x86/srso: Add a Speculative RAS Overflow mitigation

Upstream commit: fb3bd914b3ec28f5fb697ac55c4846ac2d542855

Add a mitigation for the speculative return address stack overflow
vulnerability found on AMD processors.

The mitigation works by ensuring all RET instructions speculate to
a controlled location, similar to how speculation is controlled in the
retpoline sequence.  To accomplish this, the __x86_return_thunk forces
the CPU to mispredict every function return using a 'safe return'
sequence.

To ensure the safety of this mitigation, the kernel must ensure that the
safe return sequence is itself free from attacker interference.  In Zen3
and Zen4, this is accomplished by creating a BTB alias between the
untraining function srso_untrain_ret_alias() and the safe return
function srso_safe_ret_alias() which results in evicting a potentially
poisoned BTB entry and using that safe one for all function returns.

In older Zen1 and Zen2, this is accomplished using a reinterpretation
technique similar to Retbleed one: srso_untrain_ret() and
srso_safe_ret().

Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

1 files changed, 4 insertions, 1 deletions

diff --git a/tools/objtool/arch/x86/decode.c b/tools/objtool/arch/x86/decode.c
index f62db0e006e9..cf8ea3594125 100644
--- a/tools/objtool/arch/x86/decode.c
+++ b/tools/objtool/arch/x86/decode.c
@@ -725,5 +725,8 @@ bool arch_is_retpoline(struct symbol *sym)
 
 bool arch_is_rethunk(struct symbol *sym)
 {
-	return !strcmp(sym->name, "__x86_return_thunk");
+	return !strcmp(sym->name, "__x86_return_thunk") ||
+	       !strcmp(sym->name, "srso_untrain_ret") ||
+	       !strcmp(sym->name, "srso_safe_ret") ||
+	       !strcmp(sym->name, "__ret");
 }