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-rw-r--r--fs/btrfs/ioctl.c5
-rw-r--r--fs/init.c2
-rw-r--r--fs/inode.c2
-rw-r--r--fs/internal.h2
-rw-r--r--fs/namei.c148
-rw-r--r--fs/xattr.c2
-rw-r--r--include/linux/fs.h14
7 files changed, 108 insertions, 67 deletions
diff --git a/fs/btrfs/ioctl.c b/fs/btrfs/ioctl.c
index 1f763c60415b..56f53d692fa2 100644
--- a/fs/btrfs/ioctl.c
+++ b/fs/btrfs/ioctl.c
@@ -927,8 +927,9 @@ static int btrfs_may_delete(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *victim, int isdir)
return error;
if (IS_APPEND(dir))
return -EPERM;
- if (check_sticky(dir, d_inode(victim)) || IS_APPEND(d_inode(victim)) ||
- IS_IMMUTABLE(d_inode(victim)) || IS_SWAPFILE(d_inode(victim)))
+ if (check_sticky(&init_user_ns, dir, d_inode(victim)) ||
+ IS_APPEND(d_inode(victim)) || IS_IMMUTABLE(d_inode(victim)) ||
+ IS_SWAPFILE(d_inode(victim)))
return -EPERM;
if (isdir) {
if (!d_is_dir(victim))
diff --git a/fs/init.c b/fs/init.c
index 02723bea8499..891284f8a443 100644
--- a/fs/init.c
+++ b/fs/init.c
@@ -181,7 +181,7 @@ int __init init_link(const char *oldname, const char *newname)
error = -EXDEV;
if (old_path.mnt != new_path.mnt)
goto out_dput;
- error = may_linkat(&old_path);
+ error = may_linkat(&init_user_ns, &old_path);
if (unlikely(error))
goto out_dput;
error = security_path_link(old_path.dentry, &new_path, new_dentry);
diff --git a/fs/inode.c b/fs/inode.c
index 49b512592dcd..46116ef44c9f 100644
--- a/fs/inode.c
+++ b/fs/inode.c
@@ -1796,7 +1796,7 @@ bool atime_needs_update(const struct path *path, struct inode *inode)
/* Atime updates will likely cause i_uid and i_gid to be written
* back improprely if their true value is unknown to the vfs.
*/
- if (HAS_UNMAPPED_ID(inode))
+ if (HAS_UNMAPPED_ID(mnt_user_ns(mnt), inode))
return false;
if (IS_NOATIME(inode))
diff --git a/fs/internal.h b/fs/internal.h
index 77c50befbfbe..6c8a4eddc7e6 100644
--- a/fs/internal.h
+++ b/fs/internal.h
@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ extern int vfs_path_lookup(struct dentry *, struct vfsmount *,
const char *, unsigned int, struct path *);
long do_rmdir(int dfd, struct filename *name);
long do_unlinkat(int dfd, struct filename *name);
-int may_linkat(struct path *link);
+int may_linkat(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct path *link);
int do_renameat2(int olddfd, struct filename *oldname, int newdfd,
struct filename *newname, unsigned int flags);
diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
index 04b001ddade3..93fa7d803fb2 100644
--- a/fs/namei.c
+++ b/fs/namei.c
@@ -506,7 +506,7 @@ int inode_permission(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
* written back improperly if their true value is unknown
* to the vfs.
