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-rw-r--r--arch/x86/mm/dump_pagetables.c6
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/mm/fault.c30
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/mm/init_64.c24
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c71
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c2
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/mm/kaslr.c11
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c5
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_boot.S5
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c27
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/mm/mpx.c2
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c33
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/mm/pkeys.c10
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/mm/pti.c10
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/mm/tlb.c2
14 files changed, 123 insertions, 115 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/dump_pagetables.c b/arch/x86/mm/dump_pagetables.c
index 6a7302d1161f..ab67822fd2f4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/dump_pagetables.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/dump_pagetables.c
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
/*
* Debug helper to dump the current kernel pagetables of the system
* so that we can see what the various memory ranges are set to.
@@ -5,11 +6,6 @@
* (C) Copyright 2008 Intel Corporation
*
* Author: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
- *
- * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
- * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
- * as published by the Free Software Foundation; version 2
- * of the License.
*/
#include <linux/debugfs.h>
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
index 46df4c6aae46..794f364cb882 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
@@ -710,6 +710,10 @@ static void set_signal_archinfo(unsigned long address,
* To avoid leaking information about the kernel page
* table layout, pretend that user-mode accesses to
* kernel addresses are always protection faults.
+ *
+ * NB: This means that failed vsyscalls with vsyscall=none
+ * will have the PROT bit. This doesn't leak any
+ * information and does not appear to cause any problems.
*/
if (address >= TASK_SIZE_MAX)
error_code |= X86_PF_PROT;
@@ -756,8 +760,7 @@ no_context(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code,
set_signal_archinfo(address, error_code);
/* XXX: hwpoison faults will set the wrong code. */
- force_sig_fault(signal, si_code, (void __user *)address,
- tsk);
+ force_sig_fault(signal, si_code, (void __user *)address);
}
/*
@@ -918,7 +921,7 @@ __bad_area_nosemaphore(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code,
if (si_code == SEGV_PKUERR)
force_sig_pkuerr((void __user *)address, pkey);
- force_sig_fault(SIGSEGV, si_code, (void __user *)address, tsk);
+ force_sig_fault(SIGSEGV, si_code, (void __user *)address);
return;
}
@@ -1015,8 +1018,6 @@ static void
do_sigbus(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code, unsigned long address,
vm_fault_t fault)
{
- struct task_struct *tsk = current;
-
/* Kernel mode? Handle exceptions or die: */
if (!(error_code & X86_PF_USER)) {
no_context(regs, error_code, address, SIGBUS, BUS_ADRERR);
@@ -1031,6 +1032,7 @@ do_sigbus(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code, unsigned long address,
#ifdef CONFIG_MEMORY_FAILURE
if (fault & (VM_FAULT_HWPOISON|VM_FAULT_HWPOISON_LARGE)) {
+ struct task_struct *tsk = current;
unsigned lsb = 0;
pr_err(
@@ -1040,11 +1042,11 @@ do_sigbus(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code, unsigned long address,
lsb = hstate_index_to_shift(VM_FAULT_GET_HINDEX(fault));
if (fault & VM_FAULT_HWPOISON)
lsb = PAGE_SHIFT;
- force_sig_mceerr(BUS_MCEERR_AR, (void __user *)address, lsb, tsk);
+ force_sig_mceerr(BUS_MCEERR_AR, (void __user *)address, lsb);
return;
}
#endif
- force_sig_fault(SIGBUS, BUS_ADRERR, (void __user *)address, tsk);
+ force_sig_fault(SIGBUS, BUS_ADRERR, (void __user *)address);
}
static noinline void
@@ -1369,16 +1371,18 @@ void do_user_addr_fault(struct pt_regs *regs,
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
/*
- * Instruction fetch faults in the vsyscall page might need
- * emulation. The vsyscall page is at a high address
- * (>PAGE_OFFSET), but is considered to be part of the user
- * address space.
+ * Faults in the vsyscall page might need emulation. The
+ * vsyscall page is at a high address (>PAGE_OFFSET), but is
+ * considered to be part of the user address space.
*
* The vsyscall page does not have a "real" VMA, so do this
* emulation before we go searching for VMAs.
+ *
+ * PKRU never rejects instruction fetches, so we don't need
+ * to consider the PF_PK bit.
