERVED_MASK; + + if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_OSXSAVE)) { + xfrm_mask = (((u64)edx) << 32) + (u64)ecx; + sgx_xfrm_reserved_mask = ~xfrm_mask; + } + + ret = misc_register(&sgx_dev_enclave); + if (ret) + return ret; + + ret = misc_register(&sgx_dev_provision); + if (ret) { + misc_deregister(&sgx_dev_enclave); + return ret; + } + + return 0; +} diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..4eddb4d571ef --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.h @@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +#ifndef __ARCH_SGX_DRIVER_H__ +#define __ARCH_SGX_DRIVER_H__ + +#include <crypto/hash.h> +#include <linux/kref.h> +#include <linux/mmu_notifier.h> +#include <linux/radix-tree.h> +#include <linux/rwsem.h> +#include <linux/sched.h> +#include <linux/workqueue.h> +#include <uapi/asm/sgx.h> +#include "sgx.h" + +#define SGX_EINIT_SPIN_COUNT 20 +#define SGX_EINIT_SLEEP_COUNT 50 +#define SGX_EINIT_SLEEP_TIME 20 + +extern u64 sgx_attributes_reserved_mask; +extern u64 sgx_xfrm_reserved_mask; +extern u32 sgx_misc_reserved_mask; + +extern const struct file_operations sgx_provision_fops; + +long sgx_ioctl(struct file *filep, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg); + +int sgx_drv_init(void); + +#endif /* __ARCH_X86_SGX_DRIVER_H__ */ diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..ee50a5010277 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c @@ -0,0 +1,740 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* Copyright(c) 2016-20 Intel Corporation. */ + +#include <linux/lockdep.h> +#include <linux/mm.h> +#include <linux/mman.h> +#include <linux/shmem_fs.h> +#include <linux/suspend.h> +#include <linux/sched/mm.h> +#include "arch.h" +#include "encl.h" +#include "encls.h" +#include "sgx.h" + +/* + * ELDU: Load an EPC page as unblocked. For more info, see "OS Management of EPC + * Pages" in the SDM. + */ +static int __sgx_encl_eldu(struct sgx_encl_page *encl_page, + struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page, + struct sgx_epc_page *secs_page) +{ + unsigned long va_offset = encl_page->desc & SGX_ENCL_PAGE_VA_OFFSET_MASK; + struct sgx_encl *encl = encl_page->encl; + struct sgx_pageinfo pginfo; + struct sgx_backing b; + pgoff_t page_index; + int ret; + + if (secs_page) + page_index = PFN_DOWN(encl_page->desc - encl_page->encl->base); + else + page_index = PFN_DOWN(encl->size); + + ret = sgx_encl_get_backing(encl, page_index, &b); + if (ret) + return ret; + + pginfo.addr = encl_page->desc & PAGE_MASK; + pginfo.contents = (unsigned long)kmap_atomic(b.contents); + pginfo.metadata = (unsigned long)kmap_atomic(b.pcmd) + + b.pcmd_offset; + + if (secs_page) + pginfo.secs = (u64)sgx_get_epc_virt_addr(secs_page); + else + pginfo.secs = 0; + + ret = __eldu(&pginfo, sgx_get_epc_virt_addr(epc_page), + sgx_get_epc_virt_addr(encl_page->va_page->epc_page) + va_offset); + if (ret) { + if (encls_failed(ret)) + ENCLS_WARN(ret, "ELDU"); + + ret = -EFAULT; + } + + kunmap_atomic((void *)(unsigned long)(pginfo.metadata - b.pcmd_offset)); + kunmap_atomic((void *)(unsigned long)pginfo.contents); + + sgx_encl_put_backing(&b, false); + + return ret; +} + +static struct sgx_epc_page *sgx_encl_eldu(struct sgx_encl_page *encl_page, + struct sgx_epc_page *secs_page) +{ + + unsigned long va_offset = encl_page->desc & SGX_ENCL_PAGE_VA_OFFSET_MASK; + struct sgx_encl *encl = encl_page->encl; + struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page; + int ret; + + epc_page = sgx_alloc_epc_page(encl_page, false); + if (IS_ERR(epc_page)) + return epc_page; + + ret = __sgx_encl_eldu(encl_page, epc_page, secs_page); + if (ret) { + sgx_free_epc_page(epc_page); + return ERR_PTR(ret); + } + + sgx_free_va_slot(encl_page->va_page, va_offset); + list_move(&encl_page->va_page->list, &encl->va_pages); + encl_page->desc &= ~SGX_ENCL_PAGE_VA_OFFSET_MASK; + encl_page->epc_page = epc_page; + + return epc_page; +} + +static struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_load_page(struct sgx_encl *encl, + unsigned long addr, + unsigned long vm_flags) +{ + unsigned long vm_prot_bits = vm_flags & (VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_EXEC); + struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page; + struct sgx_encl_page *entry; + + entry = xa_load(&encl->page_array, PFN_DOWN(addr)); + if (!entry) + return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT); + + /* + * Verify that the faulted page has equal or higher build time + * permissions than the VMA permissions (i.e. the subset of {VM_READ, + * VM_WRITE, VM_EXECUTE} in vma->vm_flags). + */ + if ((entry->vm_max_prot_bits & vm_prot_bits) != vm_prot_bits) + return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT); + + /* Entry successfully located. */ + if (entry->epc_page) { + if (entry->desc & SGX_ENCL_PAGE_BEING_RECLAIMED) + return ERR_PTR(-EBUSY); + + return entry; + } + + if (!(encl->secs.epc_page)) { + epc_page = sgx_encl_eldu(&encl->secs, NULL); + if (IS_ERR(epc_page)) + return ERR_CAST(epc_page); + } + + epc_page = sgx_encl_eldu(entry, encl->secs.epc_page); + if (IS_ERR(epc_page)) + return ERR_CAST(epc_page); + + encl->secs_child_cnt++; + sgx_mark_page_reclaimable(entry->epc_page); + + return entry; +} + +static vm_fault_t sgx_vma_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf) +{ + unsigned long addr = (unsigned long)vmf->address; + struct vm_area_struct *vma = vmf->vma; + struct sgx_encl_page *entry; + unsigned long phys_addr; + struct sgx_encl *encl; + unsigned long pfn; + vm_fault_t ret; + + encl = vma->vm_private_data; + + /* + * It's very unlikely but possible that allocating memory for the + * mm_list entry of a forked process failed in sgx_vma_open(). When + * this happens, vm_private_data is set to NULL. + */ + if (unlikely(!encl)) + return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS; + + mutex_lock(&encl->lock); + + entry = sgx_encl_load_page(encl, addr, vma->vm_flags); + if (IS_ERR(entry)) { + mutex_unlock(&encl->lock); + + if (PTR_ERR(entry) == -EBUSY) + return VM_FAULT_NOPAGE; + + return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS; + } + + phys_addr = sgx_get_epc_phys_addr(entry->epc_page); + + /* Check if another thread got here first to insert the PTE. */ + if (!follow_pfn(vma, addr, &pfn)) { + mutex_unlock(&encl->lock); + + return VM_FAULT_NOPAGE; + } + + ret = vmf_insert_pfn(vma, addr, PFN_DOWN(phys_addr)); + if (ret != VM_FAULT_NOPAGE) { + mutex_unlock(&encl->lock); + + return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS; + } + + sgx_encl_test_and_clear_young(vma->vm_mm, entry); + mutex_unlock(&encl->lock); + + return VM_FAULT_NOPAGE; +} + +static void sgx_vma_open(struct vm_area_struct *vma) +{ + struct sgx_encl *encl = vma->vm_private_data; + + /* + * It's possible but unlikely that vm_private_data is NULL. This can + * happen in a grandchild of a process, when sgx_encl_mm_add() had + * failed to allocate memory in this callback. + */ + if (unlikely(!encl)) + return; + + if (sgx_encl_mm_add(encl, vma->vm_mm)) + vma->vm_private_data = NULL; +} + + +/** + * sgx_encl_may_map() - Check if a requested VMA mapping is allowed + * @encl: an enclave pointer + * @start: lower bound of the address range, inclusive + * @end: upper bound of the address range, exclusive + * @vm_flags: VMA flags + * + * Iterate through the enclave pages contained within [@start, @end) to verify + * that the permissions requested by a subset of {VM_READ, VM_WRITE, VM_EXEC} + * do not contain any permissions that are not contained in the build time + * permissions of any of the enclave pages within the given address range. + * + * An enclave creator must declare the strongest permissions that will be + * needed for each enclave page. This ensures that mappings have the identical + * or weaker permissions than the earlier declared permissions. + * + * Return: 0 on success, -EACCES otherwise + */ +int sgx_encl_may_map(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long start, + unsigned long end, unsigned long vm_flags) +{ + unsigned long vm_prot_bits = vm_flags & (VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_EXEC); + struct sgx_encl_page *page; + unsigned long count = 0; + int ret = 0; + + XA_STATE(xas, &encl->page_array, PFN_DOWN(start)); + + /* + * Disallow READ_IMPLIES_EXEC tasks as their VMA permissions might + * conflict with the enclave page permissions. + */ + if (current->personality & READ_IMPLIES_EXEC) + return -EACCES; + + mutex_lock(&encl->lock); + xas_lock(&xas); + xas_for_each(&xas, page, PFN_DOWN(end - 1)) { + if (~page->vm_max_prot_bits & vm_prot_bits) { + ret = -EACCES; + break; + } + + /* Reschedule on every XA_CHECK_SCHED iteration. */ + if (!(++count % XA_CHECK_SCHED)) { + xas_pause(&xas); + xas_unlock(&xas); + mutex_unlock(&encl->lock); + + cond_resched(); + + mutex_lock(&encl->lock); + xas_lock(&xas); + } + } + xas_unlock(&xas); + mutex_unlock(&encl->lock); + + return ret; +} + +static int sgx_vma_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long start, + unsigned long end, unsigned long newflags) +{ + return sgx_encl_may_map(vma->vm_private_data, start, end, newflags); +} + +static int sgx_encl_debug_read(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct sgx_encl_page *page, + unsigned long addr, void *data) +{ + unsigned long offset = addr & ~PAGE_MASK; + int ret; + + + ret = __edbgrd(sgx_get_epc_virt_addr(page->epc_page) + offset, data); + if (ret) + return -EIO; + + return 0; +} + +static int sgx_encl_debug_write(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct sgx_encl_page *page, + unsigned long addr, void *data) +{ + unsigned long offset = addr & ~PAGE_MASK; + int ret; + + ret = __edbgwr(sgx_get_epc_virt_addr(page->epc_page) + offset, data); + if (ret) + return -EIO; + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Load an enclave page to EPC if required, and take encl->lock. + */ +static struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_reserve_page(struct sgx_encl *encl, + unsigned long addr, + unsigned long vm_flags) +{ + struct sgx_encl_page *entry; + + for ( ; ; ) { + mutex_lock(&encl->lock); + + entry = sgx_encl_load_page(encl, addr, vm_flags); + if (PTR_ERR(entry) != -EBUSY) + break; + + mutex_unlock(&encl->lock); + } + + if (IS_ERR(entry)) + mutex_unlock(&encl->lock); + + return entry; +} + +static int sgx_vma_access(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr, + void *buf, int len, int write) +{ + struct sgx_encl *encl = vma->vm_private_data; + struct sgx_encl_page *entry = NULL; + char data[sizeof(unsigned long)]; + unsigned long align; + int offset; + int cnt; + int ret = 0; + int i; + + /* + * If process was forked, VMA is still there but vm_private_data is set + * to NULL. + */ + if (!encl) + return -EFAULT; + + if (!test_bit(SGX_ENCL_DEBUG, &encl->flags)) + return -EFAULT; + + for (i = 0; i < len; i += cnt) { + entry = sgx_encl_reserve_page(encl, (addr + i) & PAGE_MASK, + vma->vm_flags); + if (IS_ERR(entry)) { + ret = PTR_ERR(entry); + break; + } + + align = ALIGN_DOWN(addr + i, sizeof(unsigned long)); + offset = (addr + i) & (sizeof(unsigned long) - 1); + cnt = sizeof(unsigned long) - offset; + cnt = min(cnt, len - i); + + ret = sgx_encl_debug_read(encl, entry, align, data); + if (ret) + goto out; + + if (write) { + memcpy(data + offset, buf + i, cnt); + ret = sgx_encl_debug_write(encl, entry, align, data); + if (ret) + goto out; + } else { + memcpy(buf + i, data + offset, cnt); + } + +out: + mutex_unlock(&encl->lock); + + if (ret) + break; + } + + return ret < 0 ? ret : i; +} + +const struct vm_operations_struct sgx_vm_ops = { + .fault = sgx_vma_fault, + .mprotect = sgx_vma_mprotect, + .open = sgx_vma_open, + .access = sgx_vma_access, +}; + +/** + * sgx_encl_release - Destroy an enclave instance + * @kref: address of a kref inside &sgx_encl + * + * Used together with kref_put(). Frees all the resources associated with the + * enclave and the instance itself. + */ +void sgx_encl_release(struct kref *ref) +{ + struct sgx_encl *encl = container_of(ref, struct sgx_encl, refcount); + struct sgx_va_page *va_page; + struct sgx_encl_page *entry; + unsigned long index; + + xa_for_each(&encl->page_array, index, entry) { + if (entry->epc_page) { + /* + * The page and its radix tree entry cannot be freed + * if the page is being held by the reclaimer. + */ + if (sgx_unmark_page_reclaimable(entry->epc_page)) + continue; + + sgx_free_epc_page(entry->epc_page); + encl->secs_child_cnt--; + entry->epc_page = NULL; + } + + kfree(entry); + } + + xa_destroy(&encl->page_array); + + if (!encl->secs_child_cnt && encl->secs.epc_page) { + sgx_free_epc_page(encl->secs.epc_page); + encl->secs.epc_page = NULL; + } + + while (!list_empty(&encl->va_pages)) { + va_page = list_first_entry(&encl->va_pages, struct sgx_va_page, + list); + list_del(&va_page->list); + sgx_free_epc_page(va_page->epc_page); + kfree(va_page); + } + + if (encl->backing) + fput(encl->backing); + + cleanup_srcu_struct(&encl->srcu); + + WARN_ON_ONCE(!list_empty(&encl->mm_list)); + + /* Detect EPC page leak's. */ + WARN_ON_ONCE(encl->secs_child_cnt); + WARN_ON_ONCE(encl->secs.epc_page); + + kfree(encl); +} + +/* + * 'mm' is exiting and no longer needs mmu notifications. + */ +static void sgx_mmu_notifier_release(struct mmu_notifier *mn, + struct mm_struct *mm) +{ + struct sgx_encl_mm *encl_mm = container_of(mn, struct sgx_encl_mm, mmu_notifier); + struct sgx_encl_mm *tmp = NULL; + + /* + * The enclave itself can remove encl_mm. Note, objects can't be moved + * off an RCU protected list, but deletion is ok. + */ + spin_lock(&encl_mm->encl->mm_lock); + list_for_each_entry(tmp, &encl_mm->encl->mm_list, list) { + if (tmp == encl_mm) { + list_del_rcu(&encl_mm->list); + break; + } + } + spin_unlock(&encl_mm->encl->mm_lock); + + if (tmp == encl_mm) { + synchronize_srcu(&encl_mm->encl->srcu); + mmu_notifier_put(mn); + } +} + +static void sgx_mmu_notifier_free(struct mmu_notifier *mn) +{ + struct sgx_encl_mm *encl_mm = container_of(mn, struct sgx_encl_mm, mmu_notifier); + + kfree(encl_mm); +} + +static const struct mmu_notifier_ops sgx_mmu_notifier_ops = { + .release = sgx_mmu_notifier_release, + .free_notifier = sgx_mmu_notifier_free, +}; + +static struct sgx_encl_mm *sgx_encl_find_mm(struct sgx_encl *encl, + struct mm_struct *mm) +{ + struct sgx_encl_mm *encl_mm = NULL; + struct sgx_encl_mm *tmp; + int idx; + + idx = srcu_read_lock(&encl->srcu); + + list_for_each_entry_rcu(tmp, &encl->mm_list, list) { + if (tmp->mm == mm) { + encl_mm = tmp; + break; + } + } + + srcu_read_unlock(&encl->srcu, idx); + + return encl_mm; +} + +int sgx_encl_mm_add(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct mm_struct *mm) +{ + struct sgx_encl_mm *encl_mm; + int ret; + + /* + * Even though a single enclave may be mapped into an mm more than once, + * each 'mm' only appears once on encl->mm_list. This is guaranteed by + * holding the mm's mmap lock for write before an mm can be added or + * remove to an encl->mm_list. + */ + mmap_assert_write_locked(mm); + + /* + * It's possible that an entry already exists in the mm_list, because it + * is removed only on VFS release or process exit. + */ + if (sgx_encl_find_mm(encl, mm)) + return 0; + + encl_mm = kzalloc(sizeof(*encl_mm), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!encl_mm) + return -ENOMEM; + + encl_mm->encl = encl; + encl_mm->mm = mm; + encl_mm->mmu_notifier.ops = &sgx_mmu_notifier_ops; + + ret = __mmu_notifier_register(&encl_mm->mmu_notifier, mm); + if (ret) { + kfree(encl_mm); + return ret; + } + + spin_lock(&encl->mm_lock); + list_add_rcu(&encl_mm->list, &encl->mm_list); + /* Pairs with smp_rmb() in sgx_reclaimer_block(). */ + smp_wmb(); + encl->mm_list_version++; + spin_unlock(&encl->mm_lock); + + return 0; +} + +static struct page *sgx_encl_get_backing_page(struct sgx_encl *encl, + pgoff_t index) +{ + struct inode *inode = encl->backing->f_path.dentry->d_inode; + struct address_space *mapping = inode->i_mapping; + gfp_t gfpmask = mapping_gfp_mask(mapping); + + return shmem_read_mapping_page_gfp(mapping, index, gfpmask); +} + +/** + * sgx_encl_get_backing() - Pin the backing storage + * @encl: an enclave pointer + * @page_index: enclave page index + * @backing: data for accessing backing storage for the page + * + * Pin the backing storage pages for storing the encrypted contents and Paging + * Crypto MetaData (PCMD) of an enclave page. + * + * Return: + * 0 on success, + * -errno otherwise. + */ +int sgx_encl_get_backing(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long page_index, + struct sgx_backing *backing) +{ + pgoff_t pcmd_index = PFN_DOWN(encl->size) + 1 + (page_index >> 5); + struct page *contents; + struct page *pcmd; + + contents = sgx_encl_get_backing_page(encl, page_index); + if (IS_ERR(contents)) + return PTR_ERR(contents); + + pcmd = sgx_encl_get_backing_page(encl, pcmd_index); + if (IS_ERR(pcmd)) { + put_page(contents); + return PTR_ERR(pcmd); + } + + backing->page_index = page_index; + backing->contents = contents; + backing->pcmd = pcmd; + backing->pcmd_offset = + (page_index & (PAGE_SIZE / sizeof(struct sgx_pcmd) - 1)) * + sizeof(struct sgx_pcmd); + + return 0; +} + +/** + * sgx_encl_put_backing() - Unpin the backing storage + * @backing: data for accessing backing storage for the page + * @do_write: mark pages dirty + */ +void sgx_encl_put_backing(struct sgx_backing *backing, bool do_write) +{ + if (do_write) { + set_page_dirty(backing->pcmd); + set_page_dirty(backing->contents); + } + + put_page(backing->pcmd); + put_page(backing->contents); +} + +static int sgx_encl_test_and_clear_young_cb(pte_t *ptep, unsigned long addr, + void *data) +{ + pte_t pte; + int ret; + + ret = pte_young(*ptep); + if (ret) { + pte = pte_mkold(*ptep); + set_pte_at((struct mm_struct *)data, addr, ptep, pte); + } + + return ret; +} + +/** + * sgx_encl_test_and_clear_young() - Test and reset the accessed bit + * @mm: mm_struct that is checked + * @page: enclave page to be tested for recent access + * + * Checks the Access (A) bit from the PTE corresponding to the enclave page and + * clears it. + * + * Return: 1 if the page has been recently accessed and 0 if not. + */ +int sgx_encl_test_and_clear_young(struct mm_struct *mm, + struct sgx_encl_page *page) +{ + unsigned long addr = page->desc & PAGE_MASK; + struct sgx_encl *encl = page->encl; + struct vm_area_struct *vma; + int ret; + + ret = sgx_encl_find(mm, addr, &vma); + if (ret) + return 0; + + if (encl != vma->vm_private_data) + return 0; + + ret = apply_to_page_range(vma->vm_mm, addr, PAGE_SIZE, + sgx_encl_test_and_clear_young_cb, vma->vm_mm); + if (ret < 0) + return 0; + + return ret; +} + +/** + * sgx_alloc_va_page() - Allocate a Version Array (VA) page + * + * Allocate a free EPC page and convert it to a Version Array (VA) page. + * + * Return: + * a VA page, + * -errno otherwise + */ +struct sgx_epc_page *sgx_alloc_va_page(void) +{ + struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page; + int ret; + + epc_page = sgx_alloc_epc_page(NULL, true); + if (IS_ERR(epc_page)) + return ERR_CAST(epc_page); + + ret = __epa(sgx_get_epc_virt_addr(epc_page)); + if (ret) { + WARN_ONCE(1, "EPA returned %d (0x%x)", ret, ret); + sgx_free_epc_page(epc_page); + return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT); + } + + return epc_page; +} + +/** + * sgx_alloc_va_slot - allocate a VA slot + * @va_page: a &struct sgx_va_page instance + * + * Allocates a slot from a &struct sgx_va_page instance. + * + * Return: offset of the slot inside the VA page + */ +unsigned int sgx_alloc_va_slot(struct sgx_va_page *va_page) +{ + int slot = find_first_zero_bit(va_page->slots, SGX_VA_SLOT_COUNT); + + if (slot < SGX_VA_SLOT_COUNT) + set_bit(slot, va_page->slots); + + return slot << 3; +} + +/** + * sgx_free_va_slot - free a VA slot + * @va_page: a &struct sgx_va_page instance + * @offset: offset of the slot inside the VA page + * + * Frees a slot from a &struct sgx_va_page instance. + */ +void sgx_free_va_slot(struct sgx_va_page *va_page, unsigned int offset) +{ + clear_bit(offset >> 3, va_page->slots); +} + +/** + * sgx_va_page_full - is the VA page full? + * @va_page: a &struct sgx_va_page instance + * + * Return: true if all slots have been taken + */ +bool sgx_va_page_full(struct sgx_va_page *va_page) +{ + int slot = find_first_zero_bit(va_page->slots, SGX_VA_SLOT_COUNT); + + return slot == SGX_VA_SLOT_COUNT; +} diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..d8d30ccbef4c --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h @@ -0,0 +1,119 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/** + * Copyright(c) 2016-20 Intel Corporation. + * + * Contains the software defined data structures for enclaves. + */ +#ifndef _X86_ENCL_H +#define _X86_ENCL_H + +#include <linux/cpumask.h> +#include <linux/kref.h> +#include <linux/list.h> +#include <linux/mm_types.h> +#include <linux/mmu_notifier.h> +#include <linux/mutex.h> +#include <linux/notifier.h> +#include <linux/srcu.h> +#include <linux/workqueue.h> +#include <linux/xarray.h> +#include "sgx.h" + +/* 'desc' bits holding the offset in the VA (version array) page. */ +#define SGX_ENCL_PAGE_VA_OFFSET_MASK GENMASK_ULL(11, 3) + +/* 'desc' bit marking that the page is being reclaimed. */ +#define SGX_ENCL_PAGE_BEING_RECLAIMED BIT(3) + +struct sgx_encl_page { + unsigned long desc; + unsigned long vm_max_prot_bits; + struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page; + struct sgx_encl *encl; + struct sgx_va_page *va_page; +}; + +enum sgx_encl_flags { + SGX_ENCL_IOCTL = BIT(0), + SGX_ENCL_DEBUG = BIT(1), + SGX_ENCL_CREATED = BIT(2), + SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED = BIT(3), +}; + +struct sgx_encl_mm { + struct sgx_encl *encl; + struct mm_struct *mm; + struct list_head list; + struct mmu_notifier mmu_notifier; +}; + +struct sgx_encl { + unsigned long base; + unsigned long size; + unsigned long flags; + unsigned int page_cnt; + unsigned int secs_child_cnt; + struct mutex lock; + struct xarray page_array; + struct sgx_encl_page secs; + unsigned long attributes; + unsigned long attributes_mask; + + cpumask_t cpumask; + struct file *backing; + struct kref refcount; + struct list_head va_pages; + unsigned long mm_list_version; + struct list_head mm_list; + spinlock_t mm_lock; + struct srcu_struct srcu; +}; + +#define SGX_VA_SLOT_COUNT 512 + +struct sgx_va_page { + struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page; + DECLARE_BITMAP(slots, SGX_VA_SLOT_COUNT); + struct list_head list; +}; + +struct sgx_backing { + pgoff_t page_index; + struct page *contents; + struct page *pcmd; + unsigned long pcmd_offset; +}; + +extern const struct vm_operations_struct sgx_vm_ops; + +static inline int sgx_encl_find(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr, + struct vm_area_struct **vma) +{ + struct vm_area_struct *result; + + result = find_vma(mm, addr); + if (!result || result->vm_ops != &sgx_vm_ops || addr < result->vm_start) + return -EINVAL; + + *vma = result; + + return 0; +} + +int sgx_encl_may_map(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long start, + unsigned long end, unsigned long vm_flags); + +void sgx_encl_release(struct kref *ref); +int sgx_encl_mm_add(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct mm_struct *mm); +int sgx_encl_get_backing(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long page_index, + struct sgx_backing *backing); +void sgx_encl_put_backing(struct sgx_backing *backing, bool do_write); +int sgx_encl_test_and_clear_young(struct mm_struct *mm, + struct sgx_encl_page *page); + +struct sgx_epc_page *sgx_alloc_va_page(void); +unsigned int sgx_alloc_va_slot(struct sgx_va_page *va_page); +void sgx_free_va_slot(struct sgx_va_page *va_page, unsigned int offset); +bool sgx_va_page_full(struct sgx_va_page *va_page); + +#endif /* _X86_ENCL_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encls.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encls.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..443188fe7e70 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encls.h @@ -0,0 +1,231 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +#ifndef _X86_ENCLS_H +#define _X86_ENCLS_H + +#include <linux/bitops.h> +#include <linux/err.h> +#include <linux/io.h> +#include <linux/rwsem.h> +#include <linux/types.h> +#include <asm/asm.h> +#include <asm/traps.h> +#include "sgx.h" + +enum sgx_encls_function { + ECREATE = 0x00, + EADD = 0x01, + EINIT = 0x02, + EREMOVE = 0x03, + EDGBRD = 0x04, + EDGBWR = 0x05, + EEXTEND = 0x06, + ELDU = 0x08, + EBLOCK = 0x09, + EPA = 0x0A, + EWB = 0x0B, + ETRACK = 0x0C, +}; + +/** + * ENCLS_FAULT_FLAG - flag signifying an ENCLS return code is a trapnr + * + * ENCLS has its own (positive value) error codes and also generates + * ENCLS specific #GP and #PF faults. And the ENCLS values get munged + * with system error codes as everything percolates back up the stack. + * Unfortunately (for us), we need to precisely identify each unique + * error code, e.g. the action taken if EWB fails varies based on the + * type of fault and on the exact SGX error code, i.e. we can't simply + * convert all faults to -EFAULT. + * + * To make all three error types coexist, we set bit 30 to identify an + * ENCLS fault. Bit 31 (technically bits N:31) is used to differentiate + * between positive (faults and SGX error codes) and negative (system + * error codes) values. + */ +#define ENCLS_FAULT_FLAG 0x40000000 + +/* Retrieve the encoded trapnr from the specified return code. */ +#define ENCLS_TRAPNR(r) ((r) & ~ENCLS_FAULT_FLAG) + +/* Issue a WARN() about an ENCLS function. */ +#define ENCLS_WARN(r, name) { \ + do { \ + int _r = (r); \ + WARN_ONCE(_r, "%s returned %d (0x%x)\n", (name), _r, _r); \ + } while (0); \ +} + +/** + * encls_failed() - Check if an ENCLS function failed + * @ret: the return value of an ENCLS function call + * + * Check if an ENCLS function failed. This happens when the function causes a + * fault that is not caused by an EPCM conflict or when the function returns a + * non-zero value. + */ +static inline bool encls_failed(int ret) +{ + if (ret & ENCLS_FAULT_FLAG) + return ENCLS_TRAPNR(ret) != X86_TRAP_PF; + + return !!ret; +} + +/** + * __encls_ret_N - encode an ENCLS function that returns an error code in EAX + * @rax: function number + * @inputs: asm inputs for the function + * + * Emit assembly for an ENCLS function that returns an error code, e.g. EREMOVE. + * And because SGX isn't complex enough as it is, function that return an error + * code also modify flags. + * + * Return: + * 0 on success, + * SGX error code on failure + */ +#define __encls_ret_N(rax, inputs...) \ + ({ \ + int ret; \ + asm volatile( \ + "1: .byte 0x0f, 0x01, 0xcf;\n\t" \ + "2:\n" \ + ".section .fixup,\"ax\"\n" \ + "3: orl $"__stringify(ENCLS_FAULT_FLAG)",%%eax\n" \ + " jmp 2b\n" \ + ".previous\n" \ + _ASM_EXTABLE_FAULT(1b, 3b) \ + : "=a"(ret) \ + : "a"(rax), inputs \ + : "memory", "cc"); \ + ret; \ + }) + +#define __encls_ret_1(rax, rcx) \ + ({ \ + __encls_ret_N(rax, "c"(rcx)); \ + }) + +#define __encls_ret_2(rax, rbx, rcx) \ + ({ \ + __encls_ret_N(rax, "b"(rbx), "c"(rcx)); \ + }) + +#define __encls_ret_3(rax, rbx, rcx, rdx) \ + ({ \ + __encls_ret_N(rax, "b"(rbx), "c"(rcx), "d"(rdx)); \ + }) + +/** + * __encls_N - encode an ENCLS function that doesn't return an error code + * @rax: function number + * @rbx_out: optional output variable + * @inputs: asm inputs for the function + * + * Emit assembly for an ENCLS function that does not return an error code, e.g. + * ECREATE. Leaves without error codes either succeed or fault. @rbx_out is an + * optional parameter for use by EDGBRD, which returns the requested value in + * RBX. + * + * Return: + * 0 on success, + * trapnr with ENCLS_FAULT_FLAG set on fault + */ +#define __encls_N(rax, rbx_out, inputs...) \ + ({ \ + int ret; \ + asm volatile( \ + "1: .byte 0x0f, 0x01, 0xcf;\n\t" \ + " xor %%eax,%%eax;\n" \ + "2:\n" \ + ".section .fixup,\"ax\"\n" \ + "3: orl $"__stringify(ENCLS_FAULT_FLAG)",%%eax\n" \ + " jmp 2b\n" \ + ".previous\n" \ + _ASM_EXTABLE_FAULT(1b, 3b) \ + : "=a"(ret), "=b"(rbx_out) \ + : "a"(rax), inputs \ + : "memory"); \ + ret; \ + }) + +#define __encls_2(rax, rbx, rcx) \ + ({ \ + unsigned long ign_rbx_out; \ + __encls_N(rax, ign_rbx_out, "b"(rbx), "c"(rcx)); \ + }) + +#define __encls_1_1(rax, data, rcx) \ + ({ \ + unsigned long rbx_out; \ + int ret = __encls_N(rax, rbx_out, "c"(rcx)); \ + if (!ret) \ + data = rbx_out; \ + ret; \ + }) + +static inline int __ecreate(struct sgx_pageinfo *pginfo, void *secs) +{ + return __encls_2(ECREATE, pginfo, secs); +} + +static inline int __eextend(void *secs, void *addr) +{ + return __encls_2(EEXTEND, secs, addr); +} + +static inline int __eadd(struct sgx_pageinfo *pginfo, void *addr) +{ + return __encls_2(EADD, pginfo, addr); +} + +static inline int __einit(void *sigstruct, void *token, void *secs) +{ + return __encls_ret_3(EINIT, sigstruct, secs, token); +} + +static inline int __eremove(void *addr) +{ + return __encls_ret_1(EREMOVE, addr); +} + +static inline int __edbgwr(void *addr, unsigned long *data) +{ + return __encls_2(EDGBWR, *data, addr); +} + +static inline int __edbgrd(void *addr, unsigned long *data) +{ + return __encls_1_1(EDGBRD, *data, addr); +} + +static inline int __etrack(void *addr) +{ + return __encls_ret_1(ETRACK, addr); +} + +static inline int __eldu(struct sgx_pageinfo *pginfo, void *addr, + void *va) +{ + return __encls_ret_3(ELDU, pginfo, addr, va); +} + +static inline int __eblock(void *addr) +{ + return __encls_ret_1(EBLOCK, addr); +} + +static inline int __epa(void *addr) +{ + unsigned long rbx = SGX_PAGE_TYPE_VA; + + return __encls_2(EPA, rbx, addr); +} + +static inline int __ewb(struct sgx_pageinfo *pginfo, void *addr, + void *va) +{ + return __encls_ret_3(EWB, pginfo, addr, va); +} + +#endif /* _X86_ENCLS_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..90a5caf76939 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c @@ -0,0 +1,716 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* Copyright(c) 2016-20 Intel Corporation. */ + +#include <asm/mman.h> +#include <linux/mman.h> +#include <linux/delay.h> +#include <linux/file.h> +#include <linux/hashtable.h> +#include <linux/highmem.h> +#include <linux/ratelimit.h> +#include <linux/sched/signal.h> +#include <linux/shmem_fs.h> +#include <linux/slab.h> +#include <linux/suspend.h> +#include "driver.h" +#include "encl.h" +#include "encls.h" + +static struct sgx_va_page *sgx_encl_grow(struct sgx_encl *encl) +{ + struct sgx_va_page *va_page = NULL; + void *err; + + BUILD_BUG_ON(SGX_VA_SLOT_COUNT != + (SGX_ENCL_PAGE_VA_OFFSET_MASK >> 3) + 1); + + if (!(encl->page_cnt % SGX_VA_SLOT_COUNT)) { + va_page = kzalloc(sizeof(*va_page), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!va_page) + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + + va_page->epc_page = sgx_alloc_va_page(); + if (IS_ERR(va_page->epc_page)) { + err = ERR_CAST(va_page->epc_page); + kfree(va_page); + return err; + } + + WARN_ON_ONCE(encl->page_cnt % SGX_VA_SLOT_COUNT); + } + encl->page_cnt++; + return va_page; +} + +static void sgx_encl_shrink(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct sgx_va_page *va_page) +{ + encl->page_cnt--; + + if (va_page) { + sgx_free_epc_page(va_page->epc_page); + list_del(&va_page->list); + kfree(va_page); + } +} + +static int sgx_encl_create(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct sgx_secs *secs) +{ + struct sgx_epc_page *secs_epc; + struct sgx_va_page *va_page; + struct sgx_pageinfo pginfo; + struct sgx_secinfo secinfo; + unsigned long encl_size; + struct file *backing; + long ret; + + va_page = sgx_encl_grow(encl); + if (IS_ERR(va_page)) + return PTR_ERR(va_page); + else if (va_page) + list_add(&va_page->list, &encl->va_pages); + /* else the tail page of the VA page list had free slots. */ + + /* The extra page goes to SECS. */ + encl_size = secs->size + PAGE_SIZE; + + backing = shmem_file_setup("SGX backing", encl_size + (encl_size >> 5), + VM_NORESERVE); + if (IS_ERR(backing)) { + ret = PTR_ERR(backing); + goto err_out_shrink; + } + + encl->backing = backing; + + secs_epc = sgx_alloc_epc_page(&encl->secs, true); + if (IS_ERR(secs_epc)) { + ret = PTR_ERR(secs_epc); + goto err_out_backing; + } + + encl->secs.epc_page = secs_epc; + + pginfo.addr = 0; + pginfo.contents = (unsigned long)secs; + pginfo.metadata = (unsigned long)&secinfo; + pginfo.secs = 0; + memset(&secinfo, 0, sizeof(secinfo)); + + ret = __ecreate((void *)&pginfo, sgx_get_epc_virt_addr(secs_epc)); + if (ret) { + ret = -EIO; + goto err_out; + } + + if (secs->attributes & SGX_ATTR_DEBUG) + set_bit(SGX_ENCL_DEBUG, &encl->flags); + + encl->secs.encl = encl; + encl->base = secs->base; + encl->size = secs->size; + encl->attributes = secs->attributes; + encl->attributes_mask = SGX_ATTR_DEBUG | SGX_ATTR_MODE64BIT | SGX_ATTR_KSS; + + /* Set only after completion, as encl->lock has not been taken. */ + set_bit(SGX_ENCL_CREATED, &encl->flags); + + return 0; + +err_out: + sgx_free_epc_page(encl->secs.epc_page); + encl->secs.epc_page = NULL; + +err_out_backing: + fput(encl->backing); + encl->backing = NULL; + +err_out_shrink: + sgx_encl_shrink(encl, va_page); + + return ret; +} + +/** + * sgx_ioc_enclave_create() - handler for %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_CREATE + * @encl: An enclave pointer. + * @arg: The ioctl argument. + * + * Allocate kernel data structures for the enclave and invoke ECREATE. + * + * Return: + * - 0: Success. + * - -EIO: ECREATE failed. + * - -errno: POSIX error. + */ +static long sgx_ioc_enclave_create(struct sgx_encl *encl, void __user *arg) +{ + struct sgx_enclave_create create_arg; + void *secs; + int ret; + + if (test_bit(SGX_ENCL_CREATED, &encl->flags)) + return -EINVAL; + + if (copy_from_user(&create_arg, arg, sizeof(create_arg))) + return -EFAULT; + + secs = kmalloc(PAGE_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!secs) + return -ENOMEM; + + if (copy_from_user(secs, (void __user *)create_arg.src, PAGE_SIZE)) + ret = -EFAULT; + else + ret = sgx_encl_create(encl, secs); + + kfree(secs); + return ret; +} + +static struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_page_alloc(struct sgx_encl *encl, + unsigned long offset, + u64 secinfo_flags) +{ + struct sgx_encl_page *encl_page; + unsigned long prot; + + encl_page = kzalloc(sizeof(*encl_page), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!encl_page) + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + + encl_page->desc = encl->base + offset; + encl_page->encl = encl; + + prot = _calc_vm_trans(secinfo_flags, SGX_SECINFO_R, PROT_READ) | + _calc_vm_trans(secinfo_flags, SGX_SECINFO_W, PROT_WRITE) | + _calc_vm_trans(secinfo_flags, SGX_SECINFO_X, PROT_EXEC); + + /* + * TCS pages must always RW set for CPU access while the SECINFO + * permissions are *always* zero - the CPU ignores the user provided + * values and silently overwrites them with zero permissions. + */ + if ((secinfo_flags & SGX_SECINFO_PAGE_TYPE_MASK) == SGX_SECINFO_TCS) + prot |= PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE; + + /* Calculate maximum of the VM flags for the page. */ + encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits = calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, 0); + + return encl_page; +} + +static int sgx_validate_secinfo(struct sgx_secinfo *secinfo) +{ + u64 perm = secinfo->flags & SGX_SECINFO_PERMISSION_MASK; + u64 pt = secinfo->flags & SGX_SECINFO_PAGE_TYPE_MASK; + + if (pt != SGX_SECINFO_REG && pt != SGX_SECINFO_TCS) + return -EINVAL; + + if ((perm & SGX_SECINFO_W) && !