diff options
| -rw-r--r-- | include/uapi/linux/bpf.h | 4 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | net/core/filter.c | 8 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h | 4 |
3 files changed, 8 insertions, 8 deletions
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h b/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h index 0ec6dbeb17a5..69b9e30375bc 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h @@ -2692,7 +2692,7 @@ union bpf_attr { * result is from *reuse*\ **->socks**\ [] using the hash of the * tuple. * - * long bpf_tcp_check_syncookie(struct bpf_sock *sk, void *iph, u32 iph_len, struct tcphdr *th, u32 th_len) + * long bpf_tcp_check_syncookie(void *sk, void *iph, u32 iph_len, struct tcphdr *th, u32 th_len) * Description * Check whether *iph* and *th* contain a valid SYN cookie ACK for * the listening socket in *sk*. @@ -2878,7 +2878,7 @@ union bpf_attr { * * **-EAGAIN** if bpf program can try again. * - * s64 bpf_tcp_gen_syncookie(struct bpf_sock *sk, void *iph, u32 iph_len, struct tcphdr *th, u32 th_len) + * s64 bpf_tcp_gen_syncookie(void *sk, void *iph, u32 iph_len, struct tcphdr *th, u32 th_len) * Description * Try to issue a SYN cookie for the packet with corresponding * IP/TCP headers, *iph* and *th*, on the listening socket in *sk*. diff --git a/net/core/filter.c b/net/core/filter.c index 06d397eeef2a..1d88e9b498eb 100644 --- a/net/core/filter.c +++ b/net/core/filter.c @@ -6086,7 +6086,7 @@ BPF_CALL_5(bpf_tcp_check_syncookie, struct sock *, sk, void *, iph, u32, iph_len u32 cookie; int ret; - if (unlikely(th_len < sizeof(*th))) + if (unlikely(!sk || th_len < sizeof(*th))) return -EINVAL; /* sk_listener() allows TCP_NEW_SYN_RECV, which makes no sense here. */ @@ -6139,7 +6139,7 @@ static const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_tcp_check_syncookie_proto = { .gpl_only = true, .pkt_access = true, .ret_type = RET_INTEGER, - .arg1_type = ARG_PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON, + .arg1_type = ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID_SOCK_COMMON, .arg2_type = ARG_PTR_TO_MEM, .arg3_type = ARG_CONST_SIZE, .arg4_type = ARG_PTR_TO_MEM, @@ -6153,7 +6153,7 @@ BPF_CALL_5(bpf_tcp_gen_syncookie, struct sock *, sk, void *, iph, u32, iph_len, u32 cookie; u16 mss; - if (unlikely(th_len < sizeof(*th) || th_len != th->doff * 4)) + if (unlikely(!sk || th_len < sizeof(*th) || th_len != th->doff * 4)) return -EINVAL; if (sk->sk_protocol != IPPROTO_TCP || sk->sk_state != TCP_LISTEN) @@ -6208,7 +6208,7 @@ static const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_tcp_gen_syncookie_proto = { .gpl_only = true, /* __cookie_v*_init_sequence() is GPL */ .pkt_access = true, .ret_type = RET_INTEGER, - .arg1_type = ARG_PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON, + .arg1_type = ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID_SOCK_COMMON, .arg2_type = ARG_PTR_TO_MEM, .arg3_type = ARG_CONST_SIZE, .arg4_type = ARG_PTR_TO_MEM, diff --git a/tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h b/tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h index 0ec6dbeb17a5..69b9e30375bc 100644 --- a/tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h +++ b/tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h @@ -2692,7 +2692,7 @@ union bpf_attr { * result is from *reuse*\ **->socks**\ [] using the hash of the * tuple. * - * long bpf_tcp_check_syncookie(struct bpf_sock *sk, void *iph, u32 iph_len, struct tcphdr *th, u32 th_len) + * long bpf_tcp_check_syncookie(void *sk, void *iph, u32 iph_len, struct tcphdr *th, u32 th_len) * Description * Check whether *iph* and *th* contain a valid SYN cookie ACK for * the listening socket in *sk*. @@ -2878,7 +2878,7 @@ union bpf_attr { * * **-EAGAIN** if bpf program can try again. * - * s64 bpf_tcp_gen_syncookie(struct bpf_sock *sk, void *iph, u32 iph_len, struct tcphdr *th, u32 th_len) + * s64 bpf_tcp_gen_syncookie(void *sk, void *iph, u32 iph_len, struct tcphdr *th, u32 th_len) * Description * Try to issue a SYN cookie for the packet with corresponding * IP/TCP headers, *iph* and *th*, on the listening socket in *sk*. |