*/
- if ((hw_error_code & X86_PF_INSTR) && is_vsyscall_vaddr(address)) {
- if (emulate_vsyscall(regs, address))
+ if (is_vsyscall_vaddr(address)) {
+ if (emulate_vsyscall(hw_error_code, regs, address))
return;
}
#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c b/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c
index 693aaf28d5fe..0f01c7b1d217 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c
@@ -671,23 +671,25 @@ static unsigned long __meminit
phys_p4d_init(p4d_t *p4d_page, unsigned long paddr, unsigned long paddr_end,
unsigned long page_size_mask, bool init)
{
- unsigned long paddr_next, paddr_last = paddr_end;
- unsigned long vaddr = (unsigned long)__va(paddr);
- int i = p4d_index(vaddr);
+ unsigned long vaddr, vaddr_end, vaddr_next, paddr_next, paddr_last;
+
+ paddr_last = paddr_end;
+ vaddr = (unsigned long)__va(paddr);
+ vaddr_end = (unsigned long)__va(paddr_end);
if (!pgtable_l5_enabled())
return phys_pud_init((pud_t *) p4d_page, paddr, paddr_end,
page_size_mask, init);
- for (; i < PTRS_PER_P4D; i++, paddr = paddr_next) {
- p4d_t *p4d;
+ for (; vaddr < vaddr_end; vaddr = vaddr_next) {
+ p4d_t *p4d = p4d_page + p4d_index(vaddr);
pud_t *pud;
- vaddr = (unsigned long)__va(paddr);
- p4d = p4d_page + p4d_index(vaddr);
- paddr_next = (paddr & P4D_MASK) + P4D_SIZE;
+ vaddr_next = (vaddr & P4D_MASK) + P4D_SIZE;
+ paddr = __pa(vaddr);
if (paddr >= paddr_end) {
+ paddr_next = __pa(vaddr_next);
if (!after_bootmem &&
!e820__mapped_any(paddr & P4D_MASK, paddr_next,
E820_TYPE_RAM) &&
@@ -699,13 +701,13 @@ phys_p4d_init(p4d_t *p4d_page, unsigned long paddr, unsigned long paddr_end,
if (!p4d_none(*p4d)) {
pud = pud_offset(p4d, 0);
- paddr_last = phys_pud_init(pud, paddr, paddr_end,
- page_size_mask, init);
+ paddr_last = phys_pud_init(pud, paddr, __pa(vaddr_end),
+ page_size_mask, init);
continue;
}
pud = alloc_low_page();
- paddr_last = phys_pud_init(pud, paddr, paddr_end,
+ paddr_last = phys_pud_init(pud, paddr, __pa(vaddr_end),
page_size_mask, init);
spin_lock(&init_mm.page_table_lock);
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
index 4b6423e7bd21..e500f1df1140 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
@@ -28,9 +28,11 @@
#include "physaddr.h"
-struct ioremap_mem_flags {
- bool system_ram;
- bool desc_other;
+/*
+ * Descriptor controlling ioremap() behavior.
+ */
+struct ioremap_desc {
+ unsigned int flags;
};
/*
@@ -62,13 +64,14 @@ int ioremap_change_attr(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long size,
return err;
}
-static bool __ioremap_check_ram(struct resource *res)
+/* Does the range (or a subset of) contain normal RAM? */
+static unsigned int __ioremap_check_ram(struct resource *res)
{
unsigned long start_pfn, stop_pfn;
unsigned long i;
if ((res->flags & IORESOURCE_SYSTEM_RAM) != IORESOURCE_SYSTEM_RAM)
- return false;
+ return 0;
start_pfn = (res->start + PAGE_SIZE - 1) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
stop_pfn = (res->end + 1) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
@@ -76,28 +79,44 @@ static bool __ioremap_check_ram(struct resource *res)
for (i = 0; i < (stop_pfn - start_pfn); ++i)
if (pfn_valid(start_pfn + i) &&
!PageReserved(pfn_to_page(start_pfn + i)))
- return true;
+ return IORES_MAP_SYSTEM_RAM;
}
- return false;
+ return 0;
}
-static int __ioremap_check_desc_other(struct resource *res)
+/*
+ * In a SEV guest, NONE and RESERVED should not be mapped encrypted because
+ * there the whole memory is already encrypted.