*/
- if (HAS_UNMAPPED_ID(inode))
+ if (HAS_UNMAPPED_ID(mnt_userns, inode))
return -EACCES;
}
@@ -1004,11 +1004,16 @@ int sysctl_protected_regular __read_mostly;
*/
static inline int may_follow_link(struct nameidata *nd, const struct inode *inode)
{
+ struct user_namespace *mnt_userns;
+ kuid_t i_uid;
+
if (!sysctl_protected_symlinks)
return 0;
+ mnt_userns = mnt_user_ns(nd->path.mnt);
+ i_uid = i_uid_into_mnt(mnt_userns, inode);
/* Allowed if owner and follower match. */
- if (uid_eq(current_cred()->fsuid, inode->i_uid))
+ if (uid_eq(current_cred()->fsuid, i_uid))
return 0;
/* Allowed if parent directory not sticky and world-writable. */
@@ -1016,7 +1021,7 @@ static inline int may_follow_link(struct nameidata *nd, const struct inode *inod
return 0;
/* Allowed if parent directory and link owner match. */
- if (uid_valid(nd->dir_uid) && uid_eq(nd->dir_uid, inode->i_uid))
+ if (uid_valid(nd->dir_uid) && uid_eq(nd->dir_uid, i_uid))
return 0;
if (nd->flags & LOOKUP_RCU)
@@ -1029,6 +1034,7 @@ static inline int may_follow_link(struct nameidata *nd, const struct inode *inod
/**
* safe_hardlink_source - Check for safe hardlink conditions
+ * @mnt_userns: user namespace of the mount the inode was found from
* @inode: the source inode to hardlink from
*
* Return false if at least one of the following conditions:
@@ -1039,7 +1045,8 @@ static inline int may_follow_link(struct nameidata *nd, const struct inode *inod
*
* Otherwise returns true.
*/
-static bool safe_hardlink_source(struct inode *inode)
+static bool safe_hardlink_source(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+ struct inode *inode)
{
umode_t mode = inode->i_mode;
@@ -1056,7 +1063,7 @@ static bool safe_hardlink_source(struct inode *inode)
return false;
/* Hardlinking to unreadable or unwritable sources is dangerous. */
- if (inode_permission(&init_user_ns, inode, MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE))
+ if (inode_permission(mnt_userns, inode, MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE))
return false;
return true;
@@ -1064,6 +1071,7 @@ static bool safe_hardlink_source(struct inode *inode)
/**
* may_linkat - Check permissions for creating a hardlink
+ * @mnt_userns: user namespace of the mount the inode was found from
* @link: the source to hardlink from
*
* Block hardlink when all of:
@@ -1072,14 +1080,21 @@ static bool safe_hardlink_source(struct inode *inode)
* - hardlink source is unsafe (see safe_hardlink_source() above)
* - not CAP_FOWNER in a namespace with the inode owner uid mapped
*
+ * If the inode has been found through an idmapped mount the user namespace of
+ * the vfsmount must be passed through @mnt_userns. This function will then take
+ * care to map the inode according to @mnt_userns before checking permissions.
+ * On non-idmapped mounts or if permission checking is to be performed on the
+ * raw inode simply passs init_user_ns.
+ *
* Returns 0 if successful, -ve on error.
*/
-int may_linkat(struct path *link)
+int may_linkat(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct path *link)
{
struct inode *inode = link->dentry->d_inode;
/* Inode writeback is not safe when the uid or gid are invalid. */
- if (!uid_valid(inode->i_uid) || !gid_valid(inode->i_gid))
+ if (!uid_valid(i_uid_into_mnt(mnt_userns, inode)) ||
+ !gid_valid(i_gid_into_mnt(mnt_userns, inode)))
return -EOVERFLOW;
if (!sysctl_protected_hardlinks)
@@ -1088,8 +1103,8 @@ int may_linkat(struct path *link)
/* Source inode owner (or CAP_FOWNER) can hardlink all they like,
* otherwise, it must be a safe source.
*/
- if (safe_hardlink_source(inode) ||
- inode_owner_or_capable(&init_user_ns, inode))
+ if (safe_hardlink_source(mnt_userns, inode) ||
+ inode_owner_or_capable(mnt_userns, inode))
return 0;
audit_log_path_denied(AUDIT_ANOM_LINK, "linkat");
@@ -1100,6 +1115,7 @@ int may_linkat(struct path *link)
* may_create_in_sticky - Check whether an O_CREAT open in a sticky directory
* should be allowed, or not, on files that already
* exist.
+ * @mnt_userns: user namespace of the mount the inode was found from
* @dir_mode: mode bits of directory
* @dir_uid: owner of directory
* @inode: the inode of the file to open
@@ -1115,16 +1131,25 @@ int may_linkat(struct path *link)
* the directory doesn't have to be world writable: being group writable will
* be enough.
*
+ * If the inode has been found through an idmapped mount the user namespace of
+ * the vfsmount must be passed through @mnt_userns. This function will then take
+ * care to map the inode according to @mnt_userns before checking permissions.