(perm & SGX_SECINFO_R)) + return -EINVAL; + + /* + * CPU will silently overwrite the permissions as zero, which means + * that we need to validate it ourselves. + */ + if (pt == SGX_SECINFO_TCS && perm) + return -EINVAL; + + if (secinfo->flags & SGX_SECINFO_RESERVED_MASK) + return -EINVAL; + + if (memchr_inv(secinfo->reserved, 0, sizeof(secinfo->reserved))) + return -EINVAL; + + return 0; +} + +static int __sgx_encl_add_page(struct sgx_encl *encl, + struct sgx_encl_page *encl_page, + struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page, + struct sgx_secinfo *secinfo, unsigned long src) +{ + struct sgx_pageinfo pginfo; + struct vm_area_struct *vma; + struct page *src_page; + int ret; + + /* Deny noexec. */ + vma = find_vma(current->mm, src); + if (!vma) + return -EFAULT; + + if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_MAYEXEC)) + return -EACCES; + + ret = get_user_pages(src, 1, 0, &src_page, NULL); + if (ret < 1) + return -EFAULT; + + pginfo.secs = (unsigned long)sgx_get_epc_virt_addr(encl->secs.epc_page); + pginfo.addr = encl_page->desc & PAGE_MASK; + pginfo.metadata = (unsigned long)secinfo; + pginfo.contents = (unsigned long)kmap_atomic(src_page); + + ret = __eadd(&pginfo, sgx_get_epc_virt_addr(epc_page)); + + kunmap_atomic((void *)pginfo.contents); + put_page(src_page); + + return ret ? -EIO : 0; +} + +/* + * If the caller requires measurement of the page as a proof for the content, + * use EEXTEND to add a measurement for 256 bytes of the page. Repeat this + * operation until the entire page is measured." + */ +static int __sgx_encl_extend(struct sgx_encl *encl, + struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page) +{ + unsigned long offset; + int ret; + + for (offset = 0; offset < PAGE_SIZE; offset += SGX_EEXTEND_BLOCK_SIZE) { + ret = __eextend(sgx_get_epc_virt_addr(encl->secs.epc_page), + sgx_get_epc_virt_addr(epc_page) + offset); + if (ret) { + if (encls_failed(ret)) + ENCLS_WARN(ret, "EEXTEND"); + + return -EIO; + } + } + + return 0; +} + +static int sgx_encl_add_page(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long src, + unsigned long offset, struct sgx_secinfo *secinfo, + unsigned long flags) +{ + struct sgx_encl_page *encl_page; + struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page; + struct sgx_va_page *va_page; + int ret; + + encl_page = sgx_encl_page_alloc(encl, offset, secinfo->flags); + if (IS_ERR(encl_page)) + return PTR_ERR(encl_page); + + epc_page = sgx_alloc_epc_page(encl_page, true); + if (IS_ERR(epc_page)) { + kfree(encl_page); + return PTR_ERR(epc_page); + } + + va_page = sgx_encl_grow(encl); + if (IS_ERR(va_page)) { + ret = PTR_ERR(va_page); + goto err_out_free; + } + + mmap_read_lock(current->mm); + mutex_lock(&encl->lock); + + /* + * Adding to encl->va_pages must be done under encl->lock. Ditto for + * deleting (via sgx_encl_shrink()) in the error path. + */ + if (va_page) + list_add(&va_page->list, &encl->va_pages); + + /* + * Insert prior to EADD in case of OOM. EADD modifies MRENCLAVE, i.e. + * can't be gracefully unwound, while failure on EADD/EXTEND is limited + * to userspace errors (or kernel/hardware bugs). + */ + ret = xa_insert(&encl->page_array, PFN_DOWN(encl_page->desc), + encl_page, GFP_KERNEL); + if (ret) + goto err_out_unlock; + + ret = __sgx_encl_add_page(encl, encl_page, epc_page, secinfo, + src); + if (ret) + goto err_out; + + /* + * Complete the "add" before doing the "extend" so that the "add" + * isn't in a half-baked state in the extremely unlikely scenario + * the enclave will be destroyed in response to EEXTEND failure. + */ + encl_page->encl = encl; + encl_page->epc_page = epc_page; + encl->secs_child_cnt++; + + if (flags & SGX_PAGE_MEASURE) { + ret = __sgx_encl_extend(encl, epc_page); + if (ret) + goto err_out; + } + + sgx_mark_page_reclaimable(encl_page->epc_page); + mutex_unlock(&encl->lock); + mmap_read_unlock(current->mm); + return ret; + +err_out: + xa_erase(&encl->page_array, PFN_DOWN(encl_page->desc)); + +err_out_unlock: + sgx_encl_shrink(encl, va_page); + mutex_unlock(&encl->lock); + mmap_read_unlock(current->mm); + +err_out_free: + sgx_free_epc_page(epc_page); + kfree(encl_page); + + return ret; +} + +/** + * sgx_ioc_enclave_add_pages() - The handler for %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES + * @encl: an enclave pointer + * @arg: a user pointer to a struct sgx_enclave_add_pages instance + * + * Add one or more pages to an uninitialized enclave, and optionally extend the + * measurement with the contents of the page. The SECINFO and measurement mask + * are applied to all pages. + * + * A SECINFO for a TCS is required to always contain zero permissions because + * CPU silently zeros them. Allowing anything else would cause a mismatch in + * the measurement. + * + * mmap()'s protection bits are capped by the page permissions. For each page + * address, the maximum protection bits are computed with the following + * heuristics: + * + * 1. A regular page: PROT_R, PROT_W and PROT_X match the SECINFO permissions. + * 2. A TCS page: PROT_R | PROT_W. + * + * mmap() is not allowed to surpass the minimum of the maximum protection bits + * within the given address range. + * + * The function deinitializes kernel data structures for enclave and returns + * -EIO in any of the following conditions: + * + * - Enclave Page Cache (EPC), the physical memory holding enclaves, has + * been invalidated. This will cause EADD and EEXTEND to fail. + * - If the source address is corrupted somehow when executing EADD. + * + * Return: + * - 0: Success. + * - -EACCES: The source page is located in a noexec partition. + * - -ENOMEM: Out of EPC pages. + * - -EINTR: The call was interrupted before data was processed. + * - -EIO: Either EADD or EEXTEND failed because invalid source address + * or power cycle. + * - -errno: POSIX error. + */ +static long sgx_ioc_enclave_add_pages(struct sgx_encl *encl, void __user *arg) +{ + struct sgx_enclave_add_pages add_arg; + struct sgx_secinfo secinfo; + unsigned long c; + int ret; + + if (!test_bit(SGX_ENCL_CREATED, &encl->flags) || + test_bit(SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED, &encl->flags)) + return -EINVAL; + + if (copy_from_user(&add_arg, arg, sizeof(add_arg))) + return -EFAULT; + + if (!IS_ALIGNED(add_arg.offset, PAGE_SIZE) || + !IS_ALIGNED(add_arg.src, PAGE_SIZE)) + return -EINVAL; + + if (!add_arg.length || add_arg.length & (PAGE_SIZE - 1)) + return -EINVAL; + + if (add_arg.offset + add_arg.length - PAGE_SIZE >= encl->size) + return -EINVAL; + + if (copy_from_user(&secinfo, (void __user *)add_arg.secinfo, + sizeof(secinfo))) + return -EFAULT; + + if (sgx_validate_secinfo(&secinfo)) + return -EINVAL; + + for (c = 0 ; c < add_arg.length; c += PAGE_SIZE) { + if (signal_pending(current)) { + if (!c) + ret = -ERESTARTSYS; + + break; + } + + if (need_resched()) + cond_resched(); + + ret = sgx_encl_add_page(encl, add_arg.src + c, add_arg.offset + c, + &secinfo, add_arg.flags); + if (ret) + break; + } + + add_arg.count = c; + + if (copy_to_user(arg, &add_arg, sizeof(add_arg))) + return -EFAULT; + + return ret; +} + +static int __sgx_get_key_hash(struct crypto_shash *tfm, const void *modulus, + void *hash) +{ + SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(shash, tfm); + + shash->tfm = tfm; + + return crypto_shash_digest(shash, modulus, SGX_MODULUS_SIZE, hash); +} + +static int sgx_get_key_hash(const void *modulus, void *hash) +{ + struct crypto_shash *tfm; + int ret; + + tfm = crypto_alloc_shash("sha256", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC); + if (IS_ERR(tfm)) + return PTR_ERR(tfm); + + ret = __sgx_get_key_hash(tfm, modulus, hash); + + crypto_free_shash(tfm); + return ret; +} + +static int sgx_encl_init(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct sgx_sigstruct *sigstruct, + void *token) +{ + u64 mrsigner[4]; + int i, j, k; + void *addr; + int ret; + + /* + * Deny initializing enclaves with attributes (namely provisioning) + * that have not been explicitly allowed. + */ + if (encl->attributes & ~encl->attributes_mask) + return -EACCES; + + /* + * Attributes should not be enforced *only* against what's available on + * platform (done in sgx_encl_create) but checked and enforced against + * the mask for enforcement in sigstruct. For example an enclave could + * opt to sign with AVX bit in xfrm, but still be loadable on a platform + * without it if the sigstruct->body.attributes_mask does not turn that + * bit on. + */ + if (sigstruct->body.attributes & sigstruct->body.attributes_mask & + sgx_attributes_reserved_mask) + return -EINVAL; + + if (sigstruct->body.miscselect & sigstruct->body.misc_mask & + sgx_misc_reserved_mask) + return -EINVAL; + + if (sigstruct->body.xfrm & sigstruct->body.xfrm_mask & + sgx_xfrm_reserved_mask) + return -EINVAL; + + ret = sgx_get_key_hash(sigstruct->modulus, mrsigner); + if (ret) + return ret; + + mutex_lock(&encl->lock); + + /* + * ENCLS[EINIT] is interruptible because it has such a high latency, + * e.g. 50k+ cycles on success. If an IRQ/NMI/SMI becomes pending, + * EINIT may fail with SGX_UNMASKED_EVENT so that the event can be + * serviced. + */ + for (i = 0; i < SGX_EINIT_SLEEP_COUNT; i++) { + for (j = 0; j < SGX_EINIT_SPIN_COUNT; j++) { + addr = sgx_get_epc_virt_addr(encl->secs.epc_page); + + preempt_disable(); + + for (k = 0; k < 4; k++) + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH0 + k, mrsigner[k]); + + ret = __einit(sigstruct, token, addr); + + preempt_enable(); + + if (ret == SGX_UNMASKED_EVENT) + continue; + else + break; + } + + if (ret != SGX_UNMASKED_EVENT) + break; + + msleep_interruptible(SGX_EINIT_SLEEP_TIME); + + if (signal_pending(current)) { + ret = -ERESTARTSYS; + goto err_out; + } + } + + if (ret & ENCLS_FAULT_FLAG) { + if (encls_failed(ret)) + ENCLS_WARN(ret, "EINIT"); + + ret = -EIO; + } else if (ret) { + pr_debug("EINIT returned %d\n", ret); + ret = -EPERM; + } else { + set_bit(SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED, &encl->flags); + } + +err_out: + mutex_unlock(&encl->lock); + return ret; +} + +/** + * sgx_ioc_enclave_init() - handler for %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_INIT + * @encl: an enclave pointer + * @arg: userspace pointer to a struct sgx_enclave_init instance + * + * Flush any outstanding enqueued EADD operations and perform EINIT. The + * Launch Enclave Public Key Hash MSRs are rewritten as necessary to match + * the enclave's MRSIGNER, which is caculated from the provided sigstruct. + * + * Return: + * - 0: Success. + * - -EPERM: Invalid SIGSTRUCT. + * - -EIO: EINIT failed because of a power cycle. + * - -errno: POSIX error. + */ +static long sgx_ioc_enclave_init(struct sgx_encl *encl, void __user *arg) +{ + struct sgx_sigstruct *sigstruct; + struct sgx_enclave_init init_arg; + struct page *initp_page; + void *token; + int ret; + + if (!test_bit(SGX_ENCL_CREATED, &encl->flags) || + test_bit(SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED, &encl->flags)) + return -EINVAL; + + if (copy_from_user(&init_arg, arg, sizeof(init_arg))) + return -EFAULT; + + initp_page = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL); + if (!initp_page) + return -ENOMEM; + + sigstruct = kmap(initp_page); + token = (void *)((unsigned long)sigstruct + PAGE_SIZE / 2); + memset(token, 0, SGX_LAUNCH_TOKEN_SIZE); + + if (copy_from_user(sigstruct, (void __user *)init_arg.sigstruct, + sizeof(*sigstruct))) { + ret = -EFAULT; + goto out; + } + + /* + * A legacy field used with Intel signed enclaves. These used to mean + * regular and architectural enclaves. The CPU only accepts these values + * but they do not have any other meaning. + * + * Thus, reject any other values. + */ + if (sigstruct->header.vendor != 0x0000 && + sigstruct->header.vendor != 0x8086) { + ret = -EINVAL; + goto out; + } + + ret = sgx_encl_init(encl, sigstruct, token); + +out: + kunmap(initp_page); + __free_page(initp_page); + return ret; +} + +/** + * sgx_ioc_enclave_provision() - handler for %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_PROVISION + * @encl: an enclave pointer + * @arg: userspace pointer to a struct sgx_enclave_provision instance + * + * Allow ATTRIBUTE.PROVISION_KEY for an enclave by providing a file handle to + * /dev/sgx_provision. + * + * Return: + * - 0: Success. + * - -errno: Otherwise. + */ +static long sgx_ioc_enclave_provision(struct sgx_encl *encl, void __user *arg) +{ + struct sgx_enclave_provision params; + struct file *file; + + if (copy_from_user(¶ms, arg, sizeof(params))) + return -EFAULT; + + file = fget(params.fd); + if (!file) + return -EINVAL; + + if (file->f_op != &sgx_provision_fops) { + fput(file); + return -EINVAL; + } + + encl->attributes_mask |= SGX_ATTR_PROVISIONKEY; + + fput(file); + return 0; +} + +long sgx_ioctl(struct file *filep, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) +{ + struct sgx_encl *encl = filep->private_data; + int ret; + + if (test_and_set_bit(SGX_ENCL_IOCTL, &encl->flags)) + return -EBUSY; + + switch (cmd) { + case SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_CREATE: + ret = sgx_ioc_enclave_create(encl, (void __user *)arg); + break; + case SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES: + ret = sgx_ioc_enclave_add_pages(encl, (void __user *)arg); + break; + case SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_INIT: + ret = sgx_ioc_enclave_init(encl, (void __user *)arg); + break; + case SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_PROVISION: + ret = sgx_ioc_enclave_provision(encl, (void __user *)arg); + break; + default: + ret = -ENOIOCTLCMD; + break; + } + + clear_bit(SGX_ENCL_IOCTL, &encl->flags); + return ret; +} diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..c519fc5f6948 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c @@ -0,0 +1,733 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* Copyright(c) 2016-20 Intel Corporation. */ + +#include <linux/freezer.h> +#include <linux/highmem.h> +#include <linux/kthread.h> +#include <linux/pagemap.h> +#include <linux/ratelimit.h> +#include <linux/sched/mm.h> +#include <linux/sched/signal.h> +#include <linux/slab.h> +#include "driver.h" +#include "encl.h" +#include "encls.h" + +struct sgx_epc_section sgx_epc_sections[SGX_MAX_EPC_SECTIONS]; +static int sgx_nr_epc_sections; +static struct task_struct *ksgxd_tsk; +static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(ksgxd_waitq); + +/* + * These variables are part of the state of the reclaimer, and must be accessed + * with sgx_reclaimer_lock acquired. + */ +static LIST_HEAD(sgx_active_page_list); + +static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sgx_reclaimer_lock); + +/* + * Reset dirty EPC