diff options
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/Kconfig | 1 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/include/asm/switch_to.h | 28 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/traps.c | 61 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/mm/tlb.c | 15 |
4 files changed, 104 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig index c580d8c33562..21a6d0ec5983 100644 --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig @@ -94,6 +94,7 @@ config X86 select HAVE_ARCH_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE select HAVE_ARCH_WITHIN_STACK_FRAMES select HAVE_EBPF_JIT if X86_64 + select HAVE_ARCH_VMAP_STACK if X86_64 select HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR select HAVE_CMPXCHG_DOUBLE select HAVE_CMPXCHG_LOCAL diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/switch_to.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/switch_to.h index 8f321a1b03a1..14e4b20f0aaf 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/switch_to.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/switch_to.h @@ -8,6 +8,28 @@ struct tss_struct; void __switch_to_xtra(struct task_struct *prev_p, struct task_struct *next_p, struct tss_struct *tss); +/* This runs runs on the previous thread's stack. */ +static inline void prepare_switch_to(struct task_struct *prev, + struct task_struct *next) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_VMAP_STACK + /* + * If we switch to a stack that has a top-level paging entry + * that is not present in the current mm, the resulting #PF will + * will be promoted to a double-fault and we'll panic. Probe + * the new stack now so that vmalloc_fault can fix up the page + * tables if needed. This can only happen if we use a stack + * in vmap space. + * + * We assume that the stack is aligned so that it never spans + * more than one top-level paging entry. + * + * To minimize cache pollution, just follow the stack pointer. + */ + READ_ONCE(*(unsigned char *)next->thread.sp); +#endif +} + #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 #ifdef CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR @@ -39,6 +61,8 @@ do { \ */ \ unsigned long ebx, ecx, edx, esi, edi; \ \ + prepare_switch_to(prev, next); \ + \ asm volatile("pushl %%ebp\n\t" /* save EBP */ \ "movl %%esp,%[prev_sp]\n\t" /* save ESP */ \ "movl %[next_sp],%%esp\n\t" /* restore ESP */ \ @@ -103,7 +127,9 @@ do { \ * clean in kernel mode, with the possible exception of IOPL. Kernel IOPL * has no effect. */ -#define switch_to(prev, next, last) \ +#define switch_to(prev, next, last) \ + prepare_switch_to(prev, next); \ + \ asm volatile(SAVE_CONTEXT \ "movq %%rsp,%P[threadrsp](%[prev])\n\t" /* save RSP */ \ "movq %P[threadrsp](%[next]),%%rsp\n\t" /* restore RSP */ \ diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c index b70ca12dd389..907b4e4aeb5e 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c @@ -292,12 +292,30 @@ DO_ERROR(X86_TRAP_NP, SIGBUS, "segment not present", segment_not_present) DO_ERROR(X86_TRAP_SS, SIGBUS, "stack segment", stack_segment) DO_ERROR(X86_TRAP_AC, SIGBUS, "alignment check", alignment_check) +#ifdef CONFIG_VMAP_STACK +static void __noreturn handle_stack_overflow(const char *message, + struct pt_regs *regs, + unsigned long fault_address) +{ + printk(KERN_EMERG "BUG: stack guard page was hit at %p (stack is %p..%p)\n", + (void *)fault_address, current->stack, + (char *)current->stack + THREAD_SIZE - 1); + die(message, regs, 0); + + /* Be absolutely certain we don't return. */ + panic(message); +} +#endif + #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 /* Runs on IST stack */ dotraplinkage void do_double_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code) { static const char str[] = "double fault"; struct task_struct *tsk = current; +#ifdef CONFIG_VMAP_STACK + unsigned long cr2; +#endif #ifdef CONFIG_X86_ESPFIX64 extern unsigned char native_irq_return_iret[]; @@ -332,6 +350,49 @@ dotraplinkage void do_double_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code) tsk->thread.error_code = error_code; tsk->thread.trap_nr = X86_TRAP_DF; +#ifdef CONFIG_VMAP_STACK + /* + * If we overflow the stack into a guard page, the CPU will fail + * to deliver #PF and will send #DF instead. Similarly, if we + * take any non-IST exception while too close to the bottom of + * the stack, the processor will get a page fault while + * delivering the exception and will generate a double fault. + * + * According to the SDM (footnote in 6.15 under "Interrupt 14 - + * Page-Fault Exception (#PF): + * + * Processors update CR2 whenever a page fault is detected. If a + * second page fault occurs while an earlier page fault is being + * deliv- ered, the faulting linear address of the second fault will + * overwrite the contents of CR2 (replacing the previous + * address). These updates to CR2 occur even if the page fault + * results in a double fault or occurs during the delivery of a + * double fault. + * + * The logic below has a small possibility of incorrectly diagnosing + * some errors as stack overflows. For example, if the IDT or GDT + * gets corrupted such that #GP delivery fails due to a bad descriptor + * causing #GP and we hit this condition while CR2 coincidentally + * points to the stack guard page, we'll think we overflowed the + * stack. Given that we're going to panic one way or another + * if this happens, this isn't necessarily worth fixing. + * + * If necessary, we could improve the test by only diagnosing + * a stack overflow if the saved RSP points within 47 bytes of + * the bottom of the stack: if RSP == tsk_stack + 48 and we + * take an exception, the stack is already aligned and there + * will be enough room SS, RSP, RFLAGS, CS, RIP, and a + * possible error code, so a stack overflow would *not* double + * fault. With any less space left, exception delivery could + * fail, and, as a practical matter, we've overflowed the + * stack even if the actual trigger for the double fault was + * something else. + */ + cr2 = read_cr2(); + if ((unsigned long)task_stack_page(tsk) - 1 - cr2 < PAGE_SIZE) + handle_stack_overflow("kernel stack overflow (double-fault)", regs, cr2); +#endif + #ifdef CONFIG_DOUBLEFAULT df_debug(regs, error_code); #endif diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c b/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c index 4dbe65622810..a7655f6caf7d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c @@ -77,10 +77,25 @@ void switch_mm_irqs_off(struct mm_struct *prev, struct mm_struct *next, unsigned cpu = smp_processor_id(); if (likely(prev != next)) { + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_VMAP_STACK)) { + /* + * If our current stack is in vmalloc space and isn't + * mapped in the new pgd, we'll double-fault. Forcibly + * map it. + */ + unsigned int stack_pgd_index = pgd_index(current_stack_pointer()); + + pgd_t *pgd = next->pgd + stack_pgd_index; + + if (unlikely(pgd_none(*pgd))) + set_pgd(pgd, init_mm.pgd[stack_pgd_index]); + } + #ifdef CONFIG_SMP this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.state, TLBSTATE_OK); this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.active_mm, next); #endif + cpumask_set_cpu(cpu, mm_cpumask(next)); /* |