+ * On non-idmapped mounts or if permission checking is to be performed on the
+ * raw inode simply passs init_user_ns.
+ *
* Returns 0 if the open is allowed, -ve on error.
*/
-static int may_create_in_sticky(umode_t dir_mode, kuid_t dir_uid,
- struct inode * const inode)
+static int may_create_in_sticky(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+ struct nameidata *nd, struct inode *const inode)
{
+ umode_t dir_mode = nd->dir_mode;
+ kuid_t dir_uid = nd->dir_uid;
+
if ((!sysctl_protected_fifos && S_ISFIFO(inode->i_mode)) ||
(!sysctl_protected_regular && S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) ||
likely(!(dir_mode & S_ISVTX)) ||
- uid_eq(inode->i_uid, dir_uid) ||
- uid_eq(current_fsuid(), inode->i_uid))
+ uid_eq(i_uid_into_mnt(mnt_userns, inode), dir_uid) ||
+ uid_eq(current_fsuid(), i_uid_into_mnt(mnt_userns, inode)))
return 0;
if (likely(dir_mode & 0002) ||
@@ -1614,17 +1639,18 @@ static struct dentry *lookup_slow(const struct qstr *name,
return res;
}
-static inline int may_lookup(struct nameidata *nd)
+static inline int may_lookup(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+ struct nameidata *nd)
{
if (nd->flags & LOOKUP_RCU) {
- int err = inode_permission(&init_user_ns, nd->inode,
+ int err = inode_permission(mnt_userns, nd->inode,
MAY_EXEC | MAY_NOT_BLOCK);
if (err != -ECHILD)
return err;
if (unlazy_walk(nd))
return -ECHILD;
}
- return inode_permission(&init_user_ns, nd->inode, MAY_EXEC);
+ return inode_permission(mnt_userns, nd->inode, MAY_EXEC);
}
static int reserve_stack(struct nameidata *nd, struct path *link, unsigned seq)
@@ -2177,7 +2203,7 @@ static int link_path_walk(const char *name, struct nameidata *nd)
u64 hash_len;
int type;
- err = may_lookup(nd);
+ err = may_lookup(&init_user_ns, nd);
if (err)
return err;
@@ -2225,7 +2251,7 @@ static int link_path_walk(const char *name, struct nameidata *nd)
OK:
/* pathname or trailing symlink, done */
if (!depth) {
- nd->dir_uid = nd->inode->i_uid;
+ nd->dir_uid = i_uid_into_mnt(&init_user_ns, nd->inode);
nd->dir_mode = nd->inode->i_mode;
nd->flags &= ~LOOKUP_PARENT;
return 0;
@@ -2703,15 +2729,16 @@ int user_path_at_empty(int dfd, const char __user *name, unsigned flags,
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(user_path_at_empty);
-int __check_sticky(struct inode *dir, struct inode *inode)
+int __check_sticky(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *dir,
+ struct inode *inode)
{
kuid_t fsuid = current_fsuid();
- if (uid_eq(inode->i_uid, fsuid))
+ if (uid_eq(i_uid_into_mnt(mnt_userns, inode), fsuid))
return 0;
- if (uid_eq(dir->i_uid, fsuid))
+ if (uid_eq(i_uid_into_mnt(mnt_userns, dir), fsuid))
return 0;
- return !capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(&init_user_ns, inode, CAP_FOWNER);
+ return !capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(mnt_userns, inode, CAP_FOWNER);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__check_sticky);
@@ -2735,7 +2762,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(__check_sticky);
* 11. We don't allow removal of NFS sillyrenamed files; it's handled by
* nfs_async_unlink().