pages to uninitialized state. Laundry can be left with SECS + * pages whose child pages blocked EREMOVE. + */ +static void sgx_sanitize_section(struct sgx_epc_section *section) +{ + struct sgx_epc_page *page; + LIST_HEAD(dirty); + int ret; + + /* init_laundry_list is thread-local, no need for a lock: */ + while (!list_empty(§ion->init_laundry_list)) { + if (kthread_should_stop()) + return; + + /* needed for access to ->page_list: */ + spin_lock(§ion->lock); + + page = list_first_entry(§ion->init_laundry_list, + struct sgx_epc_page, list); + + ret = __eremove(sgx_get_epc_virt_addr(page)); + if (!ret) + list_move(&page->list, §ion->page_list); + else + list_move_tail(&page->list, &dirty); + + spin_unlock(§ion->lock); + + cond_resched(); + } + + list_splice(&dirty, §ion->init_laundry_list); +} + +static bool sgx_reclaimer_age(struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page) +{ + struct sgx_encl_page *page = epc_page->owner; + struct sgx_encl *encl = page->encl; + struct sgx_encl_mm *encl_mm; + bool ret = true; + int idx; + + idx = srcu_read_lock(&encl->srcu); + + list_for_each_entry_rcu(encl_mm, &encl->mm_list, list) { + if (!mmget_not_zero(encl_mm->mm)) + continue; + + mmap_read_lock(encl_mm->mm); + ret = !sgx_encl_test_and_clear_young(encl_mm->mm, page); + mmap_read_unlock(encl_mm->mm); + + mmput_async(encl_mm->mm); + + if (!ret) + break; + } + + srcu_read_unlock(&encl->srcu, idx); + + if (!ret) + return false; + + return true; +} + +static void sgx_reclaimer_block(struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page) +{ + struct sgx_encl_page *page = epc_page->owner; + unsigned long addr = page->desc & PAGE_MASK; + struct sgx_encl *encl = page->encl; + unsigned long mm_list_version; + struct sgx_encl_mm *encl_mm; + struct vm_area_struct *vma; + int idx, ret; + + do { + mm_list_version = encl->mm_list_version; + + /* Pairs with smp_rmb() in sgx_encl_mm_add(). */ + smp_rmb(); + + idx = srcu_read_lock(&encl->srcu); + + list_for_each_entry_rcu(encl_mm, &encl->mm_list, list) { + if (!mmget_not_zero(encl_mm->mm)) + continue; + + mmap_read_lock(encl_mm->mm); + + ret = sgx_encl_find(encl_mm->mm, addr, &vma); + if (!ret && encl == vma->vm_private_data) + zap_vma_ptes(vma, addr, PAGE_SIZE); + + mmap_read_unlock(encl_mm->mm); + + mmput_async(encl_mm->mm); + } + + srcu_read_unlock(&encl->srcu, idx); + } while (unlikely(encl->mm_list_version != mm_list_version)); + + mutex_lock(&encl->lock); + + ret = __eblock(sgx_get_epc_virt_addr(epc_page)); + if (encls_failed(ret)) + ENCLS_WARN(ret, "EBLOCK"); + + mutex_unlock(&encl->lock); +} + +static int __sgx_encl_ewb(struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page, void *va_slot, + struct sgx_backing *backing) +{ + struct sgx_pageinfo pginfo; + int ret; + + pginfo.addr = 0; + pginfo.secs = 0; + + pginfo.contents = (unsigned long)kmap_atomic(backing->contents); + pginfo.metadata = (unsigned long)kmap_atomic(backing->pcmd) + + backing->pcmd_offset; + + ret = __ewb(&pginfo, sgx_get_epc_virt_addr(epc_page), va_slot); + + kunmap_atomic((void *)(unsigned long)(pginfo.metadata - + backing->pcmd_offset)); + kunmap_atomic((void *)(unsigned long)pginfo.contents); + + return ret; +} + +static void sgx_ipi_cb(void *info) +{ +} + +static const cpumask_t *sgx_encl_ewb_cpumask(struct sgx_encl *encl) +{ + cpumask_t *cpumask = &encl->cpumask; + struct sgx_encl_mm *encl_mm; + int idx; + + /* + * Can race with sgx_encl_mm_add(), but ETRACK has already been + * executed, which means that the CPUs running in the new mm will enter + * into the enclave with a fresh epoch. + */ + cpumask_clear(cpumask); + + idx = srcu_read_lock(&encl->srcu); + + list_for_each_entry_rcu(encl_mm, &encl->mm_list, list) { + if (!mmget_not_zero(encl_mm->mm)) + continue; + + cpumask_or(cpumask, cpumask, mm_cpumask(encl_mm->mm)); + + mmput_async(encl_mm->mm); + } + + srcu_read_unlock(&encl->srcu, idx); + + return cpumask; +} + +/* + * Swap page to the regular memory transformed to the blocked state by using + * EBLOCK, which means that it can no loger be referenced (no new TLB entries). + * + * The first trial just tries to write the page assuming that some other thread + * has reset the count for threads inside the enlave by using ETRACK, and + * previous thread count has been zeroed out. The second trial calls ETRACK + * before EWB. If that fails we kick all the HW threads out, and then do EWB, + * which should be guaranteed the succeed. + */ +static void sgx_encl_ewb(struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page, + struct sgx_backing *backing) +{ + struct sgx_encl_page *encl_page = epc_page->owner; + struct sgx_encl *encl = encl_page->encl; + struct sgx_va_page *va_page; + unsigned int va_offset; + void *va_slot; + int ret; + + encl_page->desc &= ~SGX_ENCL_PAGE_BEING_RECLAIMED; + + va_page = list_first_entry(&encl->va_pages, struct sgx_va_page, + list); + va_offset = sgx_alloc_va_slot(va_page); + va_slot = sgx_get_epc_virt_addr(va_page->epc_page) + va_offset; + if (sgx_va_page_full(va_page)) + list_move_tail(&va_page->list, &encl->va_pages); + + ret = __sgx_encl_ewb(epc_page, va_slot, backing); + if (ret == SGX_NOT_TRACKED) { + ret = __etrack(sgx_get_epc_virt_addr(encl->secs.epc_page)); + if (ret) { + if (encls_failed(ret)) + ENCLS_WARN(ret, "ETRACK"); + } + + ret = __sgx_encl_ewb(epc_page, va_slot, backing); + if (ret == SGX_NOT_TRACKED) { + /* + * Slow path, send IPIs to kick cpus out of the + * enclave. Note, it's imperative that the cpu + * mask is generated *after* ETRACK, else we'll + * miss cpus that entered the enclave between + * generating the mask and incrementing epoch. + */ + on_each_cpu_mask(sgx_encl_ewb_cpumask(encl), + sgx_ipi_cb, NULL, 1); + ret = __sgx_encl_ewb(epc_page, va_slot, backing); + } + } + + if (ret) { + if (encls_failed(ret)) + ENCLS_WARN(ret, "EWB"); + + sgx_free_va_slot(va_page, va_offset); + } else { + encl_page->desc |= va_offset; + encl_page->va_page = va_page; + } +} + +static void sgx_reclaimer_write(struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page, + struct sgx_backing *backing) +{ + struct sgx_encl_page *encl_page = epc_page->owner; + struct sgx_encl *encl = encl_page->encl; + struct sgx_backing secs_backing; + int ret; + + mutex_lock(&encl->lock); + + sgx_encl_ewb(epc_page, backing); + encl_page->epc_page = NULL; + encl->secs_child_cnt--; + + if (!encl->secs_child_cnt && test_bit(SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED, &encl->flags)) { + ret = sgx_encl_get_backing(encl, PFN_DOWN(encl->size), + &secs_backing); + if (ret) + goto out; + + sgx_encl_ewb(encl->secs.epc_page, &secs_backing); + + sgx_free_epc_page(encl->secs.epc_page); + encl->secs.epc_page = NULL; + + sgx_encl_put_backing(&secs_backing, true); + } + +out: + mutex_unlock(&encl->lock); +} + +/* + * Take a fixed number of pages from the head of the active page pool and + * reclaim them to the enclave's private shmem files. Skip the pages, which have + * been accessed since the last scan. Move those pages to the tail of active + * page pool so that the pages get scanned in LRU like fashion. + * + * Batch process a chunk of pages (at the moment 16) in order to degrade amount + * of IPI's and ETRACK's potentially required. sgx_encl_ewb() does degrade a bit + * among the HW threads with three stage EWB pipeline (EWB, ETRACK + EWB and IPI + * + EWB) but not sufficiently. Reclaiming one page at a time would also be + * problematic as it would increase the lock contention too much, which would + * halt forward progress. + */ +static void sgx_reclaim_pages(void) +{ + struct sgx_epc_page *chunk[SGX_NR_TO_SCAN]; + struct sgx_backing backing[SGX_NR_TO_SCAN]; + struct sgx_epc_section *section; + struct sgx_encl_page *encl_page; + struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page; + pgoff_t page_index; + int cnt = 0; + int ret; + int i; + + spin_lock(&sgx_reclaimer_lock); + for (i = 0; i < SGX_NR_TO_SCAN; i++) { + if (list_empty(&sgx_active_page_list)) + break; + + epc_page = list_first_entry(&sgx_active_page_list, + struct sgx_epc_page, list); + list_del_init(&epc_page->list); + encl_page = epc_page->owner; + + if (kref_get_unless_zero(&encl_page->encl->refcount) != 0) + chunk[cnt++] = epc_page; + else + /* The owner is freeing the page. No need to add the + * page back to the list of reclaimable pages. + */ + epc_page->flags &= ~SGX_EPC_PAGE_RECLAIMER_TRACKED; + } + spin_unlock(&sgx_reclaimer_lock); + + for (i = 0; i < cnt; i++) { + epc_page = chunk[i]; + encl_page = epc_page->owner; + + if (!sgx_reclaimer_age(epc_page)) + goto skip; + + page_index = PFN_DOWN(encl_page->desc - encl_page->encl->base); + ret = sgx_encl_get_backing(encl_page->encl, page_index, &backing[i]); + if (ret) + goto skip; + + mutex_lock(&encl_page->encl->lock); + encl_page->desc |= SGX_ENCL_PAGE_BEING_RECLAIMED; + mutex_unlock(&encl_page->encl->lock); + continue; + +skip: + spin_lock(&sgx_reclaimer_lock); + list_add_tail(&epc_page->list, &sgx_active_page_list); + spin_unlock(&sgx_reclaimer_lock); + + kref_put(&encl_page->encl->refcount, sgx_encl_release); + + chunk[i] = NULL; + } + + for (i = 0; i < cnt; i++) { + epc_page = chunk[i]; + if (epc_page) + sgx_reclaimer_block(epc_page); + } + + for (i = 0; i < cnt; i++) { + epc_page = chunk[i]; + if (!epc_page) + continue; + + encl_page = epc_page->owner; + sgx_reclaimer_write(epc_page, &backing[i]); + sgx_encl_put_backing(&backing[i], true); + + kref_put(&encl_page->encl->refcount, sgx_encl_release); + epc_page->flags &= ~SGX_EPC_PAGE_RECLAIMER_TRACKED; + + section = &sgx_epc_sections[epc_page->section]; + spin_lock(§ion->lock); + list_add_tail(&epc_page->list, §ion->page_list); + section->free_cnt++; + spin_unlock(§ion->lock); + } +} + +static unsigned long sgx_nr_free_pages(void) +{ + unsigned long cnt = 0; + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < sgx_nr_epc_sections; i++) + cnt += sgx_epc_sections[i].free_cnt; + + return cnt; +} + +static bool sgx_should_reclaim(unsigned long watermark) +{ + return sgx_nr_free_pages() < watermark && + !list_empty(&sgx_active_page_list); +} + +static int ksgxd(void *p) +{ + int i; + + set_freezable(); + + /* + * Sanitize pages in order to recover from kexec(). The 2nd pass is + * required for SECS pages, whose child pages blocked EREMOVE. + */ + for (i = 0; i < sgx_nr_epc_sections; i++) + sgx_sanitize_section(&sgx_epc_sections[i]); + + for (i = 0; i < sgx_nr_epc_sections; i++) { + sgx_sanitize_section(&sgx_epc_sections[i]); + + /* Should never happen. */ + if (!list_empty(&sgx_epc_sections[i].init_laundry_list)) + WARN(1, "EPC section %d has unsanitized pages.\n", i); + } + + while (!kthread_should_stop()) { + if (try_to_freeze()) + continue; + + wait_event_freezable(ksgxd_waitq, + kthread_should_stop() || + sgx_should_reclaim(SGX_NR_HIGH_PAGES)); + + if (sgx_should_reclaim(SGX_NR_HIGH_PAGES)) + sgx_reclaim_pages(); + + cond_resched(); + } + + return 0; +} + +static bool __init sgx_page_reclaimer_init(void) +{ + struct task_struct *tsk; + + tsk = kthread_run(ksgxd, NULL, "ksgxd"); + if (IS_ERR(tsk)) + return false; + + ksgxd_tsk = tsk; + + return true; +} + +static struct sgx_epc_page *__sgx_alloc_epc_page_from_section(struct sgx_epc_section *section) +{ + struct sgx_epc_page *page; + + spin_lock(§ion->lock); + + if (list_empty(§ion->page_list)) { + spin_unlock(§ion->lock); + return NULL; + } + + page = list_first_entry(§ion->page_list, struct sgx_epc_page, list); + list_del_init(&page->list); + section->free_cnt--; + + spin_unlock(§ion->lock); + return page; +} + +/** + * __sgx_alloc_epc_page() - Allocate an EPC page + * + * Iterate through EPC sections and borrow a free EPC page to the caller. When a + * page is no longer needed it must be released with sgx_free_epc_page(). + * + * Return: + * an EPC page, + * -errno on error + */ +struct sgx_epc_page *__sgx_alloc_epc_page(void) +{ + struct sgx_epc_section *section; + struct sgx_epc_page *page; + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < sgx_nr_epc_sections; i++) { + section = &sgx_epc_sections[i]; + + page = __sgx_alloc_epc_page_from_section(section); + if (page) + return page; + } + + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); +} + +/** + * sgx_mark_page_reclaimable() - Mark a page as reclaimable + * @page: EPC page + * + * Mark a page as reclaimable and add it to the active page list. Pages + * are automatically removed from the active list when freed. + */ +void sgx_mark_page_reclaimable(struct sgx_epc_page *page) +{ + spin_lock(&sgx_reclaimer_lock); + page->flags |= SGX_EPC_PAGE_RECLAIMER_TRACKED; + list_add_tail(&page->list, &sgx_active_page_list); + spin_unlock(&sgx_reclaimer_lock); +} + +/** + * sgx_unmark_page_reclaimable() - Remove a page from the reclaim list + * @page: EPC page + * + * Clear the reclaimable flag and remove the page from the active page list. + * + * Return: + * 0 on success, + * -EBUSY if the page is in the process of being reclaimed + */ +int sgx_unmark_page_reclaimable(struct sgx_epc_page *page) +{ + spin_lock(&sgx_reclaimer_lock); + if (page->flags & SGX_EPC_PAGE_RECLAIMER_TRACKED) { + /* The page is being reclaimed. */ + if (list_empty(&page->list)) { + spin_unlock(&sgx_reclaimer_lock); + return -EBUSY; + } + + list_del(&page->list); + page->flags &= ~SGX_EPC_PAGE_RECLAIMER_TRACKED; + } + spin_unlock(&sgx_reclaimer_lock); + + return 0; +} + +/** + * sgx_alloc_epc_page() - Allocate an EPC page + * @owner: the owner of the EPC page + * @reclaim: reclaim pages if necessary + * + * Iterate through EPC sections and borrow a free EPC page to the caller. When a + * page is no longer needed it must be released with sgx_free_epc_page(). If + * @reclaim is set to true, directly reclaim pages when we are out of pages. No + * mm's can be locked when @reclaim is set to true. + * + * Finally, wake up ksgxd when the number of pages goes below the watermark + * before returning back to the caller. + * + * Return: + * an EPC page, + * -errno on error + */ +struct sgx_epc_page *sgx_alloc_epc_page(void *owner, bool reclaim) +{ + struct sgx_epc_page *page; + + for ( ; ; ) { + page = __sgx_alloc_epc_page(); + if (!IS_ERR(page)) { + page->owner = owner; + break; + } + + if (list_empty(&sgx_active_page_list)) + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + + if (!reclaim) { + page = ERR_PTR(-EBUSY); + break; + } + + if (signal_pending(current)) { + page = ERR_PTR(-ERESTARTSYS); + break; + } + + sgx_reclaim_pages(); + cond_resched(); + } + + if (sgx_should_reclaim(SGX_NR_LOW_PAGES)) + wake_up(&ksgxd_waitq); + + return page; +} + +/** + * sgx_free_epc_page() - Free an EPC page + * @page: an EPC page + * + * Call EREMOVE for an EPC page and insert it back to the list of free pages. + */ +void sgx_free_epc_page(struct sgx_epc_page *page) +{ + struct sgx_epc_section *section = &sgx_epc_sections[page->section]; + int ret; + + WARN_ON_ONCE(page->flags & SGX_EPC_PAGE_RECLAIMER_TRACKED); + + ret = __eremove(sgx_get_epc_virt_addr(page)); + if (WARN_ONCE(ret, "EREMOVE returned %d (0x%x)", ret, ret)) + return; + + spin_lock(§ion->lock); + list_add_tail(&page->list, §ion->page_list); + section->free_cnt++; + spin_unlock(§ion->lock); +} + +static bool __init sgx_setup_epc_section(u64 phys_addr, u64 size, + unsigned long index, + struct sgx_epc_section *section) +{ + unsigned long nr_pages = size >> PAGE_SHIFT; + unsigned long i; + + section->virt_addr = memremap(phys_addr, size, MEMREMAP_WB); + if (!section->virt_addr) + return false; + + section->pages = vmalloc(nr_pages * sizeof(struct sgx_epc_page)); + if (!section->pages) { + memunmap(section->virt_addr); + return false; + } + + section->phys_addr = phys_addr; + spin_lock_init(§ion->lock); + INIT_LIST_HEAD(§ion->page_list); + INIT_LIST_HEAD(§ion->init_laundry_list); + + for (i = 0; i < nr_pages; i++) { + section->pages[i].section = index; + section->pages[i].flags = 0; + section->pages[i].owner = NULL; + list_add_tail(§ion->pages[i].list, §ion->init_laundry_list); + } + + section->free_cnt = nr_pages; + return true; +} + +/** + * A section metric is concatenated in a way that @low bits 12-31 define the + * bits 12-31 of the metric and @high bits 0-19 define the bits 32-51 of the + * metric. + */ +static inline u64 __init sgx_calc_section_metric(u64 low, u64 high) +{ + return (low & GENMASK_ULL(31, 12)) + + ((high & GENMASK_ULL(19, 0)) << 32); +} + +static bool __init sgx_page_cache_init(void) +{ + u32 eax, ebx, ecx, edx, type; + u64 pa, size; + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(sgx_epc_sections); i++) { + cpuid_count(SGX_CPUID, i + SGX_CPUID_EPC, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx); + + type = eax & SGX_CPUID_EPC_MASK; + if (type == SGX_CPUID_EPC_INVALID) + break; + + if (type != SGX_CPUID_EPC_SECTION) { + pr_err_once("Unknown EPC section type: %u\n", type); + break; + } + + pa = sgx_calc_section_metric(eax, ebx); + size = sgx_calc_section_metric(ecx, edx); + + pr_info("EPC section 0x%llx-0x%llx\n", pa, pa + size - 1); + + if (!sgx_setup_epc_section(pa, size, i, &sgx_epc_sections[i])) { + pr_err("No free memory for an EPC section\n"); + break; + } + + sgx_nr_epc_sections++; + } + + if (!sgx_nr_epc_sections) { + pr_err("There are zero EPC sections.