+ */
+static unsigned int __ioremap_check_encrypted(struct resource *res)
{
- return (res->desc != IORES_DESC_NONE);
+ if (!sev_active())
+ return 0;
+
+ switch (res->desc) {
+ case IORES_DESC_NONE:
+ case IORES_DESC_RESERVED:
+ break;
+ default:
+ return IORES_MAP_ENCRYPTED;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
}
-static int __ioremap_res_check(struct resource *res, void *arg)
+static int __ioremap_collect_map_flags(struct resource *res, void *arg)
{
- struct ioremap_mem_flags *flags = arg;
+ struct ioremap_desc *desc = arg;
- if (!flags->system_ram)
- flags->system_ram = __ioremap_check_ram(res);
+ if (!(desc->flags & IORES_MAP_SYSTEM_RAM))
+ desc->flags |= __ioremap_check_ram(res);
- if (!flags->desc_other)
- flags->desc_other = __ioremap_check_desc_other(res);
+ if (!(desc->flags & IORES_MAP_ENCRYPTED))
+ desc->flags |= __ioremap_check_encrypted(res);
- return flags->system_ram && flags->desc_other;
+ return ((desc->flags & (IORES_MAP_SYSTEM_RAM | IORES_MAP_ENCRYPTED)) ==
+ (IORES_MAP_SYSTEM_RAM | IORES_MAP_ENCRYPTED));
}
/*
@@ -106,15 +125,15 @@ static int __ioremap_res_check(struct resource *res, void *arg)
* resource described not as IORES_DESC_NONE (e.g. IORES_DESC_ACPI_TABLES).
*/
static void __ioremap_check_mem(resource_size_t addr, unsigned long size,
- struct ioremap_mem_flags *flags)
+ struct ioremap_desc *desc)
{
u64 start, end;
start = (u64)addr;
end = start + size - 1;
- memset(flags, 0, sizeof(*flags));
+ memset(desc, 0, sizeof(struct ioremap_desc));
- walk_mem_res(start, end, flags, __ioremap_res_check);
+ walk_mem_res(start, end, desc, __ioremap_collect_map_flags);
}
/*
@@ -131,15 +150,15 @@ static void __ioremap_check_mem(resource_size_t addr, unsigned long size,
* have to convert them into an offset in a page-aligned mapping, but the
* caller shouldn't need to know that small detail.
*/
-static void __iomem *__ioremap_caller(resource_size_t phys_addr,
- unsigned long size, enum page_cache_mode pcm,
- void *caller, bool encrypted)
+static void __iomem *
+__ioremap_caller(resource_size_t phys_addr, unsigned long size,
+ enum page_cache_mode pcm, void *caller, bool encrypted)
{
unsigned long offset, vaddr;
resource_size_t last_addr;
const resource_size_t unaligned_phys_addr = phys_addr;
const unsigned long unaligned_size = size;
- struct ioremap_mem_flags mem_flags;
+ struct ioremap_desc io_desc;
struct vm_struct *area;
enum page_cache_mode new_pcm;
pgprot_t prot;
@@ -158,12 +177,12 @@ static void __iomem *__ioremap_caller(resource_size_t phys_addr,
return NULL;
}
- __ioremap_check_mem(phys_addr, size, &mem_flags);
+ __ioremap_check_mem(phys_addr, size, &io_desc);
/*
* Don't allow anybody to remap normal RAM that we're using..
*/
- if (mem_flags.system_ram) {
+ if (io_desc.flags & IORES_MAP_SYSTEM_RAM) {
WARN_ONCE(1, "ioremap on RAM at %pa - %pa\n",
&phys_addr, &last_addr);
return NULL;
@@ -201,7 +220,7 @@ static void __iomem *__ioremap_caller(resource_size_t phys_addr,
* resulting mapping.
*/
prot = PAGE_KERNEL_IO;
- if ((sev_active() && mem_flags.desc_other) || encrypted)
+ if ((io_desc.flags & IORES_MAP_ENCRYPTED) || encrypted)
prot = pgprot_encrypted(prot);
switch (pcm) {
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c b/arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c
index 8dc0fc0b1382..296da58f3013 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c
@@ -199,7 +199,7 @@ static inline p4d_t *early_p4d_offset(pgd_t *pgd, unsigned long addr)
if (!pgtable_l5_enabled())
return (p4d_t *)pgd;
- p4d = __pa_nodebug(pgd_val(*pgd)) & PTE_PFN_MASK;
+ p4d = pgd_val(*pgd) & PTE_PFN_MASK;
p4d += __START_KERNEL_map - phys_base;
return (p4d_t *)p4d + p4d_index(addr);
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/kaslr.c b/arch/x86/mm/kaslr.c
index dc3f058bdf9b..dc6182eecefa 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/kaslr.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/kaslr.c
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ static __initdata struct kaslr_memory_region {
} kaslr_regions[] = {
{ &page_offset_base, 0 },
{ &vmalloc_base, 0 },
- { &vmemmap_base, 1 },
+ { &vmemmap_base, 0 },
};
/* Get size in bytes used by the memory region */
@@ -78,6 +78,7 @@ void __init kernel_randomize_memory(void)
unsigned long rand, memory_tb;
struct rnd_state rand_state;
unsigned long remain_entropy;
+ unsigned long vmemmap_size;
vaddr_start = pgtable_l5_enabled() ? __PAGE_OFFSET_BASE_L5 : __PAGE_OFFSET_BASE_L4;
vaddr = vaddr_start;
@@ -109,6 +110,14 @@ void __init kernel_randomize_memory(void)
if (memory_tb < kaslr_regions[0].size_tb)
kaslr_regions[0].size_tb = memory_tb;
+ /*
+ * Calculate the vmemmap region size in TBs, aligned to a TB
+ * boundary.