*/
-static int may_delete(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *victim, bool isdir)
+static int may_delete(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *dir,
+ struct dentry *victim, bool isdir)
{
struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(victim);
int error;
@@ -2747,19 +2775,21 @@ static int may_delete(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *victim, bool isdir)
BUG_ON(victim->d_parent->d_inode != dir);
/* Inode writeback is not safe when the uid or gid are invalid. */
- if (!uid_valid(inode->i_uid) || !gid_valid(inode->i_gid))
+ if (!uid_valid(i_uid_into_mnt(mnt_userns, inode)) ||
+ !gid_valid(i_gid_into_mnt(mnt_userns, inode)))
return -EOVERFLOW;
audit_inode_child(dir, victim, AUDIT_TYPE_CHILD_DELETE);
- error = inode_permission(&init_user_ns, dir, MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC);
+ error = inode_permission(mnt_userns, dir, MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC);
if (error)
return error;
if (IS_APPEND(dir))
return -EPERM;
- if (check_sticky(dir, inode) || IS_APPEND(inode) ||
- IS_IMMUTABLE(inode) || IS_SWAPFILE(inode) || HAS_UNMAPPED_ID(inode))
+ if (check_sticky(mnt_userns, dir, inode) || IS_APPEND(inode) ||
+ IS_IMMUTABLE(inode) || IS_SWAPFILE(inode) ||
+ HAS_UNMAPPED_ID(mnt_userns, inode))
return -EPERM;
if (isdir) {
if (!d_is_dir(victim))
@@ -2784,7 +2814,8 @@ static int may_delete(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *victim, bool isdir)
* 4. We should have write and exec permissions on dir
* 5. We can't do it if dir is immutable (done in permission())
*/
-static inline int may_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *child)
+static inline int may_create(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+ struct inode *dir, struct dentry *child)
{
struct user_namespace *s_user_ns;
audit_inode_child(dir, child, AUDIT_TYPE_CHILD_CREATE);
@@ -2793,10 +2824,10 @@ static inline int may_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *child)
if (IS_DEADDIR(dir))
return -ENOENT;
s_user_ns = dir->i_sb->s_user_ns;
- if (!kuid_has_mapping(s_user_ns, current_fsuid()) ||
- !kgid_has_mapping(s_user_ns, current_fsgid()))
+ if (!kuid_has_mapping(s_user_ns, fsuid_into_mnt(mnt_userns)) ||
+ !kgid_has_mapping(s_user_ns, fsgid_into_mnt(mnt_userns)))
return -EOVERFLOW;
- return inode_permission(&init_user_ns, dir, MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC);
+ return inode_permission(mnt_userns, dir, MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC);
}
/*
@@ -2846,7 +2877,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(unlock_rename);
int vfs_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode,
bool want_excl)
{
- int error = may_create(dir, dentry);
+ int error = may_create(&init_user_ns, dir, dentry);
if (error)
return error;
@@ -2869,7 +2900,7 @@ int vfs_mkobj(struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode,
void *arg)
{
struct inode *dir = dentry->d_parent->d_inode;
- int error = may_create(dir, dentry);
+ int error = may_create(&init_user_ns, dir, dentry);
if (error)
return error;
@@ -2891,7 +2922,8 @@ bool may_open_dev(const struct path *path)
!(path->mnt->mnt_sb->s_iflags & SB_I_NODEV);
}
-static int may_open(const struct path *path, int acc_mode, int flag)
+static int may_open(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, const struct path *path,
+ int acc_mode, int flag)
{
struct dentry *dentry = path->dentry;
struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
@@ -2926,7 +2958,7 @@ static int may_open(const struct path *path, int acc_mode, int flag)
break;
}
- error = inode_permission(&init_user_ns, inode, MAY_OPEN | acc_mode);
+ error = inode_permission(mnt_userns, inode, MAY_OPEN | acc_mode);
if (error)
return error;
@@ -2941,7 +2973,7 @@ static int may_open(const struct path *path, int acc_mode, int flag)
}
/* O_NOATIME can only be set by the owner or superuser */
- if (flag & O_NOATIME && !inode_owner_or_capable(&init_user_ns, inode))
+ if (flag & O_NOATIME && !inode_owner_or_capable(mnt_userns, inode))
return -EPERM;
return 0;
@@ -2976,7 +3008,9 @@ static inline int open_to_namei_flags(int flag)
return flag;
}
-static int may_o_create(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode)