\n"); + return false; + } + + return true; +} + +static void __init sgx_init(void) +{ + int ret; + int i; + + if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SGX)) + return; + + if (!sgx_page_cache_init()) + return; + + if (!sgx_page_reclaimer_init()) + goto err_page_cache; + + ret = sgx_drv_init(); + if (ret) + goto err_kthread; + + return; + +err_kthread: + kthread_stop(ksgxd_tsk); + +err_page_cache: + for (i = 0; i < sgx_nr_epc_sections; i++) { + vfree(sgx_epc_sections[i].pages); + memunmap(sgx_epc_sections[i].virt_addr); + } +} + +device_initcall(sgx_init); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..5fa42d143feb --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h @@ -0,0 +1,86 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +#ifndef _X86_SGX_H +#define _X86_SGX_H + +#include <linux/bitops.h> +#include <linux/err.h> +#include <linux/io.h> +#include <linux/rwsem.h> +#include <linux/types.h> +#include <asm/asm.h> +#include "arch.h" + +#undef pr_fmt +#define pr_fmt(fmt) "sgx: " fmt + +#define SGX_MAX_EPC_SECTIONS 8 +#define SGX_EEXTEND_BLOCK_SIZE 256 +#define SGX_NR_TO_SCAN 16 +#define SGX_NR_LOW_PAGES 32 +#define SGX_NR_HIGH_PAGES 64 + +/* Pages, which are being tracked by the page reclaimer. */ +#define SGX_EPC_PAGE_RECLAIMER_TRACKED BIT(0) + +struct sgx_epc_page { + unsigned int section; + unsigned int flags; + struct sgx_encl_page *owner; + struct list_head list; +}; + +/* + * The firmware can define multiple chunks of EPC to the different areas of the + * physical memory e.g. for memory areas of the each node. This structure is + * used to store EPC pages for one EPC section and virtual memory area where + * the pages have been mapped. + * + * 'lock' must be held before accessing 'page_list' or 'free_cnt'. + */ +struct sgx_epc_section { + unsigned long phys_addr; + void *virt_addr; + struct sgx_epc_page *pages; + + spinlock_t lock; + struct list_head page_list; + unsigned long free_cnt; + + /* + * Pages which need EREMOVE run on them before they can be + * used. Only safe to be accessed in ksgxd and init code. + * Not protected by locks. + */ + struct list_head init_laundry_list; +}; + +extern struct sgx_epc_section sgx_epc_sections[SGX_MAX_EPC_SECTIONS]; + +static inline unsigned long sgx_get_epc_phys_addr(struct sgx_epc_page *page) +{ + struct sgx_epc_section *section = &sgx_epc_sections[page->section]; + unsigned long index; + + index = ((unsigned long)page - (unsigned long)section->pages) / sizeof(*page); + + return section->phys_addr + index * PAGE_SIZE; +} + +static inline void *sgx_get_epc_virt_addr(struct sgx_epc_page *page) +{ + struct sgx_epc_section *section = &sgx_epc_sections[page->section]; + unsigned long index; + + index = ((unsigned long)page - (unsigned long)section->pages) / sizeof(*page); + + return section->virt_addr + index * PAGE_SIZE; +} + +struct sgx_epc_page *__sgx_alloc_epc_page(void); +void sgx_free_epc_page(struct sgx_epc_page *page); + +void sgx_mark_page_reclaimable(struct sgx_epc_page *page); +int sgx_unmark_page_reclaimable(struct sgx_epc_page *page); +struct sgx_epc_page *sgx_alloc_epc_page(void *owner, bool reclaim); + +#endif /* _X86_SGX_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/topology.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/topology.c index d3a0791bc052..1068002c8532 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/topology.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/topology.c @@ -96,6 +96,7 @@ int detect_extended_topology(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) unsigned int ht_mask_width, core_plus_mask_width, die_plus_mask_width; unsigned int core_select_mask, core_level_siblings; unsigned int die_select_mask, die_level_siblings; + bool die_level_present = false; int leaf; leaf = detect_extended_topology_leaf(c); @@ -126,6 +127,7 @@ int detect_extended_topology(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) die_plus_mask_width = BITS_SHIFT_NEXT_LEVEL(eax); } if (LEAFB_SUBTYPE(ecx) == DIE_TYPE) { + die_level_present = true; die_level_siblings = LEVEL_MAX_SIBLINGS(ebx); die_plus_mask_width = BITS_SHIFT_NEXT_LEVEL(eax); } @@ -139,8 +141,12 @@ int detect_extended_topology(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) c->cpu_core_id = apic->phys_pkg_id(c->initial_apicid, ht_mask_width) & core_select_mask; - c->cpu_die_id = apic->phys_pkg_id(c->initial_apicid, - core_plus_mask_width) & die_select_mask; + + if (die_level_present) { + c->cpu_die_id = apic->phys_pkg_id(c->initial_apicid, + core_plus_mask_width) & die_select_mask; + } + c->phys_proc_id = apic->phys_pkg_id(c->initial_apicid, die_plus_mask_width); /* diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c b/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c index 25c06b67e7e0..299c20f0a38b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c @@ -78,6 +78,9 @@ static int copy_code(struct pt_regs *regs, u8 *buf, unsigned long src, if (!user_mode(regs)) return copy_from_kernel_nofault(buf, (u8 *)src, nbytes); + /* The user space code from other tasks cannot be accessed. */ + if (regs != task_pt_regs(current)) + return -EPERM; /* * Make sure userspace isn't trying to trick us into dumping kernel * memory by pointing the userspace instruction pointer at it. @@ -85,6 +88,12 @@ static int copy_code(struct pt_regs *regs, u8 *buf, unsigned long src, if (__chk_range_not_ok(src, nbytes, TASK_SIZE_MAX)) return -EINVAL; + /* + * Even if named copy_from_user_nmi() this can be invoked from + * other contexts and will not try to resolve a pagefault, which is + * the correct thing to do here as this code can be called from any + * context. + */ return copy_from_user_nmi(buf, (void __user *)src, nbytes); } @@ -115,13 +124,19 @@ void show_opcodes(struct pt_regs *regs, const char *loglvl) u8 opcodes[OPCODE_BUFSIZE]; unsigned long prologue = regs->ip - PROLOGUE_SIZE; - if (copy_code(regs, opcodes, prologue, sizeof(opcodes))) { - printk("%sCode: Unable to access opcode bytes at RIP 0x%lx.\n", - loglvl, prologue); - } else { + switch (copy_code(regs, opcodes, prologue, sizeof(opcodes))) { + case 0: printk("%sCode: %" __stringify(PROLOGUE_SIZE) "ph <%02x> %" __stringify(EPILOGUE_SIZE) "ph\n", loglvl, opcodes, opcodes[PROLOGUE_SIZE], opcodes + PROLOGUE_SIZE + 1); + break; + case -EPERM: + /* No access to the user space stack of other tasks. Ignore. */ + break; + default: + printk("%sCode: Unable to access opcode bytes at RIP 0x%lx.\n", + loglvl, prologue); + break; } } @@ -168,7 +183,7 @@ static void show_regs_if_on_stack(struct stack_info *info, struct pt_regs *regs, } } -void show_trace_log_lvl(struct task_struct *task, struct pt_regs *regs, +static void show_trace_log_lvl(struct task_struct *task, struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long *stack, const char *log_lvl) { struct unwind_state state; diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c index 05e117137b45..5e9beb77cafd 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c @@ -37,7 +37,6 @@ #include <asm/kasan.h> #include <asm/fixmap.h> #include <asm/realmode.h> -#include <asm/desc.h> #include <asm/extable.h> #include <asm/trapnr.h> #include <asm/sev-es.h> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S b/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S index 3c417734790f..04bddaaba8e2 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S @@ -26,15 +26,6 @@ #include <asm/nospec-branch.h> #include <asm/fixmap.h> -#ifdef CONFIG_PARAVIRT_XXL -#include <asm/asm-offsets.h> -#include <asm/paravirt.h> -#define GET_CR2_INTO(reg) GET_CR2_INTO_AX ; _ASM_MOV %_ASM_AX, reg -#else -#define INTERRUPT_RETURN iretq -#define GET_CR2_INTO(reg) _ASM_MOV %cr2, reg -#endif - /* * We are not able to switch in one step to the final KERNEL ADDRESS SPACE * because we need identity-mapped pages. @@ -540,21 +531,19 @@ SYM_DATA_END(level3_kernel_pgt) SYM_DATA_START_PAGE_ALIGNED(level2_kernel_pgt) /* - * 512 MB kernel mapping. We spend a full page on this pagetable - * anyway. + * Kernel high mapping. * - * The kernel code+data+bss must not be bigger than that. + * The kernel code+data+bss must be located below KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE in + * virtual address space, which is 1 GiB if RANDOMIZE_BASE is enabled, + * 512 MiB otherwise. * - * (NOTE: at +512MB starts the module area, see MODULES_VADDR. - * If you want to increase this then increase MODULES_VADDR - * too.) + * (NOTE: after that starts the module area, see MODULES_VADDR.) * - * This table is eventually used by the kernel during normal - * runtime. Care must be taken to clear out undesired bits - * later, like _PAGE_RW or _PAGE_GLOBAL in some cases. + * This table is eventually used by the kernel during normal runtime. + * Care must be taken to clear out undesired bits later, like _PAGE_RW + * or _PAGE_GLOBAL in some cases. */ - PMDS(0, __PAGE_KERNEL_LARGE_EXEC, - KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE/PMD_SIZE) + PMDS(0, __PAGE_KERNEL_LARGE_EXEC, KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE/PMD_SIZE) SYM_DATA_END(level2_kernel_pgt) SYM_DATA_START_PAGE_ALIGNED(level2_fixmap_pgt) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/opt.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/opt.c index 041f0b50bc27..08eb23074f92 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/opt.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/opt.c @@ -272,6 +272,19 @@ static int insn_is_indirect_jump(struct insn *insn) return ret; } +static bool is_padding_int3(unsigned long addr, unsigned long eaddr) +{ + unsigned char ops; + + for (; addr < eaddr; addr++) { + if (get_kernel_nofault(ops, (void *)addr) < 0 || + ops != INT3_INSN_OPCODE) + return false; + } + + return true; +} + /* Decode whole function to ensure any instructions don't jump into target */ static int can_optimize(unsigned long paddr) { @@ -310,9 +323,14 @@ static int can_optimize(unsigned long paddr) return 0; kernel_insn_init(&insn, (void *)recovered_insn, MAX_INSN_SIZE); insn_get_length(&insn); - /* Another subsystem puts a breakpoint */ + /* + * In the case of detecting unknown breakpoint, this could be + * a padding INT3 between functions. Let's check that all the + * rest of the bytes are also INT3. + */ if (insn.opcode.bytes[0] == INT3_INSN_OPCODE) - return 0; + return is_padding_int3(addr, paddr - offset + size) ? 1 : 0; + /* Recover address */ insn.kaddr = (void *)addr; insn.next_byte = (void *)(addr + insn.length); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/msr.c b/arch/x86/kernel/msr.c index c0d409810658..8a67d1fa8dc5 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/msr.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/msr.c @@ -99,11 +99,9 @@ static int filter_write(u32 reg) if (!__ratelimit(&fw_rs)) return 0; - if (reg == MSR_IA32_ENERGY_PERF_BIAS) - return 0; - - pr_err("Write to unrecognized MSR 0x%x by %s (pid: %d). Please report to x86@kernel.org.\n", - reg, current->comm, current->pid); + pr_warn("Write to unrecognized MSR 0x%x by %s (pid: %d).\n", + reg, current->comm, current->pid); + pr_warn("See https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip.git/about for details.\n"); return 0; } diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/perf_regs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/perf_regs.c index bb7e1132290b..624703af80a1 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/perf_regs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/perf_regs.c @@ -101,8 +101,7 @@ u64 perf_reg_abi(struct task_struct *task) } void perf_get_regs_user(struct perf_regs *regs_user, - struct pt_regs *regs, - struct pt_regs *regs_user_copy) + struct pt_regs *regs) { regs_user->regs = task_pt_regs(current); regs_user->abi = perf_reg_abi(current); @@ -123,18 +122,26 @@ int perf_reg_validate(u64 mask) u64 perf_reg_abi(struct task_struct *task) { - if (test_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_IA32)) + if (!user_64bit_mode(task_pt_regs(task))) return PERF_SAMPLE_REGS_ABI_32; else return PERF_SAMPLE_REGS_ABI_64; } +static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct pt_regs, nmi_user_regs); + void perf_get_regs_user(struct perf_regs *regs_user, - struct pt_regs *regs, - struct pt_regs *regs_user_copy) + struct pt_regs *regs) { + struct pt_regs *regs_user_copy = this_cpu_ptr(&nmi_user_regs); struct pt_regs *user_regs = task_pt_regs(current); + if (!in_nmi()) { + regs_user->regs = user_regs; + regs_user->abi = perf_reg_abi(current); + return; + } + /* * If we're in an NMI that interrupted task_pt_regs setup, then * we can't sample user regs at all. This check isn't really diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c index ba4593a913fa..145a7ac0c19a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c @@ -685,7 +685,7 @@ void arch_cpu_idle(void) */ void __cpuidle default_idle(void) { - safe_halt(); + raw_safe_halt(); } #if defined(CONFIG_APM_MODULE) || defined(CONFIG_HALTPOLL_CPUIDLE_MODULE) EXPORT_SYMBOL(default_idle); @@ -736,6 +736,8 @@ void stop_this_cpu(void *dummy) /* * AMD Erratum 400 aware idle routine. We handle it the same way as C3 power * states (local apic timer and TSC stop). + * + * XXX this function is completely buggered vs RCU and tracing. */ static void amd_e400_idle(void) { @@ -757,9 +759,9 @@ static void amd_e400_idle(void) * The switch back from broadcast mode needs to be called with * interrupts disabled. */ - local_irq_disable(); + raw_local_irq_disable(); tick_broadcast_exit(); - local_irq_enable(); + raw_local_irq_enable(); } /* @@ -801,9 +803,9 @@ static __cpuidle void mwait_idle(void) if (!need_resched()) __sti_mwait(0, 0); else - local_irq_enable(); + raw_local_irq_enable(); } else { - local_irq_enable(); + raw_local_irq_enable(); } __current_clr_polling(); } diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c index df342bedea88..ad582f9ac5a6 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c @@ -511,11 +511,10 @@ start_thread(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long new_ip, unsigned long new_sp) EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(start_thread); #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT -void compat_start_thread(struct pt_regs *regs, u32 new_ip, u32 new_sp) +void compat_start_thread(struct pt_regs *regs, u32 new_ip, u32 new_sp, bool x32) { start_thread_common(regs, new_ip, new_sp, - test_thread_flag(TIF_X32) - ? __USER_CS : __USER32_CS, + x32 ? __USER_CS : __USER32_CS, __USER_DS, __USER_DS); } #endif @@ -641,16 +640,12 @@ void set_personality_64bit(void) /* inherit personality from parent */ /* Make sure to be in 64bit mode */ - clear_thread_flag(TIF_IA32); clear_thread_flag(TIF_ADDR32); - clear_thread_flag(TIF_X32); /* Pretend that this comes from a 64bit execve */ task_pt_regs(current)->orig_ax = __NR_execve; current_thread_info()->status &= ~TS_COMPAT; - - /* Ensure the corresponding mm is not marked. */ if (current->mm) - current->mm->context.ia32_compat = 0; + current->mm->context.flags = MM_CONTEXT_HAS_VSYSCALL; /* TBD: overwrites user setup. Should have two bits. But 64bit processes have always behaved this way, @@ -662,10 +657,9 @@ void set_personality_64bit(void) static void __set_personality_x32(void) { #ifdef CONFIG_X86_X32 - clear_thread_flag(TIF_IA32); - set_thread_flag(TIF_X32); if (current->mm) - current->mm->context.ia32_compat = TIF_X32; + current->mm->context.flags = 0; + current->personality &= ~READ_IMPLIES_EXEC; /* * in_32bit_syscall() uses the presence of the x32 syscall bit @@ -683,10 +677,14 @@ static void __set_personality_x32(void) static void __set_personality_ia32(void) { #ifdef CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION - set_thread_flag(TIF_IA32); - clear_thread_flag(TIF_X32); - if (current->mm) - current->mm->context.ia32_compat = TIF_IA32; + if (current->mm) { + /* + * uprobes applied to this MM need to know this and + * cannot use user_64bit_mode() at that time. + */ + current->mm->context.flags = MM_CONTEXT_UPROBE_IA32; + } + current->personality |= force_personality32; /* Prepare the first "return" to user space */ task_pt_regs(current)->orig_ax = __NR_ia32_execve; diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c index 84f581c91db4..a23130c86bdd 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c @@ -119,11 +119,6 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(boot_cpu_data); unsigned int def_to_bigsmp; -/* For MCA, but anyone else can use it if they want */ -unsigned int machine_id; -unsigned int machine_submodel_id; -unsigned int BIOS_revision; - struct apm_info apm_info; EXPORT_SYMBOL(apm_info); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/tboot.c b/arch/x86/kernel/tboot.c index 992fb1415c0f..ae64f98ec2ab 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/tboot.