+ */
+ vmemmap_size = (kaslr_regions[0].size_tb << (TB_SHIFT - PAGE_SHIFT)) *
+ sizeof(struct page);
+ kaslr_regions[2].size_tb = DIV_ROUND_UP(vmemmap_size, 1UL << TB_SHIFT);
+
/* Calculate entropy available between regions */
remain_entropy = vaddr_end - vaddr_start;
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(kaslr_regions); i++)
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
index 51f50a7a07ef..e0df96fdfe46 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
@@ -1,13 +1,10 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
/*
* AMD Memory Encryption Support
*
* Copyright (C) 2016 Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.
*
* Author: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
- *
- * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
- * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
- * published by the Free Software Foundation.
*/
#define DISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_boot.S b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_boot.S
index 40a6085063d6..6d71481a1e70 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_boot.S
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_boot.S
@@ -1,13 +1,10 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
/*
* AMD Memory Encryption Support
*
* Copyright (C) 2016 Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.
*
* Author: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
- *
- * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
- * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
- * published by the Free Software Foundation.
*/
#include <linux/linkage.h>
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c
index 4aa9b1480866..e2b0e2ac07bb 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c
@@ -1,13 +1,10 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
/*
* AMD Memory Encryption Support
*
* Copyright (C) 2016 Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.
*
* Author: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
- *
- * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
- * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
- * published by the Free Software Foundation.
*/
#define DISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING
@@ -73,6 +70,19 @@ struct sme_populate_pgd_data {
unsigned long vaddr_end;
};
+/*
+ * This work area lives in the .init.scratch section, which lives outside of
+ * the kernel proper. It is sized to hold the intermediate copy buffer and
+ * more than enough pagetable pages.
+ *
+ * By using this section, the kernel can be encrypted in place and it
+ * avoids any possibility of boot parameters or initramfs images being
+ * placed such that the in-place encryption logic overwrites them. This
+ * section is 2MB aligned to allow for simple pagetable setup using only
+ * PMD entries (see vmlinux.lds.S).
+ */
+static char sme_workarea[2 * PMD_PAGE_SIZE] __section(.init.scratch);
+
static char sme_cmdline_arg[] __initdata = "mem_encrypt";
static char sme_cmdline_on[] __initdata = "on";
static char sme_cmdline_off[] __initdata = "off";
@@ -314,8 +324,13 @@ void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(struct boot_params *bp)
}
#endif
- /* Set the encryption workarea to be immediately after the kernel */
- workarea_start = kernel_end;
+ /*
+ * We're running identity mapped, so we must obtain the address to the
+ * SME encryption workarea using rip-relative addressing.