+static int may_o_create(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+ const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
+ umode_t mode)
{
struct user_namespace *s_user_ns;
int error = security_path_mknod(dir, dentry, mode, 0);
@@ -2984,11 +3018,11 @@ static int may_o_create(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t m
return error;
s_user_ns = dir->dentry->d_sb->s_user_ns;
- if (!kuid_has_mapping(s_user_ns, current_fsuid()) ||
- !kgid_has_mapping(s_user_ns, current_fsgid()))
+ if (!kuid_has_mapping(s_user_ns, fsuid_into_mnt(mnt_userns)) ||
+ !kgid_has_mapping(s_user_ns, fsgid_into_mnt(mnt_userns)))
return -EOVERFLOW;
- error = inode_permission(&init_user_ns, dir->dentry->d_inode,
+ error = inode_permission(mnt_userns, dir->dentry->d_inode,
MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC);
if (error)
return error;
@@ -3121,7 +3155,8 @@ static struct dentry *lookup_open(struct nameidata *nd, struct file *file,
if (!IS_POSIXACL(dir->d_inode))
mode &= ~current_umask();
if (likely(got_write))
- create_error = may_o_create(&nd->path, dentry, mode);
+ create_error = may_o_create(&init_user_ns, &nd->path,
+ dentry, mode);
else
create_error = -EROFS;
}
@@ -3282,7 +3317,7 @@ static int do_open(struct nameidata *nd,
return -EEXIST;
if (d_is_dir(nd->path.dentry))
return -EISDIR;
- error = may_create_in_sticky(nd->dir_mode, nd->dir_uid,
+ error = may_create_in_sticky(&init_user_ns, nd,
d_backing_inode(nd->path.dentry));
if (unlikely(error))
return error;
@@ -3302,7 +3337,7 @@ static int do_open(struct nameidata *nd,
return error;
do_truncate = true;
}
- error = may_open(&nd->path, acc_mode, open_flag);
+ error = may_open(&init_user_ns, &nd->path, acc_mode, open_flag);
if (!error && !(file->f_mode & FMODE_OPENED))
error = vfs_open(&nd->path, file);
if (!error)
@@ -3377,7 +3412,7 @@ static int do_tmpfile(struct nameidata *nd, unsigned flags,
path.dentry = child;
audit_inode(nd->name, child, 0);
/* Don't check for other permissions, the inode was just created */
- error = may_open(&path, 0, op->open_flag);
+ error = may_open(&init_user_ns, &path, 0, op->open_flag);
if (error)
goto out2;
file->f_path.mnt = path.mnt;
@@ -3584,7 +3619,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(user_path_create);
int vfs_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, dev_t dev)
{
bool is_whiteout = S_ISCHR(mode) && dev == WHITEOUT_DEV;
- int error = may_create(dir, dentry);
+ int error = may_create(&init_user_ns, dir, dentry);
if (error)
return error;
@@ -3685,7 +3720,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(mknod, const char __user *, filename, umode_t, mode, unsigned, d
int vfs_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode)
{
- int error = may_create(dir, dentry);
+ int error = may_create(&init_user_ns, dir, dentry);
unsigned max_links = dir->i_sb->s_max_links;
if (error)
@@ -3746,7 +3781,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(mkdir, const char __user *, pathname, umode_t, mode)
int vfs_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
{
- int error = may_delete(dir, dentry, 1);
+ int error = may_delete(&init_user_ns, dir, dentry, 1);
if (error)
return error;
@@ -3868,7 +3903,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(rmdir, const char __user *, pathname)
int vfs_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, struct inode **delegated_inode)
{
struct inode *target = dentry->d_inode;
- int error = may_delete(dir, dentry, 0);
+ int error = may_delete(&init_user_ns, dir, dentry, 0);
if (error)
return error;
@@ -4000,7 +4035,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(unlink, const char __user *, pathname)
int vfs_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *oldname)
{
- int error = may_create(dir, dentry);
+ int error = may_create(&init_user_ns, dir, dentry);
if (error)
return error;
@@ -4089,7 +4124,7 @@ int vfs_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_de
if (!inode)
return -ENOENT;
- error = may_create(dir, new_dentry);
+ error = may_create(&init_user_ns, dir, new_dentry);
if (error)
return error;
@@ -4106,7 +4141,7 @@ int vfs_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_de
* be writen back improperly if their true value is unknown to
* the vfs.