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/tboot.c @@ -514,16 +514,10 @@ int tboot_force_iommu(void) if (!tboot_enabled()) return 0; - if (intel_iommu_tboot_noforce) - return 1; - - if (no_iommu || swiotlb || dmar_disabled) + if (no_iommu || dmar_disabled) pr_warn("Forcing Intel-IOMMU to enabled\n"); dmar_disabled = 0; -#ifdef CONFIG_SWIOTLB - swiotlb = 0; -#endif no_iommu = 0; return 1; diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c index e19df6cde35d..7798d862983f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c @@ -60,6 +60,7 @@ #include <asm/umip.h> #include <asm/insn.h> #include <asm/insn-eval.h> +#include <asm/vdso.h> #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 #include <asm/x86_init.h> @@ -117,6 +118,9 @@ do_trap_no_signal(struct task_struct *tsk, int trapnr, const char *str, tsk->thread.error_code = error_code; tsk->thread.trap_nr = trapnr; die(str, regs, error_code); + } else { + if (fixup_vdso_exception(regs, trapnr, error_code, 0)) + return 0; } /* @@ -550,6 +554,9 @@ DEFINE_IDTENTRY_ERRORCODE(exc_general_protection) tsk->thread.error_code = error_code; tsk->thread.trap_nr = X86_TRAP_GP; + if (fixup_vdso_exception(regs, X86_TRAP_GP, error_code, 0)) + return; + show_signal(tsk, SIGSEGV, "", desc, regs, error_code); force_sig(SIGSEGV); goto exit; @@ -1048,6 +1055,9 @@ static void math_error(struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr) if (!si_code) goto exit; + if (fixup_vdso_exception(regs, trapnr, 0, 0)) + return; + force_sig_fault(SIGFPE, si_code, (void __user *)uprobe_get_trap_addr(regs)); exit: diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/uprobes.c b/arch/x86/kernel/uprobes.c index 3fdaa042823d..138bdb1fd136 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/uprobes.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/uprobes.c @@ -255,12 +255,13 @@ static volatile u32 good_2byte_insns[256 / 32] = { static bool is_prefix_bad(struct insn *insn) { + insn_byte_t p; int i; - for (i = 0; i < insn->prefixes.nbytes; i++) { + for_each_insn_prefix(insn, i, p) { insn_attr_t attr; - attr = inat_get_opcode_attribute(insn->prefixes.bytes[i]); + attr = inat_get_opcode_attribute(p); switch (attr) { case INAT_MAKE_PREFIX(INAT_PFX_ES): case INAT_MAKE_PREFIX(INAT_PFX_CS): @@ -715,6 +716,7 @@ static const struct uprobe_xol_ops push_xol_ops = { static int branch_setup_xol_ops(struct arch_uprobe *auprobe, struct insn *insn) { u8 opc1 = OPCODE1(insn); + insn_byte_t p; int i; switch (opc1) { @@ -746,8 +748,8 @@ static int branch_setup_xol_ops(struct arch_uprobe *auprobe, struct insn *insn) * Intel and AMD behavior differ in 64-bit mode: Intel ignores 66 prefix. * No one uses these insns, reject any branch insns with such prefix. */ - for (i = 0; i < insn->prefixes.nbytes; i++) { - if (insn->prefixes.bytes[i] == 0x66) + for_each_insn_prefix(insn, i, p) { + if (p == 0x66) return -ENOTSUPP; } diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S b/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S index bf9e0adb5b7e..efd9e9ea17f2 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S @@ -454,13 +454,13 @@ SECTIONS ASSERT(SIZEOF(.rela.dyn) == 0, "Unexpected run-time relocations (.rela) detected!") } -#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 /* * The ASSERT() sink to . is intentional, for binutils 2.14 compatibility: */ . = ASSERT((_end - LOAD_OFFSET <= KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE), "kernel image bigger than KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE"); -#else + +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 /* * Per-cpu symbols which need to be offset from __per_cpu_load * for the boot processor. @@ -470,18 +470,12 @@ INIT_PER_CPU(gdt_page); INIT_PER_CPU(fixed_percpu_data); INIT_PER_CPU(irq_stack_backing_store); -/* - * Build-time check on the image size: - */ -. = ASSERT((_end - _text <= KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE), - "kernel image bigger than KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE"); - #ifdef CONFIG_SMP . = ASSERT((fixed_percpu_data == 0), "fixed_percpu_data is not at start of per-cpu area"); #endif -#endif /* CONFIG_X86_32 */ +#endif /* CONFIG_X86_64 */ #ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_CORE #include <asm/kexec.h> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c index 06a278b3701d..83637a2ff605 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c @@ -90,6 +90,20 @@ static int kvm_check_cpuid(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entries, int nent) return 0; } +void kvm_update_pv_runtime(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +{ + struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *best; + + best = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, KVM_CPUID_FEATURES, 0); + + /* + * save the feature bitmap to avoid cpuid lookup for every PV + * operation + */ + if (best) + vcpu->arch.pv_cpuid.features = best->eax; +} + void kvm_update_cpuid_runtime(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *best; @@ -124,13 +138,6 @@ void kvm_update_cpuid_runtime(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) (best->eax & (1 << KVM_FEATURE_PV_UNHALT))) best->eax &= ~(1 << KVM_FEATURE_PV_UNHALT); - /* - * save the feature bitmap to avoid cpuid lookup for every PV - * operation - */ - if (best) - vcpu->arch.pv_cpuid.features = best->eax; - if (!kvm_check_has_quirk(vcpu->kvm, KVM_X86_QUIRK_MISC_ENABLE_NO_MWAIT)) { best = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 0x1, 0); if (best) @@ -162,6 +169,8 @@ static void kvm_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) vcpu->arch.guest_supported_xcr0 = (best->eax | ((u64)best->edx << 32)) & supported_xcr0; + kvm_update_pv_runtime(vcpu); + vcpu->arch.maxphyaddr = cpuid_query_maxphyaddr(vcpu); kvm_mmu_reset_context(vcpu); @@ -169,6 +178,8 @@ static void kvm_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) vcpu->arch.cr4_guest_rsvd_bits = __cr4_reserved_bits(guest_cpuid_has, vcpu); + vcpu->arch.cr3_lm_rsvd_bits = rsvd_bits(cpuid_maxphyaddr(vcpu), 63); + /* Invoke the vendor callback only after the above state is updated. */ kvm_x86_ops.vcpu_after_set_cpuid(vcpu); } @@ -672,7 +683,9 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_func(struct kvm_cpuid_array *array, u32 function) edx.split.num_counters_fixed = min(cap.num_counters_fixed, MAX_FIXED_COUNTERS); edx.split.bit_width_fixed = cap.bit_width_fixed; - edx.split.reserved = 0; + edx.split.anythread_deprecated = 1; + edx.split.reserved1 = 0; + edx.split.reserved2 = 0; entry->eax = eax.full; entry->ebx = cap.events_mask; diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h index bf8577947ed2..f7a6e8f83783 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ extern u32 kvm_cpu_caps[NCAPINTS] __read_mostly; void kvm_set_cpu_caps(void); void kvm_update_cpuid_runtime(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); +void kvm_update_pv_runtime(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *kvm_find_cpuid_entry(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 function, u32 index); int kvm_dev_ioctl_get_cpuid(struct kvm_cpuid2 *cpuid, diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c b/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c index 0d917eb70319..56cae1ff9e3f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c @@ -4046,6 +4046,12 @@ static int em_clflush(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt) return X86EMUL_CONTINUE; } +static int em_clflushopt(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt) +{ + /* emulating clflushopt regardless of cpuid */ + return X86EMUL_CONTINUE; +} + static int em_movsxd(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt) { ctxt->dst.val = (s32) ctxt->src.val; @@ -4585,7 +4591,7 @@ static const struct opcode group11[] = { }; static const struct gprefix pfx_0f_ae_7 = { - I(SrcMem | ByteOp, em_clflush), N, N, N, + I(SrcMem | ByteOp, em_clflush), I(SrcMem | ByteOp, em_clflushopt), N, N, }; static const struct group_dual group15 = { { diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/irq.c b/arch/x86/kvm/irq.c index 99d118ffc67d..814698e5b152 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/irq.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/irq.c @@ -40,29 +40,10 @@ static int pending_userspace_extint(struct kvm_vcpu *v) * check if there is pending interrupt from * non-APIC source without intack. */ -static int kvm_cpu_has_extint(struct kvm_vcpu *v) -{ - u8 accept = kvm_apic_accept_pic_intr(v); - - if (accept) { - if (irqchip_split(v->kvm)) - return pending_userspace_extint(v); - else - return v->kvm->arch.vpic->output; - } else - return 0; -} - -/* - * check if there is injectable interrupt: - * when virtual interrupt delivery enabled, - * interrupt from apic will handled by hardware, - * we don't need to check it here. - */ -int kvm_cpu_has_injectable_intr(struct kvm_vcpu *v) +int kvm_cpu_has_extint(struct kvm_vcpu *v) { /* - * FIXME: interrupt.injected represents an interrupt that it's + * FIXME: interrupt.injected represents an interrupt whose * side-effects have already been applied (e.g. bit from IRR * already moved to ISR). Therefore, it is incorrect to rely * on interrupt.injected to know if there is a pending @@ -75,6 +56,23 @@ int kvm_cpu_has_injectable_intr(struct kvm_vcpu *v) if (!lapic_in_kernel(v)) return v->arch.interrupt.injected; + if (!kvm_apic_accept_pic_intr(v)) + return 0; + + if (irqchip_split(v->kvm)) + return pending_userspace_extint(v); + else + return v->kvm->arch.vpic->output; +} + +/* + * check if there is injectable interrupt: + * when virtual interrupt delivery enabled, + * interrupt from apic will handled by hardware, + * we don't need to check it here. + */ +int kvm_cpu_has_injectable_intr(struct kvm_vcpu *v) +{ if (kvm_cpu_has_extint(v)) return 1; @@ -91,20 +89,6 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_cpu_has_injectable_intr); */ int kvm_cpu_has_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *v) { - /* - * FIXME: interrupt.injected represents an interrupt that it's - * side-effects have already been applied (e.g. bit from IRR - * already moved to ISR). Therefore, it is incorrect to rely - * on interrupt.injected to know if there is a pending - * interrupt in the user-mode LAPIC. - * This leads to nVMX/nSVM not be able to distinguish - * if it should exit from L2 to L1 on EXTERNAL_INTERRUPT on - * pending interrupt or should re-inject an injected - * interrupt. - */ - if (!lapic_in_kernel(v)) - return v->arch.interrupt.injected; - if (kvm_cpu_has_extint(v)) return 1; @@ -118,16 +102,21 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_cpu_has_interrupt); */ static int kvm_cpu_get_extint(struct kvm_vcpu *v) { - if (kvm_cpu_has_extint(v)) { - if (irqchip_split(v->kvm)) { - int vector = v->arch.pending_external_vector; - - v->arch.pending_external_vector = -1; - return vector; - } else - return kvm_pic_read_irq(v->kvm); /* PIC */ - } else + if (!kvm_cpu_has_extint(v)) { + WARN_ON(!lapic_in_kernel(v)); return -1; + } + + if (!lapic_in_kernel(v)) + return v->arch.interrupt.nr; + + if (irqchip_split(v->kvm)) { + int vector = v->arch.pending_external_vector; + + v->arch.pending_external_vector = -1; + return vector; + } else + return kvm_pic_read_irq(v->kvm); /* PIC */ } /* @@ -135,13 +124,7 @@ static int kvm_cpu_get_extint(struct kvm_vcpu *v) */ int kvm_cpu_get_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *v) { - int vector; - - if (!lapic_in_kernel(v)) - return v->arch.interrupt.nr; - - vector = kvm_cpu_get_extint(v); - + int vector = kvm_cpu_get_extint(v); if (vector != -1) return vector; /* PIC */ diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c b/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c index 105e7859d1f2..86c33d53c90a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c @@ -2465,7 +2465,7 @@ int kvm_apic_has_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) struct kvm_lapic *apic = vcpu->arch.apic; u32 ppr; - if (!kvm_apic_hw_enabled(apic)) + if (!kvm_apic_present(vcpu)) return -1; __apic_update_ppr(apic, &ppr); diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c index 1f96adff8dc4..7a6ae9e90bd7 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c @@ -856,12 +856,14 @@ static int pte_list_add(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *spte, } else { rmap_printk("pte_list_add: %p %llx many->many\n", spte, *spte); desc = (struct pte_list_desc *)(rmap_head->val & ~1ul); - while (desc->sptes[PTE_LIST_EXT-1] && desc->more) { - desc = desc->more; + while (desc->sptes[PTE_LIST_EXT-1]) { count += PTE_LIST_EXT; - } - if (desc->sptes[PTE_LIST_EXT-1]) { - desc->more = mmu_alloc_pte_list_desc(vcpu); + + if (!desc->more) { + desc->more = mmu_alloc_pte_list_desc(vcpu); + desc = desc->more; + break; + } desc = desc->more; } for (i = 0; desc->sptes[i]; ++i) @@ -3515,7 +3517,7 @@ static bool get_mmio_spte(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 addr, u64 *sptep) { u64 sptes[PT64_ROOT_MAX_LEVEL]; struct rsvd_bits_validate *rsvd_check; - int root = vcpu->arch.mmu->root_level; + int root = vcpu->arch.mmu->shadow_root_level; int leaf; int level; bool reserved = false; diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.c index fcac2cac78fe..c51ad544f25b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.c @@ -40,8 +40,8 @@ static u64 generation_mmio_spte_mask(u64 gen) WARN_ON(gen & ~MMIO_SPTE_GEN_MASK); BUILD_BUG_ON((MMIO_SPTE_GEN_HIGH_MASK | MMIO_SPTE_GEN_LOW_MASK) & SPTE_SPECIAL_MASK); - mask = (gen << MMIO_SPTE_GEN_LOW_START) & MMIO_SPTE_GEN_LOW_MASK; - mask |= (gen << MMIO_SPTE_GEN_HIGH_START) & MMIO_SPTE_GEN_HIGH_MASK; + mask = (gen << MMIO_SPTE_GEN_LOW_SHIFT) & MMIO_SPTE_GEN_LOW_MASK; + mask |= (gen << MMIO_SPTE_GEN_HIGH_SHIFT) & MMIO_SPTE_GEN_HIGH_MASK; return mask; } diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h index 5c75a451c000..2b3a30bd38b0 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h @@ -56,11 +56,11 @@ #define SPTE_MMU_WRITEABLE (1ULL << (PT_FIRST_AVAIL_BITS_SHIFT + 1)) /* - * Due to limited space in PTEs, the MMIO generation is a 19 bit subset of + * Due to limited space in PTEs, the MMIO generation is a 18 bit subset of * the memslots generation and is derived as follows: * * Bits 0-8 of the MMIO generation are propagated to spte bits 3-11 - * Bits 9-18 of the MMIO generation are propagated to spte bits 52-61 + * Bits 9-17 of the MMIO generation are propagated to spte bits 54-62 * * The KVM_MEMSLOT_GEN_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS flag is intentionally not included in * the MMIO generation number, as doing so would require stealing a bit from @@ -69,18 +69,29 @@ * requires a full MMU zap). The flag is instead explicitly queried when * checking for MMIO spte cache hits. */ -#define MMIO_SPTE_GEN_MASK GENMASK_ULL(17, 0) #define MMIO_SPTE_GEN_LOW_START 3 #define MMIO_SPTE_GEN_LOW_END 11 -#define MMIO_SPTE_GEN_LOW_MASK GENMASK_ULL(MMIO_SPTE_GEN_LOW_END, \ - MMIO_SPTE_GEN_LOW_START) #define MMIO_SPTE_GEN_HIGH_START PT64_SECOND_AVAIL_BITS_SHIFT #define MMIO_SPTE_GEN_HIGH_END 62 + +#define MMIO_SPTE_GEN_LOW_MASK GENMASK_ULL(MMIO_SPTE_GEN_LOW_END, \ + MMIO_SPTE_GEN_LOW_START) #define MMIO_SPTE_GEN_HIGH_MASK GENMASK_ULL(MMIO_SPTE_GEN_HIGH_END, \ MMIO_SPTE_GEN_HIGH_START) +#define MMIO_SPTE_GEN_LOW_BITS (MMIO_SPTE_GEN_LOW_END - MMIO_SPTE_GEN_LOW_START + 1) +#define MMIO_SPTE_GEN_HIGH_BITS (MMIO_SPTE_GEN_HIGH_END - MMIO_SPTE_GEN_HIGH_START + 1) + +/* remember to adjust the comment above as well if you change these */ +static_assert(MMIO_SPTE_GEN_LOW_BITS == 9 && MMIO_SPTE_GEN_HIGH_BITS == 9); + +#define MMIO_SPTE_GEN_LOW_SHIFT (MMIO_SPTE_GEN_LOW_START - 0) +#define MMIO_SPTE_GEN_HIGH_SHIFT (MMIO_SPTE_GEN_HIGH_START - MMIO_SPTE_GEN_LOW_BITS) + +#define MMIO_SPTE_GEN_MASK GENMASK_ULL(MMIO_SPTE_GEN_LOW_BITS + MMIO_SPTE_GEN_HIGH_BITS - 1, 0) + extern u64 __read_mostly shadow_nx_mask; extern u64 __read_mostly shadow_x_mask; /* mutual exclusive with nx_mask */ extern u64 __read_mostly shadow_user_mask; @@ -228,8 +239,8 @@ static inline u64 get_mmio_spte_generation(u64 spte) { u64 gen; - gen = (spte & MMIO_SPTE_GEN_LOW_MASK) >> MMIO_SPTE_GEN_LOW_START; - gen |= (spte & MMIO_SPTE_GEN_HIGH_MASK) >> MMIO_SPTE_GEN_HIGH_START; + gen = (spte & MMIO_SPTE_GEN_LOW_MASK) >> MMIO_SPTE_GEN_LOW_SHIFT; + gen |= (spte & MMIO_SPTE_GEN_HIGH_MASK) >> MMIO_SPTE_GEN_HIGH_SHIFT; return gen; } diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c index 27e381c9da6c..84c8f06bec26 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c @@ -49,7 +49,14 @@ bool is_tdp_mmu_root(struct kvm *kvm, hpa_t hpa) { struct kvm_mmu_page *sp; + if (!kvm->arch.tdp_mmu_enabled) + return false; + if (WARN_ON(!VALID_PAGE(hpa))) + return false; + sp = to_shadow_page(hpa); + if (WARN_ON(!sp)) + return false; return sp->tdp_mmu_page && sp->root_count; } @@ -59,7 +66,7 @@ static bool zap_gfn_range(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu_page *root, void kvm_tdp_mmu_free_root(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu_page *root) { - gfn_t max_gfn = 1ULL << (boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits - PAGE_SHIFT); + gfn_t max_gfn = 1ULL << (shadow_phys_bits - PAGE_SHIFT); lockdep_assert_held(&kvm->mmu_lock); @@ -449,7 +456,7 @@ bool kvm_tdp_mmu_zap_gfn_range(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t start, gfn_t end) void kvm_tdp_mmu_zap_all(struct kvm *kvm) { - gfn_t max_gfn = 1ULL << (boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits - PAGE_SHIFT); + gfn_t max_gfn = 1ULL << (shadow_phys_bits - PAGE_SHIFT); bool flush; flush = kvm_tdp_mmu_zap_gfn_range(kvm, 0, max_gfn); diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c index c0b14106258a..566f4d18185b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c @@ -642,8 +642,8 @@ static int __sev_dbg_decrypt(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long src_paddr, * Its safe to read more than we are asked, caller should ensure that * destination has enough space. */ - src_paddr = round_down(src_paddr, 16); offset = src_paddr & 15; + src_paddr = round_down(src_paddr, 16); sz = round_up(sz + offset, 16); return __sev_issue_dbg_cmd(kvm, src_paddr, dst_paddr, sz, err, false); diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c index 2f32fd09e259..da7eb4aaf44f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c @@ -530,12 +530,12 @@ static int svm_hardware_enable(void) static void svm_cpu_uninit(int cpu) { - struct svm_cpu_data *sd = per_cpu(svm_data, raw_smp_processor_id()); + struct svm_cpu_data *sd = per_cpu(svm_data, cpu); if (!sd) return; - per_cpu(svm_data, raw_smp_processor_id()) = NULL; + per_cpu(svm_data, cpu) = NULL; kfree(sd->sev_vmcbs); __free_page(sd->save_area); kfree(sd); @@ -1309,8 +1309,10 @@ static int svm_create_vcpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) svm->avic_is_running = true; svm->msrpm = svm_vcpu_alloc_msrpm(); - if (!svm->msrpm) + if (!svm->msrpm) { + err = -ENOMEM; goto error_free_vmcb_page; + } svm_vcpu_init_msrpm(vcpu, svm->msrpm); @@ -3741,6 +3743,7 @@ static u64 svm_get_mt_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gfn_t gfn, bool is_mmio) static void svm_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu); + struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *best; vcpu->arch.xsaves_enabled = guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XSAVE) && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XSAVE) && @@ -3753,6 +3756,13 @@ static void svm_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) /* Check again if INVPCID interception if required */ svm_check_invpcid(svm); + /* For sev guests, the memory encryption bit is not reserved in CR3. */ + if (sev_guest(vcpu->kvm)) { + best = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 0x8000001F, 0); + if (best) + vcpu->arch.cr3_lm_rsvd_bits &= ~(1UL << (best->ebx & 0x3f)); + } + if (!kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu)) return; diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c index f5ede41bf9e6..e545a8a613b1 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c @@ -255,11 +255,10 @@ static struct kmem_cache *x86_emulator_cache; /* * When called, it means the previous get/set msr reached an invalid msr. - * Return 0 if we want to ignore/silent this failed msr access, or 1 if we want - * to fail the caller. + * Return true if we want to ignore/silent this failed msr access. */ -static int kvm_msr_ignored_check(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr, - u64 data, bool write) +static bool kvm_msr_ignored_check(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr, + u64 data, bool write) { const char *op = write ? "wrmsr" : "rdmsr"; @@ -268,11 +267,11 @@ static int kvm_msr_ignored_check(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr, kvm_pr_unimpl("ignored %s: 0x%x data 0x%llx\n", op, msr, data); /* Mask the error */ - return 0; + return true; } else { kvm_debug_ratelimited("unhandled %s: 0x%x data 0x%llx\n", op, msr, data); - return -ENOENT; + return false; } } @@ -1042,7 +1041,7 @@ int kvm_set_cr3(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr3) } if (is_long_mode(vcpu) && - (cr3 & rsvd_bits(cpuid_maxphyaddr(vcpu), 63))) + (cr3 & vcpu->arch.cr3_lm_rsvd_bits)) return 1; else if (is_pae_paging(vcpu) && !load_pdptrs(vcpu, vcpu->arch.walk_mmu, cr3)) @@ -1416,7 +1415,8 @@ static int do_get_msr_feature(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned index, u64 *data) if (r == KVM_MSR_RET_INVALID) { /* Unconditionally clear the output for simplicity */ *data = 0; - r = kvm_msr_ignored_check(vcpu, index, 0, false); + if (kvm_msr_ignored_check(vcpu, index, 0, false)) + r = 0; } if (r) @@ -1540,7 +1540,7 @@ static int __kvm_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 index, u64 data, struct msr_data msr; if (!host_initiated && !kvm_msr_allowed(vcpu, index, KVM_MSR_FILTER_WRITE)) - return -EPERM; + return KVM_MSR_RET_FILTERED; switch (index) { case MSR_FS_BASE: @@ -1581,7 +1581,8 @@ static int kvm_set_msr_ignored_check(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int ret = __kvm_set_msr(vcpu, index, data, host_initiated); if (ret == KVM_MSR_RET_INVALID) - ret = kvm_msr_ignored_check(vcpu, index, data, true); + if (kvm_msr_ignored_check(vcpu, index, data, true)) + ret = 0; return ret; } @@ -1599,7 +1600,7 @@ int __kvm_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 index, u64 *data, int ret; if (!host_initiated && !kvm_msr_allowed(vcpu, index, KVM_MSR_FILTER_READ)) - return -EPERM; + return KVM_MSR_RET_FILTERED; msr.index = index; msr.host_initiated = host_initiated; @@ -1618,7 +1619,8 @@ static int kvm_get_msr_ignored_check(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, if (ret == KVM_MSR_RET_INVALID) { /* Unconditionally clear *data for simplicity */ *data = 0; - ret = kvm_msr_ignored_check(vcpu, index, 0, false); + if (kvm_msr_ignored_check(vcpu, index, 0, false)) + ret = 0; } return ret; @@ -1662,9 +1664,9 @@ static int complete_emulated_wrmsr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) static u64 kvm_msr_reason(int r) { switch (r) { - case -ENOENT: + case KVM_MSR_RET_INVALID: return KVM_MSR_EXIT_REASON_UNKNOWN; - case -EPERM: + case KVM_MSR_RET_FILTERED: return KVM_MSR_EXIT_REASON_FILTER; default: return KVM_MSR_EXIT_REASON_INVAL; @@ -1965,7 +1967,7 @@ static void kvm_write_system_time(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t system_time, struct kvm_arch *ka = &vcpu->kvm->arch; if (vcpu->vcpu_id == 0 && !host_initiated) { - if (ka->boot_vcpu_runs_old_kvmclock && old_msr) + if (ka->boot_vcpu_runs_old_kvmclock != old_msr) kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_MASTERCLOCK_UPDATE, vcpu); ka->boot_vcpu_runs_old_kvmclock = old_msr; @@ -3063,9 +3065,9 @@ int kvm_set_msr_common(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info) /* Values other than LBR and BTF are vendor-specific, thus reserved and should throw a #GP */ return 1; - } - vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "%s: MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR 0x%llx, nop\n", - __func__, data); + } else if (report_ignored_msrs) + vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "%s: MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR 0x%llx, nop\n", + __func__, data); break; case 0x200 ... 0x2ff: return kvm_mtrr_set_msr(vcpu, msr, data); @@ -3463,29 +3465,63 @@ int kvm_get_msr_common(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info) msr_info->data = vcpu->arch.efer; break; case MSR_KVM_WALL_CLOCK: + if (!guest_pv_has(vcpu, KVM_FEATURE_CLOCKSOURCE)) + return 1; + + msr_info->data = vcpu->kvm->arch.wall_clock; + break; case MSR_KVM_WALL_CLOCK_NEW: + if (!guest_pv_has(vcpu, KVM_FEATURE_CLOCKSOURCE2)) + return 1; + msr_info->data = vcpu->kvm->arch.wall_clock; break; case MSR_KVM_SYSTEM_TIME: + if (!guest_pv_has(vcpu, KVM_FEATURE_CLOCKSOURCE)) + return 1; + + msr_info->data = vcpu->arch.time; + break; case MSR_KVM_SYSTEM_TIME_NEW: + if (!guest_pv_has(vcpu, KVM_FEATURE_CLOCKSOURCE2)) + return 1; + msr_info->data = vcpu->arch.time; break; case MSR_KVM_ASYNC_PF_EN: + if (!guest_pv_has(vcpu, KVM_FEATURE_ASYNC_PF)) + return 1; + msr_info->data = vcpu->arch.apf.msr_en_val; break; case MSR_KVM_ASYNC_PF_INT: + if (!guest_pv_has(vcpu, KVM_FEATURE_ASYNC_PF_INT)) + return 1; + msr_info->data = vcpu->arch.apf.msr_int_val; break; case MSR_KVM_ASYNC_PF_ACK: + if (!guest_pv_has(vcpu, KVM_FEATURE_ASYNC_PF)) + return 1; + msr_info->data = 0; break; case MSR_KVM_STEAL_TIME: + if (!guest_pv_has(vcpu, KVM_FEATURE_STEAL_TIME)) + return 1; + msr_info->data = vcpu->arch.st.msr_val; break; case MSR_KVM_PV_EOI_EN: + if (!guest_pv_has(vcpu, KVM_FEATURE_PV_EOI)) + return 1; + msr_info->data = vcpu->arch.pv_eoi.msr_val; break; case MSR_KVM_POLL_CONTROL: + if (!guest_pv_has(vcpu, KVM_FEATURE_POLL_CONTROL)) + return 1; + msr_info->data = vcpu->arch.msr_kvm_poll_control; break; case MSR_IA32_P5_MC_ADDR: @@ -4015,21 +4051,23 @@ static int kvm_vcpu_ioctl_set_lapic(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, static int kvm_cpu_accept_dm_intr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { + /* + * We can accept userspace's request for interrupt injection + * as long as we have a place to store the interrupt number. + * The actual injection will happen when the CPU is able to + * deliver the interrupt. + */ + if (kvm_cpu_has_extint(vcpu)) + return false; + + /* Acknowledging ExtINT does not happen if LINT0 is masked. */ return (!lapic_in_kernel(vcpu) || kvm_apic_accept_pic_intr(vcpu)); } -/* - * if userspace requested an interrupt window, check that the - * interrupt window is open. - * - * No need to exit to userspace if we already have an interrupt queued. - */ static int kvm_vcpu_ready_for_interrupt_injection(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { return kvm_arch_interrupt_allowed(vcpu) && - !kvm_cpu_has_interrupt(vcpu) && - !kvm_event_needs_reinjection(vcpu) && kvm_cpu_accept_dm_intr(vcpu); } @@ -4575,6 +4613,8 @@ static int kvm_vcpu_ioctl_enable_cap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, case KVM_CAP_ENFORCE_PV_FEATURE_CPUID: vcpu->arch.pv_cpuid.enforce = cap->args[0]; + if (vcpu->arch.pv_cpuid.enforce) + kvm_update_pv_runtime(vcpu); return 0; diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h index 3900ab0c6004..e7ca622a468f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h @@ -376,7 +376,13 @@ int kvm_handle_memory_failure(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int r, int kvm_handle_invpcid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long type, gva_t gva); bool kvm_msr_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 index, u32 type); -#define KVM_MSR_RET_INVALID 2 +/* + * Internal error codes that are used to indicate that MSR emulation encountered + * an error that should result in #GP in the guest, unless userspace + * handles it. + */ +#define KVM_MSR_RET_INVALID 2 /* in-kernel MSR emulation #GP condition */ +#define KVM_MSR_RET_FILTERED 3 /* #GP due to userspace MSR filter */ #define __cr4_reserved_bits(__cpu_has, __c) \ ({ \ diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/copy_mc.c b/arch/x86/lib/copy_mc.c index c13e8c9ee926..80efd45a7761 100644 --- a/arch/x86/lib/copy_mc.c +++ b/arch/x86/lib/copy_mc.c @@ -10,10 +10,6 @@ #include <asm/mce.h> #ifdef CONFIG_X86_MCE -/* - * See COPY_MC_TEST for self-test of the copy_mc_fragile() - * implementation. - */ static DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(copy_mc_fragile_key); void enable_copy_mc_fragile(void) diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/copy_mc_64.S b/arch/x86/lib/copy_mc_64.S index 892d8915f609..e5f77e293034 100644 --- a/arch/x86/lib/copy_mc_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/lib/copy_mc_64.S @@ -2,14 +2,11 @@ /* Copyright(c) 2016-2020 Intel Corporation. All rights reserved. */ #include <linux/linkage.h> -#include <asm/copy_mc_test.h> -#include <asm/export.h> #include <asm/asm.h> #ifndef CONFIG_UML #ifdef CONFIG_X86_MCE -COPY_MC_TEST_CTL /* * copy_mc_fragile - copy memory with indication if an exception / fault happened @@ -38,8 +35,6 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(copy_mc_fragile) subl %ecx, %edx .L_read_leading_bytes: movb (%rsi), %al - COPY_MC_TEST_SRC %rsi 1 .E_leading_bytes - COPY_MC_TEST_DST %rdi 1 .E_leading_bytes .L_write_leading_bytes: movb %al, (%rdi) incq %rsi @@ -55,8 +50,6 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(copy_mc_fragile) .L_read_words: movq (%rsi), %r8 - COPY_MC_TEST_SRC %rsi 8 .E_read_words - COPY_MC_TEST_DST %rdi 8 .E_write_words .L_write_words: movq %r8, (%rdi) addq $8, %rsi @@ -73,8 +66,6 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(copy_mc_fragile) movl %edx, %ecx .L_read_trailing_bytes: movb (%rsi), %al - COPY_MC_TEST_SRC %rsi 1 .E_trailing_bytes - COPY_MC_TEST_DST %rdi 1 .E_trailing_bytes .L_write_trailing_bytes: movb %al, (%rdi) incq %rsi @@ -88,7 +79,6 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(copy_mc_fragile) .L_done: ret SYM_FUNC_END(copy_mc_fragile) -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(copy_mc_fragile) .section .fixup, "ax" /* diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/insn-eval.c b/arch/x86/lib/insn-eval.c index 58f7fb95c7f4..4229950a5d78 100644 --- a/arch/x86/lib/insn-eval.c +++ b/arch/x86/lib/insn-eval.c @@ -63,13 +63,12 @@ static bool is_string_insn(struct insn *insn) */ bool insn_has_rep_prefix(struct insn *insn) { + insn_byte_t p; int i; insn_get_prefixes(insn); - for (i = 0; i < insn->prefixes.nbytes; i++) { - insn_byte_t p = insn->prefixes.bytes[i]; - + for_each_insn_prefix(insn, i, p) { if (p == 0xf2 || p == 0xf3) return true; } @@ -95,14 +94,15 @@ static int get_seg_reg_override_idx(struct insn *insn) { int idx = INAT_SEG_REG_DEFAULT; int num_overrides = 0, i; + insn_byte_t p; insn_get_prefixes(insn); /* Look for any segment override prefixes. */ - for (i = 0; i < insn->prefixes.nbytes; i++) { + for_each_insn_prefix(insn, i, p) { insn_attr_t attr; - attr = inat_get_opcode_attribute(insn->prefixes.bytes[i]); + attr = inat_get_opcode_attribute(p); switch (attr) { case INAT_MAKE_PREFIX(INAT_PFX_CS): idx = INAT_SEG_REG_CS; diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/usercopy.c b/arch/x86/lib/usercopy.c index 3f435d7fca5e..c3e8a62ca561 100644 --- a/arch/x86/lib/usercopy.c +++ b/arch/x86/lib/usercopy.c @@ -9,9 +9,23 @@ #include <asm/tlbflush.h> -/* - * We rely on the nested NMI work to allow atomic faults from the NMI path; the - * nested NMI paths are careful to preserve CR2. +/** + * copy_from_user_nmi - NMI safe copy from user + * @to: Pointer to the destination buffer + * @from: Pointer to a user space address of the current task + * @n: Number of bytes to copy + * + * Returns: The number of not copied bytes. 