+ */
+ asm ("lea sme_workarea(%%rip), %0"
+ : "=r" (workarea_start)
+ : "p" (sme_workarea));
/*
* Calculate required number of workarea bytes needed:
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mpx.c b/arch/x86/mm/mpx.c
index 0d1c47cbbdd6..895fb7a9294d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mpx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mpx.c
@@ -912,7 +912,7 @@ void mpx_notify_unmap(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long start,
ret = mpx_unmap_tables(mm, start, end);
if (ret)
- force_sig(SIGSEGV, current);
+ force_sig(SIGSEGV);
}
/* MPX cannot handle addresses above 47 bits yet. */
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c b/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c
index 1f67b1e15bf6..44816ff6411f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c
@@ -13,33 +13,17 @@ phys_addr_t physical_mask __ro_after_init = (1ULL << __PHYSICAL_MASK_SHIFT) - 1;
EXPORT_SYMBOL(physical_mask);
#endif
-#define PGALLOC_GFP (GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | __GFP_ZERO)
-
#ifdef CONFIG_HIGHPTE
-#define PGALLOC_USER_GFP __GFP_HIGHMEM
+#define PGTABLE_HIGHMEM __GFP_HIGHMEM
#else
-#define PGALLOC_USER_GFP 0
+#define PGTABLE_HIGHMEM 0
#endif
-gfp_t __userpte_alloc_gfp = PGALLOC_GFP | PGALLOC_USER_GFP;
-
-pte_t *pte_alloc_one_kernel(struct mm_struct *mm)
-{
- return (pte_t *)__get_free_page(PGALLOC_GFP & ~__GFP_ACCOUNT);
-}
+gfp_t __userpte_alloc_gfp = GFP_PGTABLE_USER | PGTABLE_HIGHMEM;
pgtable_t pte_alloc_one(struct mm_struct *mm)
{
- struct page *pte;
-
- pte = alloc_pages(__userpte_alloc_gfp, 0);
- if (!pte)
- return NULL;
- if (!pgtable_page_ctor(pte)) {
- __free_page(pte);
- return NULL;
- }
- return pte;
+ return __pte_alloc_one(mm, __userpte_alloc_gfp);
}
static int __init setup_userpte(char *arg)
@@ -235,7 +219,7 @@ static int preallocate_pmds(struct mm_struct *mm, pmd_t *pmds[], int count)
{
int i;
bool failed = false;
- gfp_t gfp = PGALLOC_GFP;
+ gfp_t gfp = GFP_PGTABLE_USER;
if (mm == &init_mm)
gfp &= ~__GFP_ACCOUNT;
@@ -399,14 +383,14 @@ static inline pgd_t *_pgd_alloc(void)
* We allocate one page for pgd.
*/
if (!SHARED_KERNEL_PMD)
- return (pgd_t *)__get_free_pages(PGALLOC_GFP,
+ return (pgd_t *)__get_free_pages(GFP_PGTABLE_USER,
PGD_ALLOCATION_ORDER);
/*
* Now PAE kernel is not running as a Xen domain. We can allocate
* a 32-byte slab for pgd to save memory space.
*/
- return kmem_cache_alloc(pgd_cache, PGALLOC_GFP);
+ return kmem_cache_alloc(pgd_cache, GFP_PGTABLE_USER);
}
static inline void _pgd_free(pgd_t *pgd)
@@ -424,7 +408,8 @@ void __init pgd_cache_init(void)
static inline pgd_t *_pgd_alloc(void)
{
- return (pgd_t *)__get_free_pages(PGALLOC_GFP, PGD_ALLOCATION_ORDER);
+ return (pgd_t *)__get_free_pages(GFP_PGTABLE_USER,
+ PGD_ALLOCATION_ORDER);
}
static inline void _pgd_free(pgd_t *pgd)
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pkeys.c b/arch/x86/mm/pkeys.c
index 1dcfc91c8f0c..c6f84c0b5d7a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/pkeys.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/pkeys.c
@@ -1,15 +1,7 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
/*
* Intel Memory Protection Keys management
* Copyright (c) 2015, Intel Corporation.
- *
- * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
- * under the terms and conditions of the GNU General Public License,
- * version 2, as published by the Free Software Foundation.
- *
- * This program is distributed in the hope it will be useful, but WITHOUT
- * ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or
- * FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public License for
- * more details.
*/
#include <linux/debugfs.h> /* debugfs_create_u32() */
#include <linux/mm_types.h> /* mm_struct, vma, etc... */
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pti.c b/arch/x86/mm/pti.c
index 9c2463bc158f..b196524759ec 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/pti.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/pti.c
@@ -1,15 +1,7 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
/*
* Copyright(c) 2017 Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.
*
- * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
- * it under the terms of version 2 of the GNU General Public License as
- * published by the Free Software Foundation.
- *
- * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
- * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
- * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
- * General Public License for more details.
- *
* This code is based in part on work published here:
*
* https://github.com/IAIK/KAISER
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c b/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c
index 91f6db92554c..4de9704c4aaf 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c
@@ -712,7 +712,7 @@ void native_flush_tlb_others(const struct cpumask *cpumask,
}
/*
- * See Documentation/x86/tlb.txt for details. We choose 33
+ * See Documentation/x86/tlb.rst for details. We choose 33
* because it is large enough to cover the vast majority (at
* least 95%) of allocations, and is small enough that we are
* confident it will not cause too much overhead. Each single
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.39.0) at 2025-02-18 17:50:09 +0300