*/
- if (HAS_UNMAPPED_ID(inode))
+ if (HAS_UNMAPPED_ID(&init_user_ns, inode))
return -EPERM;
if (!dir->i_op->link)
return -EPERM;
@@ -4188,7 +4223,7 @@ retry:
error = -EXDEV;
if (old_path.mnt != new_path.mnt)
goto out_dput;
- error = may_linkat(&old_path);
+ error = may_linkat(&init_user_ns, &old_path);
if (unlikely(error))
goto out_dput;
error = security_path_link(old_path.dentry, &new_path, new_dentry);
@@ -4281,6 +4316,7 @@ int vfs_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
struct inode **delegated_inode, unsigned int flags)
{
int error;
+ struct user_namespace *mnt_userns = &init_user_ns;
bool is_dir = d_is_dir(old_dentry);
struct inode *source = old_dentry->d_inode;
struct inode *target = new_dentry->d_inode;
@@ -4291,19 +4327,19 @@ int vfs_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
if (source == target)
return 0;
- error = may_delete(old_dir, old_dentry, is_dir);
+ error = may_delete(mnt_userns, old_dir, old_dentry, is_dir);
if (error)
return error;
if (!target) {
- error = may_create(new_dir, new_dentry);
+ error = may_create(mnt_userns, new_dir, new_dentry);
} else {
new_is_dir = d_is_dir(new_dentry);
if (!(flags & RENAME_EXCHANGE))
- error = may_delete(new_dir, new_dentry, is_dir);
+ error = may_delete(mnt_userns, new_dir, new_dentry, is_dir);
else
- error = may_delete(new_dir, new_dentry, new_is_dir);
+ error = may_delete(mnt_userns, new_dir, new_dentry, new_is_dir);
}
if (error)
return error;
diff --git a/fs/xattr.c b/fs/xattr.c
index 79c439d31eaa..b3444e06cded 100644
--- a/fs/xattr.c
+++ b/fs/xattr.c
@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ xattr_permission(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode,
* to be writen back improperly if their true value is
* unknown to the vfs.
*/
- if (HAS_UNMAPPED_ID(inode))
+ if (HAS_UNMAPPED_ID(mnt_userns, inode))
return -EPERM;
}
diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h
index 182641d8322f..a27884af7222 100644
--- a/include/linux/fs.h
+++ b/include/linux/fs.h
@@ -2083,9 +2083,11 @@ static inline bool sb_rdonly(const struct super_block *sb) { return sb->s_flags
#define IS_WHITEOUT(inode) (S_ISCHR(inode->i_mode) && \
(inode)->i_rdev == WHITEOUT_DEV)
-static inline bool HAS_UNMAPPED_ID(struct inode *inode)
+static inline bool HAS_UNMAPPED_ID(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+ struct inode *inode)
{
- return !uid_valid(inode->i_uid) || !gid_valid(inode->i_gid);
+ return !uid_valid(i_uid_into_mnt(mnt_userns, inode)) ||
+ !gid_valid(i_gid_into_mnt(mnt_userns, inode));
}
static inline enum rw_hint file_write_hint(struct file *file)
@@ -2823,7 +2825,8 @@ static inline int path_permission(const struct path *path, int mask)
return inode_permission(mnt_user_ns(path->mnt),
d_inode(path->dentry), mask);
}
-extern int __check_sticky(struct inode *dir, struct inode *inode);
+int __check_sticky(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *dir,
+ struct inode *inode);
static inline bool execute_ok(struct inode *inode)
{
@@ -3442,12 +3445,13 @@ static inline bool is_sxid(umode_t mode)
return (mode & S_ISUID) || ((mode & S_ISGID) && (mode & S_IXGRP));
}
-static inline int check_sticky(struct inode *dir, struct inode *inode)
+static inline int check_sticky(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+ struct inode *dir, struct inode *inode)
{
if (!(dir->i_mode & S_ISVTX))
return 0;
- return __check_sticky(dir, inode);
+ return __check_sticky(mnt_userns, dir, inode);
}
static inline void inode_has_no_xattr(struct inode *inode)
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.39.0) at 2024-11-28 17:52:40 +0300