0 is success, i.e. all bytes copied + * + * Contrary to other copy_from_user() variants this function can be called + * from NMI context. Despite the name it is not restricted to be called + * from NMI context. It is safe to be called from any other context as + * well. It disables pagefaults across the copy which means a fault will + * abort the copy. + * + * For NMI context invocations this relies on the nested NMI work to allow + * atomic faults from the NMI path; the nested NMI paths are careful to + * preserve CR2. */ unsigned long copy_from_user_nmi(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n) @@ -27,7 +41,7 @@ copy_from_user_nmi(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n) /* * Even though this function is typically called from NMI/IRQ context * disable pagefaults so that its behaviour is consistent even when - * called form other contexts. + * called from other contexts. */ pagefault_disable(); ret = __copy_from_user_inatomic(to, from, n); diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c index 82bf37a5c9ec..f1f1b5a0956a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c @@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ #include <asm/cpu_entry_area.h> /* exception stack */ #include <asm/pgtable_areas.h> /* VMALLOC_START, ... */ #include <asm/kvm_para.h> /* kvm_handle_async_pf */ +#include <asm/vdso.h> /* fixup_vdso_exception() */ #define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS #include <asm/trace/exceptions.h> @@ -602,11 +603,9 @@ pgtable_bad(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code, oops_end(flags, regs, sig); } -static void set_signal_archinfo(unsigned long address, - unsigned long error_code) +static void sanitize_error_code(unsigned long address, + unsigned long *error_code) { - struct task_struct *tsk = current; - /* * To avoid leaking information about the kernel page * table layout, pretend that user-mode accesses to @@ -617,7 +616,13 @@ static void set_signal_archinfo(unsigned long address, * information and does not appear to cause any problems. */ if (address >= TASK_SIZE_MAX) - error_code |= X86_PF_PROT; + *error_code |= X86_PF_PROT; +} + +static void set_signal_archinfo(unsigned long address, + unsigned long error_code) +{ + struct task_struct *tsk = current; tsk->thread.trap_nr = X86_TRAP_PF; tsk->thread.error_code = error_code | X86_PF_USER; @@ -658,6 +663,8 @@ no_context(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code, * faulting through the emulate_vsyscall() logic. */ if (current->thread.sig_on_uaccess_err && signal) { + sanitize_error_code(address, &error_code); + set_signal_archinfo(address, error_code); /* XXX: hwpoison faults will set the wrong code. */ @@ -806,13 +813,10 @@ __bad_area_nosemaphore(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code, if (is_errata100(regs, address)) return; - /* - * To avoid leaking information about the kernel page table - * layout, pretend that user-mode accesses to kernel addresses - * are always protection faults. - */ - if (address >= TASK_SIZE_MAX) - error_code |= X86_PF_PROT; + sanitize_error_code(address, &error_code); + + if (fixup_vdso_exception(regs, X86_TRAP_PF, error_code, address)) + return; if (likely(show_unhandled_signals)) show_signal_msg(regs, error_code, address, tsk); @@ -931,6 +935,11 @@ do_sigbus(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code, unsigned long address, if (is_prefetch(regs, error_code, address)) return; + sanitize_error_code(address, &error_code); + + if (fixup_vdso_exception(regs, X86_TRAP_PF, error_code, address)) + return; + set_signal_archinfo(address, error_code); #ifdef CONFIG_MEMORY_FAILURE @@ -1102,6 +1111,18 @@ access_error(unsigned long error_code, struct vm_area_struct *vma) return 1; /* + * SGX hardware blocked the access. This usually happens + * when the enclave memory contents have been destroyed, like + * after a suspend/resume cycle. In any case, the kernel can't + * fix the cause of the fault. Handle the fault as an access + * error even in cases where no actual access violation + * occurred. This allows userspace to rebuild the enclave in + * response to the signal. + */ + if (unlikely(error_code & X86_PF_SGX)) + return 1; + + /* * Make sure to check the VMA so that we do not perform * faults just to hit a X86_PF_PK as soon as we fill in a * page. diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/ident_map.c b/arch/x86/mm/ident_map.c index fe7a12599d8e..968d7005f4a7 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/ident_map.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/ident_map.c @@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ static int ident_p4d_init(struct x86_mapping_info *info, p4d_t *p4d_page, unsigned long addr, unsigned long end) { unsigned long next; + int result; for (; addr < end; addr = next) { p4d_t *p4d = p4d_page + p4d_index(addr); @@ -73,13 +74,20 @@ static int ident_p4d_init(struct x86_mapping_info *info, p4d_t *p4d_page, if (p4d_present(*p4d)) { pud = pud_offset(p4d, 0); - ident_pud_init(info, pud, addr, next); + result = ident_pud_init(info, pud, addr, next); + if (result) + return result; + continue; } pud = (pud_t *)info->alloc_pgt_page(info->context); if (!pud) return -ENOMEM; - ident_pud_init(info, pud, addr, next); + + result = ident_pud_init(info, pud, addr, next); + if (result) + return result; + set_p4d(p4d, __p4d(__pa(pud) | info->kernpg_flag)); } diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/init.c b/arch/x86/mm/init.c index c7a47603537f..e26f5c5c6565 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/init.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/init.c @@ -596,7 +596,7 @@ static unsigned long __init get_new_step_size(unsigned long step_size) static void __init memory_map_top_down(unsigned long map_start, unsigned long map_end) { - unsigned long real_end, start, last_start; + unsigned long real_end, last_start; unsigned long step_size; unsigned long addr; unsigned long mapped_ram_size = 0; @@ -609,7 +609,7 @@ static void __init memory_map_top_down(unsigned long map_start, step_size = PMD_SIZE; max_pfn_mapped = 0; /* will get exact value next */ min_pfn_mapped = real_end >> PAGE_SHIFT; - last_start = start = real_end; + last_start = real_end; /* * We start from the top (end of memory) and go to the bottom. @@ -618,6 +618,8 @@ static void __init memory_map_top_down(unsigned long map_start, * for page table. */ while (last_start > map_start) { + unsigned long start; + if (last_start > step_size) { start = round_down(last_start - 1, step_size); if (start < map_start) diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c index 733b983f3a89..6c5eb6f3f14f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c @@ -45,8 +45,8 @@ #define PMD_FLAGS_LARGE (__PAGE_KERNEL_LARGE_EXEC & ~_PAGE_GLOBAL) #define PMD_FLAGS_DEC PMD_FLAGS_LARGE -#define PMD_FLAGS_DEC_WP ((PMD_FLAGS_DEC & ~_PAGE_CACHE_MASK) | \ - (_PAGE_PAT | _PAGE_PWT)) +#define PMD_FLAGS_DEC_WP ((PMD_FLAGS_DEC & ~_PAGE_LARGE_CACHE_MASK) | \ + (_PAGE_PAT_LARGE | _PAGE_PWT)) #define PMD_FLAGS_ENC (PMD_FLAGS_LARGE | _PAGE_ENC) diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/numa.c b/arch/x86/mm/numa.c index 44148691d78b..5eb4dc2b97da 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/numa.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/numa.c @@ -938,6 +938,7 @@ int phys_to_target_node(phys_addr_t start) return meminfo_to_nid(&numa_reserved_meminfo, start); } +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(phys_to_target_node); int memory_add_physaddr_to_nid(u64 start) { @@ -947,4 +948,5 @@ int memory_add_physaddr_to_nid(u64 start) nid = numa_meminfo.blk[0].nid; return nid; } +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(memory_add_physaddr_to_nid); #endif diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c b/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c index 11666ba19b62..569ac1d57f55 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c @@ -474,8 +474,14 @@ void switch_mm_irqs_off(struct mm_struct *prev, struct mm_struct *next, /* * The membarrier system call requires a full memory barrier and * core serialization before returning to user-space, after - * storing to rq->curr. Writing to CR3 provides that full - * memory barrier and core serializing instruction. + * storing to rq->curr, when changing mm. This is because + * membarrier() sends IPIs to all CPUs that are in the target mm + * to make them issue memory barriers. However, if another CPU + * switches to/from the target mm concurrently with + * membarrier(), it can cause that CPU not to receive an IPI + * when it really should issue a memory barrier. Writing to CR3 + * provides that full memory barrier and core serializing + * instruction. */ if (real_prev == next) { VM_WARN_ON(this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.ctxs[prev_asid].ctx_id) != diff --git a/arch/x86/oprofile/backtrace.c b/arch/x86/oprofile/backtrace.c index a2488b6e27d6..1d8391fcca68 100644 --- a/arch/x86/oprofile/backtrace.c +++ b/arch/x86/oprofile/backtrace.c @@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ x86_backtrace_32(struct pt_regs * const regs, unsigned int depth) struct stack_frame_ia32 *head; /* User process is IA32 */ - if (!current || !test_thread_flag(TIF_IA32)) + if (!current || user_64bit_mode(regs)) return 0; head = (struct stack_frame_ia32 *) regs->bp; diff --git a/arch/x86/pci/i386.c b/arch/x86/pci/i386.c index fa855bbaebaf..f2f4a5d50b27 100644 --- a/arch/x86/pci/i386.c +++ b/arch/x86/pci/i386.c @@ -366,9 +366,9 @@ static int __init pcibios_assign_resources(void) return 0; } -/** - * called in fs_initcall (one below subsys_initcall), - * give a chance for motherboard reserve resources +/* + * This is an fs_initcall (one below subsys_initcall) in order to reserve + * resources properly. */ fs_initcall(pcibios_assign_resources); diff --git a/arch/x86/pci/mmconfig-shared.c b/arch/x86/pci/mmconfig-shared.c index 6fa42e9c4e6f..234998f196d4 100644 --- a/arch/x86/pci/mmconfig-shared.c +++ b/arch/x86/pci/mmconfig-shared.c @@ -425,7 +425,7 @@ static acpi_status find_mboard_resource(acpi_handle handle, u32 lvl, return AE_OK; } -static bool is_acpi_reserved(u64 start, u64 end, unsigned not_used) +static bool is_acpi_reserved(u64 start, u64 end, enum e820_type not_used) { struct resource mcfg_res; @@ -442,7 +442,7 @@ static bool is_acpi_reserved(u64 start, u64 end, unsigned not_used) return mcfg_res.flags; } -typedef bool (*check_reserved_t)(u64 start, u64 end, unsigned type); +typedef bool (*check_reserved_t)(u64 start, u64 end, enum e820_type type); static bool __ref is_mmconf_reserved(check_reserved_t is_reserved, struct pci_mmcfg_region *cfg, diff --git a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c index 8f5759df7776..e1e8d4e3a213 100644 --- a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c +++ b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c @@ -78,28 +78,30 @@ int __init efi_alloc_page_tables(void) gfp_mask = GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO; efi_pgd = (pgd_t *)__get_free_pages(gfp_mask, PGD_ALLOCATION_ORDER); if (!efi_pgd) - return -ENOMEM; + goto fail; pgd = efi_pgd + pgd_index(EFI_VA_END); p4d = p4d_alloc(&init_mm, pgd, EFI_VA_END); - if (!p4d) { - free_page((unsigned long)efi_pgd); - return -ENOMEM; - } + if (!p4d) + goto free_pgd; pud = pud_alloc(&init_mm, p4d, EFI_VA_END); - if (!pud) { - if (pgtable_l5_enabled()) - free_page((unsigned long) pgd_page_vaddr(*pgd)); - free_pages((unsigned long)efi_pgd, PGD_ALLOCATION_ORDER); - return -ENOMEM; - } + if (!pud) + goto free_p4d; efi_mm.pgd = efi_pgd; mm_init_cpumask(&efi_mm); init_new_context(NULL, &efi_mm); return 0; + +free_p4d: + if (pgtable_l5_enabled()) + free_page((unsigned long)pgd_page_vaddr(*pgd)); +free_pgd: + free_pages((unsigned long)efi_pgd, PGD_ALLOCATION_ORDER); +fail: + return -ENOMEM; } /* diff --git a/arch/x86/platform/uv/Makefile b/arch/x86/platform/uv/Makefile index 224ff0504890..1441dda8edf7 100644 --- a/arch/x86/platform/uv/Makefile +++ b/arch/x86/platform/uv/Makefile @@ -1,2 +1,2 @@ # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only -obj-$(CONFIG_X86_UV) += bios_uv.o uv_irq.o uv_sysfs.o uv_time.o uv_nmi.o +obj-$(CONFIG_X86_UV) += bios_uv.o uv_irq.o uv_time.o uv_nmi.o diff --git a/arch/x86/platform/uv/bios_uv.c b/arch/x86/platform/uv/bios_uv.c index 54511eaccf4d..bf31af3d32d6 100644 --- a/arch/x86/platform/uv/bios_uv.c +++ b/arch/x86/platform/uv/bios_uv.c @@ -72,6 +72,7 @@ static s64 uv_bios_call_irqsave(enum uv_bios_cmd which, u64 a1, u64 a2, u64 a3, long sn_partition_id; EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sn_partition_id); long sn_coherency_id; +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sn_coherency_id); long sn_region_size; EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sn_region_size); long system_serial_number; @@ -171,6 +172,60 @@ int uv_bios_set_legacy_vga_target(bool decode, int domain, int bus) (u64)decode, (u64)domain, (u64)bus, 0, 0); } +extern s64 uv_bios_get_master_nasid(u64 size, u64 *master_nasid) +{ + return uv_bios_call(UV_BIOS_EXTRA, 0, UV_BIOS_EXTRA_MASTER_NASID, 0, + size, (u64)master_nasid); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(uv_bios_get_master_nasid); + +extern s64 uv_bios_get_heapsize(u64 nasid, u64 size, u64 *heap_size) +{ + return uv_bios_call(UV_BIOS_EXTRA, nasid, UV_BIOS_EXTRA_GET_HEAPSIZE, + 0, size, (u64)heap_size); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(uv_bios_get_heapsize); + +extern s64 uv_bios_install_heap(u64 nasid, u64 heap_size, u64 *bios_heap) +{ + return uv_bios_call(UV_BIOS_EXTRA, nasid, UV_BIOS_EXTRA_INSTALL_HEAP, + 0, heap_size, (u64)bios_heap); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(uv_bios_install_heap); + +extern s64 uv_bios_obj_count(u64 nasid, u64 size, u64 *objcnt) +{ + return uv_bios_call(UV_BIOS_EXTRA, nasid, UV_BIOS_EXTRA_OBJECT_COUNT, + 0, size, (u64)objcnt); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(uv_bios_obj_count); + +extern s64 uv_bios_enum_objs(u64 nasid, u64 size, u64 *objbuf) +{ + return uv_bios_call(UV_BIOS_EXTRA, nasid, UV_BIOS_EXTRA_ENUM_OBJECTS, + 0, size, (u64)objbuf); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(uv_bios_enum_objs); + +extern s64 uv_bios_enum_ports(u64 nasid, u64 obj_id, u64 size, u64 *portbuf) +{ + return uv_bios_call(UV_BIOS_EXTRA, nasid, UV_BIOS_EXTRA_ENUM_PORTS, + obj_id, size, (u64)portbuf); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(uv_bios_enum_ports); + +extern s64 uv_bios_get_geoinfo(u64 nasid, u64 size, u64 *buf) +{ + return uv_bios_call(UV_BIOS_GET_GEOINFO, nasid, (u64)buf, size, 0, 0); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(uv_bios_get_geoinfo); + +extern s64 uv_bios_get_pci_topology(u64 size, u64 *buf) +{ + return uv_bios_call(UV_BIOS_GET_PCI_TOPOLOGY, (u64)buf, size, 0, 0, 0); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(uv_bios_get_pci_topology); + unsigned long get_uv_systab_phys(bool msg) { if ((uv_systab_phys == EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR) || diff --git a/arch/x86/platform/uv/uv_sysfs.c b/arch/x86/platform/uv/uv_sysfs.c deleted file mode 100644 index 266773e2fb37..000000000000 --- a/arch/x86/platform/uv/uv_sysfs.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,63 +0,0 @@ -// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later -/* - * This file supports the /sys/firmware/sgi_uv interfaces for SGI UV. - * - * Copyright (c) 2008 Silicon Graphics, Inc. All Rights Reserved. - * Copyright (c) Russ Anderson - */ - -#include <linux/device.h> -#include <asm/uv/bios.h> -#include <asm/uv/uv.h> - -struct kobject *sgi_uv_kobj; - -static ssize_t partition_id_show(struct kobject *kobj, - struct kobj_attribute *attr, char *buf) -{ - return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%ld\n", sn_partition_id); -} - -static ssize_t coherence_id_show(struct kobject *kobj, - struct kobj_attribute *attr, char *buf) -{ - return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%ld\n", sn_coherency_id); -} - -static struct kobj_attribute partition_id_attr = - __ATTR(partition_id, S_IRUGO, partition_id_show, NULL); - -static struct kobj_attribute coherence_id_attr = - __ATTR(coherence_id, S_IRUGO, coherence_id_show, NULL); - - -static int __init sgi_uv_sysfs_init(void) -{ - unsigned long ret; - - if (!is_uv_system()) - return -ENODEV; - - if (!sgi_uv_kobj) - sgi_uv_kobj = kobject_create_and_add("sgi_uv", firmware_kobj); - if (!sgi_uv_kobj) { - printk(KERN_WARNING "kobject_create_and_add sgi_uv failed\n"); - return -EINVAL; - } - - ret = sysfs_create_file(sgi_uv_kobj, &partition_id_attr.attr); - if (ret) { - printk(KERN_WARNING "sysfs_create_file partition_id failed\n"); - return ret; - } - - ret = sysfs_create_file(sgi_uv_kobj, &coherence_id_attr.attr); - if (ret) { - printk(KERN_WARNING "sysfs_create_file coherence_id failed\n"); - return ret; - } - - return 0; -} - -device_initcall(sgi_uv_sysfs_init); diff --git a/arch/x86/purgatory/purgatory.c b/arch/x86/purgatory/purgatory.c index 7b37a412f829..f03b64d9cb51 100644 --- a/arch/x86/purgatory/purgatory.c +++ b/arch/x86/purgatory/purgatory.c @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ */ #include <linux/bug.h> -#include <crypto/sha.h> +#include <crypto/sha2.h> #include <asm/purgatory.h> #include "../boot/string.h" diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/spinlock.c b/arch/x86/xen/spinlock.c index 799f4eba0a62..043c73dfd2c9 100644 --- a/arch/x86/xen/spinlock.c +++ b/arch/x86/xen/spinlock.c @@ -93,10 +93,20 @@ void xen_init_lock_cpu(int cpu) void xen_uninit_lock_cpu(int cpu) { + int irq; + if (!xen_pvspin) return; - unbind_from_irqhandler(per_cpu(lock_kicker_irq, cpu), NULL); + /* + * When booting the kernel with 'mitigations=auto,nosmt', the secondary + * CPUs are not activated, and lock_kicker_irq is not initialized. + */ + irq = per_cpu(lock_kicker_irq, cpu); + if (irq == -1) + return; + + unbind_from_irqhandler(irq, NULL); per_cpu(lock_kicker_irq, cpu) = -1; kfree(per_cpu(irq_name, cpu)); per_cpu(irq_name, cpu) = NULL; |