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authorJuergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>2025-10-14 14:28:15 +0300
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2026-03-25 13:03:25 +0300
commit65dcb23973e0464ef3502959bdff87ca483e4914 (patch)
treef423d23fd7a1dafb16a0fa4b124618ca807d94ae /tools/perf/scripts/python/stackcollapse.py
parent87a803edb2ded911cb587c53bff179d2a2ed2a28 (diff)
downloadlinux-65dcb23973e0464ef3502959bdff87ca483e4914.tar.xz
xen/privcmd: add boot control for restricted usage in domU
commit 1613462be621ad5103ec338a7b0ca0746ec4e5f1 upstream. When running in an unprivileged domU under Xen, the privcmd driver is restricted to allow only hypercalls against a target domain, for which the current domU is acting as a device model. Add a boot parameter "unrestricted" to allow all hypercalls (the hypervisor will still refuse destructive hypercalls affecting other guests). Make this new parameter effective only in case the domU wasn't started using secure boot, as otherwise hypercalls targeting the domU itself might result in violating the secure boot functionality. This is achieved by adding another lockdown reason, which can be tested to not being set when applying the "unrestricted" option. This is part of XSA-482 Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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